Document #1070182
Freedom House (Author)
2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
National Democratic Governance | 5.50 | 5.75 | 6.00 | 6.00 | 5.75 | 5.75 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 |
Electoral Process | 4.50 | 4.75 | 5.25 | 5.25 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 4.75 | 4.50 | 4.50 | 4.50 |
Civil Society | 3.50 | 3.50 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 |
Independent Media | 4.00 | 4.25 | 4.25 | 4.25 | 4.25 | 4.25 | 4.25 | 4.00 | 4.00 | 4.00 |
Local Democratic Governance | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.25 | 5.25 |
Judicial Framework and Independence | 4.75 | 4.75 | 4.75 | 4.75 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 4.75 |
Corruption | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 4.75 | 4.50 | 4.50 | 4.50 | 4.50 | 4.50 |
Democracy Score | 4.68 | 4.79 | 4.93 | 4.93 | 4.86 | 4.82 | 4.75 | 4.68 | 4.64 | 4.61 |
NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. If consensus cannot be reached, Freedom House is responsible for the final ratings. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s).
Democratic institutions and practices in Georgia saw signs of development, stagnation, and even regression in 2015. Positively, the year saw increased evidence of political pluralism and a noticeable slowing in new prosecutions against former officials from the previously ruling United National Movement (UNM), while the structural independence and functionality of the Georgian judicial system were largely sustained in 2015. However, there were also signs of stagnation and even possible regression in other areas, and particularly in the realm of media freedom. While the Georgian media landscape remains diverse and largely pluralistic, the investigation and prosecution of the leading opposition media outlet, Rustavi2, points to political pressure by elements of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) coalition.
After gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia was mired in a succession of separatist conflicts, civil wars, and persistent economic depression in the 1990s. After peaceful protests known as the Rose Revolution ousted former President Eduard Shevardnadze in late 2003, the UNM’s Mikheil Saakashvili held the presidency from 2004 to 2013. The UNM was effective in combating low-level graft, strengthening state institutions, and diminishing both organized and petty criminality, but its agenda often ran contrary to the rule of law, and power was concentrated among a small circle of UNM elites. Growing popular dissatisfaction led to a surprise victory by the GD coalition in 2012, and Georgian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili became prime minister, resulting in an uneasy cohabitation with Saakashvili. Ivanishvili resigned from the premiership in 2013, upholding previous promises to remain in office only briefly, and his longtime associate Irakli Gharibashvili assumed the post through December 2015. Despite Ivanishvili’s departure, he remained active in GD party affairs, leading to accusations from the UNM and other opposition politicians that he maintained power through informal means and was therefore unaccountable. After coming to power in 2012, the GD-led government also embarked on a campaign of what some GD leaders termed “restorative justice,” which targeted former state officials from the UNM. While UNM officials did engage in abuses during their period in power, critics claimed that the GD’s campaign was politically motivated and largely arbitrary. Frequent statements by senior GD officials assuming UNM officials’ guilt lent further evidence to this view.
New cases against UNM ex-officials largely ceased in 2015, though litigation against existing defendants continued. In a particularly high-profile case, former Tbilisi Mayor Gigi Ugulava was found guilty on a variety of corruption charges and sentenced to four and a half years in prison in September, after extended periods of pretrial detention that the Georgian Constitutional Court had found unconstitutional. Another former UNM official, onetime Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili, was acquitted in absentia in the same month. Additionally, senior Defense Ministry staffers arrested and charged with corruption in 2014, coinciding with a public fallout between Ivanishvili and former GD Defense Minister Irakli Alasania, were released from pretrial detention and allowed to return to work. While the prosecutions raised questions about politicization, regular contrary rulings by various Georgian courts highlighted a degree of independence not previously seen in the judiciary.
However, there is evidence of potential regression in independence of the media. Rustavi2, the country’s most popular television channel that is also closely linked with the opposition UNM, was subjected to court-imposed limited asset freezes in 2015. The August court decision came amid a lawsuit by a previous owner seeking to reclaim shares of the company that he claims had been illegally seized under the UNM government. While asset freezes and injunctions are not uncommon in such cases, independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) detected problematic patterns in the handling of the case suggesting that the process could be politicized. Comments from senior GD officials presuming Rustavi2’s guilt did nothing to dispel this notion. Also of concern was a string of cancelled television programming across multiple channels during the summer, which critics claimed was a result of government pressure. Allegedly, senior GD officials were pressuring channels to modify their talk show programming in favor of new content to boost GD’s flagging public image ahead of planned parliamentary elections in 2016.
The question of Rustavi 2’s ownership raises major questions about the integrity and freedom of the media in Georgia, which have seen significant improvement in recent years but remain fragile and susceptible to potential abuse. At the same time, it also underscores the problems with maintaining a democratic trajectory while redressing the abuses of the previous regime when that regime is the principal opposition party.
Score Changes:
As a result, Georgia’s Democracy Score improved from 4.64 to 4.61.
Outlook for 2016: The parliamentary elections, scheduled for October, will be next year’s most significant political event. Given the expected tight race, the year is likely to see increased levels of political activity from the ruling GD coalition and from parliamentary and non-parliamentary opposition groups. Due to falling support for GD and largely stagnant backing for UNM, the main beneficiaries of the elections could be non-parliamentary opposition parties, if current trends continue. These parties include a number of pro-Russia and anti-West groupings, which have the potential to fundamentally change the character of Georgian parliamentary politics, though they are unlikely to win enough support to gain power on their own. The fate of Rustavi2 and former Tbilisi mayor Gigi Ugulava will remain a topic of discussion as appeals cases are likely to conclude in 2016.
2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
5.50 | 5.75 | 6.00 | 6.00 | 5.75 | 5.75 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 |
2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4.50 | 4.75 | 5.25 | 5.25 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 4.75 | 4.50 | 4.50 | 4.50 |
2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
3.50 | 3.50 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 |
2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4.00 | 4.25 | 4.25 | 4.25 | 4.25 | 4.25 | 4.25 | 4.00 | 4.00 | 4.00 |
2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.25 | 5.25 |
2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4.75 | 4.75 | 4.75 | 4.75 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 4.75 |
2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 4.75 | 4.50 | 4.50 | 4.50 | 4.50 | 4.50 |
Author: Michael Hikari Cecire
Michael Hikari Cecire is an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and co-founder of the Tbilisi-based Georgian Institute of Politics. He has researched politics and foreign relations in Georgia and the wider Black Sea region since 2007, and has lived and worked in Georgia for over three years. Cecire is co-editor of Georgian Foreign Policy: The Quest for Sustainable Security (2014), and has published peer-reviewed articles on Eurasian politics in Orbis (2013), Demokratizatsiya (2014), E Cadernos CES (2014), and has a chapter in a forthcoming multiauthor volume from Routledge. His analyses on the region have recently appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, World Politics Review, the Washington Post, the Caucasus Analytical Digest, and Business New Europe, where he is the Colchis columnist. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Pennsylvania.
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[34] "National Integrity System—Georgia: Civil Society," Transparency International Georgia, 2011, http://www.transparency.ge/nis/2011/civil-society
[35] "Six Detained in Clashes Outside Parliament in Tbilisi," Democracy and Freedom Watch, 12 March 2015, http://dfwatch.net/six-detained-in-clashes-outside-parliament-in-tbilisi-34262
[36] "Free Zone Members Were Beaten at Pro-Russian Rally," Rustavi2, 24 September 2015, http://rustavi2.com/en/news/27068
[37] "Ivanishvili Slams NGO's Head and President's Adviser," Democracy and Freedom Watch, 27 April 2015, http://dfwatch.net/ivanishvili-slams-at-ngos-head-and-presidents-adviser-35323
[38] Ana Robakidze, "Georgian NGOs: Ivanishvili a Threat to Civil Society," The Messenger Online, 3 February 2015, http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/3300_february_3_2015/3300_ani.html
[39] Khatuna Chigogidze, "Who Will Inherit Kakha Bendukidze's Wealth," Georgian Journal, 18 November 2014, http://www.georgianjournal.ge/society/28771-who-will-inherit-kakha-bendukidzes-wealth.html
[40] Nata Dzvelishvili and Tazo Kupreishvili, "Russian Influence of Georgian NGOs and Media," Damoukidebloba, 15 June 2015, https://idfi.ge/public/upload/IDFI/media.and.NGO.pdf
[41] Michael Cecire, "The Kremlin Pulls on Georgia," Foreign Policy, 9 March 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/09/the-kremlin-pulls-on-georgia/
[42] "2015 World Press Freedom Index," Reporters Without Borders, 12 February 2015, http://index.rsf.org/#!/; "Eastern Partnership Media Freedom Index: Updated," Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, 26 September 2014, http://eap-csf.eu/en/news-events/news/eastern-partnership-media-freedom-index-updated/
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[47] "One of Ex-Owners in Court Bid to Reclaim Rustavi 2 TV," Civil Georgia, 7 August 2015, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28484
[48] "Court Orders Rustavi 2 TV Asset Freeze," Civil Georgia, 07 August 2015, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28486
[49] "NGOs Respond to the Rustavi 2 Asset Freeze," Transparency International Georgia, 10 August 2015, http://www.transparency.ge/en/post/general-announcement/ngos-respond-rustavi2-asset-freeze
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[51] "Judge Rules in Favor of Ex-Owner in Rustavi 2 TV Ownership Dispute," Civil Georgia, 3 November 2015, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28738
[52] "Constitutional Court Suspends Clause on Immediate Enforcement of Verdicts in Civil Disputes," Civil Georgia, 2 November 2015, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28733
[53] "Judge Orders Rustavi 2 TV's Chief Executives to Be Replaced," Civil Georgia, 6 November 2015, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28748
[54] "In Quotes: Int'l Reactions to Rustavi 2 TV Case," Civil Georgia, 7 November 2015, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28756; "Giorgi Margvelashvili Made a Statement on 'Rustavi 2' Case," Rustavi2, 6 November 2015, http://web1.rustavi2.com/en/news/31041; "Ivanishvili Has Questions to Tamaz Urtmelidze," Rustavi2, 10 November 2015, http://rustavi2.com/en/news/31375
[55] "Court Reverses Rustavi 2 Director's Dismissal and Reinstates Management," Democracy and Freedom Watch, 12 November 2015, http://dfwatch.net/court-reverses-rustavi-2-directors-dismissal-and-reinstates-management-38942
[56] Giorgi Lomsadze, "Georgia's Rustavi2 Case: Was Justice Served?," EurasiaNet.org, 16 November 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/76111
[57] "Host of Cancelled Talk-Shows: Politics was Behind the Decision," Democracy and Freedom Watch, 1 September 2015, http://dfwatch.net/host-of-cancelled-talk-shows-politics-was-behind-the-decision-38069
[58] "Local Self-Government in Georgia: 1991-2014," International Center for Civic Culture, 2 July 2015, http://www.ivote.ge/images/doc//local%20democracy%20development%20report_english%20final%202.pdf
[59] Katharina Hoffmann, Arman Melkonyan, Anar Valiyev, and Michael Cecire, "No 74, Caucasus Analytical Digest: Local Governance," Caucasus Analytical Digest, 30 June 2015, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=192096
[60] "Orthodox Church Weighs in Local Self-Governance Reform Debate," Civil Georgia, 4 December 2013, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26760
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[64] "Judiciary After Parliamentary Elections 2012," Transparency International Georgia, 25 July 2013, http://www.transparency.ge/en/node/3280
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[68] "International Legal Experts Offer Advice to Georgia's Chief Prosecutor's Office," Agenda.ge, 22 July 2014, http://agenda.ge/news/18432
[69] Author Interviews with Georgian Officials, October 2015.
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[71] "Ugulava Found Guilty of Misspending, Sentenced to 4.5 Years in Prison," Civil Georgia, 18 September 2015, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28580
[72] "Ex-Defense Minister Akhalaia Remaded in Pre-Trial Detention," Civil Georgia, 05 July 2014, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27447
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[74] "Court Delivers Partly Guilty Verdict Against Gigi Ugulava, Acquits Davit Kezerashvili," Inter Press News, 19 September 2015, http://www.interpressnews.ge/en/justice/72295-court-delivers-partly-guilty-verdict-against-gigi-ugulava-acquits-davit-kezerashvili.html
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[76] “PM Questions Credibility of NDI-Commissioned Poll,” Civil Georgia, 18 October 2015, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28666
[77] “PM: UNM Has ‘No Right to Remain in Politics,’” Civil Georgia, 22 October 2015, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28679
[78] Paul Rimple, "Who Owned Georgia (2003–2012)," Transparency International Georgia, 18 December 2012, http://www.transparency.ge/en/node/2619
[79] "Tbilisi Mayoral Officials Resign Amid Corruption Scandals," RFE/RL, 5 March 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/tbilisi-mayoral-officials-resign-amid-corruption-scandal/26883443.html
[80] "Two Defense Officials Accused of Corruption Given Their Jobs Back," Democracy and Freedom Watch, 13 August 2015, http://dfwatch.net/two-defense-ministry-employees-accused-of-corruption-given-their-jobs-back-37778
[81] "Former Head of Pardon Commission Alexander Elisashvili Being Questioned at Prosecutor's Office," Inter Press News, 9 December 2015, http://www.interpressnews.ge/en/justice/74459-former-head-of-pardon-commission-alexander-elisashvili-being-questioned-at-prosecutors-office.html
[82] "Nepotism, Abuse of Power, and Bribery: Public Opinion Survey Outcomes," Transparency International Georgia, 25 September 2015, http://www.transparency.ge/en/blog/nepotism-abuse-power-and-bribery-public-opinion-survey-outcomes
[83] "TI Georgia Proposes Criminalization of Nepotism in the Civil Service," Transparency International Georgia, 10 March 2015, http://www.transparency.ge/en/node/5078
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