USDOS – US Department of State (Author): “Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1987”, Document #1117326

Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1987

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Soviet Union is a one-party dictatorship, dominated by the

leadership of the Communist Party. That leadership is a

self-perpetuating elite which, with the assistance of a

powerful secret police apparatus, attempts to direct all

aspects of public life and to prohibit the development of

independent centers of political or ideological influence.

Although the Soviet Union is a multinational state, political

power has always been highly centralized in Moscow.

The Committee on State Security (KGB), police authorities, and

prosecutors' offices are charged by the party leadership with

enforcing the population's compliance with policy decisions,

directives, and legislation. They do so by seeking to

intimidate dissenters and potential dissenters and, when

necessary, by meting out punishment, including long-term

imprisonment or exile.

On the economic front the Communist Party bolsters its

monopoly on power through state ownership of the means of

production and government administration of all significant

economic activity. In 1987 the Soviet leadership broadened

somewhat the limits of legal private enterprise, and

elaborated a comprehensive economic reform program aimed at

streamlining and decentralizing economic management. However,

these reforms, even if fully implemented on schedule between

1988 and 1991, seem at this point unlikely to eliminate all

the basic features of the Stalinist "command economy."

This year saw some change in the Soviet handling of dissent.

The limits of permissible dissent were expanded, and those who

exceeded them usually were not subjected to imprisonment or

exile. Instead, authorities used other means of intimidation

short of court trial. These changes, although evident in

Moscow and Leningrad, were barely felt elsewhere. Official

attitudes toward dissent also seemed to harden as the year

progressed. Unlike other government agencies, the KGB has

largely been exempted from the policy of "glasnosf"

(openness), and there is no indication of movement toward

reform of that agency. Even in Moscow, the city where the

most notable changes occurred, most dissident sources

described the changes as primarily in the sphere of what it

was possible to say and much less in what it was possible to

do.

Reforms are taking place at the direction of the party and are

primarily the product of political decisions, not the result

of legal reform. The improvements in Soviet human rights

performance which took place in 1987 have yet to be reinforced

by reform laws, administrative regulations, and bureaucratic

procedures which would help ensure that the rights of

individuals are respected. Soviet authorities currently are

reviewing their entire set of interlocking criminal codes, and

Soviet officials have said repeatedly that significant reforms

are expected. Their effect on the human rights of Soviet

citizens will not be clear until the revised criminal code

appears and is implemented.

Under current laws, those who exercise their rights continue

to face the possibility of arrest, trial, and imprisonment;

internment in a psychiatric hospital; or, more commonly, the

loss of their jobs and opportunities for education, housing,

and even medical treatment. Fear of these possibilities

restrains the vast majority of people in the Soviet Union from

attempting to exercise the basic rights of freedom of speech,

assembly, or religion.

Nevertheless, a small but apparently growing number of Soviet

citizens have begun to organize unofficial groups and issue

unofficial publications that provide a forum for public

discussion of political, social, ecological, religious, and

other current issues. At the same time, the official press

has provided more open discussion of some historical,

economic, social, and--to a lesser extent--political issues.

While freedom of expression has been expanded and censorship

relaxed, controls remain in place, and the current trends are

neither stable nor legally defined. Direct attacks on the

leadership or party directives or serious calls for a

developed political opposition, including multiple parties,

are beyond the pale.

Jewish, ethnic German, and Armenian emigration increased

markedly, in contrast to the last several years. By the end

of 1987, monthly average departures for ethnic Germans and

Armenians compared favorably with those of the late 1970's and

early 1980 's; however, Jewish monthly average departures in

1987 were less than half those of the 1970's and far below the

peak of 1979. Emigration of members of other ethnic groups

remained negligible.

In January new Soviet regulations for travel abroad went into

effect. In making family reunification the only legal basis

for emigration, the regulations codified Moscow's longstanding

refusal to recognize the "right to leave," a right included in

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was

incorporated into the Helsinki Final Act. Soviet performance

in resolving longstanding family reunification cases was

significantly better than in previous years. Approximately 75

such cases on a U.S. Government list of families seeking to

join relatives in the United States were resolved in 1987 or

were in the process of being resolved. However, 106 cases

remain unresolved.

Abroad, the Soviet Union continues its occupation of

Afghanistan and its support of the Vietnamese occupation of

Cambodia, which have resulted in widespread and flagrant human

rights violations. There has been evidence in previous years

that the Soviet Union has been responsible for the use of

chemical warfare in Afghanistan, Laos, and Cambodia.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including

Freedom from:

a. Political Killing

On December 26, 23-year-old Sarkis Ogadzhanyan, a Hare

Krishna, died of malnutrition in a labor camp near Orenburg,

only weeks before his scheduled release. Ogadzhanyan was

arrested in January 1986 under religious Article 227 of the

criminal code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist

Republic (R. S.F. S.R. ) , or Article 224 of the Armenian code.

Another case of death under suspicious circumstances that

became known in 1987 was that of Aleksandr Petrovich Mironov,

a 40-year-old engineer-economist employed by the Tatar branch

of TSINOTUR (Tsentral *nyy Instituf Nauchnoy Organizatsii

Truda, Upravleniya i Ratsionalizatsii) in Kazan'. He traveled

to Moscow in August 1986 on his own and his coworkers' behalf

to complain of official corruption in Kazan'. He apparently

threatened to demonstrate if the problem was not corrected.

On his return home, he was detained by militia and on August

28 placed in a mental hospital. On September 9, 1986, his

mother was informed that he had committed suicide by jumping

from a third-floor window. Photographs of the mutilated,

disfigured corpse, however, show clear signs of torture.

Soviet law provides for the imposition of capital punishment

for some economic crimes (e.g., fraud, corruption) which are

not generally considered capital offenses outside the

U.S.S.R. There are no official statistics available regarding

its imposition, but official confirmations sometimes appear.

For example, A.K. Karimov, first secretary of the Bukhara

Oblast' Committee, was executed in the spring for his role in

inflating cotton output figures for his oblast". Soviet

officials have said, however, that among legal reforms

currently being considered is the elimination of the death

penalty for economic crimes.

b. Disappearance

There have been no known instances of prolonged or permanent

disappearance in recent years. However, it is not unusual for

people to be arrested or confined in psychiatric facilities

without next of kin being notified. Concerned relatives are

expected to initiate an inquiry with the authorities to find

out if and when their family member was arrested and where he

or she is being held. Press articles critical of this

practice appeared in 1987. In 1987 Soviet officials were

willing to respond to questions concerning Raoul Wallenberg,

the Swedish diplomat and honorary American citizen who was

apprehended by the Soviets at the end of World War II. Their

responses, however, provided nothing beyond the limited

information already known about Mr. Wallenberg's fate.

c. Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Many Soviet political prisoners suffer both mental and

physical abuse and mistreatment during interrogation, trial,

and confinement, according to a wide variety of reliable

sources. Eighteen-year-old Jehovah's Witness Yaroslav

Zazhitskiy was so badly beaten during pretrial detention that

his September 1987 trial for refusal to perform military

service on religious grounds had to be delayed. On May 4,

militia raided a locality on Gogol Boulevard in Moscow, where

nonconformist youth gather, and detained 50-60 people. Some

had sacks placed over their heads to muffle cries, and three

were beaten so severely they had to be hospitalized. In a

show of glasnost", the July 3 Komsomolskaya Pravda criticized

the militia's handling of the event and reported that those

responsible had been punished.

Prison and camp conditions have not improved this year; they

may have grown worse, owing to more consistent implementation

of regulations, which are harsh. Life in prison continues to

be m.arked by isolation, poor diet and malnutrition, compulsory

hard labor, beatings, frequent illness, and inadequate medical

care. The 13 political prisoners in Special Regimen Camp

36-1, who in December were reportedly transferred to Special

Regimen Camp 35, suffered under most brutal conditions of any

labor camp in the U.S.S.R. Many political prisoners.

including four Helsinki monitors, have died in Perm' 36-1

within the last 4 years. Of the 13 most recent inmates--9

Ukrainians, 2 Estonians, 1 Latvian, and 1 Russian--? are

Helsinki Monitoring Group members. Ukrainian Ivan Skalch, who

is gravely ill with bone tuberculosis, has been temporarily

moved to a hospital, but some fear he has died. Hryhorii

Prykhodko, who also suffers from tuberculosis, remains under a

special regimen, which endangers not only his own life but

also the lives of his cellmates.

The Government continued to place selected political and

religious activists in psychiatric hospitals, some of which

fell under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior

and not of the Ministry of Health, although, as described

below, the Interior Ministry may be giving up this

jurisdiction. These patients are often subjected to the

painful, forced administration of sedatives, antipsychotics,

and other mind-altering drugs.

Several demonstrators suffered psychiatric confinements in

1987. Igor Baryl'nik of the Group to Establish Trust Between

East and West was placed in a psychiatric hospital September

11, apparently to prevent him from participating in a

September 13 demonstration on behalf of Matthias Rust, the

young West German who landed his small plane in Moscow's Red

Square. He remained there until October. Serafim Yevsukov

was placed in a mental hospital February 27 after

demonstrating for permission to emigrate. Yuriy Makhov has

been placed in mental institutions four times because of his

desire to emigrate to the United States—the last time from

September 24 to October 17.

Armenian human rights activist Sirvard Avagyan, a former

political prisoner who has twice been confined to mental

hospitals, was again forcibly confined in a mental institution

outside Yerevan in April or May. In a tape played at a Moscow

human rights activists' press conference October 20, Avagyan

described forced drug treatments and beatings.

Vasiliy G. Shipilov has reportedly been held in mental

institutions for 38 years and spent time in Stalin's labor

camps before that because of his opposition to communism on

religious grounds. According to Western sources, 64 political

prisoners were released from psychiatric hospitals in 1987,

including Nizametdin Akhmetov, Vladimir Klebanov, Aleksandr

Riga, Aleksandr Skobov, Anna Chertkova, and Algirdas

Statkevicius . Between 65 and 95 known political prisoners

remained in Soviet psychiatric hospitals at the end of the

year, including Ukrainian human rights activist Hanna

Mikhailenko. Nina Kovalenko, a former Trust Group member who

was released from a psychiatric hospital in December 1986, was

permitted to emigrate in January.

The official press has begun to devote attention to the

problem of psychiatric abuse, with a major article in

Izvestiya in July, another important "expose" in Moscow News

in October, and a third in Komsomol ' skaya Pravda in November.

The relationship between psychiatric abuse and control of

political dissidence is, however, a subject that is still not

discussed openly.

In late summer, TASS announced that all psychiatric

institutions were being placed under the control of the

Ministry of Health. This appears to be an attempt to blunt

Western criticism and to eliminate the abuses that occurred at

institutions run by the Ministry of the Interior. Nonetheless,

there is little indication of change at those institutions, as

most personnel remain in their positions. The abuse of

psychiatry reportedly still occurs.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, Exile or Forced Labor

Government spokesmen insist that prosecution occurs only in

cases in which persons commit acts prohibited by law. But the

provisions of laws under which prosecutions have occurred

themselves violate internationally recognized human rights,

including freedom of expression and freedom of association.

Among these provisions are:

--Article 7G, "Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda,"

which carries a maximum penalty of 7 years' imprisonment and

up to an additional 5 years in internal exile.

—Article 142, "Infringement of the laws on separation of

the church from the State and of the school from the church."

—Article L90-1, "The dissemination of deliberately

hostile fabrications defaming the Soviet State and social

system." This article, introduced in 1965, carries a maximum

penalty of 3 years' imprisonment.

—Article 190-3, "The organization of, or active

participation in, a group actively violating public order,"

which carries a maximum penalty of 3 years' imprisonment.

--Article 22V, "The infringement of the person and the

rights of citizens under the appearance of performing

religious ceremonies," which carries a maximum penalty of

5 years' imprisonment.

In addition to these provisions, the authorities continue to

use criminal code provisions against "parasitism,"

"hooliganism," and "illegal commerce" or "speculation" to

harass persons for political activity. Dissidents are

sometimes fired from their jobs, then threatened with arrest

or even in some cases arrested for "parasitism" because they

have nc jobs. The authorities also reportedly fabricate

charges for criminal offenses, such as the possession of drugs

or weapons, or even more extreme crimes, such as rape. It was

reported in September, for example, that Valentin Yaroshchuk,

a Hare Krishna, faced trumped-up criminal charges in Riga of

resisting the militia.

Overall, however, there was a substantial decrease in the

application of the "political" articles in the course of the

year. These articles reportedly are being reviewed as part of

the general process of revision of the criminal code, but have

not been revised to date.

Soviet criminal codes also permit administrative jailing for

periods of up to 15 days. In practice, such incarcerations

are often used to punish demonstrators and political and

religious activists under the guise of "hooliganism" or

"disturbing the peace." The criminal codes also provide

Soviet authorities power to detain citizens for 3 to 4 hours

for questioning; after this period, detainees must either be

charged or releebed.

There were numerous reports in 1987 of groups or individuals

who neld unofficial demonstrations in support of various

causes; most were either detained for a few hours or, in some

cases, given jail sentences of 10-15 days. Many managed to

carry out large public protests, however, in a notable change

from the past. The authorities' toleration of demonstrations

by the Crimean Tatars in Moscow in July and by nationalists in

the Baltic republics in June and August were the most

prominent examples. Nevertheless, participants in those

demonstrations and others were sometimes subjected to

beatings, arbitrary detention, and house arrest. In most

cases of arbitrary detention, detained persons are released

within a few hours. Toward the end of the year, Soviet

tolerance for such demonstrations rapidly dwindled, and most

were broken up by force or prevented from occurring altogether.

According to the code of criminal procedure, pretrial

detention can last as long as 9 months, and prisoners are not

entitled to consult with a lawyer until shortly before trial.

Prolonged pretrial detention thus functions as a form of

preventive detention, although there were no reports of its

use in this way in 1987.

Most political prisoners, as well as most ordinary criminals,

are confined to camps where they are forced to labor, often

under harsh and degrading conditions, on Soviet developmental

projects and to assist in the production of large amounts of

primary and manufactured goods. Goods are manufactured on

behalf of nearby factories and are included in those factories'

quotas and production statistics. Prisoners are theoretically

paid the same wage as factory workers, but up to 90 percent of

their pay goes to prison authorities, supposedly to cover the

cost of their maintenance, according to the Corrective Labor

Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

Soviet psychiatric institutions are also used to detain and

confine dissidents arbitrarily. A Soviet Ministry of Health

directive, issued in August 1971, authorizes the psychiatric

confinement of persons who pose a "social danger," without

providing an identifiable list of suspect symptoms. In effect,

individuals can be confined, with the assistance of the police

and the agreement of three psychiatrists, without their consent

or that of their families. The length of the detention can

vary greatly, and doctors often refuse to give a diagnosis or

set a release date. Patients committed under criminal

confinement procedures may lose the right to be informed about

the charges brought against them and the right to mount their

own defense. Soviet authorities have said, however, that

there will be a reform of psychiatric hospitals and that steps

are being taken to make psychiatric commitments subject to

judicial review.

In September 1983, the authorities approved an addition to the

R.S.F.S.R. criminal code dealing with "malicious disobedience

to the administration of corrective labor institutions."

Under this provision, prisoners who disobey camp authorities

or who have spent time in solitary confinement during the

course of the previous year may be sentenced to an additional

3 years. This provision was applied only infrequently in

1987. In March Vladimir Kustrya was sentenced to an

additional 2 years, 8 months under article 188-3; also in

March, longtime political prisoner Pyotr Saranchuk was

sentenced to 3 years in a special-regime camp under article

188-3.

In 1987 the authorities continued the practice, which dates

back to tsarist times, of exiling political dissenters. Exile

iOol

often follows prison and, in practice, means confinernent in a

remote vi^ilago, far away from ho:!>.elana and family, vvhsre

climatic conditions are usually severe, fresh food is scarce,

and isolation is an additional barde-. These conditions are

mitigated only by the privile^a of tecesving foud parcels from

family tnembers, moviny about within a limited area, finding

work (usually rr.enici), and arranginy one's own (often

primitive) accomn)o5ations . The fsir.i.iies of exiles are usually

permitted to live with them, although it may take several

months to receive the required pennits. In November, however,

the Goveiriment announced that it was planning to end the use

of internal exile as a form of punishment. Vs'hen implemented,

this decree should fr?.e about 25 knowr. prisoners in exile and

will benefit others who art scheduled to be sent into exile

after finishing their labor camp terms.

Persons released from exile often are not allowed to return to

their former places of residence. Some are forced to live in

other areas of the Soviet Union, in reality ensuring continued

separation from their homes. Others, having nowhere to go,

return Lo their old homes without residence permits, where

they risk arrest for violating residence laws. In August

1935, the Council c" Ministers issued decree no. 738, as yet

unpublished, which severely limits the right of many former

prisoners to reside in or visit Moscow or its suburbs. In

November Pentecostal emigration activists Galina and Vasiliy

Barats were forcibly expelled from Moscow to Trans-Carpathia

The authorities also have utilized external exile or

"voluntary" departure as a method of eliminating dissent.

In 19S7 the Soviets released over 300 political prisoners; a

number of them, however, had already completed their terms. A

substantial number of the best-known prisoners were forced to

emigrate, with the iruplicit or explicit understanding that the

alternative was an eventual return to the labor camps or

mental institutions from which they had just been released.

With few exceptions, all were forced to leave on exit visas to

Israel, which meant they were deprived of Soviet citizenship.

Those who left included Latvian activists Roland Silaraups and

Janii P.ozkaln^.:, Estonian activist Tiit Madisson, and Russian

activists Sergey Khodorovich and Vladimir Titov. A number of

form.er Helsinki monitors, or members of human rights groups

associated with the Helsinki process, also departed, including

Tanya Osipova, Ivan Kovalev, Viktor Nekipelov, Anatoliy

Koryagin. Eduard Gudava, Tengiz Gudava, losip Terelya, and

Vytautas Skuodis. Danilo Shum.uk, who had served 42 years in

Polish, Nazi, and Soviet prisons, also left the Soviet Union

in 1987.

A number of released Helsinki monitors remained in the Soviet

Union, including Merab Kostava, Gleb Yakunin, Myroslav

Marynovich, and Vasyl Smiltsiv. Thirteen Helsinki monitors

remained in prison, labor camp, exile, or psychiatric

hospitals as of the end of the year. They included Lev

Lukyanenko, Ivan Kandyba, Mart Niklus, Yuriy Shukhevych,

Viktoras Petkus, Alfonsas Svarinskas, Sigitas Tamkevicius, and

Vasyl Ovsyenko.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Communist party control of society extends to the legal and

judicial system and is exercised in political cases to negate

constitutional guarantees of the objectivity and independence

of the judicial process. Soviet authorities generally ensure

that political trials are closed to the public by requiring

admission passes, packing the courtroom, and harassing or

detaining observers outside. The location and date of a trial

are often announced on short notice and may be changed with

little warning. Western journalists and diplomats are

regularly denied access to political trials as well as

permission to visit cities outside Moscow where trials are

taking place.

Defense attorneys, like judges, are subject to political

pressures and constraints applied by the security forces and

the party. According to official statistics, about 60 percent

of attorneys are party members, and this proportion rises with

the seniority of the position. Moreover, attorneys must have

special clearance to act as defendant's counsel in a political

case. Attorneys who overstep their assigned role of providing

a perfunctory defense risk losing their clearance and even

destroying their careers. Even the most honest and vigorous

defense is of limited utility since results indicate that the

outcome of political trials is determined beforehand by the

authorities. Appeals, although permitted, are usually a

formality.

Since data on political prisoners is regarded as a state

secret, estimates about the number vary considerably. One

list of political prisoners whose names are known, compiled by

Soviet emigre and former political prisoner Kronid Lubarsky,

includes about 400 persons. It is believed that the number of

political prisoners is much higher, however, although their

identities are not known. Although prominent political and

religious figures are segregated and kept in special labor

camps, many lesser known activists are tried on nonpolitical

criminal charges (e.g., speculation, parasitism, hooliganism,

resisting arrest) and are treated as ordinary criminals, and

therefore might not be included in statistics on political

convictions

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence

Government interference in personal life is pervasive. The

authorities regard it as a citizen's duty to inform on the

unorthodox attitudes of family members, friends, and

neighbors. The electronic monitoring of the residences and

telephones of certain Soviet citizens and foreigners is done

routinely, despite constitutional provisions assuring the

inviolability of citizens' homes. According to law, no one

may enter a home against the will of the resident "without

legal grounds." In practice, this provision has little

restraining effect on investigative agencies.

Nevertheless, the number of house searches for political

materials was reduced this year. There were none reported in

Moscow and Leningrad (although materials related to the

reported destruction by the Soviet Supreme Court of files on

1930's purge victims disappeared from Dmitriy Yurasov's Moscow

apartment September 7, and dissident sources assumed the theft

was the work of government agents) . They continued outside

Moscow and Leningrad but on a reduced basis.

Through the control of mail and telephone circuits, the

authorities often selectively restrict contact between

citizens and foreigners, often intercepting mail or cutting

off telephone conversations. On June 1, four Moscow women

refuseniks arranged meetings with refuseniks in their homes

and asked Western supporters to call them to commemorate

International Children's Day and remember refusenik children.

During the hours of June 1 arranged for the calls, all four

had their telephone service interrupted and were unable to

receive the calls. Political activist Valery Senderov's

telephone was also reported to have been disconnected, and

telephone calls between divided spouses and families were

occasionally interrupted. Nevertheless, in most cases, the

authorities do not interfere with telephone contact between

refuseniks and dissidents and friends or family in the West.

It has now become common practice for Soviet human rights

activists to telephone Western human rights organizations with

news on the human rights situation in the U.S.S.R.

Contacts with foreigners had been further discouraged with the

issuance of a decree in 1984 which mandated fines for Soviet

citizens who provide foreigners with "accommodation or

transportation or have rendered them, other services in

violation of established rules." There was only one reported

case in which fines were imposed during 1987. That occurred

in Rcstov-on-Don this fall when two Soviet citizens were fined

50 rubles apiece (about $80) for driving several United States

Information Service exhibit guides outside the city limits.

There has also been less harassment of foreigners who visit

refuseniks or dissidents. Refuseniks and dissidents are

sometimes criticized in the press for their ties and contacts

with the West. For example, Serafim Yevsukov, an ethnic

Russian who succeeded in emigrating to the West in 1987, was

attacked by Moskovskaya Pravda March 5 and called a "tool of

anti-Soviet elements in the West." This epithet is also

commonly used against Jewish activists, such as losif Begun.

Glasnosf editor Sergey Grigor'yants was attacked in the

September 15 Vechernyaya Moskva for his contacts with Western

journalists. Press attacks on persons who seek to emigrate or

agitate for human rights continue, although less frequently in

1987 than in the past.

Foreigners who decide to marry Soviet citizens are sometimes

prevented from returning to the Soviet Union for the required

registration of the intention to marry or the marriage itself,

resulting in a "blocked marriage." A number of spouses of

U.S. citizens have not been permitted to emigrate. During

1987 a number of such cases were resolved, and fewer new cases

arose. In November, however, the authorities began to insist

that a special "guest" visa be obtained by travelers going to

the Soviet Union for the purpose of marriage. This may

represent a step backward, since such visas have traditionally

been difficult to obtain.

The Government continues to jam some Western radio broadcasts,

including those of Radio Liberty in Russian and other Soviet

languages, Deutsche Welle, and the Voice of Israel. These

actions are inconsistent with the provisions of the Helsinki

Final Act. Islamic (mostly Iranian) broadcasts into Central

Asia also are jammed. Most jamming of Voice of America

broadcasts was ended in 1987, and broadcasts in English and

other Western European languages generally are not jammed.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Presso

The Constitution provides for most internationally accepted

political liberties but requires that their exercise be in

accordance with the "interests of the people and the

strengthening and development of the Socialist system." In

practice, this has generally meant that the good of the State

comes before that of the individual.

All official information media are controlled by the party and

the Government. According to Soviet officials, this year

marked the end of the requirement to submit all publications,

films, and radio and television scripts for censorship to the

Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the

Media. Instead, it is now the responsibility of individual

editors to assure that their publications are in line with

party policies and directives. This has meant a broadening of

discussion of historical, social, economic, and--to a lesser

extent--political issues in the official media. There remain

strict limits, however, on what can be published. Editors who

have published articles pushing those limits have been

reprimanded by party officials, but there was no reported

instance in 1987 in which an editor was fired for that

reason. Thus, some publications have developed distinctive

perspectives on issues, and there have been open debates on

the "correct" approach to "perestroyka" (restructuring),

glasnost' (openness), Soviet history, and other public issues.

Openly dissident views on important questions of policy--e.g .

the wisdom of party guidelines or of the leadership—have

begun to appear in the official media, usually in the form of

letters to the editor. Debate within the leadership is often

reflected in published texts where sophisticated polemics and

criticism, expressed in veiled language, allow experienced

readers to identify policy trends and controversial issues.

Open polemics have occasionally emerged between advocates of

different lines of policy, as was the case in the summer when

several of the most prominent Soviet literary publications

openly and vigorously criticized each other over official

cultural policy. Media debate over economic policy is now

commonplace

Soviet journalists are subject to the discipline of the

Communist Party and subordinated to the directives of their

editorial superiors, themselves trusted members of the party.

As such, they have been spokesmen for official policies rather

than journalists in the Western sense. Now, however,

journalists are more frequently able to voice their own

opinions in signed articles for which they are held

responsible. The policy of glasnost' has contributed to the

development of investigating journalism, much to the

discomfiture of local and economic officials.

The most significant development in this area has been the

proliferation of unofficial publications (samizdat, or

self-published material). Unlike past samizdat journals,

current journals are written and edited by persons who do not

hide their identities. These publications exist in a gray

area--they are neither explicitly permitted nor prohibited.

In the past, many of their editors and contributors would have

been convicted for "anti-Soviet activity," thus effectively

stopping the publications. Under present conditions, the fate

of these publications is unclear, given the Government's

effort to stimulate private initiative and unwillingness to

try persons in Moscow or Leningrad on grounds of "anti-Soviet

activity," particularly in light of the current government

review of the legal articles banning "anti-Soviet activity."

Editors and contributors for the more outspoken periodicals

have been harassed--some have lost their jobs, been detained,

visited repeatedly by militia, threatened with prosecution for

illegal use of government reproduction facilities, and

attacked in the official media. Sergei Grigor 'yants , editor

of the unofficial journal Glasnost', has been repeatedly

attacked in the press; 70 copies of his journal were

confiscated in September; and he and two other editorial board

members were detained and beaten on several occasions. The

editor of the underground journal Ukrainian Herald Vyacheslav

Chornovil, has been pressured to leave the U.S.S.R. Samizdat

publications by the Ukrainian Catholic and Lithuanian Catholic

Churches and by unregistered Protestant denominations, such as

some Baptists, continue to be the object of particular

government repression. House searches for these types of

materials, which are generally confiscated when found,

continue.

The Government has relaxed somewhat the obstacles to the work

of foreign journalists. Official press conferences have

become a regular feature of life, and most Western journalists

maintain that their access to Soviet officials has been much

improved. Some Western journalists have been allowed to

travel to and conduct interviews in closed areas. The

Government continues to circumscribe the circulation of

non-Communist foreign newspapers, which are rarely available

to average Soviet citizens. Overt censorship of wire and

satellite transmissions of news stories out of the Soviet

Union is rare, but the authorities sometimes harass selected

foreign journalists, especially those who maintain close

contacts with dissidents and refuseniks.

-All universities and research institutes are operated by the

State or party; teaching and research must conform to official

requirements. In areas such as foreign policy and

contemporary Soviet history, requirements on research and

teaching reportedly are being relaxed. Although previously

forbidden areas are becoming mors and more open to researchers

(particularly in the field of Soviet history), academic

freedom in the Western sense does not exist. Freedom of

expression expanded in 19f7, although there remained subjects

which were politically sensitive and had to be treated

cautiously. The Government's range of political sensitivities

remains broad, and censorship standards can be applied in an

arbitrary =)nd capricious manner. Nevertheless, the realm of

the permissible in literature, scholarship, and culture

continued to expand. A significant number of previously

banned books and plays were published or staged, including

Rybakov's "Children of the Arbat" and Bulgakov's "Heart of a

Dog." Political satire by Soviet comedians became sharper,

although generally within officially approved limits--for

example, satirizing official corruption, mismanagement, or

inertia. Soviet news media published or broadcast information

on internal events, such as demonstrations, that was previously

forbidden. There has been increased discussion of government

policies, such as price reform, removal of subsidies, and

various ecological issues.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

During 1987 the Government was more willing to tolerate

demonstrations, both by groups and individuals.

Demonstrations have been used primarily by emigration

activists, but 1987 saw many demonstrations by Soviets

interested in remaining in the Soviet Union and agitating for

changes of various kinds. National minorities, including the

Crimean Tatars, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, and

Armenians, staged major demonstrations.

Efforts to eliminate such open expressions of discontent

persisted, however. Demonstrators often have their placards

seized and are then detained for short periods, harassed,

attacked in the press, or occasionally sentenced to jail

sentences of 10-15 days. The newspaper Vechernyaya Moskva

attacked the unofficial seminar "Democracy and Humanism" for

organizing a demonstration in support of political prisoners.

Their demonstration was prevented in Moscow by the roundup of

35 people suspected of organizing the demonstration. In

Leningrad they managed to demonstrate, but several were

sentenced to 10 days in jail, and many were detained. An

October 31 Vecherniy Leningrad article criticizing the

demonstration commented that it should be understood that

democracy was subordinate to the need to maintain order. Some

demonstrators continue to be beaten. During U.S. Secretary of

State Shultz's visit to Moscow October 22-23, Andrey Zhdanov

and Galina Gerasimova were beaten and forced into militia cars

when they attempted to demonstrate in front of the American

Embassy. Subsequently, however, they received permission to

join their daughter (who defected several years ago) in the

West.

Rules introduced in Moscow and Leningrad in 1987 regulating

demonstrations, despite stiff restrictions on locale, would

seem to legitimate them, but in no known instance was an

application for a protest demonstration approved. Authorities

approved a September 27 commemoration of Babi Yar, which was

attended by leaders of the official Anti-Zionist Committee, as

well as unofficial activists. One applicant for permission to

demonstrate was told it was only legal to demonstrate "for"

something, not "against."

Despite the release of over 300 political prisoners in 1987,

many remain incarcerated for their participation in unofficial

groups. Thirteen former Helsinki monitors were still confined

at the end of the year. Persons who are "too active" in

their protests continue to be threatened with confinement in

mental institutions. Igor Baryl'nik, a member of the

Leningrad trust group, was placed in a Leningrad Mental

Hospital September 11, apparently in order to prevent him from

participating in a September 13 demonstration in Moscow on

behalf of Matthias Rust. Other demonstrators were seized

September 13 when they began trying to collect signatures in

downtown Moscow supporting Rust's release and were detained

and interrogated for several hours. Also on September 13, 18

Moscow Jews were detained for several hours in order to

"prevent" a demonstration against anti-Semitism that had

already been canceled by the organizers after they were

refused permission to demonstrate and attacked repeatedly in

the press, television, and radio. Official attitudes towards

demonstrations seemed to harden further later in the year.

Demonstrations in Riga in June and August took place despite

official attempts to discourage them; in November demonstrators

in Riga were met with beatings and detentions. On December 6

a demonstration in Moscow protesting emigration policy was

disrupted by the pushing and shoving of groups of young men

and some of the demonstrators taken into custody. A late

December demonstration marking the eighth year of Soviet

occupation in Afghanistan was broken up by force, and several

demonstrators were detained.

The Constitution grants citizens the right to associate in

public organizations "in accordance with the aim of building

communism." In practice, public associations are organized by

the authorities or are subject to their strict control, and

the Government suppresses attempts to function independently

of its supervision. Nevertheless, current conditions have

fostered the growth of a large number of unofficial or informal

organizations that provide a forum for discussion of political,

social, ecological, and other issues. Many of these clubs

produce journals or bulletins. Most actively support

perestroyka. Both Moscow and Leningrad have developed

umbrella organizations that represent a number of these clubs;

in Moscow, the "Social Initiatives Group" and in Leningrad,

"Epitsentr." Other cities, including Kiev, Kazan", Sverdlovsk,

Ulyanovsk, and Brezhnev, have developed their own clubs. Some

clubs are trying to register as official organizations, for

example, the Perestroyka Club in Moscow. The proliferation of

these groups, with the opportunity they provide for public

discussion, is one of the most significant developments in the

human rights situation in the U.S.S.R.

In October 3 group of Moscow activists announced the formation

of the Moscow branch of the Frankfurt-based International

Society for Human Rights. On October 20, the group held a

press conference on the problem of psychiatric abuse in the

Soviet Union. Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, and Georgian

committees for the defense of political prisoners have been

formed. On International Human Rights Day, the unofficial

organization "Press Club Glasnost'" held an international

human rights seminar, but not without some detentions and

other problems. This is one of several relatively recent

examples of attempts at open, visible discussion of human

rights problems. At the same time, greater openness has

provided a public forum for some of the more unattractive

sides of Soviet life, such as anti-Semitism. The organization

"Pamyat"", which began as an organization dedicated to

preserving historical monuments, has developed a faction in

the R.S.F.S.R. that is rabidly anti-Semitic. Despite criticism

of "Pamyat'" by Soviet media, the regime has treated it

cautiously, suggesting that it enjoys some suppc^t in official

quarters

Trade unions are strictly subordinated to the Communist Party

and act as agents of the Government in implementing economic

policy and ensuring Isbor discipline. The unions do not act

as collective bargaining agents. The International Labor

Organization's Committee of Experts has noted that the Soviet

Union has contravened the Convention on Freedom of Association

and Protection of the Right to Organize by imposing a

constitutional link between the Communist Party and trade

unions, which restricted the right of the unions to organize

their own activities and formulate their own programs.

The right to strike is not recognij^ed, and strikes are rare.

Local authorities sometimes make concessions whe-" confronted

v/ith a spontaneous strike o^er a local, limited grievance.

Bus drivers in the town of Chekhov, for example, held a strike

September 14 to protest a new regulation that would dock their

pay if they did not keep strictly to their tirr:etable Their

demands were met. There were other unconfirmed reports of

"work stoppages" that occurred throughout the U.S.S.R.

There were no reports of independent labor activity in the

U.S.S.R. during 1987, although the Free Inter-Professional

Union of Workers (SMCT), which had been decimated by arrests

and forced e;migration, has reportedly begun a very limited

level of activity. SMOT activist Fador Finkel was permitted

to emigrate to the United States.

c. Freedom of Religion

The Constitution provides for the "right to profess or not to

profess any religion and to conduct religious worship or

atheistic propaganda." The right to conduct religious worship

and the right to make atheistic propaganda are not equivalent,

however, since the former right does not include the right to

conduct "religious propaganda," i.e., to engage in public

defense of religious values or to rebut official attacks on

religion. Moreover, extensive legislation and administrative

regulations on "religious cults" place additional restrictions

on freedom of religion. On balance, religious believers have

benefited less from policies of glasnosf and perestroyka than

other social groups.

Registration with the Soviet Council on Religious Affairs is

required for religious groups of 20 adults or more. The State

is able to limit the number of congregations since the

authorities reserve the right to grant or withhold

registration. Their refusal to grant registration has been

used to deny legal status to entire religious denominations,

for example, to the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church since

1946. Once registered, religious congregations must accept

strict regulations which prohibit proselytizing, religious

discussion and Bible study groups, charitable activity, and

formal religious training for children. Existing seminaries

and other institutions of clerical education and the numbers

of students permitted to pursue a religious vocation do not

provide a sufficient body of trained clergy for officially

registered denominations. In one positive development in

1987, authorities rescinded the requirement that priests

Moscow and Leningrad, however, priests continue to register

baptisms

Many groups of believers refuse to register officially on the

grounds that much of the legislation affecting "religious

cults" contradicts the tenets of their religious beliefs.

Others, such as the Hare Krishna, are refused the right to

Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh-Day Adventists, Pentecostalists,

and Hare Krishnas, are subject to repressive measures,

including harassment at school or place of employment, denial

of access to housing and educational and job opportunities,

dismissal from work, and imprisonment. One reliable list of

dissidents counts approximately 204 religious activists who

are currently serving prison sentences on charges related to

their religious beliefs.

Pentecostalist Presbyter Vasiliy Boyechko was released early

from a 3-year labor camp sentence in April but was threatened

with rearrest in September if his congregation did not

camp and sentenced to another 3 years in a strict-regime

camp. The small Pentecostalist community in Chuguyevka in the

Soviet Far East continued to face repression during 1987. No

member of the community has been permitted to hold a job for 4

years, with consequent extreme economic hardship. Eight

members are still imprisoned, including their pastor, Viktor

Val'ter. While the family of imprisoned Chuguevka

Pentecostalist Nikolay Wiens was permitted to emigrate to the

Federal Republic of Germany, Wiens himself remained in a labor

camp. Also, Leningrad Pentecostalist Vladimir Markov was

permitted to emigrate in September.

Among unregistered Baptists, Anna Chertkova was confined in a

special psychiatric hospital but has now been released. In

February Baptist Viktor Litovchenko was sentenced in Kiev to 3

years' strict-regime labor camp under article 190-1. Baptist

prayer meetings continue to be broken up. On the positi^f;-

side. a nuraber of Baptise prisoners were released early,

including Lidiya noronina-Las.T.ane . Baptist Vladimir Khaylo

was released from a rnentiil institution and permitted to

emigrate with most members of his family.

Tl-e traditional religious affiliation of ethnic Russians is

the Russian Orthodox Church, -Jhich, according to many dissident

church source?, is subjected to heavy interference in its

internal acfairs by the authorities, including the k:GB. The

church hierarchy is often called on to support government

initiatives publicly, particularly on disarmament. While

tcloiating the existence of this church, largely for

international propaganda purposes, the authorities discourage

the population's intsres'c, participat io;i, yad involvement in

church affairs. In Moscow, authorities permit only about 50

churches to function. At Easter, the Russian Orthodox

Church's most important religious holiday, police often

blocked or denied access to the crowds trying to attend

services

The independent Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church was

liquidated by the Soviets in the 1920 's and 1930 's by means of

massive repressive measures, including executions of the

church hierarchy, and remains forcibly incorporated into the

Russian Orthodox Church,

Soviet officials in 1987 generally demonstrated a slightly

more tolerant attitude toward Christianity in general and

Russian Orthodoxy in particular. Released prisoner Father

Gleb Yakunin was given his first parish (in Shchelkovo) in 20

years, but only after warnings not to engage in political

activity. Konstantin Kharchev, chairman of the Council on

Religious Affairs, stated that legislation on religion is

being reviewed and promised tihat there would be no religious

prisoners by the end of November; however, the Soviets have

failed to fulfil the latter. Moscow News and Literaturnaya

Gazeta have carried articles encouraging tolerance of

religious believers, although regional nev\;spapers still seem

to be following the old antireligious line. Two unofficial

Russian Orthodox journals appeared this year—Bulletin of the

Christian Community and Choice--3long with the officially

permitted Vestnik of the Patriarchate.

Believers active in other than officially sanctioned church

rituals are often punished, although 1987 saw an improvement

in this area. Still, Russian Orthodox Deacon and Historian

Vladimir Rusak remains in Perm' Labor Camp 35 on charges of

anti-So\^iet agitation and propaganda because he criticized the

Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy's cooperation with the

Communist Government; in September he was reported to be held

in the camp's internal prison.

In Ukraine, a group of more than 200 Ukrainian Catholic

bishops, priests, and lay people issued an appeal to the Pope

and to General Secretary Gorbachev to help them gain legal

status for their church and announced that they were formally

"coming out from the underground." In the wake of the appeal,

a number of signatories were harassed, and 38-year-old

Mykhailo Hawryliw was called up for reserve duty. Since this

appeal, two more petitions with over 2,500 signatures have

been forwarded to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. It was

reported that authorities forcibly broke up a number of

Ukrainian Catholic Christmas celebrations. Ukrainian Catholic

activist losip Terelya was permitted to emigrate to Canada

with his family in September. Persecution of Catholic

activists also continued. The homes of Lithuanian Catholics

involved in producing the Lithuanian Catholic Chronicle were

repeatedly searched and copies of the Chronicle confiscated.

Lithuanian Catholic priests Alfonsas Svarinskas and Sigitas

Tamkevicius remain in a labor camp.

Harassment of religious Jews decreased in 1987. A ritual bath

in Moscow's one Hasidic synagogue was restored by government

authorities who had destroyed it in 1987. Chairman of the

Council on Religious Affairs Konstantin Kharchev told U.S.

Rabbi David Hollander in May that six young Soviet Jews would

be permitted to study at rabbinical seminaries in the United

States, although this has not yet taken place. Small numbers

of Hebrew Bibles and prayer books provided by Western donors

appear to have reached Moscow in 1987. In general, however,

it remained next to impossible for religious Jews to obtain

Hebrew prayer books and other religious items. Although there

were reports toward year's end that Hebrew classes in one

locality were being tolerated, the teaching of Hebrew remains

illegal

Although only a small number of mosques are open for use in

the Muslim regions of Central Asia and Azerbaijan, Islam

appears to retain a strong hold on the population. Unofficial

mullahs, who function without government permission, are the

subject of nearly constant pressure. Soviet press

condemnations of foreign (mostly Iranian) Islamic radio

broadcasts and continued jamming of these broadcasts reflect

considerable anxiety on the part of the authorities. Official

propaganda efforts are tailored to bolster atheism among the

Muslim peoples of the U.S.S.R. and advocate secular Soviet

ceremonies as substitutes for religious observances on the

occasion of births, marriages, and deaths. The unauthorized

printing and distribution of religious books continues to be

met with harsh punishment.

According to reliable Soviet dissident sources, there are at

least 17 Muslims imprisoned on religious grounds. At the end

of 1986 or beginning of 1987, a number of Muslims were

sentenced to prison terms, including 32-year-old Rajabali

Shaev, an unregistered mullah, who was sentenced to 3 years in

a labor camp under articles 142 and 227, and Akhmadkan

Azizkhodzaev, imam at Makhmud-Ishan mosque in Namangan,

Uzbekistan, who was sentenced to 5 years' deprivation of

liberty for trading in religious literature and posters

depicting Mecca.

Very small religious groups were not immune to severe

pressure. Harassment, arrests, and trials of Hare Krishna

followers in the Baltic area, Ukraine, the R.S.F.S.R., and the

Caucasus continued. One Hare Krishna follower remained in a

mental institution and several in labor camps. It became

known in 1987 that Krishna follower Znamkochyan was forcibly

confined to a Yerevan Mental Institution in November 1986 and

died after 5 days of treatment with haloperidol and tizerzine.

Armenian television in June 1987 reported that he had died

after a hunger strike. Lev Chernyak was detained, beaten, and

in August sentenced to 15 days. A Krishna demonstration in

Moscow August 29 was broken up by the militia, who detained

about 50 of the approximately 100 Hare Krishna followers who

were demanding the release of imprisoned coreligionists and

the registration of their group as a religious congregation.

A number of demonstrators were severely beaten.

The authorities exert wide-ranging pressure, including through

the official media, to discourage religious belief in general

among its citizens. The Communist Party is, according to its

rules, an atheistic organization. Membership in the party,

considered incompatible with religious belief, is in effect a

requirement for advancement to most positions of authority or

prestige in the country. Thus the authorities have virtually

excluded practicing believers from attractive educational

opportunities and desirable careers. At the same time,

Ukrainian Catholic, Lithuanian Catholic, and Baptist

unofficial journals continue to be repressed. The number of

sacred books, such as the Bible or the Koran, which may be

printed or imported is strictly limited, although Soviet

officials announced 100,000 Baptist Bibles would be imported

in 1987. Non-Russian language Bibles are in particularly

short supply. The number of clergymen and places of worship

today is only a small fraction of the number which existed

before the October 1917 revolution. At the same time, Soviet

officials recognize that up to 70 million Soviet citizens

adhere to some religion.

e. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign

Freedom of movement is neither assured by law nor respected in

practice. Although citizens are generally free to move about

within the country, travel in certain areas (e.g., frontier

regions or areas of military significance) requires special

permission. All adults are issued identity documents or

internal passports, which must be carried on their person

during travel and used to register visits of more than 3 days

with the local authorities. Approximately 20 percent of

Soviet territory is formally closed to travel by foreigners,

and except for major urban centers most of the remaining

territory is in practice difficult to visit or inaccessible.

The right to choose one's place of residence, although

formally provided for by law, is subject to restrictions.

Everyone is required to register his or her place of

residence. The authorities limit the number of residence

permits in an increasing number of large cities, including

Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, where housing is at a premium.

An unpublished directive issued by the U.S.S.R. Council of

Ministers in August 1985 (the text became available from

unofficial sources in 1986) excludes citizens convicted of

certain offenses, including all the "political" articles of

the criminal code, from residing in Moscow unless the person

has been pardoned or granted amnesty. Its apparent purpose

was to reduce contacts between released activists and either

other Soviet human rights activists or foreigners resident in

Moscow. A number of recently released prisoners, including

Aleksandr Ogorodnikov and Vasiliy Barats, have not been given

residence permits in Moscow because of this directive. They

have been repeatedly harassed and threatened with prosecution.

Barats and his wife were finally expelled by force from

Moscow. Many recently freed prisoners of conscience are

compelled to live with others and are not able to work.

To travel abroad, Soviet citizens must have a passport for

foreign travel and an exit visa specifying the precise

destination for each trip. In 1987 the amount of travel both

on officially sponsored trips (for business, academic exchange,

or plain tourism) and on private visits has increased

significantly—in the case of private visits to the United

States, from 1,981 in 1986 to 5,764 in 1987. However, while

Soviet authorities claim that they are encouraging those who

have the time off from work and the financial resources to

travel to the West to visit relatives or friends, permission

to travel abroad remains difficult to obtain. Lengthy

formalities, an unresponsive bureaucratic infrastructure, and

arbitrary denials for reasons of security continue to

discourage many from attempting a private trip. In one

instance, a 67-year-old Ukrainian woman who was told she would

be permitted to travel to the United States to visit her

husband, from whom she had been separated since World War II,

was arrested and sentenced to 3 years' "deprivation of

freedom." Prohibitive costs and the Soviet Union's lack of a

convertible currency also ensures that travel will continue to

be restricted for most ordinary persons.

The right to emigrate is restricted, as Soviet law does not

recognize the right of citizens to emigrate by choice. The

Soviet Union has signed the Helsinki Final Act and has thereby

agreed to act in conformity with the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, which states that, "Everyone has the right to

leave any country, including his own." However, the Soviet

system continues to restrict emigration (with very few

exceptions) to those citizens desiring family reunification

with immediate relatives abroad, and even those with immediate

relatives abroad are often not permitted to emigrate. The

entry-exit regulations which came into effect on January 1,

1987, codify this restriction, although during 1987 many

longtime refuseniks were permitted to emigrate without regard

to this requirement. A number of political prisoners released

in 1987 were given the option of emigrating, or were forced to

emigrate, although they had no claim to family reunification.

Other barriers to emigration are the requirement that family

members sign forms on financial liability for their

children—meaning that they may refuse to release an adult

child from financial or moral commitments--and the widespread

use of alleged "knowledge of state secrets" to deny

emigration, even though the person never had access to state

secrets or had not been involved in security-related matters

for more than a decade.

Many Jews have waited in vain for 10 years or longer for

permission to emigrate. Official Israeli sources estimate

that there are approximately 370,000 Soviet Jews who have

requested the letters of invitation (vyzovs) necessary to

apply to emigrate, and that many more Jews would eventually

leave if emigration restrictions were lifted. However, a

variety of administrative and extralegal sanctions, including

loss of employment, harassment, social ostracism, and long

delays, dissuade many Jews from even attempting to submit an

emigration application.

Jewish emigration in 1987 totaled 8,155, up substantially from

914 in 1986, and the highest yearly total since 1981, when

9,447 Jews emigrated. During the 1970"s, however, over 2,000

Jews per month were permitted to depart. In the peak year of

1979, 51,320 emigrated. A number of longtime prominent

refuseniks received exit permission, including Vladimir and

Mariya Slepak and Ida Nudel. Many longtime refuseniks

continued to be refused on grounds of security, however. The

Supreme Soviet Presidium reportedly formed a commission to

review security refusals, and a number of Soviet Jews,

previously refused on security grounds, have been permitted to

emigrate. Repeated refusenik requests for names of commission

members or appointments with the Commission have been rebuffed,

however, leading to some public skepticism about the

Commission. Over 14,000 Germans and over 3,000 Armenians left

the U.S.S.R. in 1987. About 5,000 additional Armenians

received exit permission but had not yet departed. These

figures represent a sizable increase over the 1986 figures of

793 Germans and 247 Armenians and are higher than figures for

the peak years of the late 1970's and early 1980's. Soviet

authorities in 1987 resolved a significant number of divided

family cases affecting the United States, France, the United

Kingdom, and Australia. Currently, 106 Soviet families,

numbering about 450 individuals, are on a United States

government list of families who are actively seeking to join

relatives in the United States and who have been refused exit

permission by the Soviet Government. Of 12 cases on the U.S.

list of separated spouses at the beginning of 1987, 9 were

resolved during the course of the year, while no new cases

were added. There were four "blocked-marriage" cases on the

representation list at the beginning of the year, three were

added and four resolved. At least 17 U.S. citizens, who also

hold Soviet citizenship and who are living in the Soviet

Union, are still being denied permission to emigrate, several

of them for many decades. Seven other dual nationals received

permission to leave in 1987.

In 1987 there was evidence that Soviet authorities had

departed from their previous practice of refusing most

emigrants the right to return to the U.S.S.R. Since the end

of 1986, at least 250 Soviet emigres have returned permanently

to the U.S.S.R., and Soviet officials indicated that at least

that number of cases were being considered for repatriation.

During 1987 a significant number of Soviet citizens residing

abroad permanently as well as former Soviet citizens were

permitted to return on short family visits, many of whom had

previously been denied permission to visit. Some, however,

continue to be denied visas to visit the Soviet Union,

including those denied emergency visas to return for funerals

or to visit seriously ill relatives or experienced long delays

in receiving these visas, although according to the regulations

on entry and exit they are to be granted within 3 days.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Gonvernment

Soviet citizens are not free to change the system of

government. Ultimate political power is vested in the

Communist Party, which is a self-selecting, self-perpetuating

hierarchy controlling virtually every element of political

expression at all levels. The Constitution provides that the

party is the "leading and guiding force of Soviet society and

the nucleus of its political system, of all state organizations

and public organizations." Ordinary citizens have little

opportunity to influence the actions of the party. Actual

power within the party flows from the top (the General

Secretary, the Politburo, and the Secretariat), thus allowing

relatively small groups of party officials and leaders to

control the decisions of subordinate bodies. Elections to the

Supreme Soviet (parliament) are based on a single list of

party-approved candidates and are therefore a formality. This

system continues to obstruct the individual initiative that

General Secretary Gorbachev is now seeking in his efforts at

perestroyka and gives opponents of perestroyka the power to

resist change. This situation has led to calls for electoral

reform, including secret balloting and multiple-candidate

elections. Some local government organizations (the "Soviets")

and enterprises have already introduced multiple- candidate

elections. Preliminary reports indicate that many candidates

are handpicked by the body's leadership (by management in

factories), and voting is public.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

The Government contends that all internationally recognized

human rights are fully protected. Soviet authorities have

adopted a more forthcoming approach to foreign criticism of

their human rights record, acknowledging problems and stating

their desire to make their society more "humane." While they

have also acknowledged that the human rights situation in the

U.S.S.R. is subject to discussion in official bilateral

contacts, they continue to insist that these are internal

political problems, and they have not permitted foreigners to

investigate the status of human rights in the U.S.S.R. The

Soviet Government did extend an invitation to several members

of the International Helsinki Watch organization late in 1987

to visit the Soviet Union, and they arrived in January 1988.

International human rights organizations such as Amnesty

International have frequently addressed communications to the

Government concerning human rights, but the authorities have

declined to reply in a substantive manner. The authorities

have suppressed the Moscow chapter of Amnesty International

and published attacks on the organization (including in 1987),

alleging that it works with Western intelligence agencies

against the Soviet Government. On the other hand, authorities

did permit Helsinki Watch Executive Director Jeri Laber to

attend the Moscow Book Fair after many previous refusals. The

Soviets also permitted a number of representatives of Western

nongovernmental organizations to attend the December

unofficial human rights seminar organized in Moscow by the

Press Club Glasnosf, but several key human rights activists

were refused a Soviet visa. Although the seminar, which

attracted over 400 Soviet and foreign participants, was not

broken up, the organizers were harassed, many potential

participants, including Vyacheslav Chornovil, Mihaylo Horyn,

Bohdan Hel ' , and Paruyr Hayrikyan, were forcibly prevented

from traveling to Moscow for the seminar, and Soviet

authorities purposely complicated the logistics. Soviet

officials have indicated willingness to permit nongovernmental

representatives to attend an official human rights conference

in Moscow, if one is held.

The Soviet Government has cooperated with the United States in

investigating allegations that war crimes were committed

during World War II by persons who are now citizens or

residents of the United States. It has permitted the U.S.

Government to take depositions from witnesses in the U.S.S.R.,

has submitted lists of alleged war criminals, and has provided

documentation for use in U.S. courts. There have been

complaints, however, of KGB interference in the depositions,

and possible disinformation in the lists.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status

The Constitution provides for the equal status of individual

Soviet citizens, regardless of nationality, sex, or language.

In reality, the Soviet leadership manipulates these factors in

order to maintain control in the U.S.S.R. These factors,

along with social status, affect a citizen's opportunities

within Soviet society. Beyond that, there is pervasive

discrimination based on national origin, practiced both by

individuals and the Government.

The Soviets recognize more than 100 nationalities in the

U.S.S.R. Many ethnic groups have territorial and

administrative entities: the 15 Soviet republics, many of

which were formerly independent countries, represent some of

the largest and most developed of the nationalities. Despite

a professed commitment to the maintenance of national

identity, actual Soviet policy continues the program of

Russianization, which has taken on a variety of forms over the

years. While mass resettlement of entire ethnic groups is no

longer practiced (although resettled groups have in most cases

not been permitted to return to their original homelands),

assimilation is promoted through more subtle means. The

extent and effectiveness of this policy, implemented to

varying degrees in the different republics, is evident in most

aspects of everyday life, including government, language,

education, media, literature, economics, and even in the legal

system. Universities often accept students according to

unpublished quotas and thus influence careers and advancement

opportunities

•

Some party and government positions traditionally have been

reserved for certain nationalities. For example, the Soviet

leadership has projected Slavic influence in non-Slavic areas

by reserving second secretary positions in republic and lower

level party organizations for Slavs while giving the first

secretary positions to a member of the indigenous ethnic

group. In December 1986, however, the Gorbachev administration

replaced the First Secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party

with a Russian. Nationalist demonstrations took place in the

republic's capital, Alma-ata. Official Kazakhstan sources

stated that up to 3,000 persons had demonstrated; 2 persons (1

student and 1 voluntary militia) were killed, and 200 wounded.

At least 13 persons were convicted in 1987 of crimes

associated with the demonstrations. Several persons were

convicted on charges of rioting, and in some instances,

additional charges. Their sentences were unusually harsh.

Some 2,000 additional people received various forms of

administrative punishment. Five workers were convicted of

"arousing national enmity" but were released because they

"repented." Their factory collective has responsibility for

punishment.

Heavy industry and overall investment remains

disproportionately targeted at areas within the R.S.F.S.R.

This policy has contributed to limited and uneven economic

growth in the non-Russian republics and required the import of

non-Russian labor, thereby forcing migration to the Russian

republic of minorities from other republics.

This migration speeds the process of Russianization as the

minorities are separated even from the limited cultural

institutions permitted in their native republics. The same

result has been accomplished in Estonia, Latvia, and

Lithuania, all of which h

doing the reverse. There, the estsblishment o." Soviet

induRtr.'.es zni the accompanying influx of Slavic workers

during the past 40 years have reduced the proportion of the

indiger.o'is nationality in the total population to a

consido^sble extent.

Certain ethnic giOi.'.ps suffsr parcicularly harshly from Soviet

rep:Rt>3ion of human rights activists. The situation in the

Ukrainiar) Soviet Socialist Republic exemplifies the extent of

Ru3s lani/ation. In a 1987 article in Literaturna (Jkraina,

Ukraine's capital, Kiev, was reported to have only 34

UKrainian-lasiguaue schools, compared with 152 Russian-language

schools; in historically ir?.portant 7aporizhia, thare are 95

Russian -language schools and only one Ukrainian-language

school; in the cities of Donetsk, Voroshilovgrad, Nikolayev,

arid Chernigov, there are no Ukranian-langu^.ge schools at all.

Ukrainir-n history, culture, and religion are often ignored or

dlstor'-.ed. Russianizatioc is also apparent in the publishing

field; in a recent year, less than 3 percent of the books and

brochures published in the K.S.S.R. were in Ukrainian, an

insufficient number to serve the 19 percent of the Soviet

population living in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The de^'filopment of the Ukrainian language (as wall as all

other non-Russian languages in the U.S.S.R.) has been further

stunted by the almost exclusive use of Russian for scientific

and technical publicationn

Ihe Crimean Tatars, a Muslim minority forcibly transported

from their historic Crimean hoir.eiand to Uzbekiscan in 194 5,

contirje to seek repatriation despite tiarsh measures by Soviet

authorities. Tatar representative^ came to Moscow in June and

July to press fo*: reestabiishment of a Crimean Tatar autonomous

republic. Senior Soviet officials, including Politburo member

Andrey Gromyko, who is also Chairm.an of the Presidium of the

Supreme Soviet, and Politburo candidate member Pyotr Demicliev,

received Tatar representatives. On .July 9 a commission headed

by Gromyko was formed to examine the problem. The Tatars

demonstrated on or near Red Square on at least three occasions:

July 5. July 23, and July 25-26. T.he last occasion included

an attempted m.arch to Red Square, vjhich was blocked by Soviet

militia, who acted with restraint.

After a meeting v;ich Gromyko on July 27, the Tatars in Moscow,

numbering between 800-1,000, were forcibly returned to their

homes A subsidiary commission was established in Tashkent to

assist the Gromyko commission, but none of the Tatar leaders

who had been in Moscov; was permitted to participate. Regular

meetings and demonstrations have been held in a number of

cities with large Tatar populations. On September 8, the

official Tashkent commission reportedly sent to the Gromyko

commission the results of a poll of Tatars in Uzbekistan that

revealed republic-wide Tatar support for returning to the

Crim.ea and establishing an autonomous republic.

A protest march that was planned to leave Taman' on October 10

and arrive in Simferopol' in the Crimea October 18 (the day of

the formation of the Crimean Autonomous Republic) was prevented

by the authorities. A number of Soviet newspapers, including

Pravda Vostoka and Moscow News, criticized the attempted march.

However, the Soviet authorities in the Kuban and southern

Ukraine reportedly made some concessions to the Crimean

Tatars. Some from Central Asia were allowed to register in

Taman" (almost unprecedented) and Tatar-language schools,

papers, and a folklore troupe have reportedly been established.

Most minorities in the Soviet Union suffer official government

discrimination. Few ethnic minorities are seen in the highest

levels of nationwide organizations, academic, or governmental

bodies though they tend to dominate their own local

organizations, including at the republic level. Jews live for

the most part assimilated into Russian and Ukrainian cities

and towns but are largely absent from positions of leadership.

Government "anti-Zionist" campaigns have served to aggravate

anti-Semitism. Books such as Aleksandr Romanenko's "Class

Essence of Zionism," which appeared in bookstores in January

1987, put forward a crudely anti-Semitic line; in a country in

which all publishers are government controlled and censored,

this can only be interpreted as government condoned.

Unpublished quotas have restricted Jewish entry into

institutions of higher education; these quotas became

especially restrictive after large numbers of Jews began to

emigrate in the 1970 's. Closing off avenues to higher

education effectively closed off professional careers for many

Jews. At the same time, Soviet authorities took some steps

against anti-Semitism. In the past, Soviet authorities

generally have denied that anti-Semitism existed at all; this

year Gorbachev appealed at the January Central Committee

plenum to repulse all manifestations of anti-Semitism, and

Soviet newspapers, including Izvestiya, Sovetskaya Kultura,

and Komsomol ' skaya Pravda carried articles strongly critical

of anti-Semitism. The Russian nationalist "Pamyaf" society,

some of whose members have made anti-Semitic remarks, was

attacked by some government leaders and in the press, though

it was rumored that some Russian officials supported its

goals. Restrictions on Jewish entry to institutions of higher

education reportedly were eased in 1987.

All imprisoned Hebrew teachers were released this year, some

ahead of schedule and others at the end of their terms. Those

released included Yuliy Edel'shtein, Vladimir Lifshits, Leonid

Vol'vovskiy, losef Zisels (also a member of the Ukrainian

Helsinki Group, and Aleksey Magarik. Hebrew teaching generally

remains forbidden, however.

There were increasing numbers of demonstrations and public

appeals by refuseniks; some resulted in detentions, beatings,

and press vilification. On September 13, a demonstration

against anti-Semitism was prevented by the detention of 18

Moscow Jews. A demonstration on December 6 by refuseniks was

disrupted.

Women normally enjoy the same legal rights as men and are

nominally accorded the right to participate in all areas of

the social, political, and economic life of the Soviet Union,

An extensive system of day-care service and maternity leave

benefits enhances the ability of women to retain employment.

Virtually all women have no choice but to work both inside and

outside the home, with women bearing the main brunt of the

hardship of daily life, such as waiting in long lines for food

products. Women hold a disproportionate percentage of

low-level jobs, such as street-sweeping. The difficulty of

women's lives in the Soviet Union has begun to be discussed in

the Soviet press. Men occupy the great majority of leading

positions in most professions, especially politics. At

present, 12 of 307 full members of the Central Committee of

the Soviet Communist Party are women, and for the first time

in two decades a woman was appointed a Secretary of the

Central Committee.

Most members of the Soviet elite (the party, the military, the

diplomatic service, the scientific-technical intelligentsia,

and the cultural and sports establishments) are shielded to

various degrees from social and economic hardships. They have

greater access than the average Soviet to quality food and

consumer goods, special medical facilities, the best schools,

foreign travel, automobiles, country houses, and paid

vacations at choice resorts.

CONDITIONS OF LABOR

The statutory minimum age for employment of children in 1986

was 16, and the standard workweek was 40 hours. There is no

indication of widespread violation of these norms. The minimum

wage was set at $112 per m.onth at the official rate of

exchange. According to the latest Soviet official data, the

average wage is about $272 per month. Soviet law establishes

minimum conditions of health and safety. According to the

Soviet press, the laws on maximum hours of work and health and

safety standards are v/idely ignored.

ecoi.net description:: Annual report on the human rights situation (covering 1987) [automatic text recognition from scan by archive.org; refer to original scan in case of errors]

Country:: Russian Federation
Source:: USDOS – US Department of State (Author)
Published:: February 1988
Original link:: http://archive.org/stream/countryreportson1987unit/countryreportson1987unit_djvu.txt
Document type:: Periodical Report
Language:: English
Document ID:: 1117326 (former ID 240300)