Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1990
ZAIRE
President Mobutu Sese Seko has for 25 years ruled Zaire, a
huge, poor country with widely disparate ethnic, cultural, and
linguistic groups, whose transition to independence in 1960
was marked by extensive civil strife. The President has the
constitutional power to promulgate laws by decree and over the
years has molded a highly personalized and centralized party/
government system. From 1974 until mid-1990, the Popular
Movement of the Revolution (MPR) was the sole legal party, and
all government institutions were considered its organs.
Faced with growing domestic criticism of one-party rule and
influenced by political liberalization in other parts of the
world. President Mobutu began to introduce changes in this
structure in 1990. After extensive consultations, he
announced on April 24 that a three-party political system
would replace the one-party state and that government
institutions, formerly organs of the MPR, would be
"revitalized." He also announced that a transitional
government would be named and the existing constitution
amended until an entirely new constitution could be drafted
within a year. Resigning as president of the MPR, he
stipulated that he would remain Chief of State and national
arbiter and stressed that the Chief of State "cannot undergo
criticism from or be under the control of" Parliament. At a
press conference the same day, Mobutu added that, as Chief of
State, he would retain powers over defense, territorial
security, and foreign affairs in a "semipresidential" system
and called for 1991 elections in five stages.
On May 3, he amended his proposals by announcing a two-phase
transition through early 1992, including adoption of a new
constitution in the first phase and elections in the second.
He clarified, however, that public political meetings would
not be permitted until party legislation had been adopted and
aspiring parties registered under its terms.. On June 30,
Mobutu elaborated further on the transition, including on
plans to choose the three parties to be permitted in a January
1991 primary election. By early July, the Constitution had
been amended to allow three parties and to formalize the
separation of the Government from the MPR, and legislation
governing the registration and conduct of political parties
had been adopted by the Parliament. On October 6, however, it
was announced that a full multiparty system would be allowed,
thus eliminating the three-party limit and the need for a
party primary. Once registered, parties are to be given
access to official media. A second revision of the
Constitution and amendment of the party law to allow multiple
parties was completed by mid-December. Since April 24, more
than 100 political groups have formed and sought legalization
to compete in future elections. At the end of 1990, it
remained unclear when aspiring parties would be recognized
under the newly amended party legislation. The President
repeatedly rejected widespread demands for a national
conference of Zaire's political, economic, religious,
military, labor, and other leadership, designed to determine
the country's political future.
Zaire has several security agencies, with overlapping powers
and jurisdictions, all in practice directly responsible to the
President. These include: the National Service for
Intelligence and Protection (SNIP), which was established in
September by combining the former National Documentation
Agency (A.N.D.) and the National Immigration Agency (A.N. I.);
the Military Intelligence Security Service (SARM); and the
Civil Guard. The gendarmerie and its special investigation
and surveillance brigade are part of the armed forces but play
a prominent role in the investigation of crimes. All these
organs, and the Special Presidential Division (DSP), have at
times been used to check internal dissent and have been
responsible for arbitrary harassment, physical mistreatment,
and unauthorized detention of ordinary citizens as well as
opposition activists. The President's National Security
Council in May issued guidelines to the security forces to
respect human rights and in August gave SNIP, now the primary
internal intelligence service, the mission of safeguarding
citizen rights.
Zaire has a mixed economy involving an active private sector
and an extensive number of state enterprises, e.g., in
mining. Export earnings are concentrated in primary products
and thus are vulnerable to changes in world market prices.
About 70 percent of the population is rural and engaged in
subsistence agriculture. Per capita income is approximately
$180 per year and is declining further as the population
increases at 3 percent per year, while economic growth is
stagnant. Zaire's communications and transportation
infrastructure are greatly eroded, making communications
between institutions of government in the capital and outlying
regions exceedingly difficult. In early 1990, the Government
abandoned the structural adjustment program sponsored by the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The budget
deficit soared, causing an increase in the rate of inflation
(expected to be about 240 percent for 1990) and an
acceleration in the depreciation of the currency. The
deterioration in the economy was an important stimulant to
public dissatisfaction and political reform.
Press freedom improved significantly in 1990, with several
newspapers severely criticizing the President and his
policies; aspiring political parties mushroomed and a leading
opposition figure was released from house arrest; and the
ability of workers to form unions independent of the governing
party was enhanced. Nevertheless, President Mobutu retains
dominant political power, and he made it clear throughout the
year that he would dictate the pace and shape of the
transition process. The political opposition was still
subject to repression, as shown by instances of security force
disruption of public political meetings, and it is not clear
that the political system will be liberalized sufficiently to
permit citizens to change their government through democratic
means. Citizens also remained subject to arbitrary and
prolonged detention and physical mistreatment; extrajudicial
killings; and continuing abridgment of freedom of
association. In May the security forces assaulted students at
the University of Lubumbashi, with consequent loss of life and
injuries. Subsequent government investigations failed to
clarify the number of students killed or to pinpoint
responsibility fully, although a number of regional officials
have been charged in the case but not yet tried. As in
previous years, those who committed human rights abuses were
seldom brought to justice; in some cases government
authorities actively obstructed efforts to identify and punish
guilty parties.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings
The security forces continued to use excessive force in
repressing peaceful political opposition, and there were
reported incidents of extrajudicial killings in 1990 as a
result.
On the night of May 11-12, after the central electric power
had been turned off at the University of Lubumbashi, armed,
masked commandos entered the darkened campus and conducted a
systematic attack on students in crowded dormitories. (The
Government's original claim that the incident was only a fight
among students was abandoned as more information came to
light.) The assault followed a May 9 incident in which
dissident students had harassed a close female relative of
Civil Guard Commander Baramoto, and a student "court" had
condemned three other Ngbandi-tribe student informers to death
(see Section 5). Parliament, the regional assembly, and the
Lubumbashi attorney general's office tried to conduct
inquiries, but, in the face of executive branch obstruction
and the dispersal of many witnesses with the closing of the
University, were unable to ascertain many details of the
attack, including the casualty toll or the full chain of
responsibility. Casualty estimates ranged from the
Government's eventual confirmation of one death and several
injuries through that of 12 deaths by the Belgian Government
and up to 40 deaths by domestic human rights groups, to claims
of several hundred deaths and correspondingly higher numbers
of injuries in early press reports. Given the circumstances
of the attack, deaths and injuries could have been higher than
the official estimate, but with the passage of time, it is
unlikely that the exact extent of loss of life can be
determined.
The June parliamentary inquiry determined that the Shaba
provincial governor, as well as the regional agents of the
then A.N.D. and A.N. I., local army officials, the rector of
the University and an executive of the urban electric company,
had organized the assault. Among several questions which the
parliamentarians admitted they were unable to resolve and
which merited further investigation, were the number of
casualties, the identity of the commandos who conducted the
attack, and whether there was any involvement by national
security, military, or political leaders. The inquiry was
obstructed at several stages. Vice Prime Minister for
Territorial Administration Engulu blocked consideration of a
separate report by the Shaba regional assembly. The report
and documentation were later seized at the instance of the
President of the regional assembly, (In December the report
was leaked to a local newspaper and published.) In July the
Lubumbashi public prosecutor arrested a local human rights
leader who was conducting an inquiry. President Mobutu and
the transition Government have rejected all further calls for
an independent commission of inquiry. The Government promised
to prosecute those whom the parliamentary inquiry identified
as responsible for the attack, but the pace and scope of the
investigation at the end of 1990 cast serious doubt on the
good faith of the effort.
Various international hxunan rights groups, including the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, which visited Zaire in
1989 and 1990, report that Zairian soldiers committed a number
of extrajudicial killings and other abuses in the Kivu region
in 1989. These reported abuses took place in the context of
local disputes over land, taxes and the role of traditional
chiefs.
b. Disappearance
After the May Lubumbashi assault there were reports of
unresolved disappearances of students. Some of those
originally reported missing eventually appeared in Kinshasa,
at their homes, or in nearby countries to which they had
fled. However, none of the investigations has been able to
determine whether any remain missing, or if so, how many.
Several students at the University of Kinshasa, allegedly
involved in demonstrations in late April and early May, were
also reported missing. Human rights groups and the Ministry
(formerly Department) of Citizens' Rights and Liberties (MDLC)
noted the July 28 disappearance of two civil servant activists
in Bandundu: Musinga Madeya and Bwanza (first name unknown).
The two were reportedly arrested by the National Immigration
Agency and transferred to Kinshasa. Their whereabouts are
unknown.
An alleged 1988 disappearance was noted by internal and
foreign human rights groups in 1990. Miss Kamunga Mwimpe was
allegedly seized at the instigation of former Minister of
Women's Affairs, Mayuma Kala. The young woman's disappearance
was reportedly a crime of passion, but observers have noted
irregularities in the Ministry of Justice investigation, which
at year's end appeared to have stalled.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The Government has stated that torture is contrary to the law
and against official policy, but in practice police and
soldiers continued to abuse their authority in 1990,
mistreating and severely beating prisoners. There were
reports, for instance, of serious security force maltreatment
of leaders of some wildcat strikes. Prisoners held on
criminal charges are particularly subject to abuse and
private citizens continue to be beaten and robbed by security
officials. As far as is known, there were no instances of
legal action against members of security services for inhuman
treatment or torture, despite a 1989 ordinance requiring such
action.
Credible allegations of security force violence against female
demonstrators were made on several occasions in 1990. An
Amnesty International (AI) update noted that security forces
raped several women after breaking up a Union for Democracy
and Social Progress (UDPS) meeting in July. The Belgian press
reported in July that security forces had raped several
nursing students at the University of Kinshasa, though no
evidence or confirmation has come to light in Zaire.
A few days after the President's April 24 announcements of
political changes, SARM, a government security force, wounded
several people in an attack on members of the UDPS, who were
meeting at the home of Etienne Tshisekedi, a former cabinet
minister and UDPS leader, just freed from house arrest. In a
May 3 address, Mobutu said that aspiring parties could not
hold public meetings until they were recognized under
registration criteria yet to be determined. Another UDPS
meeting was violently suppressed on November 4, and several
people were injured.
Prison conditions are harsh, and hunger and disease remained
common. There were unconfirmed reports that a number of
prisoners died in Makala prison due to hunger or
hunger- induced illnesses. Prison reform efforts, begun in
1989, slowed in 1990, in part due to financial problems.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued
to visit places of detention and provided limited medical
supplies and clothing to prisoners in Zaire. Its regular
prison visits allow the ICRC to ascertain detention
conditions. The prison controlled by the Special Presidential
Division (DSP) is not subject to scrutiny by internal or
international observers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The National Security Council in May issued guidelines for
assuring greater respect for human rights, and the primary
internal intelligence service, (SNIP), in August was given the
mission of safeguarding citizen rights. The security
services, however, appear not to have ceased the practice of
holding detainees incommunicado for varying lengths of time.
By law, those arrested by a judicial police officer must be
brought before a magistrate within 48 hours for an initial
hearing. If there are sufficient grounds for arrest, the
magistrate may order bail or preventive detention for up to 15
days. Preventive detention judgments must be reviewed by a
three-magistrate body within 5 days. In practice, arbitrary
arrest and long detention without charges are common. Some
suspects are arrested and held without a hearing, often
incommunicado. Judicial personnel are supposed to visit
prisons and detention centers to assure that detainees appear
before a magistrate within the required 48 hours, but such
visits often do not occur, owing, in part, to a lack of
personnel and communication and transportation problems.
Most persons who have been detained for political reasons have
been held by nonjudicial means ranging from administrative
detention and house arrest to internal exile and restricted
movement. They have rarely been brought to trial. The
Government restricts some dissidents to villages of origin or
other locations in the interior, one example being General
Mukobo Mudende, a former army chief of staff, who has been
under a banishment order in Isangi since 1987. There were no
reported examples of banishment to the interior in 1990.
Following the April 24 announcement, the Government ended the
unacknowledged house arrest of UDPS leader Etienne Tshisekedi.
The number of political detainees at the end of 1990 was
unknown. Since many arrests are short term, it is impossible
to give a figure for those who may be in custody at any one
time for what could be defined as political offenses.
However, there were many arbitrary arrests in 1990, including
of labor leaders, teachers, civil servants, and medical
workers, often in connection with wildcat strikes. The
authorities arrested Reverend Brother Digekisa Piluka for
alleged participation in student activity at Lumbumbushi
University, and he remained in detention without charge at the
end of 1990. Others arrested on political grounds included
members of the Congolese National Movement /Lumbumba (MNC/L),
Ekongo Odimba Pual, Otete Mamba Jean-Marie, and Otete Gaston,
who have all been released. A labor activist, Muntumoy
Tamundel Ngamakam, was arrested for distributing tracts
calling for a December 8 general strike. Pastor Dibinga wa
Saidi, a former UDPS militant returned home from Boston, was
arrested in December while demonstrating outside the Central
Post Office in Kinshasa and released after several days'
detention. There were also reports of the detention of
military officers, including Colonel Lenga-Lenga, Colonel
Doctor Kabanda Kurhenga, and Lt . Colonel Doctor Bokuli.
A number of opponents of the Government returned in 1990,
notably UDPS coleader Marcel Lihau, Congolese National
Liberation Front (FLNC) chairman Nathaniel Mbumba, MNC/L
activist Mende Lambert, and others. Other dissidents,
however, left the country for fear of arrest or harassment,
including former Minister of Education and human rights
activist Ndjelo-Empenge . Kanyonga Joseph Emmanuel, who had
returned to Zaire from exile in 1989 to organize for the
Action Movement for Congo Renewal (MARC—a European-based
opposition party), has charged that authorities seized all his
belongings. Professor Mufuta Kabemba, dean of the Lubumbashi
faculty, and now in self-exile in Brussels, alleged that
security forces threatened him for joining other professors in
a statement condemning the May campus assault.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Judicial Council (formerly a super-ministry of justice
also charged with administration of the court and penal
systems) reverted to its earlier status as the Ministry of
Justice. Zaire's highly centralized Government continued to
exercise control—sometimes through the Ministry of Justice,
sometimes through direct intervention of the Presidency—over
a judiciary and legal system rooted in Belgian and customary
law. The system includes the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal
in each region, and the Court of State Security. Judges are
free of direct political interference in most cases, but in
sensitive or highly politicized cases they work under implicit
or explicit constraints imposed by executive or security
forces. Courts theoretically have increased independence
since the President's April 24 speech, but senior judges still
meet resistance from authorities as government policy
dictates. The transfer of the prosecutor general of
Lubumbashi in September hampered the judicial inquiry into the
May campus assault.
Inadequate judicial salaries are also a severe obstacle to
achieving an independent judiciary. Magistrates' salaries,
even after 1989 raises, are so low as to foster corruption.
Some magistrates and lawyers are frequently thought to accept
bribes, applying the full vigor of the law only to those who
cannot pay.
Defendants are entitled by the Constitution to a public trial
and defense counsel and, except in certain cases (see below),
have the right of appeal. They must be represented by
counsel, at public expense if necessary, in all trials before
the Supreme Court and before lesser courts (including courts
martial) in capital cases. Free legal aid may also be
provided in other cases by request of the court concerned.
Counsel in lesser civil and criminal cases is often not
available. With only 500 lawyers and some 600 magistrates in
all Zaire, many disputes in outlying areas are adjudicated by
local administrative officials or by traditional authorities.
State Security Court decisions on national security, armed
robbery, and smuggling cases are not subject to appeal, but
other criminal code procedural protections apply. In practice
many security-related cases never come to trial. There were
no such trials in 1990.
The exact number of political prisoners, as distinct from
political detainees, was unknown at the end of 1990, but
Amnesty International in its 1990 report covering 1989 stated
that at least 100 persons were imprisoned for their political
or religious beliefs. The Government claim.ed, implausibly,
that there were no political prisoners being held in Zaire.
The MDLC was created to redress citizen's rights when all
other legal avenues had failed. Critics have correctly
pointed out that the Ministry, in representing the Government
before the U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) , is involved
in a clear conflict of interest for an entity supposed to be
the citizens' watchdog against government abuses. The
Ministry deals primarily with conflicts over land titles,
labor disputes, execution of judgments, and inheritance; only
about a fourth of its cases have dealt with arbitrary arrests,
prolonged detentions, illegal seizures, and security force
abuses. It has achieved only minimal results in such cases,
although it played a useful role in 1990 in monitoring arrests
of civil service strikers, in one case reporting on the
release of a key leader. In any case, the Ministry cannot
substitute for an independent and forceful judiciary.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.
Except when national security is threatened, the law requires
police to have a judicial warrant to search a home. In
practice, security forces often enter and search homes without
warrants. UDPS activist Lusanga Ngiele, in a letter to the
Minister for Territorial Security later printed in an American
monthly, complained that security agents had sacked his home
and those of fellow activists. Many Zairians believe security
services open mail and tap telephone conversations, although
evidence to confirm this has not come to light.
Abolition of the single-party system and of several
specialized ruling party organs on April 24 significantly
reduced the administrative apparatus which interfered on a
day-by-day basis with individual privacy. Two grating
long-time restrictions, part of the President's "Zairian
authenticity" policy, were abolished in 1990, namely
restrictions against neckties and European forms of address.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for the citizen's right to express
opinions and feelings freely but subordinates all rights to
"public order and good conduct." In 1990 citizens spoke more
openly than ever before in all forums.
The growing freedom of the press in Kinshasa was one of the
most notable human rights developments in 1990. While
A
radio and television (which reach much larger audiences,
especially in rural areas) remained tightly controlled, up to
a dozen new or newly aggressive newspapers openly report on
and often sharply criticize government policies. There was
unprecedented press criticism of the President's ruling style
and policies, and questioning of his commitment to democracy.
Several newspapers featured interviews with the opposition to
present dissident views, an effective technique for expanding
the limits of political debate. However, the growth in press
freedom has largely been limited to Kinshasa; press
distribution in the interior is almost totally lacking.
Moreover, despite President Mobutu's new tolerance of personal
criticism from the Kinshasa press, there were s'erious
incidents of harassment and intimidation of the press. On
August 28, armed commandos invaded the offices of the daily
newspaper Elima. The commandos' leader, Bolamba Mooga Ngungu,
self-styled head of the "young unconditional Mobutists,"
earlier had publicly threatened Elima 's editor, Essolomwa
Khoy, and claimed to have been acting on behalf of President
Mobutu. Security and police forces were slow to intervene to
stop the attack on the Elima offices, and Bolamba was later
released. Essolomwa was arrested on October 22, harshly
interrogated for over 4 hours, and held in detention for 2
days. Reportedly he was arrested for publishing articles
characterized as "injurious, defamatory, and leading to
indiscipline." An additional reason appeared to be related to
his refusal to attend a September meeting when President
Mobutu summoned editors to a press conference and a day of
study at which the rector of the Kinshasa journalism school
and a prominent jurist (and Mobutu's former chef de cabinet)
lectured on press responsibility and on the linkage of press
freedom to law and public order. Several editors in addition
to Essolomwa refused to attend; some labeled it an attempt to
temper press openness. There were allegations—some
proved—that some editors were bought off. Since the meeting,
some newspapers appear to have softened criticism of the
President.
State-owned radio and television have lagged behind the print
media. A glaring example was television news' nightly press
review, which utterly failed to reflect intensifying political
debate. Radio and televison workers asked for greater
freedom, as well as better working conditions and salaries,
but were obliged to follow government policy guidance. In May
a group of television journalists wrote a letter to the
Minister of Information complaining of both poor salaries and
the pace of democratization. The drafters of the letter were
later either fired or demoted to positions of minimal
responsibility. On October 6, Mobutu announced that
opposition parties could have (apparently commercial) access
to television and radio. Foreign journalists wishing to visit
Zaire must receive prior permission from the Ministry of
Information.
Academics and students were able to speak openly in pressing
for political reform, but the Government cracked down on
student demonstrations (see Section 2.b.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The year's most blatant suppression of peaceful assembly—and
there were many such instances—came just after the April 24
democratization speech. On April 30, 2 days after dispersing
a 300- to 500-person UDPS gathering with tear gas, agents of
the SARM under the personal command of its commander, General
Mahele, raided a former residence of UDPS leader Etienne
Tshisekedi during a ceremony in which the building was being
converted into party headquarters. The SARM sacked the house
and injured several persons, including Tshisekedi.
On May 3, President Mobutu specified that, despite his April
24 announcement of multiparty democracy, political groups
could not act as parties until legally authorized to do so.
Several actions were taken to enforce this. On August 9, the
Interior Ministry ordered regional governors to forbid
political meetings or demonstrations, and subsequently
governors prevented political activists from holding press
conferences. However, these restrictions do not apply in
practice to the former ruling party, the MPR.
In early May, security forces reportedly used excessive force
against students in Kinshasa, Kisangani, Mbanzangungu, and
Bukavu. The security forces also intervened against MNC/L
party demonstrators and against striking workers, including
Onatra Shipping Company workers. In the latter intervention
several workers were reported severely wounded. In August and
September, security forces fired in the air above labor union
and student demonstrators. Again in November, after the
Government had denied authorization, security forces broke up
a planned UDPS rally, severely injuring several people. In
December security forces harassed UDPS and Union of
Federalists and Independent Republicans (UFERI, former Foreign
Minister Nguz ' party) activists in Lubumbashi, and a squad of
armed men ransacked the home of Social Christian Democractic
Party (PDSC) leader Ileo.
In September the Foreign Ministry issued two separate
diplomatic notes attempting to restrict diplomats' contacts
with political groups.
c. Freedom of Religion
Religious freedom is recognized in the Constitution, but there
are significant restrictions on some groups. The population
is about 50 percent Catholic, 36 percent Protestant and
Kimbanguist (a Zairian Protestant sect), and 5 percent
Muslim. Indigenous beliefs and religious traditions are also
strong. Officially recognized religions are free to establish
places of worship and to train clergy, but the process to
become officially recognized is fairly restrictive. The
Jehovah's Witnesses and a number of other small religious
groups and sects, banned in 1986 on charges of subversive
activities or fraud, remained banned in 1990. Most recognized
churches have external ties, and expatriates are allowed to
proselytize. There is no legally favored church or religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
All citizens, refugees, and permanent residents must carry
identity cards, and police and soldiers often set up
checkpoints on major roads to inspect papers.
In principle any Zairian may obtain a passport and exit visa,
though in practice it is often difficult to do so. In 1990
the Foreign Ministry withdrew the diplomatic passports of
former foreign ministers and ambassadors. Some days later,
security officials stopped opposition presidential candidate
and former Foreign Minister Nguz a Karl-i-Bond as he was
attempting to leave the country at Kinshasa's airport and
confiscated both his diplomatic and civilian passports. The
passports were returned after domestic and international
criticism, and Nguz departed a week later.
In 1990 there were estimates of about 61,000 officially
registered Zairians living as refugees in neighboring
countries—a number that has remained fairly stable in recent
years. Between September 1989 and January 1990, some 2,800
Zairian refugees in Angola returned to Zaire as part of a
repatriation program sponsored by the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) . The repatriation program was ultimately
suspended due to a lack of security at the returnee site in
Angola.
Zaire provides safe haven to some 385,000 refugees, of whom
314,000 are Angolans. The latest arrivals, some 40,000
Sudanese who have taken refuge in the remote northeastern
corner of Zaire, arrived in March of this year. At year's
end, additional Sudanese were reported to be in the area, and
several thousand had already moved into the Central African
Republic. Refugees are generally allowed to pass freely into
Zaire, and the Government provides land for resettlement and
camps. Upon entry refugees are first processed by military
and state security officials, and some may be detained and
closely monitored on suspicion of illegal political activity.
The UNHCR and church-affiliated organizations provide them
food, housing, transportation, education, and medical care.
Forced repatriation is contrary to official government policy,
and as far as was known, there were no cases in 1990.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government »
Despite promises of political reform which, if fully
implemented, would create a more open and democratic system,
citizens still did not have the right in 1990 to change their
government through democratic means. Political power in Zaire
remains highly centralized and controlled by the President,
who, while normally consulting widely, makes all important
decisions. However, some changes took place. While the
President made it clear throughout the year that he would
remain firmly in control of the process of change and the
future government structure, opposition figures repeatedly
contested his decisions. As a result, he issued a series of
modifications.
President Mobutu first proposed in April a three-party
political system for Zaire, and then in October, responding to
public demands, approved a full multiparty format. According
to his various statements in 1990, the first priority in 1991
will be to draft a new constitution and then hold a referendum
on it; the timing of presidential and legislative elections
was not announced. Since April 24, more than 100 political
parties have been announced, including the MPR, the former
sole legal party, the long-time opposition party UDPS, the
PDSC, and UFERI . The revisions in the July party legislation
required by the October 6 decision not to limit party numbers
were approved in December; as of year's end the Government had
not yet announced which aspiring parties met the criteria for
registration. Public political meetings were only to be
permitted after parties had been registered, and government
forces used excessive force to break up any attempt of the new
political groupings to meet in public. At the same time, the
KPR continued to enjoy unacknowledged official backing,
including continued access to state funds and, in the
interior, to the use of publicly owned housing. Although the
Members of Parliament were all elected when the MPR was the
sole legal party, there have been some lively debates on key
political issues, and a growing minority is willing to vote
against government initiatives.
A major point of contention is the opposition's demand for
some form of national conference to determine the pace and
direction of democratization. President Mobutu has on several
occasions rejected such a conference.
In addition to the new political groupings, other elements of
society, including the major churches, pressed for political
reform during the year. Zaire's churches, both Catholic and
Protestant, took explicit stands on social reform and
development of democracy and also called for a national
conference. In March the Catholic bishops' conference
prepared a document for President Mobutu, which was leaked and
published in a Paris-based magazine, criticizing the
concentration of power and wealth and calling for a new
constitution. The bishops issued follow-up statements in June
and September criticizing the slow progress toward
democratization and called for greater efforts to inform rural
areas of the political changes taking place. The September
statement noted that, while the President had declared
democratization as an irreversible process, the climate of
intimidation continued.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In midyear several internal, independent human rights groups
began to operate, including the Zairian League of Human
Rights, the Voice of the Voiceless, and the review, Les Droits
de 1 'Homme (Human Rights), which has appeared occasionally.
They have reported aggressively on human rights violations,
including obstacles to democratization. These groups have
been permitted to operate without molestation despite their
publication of reports that were very critical of the
Government.
The Government has allowed the ICRC to maintain a permanent
office in Zaire since 1978, although at times its access to
prisons has been restricted. In January the Government
received the special rapporteur on torture of the UNHRC but it
consistently rejected an international commission to
investigate the Lubumbashi assault. On December 31, Mobutu
announced he would invite a representative of the UNHRC to
attend the trial of those charged in the Lubumbashi incident.
Such a visit, while useful, would not constitute a full
independent investigation of the incident.
In March representatives of the New York-based Lawyers'
Committee on Human Rights made a follow-up visit to Zaire. In
contrast to their reception during their previous visit in
August 1989, when they had come with official sanction, they
were not received at the MCRL nor, with the exception of a
senior aide at the Ministry of Justice, by other Zairian
officials. After a factfinding trip in the interior, they
returned to Kinshasa where, on March 15, they were assaulted
and robbed of a briefcase outside the capital's principal
hotel. The Lawyer's Committee believes the assault was a
political act designed to intimidate them, although the
Government rejected this charge. Subsequently, the Committee
released a highly critical report, entitled "Zaire:
Repression as Policy," cataloging a "systemic pattern of
(human rights) abuses."
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Zaire, with a population of over 33 million, contains several
hundred disparate ethnic groups. There are four official
indigenous languages, while French is the official language of
government and education. President Mobutu has made a
political point of naming ethnically diverse governments,
excluding no region from high office. Still, his home region
of Eqiiateur, and especially his own Ngbandi tribe, have
dominated the highest security, intelligence, and military
posts.
Custom, tradition, and existing law deny women social
equality, especially in rural areas. In addition to raising a
family, women work in the fields and sell food in the markets.
In the modern economy, women also face discrimination; they
hold less responsible and lower paying jobs and receive less
pay for similar work. The Government has been a force for
some change. For example, women can now legally own
property. The 1987 family code expressly allows women to
inherit their husband's estate and strengthens their right to
manage personal property and to obtain a property settlement
upon divorce. Still, the code requires married women to
obtain their husbands' permission for legal transactions such
as opening a bank account, accepting a job, obtaining a
passport, and renting or selling land.
A growing number of women work in the professions,
universities, and civil service, and women became politically
more active and vocal during 1990, addressing national
problems, including education and the health of children,
rather than primarily womens ' issues.
However, neither the Government nor women's groups have
addressed domestic violence as a public issue. Wife beating
occurs and may be widespread, but there are no studies or
statistical data available on the subject. The police rarely
intervene, and there are only a few court cases, usually
involving instances of rape. The press rarely mentions
domestic violence. Domestic violence is more likely to be
addressed by family or traditional tribal mechanisms. Female
circumcision is not generally practiced in Zaire, though
reports suggest it may exist among some groups in northern
areas
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Before April 24, the labor movement in Zaire was limited by
law to the National Union of Zairian Workers (UNTZa) , which
was an integral part of the then sole political party, the
MPR. In his April 24 democratization speech, President Mobutu
also declared he would allow union pluralism, but 8 months
later the Labor Ministry had not yet authorized unions other
than the UNTZa. Several days after the April 24 speech, the
UNTZa declared itself independent of the MPR. The
Secretary-General was later ousted and new UNTZa leaders were
chosen in September in a relatively free and fair election.
Since April, several worker groups have been organized and
have applied to the Minister of Labor for approval as legal
unions. Some of these groups, headed by former Secretaries
General of the UNTZa, represent an effort to reestablish
unions which had existed until the late 1960 's, before being
amalgamated into the UNTZa. Others, notably those of the
civil servants, teachers, and medical personnel, are new
unions. At the end of 1990, as organizational activities
proceeded, labor sought answers to such questions as which
unions will be legalized, to what extent will they be legally
empowered to collect dues, and whether the UNTZa would
continue to be favored by the authorities.
The right to strike is included in the present labor law, but
because the law establishes lengthy and mandatory arbitration
and appeal procedures, legal strikes have been rare. In 1990,
however, the advent of multiple de facto unions and a
deteriorating economy led to a number of illegal strikes by
both white-collar and blue-collar workers to press their
demands, but few received what they viewed as satisfactory
reponses . Civil servants returned to work in October after a
3-month strike and partial concessions by the Government. For
several weeks in September, the teachers' union complained
that the Ministry of Education declined to bargain on their
demands.
The Government used force to put down wildcat strikes, notably
in the case of ONATRA, the navigation company.
The UNTZa participates actively in the Organization of African
Trade Union Unity and maintains ties with a number of foreign
labor confederations. The new unions have not yet been able
to establish, or to exploit openly, foreign labor ties.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Neither the UNTZa, which still has the right to bargain
collectively with employers, nor the new unions, which do not
yet have legal status, are able to protect worker interests or
defend worker rights that run counter to government policies.
Over the last few years, UNTZa has freely negotiated nearly
1,000 collective bargaining agreements. Under the UNTZa/ANEZA
(the employer's association) agreements, wages and prices have
been fixed jointly on an annual basis. Government supervision
of this process is minimal. Given greater union competition,
it is unclear how much influence UNTZa will now have in this
process. The UNTZa is charged with implementing government
programs to improve worker benefits. It is also unclear to
what extent the competing unions will be similarly charged
following the authorization to operate.
The International Labor Organization Committee of Experts
noted in 1989 the Government's assurances that, as part of the
revj.sion of the labor code, measures are to be taken to
strengthen the provisions protecting workers against antiunion
discrimination. However, there was little progress toward
this goal in 1990, given the extensive changes during the
year, nearly chaotic competition for leadership of UNTZa in
May-September, and the frequent changes of labor ministers.
There are currently no export processing zones, although the
Government has discussed plans to establish one or more.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution and labor code forbid forced labor, and there
are no indications that it is practiced.
d. Minimum Age and Employment of Children
The legislated minimum age for employment is 18, though minors
between ages 14 and 18 may legally engage in "light work" if a
parent or guardian consents. Many children under 14 years old
work in the informal economic sector, especially in family
subsistence agriculture. Neither the labor unions nor the
Government makes a major effort to enforce child labor laws.
But child labor, while sometimes used in handicraft
production, is not frequently used in larger enterprises.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The majority of the population is engaged in subsistence
agriculture or small-scale commerce outside the formal
sector. In recent years, income in the modern economy has not
kept up with inflation. The minimum legal daily wage does not
provide a decent living for workers and their families, and
workers must rely on the extended family and subsistence
agriculture to live. Public sector remuneration for the great
majority of employees remains below a family living wage, and
workers are often driven to corruption or to second jobs in
the private sector. The lowest level civil servants earned
the equivalent of approximately $25 a month at the official
exchange rate at the end of the year. The maximum legal
workweek is 48 hours, with only one 24-hour rest period
required during the week. The labor code specifies health and
safety standards ostensibly enforced by Ministry of Labor
inspectors, but there is limited enforcement in practice.
Minimum wage, safety, and health standards are not observed
for employees in subsistence agriculture.
