The following information was provided during a 22 April 1996 interview held in Beirut with the Director of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut (AUB). A second interview was held on 25 April 1996. The Director has conducted research on Islamic groups in Lebanon with a special focus on Hezbollah. The Director has been involved in field research and has travelled extensively in all parts of Lebanon.

Checkpoints

There are no Hezbollah checkpoints between Tripoli and Beirut, or between Beirut and Tyr in the south, only Lebanese and Syrian army checkpoints on the highway. There are also no Hezbollah checkpoints in Beirut, not even in the Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut's southern suburbs. In these suburbs, the Lebanese and Syrian army have checkpoints on the main streets. There are more Syrian troops in these suburbs than Lebanese.

In the last four years checkpoints between Tripoli, Beirut and Tyr have been mainly in place to signal a presence. In fact, these army checkpoints are assisting traffic more than they are checking passengers' identity or searching vehicles. When needed, the responsibility of checking the identity of passengers is with the Lebanese army. Syrian soldiers will only check cars and people when there is a serious threat to Syrian and Lebanese interests.

There is a Hezbollah security control in the southern suburbs of Beirut at the entrance to Hezbollah's buildings. The principal offices are located in these five or so main buildings. Members of the Hezbollah security unit are armed and check the identity of people coming in and out of these buildings. People entering a Hezbollah building must provide an identity document with a picture to the security guards at the entrance.

In South Lebanon, there are some Hezbollah alternating roadblocks in the area where it conducts its resistance activities. This area would cover approximately the mountain area around Nabatiye to the western Biqa including Mashgara and Bint Jbeil. For example, in an area called Al-Arbsali which was shelled during the April 1996 Israeli bombings, there are some Hezbollah controlled roadblocks. In these mountains surrounding Nabatiye there are very few Lebanese army checkpoints. Hezbollah does not have fixed roadblocks because they would represent easy targets for the South Lebanese Army (SLA) or Israeli army shelling.

Syrian Influence on the Lebanese Population

This influence is both implicit and explicit. There are approximately 35,000 Syrian soldiers in Lebanon. Under the Taef Accord and the Distinguished Relationship between Syria and Lebanon, there is daily collaboration between the two countries. Politically, it seems that there are no areas not influenced by Syria. Economically, the influence may take various forms. It can be cooperation on trade and customs issues such as agricultural policies in the Biqa Valley. At the social level, Syria's influence is rather limited Syria does not influence Lebanese citizens every day of their lives.

Syrian soldiers or officers might intervene in some aspects of the day-to-day lives of Lebanese citizens as, for example, in a parking problem between two individuals. This example might seem insignificant for people in Canada where space is not so much a problem, but in Lebanon, especially Beirut, it is a very serious problem. A Syrian soldier or officer might intervene in such a dispute to resolve it, when Lebanese policemen have been unsuccessful. Another example is that the presence of Syrian soldiers has an impact on the ability of Lebanese to travel from one place to another by stopping or helping the flow of traffic through their checkpoints.

Normalization Process

The level of violence in Lebanon has receded immensely since 1991, except for the south. Some instances of violence have occurred since then but they are related to criminal cases with no connections to political activities. In fact, the level of violence in major Lebanese cities is significantly less than in cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago.

State protection has improved but not to a level where action is taken on trivial cases such as a person threatening a neighbour. If the neighbour files a complaint with the police, a report is written but no real action is taken. It is like having a stereo stolen from a car or an apartment in Toronto, Montreal, or New York the person makes a complaint to the police but is unsure whether anything will be done.

However, state protection has greatly improved on the level of police presence in the street during the day and at night. Although without streets lights it might seem a little eerie, it is safe to go out at all hours of the night. Again, it is safer to go out at night in Lebanon today than in most major cities of the United States.

State protection at the level of political activities depends on the political objectives of such activities as, for example, whether such activities threaten Lebanese and Syrian interests, or the Lebanese and Syrian governments. If a person conducts political activities threatening those interests, it is difficult to estimate to what extent state protection would be available. People who conduct political activities have to respect the general norms of political behaviour that are in place today in Lebanon. One cannot declare that people can say everything they think about the Lebanese and Syrian governments. Lebanese who conduct political activities, either in favour of or critical of the government, are aware of the "ceiling" in this matter. Therefore, they adjust to this reality while conducting their political activities. There is room for political opposition in Lebanon. The opposition in place today produces a debate on issues and policies that is politically healthy for Lebanon.

State protection in terms of western human rights standards is an open question. In developing countries, human rights are mainly understood in terms of socio-economic development, and as such, the Lebanese government has been taking on its responsibilities by investing large financial assets in the reconstruction of the country. One has to understand that after fifteen years of civil war the priorities of the government are reconstruction, security and stability.

State Protection and Individuals Fearing Reprisals from the Hezbollah

People at risk from Hezbollah are high ranking party members who were involved in security matters for the organization and later became involved in anti-Hezbollah activities. Such individuals could easily provide documents such as identity cards or newspapers articles which prove their rank in the organization, or the names of leaders of the Islamic Resistance, Hezbollah's military wing. It is very unlikely that such persons would not be able to substantiate their status in the organization. There have been no reports of such cases. Other people at risk would be individuals who collaborate voluntarily with the Israelis. Members of the SLA would also qualify in this category unless they desert and repent for their past behaviour. In Arabic it is called tah'eb.

It would be very difficult for the Lebanese government to justify offering protection to individuals who collaborated with Israel or the SLA. In remote areas of the south where the Lebanese army units are scattered and where Hezbollah is militarily present there is little the government would do for such individuals. It would also be difficult for the state to provide protection to a former leader of Hezbollah who openly divulges secrets about the organization, especially in the south of Lebanon and in the southern suburbs of Beirut.

Through its own publication called Al-Ahd, Hezbollah declared that forgiveness would be granted to members of the SLA who were forcibly recruited and who deserted in order to repent. This was not a fatwa but a political statement. Hezbollah also published a list of former SLA members who deserted and asked for forgiveness. These former militiamen are living a normal life today in Lebanon.

Relations between Hezbollah and the Christian community are normal. For example, there is a Christian neighbourhood close to the southern suburbs of Beirut called al-Hadeth. When the Syrian army stormed General Aoun's position in October 1990, several people followed them and looted many Christian and Muslim properties. Those Christians went to Hezbollah and told them that they were informed that people who had committed these crimes were from the areas controlled by Hezbollah, or were members of Hezbollah. Leaders of Hezbollah immediately dispatched its security men to investigate the situation. The perpetrators were captured, the property recovered, and the criminals brought to the Lebanese security forces to demonstrate that Hezbollah was respectful of the emerging Lebanese authorities. If the stolen properties suffered damage, Hezbollah paid to fix them, and if it was not possible to repair them the organization bought new ones.

Hezbollah does not recruit its members by force nor does it lacks new recruits.

Hezbollah does not harass or threaten people who disagree with its policies. Actually, although many Lebanese, both Christian and Muslim disagree with Hezbollah, they never have problems even those people who criticize the meaning and success of Hezbollah's attacks on the so called "security zone" or on Israel.

For ordinary citizens whether Christian, Muslim or Druze there are no problems regarding the Hezbollah. There have been no instances where the government has had to provide protection to ordinary citizens because they were afraid of Hezbollah. Even regular Hezbollah members who leave the party for whatever reasons would not have problems with the party because ordinary members do not have information that would threaten the organization.

Areas in Lebanon Controlled by Hezbollah

In the southern suburbs of Beirut there are specific buildings under direct control of the Hezbollah. Those buildings are the headquarters of the organization. This direct control is related to Hezbollah's security requirements of which the Lebanese government is aware. Only Hezbollah guards at the entrance of the buildings carry weapons. However, this is not to suggest that the entire southern suburbs of Beirut are under the direct military control of Hezbollah. This would be a false statement. Hezbollah members do not carry weapons in the streets of Beirut. They would be arrested by Lebanese security forces.

There are both Lebanese and Syrian army checkpoints and barracks in the southern suburbs of the capital. The Lebanese government is in control of the security in this suburb.

Hezbollah influence in the suburbs is mainly felt through social establishments such as schools, hospitals, medical clinics, youth activities, etc. This is much more efficient than an aggressive military presence.

Hezbollah is not militarily present in the Akkar (northern area), in the Kesrouan (central costal area), or Beirut, except for the leadership buildings in the southern suburbs.

Hezbollah has a military presence in the south starting at the mountain on the outskirts of Jezzine down to Nabatiye and the western Biqa Valley, passing by the eastern chain of mountains to the boundary of the so called "security zone" all the way to Tyr. The low land area between Saida and Tyr is not known to have a strong Hezbollah presence, except for some high hills. There are some political offices belonging to Hezbollah in the suburbs of Sidon, but not a military presence. Hezbollah has a strong representation in the Baalbeck area.

Even in the most heavily influenced areas, the Hezbollah military presence on Lebanese territory does not exceed 5 per cent.

However, if there were serious allegations against an individual such as a former high ranking Hezbollah official who revealed secrets about military operations to foreigners or Israel, there are no areas in Lebanon where the person could hide. This represents an extreme case which would rarely happen. However, people who say publicly that they do not like Hezbollah or criticize them in newspapers, etc. are not threatened by the organization. The leadership of Hezbollah is well aware that there is a large section of the Lebanese population that disagrees with its ideology. It does not mean they are in danger.

It is important to understand that since its entry into the Lebanese parliament, Hezbollah has undergone an active policy of rapprochement with various political and religious groups in Lebanon. Hezbollah leaders have met often with the Maronite Patriarch Sfeir for example. They are engaging in political dialogue with everyone.

The Lebanese State and the Hezbollah

Before the Taef Accord, government institutions were almost non-existent and various organizations took the place of the state apparatus. Before 1989, there was no cooperation between the state and the Hezbollah simply because the Lebanese state was almost non-existent. Also, the government did not have the manpower capacity to enforce its presence and its rules in the various regions of the country.

Since 1989, there has been an increasing willingness on the part of Hezbollah to submit to the emerging state authority, especially regarding criminal justice. For example, when criminals are captured by Hezbollah in the southern suburbs of Beirut they are transferred to the Lebanese authorities. The area that does not fall under this transfer to the Lebanese authorities is that of Shi'a clan conflict where the parties involved (Shi'a clans or families) prefer to use independent traditional mediation mechanisms rather than the state institutions. This takes place in the Biqa Valley and close to Mount Hermil.

Cases of unrepentant collaboration with Israel and treason by a former high ranking member of Hezbollah would be dealt with first through Hezbollah institutions and then transferred to the Lebanese authorities since 1990.

Groups or individuals and the Hezbollah

The source identified several categories of people who might have unwanted contact with the Hezbollah.

People who collaborate with Israel on the basis of security and intelligence in its occupation of Lebanese territory would face serious difficulties with the Hezbollah. These people are mainly located in the south of Lebanon.

There is another category of people who might be questioned by Hezbollah members. It does not mean that they are facing threats. These are people who live inside the so called "security zone" who do not collaborate with Israel but exit the zone to take residence in other areas of Lebanon. These people are often questioned by members of Hezbollah for updated intelligence information about the current positions or movements of SLA or Israeli troops. There have been no reports of violence or harassment of these people, only of questioning.

Finally, in exceptional circumstances such as the beginning of another all-out civil war, or the 1982 Israeli invasion, known field researchers or politicians who have influenced government decisions and who oppose Hezbollah may face difficulties from them. The source stated that this is a hypothetical situation and is not aware of any such cases.

Recruitment for Military Operations in Hezbollah

It is difficult to provide a specific profile of recruits for suicide or military operations as it is highly classified information. However, general information can be provided.

Hezbollah will not ask new recruits to conduct military or suicide operations. Recruits for military operations are volunteers. It is important to understand that a party member is not necessarily a military man. Party members are involved in a variety of social activities; military people represent a small fraction of Hezbollah membership. Recruitment for the Islamic Resistance, Hezbollah's military wing, requires strong ideological beliefs and commitment, as well as rigorous military training. The principal ideological beliefs are sacrifice to the cause of liberation of the Lebanese territory, and martyrdom. There are few people who would possess these qualities. The Islamic Resistance leadership must be totally convinced of the person's trustworthiness, something that cannot be ascertained in a short period of time. Therefore, it is very doubtful that people who are recruited for these operations are forced to do so.

For the reasons mentioned above, it is extremely unlikely that a non-Shi'a or an ordinary person would be recruited for military operations or, even more so, forcibly recruited. They would certainly be deemed unfit to conduct such operations. The main reason is that they would have sensitive information about the Islamic Resistance and would not be able to resist the brutal interrogation procedures of Israeli and SLA agents. A committed guerilla would fight to the death before surrendering. Therefore, it is inconceivable that a person who is forcibly recruited would be able to conduct sophisticated military operations that require total commitment and training. This is a basic rule in all military organizations, whether guerilla or professional army.

Support to Hezbollah from the Lebanese Government and the Syrians

Other than moral support for the resistance against the Israeli occupation of the Lebanese territory, there has been no special support such as logistics or military from the Lebanese government to the Hezbollah.

Syrian support for the Islamic Resistance is well known. The support takes the form of facilitating the passage of materiel to the Islamic Resistance in the south. Syrian support for the Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance has to be understood within the larger framework of the Syrian-Iranian relationship.

Influence on the Hezbollah

The Syrians have much more influence on the Hezbollah than do the Lebanese authorities and, because of its geographical location, Syria has, in terms of logistic support, more influence on the Hezbollah than does Iran. However, this does not include the ideological domain which can be explained by the mutual understanding reached between Syria and Iran with regard to the Islamic Resistance.

This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Director of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, The American University of Beirut (AUB), Beirut. 22 April 1996 and 25 April 1996. Interviews.