The following information on the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was taken from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Intelligence Resource Program Website that was last updated on 24 May 1998:

The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI] was founded in 1948 by a British army officer, Maj Gen R Cawthome, then Deputy Chief of Staff in Pakistan Army. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the president of Pakistan in the 1950s, expanded the role of ISI in safeguarding Pakistan's interests, monitoring opposition politicians, and sustaining military rule in Pakistan.

The ISI is tasked with collection of foreign and domestic intelligence; co-ordination of intelligence functions of the three military services; surveillance over its cadre, foreigners, the media, politically active segments of Pakistani society, diplomats of other countries accredited to Pakistan and Pakistani diplomats serving outside the country; the interception and monitoring of communications; and the conduct of covert offensive operations.

The ISI has become a state within a state, answerable neither to the leadership of the army, nor to the President or the Prime Minister. The result is there has been no real supervision of the ISI, and corruption, narcotics, and big money have all come into play, further complicating the political scenario. Drug money is used by ISI to finance not only the Afghanistan war, but also the proxy war against India in Punjab and Kashmir.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee deals with all problems bearing on the military aspects of state security and is charged with integrating and coordinating the three services. Affiliated with the committee are the offices of the engineer in chief, the director general of medical service, the Director of Inter-Services Public Relations, and the Director of Inter-Services Intelligence.

Staffed by hundreds of civilian and military officers, and thousands of other workers, the agency's headquarters is located in Islamabad. The ISI reportedly has a total of about 10,000 officers and staff members, a number which does not include informants and assets. It is reportedly organized into between six and eight divisions:

Joint Intelligence X (JIX) serves as the secretariat which co-ordinates and provides administrative support to the other ISI wings and field organisations. It also prepares intelligence estimates and threat assessments.

The Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), responsible for political intelligence, was the most powerful component of the organisation during the late 1980s. The JIB consists of three subsections, with one subsection devoted to operations against India.

The Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau (JCIB) is responsible for field surveillance of Pakistani diplomats stationed abroad, as well as for conducting intelligence operations in the Middle East, South Asia, China, Afghanistan and the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union.

Joint Intelligence / North (JIN) is responsible for Jammu and Kashmir operations, including infiltration, exfilteration, propaganda and other clandestine operations.

Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM) conducts espionage in foreign countries, including offensive intelligence operations.

The Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau (JSIB), which includes Deputy Directors for Wireless, Monitoring and Photos, operates a chain of signals intelligence collection stations along the border with India, and provide communication support to militants operating in Kashmir.

Joint Intelligence Technical

In addition to these main elements, ISI also includes a separate explosives section and a chemical warfare section. Published reports provide contradictory indications as to the relative size of these organizational elements, suggesting that either JIX is the largest, or that the Joint Intelligence Bureau is the largest with some sixty percent of the total staff. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) is the ISI's main international financial vehicle.

The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence is of particular importance at the joint services level. The directorate's importance derives from the fact that the agency is charged with managing covert operations outside of Pakistan -- whether in Afghanistan, Kashmir, or farther afield. The ISI supplies weapons, training, advice and planning assistance to terrorists in Punjab and Kashmir, as well as the separatist movements in the Northeast frontier areas of India.

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The ISI continues to actively participate in Afghan Civil War, supporting the Talibaan in their fight against the Rabbani government.

ISI is currently engaged in covertly supporting the Kashmiri Mujahideen in their fight against the Indian authorities in Kashmir. ... According to a report compiled by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of India in 1995, ISI spent about Rs 2.4 crore [Rs. 24 million] per month to sponsor its activities in Jammu and Kashmir. Although all groups reportedly receive arms and training from Pakistan, the pro-Pakistani groups are reputed to be favored by the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence. ...

ISI is reported to operate training camps near the border of Bangladesh where members of separatist groups of the northeastern states, known as the "United Liberation Front Of Seven Sisters" [ULFOSS] are trained with military equipment and terrorist activities. These groups include the National Security Council of Nagaland [NSCN], People's Liberation Army [PLA], United Liberation Front of Assam [ULFA], and North East Students Organization [NESO]. ISI is said to have intensified its activities in the southern Indian States of Hyderabad, Bangalore, Cochin, Kojhikode, Bhatkal, and Gulbarga. In Andhra Pradesh the Ittehadul Musalmeen and the Hijbul Mujahideen are claimed to be involved in subversive activities promoted by ISI. And Koyalapattinam, a village in Tamil Nadu, is said to be the common center of operations of ISI and the Liberation Tigers.

In a 25 May 1999 article entitled The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, Maj Gen Ashok Krishna AVSM (Retd.), Deputy Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in Delhi, stated that:

When infiltration occurs in Jammu and Kashmir [J &K], or bomb blasts are reported in Delhi, Mumbai or Coimbatore, or any where else in India , government organisations and the media point a finger of suspicion at Pakistan's ISI. India has indeed been the prime target of this organisation's external activities. It is, therefore, essential to comprehend the aims and manner of functioning of the ISI to see how it threatens the security of India.

The ISI is headed by a Director General [DG] of the rank of Lt Gen/Maj Gen; he has hitherto been a serving officer seconded from the Army. The ISI coordinates the functioning of the intelligence directorates of the armed forces and is the sole organisation for collection of military and external intelligence. The DG, although under the Ministry of Defence, is also the adviser to the Prime Minister on intelligence matters. The DG being the Army Chief's man only disseminates what the Army Chief wants the politicians to know. The Army Chief draws his power from the Army, which has the final say in Pakistan on matters of national security; any political interference or opposition is not countenanced. The plans of the ISI are really the plans of the Pak Army. The ISI, is therefore, an organ of the Army, not an organ of the state.

The ISI combines in itself all the functions carried out in India by the Research and Analysis Wing, the Intelligence Bureau, the Special Intelligence Bureau, the Central Bureau for Investigation, the various specialist agencies under the Home Ministry, the Intelligence Directorates of the armed forces and paramilitary forces, and the Joint Intelligence Committee.

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The ISI spends nearly Rs 100 crores [Rs. 1 billion] every year to run its proxy war in J & K. Each militant is paid between Rs 2000 to Rs 3000 per month depending upon his experience and status in the terrorist outfit. In case a militant dies in action, his or her family gets a compensation ranging from Rs 20,000 to Rs 30,000. ISI agents active in Kashmir receive between Rs 50,000 to Rs one lakh [100,000] a month as emoluments. They are accorded five star facilities during their visits to Rawalpindi. Some Islamic organisations are also funding the militants in J & K.

About 30 militant training camps are running in Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir [POK]. These camps are controlled from headquarters in Muzaffarabad and Kotli.

The ISI is assisted in its activities by the Harkat-ul-Ansar [HUA] -a group declared to be terrorist by the US State Department in 1997. The HUA has close links with Osama bin Laden, the dissident Saudi millionaire blamed for the bombing of two US embassies in Africa in 1998. The HUA's two militias - Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the more extreme Harkat-ul-Jehad - provide shelter, food and clothing for the trainees at these camps, while the ISI provides weapons, ammunition and transport, along with specialist instructors for training. The ISI has been training Afghan Mujahideen, Kashmiris and Punjabis from Pakistan at these camps. ...

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Elsewhere in India, the ISI offers monetary rewards, sex, and other attractions to cultivate agents. One of their tactics is to form cells near military cantonments. Using its old contacts in Bangladesh, reportedly with some co-operation from the Bangladesh Intelligence services, the ISI has activated its networks, and established contact with every insurgent group in the North Eastern region and in Assam. It is also using Nepal for opening new areas to infiltrate and exfiltrate agents and material into Eastern India.

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The information that follows pertains to the activities of the ISI between 1991 and 1994 and supplements that provided in the two passages above.

By 1992 the ISI was operating 13 permanent, 18 temporary and 8 joint training camps for Kashmiri youth recruits, hosting approximately 3,700 Kashmiri militants by the summer of 1992 (IDSA n.d.). Camp graduates were reportedly dispatched regularly to Kashmir, Bosnia, Palestine and some African countries on jihad campaigns (ibid.).

On the Afghan front, between 1992 and 1995 the ISI continued to back Gulbuddin Hekmatyr and his Pashtun Hizb-i-Islami against the Kabul regime of Burhanuddin Rabbani in the Afghan civil war (Jane's Intelligence Review Oct. 1999, 32). Thus the ISI was continuing its involvement in Afghanistan that had, from 1980-91, been a coordination of a "massive programme of Western support for the anti-Soviet mujahideen" (ibid.).

Additional and/or corroborating information on the ISI could not be found among the sources consulted within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please find below the list of additional sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Intelligence Resource Program. Updated 24 May 1998. Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI]. http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/isi/index.html [Accessed 19 Nov. 1999]

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. n.d. P.B. Sinha. Pakistan-The Chief Patron-Promoter of Islamic Militancy and Terrorism. http://www.idsa-india.org/an-oct.5.htm [Accessed 19 Nov. 1999]

Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), Delhi. 25 May 1999. Maj Gen Ashok Krishna, AVSM (Retd), Deputy Director, IPCS. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/191-ip-krishna.htm [Accessed 22 Nov. 1999]

Jane's Intelligence Review [Surrey]. October 1999. Anthony Davis. "Pakistan's 'War by Proxy' in Afghanistan Loses its Deniability."

Amnesty International Report. Yearly. 1992, 1994.

Asian Survey [Berkeley, Calif.]. Monthly. January 1991-December 1994.

Critique: Review of the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Yearly. July 1992, July 1993, July 1994.

Current History [Philadelphia]. Monthly. January 1992-December 1994.

Herald [Karachi]. Monthly. January-February 1994, April 1994, June 1994, November-December 1994.

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), Lahore. State of Human Rights in Pakistan. Yearly. 1992, 1993, 1994.

Human Rights Watch World Report. Yearly. December 1993, December 1994.
INS Resource Information Center, Washington, DC. November 1993.

Profile Series: Pakistan.

Jane's Intelligence Review [Surrey]. Monthly. December 1995-October 1999.

Jane's Intelligence Review: Special Report [Surrey]. Nos. 8-19.
Jilani, Hina. 1998.

Human Rights and Democratic Development in Pakistan.

Police Studies: The International Review of Police Development [Yorkshire]. Quarterly. 1996.

Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management [Bradford]. Quarterly. 1997-1999.
Refugees, Immigration and Asylum Section (RIAS), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia. October 1993.

Refugee Determination: Country Profile: Pakistan.

Resource Centre. "Pakistan" country file. January 1994-December 1994.

Electronic sources: various Internet sites, IRB Databases.