10. Juli 2014

 

Informationen zum Konflikt zwischen Kuchis und Hazara sind unserer Anfragebeantwortung a-8250 vom 5. Februar 2013 zu entnehmen:

·      ACCORD - Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Afghanistan: Provinz Wardak bzw. Behsud: Informationen zu Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Kuchi und Hazara; Maßnahmen staatlicher Behörden [a-8250], 5. Februar 2013 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/238396/361936_de.html

 

Im Folgenden werden daher nur Informationen berücksichtigt, die über die in der obigen Anfragebeantwortung enthaltenen Angaben hinausgehen.

1) Konflikt zwischen Kuchis und Hazara

Aktualität des Konflikts

In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche nur wenige Informationen jüngeren Datums gefunden werden, die auf den Konflikt Bezug nehmen:

 

Das US-Außenministerium (US Department of State, USDOS) erwähnt in seinem Länderbericht zur Menschenrechtslage im Jahr 2013:

„Clashes between ethnic Hazaras and nomadic Kuchi tribes continued, with Hazaras alleging that Kuchis attempted to illegally seize their lands.” (USDOS, 27. Februar 2014, Section 6)

Das britische Außenministerium (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO) schreibt in seinem Bericht zu Menschenrechten und Demokratie im Jahr 2013:

„Tensions continue between the Hazaras and nomadic Kuchis over the annual migration through the Hazarajat area.” (FCO, 10. April 2014)

Die afghanische Nachrichtenagentur Pajhwok berichtet im April 2014:

„A fresh clash between Kuchi and Hazara tribes was feared on Wednesday by the Military Council in central Maidan Wardak province. There has been a history of clashes between the two communities over meadows’ ownership in Maidan Wardak and other provinces. The Wardak Military Council alerted security forces and demanded their deployment to areas in the Daimirdad district, where the conflict could possibly erupt.” (Pajhwok, 9. April 2014)

Die afghanische Nachrichtenagentur Pajhwok berichtet im April 2013, dass es mehrere blutige Zusammenstöße zwischen Kuchis und Hazara in der Provinz Maidan Wardak gegeben habe, die auf einen 30 Jahre alten Streit um den Besitz von Wiesenflächen in den Distrikten Daimirdad und Behsud zurückgehen würden:

„A government delegation on Thursday launched efforts to patch up a row between Kuchi and Hazara tribes in central Maidan Wardak province, an official said. Despite efforts at the governmental level, the 30-year dispute between the tribes over the ownership of meadows in Daimirdad and Behsud districts has sparked several bloody clashes.” (Pajhwok, 5. April 2013)

Das norwegische Herkunftsländerinformationszentrum Landinfo erwähnt in einem Bericht vom Oktober 2012, dass es in den beiden Behsud-Distrikten und im Distrikt Day Mirdad im nordwestlichen Teil der Provinz Wardak relativ wenige Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Aufständischen und Sicherheitskräften gebe. Man habe den Eindruck, dass die Aufständischen in diesen mehrheitlich von Hazara besiedelten Distrikten keine starke Machtbasis hätten. Im Mai und Juni 2012 habe es saisonale gewaltsame Konfrontationen zwischen dort ansässigen Hazara und nomadischen Kuchis gegeben. Es scheine indes, dass die Auseinandersetzungen diesmal von geringerer Intensität gewesen seien als in vergangenen Jahren:

„I provinsens nordvestlige distrikter, de to Beshud-distriktene og Day Mirdad, er det relativt få konfrontasjoner mellom opprørere og sikkerhetsstyrker. Inntrykket er at opprørerne har dårlig fotfeste i distriktene, hvor befolkningen i hovedsak er hazaraer. I mai/juni har det vært sesongbaserte voldelige konfrontasjoner mellom bofaste hazaraer og nomadiske kuchier. I 2012 ser det ut til at konfliktnivået har vært lavere enn i tidligere år.” (Landinfo, 5. Oktober 2012, S. 19)

Die Nachrichtenagentur Agence France-Presse (AFP) schreibt im August 2012, dass der 130 Jahre alte Streit zwischen ethnisch paschtunischen Kuchis und Hazara-Siedlern um Land seit 2005 eine neue Gestalt in Form von saisonaler Gewalt im Kajab-Tal (Distrikt Behsud, Provinz Wardak) angenommen habe:

„For more than a century, ethnic Pashtuns known as Kuchis have wintered in the south and east where the weather is better, and migrated in the summer to let their herds graze in the cooler north. But a land dispute between the Kuchis and the settled ethnic Hazaras dating back 130 years has since 2005 disintegrated into seasonal violence in the Kajab valley west of the capital.” (AFP, 6. August 2012)

In einem zweiwöchigen Update zur Sicherheitslage in Afghanistan vom Juli 2012 dokumentiert das Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) folgende Ereignisse in der Provinz Wardak:

„In the ongoing Kuchi-Hazara conflict, just two related conflict incidents were recorded. First, a clash in Day Mirdad’s Dasht-e Yurord saw three Hazaras killed and two others wounded, while in the Kajaw valley of Markazi Behsud, an IED struck an ANA [Afghan National Army] vehicle and killed two Afghan soldiers and injured two more. As with similar incidents in the previous period, the latter incident can be understood to be both armed opposition-related and ultimately driven by the land dispute, as the Kajaw valley has no known permanent AOG [armed opposition groups] presence, which instead manifested itself just as Kuchi nomads moved into the ar ea. Further political meetings also took place over the issue, which again failed to find any lasting, or even temporary, solution sufficient to halt the sporadic violence.” (ANSO, 2. Juli 2012, S. 2)

Dieselbe Quelle berichtet in einem zweiwöchigen Update vom Juni 2012 über folgende Zusammenstöße zwischen Kuchis und Hazara in der Provinz Wardak:

„The other major development in the province during the period was the commencement of this year’s clashes between indigenous Hazara communities and migrating Kuchis in the Behsuds and Dai Mirdad. So far, three separate armed clashes have taken place between the rival communities, the first of which occurred in the Dahan-e Baghak area of Behsud 1, which led to the killing of one Kuchi and the injury of two Hazaras. Some days later in the Kajaw valley in Markazi Behsud a more serious clash occurred, leading to the death of four Hazaras, injuries to three, and the kidnapping of two more by armed Kuchis. Then on the final day of the fortnight, the latest clash took place in Dai Mirdad’s Dasht-e Yorud, in which two local Hazaras were injured. Complicating the picture, earlier in the fort- night armed Kuchis ambushed an ANA [Afghan National Army] convoy in the Tezak area of Behsud 1, killing four soldiers and injuring two more. It is certain that there are elements of the Kuchi community working with the armed opposition, who are likely eager to exploit what is ultimately an economic conflict in order to embarrass the government and inflict the occasional casualty against the security forces. However, Kuchis most likely do this for pragmatic (rather than ideological) reasons. For one, there have been allegations previously made that ALP [Afghan Local Police] in the northern districts have been overly partisan in favour of local fellow Hazara communities, and this may be felt by Kuchi communities vis- a-vis other parts of the security forces and government too. As such, this issue and its resulting violence is likely to continue only as long as there is a failure by leaders of both communities to agree on a mutually acceptable solution – which, however, currently appears unlikely.” (ANSO, 17. Juni 2012, S. 3)

Konfliktgründe

In einem im Februar 2013 herausgegebenen Bericht der unabhängigen Forschungseinrichtung Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) geht die politische Ökonomin Liz Alden Wily wie folgt auf die Hintergründe des Konflikts ein:

„The historic source of present-day problems between Kuchi and Hazara lies in the allocation of alpine pastures of Hazarajat to certain Kuchi clans by Amir Abdul Rahman in the 1890s following his conquest of Hazarajat as part of his expanding control over what is now modern Afghanistan. Northern areas were also affected but resulted in less severe dispossession. Despite the conquest and reallocation of their lands to outsiders local Hazara tribes continued to believe that that the pastures were their property owned by the community, Deprivation of the right to use these resources beyond the narrow con fines of their settlements also severely undermined their agropastoral livelihood and contributed to their economic and political subordination. The most common action taken by settled communities in the highlands and northern areas after the 1978-79 revolution was to retake pastures from the Kuchi and other outsiders who had settled in their lands. This was reported in the provinces of Faryab, Badakhshan, Ghazni, and Bamyan, among others. During the Taliban rule (1996-2001), many key pastures were taken by Pashtun agro-pastoralists and nomads (Kuchi) who had returned to their former homes in the North but they were evicted again when the Northern Alliance gained ground in late 2001. Similar patterns occurred in the peripheral provinces of the central highlands and the foothills of Wardak, Ghazni and Uruzghan. The issue also has political dimensions. This reflects the changing status of historically marginalised Hazara people over the last 50 years, but who emerged as a significant force from the civil war. Today, Hazara have a political pro fi le that some regard as disproportionately higher than their share of the population which stands at 20 percent. Kuchi are also supported with special assistance programmes as nomads. Interpretation of rights is also highly influenced by wealthy commercial and political forces on both sides that have notoriously used the dispute for personal land grabbing ends. Mainly due to mismanagement of the dispute as will be traced below, the matter now has important security implications, threatening peace. […] In matters of documentation, Hazara do not contest the fact that Kuchi were granted their lands, often with documented grant papers (firman) to back this up. What they contest is not the legality of these grants but the legitimacy of the original grant, disputing the right of the State to claim pastures as its own property and to allocate these at will. Since Bonn Hazaras have also contested what they see as a worrying trend of modern groups of Kuchis who have no history of land grants in their areas also making claims to their pastures. […] As violence and loss of life grew each spring in the eastern and southeast districts of the central highlands, a mountain force made up of ISAF, Afghan Army and the Afghan National Police units was dispatched to keep the peace. Spring opened particularly badly in 2008 with Hazaras accusing Karzai of favouring Kuchis in a bid to win votes in the upcoming elections. A declaration by a Kuchi member of the Parliament proclaiming that only Pashtuns were true Afghans and that Kuchis were the rightful owners of all high pastures made matters worse. Karzai responded by ordering Kuchis to return to their winter areas in the east and south of the country (as they were bound in any event to do in autumn). He also created a high-level Presidential Commission for Resolving Land Disputes Involving Kuchis and Settled People. By then, national political influence was embedded on both sides of the dispute. Public marches in Kabul, especially by Hazaras, have become common. Taliban support for Kuchis raises the stakes further. The Commission has failed to resolve the conflict. The acknowledged payment it makes annually to Kuchi leaders to persuade them to keep out of Hazarajat has limited escalation. However, the payments encourage Kuchis to enter the land again the following year in order to receive the same benefits. The focal points of conflict in Markaz-e Behsud, Hesa Awal-e Behsud and Daymardad Districts have remained the same. The current focus of the Commission is to appoint Peace Ambassadors to resolve disputes involving Kuchis.” (AREU, Februar 2013, S. 76-78)

In einem Bericht des Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) vom 2013 beschreibt der Afghanistan-Spezialist Fabrizio Froschini die ökonomischen und politischen Dynamiken des Konflikts:

„After 2001, the issue of nomad access to Hazarajat became a driver of ethnic tension and political propaganda in Afghanistan. Its yearly climax is in the months of May and June, when nomads approach the highlands. The first incidents over access to pastures and water sources were reported in 2004 in Jaghatu (Ghazni) and Behsud (Wardak), and the first lives claimed. Since 2007, tension has often broken into open conflict, as the Kuchis have started pushing on the borders of Hazarajat in an increasingly aggressive and militarised way. Although the pastures that the Kuchis are mainly interested in lie well inside Hazarajat, the confrontation usually takes place in the first Hazara-inhabited districts encountered by the Kuchis in their migration through Wardak province: Daimirdad and Behsud – often called the ‘Behsud conflict' in the press. […] In the spring of 2010, for example, many armed nomads attacked Hazara settlements in these districts, triggering a large exodus of the settled population. Between 500 and 1,000 well-armed Kuchi fighters entered the northern, Hazara-inhabited half of Daimirdad. Most of the local population left the area. Even after a ceasefire was reached, Kuchi fighters remained for several w eeks before accepting to withdraw . Altogether, more than 2,500 families were displaced, mainly to Kabul. Upon returning, many found their property looted. Their long absence from the fields also meant that the year’s harvest was lost. Events of this kind reverberated in the country ’ s public debate, causing scuffles in the pa rliament and widespread protests by the Hazara sections of Kabul, other big cities and even abroad. The two main (rival) Hazara political leaders have often exploited the occasion to compete for popular support by staging rallies of protest, or to put pressure on the government. In the eyes of many Hazaras, Kuchis have become veritable bogeymen in recent years, symbolising the past (Taleban) oppression and the new challenges. Their accusations range from claims that the Kuchis loot Hazara villages and black mail the government in to paying them to keep quiet, to suspicions that the Taleban hire Kuchis to cause disorder and bully a pro­government community like the Hazaras, or even of comprising a majority of Taleban in their ranks.” (AAN, November 2013, S. 18-19)

„The Kuchis’ spring movement [...] towards Hazarajat seems to be partly a half-organised push by their own leaders and partly a spontaneous urge of several communities. Groups of Kuchis left without flocks may see it as an opportunity to get some prize; others are in desperate need of boosting their livestock breeding by gaining access to rich pastures.” (AAN, November 2013, S. 20)

In einem älteren, im Oktober 2010 veröffentlichten Bericht der auf Friedensarbeit in Afghanistan spezialisierten NGO Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) schreibt der Forscher Khibar Rassul über ein Zusammenwirken von „greifbaren“ sozioökonomischen Faktoren und „nicht greifbaren“ historisch bzw. gesellschaftlich bedingten Faktoren im Konflikt zwischen nomadischen und sesshaften Gemeinden in Afghanistan:

„The conflict between nomadic and settled communities is not as simple as a grievance over tangible factors such as land and water. It is a combination of tangible factors such as land and water and intangible factors such as the historical creation of myths, fears and ultimately social fragmentation which enable this conflict. These tangible and intangible factors enhance peoples’ vulnerability to the conflict. The vulnerability experienced in these communities is the root cause of the current conflict. […]

Tangible Factors – Socio-economic Deprivation […]

In the testimonies gathered by Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) from members of both communities, the economic im plications of this conflict are a key area of focus for both communities. This is reinforced by the field research conducted by CPAU in form of focus groups discussions and individual interviews between May and July 2010. The nomads see their migration to Behsud as a necessity for their survival; it is a key part in their livelihood strategies. […]

Intangible Factors – Social fragmentation […]

The relationship between nomads and settled communities seen by CPAU is seriously fragmented even though there is a strong aspiration by local leaders to better this relationship. Their view of each other is seriously skewed along ethnic and religious lines. Among settled communities the main focus is on ethnicity, seeing the Kuchies as Pashtuns who are identified as the historical enemies of the Hazara people. There is clearly a sense of mistrust and even hatred towards people identified as Pashtuns, especially among locals in the settled communities (CPAU Field Research, 2010). There is a sense of fear in settled communities that the nomads will marginalize them even more , drive them further up the mountains and deprive them of their lands and livelihoods. This fear originates from the historical events kept alive among the people of the nomad/Pashtun conquest of their lands under the leadership of Abdur-Rahman Khan and the hardship suffered during the Taliban. The resulting fear and defensiveness is a powerful tool which enables the mobilization of communities, thus making them vulnerable to political exploitation Among the nomads a combination of ethnic and religious factors are used in order to build a sense of superiority and to justify utilizing this superiority against settled communities. The fact that most of the nomads are Pashtun enables them to draw upon the history of this country, which has been shaped by Pashtun leadership to build a sense of superiority. A sense of superiority in this case means th at the nomads see these lands as rightfully belonging to them and as having an historical understanding of them that is stronger th a n the settled communities, mixing a sense of superior right with superior might (CPAU Field Research 2010). The perceived relationship between Iran and the settled communities is yet another factor adding to the view among nomads of the settled communities as out siders . The social fragmentation between these people resulting from holding on to historical myths and fears which translate into ethnicity and religion is a weakness easily exploited by political actors. […]

The Resulting Vulnerability […]

The poor economic conditions in these communities and the social fragmentations created between them make these communities vulnerable to conflict and violence. The intangible factors used to create and maintain a division between these communities’ functi ons as a means of enabling alienation, the spread of negative propaganda and prejudice to take hold in the respective communities. This creates a form of vulnerability to political manipulation and exploitation, making it easier to mobilize communities aga inst each other. The vulnerability to political manipulation and exploitation means that it is easier for political actors to play on the ignorance of the respective communities of each other resulting from the alienation, to exploit the existing prejudice in the respective communities and to spread propaganda fitting their own political agenda. The vulnerability to political manipulation and exploitation resulting from the intangible factors is the main factor enabling this conflict on a large scale. It en ables wider mobilization of these communities against each other thus allowing the conflict to grow to the magnitude we see today. ” (CPAU, Oktober 2010, S. 8-11)

William Maley, ein auf Afghanistan spezialisierter Professor an der Australian National University (ANU), schreibt in einem Gutachten zu einem Asylverfahren folgendes zum Thema Hazara in Afghanistan:

„In a number of recent decisions, there appears to have been a tendency to see violence and displacement experienced by Hazaras (most recently reported from Wardak province, adjacent to Kabul, in May 2010) as simply a consequence of land disputes between settled Hazaras and Pushtun nomads (kuchis) that do not give rise to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In my view, this reflects an overly-simplistic reading of complex social relations. There is no doubt that land disputes abound in Afghanistan (see Liz Alden Wily, Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2003); Colin Deschamps and Alan Roe (2009), Land Conflict in Afghanistan: Building Capacity to Address Vulnerability (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2009)). However, latent tensions over issues such as land are tailor-made for oppositional groups that seek to build support by assisting one party or another, and there is every reason to suspect a Taliban role in fuelling such tensions. Here, the position of Hazaras as an overwhelmingly Shiite non-Pushtun minority makes them an easy target for overwhelmingly-Pushtun Taliban seeking to rebuild support from Sunni Pushtun groups such as the kuchis.” (Maley, 20. Mai 2010)

In einem im Jahr 2013 veröffentlichten wissenschaftlichen Beitrag geht der Autor Nasrat Esmaty, über den kaum verlässliche Informationen gefunden werden konnte, wie folgt auf die Gründe des Konflikts ein:

„What are the causes, and associated factors to the Hazara-Kuchi di spute and conflict? The current literature suggests that it is a battle for resources – land and pasturel and to be precise. However, based on the analysis of the aforementioned history and the ethnic exploitation by political elites from both sides, which will be discussed in the identity subsection, this paper argues that it is a struggle for the survival of identity and then resource domination. The author also sees poor land tenure and the government’s contemplation of Kuchi settlement as peripheral issues to the disput e and conflict that hinder the prospect of any long-term resolution. […] Hazaras always associate the Kuchis with the Taliban because of their Pashtun connections while Kuchis still doubt the religious correctness of Hazaras (Wily, 2009). The recent political achievements have turned Hazaras from a minority group to the third ethnic ‘majority group’ in the country (Simonsen, 2004). On the other hand, Kuchis have solidified their identity and claims after the Afghan government’s Kuchi recognition and allotment of ten seats in the National Assemb ly (Tapper, 2008). The Hazaras and Kuchis see fighting against one other as the struggle for survival of self and ethnic identity (Monsutti, 2012). […]

As stated before, land or resource is the second source of dispute and conflict. Both the Hazaras and Kuchis need land for survival as land 2 is a valuable commodity. Kuchis need to access the pasturelands of Wardak province and Hazarajat, in general, so that their livestock of mostly sheep and goats can survive, nurture and grow in numbers (Ferdinand, 2006). On the other hand, the Hazaras believe that the Kuchis should not use their pastureland (freely) as the latter were awarded their lands unfairly (Wily, 2009). The other problem that indirectly affects the dispute and prolongs both the dispute and conflict is poor land tenure (ibid). The Afghanistan government has never registered all of its land (ibid). As a result, the powerful warlords and civil servants have usurped (or tried to usurp) public land, especially pastureland, and appropriated it for cultivation and/or other personal use (ibid). The indetermination of pastureland boundaries and its public or communal use is amongst other ambiguities that has been caused by poor land tenure (ibid). Lastly, the Afghan government’s stance to settling Kuchis as an option indicates the lack of appreciation and understanding of Kuch i lifestyle and their economic contribution to the nascent Afghan economy (Wily, 2009 and Barfield, 2004).” (Esmaty, 2013, S. 2-4)

2) Sind Sesshaftigkeit, Viehzucht oder Landwirtschaft ein Identitätsmerkmal der Ethnie der Hazara?

Die Encyclopedia Iranica enthält in ihrem zuletzt im März 2012 aktualisierten Eintrag zu den Hazara folgende Informationen zum Siedlungswesen und zur Landnutzung dieser Volksgruppe:

„In most of the Hazārajāt, settlements consist of small hamlets (qaria or āḡel); fortified farms (qalʿa) dominate in the south, while smaller houses and huts (čapari) are found towards the north. The basic territorial unit of social life in the Hazārajāt is the manṭeqa (literally ‘area, region’). In most of the region, these communities are made up of several descent groups — often, though not always, claiming a common ancestor — which are split into separate hamlets. They have external kinship ties and maintain local solidarity with their neighbors (Monsutti, 2000a; 2002, pp. 111-66). In some areas of eastern Hazārajāt where non-irrigated agriculture dominates, factionalism may be expressed in the form of sectarian alignments between Twelver Shiʿites and Ismaʿilis (Canfield, 1973a and 1973b). The Hazāras dwelling south of Kuh-e Bābā are mostly highland sedentary farmers. Those who live to the north (between Yak-awlang and Bāmiān) have a more pastoral economy. However, on the northern part of the Hazār-ajāt, high altitude settlements (aylāq) are distinguished from permanent villages situated in the valley (qešlāq). Irrigated land (zamin-e ābi) may be worked jointly by a group of brothers or even cousins (especially due to the fact that several male adults may have left), but it tends to be owned privately by an individual. However, it may not be sold to strangers, and the members of the owner’s descent group have a pre-emptive right to it. Most grazing land (čarāgāh, zamin-e ʿalafčar) is held communally and used by the inhabitants of the same hamlet, or sometimes by the members of the same lineage. Many farmers cultivate land they do not own: they customarily keep a quarter of the crop and give three quarters to the landlord, who normally also provides the water and the seed. Wheat is the main crop. Irrigated wheat may be classified into two groups: autumn wheat (gandom-e termāhi), which is sowed in autumn and harvested in summer, and is common in the south; and spring wheat (gandom-e bahāri), which has a shorter cycle (it is generally sowed in April and harvested just before the winter) and tends to be predominant in the higher and colder areas of the center and the north of the Hazārajāt. Non-irrigated wheat may also be found; it is considered to be of better quality but has a much smaller yield. The economy of the Hazārajāt is not self-sufficient but depends on migration and remittance networks. These have been set up throughout the 20th century, but have played an increasingly important role since 1978 […].” (Encyclopedia Iranica, 20. März 2012)

Landinfo erwähnt in einer Anfragebeantwortung vom Juni 2011:

„The Kuchis are fundamentally dependent on their livestock having access to water and grazing land, while the Hazaras are dependent on cultivating the areas to secure their livelihood.”(Landinfo, 6. Juni 2011)

Der in Großbritannien ausgebildete afghanische Autor Sayed Askar Mousavi schreibt in seinem 1998 erschienenen Buch „The Hazaras of Afghanistan”:

„Throughout the periods covered, from 724 AD to 1978 and up to the present, the mainstays of the Hazara economy have been agriculture, animal husbandry, industry and commerce.” (Mousavi, 1998, S. 97)

3) Informationen zu Taliban, die auf Seiten der Kuchis kämpfen

In einem Bericht der Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) vom Jänner 2012 geht die britische Afghanistan-Spezialistin Emily Winterbotham auf die Wahrnehmung von Kuchis durch die von ihr befragten Hazara ein:

„Hazaras interviewed had the perception that the Kuchis have adopted a more political angle to their migration patterns. There was the widespread belief that they have been receiving Taliban support in choosing to migrate to Hazara areas and grazing their livestock on their land. Clashes in 2010 between the Kuchis and Hazaras, largely in Behsud and Daymerdad of Wardak Province, caused concern among Hazara populations in Bamiyan.” (AREU, 9. Jänner 2012, S. 81)

Im bereits oben zitierten Bericht des Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) vom November 2013 schreibt Fabrizio Froschini:

„Some Kuchi communities that traditionally did not move into Hazarajat have even joined the annual Kuchi attempt at gaining access, hoping to derive some benefit from it in terms of looting or compensation. Indeed, local Hazaras interviewed by AAN claim that today’s Kuchis are not related to the nomads who used to travel through their areas before the war. In 2011, they reported heavily armed‘ black-clad Kuchis’, identifying them as Taleban, coming from the greater Kandahar area. Many sides claimed, and some interviewed Kuchis agreed, that a range of armed groups, more or less linked to the Taleban insurgency or following an opportunistic agenda, might have joined in looting Hazara villag es on the occasion of the annual confrontation and exploited the chance to disrupt security and government control in previously calm areas.” (AAN, November 2013, S. 20)

In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche keine weiteren Informationen zu dieser Frage gefunden werden.

 

 

 

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 10. Juli 2014)

·      AAN – Afghanistan Analysts Network (Autor: Fabrizio Froschini): The Social Wandering of the Afghan Kuchis, November 2013

http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/20131125_FFoschini-Kuchis.pdf

·      ACCORD - Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Afghanistan: Provinz Wardak bzw. Behsud: Informationen zu Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Kuchi und Hazara; Maßnahmen staatlicher Behörden [a-8250], 5. Februar 2013 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/238396/361936_de.html

·      AFP – Agence France-Presse: Afghan nomad clashes raise fears of ethnic strife, 6. August 2012 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghan-nomad-clashes-raise-fears-ethnic-strife

·      ANSO – Afghanistan NGO Safety Office: Bi-Weekly Data Report; 1 - 15 June 2012, 17. Juni 2012 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1345122462_the-20anso-20report-20-1-15-20june-202012.pdf

·      ANSO - Afghanistan NGO Safety Office: Bi-Weekly Data Report; 16 - 30 June 2012, 2. Juli 2012 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1347526421_the-20anso-20report-20-16-30-20june-202012.pdf

·      AREU - Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (Autorin: Emily Winterbotham): Healing the Legacies of Conflict in Afghanistan: Community Voices on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation, 9. Jänner 2012 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/2162_1326102513_2012-01-09-areu-healing-the-legacies-of-conflict-in-afghanistan.pdf

·      AREU - Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (Alden Wily, Liz): Land, People, and the State in Afghanistan: 2002 – 2012, Februar 2013 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1362566796_1303e-land-ii-cs-feb-2013.pdf

·      CPAU - Cooperation for Peace and Unity (Autor: Khibar Rassul): Fractured Relationships: Understanding Conflict between Nomadic and Settled Communities in Wardak’s Pastureland, Oktober 2010

http://cpau.org.af/manimages/publications/CPAU_Report_Fractured_Relationships.pdf

·      Encyclopedia Iranica: Hazāra, 20. März 2012

http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hazara-3

·      Esmaty, Nasrat: The Kuchi & Hazara Land Dispute & Conflict; An Endless Struggle for Land Ownership, 2013

http://www.khaama.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Dissertation-Dissertation-Style.pdf

·      FCO - UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Human Rights and Democracy Report 2013 - Section XI: Human Rights in Countries of Concern - Afghanistan, 10. April 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/273683/402718_de.html

·      Landinfo - Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre: Afghanistan: The conflict between Hazaras and Kuchis in the Beshud Districts of Wardak Province, 6. Juni 2011

http://www.landinfo.no/asset/2057/1/2057_1.pdf

·      Landinfo - Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre: Afghanistan: Sikkerhetsrapport januar – august 2012, 5. Oktober 2012 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net) http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1382977515_afghanistan-sikkerhetsrapport-jan-aug2012.pdf

·      Maley, William: On the Position of the Hazara Minority in Afghanistan, 20. Mai 2010

http://www.ajustaustralia.com/downloads/Maley-Hazaras-Opinion-1.doc

·      Mousavi, Sayed Askar: The Hazaras of Afghanistan; An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study, 1998

·      Pajhwok: Efforts launched to resolve Kuchi-Hazara tiff, 5. April 2013

http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/04/05/efforts-launched-resolve-kuchi-hazara-tiff

·      Pajhwok: Kuchi-Hazara clash feared in Wardak, 9. April 2014

http://www.pajhwok.com/dr/node/228652

·      USDOS - US Department of State: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2013 - Afghanistan, 27. Februar 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/270628/399487_de.html