a-pr3733 (ACC-AFG-3733)

Nach einer Recherche in unserer Länderdokumentation und im Internet können wir Ihnen zu oben genannter Fragestellung Materialien zur Verfügung stellen, die unter anderem folgende Informationen enthalten:
Situation im Bezirk Jaghuri (Jaghori)
Das UNHCR-Bezirksprofil zu Jaghori vom Juni 2002 beschreibt die politische Lage in dem Bezirk folgendermaßen: 
„Since the fall of the Taliban’s regime, Commander Mohammed Ali Ahmadi has led Jaghori district. So far, there has been no official appointment made by Provincial and central Governments for the district of Jaghori. The current local administration expects the official appointments to be made in the coming weeks. Mohammed Ali Ahmadi, who belongs to Hezb-e-Wahdat Khalili, is assisted in his tasks by Security Commander, Mohammed Anif Hissani, also member of the same political & military wing. The acting head of district and the security commander take decisions with the assistance of an informal Shura, of seven members, that has not received official nor popular endorsement. These members are teachers, commanders and a civil administrator. The security commander refers disputes to a council of five judges (Mullahs), one acting as Head of informal Court. Study of the cases is based on custom and decisions taken on consensus. Should the case be of specific nature, Sharia would be the reference to adjudicate. Cases can also be transferred to Ghazni provincial court of second instance (Mahkama Mura’fi’a) for appeal or first instance, should the informal court declare itself incompetent to deal with case. According to Jaghori’s local authorities, two people represent the district in Ghazni city. The first representative is Ustaz Irfani, Commander native of Sange-e-Marsha, Jaghori, and important figure of Hezb-e-Wahdat Khalili. Mr. Irfani, who has no official portfolio at district and provincial levels, remains influential in the district due to his resistance against the Soviet occupation and under Taliban regime. The second representative is Ismatullah Hamadi. (UNHCR, 30. Juli 2002, S. 1)
The security situation in the district is apparently satisfactory. However, disarmament has not started yet. No indication was provided on planned schedule to conduct these activities. Officially, there is no garrison under the control of the Ministry of Defence in Jaghori. However, armed elements are still present, belonging to local commanders, all under Commander Hissani and Hezb-e-Wahdat Khalili’s control. Jaghori district, as the rest of Hazara-majority regions, is under the control of Hezb-e-Wahdat (Khalili faction). Officially, members of other political & military parties, specifically Harakat are said to be accepted but not present. (UNHCR, 30. Juli 2002, S. 2)
Jaghori is a 100% Hazara populated district, which is not immediately confronted with minority issues. However, Jaghori, as neighbouring Malistan was until last year, one of the summer residences for Kuchi communities, coming from Kandahar and Helmand. Confrontations have been reported in the past between Kuchis and Hazara, mostly due to occupation of lands and destruction of fields of Hazara villagers. Villagers in Dolana village explained that fighting was intense under Talibans between the two ethnic groups. Clashes have been serious and since the fall of Taliban regime, Kuchis have not risked going to Jaghori district. They’d rather moved to Southeast districts, where important parts of the population are Pashtoun. Local authorities declare themselves ready to fight the Kuchis if they dare to enter Jaghori territory. Apart from the above, no ethnic-related incidents have been reported in the district. However, locals report of Pashtoo-speakers aggressing travellers on the border with Qarabagh.“ (UNHCR, 30. Juli 2002, S. 5) 
In den uns zugänglichen Quellen konnten leider bisher keine Informationen darüber gefunden werden, ob es derzeit eine Gemeinschaft der Ismaili in Jaghori gibt. Wir haben eine diesbezügliche Anfrage über das UNHCR-Büro in Wien gestellt.
Hafizullah Emadi führt in einem 1993 in der Central Asian Survey erschienenen Artikel eine Tabelle über die geographische Verteilung der Ismaili-Bevölkerung in Afghanistan mit Stand 1979 an. In einem Artikel über Hazara Ismaili vom Juni 2002 schreibt Emadi: “Isma'ilis primarily reside in the Bamiyan, Kabul, Baghlan, Samangan, Parwan and Wardak provinces of Afghanistan“ (Emadi, 30. Juni 2002)
Allgemeine Situation der Ismaili
Emadi analysiert das Verhältnis zwischen der Mehrheit der Hazara, die zu den Athna Ashari-Schiiten (12-er Schia) gerechnet werden und den Ismaili, die sowohl von Schiiten als auch Sunniten als Häretiker angesehen werden. 
„The majority of the Hazaras are Shiites of the Athna Ashari orientation, i.e., whose line started the twelve Shiite Imam genealogies, followed by the Isma'ilis, while a small number are followers of Sunni Islam. Some people were forced to convert to the Sunni faith while others may have accepted it, willingly or otherwise, in the hope that by doing so they would enjoy greater security and stability and find escape from religious and political persecution. Shiites pledge allegiance to Ali, the son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad, and Ali's descendants through his wife, Fatima. However, there was a split after the death of Imam Jafar Sadiq in 765; those who followed Jafar's oldest son, Isma'il, are known as Isma'ilis and the followers of Jafar's other son, Musa al-Kazim, are also known as Athna Ashari. The latter group's last imam (religious leader), Mahdi, disappeared in about 873 and the Shiites believe that he will return as a messiah to rule the earth. As an oppressed minority within the Islamic world, the Shiites uphold the belief that justice would prevail if the descendants of Ali led the Islamic world. In contrast, the Isma'ilis maintain that the line of the imamat (the mission of an imam) continues unbroken to this day and Karim Aga Khan, a staunch advocate and practitioner of Third World development, is the present and 49th Imam of the community internationally. Since the Isma'ilis advocated radical transformation of the status quo and practiced a form of Islam, which differed from the prevailing Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxy, both the Sunnis and the Shiites regard them as heretics.“ (Emadi, 30. Juni 2002) 
Der 1995 von den Taliban ermordete Führer der Hezb-e Wahdat Abdul Ali Mazari habe sich laut Emadi als erster für die Einheit aller Hazara, unabhängig von der Glaubensrichtung eingesetzt. Zur sozialen Rangordnung zwischen Hazara und Sayyed bzw. Ismaili führt Emadi folgendes aus:
Stratification of the Hazara Isma'ili
„Feudalism constituted the dominant mode of production in Hazarajat. The main social classes were the feudal nobility, rich landowning families, peasants and landless peasants, small business strata and artisans. The tribal chiefs remained at the top of the religious, social and political hierarchies. The Isma'ili chief is known by the tide of Mukhi or Pit and comes from the Sayyed families that claim to be of Arab origin and trace their genealogy to the first Shiite imam, Ali. Their ancestors settled among the Hazaras and married their women, which is why their descendants resembled the Hazaras. However, the latter are not allowed to marry women of the Sayyed families. The Hazaras submit to Sayyed leadership because of their familial connection to the Prophet's family and ancient, entrenched religious beliefs that the Sayyeds are endowed with the ability to perform miracles and bring good fortune. Such beliefs in turn discourage independent thought and action and encourage reliance on others for leadership and for making decisions that affect their lives. It is due to these historical factors that the Hazaras have not had confidence in themselves and so tend to seek the leadership of others. 
Sayyeds of both Athna Ashari and Isma'ili communities harbor no hostility toward one another. They have however tended to follow a policy of divide and conquer, deliberately exploiting sectarian differences among their respective followers, to the extent that Isma'ilis and Athna Asharis regard their own religious practice or tariqa to be the true one and refute the beliefs of the other. Although in the past the Hazaras of both persuasions have intermarried and assisted one another as members of an extended family, the sectarian propaganda of the clerics has led to a widening gap between them. This is reflected in the disunity among them prior to, during and after the Soviet era. It was the late Abdul Ali Mazari, head of Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party) who for the first time spoke against this divisive trend, deploring such policies and practices of the Shiite clerics. He avidly supported and argued for unity among the Hazaras, irrespective of their faith (Emadi, 1997). 
The Hazaras have been told that they have no right to question the authority of the Sayyeds, whose prerogative remained predominant in the Shiite Hazara community. To other ethnic groups it does not matter whether the person is Hazara or Sayyed as they regard both to be Shiite Hazaras. The rank and file of ordinary Sayyeds do not enjoy authority in the Isma'ili community because of the following reasons: a) The number of Isma'ili Sayyeds are very limited; b) Isma'ilis do not advocate paying khums (religious tax) to every Sayyed but only to the Imam through his representative, the Mukhi (treasurer) and Kamadia (assistant treasurer); c) the Isma'ili chief, Kayani, who established himself as a virtual godfather of the community, subjugated all the Sayyeds of the Isma'ili community under his rule and appointed his trusted men as clerics or Khalifas (religious heads) to different villages with resident followers; and d) the Mukhi ruled with an iron-fist, collecting religious taxes, using public funds to maintain his luxurious lifestyle. Khalifas and Mullahs (clerics) comprise the second level of the ruling hierarchy. Their level of education does not go beyond rudimentary religious education imparted at home. The distinction between a Sayyed and Khalifa is somewhat blurred and confusing, as there are individuals who possess dual identifies. The difference between Sayyed, Khalifa and Mullah is that a Sayyed's prerogative and authority are hereditary, transferable to his progeny, while those of Khalifa and Mullah are not so, but once achieved are retained for life.
The Mir comprises another layer in the ruling hierarchy and consolidates his power base by forging close ties with the Pir and Khalifa, seeking their support for legitimizing of his rule. Although the Mir supported the government, in order to weaken Hazara unity, government officials often did not support the succession of a Mir's son after the death of his father and instead recognized the succession of a rival sibling to such a position. In doing so the state tried to perpetuate enmity among the Hazara tribal communities (Davlatabadi, 1999). Arbab is the lowest rank in the hierarchy of leaders whose domain of influence is restricted to a few villages and his function is to arbitrate in social disputes, mediating between the community and government offices. 
At the bottom of the Hazara Isma'ili social ladder are the lower class families, i.e., poor peasants, petty businessmen, artisans and laborers drawn from various tribal communities. The relationship between rulers and ruled is based on the ownership of the means of production, such as water, land and animals. The majority of the peasants are poor, exploited by their tribal chiefs and spiritual leaders, the Pits or Mukhis, and by the ruling classes who control the bureaucracy. Lack of resources in Hazarajat forced many marginalized people to migrate to provincial urban centers and Kabul where they engage in menial jobs and some have started small businesses, leading to the emergence of the laboring and middle classes.“ (Emadi, 30. Juni 2002)
Der ACCORD-Reisebericht vom September 2003 führt zur Situation von Ismaili nach dem Ende des Taliban-Regimes folgendes an:
„7.2.2 Ismailis
215. Laut dem Vertreter einer lokalen Organisation sei die Minderheit der Ismaili in der Vergangenheit sehr unterdrückt worden und sie hätte ihren Glauben nicht praktizieren dürfen. Nun setzen sich der Aga Khan und seine Stiftungen in Teilen Pakistans, Afghanistans und Tadschikistans für die Anliegen der Ismaili ein und ihre Situation hätte sich verbessert.
216. Laut dem im Juli 2003 erschienenen Positionspapier von UNHCR sind Ismailis aus der Provinz Baghlan weiterhin gefährdet.
217. Ein Artikel des Institute for War and Peace Reporting verweist auf politische Querelen zwischen der Ismaili-Gemeinschaft und einem lokalen Kommandanten der Shura-e Nazar, Jalal Khan, der einen neuen Führer der Ismaili eingesetzt hatte, um die Rückkehr des mit Dostum verbündeten Sektenführers Nadiri zu verhindern. Als eine Gruppe von 170 Ismailis nach Kabul reisen wollte, um den aus dem Exil erwarteten Nadiri zu begrüßen, soll der Kommandant die Gruppe wegen Planung einer illegalen politischen Demonstration verhaftet und für anderthalb Monate festgehalten haben. Der Aga Khan soll bei seinem ersten Auftritt in Kabul im November 2002 vor etwa 500 Vertretern der Ismaili-Gemeinschaft gesprochen haben.“ (ACCORD, September 2003, Abs 215-217) 
Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe, 1. März 2004:
„5.2 Religiöse Minderheiten
Religiöse Minderheiten wie Sikhs/Hindu, Ismailis und Christen können gemäss der neuen Verfassung ihren Glauben frei ausüben, wenn dies mit islamischen Gesetzen vereinbar ist. Die afghanische Gesellschaft ist gegenüber religiösen Minderheiten jedoch nicht tolerant. Sikhs haben Reintegrationsprobleme, werden wirtschaftlich diskriminiert, beschimpft und an öffentlichen Orten angegriffen. In Einzelfällen werden Ismailis diskriminiert und unterliegen der Willkür von Kommandanten. […]“ (SFH, 1. März 2004, S. 12) 
US Department of State, 18. Dezember 2003
„Relations between the different branches of Islam in the country have been difficult. Historically, the minority Shi’a faced discrimination from the majority Sunni population. Most Shi’a Muslims are members of the Hazara ethnic group, which traditionally has been segregated from the rest of society for a combination of political, ethnic, and religious reasons. Throughout the country’s history, there have been many examples of conflicts between the Hazaras and other citizens. These conflicts often have had economic and political roots but also have acquired religious dimensions. The treatment of Shi’a varied from locality to locality. However, the active persecution of Afghanistan’s Shi’a minority, including Ismailis, under the Taliban regime has ended and, although some discrimination continues at the local level, Shi’a generally are once again free to participate fully in public life.“ (USDOS, 18. Dezember 2003)
Politische Allianzen der Ismaili während des Afghanistan-Krieges
Laut Emadi hatten Teile der Ismaili die von der Sowjetunion unterstützte Regierung Karmals unterstützt:
„When Afghanistan was declared a democratic republic in April 1978, Nasir Naderi and his brothers were imprisoned again and released shortly after the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Nasir Naderi and Mansoor Naderi survived the onslaught of the Kabul regime but their brothers were murdered. In 1981, Nasir Naderi sought asylum in London and selected his brother Mansoor Naderi to look after their community of followers. Mansoor supported the Soviet-backed government and eventually gained a prominent military position (Emadi, 1993a). However, the fiefdom that he had created crumbled when the advancing Taliban army defeated his demoralized army and supporters in 1998 and seized control of the Isma'ili region in the Kayan district in Baghlan province. Mansoor and his brother, Nasir, remained in exile, unable to assume the leadership of the community. On 8 March 2002, the Aga Khan issued an edict that he would appoint new leaders for the Isma'ili communities in Afghanistan. He said: "at an appropriate juncture in time, I shall appoint Mukhis (treasurers) and Kamadias (assistant treasurers) at the Jamatkhanas (community centers) in Afghanistan, and I shall also establish a number of councils and other social development institutions, as I have done for my Jamat (community) in other parts of the world" (Aga Khan, 2002).“ (Emadi, 30. Juni 2003; siehe auch Emadi, 1993, S. 388) 
Nach dem Sturz Najibullahs, so Hafizullah Emadi, habe der Vorsitzende der Ismaili Sayid Mansur Naderi eine Allianz mit Dostum gebildet, und gute Beziehungen zur Führung in Kabul unterhalten. (Emadi, 1993, S. 389)
Laut Human Rights Watch bildeten Massoud, Dostum, die Hezb-e Wahdat und Mazari sowie der Anführer der Ismaili-Schiiten, Jaffar Naderi, die vom Iran unterstützte Allianz die 1992 Kabul eingenommen hatte. (HRW, Juli 2001, S. 36)
Laut AFP soll es im Juni 1992 zu Kämpfen zwischen einer Ismaili-Miliz und Massoud um das für die Hezb-e Wahdat vorgesehene Innenministerium gekommen sein. Dabei soll es sich laut Hezb-e Wahdat General Hazereh nicht um einen politischen Kampf, sondern um einen kleineren Streit gehandelt haben. (AFP, 26. Juni 1992)
Im März 1994 berichtete The Independent von Friedensverhandlungen zwischen Massoud und Sayid Jaffar Naseri, dem Sohn von Sayid Mansur Naderi, nach einer Serie von Niederlagen der Ismaili durch die Regierung. Die Ismaili, mit Dostum verbündet, hatten den Salang-Pass für die Regierung in Kabul abgeschnitten, nachdem Dostum im Jänner 1994 auf die Seite des mit der Regierung zu diesem Zeitpunkt verfeindeten Hekmatyar gewechselt hatte. (The Independent, 19. März 1994)
BBC brachte im März 1996 eine Meldung des afghanischen Oppositionsradios Message of Freedom, laut der ein Vertreter der Hezb-e Islami die Gruppe Sayid Kayan der Ismaili-Sekte für eine Serie von Auseinandersetzungen in Baghlan verantwortlich macht. (Radio Message of Freedom/BBC, 6. März 1996; siehe auch Radio Message of Freedom/BBC, 6. März 1996)
Der Sohn Sayid Mansur Naderis, Sayid Jaffar Naderi, soll, so eine auf der privaten Webseite „Der Weg nach Bamiyan“ zusammengestellte Biographie, für den Mord am ehemaligen Gouverneur der Provinz Baghlan, einem Vertreter der Hezb-e Islami im Jahr 1995 wie auch eines derzeitigen Gegners verantwortlich sein: 
„Jaffar wurde ca. 1965 geboren und ist der Sohn des Pirs der Ismailiten von Baghlan, Sayid Mansur Nadiri* [Note über die Ismailiten*].
Er ging in England zur Schule und wanderte von hier in die USA aus. Dort arbeitete Jaffar in McDonald's Restaurant, imitierte den Stil von Charles Bronson, hörte hard rock und war Captain einer Hockey-Mannschaft.
Zum "Mujahid" wurde er in den Ferien, als er seinen Clan in der Provinz Baghlan besuchte, und in der Folge zum Kriegsherrn der Isma'iliten Baghlans mit aufwendigem militärischem Quartier und 12.000 Soldaten, ausgerüstet mit Panzern und Waffen, die von der Roten Armee erbeutet oder zurückgelassen worden waren:
[…] sowie 1992 zum General der Nordallianz und Waffenbruder General Dostums (mit dem er beim Putsch gegen die Najibullah-Regierung* im April 1992 koallierte) und Gouverneur der Provinz Baghlan. 
Nebenbei auch Wegelagerer:
“Im Oktober 1995 wurden Mamur Ghayyur, der ehemalige Gouverneur der Provinz Baghlan und Mitglied der Hizb-i-Islami, sowie 15 weitere Personen während einer Reise durch Baghlan umgebracht. Die Lokal-Presse vermutet, daß die Mörder im Auftrag General Jaffar Nadiris gehandelt haben. [siehe: www.usis.usemb.se]”
(Der Weg nach Bamiyan: Kurzbiographien – J; siehe auch US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1995: Afghanistan, März 1996) 
Anfang Oktober 1996 verkündete Sayid Mansur Naderi anlässlich eines Besuches von Burhunuddin Rabbani in Pol-e Khomri seine Unterstützung für den Islamischen Staat Afghanistan. (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7. Oktober 1996)
Im Februar 1998, so meldete die Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, schloss sich Sayid Mansu Naderi dem Shia Accord Council an, dem auch die Hezb-e Wahdat und die Harakat-e Islami angehörten. (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 9. Februar 1998) Im März 1998 soll Sayid Mansur Naderi zum Vizepräsidenten der Islamischen Republik Afghanistan ernannt worden sein. (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7. März 1998)
Ein Interview der 'Al-Sharq al-Awsat' mit Mola Mohammed Rabbani, einem Mitglied der Taliban, der BBC vom 3. April 1998 erwähnt Kämpfe zwischen Dostum und der Hezb-e Wahdat sowie zwischen Masoud und der Ismaili-Miliz in Baghlan. ('Al-Sharq al-Awsat'/BBC, 3. April 1998)
„[Q] Though profound differences do exist among the various parties to the northern alliance, the alliance remains united against the Taleban. Does this not indicate their common desire not to submit to the Taleban rule and to resist it?
[A] This alliance will not last long because it has broken the accord that existed between its various elements in the past. You are aware of the fighting and wars now raging between Gen Abdorrashid Dostum and the Hezb-e Wahdat and between Ahmad Shah Masud and the Ismaili militia at Baghlan, which neither the Taleban nor the Pashtun factor has anything to do with.” ('Al-Sharq al-Awsat'/BBC, 3. April 1998)
Der anonyme Autor von „Der Weg nach Bamiyan“ schildert die Rolle von Jaffar Naderi während der Taliban und nach ihrem Fall folgendermaßen: 
„Nachdem Baghlan von den Taliban eingenommen worden war, flohen Jaffar Nadiri und sein Vater zu ihren Verbündeten in die Provinz Bamiyan.
Nach dem 11. September 2001 und der Vertreibung der Taliban aus Baghlan kam es zu Machtkämpfen zwischen den Warlords verschiedener Parteien.
Jaffar war mit Dostums Junbish-i Mily-i Islami* verbunden, seine Gegner waren Rabbanis/Masuds Hizb-i Jami'at-i Islami* Im November 2001 hatte die Jamiat die Provinz Baghlan unter Kontrolle.
Auf der Bonn-Petersberger Konferenz sah Jaffar ebenso wie Dostum seine Interessen unzureichend berücksichtigt. Wie vor einigen Jahren seinen Widersacher aus der Hizb-i-Islami soll er jetzt - nur in größerem Stil - Gegner der Hizb-i Jami'at erledigt haben: Jaffar Nadiri habe die US-Truppen davon überzeugt, dass er im Kampf mit den Taliban stehe und Luftunterstützung gegen angebliche Taliban-Ziele angefordert und so Bombenabwürfe auf Stellungen seiner Rivalen der Nord-Allianz provoziert. Solche Tricks sind auch von anderen Warlords bekannt, doch sollen, lt. einer Korrespondentin der "New York Times" in Jaffars Basis zudem amerikanische Soldaten einquartiert gewesen sein, was den Verdacht nährt, die USA ergriffen Partei im lokalen Streit der Warlords von Baghlan.“ (Der Weg nach Bamiyan: Kurzbiographien – J)
In einem Interview mit der afghanischen Zeitung Bahar im März 2003 erklärte der Vorsitzende der Ismaili-Partei, Sayid Mansur Naderi, dass die Beziehungen der Ismaili-Partei zu den Parteien des Jihad (d.h. Mujahedin) wie etwa der Hezb-e Wahdat, außerordentlich gut wären: Er suche derzeit kein öffentliches Amt. Die Lebensbedingungen der Ismaili seien allerdings weiterhin äußerst schwierig (Bahar/BBC Monitoring, 16. März 2003)
„Bahar It is said that you are one of those persons who have been exerting efforts to bridge gaps between different schools of thought, especially in bringing together the Ismaili and Imami groups?
 Mansur Agha Well, there were many differences between us and our brothers who are followers of the Imami school of thought. Contacts were initiated which resulted in understanding. It was realized that the two groups are brothers and that there is no difference between us. Misunderstandings were thus removed and we are now living as brothers alongside each other.
Bahar How are your relations with all jihadic groups parties associated with resistance to Soviets , like Hezb-e Wahdat, Jonbesh -e Melli and Jamiat -e Eslami ?
 Mansur Agha We have extraordinary relations with all our brothers in the factions. Our brothers too in turn are kind to us. Our relations are extraordinarily good.
 Bahar Can you tell us about the situation of the Ismaili Shiites?
 Mansur Agha Most of the Ismaili Shiites in Afghanistan have lost their houses and have become vagrants. All their property and assets were plundered by the Taleban and people who are still living in their areas are in a very poor condition.
 Bahar As observed, most of the Ismailis are shifting. Why is that so?
 Mansur Agha Most of the people in Afghanistan are poor and labourers. Some of them who held political position have brought sentence unfinished As there are no jobs, people have no option but to leave the country to find a loaf of bread, become vagrants and travel to other countries. […]Bahar What is your role in the present government?
 Mansur Agha I do not have an official position in the government and am not seeking it. I was the first person to establish a cultural centre in Afghanistan by the name of Naser Khosrow. Our library and historic books were plundered during these developments. When we came to Afghanistan, we revived our cultural centre. Our only hope is to serve men of letters, writers and poets. It is my best wish.“
 (Bahar/BBC Monitoring, 16. März 2003)
Vergangene Konflikte zwischen der Hezb-e Wahdat und der Hezb-e Islami
Sayed Askar Mousavi erwähnt in seinem Buch The Hazaras of Afghanistan, dass er 1981 in Jaghuri eine Gruppe bewaffneter Jaghuri-Hazara getroffen hätte, die als Vertreter der Hezb-e Islami Hekmatyars auftraten. Acht Jahre später wolle er in Bamyan eine ähnliche Allianz zwischen schiitischen Hazara und einzelnen Sunni-Parteien beobachtet haben (Mousavi, 1998, S. 181-182).
Die Hezb-e Wahdat soll laut Barnett Rubin und William Maley in Folge des Versuchs von Ahmed Shah Massoud, die Wahdat zu entwaffnen, im Jänner 1993 eine formelle Vereinbarung mit Hekmatyar, der sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt in Gegnerschaft zu den von Massoud befehligten Kräften befand, geschlossen haben (Rubin, 2002 272/273; Maley, 1998 202/203) Nach einer Zusammenfassung der Ereignisse 1993/1994 durch UNHCR gab im März 1993 der neu gewählte Präsident Burhunuddin Rabbani das Amt des Premierministers an Hekmatyar. Im Jänner 1994 wendete sich Hekmatyar in einer Allianz mit Dostum wiederum gegen Rabbani und dessen Kommandanten Massoud:
„After the fall of President M. Najibullah, four main armed groups with different ethnic characteristics and foreign support initially fought for power in Kabul. The leader of the weakest party, Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, a conservative traditionalist religious leader, was chosen as president (Rubin, Januar 1992, 3). On 28 June 1992 S. Mojaddedi surrendered power to the so-called Leadership Council, which immediately offered B. Rabbani the presidency of the country and the concomitant responsibility of the Interim Council of Ministers for four months (Europa Publications Limited, 1996, 56). After the so-called Islamabad Accord of March 1993, Afghanistan was formally ruled by President B. Rabbani from Jamiat-i Islami. The post of Prime Minister went to the leader of Hizb-i Islami, G. Hikhmatyar (Thomsen & Winding, 9. November 1993, 3)
Renewed intense fighting broke out on 1 January 1994, when Prime Minister G. Hikmatyar, in a new alliance with Uzbek General Dostum (who headed his own National Islamic Movement in northern Afghanistan) attempted to force President B. Rabbani from office (Amnesty International, 11 April 1994, 1). The fighting over control of territory and political authority in Afghanistan intensified between the Jamiat-i Islami, led by President B. Rabbani and his Commander Massoud, and the alliance between the northern General Dostum and G. Hikmatyar referred to as the Supreme Coordination Council, with the backing of the Hizb-i Wahdat“ (Rubin, B., February 1996, 31). (UNHCR CDR, June 1997)
Laut Mousavi hielt nach dem Afshar-Massaker an den Hazara im Westen von Kabul geschmiedete Allianz aus Hazara, Paschtunen und Uzbeken zwischen Wahdat, Hezb-e Islami, Jumbesh, und der Jabha-ye Nijat-e Melli unter dem Namen Shura-ye Ali-ye Hamahangi (Shura-e Hamahangi; Supreme Coordination Council) bis Mitte 1996. (Mousavi ,1998, S. 199; siehe auch Amnesty International, 29 November 1995).
Laut UNHCR zerbrach die fragile Koalition, die General Dostum mit Rabbani, Hekmatyar und der Hezb-e Wahdat verband, mit dem Seitenwechsel von Dostums Kommandanten Abdul Malik, der zum Fall Mazari-Sharifs im Mai 1997 führte:
„However, in late May 1997, the situation swiftly changed as the fragile coalition linking General Dostum with former government forces of President B. Rabbani, G. Hikmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islam and the mainly Shi’a Hizb-i-Wahdat fell apart following the defection on 19 May 1997 of General Dostum’s senior commander, Abdul Malik.“ (UNHCR CDR, Juni 1997)
Leider enthalten die von uns konsultierten Quellen keine Informationen über das Verhältnis zwischen Hezb-e Islami und Hezb-e Wahdat in den Jahren 1996-2000. Im März 2000, so 'Payam-e Mojahed', eine Zeitschrift der Nordallianz, sollen sich Dostum (Jumbesh), Khalili (Wahdat) und Hekmatyar (Hezb-e Islami) in Teheran getroffen haben, um den 1993 gegründeten „Conciliation Council“ wiederzubeleben. (Payam-e Mojahed/BBC Monitoring, 24. März 2000).
In den uns zugänglichen Quellen konnten wir bisher keine Informationen über einen Kommandanten namens Korkanai (Qorkanai, Qorqanai) finden. 

Diese Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen. Die Antwort stellt keine abschließende Meinung zur Glaubwürdigkeit eines bestimmten Asylansuchens dar.
  • Agence France Presse:  Ethnic issues, feuds threaten Afghan mujahedeen victory, 2. Mai 1992 (Quelle: Lexis-Nexis)
  • Agence France Presse: Security minister demands equal rights for minorities, 26. Juni 1992 (Quelle: Lexis-Nexis)
  • 'Al-Sharq al-Awsat', 29 Mar 98 p6 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Taleban leader discusses current developments 3. April 1998 (Quelle: Lexis-Nexis)
  • Amnesty International : Afghanistan: International responsibility for human rights disaster AI INDEX: ASA 11/009/1995, 29. November 1995
    http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA110091995?open&of=ENG-AFG (Zugriff am 07. April 2004)
  • Bahar/BBC Monitoring International Reports AFGHAN ISMAILI PARTY LEADER OUTLINES HIS GOALS 16. März 2003 (Quelle: Lexis-Nexis)
  • BBC Monitoring Online: Three northern Afghan parties attempt to revive union Text of report by Afghan Northern Alliance newspaper 'Payam-e Mojahed' on 24th March, 24. März 2000
  • Emadi Hafizullah, "Minority Group Politics: The Role of Isma'ilis in Afghanistan's Politics," Central Asian Survey, 12: 3 (1993): 379-392.
  • Emadi, Hafizullah Struggle for Recognition: Hazara Isma'ili Women and Their Role in the Public Arena in Afghanistan AJWS: Asian Journal of Women's Studies Vol. 8; No. 2; Pg. 76, June 30, 2002 (Quelle: Lexis-Nexis)
  • Human Rights Watch: A Crisis of Impunity. The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War Juli 2001, S. 36
    http://www.ecoi.net/pub/dh780_00262.pdf (Zugriff am 07. April 2004)
  • IWPR: Troubled Ismaili Homecoming, 24. Jänner 2003
    http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/arr/arr_200301_45_2_eng.txt (Zugriff am 07. April 2004)
  • Maley William. The Afghanistan Wars. Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan 1998, S. 200-207;214-216
  • Mousavi Sayed Askar: The Hazaras of Afghanistan. An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study Richmond: Curzon 1998, S. 181ff.
  • ÖRK / ACCORD Reisebericht Afghanistan, 13. – 24. Juli 2003, September 2003, Abs. 215-217
  • Radio Message of Freedom 5 Mar 96/BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Faction relations in Baghlan Province said friendly, 6. März 1996 (Quelle: Lexis-Nexis)
  • Radio Message of Freedom 5 Mar 96/BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Faction leaders agree to investigation of commanders' killings 6. März 1996 b(Quelle: Lexis-Nexis)
  • Rubin Barnett The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the International System. New Haven: Yale University Press 2002, S. 272-273
  • SFH - Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe/Swiss Refugee Council: Afghanistan - Update über die Entwicklungen bis Februar 2004 (Autor: Michael Kirschner), 1. März 2004, S. 12
    http://www.ecoi.net/pub/bp87_afghanistan040301_d.pdf (Zugriff am 07. April 2004)
  • The Independent (London) Kabul ceasefire strengthened as Ismaili faction seeks peace, 19. März 1994 (Quelle: Lexis-Nexis)
  • UNHCR District Profiles Ghazni: District Jaghori, 30. Juli 2002
    http://www.aims.org.af/country_profile/unhcr_district_profiles/UNHCR_central_district_profile/Ghazni/D_Jaghori/JAGHORI.pdf (Zugriff am 07. April 2004)
  • UNHCR-Stellungnahme zur Frage der Flüchtlingseigenschaft afghanischer Asylsuchender Juli 2003
    http://www.unhcr.de/pdf/368.pdf (Zugriff am 07. April 2004)
  • US Department of State: International Religious Freedom Report 2003: Afghanistan, 18. Dezember 2003
    http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/24467.htm (Zugriff am 07. April 2004)
  • USDOS - US Department of State: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2003: Afghanistan, 25. Februar 2004
    http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27943.htm (Zugriff am 07. April 2004)
  • Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 7 Mar 98/BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, New distribution of posts agreed 10. März 1998 (Quelle: Lexis-Nexis)
  • Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 7 Oct 96/BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Former President Rabbani wins Ismaili support, 10. Oktober 1996 (Quelle: Lexis-Nexis)
  • Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 9 Feb 98/ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Leader of Ismaili party joins northern Shi'i alliance 11. Februar 1998 (Quelle: Lexis-Nexis)
  • Der Weg nach Bamiyan: Kurzbiographien – J
    http://www.afghanistan-seiten.de/afghanistan/bios_i_j.html (Zugriff am 07. April 2004)