Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1991
IRAN
* Because of the absence of a United States Mission in Iran,
this report draws heavily on unofficial sources.
Iran is an Islamic Republic under the leadership of Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei. The formal system of government, based on a
Constitution approved in 1980 by popular referendum and revised
in July 1989, features a parliament and a president elected
from among multiple candidates by universal suffrage. However,
all candidates must meet highly restrictive religious and
political criteria imposed by the Council of Guardians, and as
a result the choice offered to voters is narrow. The
Government, dominated by a political elite composed of Shi '
a
Muslim clerics and of laymen allied with these clerics,
attempts to impose its views on political and socioreligious
orthodoxy. However, there remain significant factional
differences on important economic and political issues.
The Government's hold on power continues to be reinforced
through arrests, summary trials and executions, ' and other forms
of intimidation implemented by an extensive internal security
system. Political arrests are made by the Revolutionary Guards
and by security forces operating under the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security.
Iran has a mixed economy. Although Islam guarantees the right
to private ownership, the Government has nationalized the banks
and several basic industries, including the petroleum and
utilities sector. Oil exports are a primary source of foreign
exchange. The disruptions of the revolution, the destruction
from the Iran-Iraq war, devastating earthc[uakes in 1990, and
government mismanagement have caused serious economic
deterioration. Inflation is estimated at 50 to 80 percent,
about 40 percent of the work force is unemployed, and
corruption and black market activities are rife. Many
industries are operating at less than half of capacity. While
an economic 5-Year Plan was approved in 1990, implementation of
reconstruction programs has been slow.
There was no evidence of significant improvement in the
Government's human rights practices; it continues to be a major
abuser of human rights. It was, however, difficult to know
precisely the details and numbers of such abuses in 1991
because of the great lengths to which the Government goes to
keep such information secret. Domestic elements that might
monitor and report on the Government's practices are ruthlessly
suppressed. The Government finally allowed a December visit by
the U.N. Special Representative for Iran, and signed an
agreement to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to visit prisoners. This report makes every effort to
describe the situation in Iran accurately within the confines
of the Government ' s efforts to obfuscate its record on human
rights.
Abuses included summary executions; widespread torture;
repression of the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and
association; arbitrary detentions; lack of fair trials;
continuing repression of the Baha'i religious community; denial
of citizens' right to change their government; and severe
restrictions on women's and worker rights. In his November
1990 report, the Special Representative concluded that "the
enormous quantity and variety of allegations and complaints
received from very diverse sources .. .provide a credible factual
basis for the belief that human rights violations occur
frequently in the country and that governinent action to prevent
and remedy such violations has not been sufficient to put an
end to them .
"
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There is no reliable estimate of the number of people killed
for political reasons in 1991. Given the lack of basic
procedural safeguards in political trials, most of the
executions ordered each year in such cases amount to summary
executions.
There continued to be credible reports that political prisoners
are among those executed for criminal offenses, and the
Government has repeatedly indicated in public statements that
it equates active opposition to Iran's Islamic revolution with
terrorism. In addition, the Government continues to carry out
political executions of its opponents residing abroad. As of
year's end, the French Government's investigation into the
August assassination of former Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar
and his assistant had resulted in a warrant for the arrest of
an Iranian governinent official.
b. Disappearance
The number of disappearances in 1991 is unknown. The situation
is complicated by the lack of government information on many
political prisoners. Many families of executed political
prisoners reportedly have not been informed officially of their
relatives' deaths. The Government responded to many of the
Special Representative's requests for information on specific
prisoners by denying that it had any judicial record of them.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Accounts of torture in Iran's prisons continued to be received
in 1991. Persistent reports tell that detainees are tortured
in detention, and that arbitrary brutality in the treatment of
convicted prisoners is common. There are also credible
reports, as noted by the Special Representative, that prisoners
are frequently held in solitary confinement or denied adequate
rations or medical care as a way of forcing them to confess.
Guards have threatened and intimidated family members of
detainees, and relatives or other prisoners have occasionally
been forced to watch torture. It is not known if such
practices occurred in 1991.
Prisoner protests against poor prison conditions have
reportedly been met with beatings, denial of medical care, and,
in some cases, execution. The Special Representative reported
that a "Prisoner's Organization" exists to redress
mistreatment. However, no information is available on its
activities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arbitrary arrest and detention is a major abuse, but it is not
known how many cases there may have been in 1991. It is known
that some persons have been arrested on trumped-up criminal
charges when their actual "offenses" were political. The lack
of fair trials and other procedural safeguards encourages such
practices.
No judicial determination of the legality of detention exists
in Iranian law. There is reportedly no legal time limit on
incommunicado detention. Suspects are held for questioning at
local Revolutionary Guard offices or in jails.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There are essentially two different court systems. The civil
courts deal with criminal offenses, and the revolutionary
courts, established in 1979, try "political" offenses as well
as cases involving narcotics trafficking and "crimes against
God."
By international standards, no trial by a revolutionary court
can be called fair or public in the usual sense. If the trial
is staged publicly, it is generally because the prisoner has
already been forced to confess to a crime. Persons tried by
the revolutionary courts enjoy virtually no procedural or
substantive safeguards. The Special Representative reported
that trials lasting 5 minutes and less are common. He also
noted in his February 1991 report many examples of the lack of
basic procedural guarantees, mentioning particularly the
problem of limited access to a lawyer. The right to a defense
counsel is theoretically provided for in the Iranian
Constitution, but many defendants do not have access to a
lawyer, are unable to call witnesses on their behalf, and are
unable to appeal. One observer with 30 years of judicial
experience told the Special Representative that lawyers are
generally not permitted to appear before the revolutionary
courts and are harassed and intimidated if they insist. Some
persons have been imprisoned beyond the limit of their
sentence, and even executed after the formal expiration of
their prison term.
There was no evidence in 1991 of judicial reform that would
bring Iranian courts into compliance with international
standards. Adoption of a draft law to guarantee legal counsel
for defendants was blocked by a lack of approval by the Council
of Guardians. Critics of the law also saw it as flawed because
it did not guarantee that counsel be provided by a qualified
attorney-at-law.
The judicial system is weakened by the fact that revolutionary
courts can consider cases formally under the jurisdiction of
the civil and criminal courts. Assignment of cases to regular
rather than revolutionary courts is haphazard and apparently
occurs mainly when arrests are made by regular police.
Revolutionary courts may also overturn the decisions of the
civilian courts. The review authority of the Supreme Court is
also limited.
For common criminal offenses, many elements of the
prerevolutionary judicial system survive, and the accused often
have the right to a public trial with benefit of lawyers of
their own choosing, assuming they can afford the fee. Even
this judiciary is not fully independent, however. Many of the
former judges were retired after the revolution, and new judges
were selected. Political and Islamic acceptability is a
requirement for any government position, including the
judiciary. Favorable verdicts reportedly can often be
"purchased" from the judges serving on civil and criminal
courts and, to a lesser degree, from judges of the
revolutionary courts. The expert cited above told the Special
Representative that even in ordinary penal cases lawyers must
be extremely careful, and mentioned the example of a colleague
who was indicted after requesting an additional hearing in a
case. In general, the expert said, the practice of interfering
with lawyers was becoming worse.
No reliable estimate is available on the number of political
prisoners. The Minister of Intelligence and Security reported
to the press in August that there were 500 prisoners from
"minigroups, " a term generally used to describe political
opposition groups, as opposed to 1,000 in 1988.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The Government rejects the Western distinction between a public
sphere which the State may control and a sphere of private life
(religion, culture, thought, and private behavior) which the
State may not properly control. Authorities enter homes,
wiretap telephones, and open mail, but these activities are
less common now than they were before 1982.
Special Revolutionary Guard units and security forces check on
social activities. Women whose clothing does not completely
cover the hair and all of the body except hands and face, or
who wear makeup, are subject to arrest. In the past, men have
also been recjuired to dress "modestly," eschewing, for example,
short-sleeved shirts. Enforcement of standards of Islamic
morality has appeared to vary with the political climate and
the jurisdiction. There have been periodic crackdowns by the
Head Office for Combating Unlawful Acts on dress code and moral
violations. However, there were increasing reports in 1991 of
instances in which women both individually and collectively
challenged the authority of the Special Revolutionary Guards to
impose "proper" dress.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
According to the Constitution, "publications and the press may
express ideas freely, except when they are contrary to Islamic
principles or are detrimental to public rights." In practice,
most publications are controlled by the Government; independent
publishers run the risk not only of press shutdowns and
confiscation of publications and equipment but of arrest and
summary punishment if they are overly critical of the
Government.
All books must be submitted to the Ministry of Islamic Guidance
for review before they may be published. Publishers, authors,
and printers also engage in substantial self-censorship before
submitting books to the Ministry in an effort to avoid the
considerable penalties, including economic losses, incurred
when books are rejected. Iranian authorities have interpreted
broadly their right to censorship on religious grounds,
including official acceptance of the 1991 renewal of the
religious decree condemning British author Salman Rushdie to
death for his book "Satanic Verses."
Newspapers, which are usually associated with various
government factions, reflect a variety of viewpoints.
Generally, newspapers can and do criticize government policies
and officials both in their reporting and editorials.
Newspapers are forbidden, however, to criticize the concept of
the Islamic republic or to promote ethnic minority rights.
Nevertheless, some independent publishers out of favor with the
Government continue to survive, and some books and pamphlets
critical of the Government are published without reprisal.
Foreign books, newspapers, and magazines may be imported only
after they have been reviewed by the Ministry of Islamic
Guidance.
All broadcasting facilities are government owned, and the
content of their broadcasting reflects the political and
socioreligious ideology of the Government.
Restrictions on academic freedom continue to be less severe.
However, course content is still monitored, and there is little
genuine critical discussion of issues. Informers are said to
be common on campus and in the classroom. To achieve tenure,
professors reportedly must cooperate with government
authorities over a period of years. All textbooks proposed for
use at the universities are reviewed by government authorities
to determine their acceptability.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution permits unarmed assemblies and marches
"provided they do not violate the principles of Islam." In
practice, the only ones permitted are those sponsored by the
Government, such as Friday prayers and parades and
demonstrations on official occasions. Throughout 1991 there
were reports of unofficial and spontaneous demonstrations
against the Government, many of them centering on the
deteriorating economy. These demonstrations were suppressed by
government forces.
Article 26 of the Constitution allows the formation of
political parties, groups, and professional associations, as
well as Islamic and some minority religious associations,
provided they do not violate the principles of "freedom,
sovereignty, [and] national unity" or question Islam or the
Islamic Republic. In practice, most independent organizations
have either been banned, co-opted by the Government, or are
moribund.
The Freedom Movement, founded in 1961, continues to be harassed
by Iranian authorities and was declared illegal in 1991.
According to reliable reports, the Movement's telephones are
tapped, its mail opened, and its members subjected to
intimidation. While the Movement participated in the first
parliamentary election after the revolution, it was prevented
from doing so in all subsequent elections. Nine members of the
Movement associated with the Association for the Defense of the
Freedom and Sovereignty of the Iranian Nation who were arrested
in May 1990 for their political opposition were finally
convicted in secret trials in September 1991 and sentenced to
terms of up to 3 years. Others arrested at the same time were
released after "confessing" the "wrongness of their stand
towards the Islamic Republic," according to government
sources. The Government claimed that the nine who were
convicted were "charged with participating in gatherings and
collaborating to take actions against the internal and external
security of the country, " and not for having signed an open
letter of protest to President Rafsanjani.
c. Freedom of Religion
Religion is almost inseparable from government in Iran. The
President and many other top officials are mullahs (Islamic
clergymen), as are the Speaker of the Parliament and nearly
half the parliamentary deputies.
Approximately 90 percent of Iranians are Shi ' a Muslims. Aside
from slightly over 1 percent who are non-Muslims (Baha'is,
Christians, Zoroastrians, and Jews), the rest are Sunni
Muslims. The Sunnis are mostly Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans,
Baluch, and other ethnic minorities whose political influence
is very limited. The Constitution declares that "the official
religion of Iran is Islam and the sect followed is Ja'fari
Shi 'ism," but it also states that "other Islcimic denominations
shall enjoy complete respect."
The small Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian (the pre-Islamic
religion of Iran) populations are concentrated mainly in urban
areas. Their religions are recognized by the Constitution, and
they elect representatives to seats reserved for them in the
Parliament. They are permitted to practice their religions, to
instruct their children, and—although with a great deal of
disruptive interference—to maintain schools.
In his February 1991 report, the Special Representative said
that religious minorities are freely able to practice their
faith, noting for example that the Armenian Christians operate
7 active churches in Tehran and 12 in Isfahan, and are able to
bury their dead in their own cemeteries. He also noted that
the Armenians, who number about 200,000, are permitted to
publish a weekly newspaper and to operate a number of cultural
associations.
Reports from other sources, however, suggest that while there
is little overt discrimination against Christians,
administrative and other official harassment is commonplace.
In the case of the Chaldean Catholics (numbering about 14,000),
the Government has reportedly refused to renew the church's
registration and has, as a result, denied requests to print
Bibles, construct chapels, or engage in registered charitable
activities. The Presbyterian church has allegedly suffered
similar interference from the authorities; while the Interior
Ministry was said to have allowed elections for church
officials, it disrupted the meeting at which they took place
and obstructed the balloting. In addition, it was confirmed
that a Christian pastor. Reverend Hossein Soodmand, was
executed in December 1990 in Mashad, apparently on charges of
apostasy, based on his earlier conversion from Islam to
Christianity and proselytizing activity. There were again
reports in 1991 that another Christian convert from Islam,
Mehdi Debadj , has been held in prison since his arrest in 1983
for apostasy.
The Government in 1991 continued to discriminate against the
Baha ' i community, Iran's largest non-Muslim minority (300,000
to 350,000 members). The Baha'i religion is considered a
"misguided sect" by the authorities and is not officially
recognized.As it has over the past few years, the Government continued to
mitigate its repression of individual Baha'is. No Baha'is were
executed in 1991. A small number of Baha'is were permitted to
leave the country. The Government continued to return some of
the property of individual Baha'is that it had previously
confiscated, although the amount represents a small fraction of
the total seized. Most Baha'is are now able to obtain food
ration booklets. Baha'is are now generally able to bury their
dead in Baha'i cemeteries, although this remains a problem in a
number of areas. Baha'i children are now permitted to attend
grade school and high school. In legal matters, the Government
has stated that it will protect the "social and legal rights"
of Baha'is as "normal citizens." However, the actual treatment
of Baha'is varies depending on the jurisdiction. In his
February 1991 report, the Special Representative noted that
"the situation of the Baha'is is moving towards quite broad de
facto tolerance."
However, widespread discrimination against the community
persists. Baha'is continued to face arbitrary arrest and
detention. A total of 31 Baha'is were detained for various
lengths of time in the first 6 months of 1991, although the
number of detainees at any one time was around 10. All
property of the community, such as places of worship, remains
confiscated. Baha'i marriages are still not recognized.
Baha'is generally cannot attend college (the Special
Representative noted that only four have been admitted to
universities) or be employed on college faculties. Baha'is are
forbidden to participate in social welfare organizations, and
they may not teach their faith. Some Baha'is continue to be
denied public sector (and often private sector) employment on
account of their religion; in a number of cases ration cards
have been denied on the same grounds. Thousands of Baha'is
dismissed from government jobs in the early 1980 's receive no
unemployment benefits and have been required to repay the
Government for salaries or pensions received from the first day
of employment. Those unable to do so face severe prison
sentences. While some Baha'i's have been issued passports, the
Special Representative reported that the vast majority of such
applications are denied. The Government continues to attack
the Baha'i community as a front for political and espionage
activities and prohibits the community from electing leaders or
conducting religious activities.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Iranians may travel to any part of Iran, although there have
been restrictions on travel to Kurdish areas at times of heavy
fighting. Persons may change their place of residence without
obtaining permission. Over 1 million refugees, the majority of
them Kurdish and Shi ' ite refugees from Iraq, entered Iran in
1991.
Males of draft age are not issued exit visas except for
approved courses of study, and Iranians who are suspect
politically, such as some retired military officers and
high-level public officials under the former regime, are not
able to leave the country. Persons who have not repaid loans
obtained under the old government also are denied exit visas.
Reportedly some Iranians, particularly those whose skills are
in short supply and who were educated at government expense,
must post bonds to obtain exit visas. In his February 1991
report, the Special Representative recounted several instances
in which passports were denied, sometimes for apparent
political reasons, and on other occasions with no reason
given. As noted in Section 2.c., most Baha'is are denied
passports.
Iranian Jews are permitted to obtain passports and to travel,
even to Israel, but they are normally denied the multiple-exit
visas given to most Iranians and must make a new application
(with another fee) for each planned trip. Permission is not
normally granted for all members of a Jewish family to travel
outside Iran at the same time.
Iranians are generally able to return to Iran after long
periods abroad without reprisal. Since the end of the
Iran-Iraq war, the Government has encouraged the many thousands
of skilled Iranians living abroad to return to help rebuild the
country. Of those who have gone back in recent years, a number
have been able to pursue, through the Iranian judicial system,
the return of their properties. However, many exiles complain
that formal legal guarantees of their safety have not yet been
provided, and, as a result, many remain reluctant to return.
There are some categories of persons who may be in danger if
they return to Iran. Some of those with close ties to the
former regime, draft evaders, and those who departed the
country illegally face possible arrest upon their return.
Members or sympathizers with the People's Mojahedin
Organization of Iran or the Communist Tudeh Party, both
opposition groups banned by the Government, are subject to
imprisonment and torture or even execution should they return.
Nevertheless, immediate relatives of persons wanted by the
Government are often able to live in Iran, travel outside, and
return without undue difficulty.
Iranian passports have always been stamped "not valid for
emigration," but the Government does not make a clear
distinction between legal residence in another country and
emigration. According to the regulations, Iranians with a
legal residence outside Iran may be issued passports and
advance exit visas by the Iranian embassy, consulate, or
interests section in their country of residence. Iranians who
have acquired U.S. citizenship are still considered to be
Iranian by the Government unless they have formally renounced
their Iranian citizenship in accordance with Iranian law.
There have been many instances in which Iranian authorities
have confiscated the U.S. passports of dual nationals. There
are no known instances of the denial of Iranian citizenship to
Iranians who left Iran, or to those who have remained there.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Iran is ruled by a group of religious leaders (mullahs) and
their lay associates who share a belief in the legitimacy of a
theocratic state based on Ayatollah Khomeini's interpretation
of Shi ' a Islam. Citizens are not free to question or to change
this form of government.
The revolutionary Government has held elections at fairly
regular intervals for president. Parliament deputies, members
of the Assembly of Experts (responsible for choosing the
Revolutionary Leader's successor), and members of local
government councils. Elections for the Assembly of Experts and
parliamentary byelections were last contested in 1990. Voting
is by universal suffrage of everyone age 15 and older and is by
secret ballot. All candidates must be approved by the Council
of Guardians, however, and only those meeting the Council's
vaguely described political and religious criteria may run. In
practice, only supporters of the theocratic state are
accepted. Following the Ministry of Interior's announcement in
December 1988 that political parties would be allowed to form,
provided they met the Government's religious and political
criteria, a few have been licensed.
The independence of the Parliament is provided for in the
Constitution and exists to a large degree in practice. While
Parliament deputies are typically allied with various powerful
political and religious officials, they may speak and vote
independently and may shift from one faction to another.
Vigorous parliamentary debates—normally covered extensively in
the press—cover a wide variety of issues. Harsh criticism of
government officials is often heard in these debates, and, in
some cases, laws proposed by the executive branch have been
voted down.
The Constitution provides for a Council of Guardians composed
of 12 members: 6 clerics unilaterally appointed by the Leader,
and 6 lay members well grounded in Islamic law who are
nominated by the head of the Judicial Council, subject to the
Parliament's approval. The Council of Guardians must certify
all bills passed by the Parliament as being in accordance with
Islamic law and the Constitution. If bills fail to be
certified, they are sent back to the Parliament for revision.
They cannot become law until passed by the Parliament and
certified by the Council.
The Council has rejected various important bills and portions
of bills passed by the Parliament, including legislation on
land reform, foreign trade, private enterprise, the dress code,
and reform of the civil code.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
Iranian organizations that attempt to speak out on human
rights, such as the Freedom Movement and the Association for
the Protection of Liberties and Human Rights, face severe
harassment by the Government (see Section 2.b.). In the past,
the Government generally has been uncooperative with foreign
human rights groups, whether government-sponsored or
independent, regarding their activities as interference in the
country's internal affairs. Foreign diplomats stationed in
Tehran who attempt to develop information about human rights
abuses face strong interference from Iranian authorities.
In 1990 the Government, for the first time, permitted the U.N.
Special Representative to visit the country and interview both
opponents and supporters of the Government, including
high-ranking government officials such as the head of the
judiciary. Nevertheless, his access to victims of abuse was
limited, many potential witnesses were prevented or intimidated
from testifying, and some of those who testified suffered
reprisals. Government- imposed controls during the Special
Representative's visits prevented him from being able to
investigate fully all reports of human rights abuses.
In his February 1991 report, the Special Representative said
that the Government had responded favorably in principle to
several of his suggestions. These included regular visits by
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to prisons
throughout the country to examine conditions and to look into
the situation of political prisoners; the possibility of the
U.N. Center for Human Rights in Geneva providing technical
assistance to Iran; development of a program to identify
inconsistencies between Islamic law and international law to
help bring the Iranian system more in line with accepted
international standards of hvrnian rights; and consideration of
humanitarian requests submitted by the Special Representative.
At the United Nations, however, Iran continued its efforts to
end, or at least restrict, the Special Representative's
mandate. The Government finally agreed late in 1991 to allow
the Special Representative to visit in December.
In November the Government signed an agreement with the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) providing for
regular ICRC visits to Iranian detention facilities to register
prisoners and monitor their treatment. (Prior to this, the
ICRC already was visiting Iraqi prisoners-of-war held by
Iran.) This agreement provided for all the normal ICRC
conditions such as privacy of interviews and repeat visits. As
of the end of the year, visits had not yet begun.
Iran held an international seminar on international and Islamic
law regarding human rights in September, at which the main
theme was that Iran should be judged by "Islamic" rather than
Western human rights principles.
The Government indicated its willingness in principle to
receive an official visit from Middle East Watch, a New
York-based human rights monitoring group, to investigate
conditions inside Iran, but the visit did not take place in
1991. In May, however, the Government did allow a separate,
unscheduled mission to Iran by Middle East Watch, as well as
one by Amnesty International, to interview Kurdish and Shi ' ite
refugees from Iraq.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status
Women traditionally have faced discrimination in Iranian
society, and this discrimination has increased since the
revolution. Ultraconservative dress, entirely hiding the hair
and all of the body except the face and hands, is a requirement
for all women, regardless of their religion, national origin,
or citizenship. In the past, women have been harassed,
detained, or physically attacked if they appeared in public in
clothing that official or self-appointed guardians of public
morality deemed insufficiently modest. Enforcement of these
rules has varied considerably since Ayatollah Khomeini's death
in 1989, and, as noted in Section l.f., there was evidence in
1991 of growing resistance by women to the authority of the
Special Revolutionary Guards to impose a dress code.
Although violence against women is known to occur in Iran,
little is known about its extent. Abuse within the family is
considered a private matter in this conservative society and is
seldom discussed publicly. There are no official statistics on
the subject. There are persistent and credible reports of the
torture and execution of women detainees, some of whom were
allegedly raped before execution; it is not known if any such
incidents occurred in 1991.
Under legislation passed in 1983, women have the right to
divorce their husbands, and regulations promulgated in 1984
substantially broadened to 12 the number of grounds for which a
woman may seek divorce. A husband may obtain a divorce without
having to state a reason or go to court.
The Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Baha'i minorities
suffer varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination
in a number of areas, particularly with respect to employment,
education, and public accommodations. Muslims who have
converted to Christianity are similarly discriminated against,
and under Shari'a (Islamic) law the ultimate penalty for
apostasy is execution. One requirement of university admission
is passing a test on Islamic theology, which has the effect of
excluding most religious minorities from higher education.
Applicants for public sector employment are similarly screened
for adherence to standards of Islamic orthodoxy, with much the
same effect. There have also been reports that religious
minorities have suffered discrimination in the legal system,
such as receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits,
and of receiving heavier punishments than those imposed on
Muslims. Although Sunnis have encountered religious
discrimination on the local level, the Government has tried to
reduce Shi ' a-Sunni antagonism.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
There are no real labor unions. A national organization known
as the "House of Labor," founded in 1982 as the labor branch of
the now defunct Islamic Republican Party, is the only
authorized national labor organization. It works closely with
the Islamic societies and Islamic labor councils set up in most
Iranian factories. The House of Labor is headed by Hossein
Kamali, the Minister of Labor; as such, it is largely a conduit
of government influence and control, not a trade union founded
by workers to represent their interests. The officially
sanctioned Islamic labor councils also are instruments of
government control and not bodies created and controlled by
workers to advance their own interests, although they have
frequently been able to block layoffs or the firing of workers.
There is also a system of "guild unions," which operates on a
regional basis. These guild unions issue vocational licenses,
fund financial cooperatives to assist members, and help workers
to find jobs. The guild unions operate with the cooperation of
the Government.
No information is available on the right of workers in Iran to
strike. It is unlikely that the Government would tolerate any
strike deemed to be at odds with its economic and labor
policies. There were reports, however, in 1991 of sporadic,
politically motivated strikes of short duration, sparked
chiefly by economic conditions in the country.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
In practice, the right of workers to organize independently and
bargain collectively is extremely limited. No information is
available on the mechanism used to set wages.
It is not known whether labor legislation and practice in the
export processing zones differ in any significant respect from
the law and practice in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Section 273 of the Iranian Penal Code provides that any person
who does not have definite means of subsistence and who,
through laziness or negligence, does not look for work may be
obliged by the Government to take suitable employment. This
provision has been frequently criticized by the Committee of
Experts (COE) of the International Labor Organization (ILO) as
contravening ILO Convention 29 on forced labor. In its 1990
report, the COE noted an indication by the Government in its
latest report to the Committee that Section 273 had been
abolished and replaced, for a trial period, by a new provision
approved by the Parliament. The Government, according to the
COE, stated that the new provision was not incompatible with
Convention 29 and promised to provide a copy after the
provision was translated. The COE noted that the Government
had indicated in its 1977 report that similar regulations
concerning unemployed persons and vagrants had been repealed
but had not yet complied with the Committee's request for a
copy of the repealing legislation.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Iranian labor law, which exempts agriculture, domestic service,
family businesses, and, to some extent, other small businesses,
forbids employment of minors under 12 years and places special
restrictions on the employment of minors under 18. In
addition, women and minors may not be used for hard labor or,
in general, for night work. The extent to which these
regulations are enforced is not known.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The labor law establishes a 6-day workweek of 48 hours maximum
(except for overtime at premium rates), with 1 day of rest
(normally Friday) per week as well as at least 12 days per year
of leave with pay and a number of paid public holidays. There
are also legal provisions with respect to minimum wages and
health and safety in workplaces. Further information on these
laws and the amount and adequacy of the minimum wage is not
available.
Given the large segments of the economy exempted from the labor
law, the State's still unresolved administrative
disorganization resulting from the revolution, the effects of
the war with Iraq, and the general lack of effective labor
unions, it is unclear to what extent the provisions of Iran's
labor law affect most of the labor force.
The ILO has long been concerned with official discrimination in
employment against members of the Baha ' i religion. In its 1991
report, the ILO's COE recounted the 1990 ILO debates about
discrimination in employment against Baha 'is, and asked the
Government to provide additional clarification of the current
situation and of the Government's claims that it is taking
steps to bring about compliance with ILO Convention 111 barring
discrimination in employment, which has been the primary focus
of complaints against Iran at the ILO for its treatment of
Baha' is (see also Section 5).
