Over the past decade, Kyrgyzstan has seen the return of authoritarianism and weathered two violent regime changes. In March 2005 opposition groups ousted President Askar Akayev, accusing him of centralizing political power and concentrating control over economic resources in his own hands. In April 2010 Akayev’s successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, was forced to flee the country because of his ruthless suppression of opposition voices and even greater levels of corruption within his regime. To prevent the emergence of another dictator, the leaders of the post-Bakiyev interim administration designed a new constitution that increased the parliament’s powers and limits presidents to a single six-year term. In 2010–11 Kyrgyzstan held its first genuinely competitive parliamentary and presidential elections, becoming the first country in Central Asia to transfer political power by means of elections.

Despite initial concerns about its viability, Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary system has functioned for over two years with relative calm. President Almazbek Atambayev has displayed a tendency to try to consolidate power, and in 2012 he secured the appointment of a loyalist, Jantoro Satybaldiyev, as prime minister; the parliament speaker since 2011, Asilbek Jeenbekov, is a member of the president’s Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK). Nevertheless, the parliament remains strong and represents all of the country’s most powerful political forces. The president is particularly challenged by the opposition Ata-Jurt (Fatherland) party, whose leader, Kamchybek Tashiyev, organized protests in Bishkek in early October and demanded Atambayev’s resignation on the grounds that he had failed to nationalize the country’s largest gold mine, Kumtor. Tashiyev was placed under arrest, and other members of parliament (MPs) criticized him for instigating unrest without first exhausting all available peaceful means for challenging the president.

During the first two years under the new constitution, the parliament produced four different ruling coalitions. The most recent reorganization occurred in August 2012, when Prime Minister Omurbek Babanov resigned amid accusations of corruption and inefficient economic policies. The subsequent coalition included the SDPK, Ar-Namys (Dignity), and Ata-Meken (Motherland), with Babanov’s Respublika party joining Ata-Jurt in the parliamentary opposition.

It remains to be seen whether Kyrgyzstan’s new decentralized political system will lead to better governance, more consolidated democratic institutions, and better economic policies. As of late 2012, economic growth continued to be sluggish, and government reforms were moving slowly. At the same time, although many MPs still put their individual interests ahead of those of their constituents and form alliances based on patronage networks, parliamentary debates have become more consistent and substantive.

The country is split along regional lines, with a more politically liberal north—featuring a high concentration of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and media outlets in the capital, Bishkek—and a southern region where local governments pursue nationalistic policies that discriminate against ethnic minorities.

MPs and government officials from all factions have generally avoided addressing the issues of ethnic equality and human rights. For example, the perpetrators of the June 2010 ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan, which took the lives of nearly 470 people, predominantly ethnic Uzbeks, still have not been brought to justice. Using foreign donor funds, a number of Kyrgyz NGOs have conducted their own investigations into the violence, alleging that the police and armed forces distributed weapons to the ethnic Kyrgyz population and failed to protect ethnic Uzbeks. Uzbeks are not represented in the local governments of southern Kyrgyzstan and are scarcely represented at the national level, although some attempts to restore Uzbek-language media were made during 2012, mostly with the support of international donors.

Local governments gained independence from the national authorities in 2012 thanks to competitive elections for local councils. The SDPK and Respublika performed well in the balloting in March and November, though they faced strong challenges from local parties. In Osh the national parties were outpolled by controversial mayor Melis Myrzakmatov’s nationalist Uluttar Birimdigi (Unity of Ethnicities) party. In Bishkek they contended with a smaller party called Zamandash (Contemporary).

Kyrgyzstan’s civil society sector continues to diversify and expand its reach to vulnerable groups, while the growing number of online media outlets and newspapers offer a greater range of views. However, most of these positive developments take place in Bishkek, whereas access to media outlets and NGO activity is still limited in rural areas. Furthermore, the prosecution of Vladimir Farafonov, an ethnic Russian journalist, demonstrated in 2012 that justice is selective and tends to protect the ethnic majority. Farafonov was accused of politically motivated extremism after he published a series of articles that criticized rising Kyrgyz nationalism in the media and politics. None of the many journalists openly promoting the dominance of ethnic Kyrgyz or inciting hatred against minority groups in the aftermath of ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010 has ever been arrested for similar charges.

National Democratic Governance. Kyrgyzstan’s parliament has been able to function under the new constitution for over two years. The country’s political system remains decentralized and competitive. In 2012 the parliament demonstrated that it is able to hold meaningful political debates around issues of national concern. However, in a sign that power may again be concentrating in the executive branch, President Almazbek Atambayev secured the election of a loyal prime minster, while opposition MPs were selectively prosecuted for alleged corruption. Kyrgyzstan’s rating for national democratic governance remains unchanged at 6.50.

Electoral Process. Elections for local councils were held throughout country in March and November 2012. The balloting was inclusive and highly competitive, continuing the trend set during parliamentary elections in 2010 and the presidential election in 2011, though several parties complained of widespread irregularities on election day. In some parts of the country, local parties prevailed over those represented in the parliament. The competition among national and local parties was particularly fierce in Bishkek. Kyrgyzstan’s rating for electoral process remains unchanged at 5.50.

Civil Society. Kyrgyzstan’s civil society operates for the most part without political pressure, and although mutual distrust remains a problem, NGOs, MPs, and government officials frequently find areas for cooperation. In 2012 NGOs played an active role in designing police reforms, investigating crimes committed by army and police personnel during the Osh violence in 2010, and lobbying the legislature to crack down on the kidnapping of women for marriage. Civil society organizations continue to depend heavily on foreign funding, and most activity is concentrated in the capital. Activists encounter greater challenges in the southern parts of the country. Consequently, Kyrgyzstan’s rating for civil society remains unchanged at 4.75.

Independent Media. Kyrgyzstan’s mass media remain mostly free from government control, though public media tend to portray the president in a neutral or positive light. A growing number of people are gaining access to the internet, including through mobile devices. While online content is not censored, the authorities have announced plans to restrict access to unspecified “extremist” websites. In July 2012, ethnic Russian journalist Vladimir Farafonov was convicted and fined for inciting ethnic hatred through his online articles. Following the shutdown of Uzbek-language mass media outlets in 2010, at least one radio station and several local newspapers in the southern parts of the country have begun to publish their content in Uzbek. Urban populations continue to enjoy greater access to mass media than those living in rural areas. Kyrgyzstan’s rating for independent media remains unchanged at 6.25.

Local Democratic Governance. The competitive local elections throughout the country in 2012 showed that earlier reforms have strengthened local government institutions, increasing their independence from the national authorities. Several new local parties emerged to compete in the elections, some of which were able to gain significant support among voters. Despite these gains, the quality of local governance remains poor in many places. Local authorities are rarely subject to media scrutiny and typically unaccustomed to consultation with civil society. The powerful mayor of Osh continues to rule with the assistance of an informal private security force. Kyrgyzstan’s rating for local democratic governance improves from 6.50 to 6.25.

Judicial Framework and Independence. Kyrgyzstan has launched several efforts to reform the judicial sector and law enforcement bodies. NGOs and experts with various backgrounds participate in the process. However, progress has been slow. Some judges elected to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court by a special committee composed of MPs and NGO representatives have dubious credentials and might be allied with political forces. The judicial system still has not provided justice to the victims of ethnic violence in 2010. Kyrgyzstan’s rating for judicial framework and independence remains unchanged at 6.25.

Corruption. President Atambayev announced a new anticorruption campaign in 2012. He pledged that no one in the country would be immune from prosecution, including members of his own party. Some progress has been made in improving the work of the financial police. In practice, however, most prosecutions for corruption have been selective and targeted opposition MPs. Kyrgyzstan’s rating for corruption remains unchanged at 6.25.

Outlook for 2013. The main question for Kyrgyzstan in 2013 is whether the parliament, government, and president will be able to collaborate effectively without challenging one another’s constitutionally allocated powers or allowing the concentration of power in one person’s hands. To date, all branches of government have withstood efforts to increase or reduce their authority despite multiple changes in the composition of the governing coalition and the cabinet. Meanwhile, the parliament has learned how to conduct debates on policy issues and seek broad compromises.

The country’s stability in 2013 will largely depend on the ability of elected officials to design viable economic policies. Specifically, if the government fails to deal with issues of energy and food security faced by the majority of the population, it is likely to face new mass protests, both spontaneous and organized by opposition leaders. Kyrgyzstan will also be tested as to whether its decentralized political system can produce good governance, and whether the current leadership can advance law enforcement reforms that began in 2010.

The political process in Kyrgyzstan has often been delayed by political and personal bickering between MPs and government officials. In the best-case scenario for the remainder of the parliament’s current five-year term, the chamber will develop more stable political alliances. In the worst case, the president could dissolve the parliament for failing to form or sustain a ruling coalition and government.