Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1990
IRAQ
Iraq is a de facto one-party state governed in theory by the
Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party (ABSP) through a Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC) which is vested with both executive and
legislative authority under the provisional Constitution of
1968. In practice Saddam Hussein holds decisive power as
President of the Republic, Chairman of the RCC, and Secretary-
General of the Regional Command of the ABSP. In 1989 the
Government announced its intention to adopt a multiparty
system enshrined in a new constitution. However, the draft
constitution published in July 1990, but not yet adopted,
would alter the form but not the substance of Iraq's political
system. In the new "Presidential Republic," the President
would assume most of the current powers of the RCC, which
would be abolished. Iraq's population comprises many
disparate groups, most notably Shi ' a and Sunni Muslim Arabs,
Kurds, Turcomans, and various Christian sects, predominantly
Assyrian and Chaldean.
Iraq's armed forces are large, generally well trained and well
equipped, and include a special component, the Fursan, or
Kurdish tribal levies, with responsibility for security within
the Kurdish autonomous region. A security apparatus
consisting of militias attached to the President, the ABSP,
and the Interior Ministry has been responsible for numerous
human rights violations. The armed forces have been
responsible for human rights abuses. Iraq's National Police
is responsible for civil order.
The Government exerts a high degree of control over the
economy, dominated by the petroleum sector, and owns all major
industries. The Government's program of divestiture and
privatization in agriculture, tourism, services, and light
industry stalled early in 1990 with the introduction of
stricter currency and import controls. Iraq's staggering
foreign debt (a minimum of $40 billion to non-Arab creditors),
a product of the country's guns-and-butter policy, v/as a
liability to its ambitious economic development plans as
lender countries increasingly refused to reschedule debt.
Iraq's abysmal record of repression of human rights was even
more flagrant in 1990. Following its invasion and takeover of
Kuwait in August, Iraq flaunted the Fourth Geneva Convention
on Civilians and other established norms of civilized behavior
by arbitrarily detaining hundreds of foreign civilians in both
Iraq and Kuwait and dispersing many of them to strategic sites
as "human shields" against possible military attack.
Nationals of some other countries were also denied permission
to leave. There were credible reports of mass extrajudicial
killings, summary executions, and widespread arrests and
torture of Kuwaiti citizens by Iraqi forces.
Almost every category of human rights dealt with in this
report is severely restricted or nonexistent in Iraq.
Freedoms of speech and press and of assembly and association
are virtually nonexistent, and Iraqis do not have the right to
change their government. The intelligence services continued
to conduct extensive surveillance and to use extralegal means,
including extreme forms of torture and summary execution of
children as well as adults, to suppress antiregime activity.
Other important himian rights problems included continuing
disappearances and arbitrary detentions, denial of due
process, and widespread interference with the right to
privacy.
Having brutally crushed most vestiges of Kurdish guerilla
resistance in 1988, through the use of chemical warfare and a
massive forced relocation of some 500,000 Kurds and Assyrians,
the regime faced little if any resistance from those groups in
1990. However, it continued to maintain a "no-man's land"
along its border with Turkey, some villages were razed, and
there were reports that some villagers were killed.
President Saddam Hussein announced in April that Iraq would
retaliate with CW if Israel attacked Iraq. He later extended
that threat to any would-be attacker. Iraq initiated CW use
during the Iran-Iraq war and used CW against its own Kurdish
citizens after the Gulf War cease-fire in 1988.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Execution has been an established Iraqi method for dealing
with perceived political and military opponents of the
Government, including, but not limited to, members of the
outlawed Da'wa organization (an Iran-supported fundamentalist
Shi ' a Muslim group that has engaged in acts of international
terrorism). In some cases, a family only learns that one of
its members has been executed when the security services
return the body, often showing clear signs of torture, and
require the family to pay a fine.
There were credible reports that hundreds of Iraqi Kurds, as
well as Assyrians, Arabs, and Turcomans, having returned to
Iraq and surrendered to the authorities under official
amnesties or after receiving assurances that they would come
to no harm, had suffered torture or execution or "disappeared"
while in custody. In June Amnesty International (AI) reported
that 30 Turcomans, including 4 who had returned from Turkey
under an official amnesty, had been executed in late January.
The Iraqi military killed hundreds of civilians in Kuwait
after the invasion. The possession of opposition literature,
the Kuwaiti flag, or photographs of the Emir of Kuwait were,
according to numerous credible reports, treated as capital
offenses.
AI reported, based on interviews with witnesses who had
escaped Iraq, that for the past several years the Government
has imprisoned, tortured, and killed hundreds of children in
efforts to silence or intimidate their dissident parents.
While no direct reports of killings of children emerged from
Iraq in 1990, there is no reason to believe the regime changed
its policy. On the contrary, Iraqi forces in Kuwait engaged
in reprisal killings, summarily and randomly executing
civilians, including children as young as 12. The true nature
of the regime was starkly outlined by the systematic looting
of hospitals for equipment and supplies which resulted in
patients being disconnected from life-support systems and, in
one particularly ghastly incident, in killing 72 babies by
dumping them from their incubators (see the report on
Kuwait)
.
b. Disappearance
There were credible reports from multiple sources, including
the U.N, Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances, of the "disappearance" of large numbers of
persons while in the custody of Iraqi authorities. AI
reported that thousands "of people arrested over the years by
Iraqi security or intelligence forces "disappeared" while in
detention, with many feared executed. AI reported in June
that five of six Kurdish refugees who had been returned to
Iraq on January 2 and 3 and who had been members of the
opposition Pesh Merga forces, as well as another 40 Kurdish
refugees forcibly repatriated to Iraq on January 21, are
currently unaccounted for.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Despite the constitutional prohibition against torture, the
use by Iraqi authorities, especially the security police, of
both physical and psychological torture is generally
acknowledged. Given the rigid chain of command within the
Government and the security services, torture could not be
practiced without the knowledge or authorization of senior
officials. Treatment is reportedly worst immediately
following arrest and during the period of interrogation and
investigation, which can last for months. Torture and brutal
treatment are not limited to political cases. Securityrelated
offenses are broadly defined and include such routine
criminal matters as currency violations.
In its 1990 Report, covering 1989, AI stated that the routine
torture and ill-treatment of prisoners continued to be
reported. It said the victims included children who were
reportedly beaten, suspended from the ceiling by their wrists,
and given electric shocks. The authorities forced dissidents
to watch the torture of their children or other family members
in order to silence or intimidate them, according to these
reports.
Methods of physical torture by Iraqi military and security
personnel since the invasion of Kuwait included rape, electric
shock, prolonged beatings on sensitive body parts, and the
breaking of limbs. Psychological torture methods included
threats of sexual assault or execution, mistreatment of family
members, mock executions, and general degradation and
humiliation.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution and legal code prohibit arbitrary arrest and
detention but, as with most other legal safeguards in Iraq,
these provisions have virtually no weight in political or
national security cases. Security police not only make
arbitrary arrests but also secretly detain suspects, whose
fate sometimes becomes known only after they have been
executed, Security charges have included not only espionage,
treason, and conspiracy against Iraq, often in collaboration
with unnamed foreign enemies, but also ordinary criminal
actions such as currency violations.
AI and Middle East Watch reported that hundreds of Kuwaiti
nationals were arrested for suspected opposition to Iraq's
annexation of Kuwait. A number of those released reported
that detainees were routinely tortured during interrogation
and that some were summarily executed.
Although the Government has stopped expelling Iraqis of
supposed Iranian descent, most of the few remaining Iranians
have been imprisoned or live xinder the fear of deportation or
incarceration. Spouses of Iraqis of Iranian origin are
required to obtain a divorce or suffer the same consequences.
Moreover, other Iraqis, whose grandparents are shown not to be
of Iraqi origin, are subject to arbitrary detention and
deportation.
e. Denial of Fair Piiblic Trial
Iraq's legal system provides for investigation by police and
then by an inquiry judge who may refer a case to the courts or
dismiss it. Judges try criminal cases; there are no juries.
Convictions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal and then to
the Court of Cassation, the Supreme Court. There are no
Shari'a courts per se in Iraq; however, family courts
administer Shari'a law as modified by Iraqi custom.
Trials of ordinary cases are held in civil, criminal, and
religious courts and are open. Defendants are entitled to
counsel—at government expense if the defendant is indigent.
Charges and evidence are available for review by the lawyer.
Appellate courts hear cases not under the jurisdiction of the
Revolutionary Courts.
In contrast to ordinary cases, security cases are handled by
the Revolutionary Courts, which usually hold closed trials.
Security cases include espionage and treason as well as other
political offenses (including peaceful dissent), smuggling,
currency exchange violations, and drug trafficking. The right
of defense in such courts is severely restricted. The
"special courts" constituted by the RCC for specific
incidents, such as the reported conspiracy against the regime
in 1979, are also closed. These special tribunals are exempt
from constitutional safeguards of defendants' rights;
defendants are held incommunicado, and confessions extracted
by torture are admissible and often serve as the basis for
conviction. Appeals may be taken only to the Chairman of the
RCC. However, the utility of this appeal is questionable,
since there are reports that executions take place shortly
after trial, many of them taking place secretly in the prison
itself.
The case of British-based Iranian journalist Farzad Bazoft and
a British nurse. Daphne Parish, demonstrated clearly the lack
of fair trial in political or security cases. The two were
arrested in Baghdad in September 1989 on espionage charges and
held incommunicado for more than 6 weeks without access to
either consular representatives or legal counsel. In October
1989, Bazoft appeared on Iraqi television and "confessed" to
spying for Israel. He and Parish, who was charged as his
accomplice, were tried in March 1990. A British Embassy
officer attended the trial. Bazoft was sentenced to death;
Parish to 15 years in prison. Despite public and private
appeals for clemency, Saddam Hussein refused to commute the
sentences. Bazoft was executed a day after his appeal
failed. Parish was released later in the year, following
numerous international appeals.
Political dissent, as defined by Iraqi authorities,
encompasses an extremely wide range of activities and, in an
environment where public acknowledgement of arrest or
imprisonment is rare, it is difficult to estimate the number
of political prisoners. In its 1990 report, AI stated that
"thousands" of political prisoners continue to be detained
without charge or trial or imprisoned after trials which did
not satisfy international standards for a fair trial.
f.
Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides protection for the inviolability of
the home, and strong cultural values reinforce these
protections in ordinary cases. Police must obtain a search
warrant before entering the home of a criminal suspect.
However, there are few if any restraints on the arrest of
security suspects. Although most arrests occur outside the
home, there have been credible reports of forced entry and
arrest by the security police, particularly of suspected
members of the outlawed Da'wa organization.
Despite constitutional safeguards for the confidentiality of
mail and telegraphic and telephone correspondence, the
monitoring of telephones is a common practice and mail is
subject to review by censors. The security services and
Ba'ath Party maintain pervasive networks of informers.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts
Elements of Iraq's Kurdish population have engaged in armed
struggle with all governments of Iraq periodically since the
1920 's. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 sparked a
new ant i government insurgency by Kurdish elements, many of
whom fought with or aided Iran during the war. From 1981 to
1989, the Government's efforts to crush the rebellion with
armed force resulted in approximately 8,000 deaths, including
civilians killed indiscriminately by chemical weapons in 1988.
Although there was a diminished level of fighting in 1990 and
the effectiveness of the Kurdish militia was significantly
undermined by the security zone policy, the cycle of Kurdish
rebellion and government repression remain unresolved.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedoms of speech and press are not respected. The
Government views political dissent as a threat to its security
and strictly controls speech and all information media. All
publications are subject to censorship. The Government and
the Ba'ath party own and operate the press, radio, and
television. The media do not criticize the Government, and
news reporting is strongly biased in favor of the regime.
There is no presentation of opposition viewpoints.
Few foreign periodicals reach Iraq, and those that do may be
censored. Western newspapers are not sold, and magazines,
newspapers, cassettes, cameras, and video cassettes carried by
foreign visitors may be confiscated at the airport. To
control the dissemination of political leaflets, word
processors and computers must be registered. Failure to
register is a criminal offense. Iraqis no longer need to
register their typewriters or photocopiers, but foreigners in
Iraq must do so.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are still severely limited. Public meetings
may only be organized under the auspices of the Government or
the Ba ' ath Party. Association for nonreligious purposes and
demonstrations without government approval have met with
severe repression. Professional organizations are subject to
control by the Ba'ath Party Central Vocational Bureau.
c. Freedom of Religion
Iraq is an ethnically and religiously diverse society, and the
Ba'ath Government, while carefully controlling religious
groups, has enforced tolerance of religious diversity, seeking
to submerge religious differences in the promotion of secular
nationalism. A 1981 law gave the Ministry of Endowments and
Religious Affairs the authority to promulgate laws and
regulations governing places of worship, appointment of
clergy, publication of religious literature, and participation
in religious councils and meetings. Muslim religious leaders
operate under close government supervision, are considered
government employees, and receive their salaries through the
Government. There are no penalties under Iraqi law for
changing one's religion, although there is a social stigma for
Muslims who convert to another faith.
The Government has been less intrusive into the religious
affairs of Iraq's Christians, who number more than 500,000 and
constitute nearly 4 percent of the population. Their freedom
of worship in churches of established denominations is legally
protected, but they are not permitted to proselytize or to
hold meetings outside church premises. Convents and
monasteries exist, and some new churches have been
constructed, in some cases with government financial support.
The Jewish community has decreased from 150,000 following
World War II to under 300. There is no recent evidence of
overt persecution of Jews, but the regime restricts their
travel, particularly to Israel and their contacts with
coreligionists abroad. One synagogue in Baghdad still
functions.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Iraqis are generally free to travel within the country and to
change their residences or workplaces. However, they are
likely to be constrained by social, cultural, and religious
traditions which define the areas occupied by the various
ethnic and religious groups. Sensitive border and other
security areas are off limits. There are police checkpoints
on highways and outside major towns. Iraqis and nondiplomatic
foreigners travel freely in nonrestricted areas.
The Government's harsh campaign to suppress Kurdish rebels,
involving mass relocations of Kurdish and Assyrian villagers,
has nullified the right of hundreds of thousands to choose
their place of residence. Since traditional Kurdish and
Assyrian culture has been deeply embedded in the rural
village, the forced removals of up to 500,000 people and
razing of villages has had a destructive impact on their
culture and way of life.
In January the Government eased travel restrictions imposed in
1982, but reimposed full restrictions after the invasion of
Kuwait. During those 7 months, Iraqis of all ethnic and
religious backgrounds whose loyalty to the regime was not in
question were permitted to travel abroad for tourism and
privately funded education. The regime continued to restrict
travel of anyone whose political views were suspect.
Despite the January liberalization of travel regulations,
certain restrictions remained. The Government retained the
right to require prospective travelers to post a substantial
bond to assure their return. The 1987 RCC decree, requiring
Iraqi students abroad who refused to return to Iraqi to
reimburse the Government for all education received in Iraq or
abroad at government expense, remained in effect. The decree
is applicable retroactively to students who have refused to
return since May 16, 1983, the date the Government began
requiring employees leaving government jobs before 20 years of
service to reimburse the State for the cost of their
education. Amounts due can be recovered by confiscation;
nonpayment may result in imprisonment. Each student must
provide a guarantor before traveling abroad. This guarantor
and the student's parents may be held liable if the student
fails to return. A married woman must still have the
concurrence of her husband to travel abroad.
There is no specific ban on emigration or special restrictions
for members of minority groups; however, emigration is
discouraged. Until January almost all of those given
permission to emigrate have been Christian Iraqi wives of
former Iraqi citizens now living abroad as citizens of another
country. With the travel liberalizations, great numbers of
Iraqis began to emigrate with relatively little difficulty
until the August reimposition of travel restrictions. Many
emigrants leave behind substantial property because of the
difficulty of exporting assets. Currency exchange violations
are considered national security offenses, and penalties can
be severe.
Non-Iraqi spouses of Iraqi citizens who have resided in Iraq
for 5 years are required to take Iraqi nationality or leave
Iraq. Many people, including several Americans, have thus
been obliged to accept Iraqi citizenship and are therefore
subject to the present travel restrictions. In March 1984, an
order by the RCC reduced the residency period before
naturalization to 1 year for the spouses of Iraqi citizens
employed in government offices. The Iraqi spouse faces
penalties for noncompliance, including loss of job, a fine of
approximately $10,000, and repayment of the costs of
education, Iraq does not recognize the concept of dual
nationality, and many Iraqi "dual nationals," especially the
children of an Iraqi father and a mother of non-Iraqi birth,
have been denied permission to leave Iraq to visit the country
of their other nationality.
Other persons of Iraqi origin have generally been permitted to
enter and depart freely, within the limits of the present
travel restrictions, including many admitted to other
countries as refugees, since they are considered not to have
violated Iraqi laws. A number of such people, especially
Assyrian Christians, have returned on temporary visits.
However, those who emigrated only after the beginning of the
Iran-Iraq war in 1980, including several U.S. permanent
resident aliens, have been unable to depart from Iraq after
returning.
In March the Government issued an amnesty for Kurds who had
fled Iraq, particularly after the Iraqi Government used
chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians in 1988. The
amnesty was extended until July. Several thousand Iraqi Kurds
returned from refuge in Turkey and Iran. AI estimated that
about 11,000 returned to Iraq from Turkey as a result of this
amnesty. The Kurdish and Assyrian former inhabitants of the
special "security zone" established by the Government inside
Iraq's borders with Turkey and Iran in 1989 remained forcibly
resettled around the cities of Sulaymaniya, Arbil, and Zakho.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Iraqi citizens do not have the ability to change their
government peacefully. President Saddam Hussein and the RCC
rule Iraq through the Ba ' ath Party. It reportedly has some
1.5 million adherents, representing about 9 percent of the
population. The National Assembly and the legislative
assembly of the Kurdish Autonomous Region are totally
subordinate to the executive authority.
There are two other small legal political parties, both
Kurdish. They and the Ba'ath Party constitute the Patriotic
and Progressive National Front, essentially a vehicle of
support for the Government. Members of the military or
security services may engage in political activities only
within the Ba'ath Party. Association with the Ba'ath Party is
not rec[uired for appointment to senior government positions or
military ranks or election to the National Assembly, but it is
normally necessary to attain political influence. Opposition
groups, including various Kurdish groups and splinter parties,
are severely repressed. The Communist Party was removed from
the National Front and declared illegal in 1979. The Da'wa
organization, a violent Shi ' ite group, is also proscribed, and
its members are subject to incarceration and execution, as are
members of other parties believed to be cooperating with
Iran. The Government announced plans in 1988 to permit
opposition parties. Several months of RCC reviews in mid-1990
produced a draft envisaging a multiparty system, but
implementation plans were halted following the invasion of
Kuwait.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violation
of Human Rights
The one authorized human rights group in Iraq operates largely
under official control. The Government denies charges that it
violates human rights, and generally claims that the
information on which AI and other human rights groups base
their charges comes from pro-Iranian and Kurdish Iraqi exile
groups in London and Paris. The Government has consistently
—
and successfully—resisted the efforts of the United Nations
Commission for Human Rights (UNHRC) to send a mission from the
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities to investigate human rights in the country. The
Government extended invitations through its human rights
organization to UNHRC Subcommission experts to visit Iraq as
private citizens whose reports would be unofficial; four
experts visited Iraq in April 1990. The Government hosted a
Swedish parliamentary delegation studying the Kurdish issue in
i"^.arch. That group, which was not allowed to visit prisons or
interview political prisoners, reported that the Government
refused to answer any general questions about abuse of
'cal prisoners and provided few or no details about
ic c='^es raised by the Swedes.
Iraq cooperates with the International Committee of the Red
Cross in efforts to resettle Iranian civilian refugees in
third countries, and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
has had a permanent representative in Iraq since April 1988
who registers Iranian refugees and works for their
resettlement.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Ba'ath Party is committed to the equality of the sexes and
has passed laws to protect women from exploitation in the
workplace; grant subsidized maternity leave; permit women to
join the regular army, popular army, and police forces; and
equalize women's rights in divorce, land ownership, taxation,
suffrage, and election to the National Assembly. In the
1970 's, the Government imposed legal penalties on families
that opposed sending women to literacy schools and on men who
were seen harassing women. While the application of these
laws has resulted in significant tangible improvements for
women, a number of problems remain. Married women may still
travel abroad only with the permission of their husbands.
School enrollment of females has been increasing in recent
years, reaching 45 percent in elementary schools and 36
percent in secondary schools in 1985-86.
Women represent about 47 percent of agricultural workers and
about 25 percent of the total work force. The Iran-Iraq war
accelerated the Government's drive to elevate the status of
women, and it appears to have significantly reduced, if not
removed, barriers to the acceptance of women in traditional
male roles. Women are increasingly employed as architects,
construction engineers, oil engineers, air traffic
controllers, and factory and farm managers. Their role in the
armed forces is limited to the medical field.
Violence against women, such as wife beating and rape, is
known to occur, but little is known about its extent. Such
abuse is customarily addressed within the tightly knit Iraqi
family structure. There is no public discussion of the
subject, and there are no official statistics. Excessive
violence against women would be grounds for divorce and
criminal charges, but suits brought on these charges in Iraq
are believed to be rare.
The Shi 'a, who make up roughly 55 percent of the population,
have historically been economically, politically, and socially
disadvantaged. The Government has a declared policy to raise
their living standards and equalize opportunities for their
economic and professional advancement. For four centuries,
political power in Iraq had been concentrated in the hands of
the Sunni minority. Sunni Arabs, who comprise 20 to 25
percent of Iraq's population, dominate the RCC, the Regional
Commmand of the Ba'ath Party, and the Cabinet. However,
increasing numbers of Shi ' as hold prominent positions, and the
economic status of the impoverished Shi ' a masses has improved
through intensive government investment in the economic and
educational infrastructure of southern Iraq.
Although Christians sometimes allege discrimination in
education and jobs, adherence to their religion has not
prevented many from obtaining wealth and professional
advancement
.
The use of minority languages in unrestricted. Kurdish is an
official language used in the schools and the media in Kurdish
areas. Turcomans publish in their dialect of Turkish, and
Christians often use Aramaic as well as Arabic.
Citizens considered to be of Iranian origin carry special
identification. They are often precluded from desirable
employment.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Trade unions independent of government control do not exist in
Iraq. Under the trade union organization law of June 2, 1987,
a new single trade union structure was prescribed for
organized labor. Workers in private and mixed enterprises and
in cooperatives—but not public employees or workers in state
enterprises—have the right to join a local union committee.
The committees form trade unions which in turn are part of
provincial trade union federations. At the top is an umbrella
organization, the Iraqi General Federation of Trade Unions,
which is organically linked to the Ba ' ath Party and required
to promote party principles and policies among union members,
The General Federation is affiliated with the International
Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the Communist-controlled
World Federation of Trade Unions. It is also active in the
tripartite Arab Labor Organization, headquartered in Baghdad.
Although workers legally have the right to strike, after
providing notice to the Labor Ministry, strikes rarely occur
and none was reported in 1990.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to bargain collectively is not recognized. Salaries
for public sector workers (i.e. the bulk of the employed) are
set by the Government. Wages in the much smaller private
sector are set by the employers or negotiated individually
with workers.
Iraq has been criticized by the Committee of Experts
the International Labor Organization (ILO) for the fact that
its new Labor Code of 1987 failed to provide workers with
protection against antiunion discrimination. The COE also
expressed regret that the 1987 Act on trade union
organizations did not provide for collective bargaining.
There are no export processing zones in Iraq.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Although compulsory labor is prohibited by law, during and
shortly after the war with Iran and again after Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait, the Popular Army, the militia of the
Ba'ath Party, employed press-gang methods to draft recruits.
ILO committees have noted that the Penal Code permits the
punishment of civil servants with imprisonment, including
compulsory prison labor, for breaches of labor discipline,
which includes resigning from one's job. Reports in the
government-directed press indicate that civil servants have
had to buy their way out of government service.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Although the employment of children under the age of 14 is
forbidden in all enterprises other than small-scale family
enterprises, children are frequently encouraged to work as
necessary to support the family. For children between the
ages of 14 and 18 who are employed, the law stipulates that
they work fewer hours per week than adults.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The workweek in urban areas is 6 days, 7 to 8 hours a day, for
workers in the private and mixed sectors. These provisions do
not apply to agricultural workers whose workweek and hours of
work per day can vary according to individual employeremployee
agreements. Hours for government employees are set
by the head of the ministry for which the employee works.
Occupational safety programs are in effect in state-run
enterprises, and inspectors make visits irregularly to private
establishments. Enforcement varies widely. A government
decree to extend occupational safety and health protection was
issued and subseqiaently withdrawn in December 1988, reportedly
resulting in the dismissal of the Labor Minister.