Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1992
ETHIOPIA
The coalition of ethnic-based insurgencies that took power in Ethiopia in 1991 remained
committed to establishing a multiparty democracy by 1994. But tensions between
the principal armed groups of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TG),
i.e., the Etniopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF), erupted into violent clashes several times in 1992. This resulted
in an outbreak of low-level war between the two groups in June when the
OLF boycotted local elections, withdrew its soldiers from camps, and took up arms.
By year's end, the EPRDF forces had dominated the fighting, and negotiations to
bring the OLF back into the TG coalition and resolve the political crisis had stalled.
The EPRDF, which is officially a coalition of four parties but additionally controls
more than a dozen loosely affiliated parties, dominates the TG and the quasi-legislative
Council of Representatives, especially since the departure of the OLF. The
Council is composed of 74 members representing 30 political and ethnic groups. The
TG held local and regional elections in June, the first attempt at internationally observed
multiparty elections in Ethiopian history. However, the results were flawed
by numerous irregularities, including fraud, harassment, intimidation, and political
.assassination. In the months leading up to the elections, numerous offices of opposition
parties were closed, supporters of opposition parties were detained without
charge, and both the TG ana opposition parties were accused of political assassination.
In Eritrea the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) administers the oneparty,
provisional government of Eritrea tasked with governing the country until an
internationally supervised referendum on Eritrea's political future, scheduled for
April 1993, can be held.
When it came to power, the TG leadership dismantled the extensive military and
security apparatus of the Mengistu regime. Following the OLF decision to leave the
TG in June, the TG military/police force numbered about 100,000 and was composed
primarily of EPRDF regulars. Battles with the OLF resulted in a number of casualties,
including civilians, and the detention of 19,000 OLF fighters. Rural instability
was a problem for much of 1992, but by the end of the year the countryside was
largely free of major security problems. During 1992, the TG began efforts to reconstitute
a professional police force and to downgrade the temporary police system of
thousands of local "peace and stability committees" which have had sweeping powers
of investigation, arrest, and detention. All security forces, including the peace
and stability committees, were accused of committing human rights abuses. Total
military expenditures for 1989, the last year for which the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency conducted a detaited analysis, were $763 million. Reduction
in military expenditures is a major goal of the TG, and current levels of military
expenditure are substantially lower tnan they were in 1989. These reductions are
linked to the Government's economic reform program.
In Eritrea approximately 110,000 Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)
regulars make up the provisional government's military/securily force. The provisional
government expelled all remaining Mengistu troops, including those accused
of "war crimes." The last renmants left in July 1992.
Ethiopia's largely agricultural economy struggled to make its way out of 17 years
of Marxist mismanagement and toward freer markets and competition. Nonetheless,
food and fuel shortages were chronic; over a million people remained displaced by
the war; the national treasury was depleted; foreign exchange was at a desperately
low level; and the inflation rate was high. While 1992 was the third good agricul85
tural year in a row (largely due to favorable rains), little real impact of the TG's
"new economic policy" was felt by year's end.
The economic situation in Eritrea roughly paraUeled that of Ethiopia. Agricultural
crop performance in 1992 was expectea to be the best in many years, and the government
continued to strive for a mixed economy with at least partial privatization.
While Ethiopia has shown considerable progress in extending and protecting
human rights, serious problems remain. In particular, over 2,000 former regime officials
were still in detention without having been charged after almost 20 months;
members of the former Workers' Party of Euiiopia (WPE) were disenfranchised; ethnic
and political violence continued with many extrajudicial killings, although at reduced
levels; and the continued lack of a police force and a fuUy reconstituted judiciary
resulted in increased use of force in dealing with criminal activity.
In Eritrea the one-party provisional government expelled numerous non-Eritreans
and was reluctant to repatriate its exiled or refugee citizens from neighboring countries.
In accordance with the 1991 National Chtirter, freedom of speech, assembly, association,
religion, and travel were more widely respected than under the M^ngistu
regime. With the appointment of special prosecutors and the declared intention of
establishing an independent judiciary, the TG moved late in 1992 to bring its political
detainees to trial and to institute the rule of law.
The provisional government of Eritrea established a range of judicial safeguards,
which are being observed.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.
In the tense atmosphere surrounding
the encampment of armed troops in Aprfl and the run up to the June elections,
officials of EPRDF and non-EPRDF parties died in violent incidents. Charges
abounded that EPRDF soldiers assassinated opposition party leaders. The body-
Saard of the chairman of the Sidamo Liberation Movement died in a shooting indent
with EPRDF soldiers at a checkpoint. The deputy chairman of the Islamic
Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO) was killed at an EPRDF checkpoint, and
the head of the Oromo People's Liberation Front was also attacked at a checkpoint.
Representatives of the Oromo People's Democratic Organization disappeared in OLF
territory. OLF officials were gruesomely murdered—apparently by the IFLO—in
eastern Ethiopia in May. In July newspapers reported a number of deaths of bandits
in "mopping up" operations.
In many areas of the country the TG does not exert effective judicial or police control.
This government weakness means that those responsible are seldom, if ever,
held legally accountable for human rights abuses. There were dozens of instances
of violent clashes in the countryside between local militaiy elements of political parties
within and outside the TG. In a number of instances, rival groups repeatedly
engaged in politically or ethnically motivated violence and killings.
In the campaign for the June local and regional elections, the Islamic Front for
the Liberation of Oromia was linked to numerous, gruesome, politically motivated
killings. Credible allegations spread in May and June that the Oromo People's
Democratic Organization, an affiliate of the EPRDF, was responsible for the massacre
of Amhara nationals in Arbagugu and in other towns in May and June.
In Eritrea there were no reports of extrajudicial killings. The provisional government
of Eritrea has made no official accounting for a number of deaths that resulted
during the 1991 forced repatriation of Ethiopians, following the establishment of the
provisional government.
b. Disappearance.
Since the TG came to power in Addis Ababa, its constituent
political parties have traded charges and countercharges regarding politically motivated
violence in the countryside as well as in the cities, including some disappearances
of opposition party workers and supporters, some still missing at the end of
1992.
In Eritrea there have been reports of kidnapings of members of political opposition
parties, including reports that those in opposition to the EPLF have been kidnaped
in nei^boring countries and returned to Eritrea mth the tacit approval of
the provisional government in Asmara. By year's end, those reported kidnaped had
not reappeared. It is assumed that they are in detention. While the provisional government
denies involvement in such disappearances, it has not made sustained efforts
to investigate the allegations.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
The National Charter of the TG abjures torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment. There were many credible allegations that de86
tainees were beaten while in detention, but there were no allegations of systematic
torture in Ethiopian jails, prisons, or detention centers since the TG came to power.
Three weeks after capturing Addis Ababa in May 1991, the interim EPRDF administration
announced that all detained Mengistu Government officials would be treated
humanely. In 1992 this continued to be the general pattern with a few exceptions,
such as at one detention center where 20 hunger strikers (security personnel
in the former government) were detained in isolation from the rest of the detainees
in unsanitary, cramped quarters.
In Eritrea physical conditions in the prisons are acceptable. Families may send
food to detainees twice a week and visit once a week. Tnere were no allegations of
torture in jails, prisons, or detention centers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The TG's National Charter approved in
July 1991 prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as exile. However, at the
end!^ of the year there was still no criminal code or related laws implementing this
f;eneral concept, and steps to develop a professional police force began only in April,
n the absence of a police force and strict guidelines for military and quasi-security
forces, arrests were often arbitrary, and investigations were the responsibility of
many different groups, namely, EPRDF administrators, local peace and stabiUty
committees, complaints review committees, and personnel from the newly reconstituted
Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defense. In addition, individuals, particularly
Oromos, were detained because of political affiliation, often without due process
of law. The TG set up "complaints review and grievance clearing committees"
to investigate allegations of corruption or abuse of power. These committees interfered
in business and government operations and detained managers. As of late
1992, they were slowly being disbanded. In the circumstances, citizens had little
protection under the law from arbitrary arrest and detention.
When the new authorities seized power in late May 1991, they detained thousands
of civilians without charge, the largest number being senior Mengistu government
or WPE officials arrested solely because of the positions they held. Also detained
were former Mengistu government officials accused of corruption or involvement
in violations of humanitarian law. While thousands—indeed the vast majority—
were subsequently released, additional suspects continued to be arrested on the
recommendation of local peace and stability committees throughout the country,
many in connection with the OLF-EPRDF conflict.
At the end of the year, the TG authorities acknowledged having over 2,000
Mengistu government civilians under detention who had still not been charged
—
they had been held for almost 20 months. TG officials said this was a consequence
of abolishing the Mengistu police force (formally charged with investigations) and
suspending Mengistu public prosecutors and judges. In August the TG announced
its intention of establishing an independent judiciary and in mid-September named
a special prosecutor to head up investigations and prosecution of the Mengistu and
WPE officials. In August the Ministry of Internal Afffdrs dispatched a seven-man
team to begin investigations of detainees at a former military training site outside
Addis Ababa. As of me end of 1992, over 800 investigative interviews of former
WPE and security personnel were completed at a former military training site outside
Addis Ababa, m addition, the TG stated that all Mengistu Government detainees
must be charged by February 1993 or they can be released on writs of habeas
corpus. The federal judiciary for trials of Mengistu-era officials had not been nominated
by the end of 1992.
The number of OLF fighters held in detention at the end of 1992 was approximately
19,000 including several hundred women and children. No charges were filed
against them. The TG was still conducting reeducation classes in the detention centers.
At the end of 1992, there were no reports of any releases from the detention
centers, although one of the detention centers was closed and the detainees moved
to other centers. There were indications that some civilians were included in the
camps' detainee population. The TG has not announced how long these detainees
will be held or how their cases will be handled.
The TG authorized the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit
all former Mengistu Government and WPE civilians remaining in detention. The
ICRC and foreign diplomats were also allowed to visit OLF military elements in detention
following the OLF's June withdrawal from the TG and the voluntary departure
of its armed wing from encampment sites. There were credible reports that civilians
associated with the OLF were among the Oromo detainees.
In June, 22 members of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party, an opposition
group, were arrested by Sudanese security forces in Sudan and were moved to
northern Ethiopia without prior consultation with the TG. At the end of 1992, four
of them remained in detention and the others had been released.
The provisional government of Eritrea published civil and criminal codes in 1991
which contain a fuD range of judicial safeguards, including habeas corpus and a 48-
hour limit on detention without charge (with the possibflity of no more than two
14-day extensions with judicial authorization). In general, these safeguards are in
place and working. There have been no reports of arbitrary arrests or searches without
warrants.
When the EPLF came to power in Eritrea in May 1991, it repatriated all but 900
of the 85,000 Mengistu military personnel captured (see Section l.a.). In July it repatriated
the remaining 900 to Ethiopia for possible trial. The provisional government
admits to detaimng a "small number" of Eritreans, somewhat over 200, accused
of collaboration and war crimes. None has been formaUy charged. Acconiing
to the provisional government, some, who were allegedly members of the former government
with no evidence against them, will not be charged, but held in prison for
a total of 2 years and then released. The provisional government does not grant
ICRC access to these detainees.
As a government policy, neither the TG nor provisional government of Eritrea
uses exile as a means of political control. The EJPLF has, however, expelled thousands
of Ethiopians. The TG announced that aU citizens remaining in exile were
free to return, and many did so in 1992.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Since the new judiciary system was not yet in
f>lace during 1992, the TG in general continued to use the criminal court system
rom the former government, with the Supreme Court at the apex. Proceedings were
open, accused were permitted to present witnesses on their behalf, and decisions
were rendered by a judge. In August the Council of Representatives issued a proclamation
on judicial independence which had not been tested in practice by years end.
No trials of former Mengistu government officials had begun.
In Eritrea the provisional government established a separate judiciary in September
1991 and appointed a new Secretary of Justice in 1992. Local elders tried many
lesser offenses. A three-judge bench tried more serious crimes, with arrest warrants
required, evidence taken under oath, and rules of evidence observed. Convicted persons
have the right of appeal to the Appeals Court, which also consists of three
judges, and finally to the Supreme Court.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The
1991 National Charter of the TG prohibits arbitrary interference in privacy, family,
home, or correspondence. Nevertheless, complaints remained common about intrusions
into private premises by the EPRDF troops (who provided public security in
urban areas in the absence of a police force). Local peace and stability committees
often appeared to act arbitrarily in authorizing searches and arrests by the EPRDF.
There were many reports, too, of EPRDF troops entering the homes of supporters
of opposition political organizations and arresting people on the spot, both in cities
and in rural areas. Unlicensed possession of firearms continued to be a problem for
the TG, and private and commercial vehicles, as well as private homes were subject
to random searches for weapons.
The practice of former WPE members reporting to their local committee every
Sunday was suspended in August, and their right to travel abroad was restored.
The National Charter explicitly condemned tne Mengistu Government's policies of
resettlement and viUagization and promised priority attention to the rehabilitation
of persons who were uprooted under those programs and wished to return to their
home areas. Some 60 to 75 percent of those resettled under Mengistu had returned
to their home areas with some financial assistance from the TG. In May the TG also
instituted a program to provide some financial assistance to those choosing to remain
in the areas in whicn they had resettled.
In Eritrea the authorities must obtain a warrant before undertaking searches of
home or other private property; this requirement was respected in practice.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts.—
Low level conflicts between EPRDF and OLF forces continued throughout
the year. These clashes resulted in a number of civilian casualties. For example, in
April at Bedeno the OLF was responsible for a massacre of over 100 innocent civilians
whose bodies were found with their arms bound behind their backs. They were
allegedly thrown over a cliff.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
People spoke freely in 1992. While the media
were freer than at any time in Ethiopia's history, they were still muted in their
treatment of the TG. In 1992 the TG passed a press law which forbade official censorship,
but the law may in fact promote self-censorship because of imprecise definitions
of what constitutes a threat to national security. The authorities may prosecute
journalists and other writers for articles deemed to threaten national security.
In addition, very few political parties have been granted free access to the official
media, consisting of all broadcast and most print media. Five political parties—three
in the coalitionGovemment, two in opposition—have their own newspapers, which
offered some critical comment on the TG.
La Eritrea the EPLF put informal pressure—much of it by appeals to Eritrean patriotism
and unity—on persons to make their opinions conform to provisioned government
positions. Nevertheless, the provisional government publicly guaranteed
the rights of all groups and individuals to air views on the April 1993 referendum,
inclumng those in opposition. In 1992 the provisional government allowed in statecontrolled
newspapers and on radio broadcasts only limited opposition views to be
heard, but in port this was due to practical limitations such as a newsprint shortage
which affected all publications, including official provisional government publications.
Views on the economy and criticism of the bureaucracy were expressed freely.
The provisional government abolished the Mengistu government's censorship
boards m 1991, and it imposed no formal restrictions on independent newspapers.
While small newspapers printed by Eritrean religious organizations circulated freehr
in 1992, no newspapers of opposition parties and movements had appeared by years
end.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The July 1991 National Charter
endorsed peaceful assembly, freedom of association, and the right to engage in
unrestricted political activity, including the right to organize political parties. In
1992 popular demonstrations became routine around the country, including those
protesting TG policies.
The TG proclamation of August 15, 1991, requires organizers to inform authorities
of pubUc political meetings 48 hours in advance. The authorities also hold the
organizers responsible to ensure these meetings take place peacefully. However, in
Jmy the High Court acquitted the three executives of the United Democratic Nationals
Party, who were arrested in November 1991. They had been charged with
responsibihly for the outcome of their rally which turned violent.
Tliere was a proUferation of political organizations (over 130) from a wide spectrum
of political opinion. The TG dissolved Mengistu's WPE and its various appendages
after the EPKDF came to power, and the Council of Representatives continued
to ban WPE members from any political activity, including voting in the June regional
elections.
The TG also abolished the Mengistu government's Revolutionary Ethiopian Women's
Association, an appendage ofthe banned WPE, and detained the former chairwoman
without charge. She remained in detention at year's end, and no successor
organization had been formed.
While not formally banned, certain expatriate Ethiopian groups which reject the
principles of the National Charter also were still not free to oinganize in the country,
although certain elements of such groups began returning to Ethiopia. These groups
included the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Party, and the All-Etniopian Socialist Movement.
In Eritrea there were no restrictions on the freedom of assembly, and no permits
for meetings were required. EPLF provisional government leaders declared that all
individuals and groups were entitled to express their views freely in the period leading
up to the April 1993 referendum on mdependence. No opposition has formally
emerged.
c. Freedom of Religion
The National Charter gufirantees freedom of religion, including
the right of conversion, and since coming to power TG officials have advocated
complete freedom of worship. A new patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox
Church was elected in July following the TG's removal of his predecessor in 1991.
At year's end, the TG had not restored the Orthodox Church to its preeminent, pre-
1974 "state church" status and, instead, treated the Church as a powerful force separate
from the Government. The TG continued to allow the reopening of Protestant
churches closed by the Mengistu government and returned their property.
The Ethiopian Orthodox Church protested the expansion of Protestant missions
into areas of its interests. On several occasions in 1992, these protests turned violent
and led to the burning of churches and homes of Protestant parishioners. In
addition, the construction of mosques in traditional Christian enclaves led to violent
clashes often resulting in deaths in some northern cities. The attempted construction
of a mosque in the traditionally Orthodox Christian area of Axum led to violent
clashes which resulted in some deaths and severe damage. Ultimately, no mosque
was constructed in Axum.
Most members of Ethiopia's small Jewish population, known as Beta Yisrael or
"Falasha" (a word meaning outsider), have left their traditional homelands in
Gondar and Tigray and emigrated to Israel. At year's end, under 1,000 Jews were
believed to remain in Ethiopia, and emigration processing was continuing for these
few. There were no reports of discrimination against Jews or "Falash Mora" (Jewish
converts to Christianity also seeking to emigrate to Israel) by the TG.
In Eritrea the provisional government announced that it would be returning
church property confiscated by the Mengistu government. It also said that religious
schools would be allowed to open, although tnis policy had not been implemented
as of late December. All major religions are represented in the provisional government.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The National Charter recomizes freedom of movement, including the
ri{^t to foreign travel and emigration. Ostensibly to dampen ethnic tensions, some
local government officials contmued to discourage migration between regions and
encouraged Ethiopians "resettled" under the draconian policies of the former government
to remain in or to return to those areas. Emigration of individual Jews continued
throughout the year. The TG, continuing the practice of the former government,
required exit visas from all people, Ethiopian and foreign, wishing to leave the country.
Despite continuing economic and security problems in much of the southern half
of the country, Ethiopia maintained its open-door poli(y for refugees as well as returning
Ethiopians.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Reftigees (UNHCR) and other international
and nongovernmental organizations have been permitted to continue their
activities in eight refugee/returnee camps, located primanly in the east near the Somali
border. Conditions are harsh in these camps, exacerbated by banditry and civil
strife which interrupted supply rations during the early part of the year. Approximately
500,000 people were estimated to be in need oi food in the Ogaden region
at the end of 1992.
Similar problems of intertribal warfare (combined with " culmination of a severe
drought across the southernmost part of the country) created a new stream of approximately
80,000 Ethiopian refugees, most of whom migrated to Kenya. The TG
made efforts to bring reconciliation to the tribal disputes, and, working with humanitarian
organixations, assistance to the region. After a November peace treaty between
Oromo subclans, some 50,(X)0 Ethiopian refugees in Kenya registered to repatriate.
In the same manner, some 10,000 ethnic Uduks received assistance from the
TG when they returned from Sudan. Despite the continued presence of the Administration
for Refugee Affairs which actually runs the camps, refugee protection remained
problematic throughout the year.
In Eritrea the provisional government no longer pursued its policy of forced repatriation
to Ethiopia of certain categories of Ethiopians. Since May 1991, approximately
50,0(X) Christian and Muslim refugees returned to Eritrea spontaneously but
were screened by the provisional government. Most non-Eritreans, particularly ethnic
Amharas, left Eritrea or were expelled if they had close contacts with the
Mengistu regime. Many ethnic Tigrayans remained, as did some non-Eritreans married
to Eritreans. The approximately 50,000 non-Eritreans in and around Asmara
are engaged mainly in trade. A few thousand non-Eritreans also live in the other
major towns in Eritrea. Although the provisional government did organize some repatriation
from Sudan, it maintained that it needed over $200 million to repatriate
Eritrean refugees from Sudan. The provisional government's demands were seen as
unrealistic by the international community, ana relations with the UNHCR deteriorated
throughout the year, with the UNHCR reducing its staff. Observers believe
the provisional government prefers to maintain a restrictive policy towards returning
refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government
Ethiopians were not free to change their govenmient peacefiilly in 1992. However,
the collapse of Mengistu's authoritarian rule in 1991 brought to power new political
forces proclaiming their intention of creating a democratic multiparty system, with
national elections scheduled to be held by January 1994.
In July 1991, the multiparty TG was established by means of a national conference
held in Addis Ababa. It was charged with administering the country until
a new constitution could be promulgated and national elections held. In 1992 the
TG named members of the Cfonstitutional Commission, and the Conmiission began
the process of preparing a new constitution. By the end of 1992, it had not yet held
?ubuc hearings to alldw for citizen contributions. According to the TG timetable, the
ionstitution will be ratified or rejected by a special body (elected solely for that purpose)
in 1993.
The EPRDF, which is actually a coalition of four parties, dominates the TG, and
its members hold the key positions of President, Prime Minister, and Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Internal AfTairs. The TG quasi-legislative Council of
Representatives comprises 74 members representing 30 political and ethnic groups.
Prior to its departure from the TG in June (see below), the OLF had functioned as
a form of loyal opposition within the Council of Representatives. After the 12 OLF
representatives departed, the EPRDF more easilv dominated Council debate.
On June 21, the TG held elections for regional governments in 10 of the 14 newly
established regions of Ethiopia (logistical diCBculties prevented the elections from
being held in 4 of the regions at that time). In many areas, particularly in the
southern and western regions of the country, the elections were maiiced by serious
irregularities and allegations of fi-aud and intimidation, principally by the EPRDF
but also by the OLF. The final results of the elections showed the EPRDF or its
allies winning 96 percent of the seats. Shortly before the day of the vote, the OLF
Mdthdrew from the elections, claiming that it was being prevented from contesting
in a free and fair manner. Smaller political parties from central and southern Ethiopia
also refused to recognize the elections.
The withdrawal of the OLF from the election and from the (Sovemment, plus the
subseqpient fighting, seriously threatened the prospects for democratic reform. The
withdrawal increased the probability of de facto one-party rule under the EPRDF.
In Eritrea the EPLF administers a one-party provisional government tasked with
governing the country until an internationally supervised referendum on Eritrea's
political niture, scheduled for April 1993, can be held. The provisional government
oflicially requested JJH. assistance in holding the Eritrean referendum. It announced
that once it attains its goal of de jure mdependence, it wiU convene a constituent
assembly to draft a new constitution based on a multiparty political system
and then will hold democratic elections.
Since Eritrea's general popilation is about evenly divided between (Christians and
Muslims, the EPO^* en^hasized religious balance in leadership positions: five of the
nine members of the EPLF politburo are Muslim, and Muslims hold half of the portfolios
in the provisional government cabinet.
Women are not well represented in leadership positions of the TG, the EPRDF,
or any of the other newly formed parties, but the TG has made efforts to change
this. Three of the 20 Cabinet members are women. The situation is similar in Eritrea
(see Section 5).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Hoarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation
ofAlleged Violations ofHuman Rights
Ethiopia's first independent human li^ts monitoring body, the Ethiopian Human
Rights Council, was established in October 1991, as were two other private groups
formed to further political dialog and promote respect for democratic rights: the
Ethiopian Congress for Democracy and Porum-84. All three groups were allowed to
operate freely and at times voiced vociferous opposition to TG policies without repercussions.
Reportedly, there is an independent human rights monitoring group in Eritrea,
but it has not published any findings.
The TG was generally willing to discuss human rights concerns with diplomatic
missions and international and nongovernmental oi^anizations. Amnesty International
and Africa Watch both visited Ethiopia early in the year to investigate alleged
violations of human rights. They were received by government officials and
granted access to political prisoners.
In Eritrea the provisional government's relations with the ICRC and UNHCR deteriorated
in 1992. ICRC requests to visitprisoners have not been well received by
the provisional government. The UNHCR recalled its senior representative in
Asmara in September. Also, in September a visiting European delegation was given
less than fuU cooperation when asking questions about human ri^ts, refugee repatriation,
and other sensitive issues.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status
Ethiopia comprises more than 80 different ethnic groups. At various times in the
past, one or another of these groups has predominated in the political, cultural, and
economic life of the country. Some ethnic groups, such as Oromos and other southerners,
claim that they have been dominated for hundreds of years by highlanders.
The declared aim of the TG is to promote the interests of all ethnic groujps through
a federal system of government. For example, elementary schools wiU offer instruction
in the language of the local population; secondary education is in Enriish. In
Eritrea there were no reports of discrimination against individuals on the oasis of
ethnicity.
Despite protections afforded them in the 1987 constitution, women are accorded
low social status in many traditional cultures in the country. U.N. studies document
that women are subject to marriage at very young ages, do more than their share
of hard and time-consuming labor, have unequal modem sector employment opportunities,
and receive below average wages in urban areas. However, women in
urban areas enjoy certain economic and legal rights equal to men; they may inherit,
sell or buy property, vote and run for office, and engage freely in commerce.
The TG has established a national committee on traditional practices considered
harmful to women. These include: female genital mutilation (circumcision); tattooing
(a possible means of transmitting the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome virus);
insertion of lip and ear plates among some southwestern tribes; nutritional taboos;
and child marriage. According to an mdependent expert in the field, the percentage
of Ethiopian women who have undergone genital mutilation may be as nigh as 90
percent. Domestic violence remains common. WhUe women have recourse to police
{trotection and official prosecution in cases of domestic violence, societal norms and
ear of loss of the social security that marriage provides inhibit many women from
seeking legal redress. The TG established a new desk of women's rights in the Ministry
of Justice and in the I*rime Minister's office, but at year's ena it was too soon
to know what, if anything, it would be able to do to ameliorate these problems.
In Eritrea the participation of women in the armed struggle in which one-third
of the EPLF fighters were women has worited to change this to a significant degree.
In the provisional government, four women hold Cabinet-level positions, and a number
of women hold mid-level positions. The provisional government codified a broad
range of rights for Eritrean women in 1991, including guarantees of equal educational
opportunity, land ownership, equal pay for equal work, legal sanctions
against domestic violence, and other economic and legal rights. Tne campaign
against dangerous traditional practices, including female circumcision, nutritional
taboos, and traditional birth methods, was taken up by the National Union of Eritrean
Women. As in Ethiopia, it was too soon to know what specific improvements
might result.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Under the National Charter, workers are free to
form and join unions of their own choosing without authorization from the TG, and
this right was exercised extensively. Over 300 trade unions were established at the
plant level. Under the Mengistu government, the nonagricultural labor force was
forced to organize under a single trade union federation, the Ethiopian Trade Union
(ETU), under the control of the WPE. Agricultural workers were similarly organized
in the Ethiopian Peasant's Association (EPA), also under WPE control. The TG dissolved
the ETU and EPA at the national level. Elections for new union officials were
held at the factoiy and national levels in industrial unions during 1991 and 1992.
Former members of the WPE and security jpersonnel were barrea from voting and
holding office. Similar elections were held m tiiose peasant associations surviving
the transition. No new national bodies for workers and peasants have been established,
but planning was under way in the TG for convening a national labor congress
to discuss the issue. In the interim, the existing 1975 Labor Code remains in
effect.
In the absence of official guidelines, TG officials have been tolerant of strikes and
protests in the workplace. Management frequently accuses the TG of being overindulgent
with labor demands, notably in strikes by former employees of Ethiopian
AirUnes and employees of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia.
Under the 1975 Code, the right of affiliation with international organizations was
reserved to the ETU. Despite its dissolution, the ETU technically remains an affiliate
of the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions.
Upon taking power in Eritrea, the provisional government similarly dissolved the
ETU and EPA on the CTound that they were instruments of political control for the
Mengistu government. In September 1991, the provisional government promulgated
a Labor Code giving workers the right to form and join unions of their choice and
the right to strike. However, Eritrean courts are given the power to order woiters
to delay strikes for 50 days pending negotiations. Should negotiations fail, unions
are required to give the provisional government a further 7-aay notice before any
strike.
b. The Ri^ht to Organize and Bargain Collectively.—The 1975 Labor Code includes
the nght to oi^anize and bargain collectively. Under the 1975 Code, wages
are to be set in negotiations between unions and management. If no agreement can
be reached, a disputes committee is formed, composed of two representatives each
from the union and management and a committee chairman (usually a member of
paanagement). If an agreement still cannot be found, the dispute goes to the Ministry
of Labor and Social Affairs for settlement. The TG's Prime Minister announced
in 1991 that all collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the Mengistu gov92
emment, frozen since 1990, were valid. There were no known instances of collective
bai;gaininff in 1992. The 1975 Labor Code prohibits discrimination against union
members oy management, but union members claim that occasionally employers
favor their own ethnic group.
In Eritrea the provisional government's Labor Code explicitly recognizes collective
baivaining and outlined an 11-step program for reaching agreements.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Slaveiy was officially abolished in
Ethiopia in 1942, but legal codes do not address the issue of forced or compulsorjr
labor. The TG's Charter proscribes slavery and involuntary servitude. Local TG officials
outside of Addis Ababa continue to call on residents to 'Volunteer" for uncompensated
community woik projects, such as road building and emergency road repair.
Industries were operating at less than half capacity; in those state-owned factories
still functioning, workers are stiU sometimes compelled by factoiy managers
to "volunteer" labor in order to meet quotas which may result in cash bonuses.
In Eritrea forced and compulsoiy labor was barred under the provisional government's
Labor Code. The provisional government acknowledges that Eritrean "fighters"
are often urged to "Volunteer" tneir services to rebuild the country's severely
damaged infrastructure for minimal compensation, although food and housing are
supplied.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Under the 1975 Labor Code, contract
employment of children under the age of 14 is prohibited. The TG appears to
respect this restriction in factories, shops, and among domestic workers. The Ministry
of Labor and Social Affairs was active in enforcing these provisions in stateowned
enterprises. Nevertheless, increasing numbers of young children are frequently
seen peddling and begging on city streets or working in fields in rural areas
uiroughout the year.
In Eritrea the EPLF's Labor Code raised the minimum age of employment to 18.
The provisional government also made education compulsory through age 18.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The statutory minimum wage, unchanged
since 1974, remains low and woefully insufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for an urban worker and family. On the other hand, only unskilled day laborers
usually receive such a low wage. In addition, although not required by law, most
employers provide some fringe benefits, most commonly transportation, which raise
the effective minimum wage. Low-paid workers often supplement their income by
holding multiple iobs, and with help from the extended family. The 1975 Labor Code
establishes an 8-hour workday and a 48-hour workweek. The maximum legal workweek
appears to be respected in practice, with the exception of previously noted uncompensated
"volunteer* labor to meet factory quotas. The 1975 Code also empowers
the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs "to aetennine protective devices" and to advise
on the health and safety of woikers. Comp>ensation for occupational injuries and
disabilities is mandatory. Tne Ministry's effectiveness in enforcing health and safety
standards is severely hampered by lack of resources.
In Eritrea the provisional government's Labor Code retains many provisions of
the 1975 Code including: a very low minimum wage, an 8-hour workday and 48-
hour workweek, and stipulations that the health and safety of workers be safeguarded.
The degree of enforcement, however, is low, as "lighters" are strongly
urged to "volunt^r'' services. Resources for enforcing health and safety standards
are severely limited.
