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HIGHLIGHTS

- **IMF rescue of NGO staff in Badakhshan**
- **NGO fatality in Sar-e Pul**
- **Civilian casualties in IMF and AOG operations**

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

The IMF rescue of four INGO staff members from mixed AOG/ACG elements in northern Badakhshan drew attention to the perceived vulnerabilities of NGOs working in remote border areas. However, it equally cast a light on just how rarely such events actually occur. With the staff safe, and the immediate threat of the armed group involved reduced, NGOs turned their gaze towards the residual implications of how perceptions of NGOs - by host communities, GOA structures, and AOG/ACGs - may change with direct IMF involvement. This is a dynamic which has the potential to materialize through the resentments of marginalized GOA actors going forward.

The inherent risks of operating in a conflict environment were further highlighted by the death of a NGO ambulance driver in an IED blast Sar-e Pul. However, it marked one of only four NGO direct incidents this cycle, and 54 thus far in 2012. Shifting local dynamics are likely to create occasional outliers, such as this circumstantial incident, or the May killing of a NGO member in Ghor by an AOG looking to increase its profile, but the 54 incidents thus far mark an almost 40% decrease compared to the same period in 2011, with the four incidents this cycle a mere third of the 12 recorded over the same period last year. Further to this, 2012 has witnessed four NGO fatalities in four separate NGO direct incidents, a decrease when contrasted to the nine deaths in seven incidents over the same period in 2011.

In counterpoint to the above, NGO demining and health care projects continue to feature regularly in incident reporting,

with occurrences in Nangarhar and Logar this cycle, while criminality also weighed heavily into the NGO security environment in Kabul. Overall, the trending clearly indicates a consistent operating environment for NGOs despite the recent outliers, although it is yet to be determined whether this will sustain in the coming months, as NGO incident volumes tend to spike over the summer, see graph p. 2.

The above is in line with the shift that both IMF and AOGs have made towards emphasizing activities more significant to a political narrative than tactical gains. Although projected AOG and IMF initiated incident volumes for June will not reach those of last year, a series of significant attacks by AOG - such as suicide ventures and complex attacks in Kandahar, Uruzgan, Kapisa, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, Khost, and Faryab - continue to allow for an effective AOG counter-narrative to transition despite this general decrease. Similarly, IMF conducted their first significant operation in Nuristan since their withdrawal in 2009, but withdrew from parts of Laghman, and continue preparations for their withdrawal from Kunar. Meanwhile, their transition narrative in the North, Central and West is clearly linked to the roll out of new ALP programs.

The strategy both sides are employing makes it likely that neither will see significant strategic gains at present, but statement operations may coincide with an increased risk to civilian populations as illustrated in Paktya, Khost, Kandahar and Logar. In fact, the civilian casualty count for June alone accounts for 13% of the total civilian casualties recorded this year.

CENTRAL REGION

KABUL


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	3

Kabul was home to the majority of the central region’s NGO incidents during the past fortnight. Two of these were a result of predatory criminality, consistent with the primary forms of threat that the NGO presence in the national capital currently witnesses. In the first instance, an NGO staff member exiting the Standard Chartered bank in Wazir Akbar Khan after withdrawing a large sum of personal cash was tricked into taking a ‘taxi’ by a man posing as a taxi driver outside the bank, who instead picked up two armed accomplices shortly after and then proceeded to rob the staff member of thousands of dollars. In another incident, the owner of a fleet of vehicles recently rented to an NGO was followed from the AIB branch in Qowai Markaz by two armed men on a motorcycle, after he had cashed the cheque he had received for the fleet’s rental. The men stopped him on the pretence of poor driving before demanding at gunpoint that he hand over the money. In both of these instances, it can be seen that the criminal groups responsible were much more aggressive in their targeting of individuals exiting banks, including surveillance at the banks involved and direct confrontation of the individuals, rather than in previous robberies which have often relied on distractions such as slashed tyres to provide the

opportunity. In the final NGO incident, an NGO driver was accosted by two (unarmed) men on a motorcycle on the Daraluman road, who warned him not to work with a ‘foreign organisation’. Given the location in the city, there is a credible possibility that those responsible were affiliated to the armed opposition; however, the widespread NGO presence in this part of the city also suggests that this may have instead been a personal dispute in disguise. Of final note on criminal targeting relevant to NGOs, an international staff member working for a non-NGO organisation was robbed at knife-point while walking home alone in the Qala-ye Fatullah area late at night midway through the period; given the growing level of petty criminality in the city, it is increasingly unwise to do so.

Apart from the above, security incidents in the city were almost entirely comprised of ANP actions, mostly arrests for criminality of various forms, including home robberies, criminally-motivated murders, narcotics possession and petty street robbery. Worthy of note, however, was an NDS operation in PD 5 which led to the arrest of six Nangarharis suspected of association with the armed opposition.

Moreover, while there was potential for armed opposition activity



in relation to the ministerial conference that took place from the 13th-15th of the month, no such activity manifested itself. However, Kabul remains statistically overdue for some form of complex attack against a high profile political or security force target, a fact NGOs are encouraged to keep in mind, especially given the prevailing absence of other forms of armed opposition activity in the capital so far this year.

Opposition activity did manifest itself outside the city however. On Highway 7 (the Kabul-Jalalabad Road), an AOG unit attacked an ANP vehicle in the Gugamunda area of Surobi, just south of Mahipar, at roughly 1700 hrs. Early in the morning two days later, an IED detonated against an ANP vehicle in the Tunal-e Khaki, just south of Gugamunda, killing two policemen and injuring three more. These incidents serve to illustrate the presence of an AOG unit in this area of the Highway, who likely descend from the Koh-e Safi mountains to conduct their operations – as well as the ongoing importance of adhering to the 0900-1500 hrs travel window for the road. Similarly in Musayi, two RCIEDs detonated on the main district road, one of which was aimed at a passing ANA convoy but which instead killed two local students who happened to also be passing. The other appeared to have prematurely detonated, striking nothing.

NOTICE:
 The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the **13th of June 2012**.
 NGO incident counts include the total for all incidents attributed to all actors.


KAPISA

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

The most significant development in Kapisa during the first half of June took the form of a BBIED attack against an IMF patrol in the immediate vicinity of the Nijrab DAC, the first time that a suicide attack has taken place in this district. As an IMF vehicle patrol was waiting in Bazaar-e Shahrani, roughly 300m from the DAC, with a number of IMF soldiers standing outside their vehicles, a BBIED operative approached them in a *burqa* and detonated his vest; the blast killed four IMF soldiers and two interpreters, and injured five further soldiers and three civilians. ANP later stated that the intended target was believed to be a local Nijrabi MP, and that the attack, which was coordinated from Tagab, was therefore opportunistic in nature. Regardless of this point however, the deployment of such an attacker to Nijrab likely demonstrates the intention by the recently-appointed district shadow governor of Nijrab, who is based in the AOG-dominated Alasay, to forcefully introduce himself to the district. Furthermore, it is also likely

that the attack was intended to demonstrate that the armed opposition in the province is capable not only of effectively defending themselves against recent ANSF expansion in Tagab and Alasay, but also to open up more serious fronts and to conduct such high-impact attacks in relatively less conflict-afflicted districts such as Nijrab.

There were, during the period, also examples of such effective defence against ANSF expansion in Tagab. Most importantly, AOG units conducted a number of direct assaults against a new ANSF presence in the eastern part of Tagab that borders Alasay, where a number of new ALP CPs have been established in recent weeks. During the period, three such attacks were recorded, in Joybar, Qorghal and Tatar Khel, the last of which saw six ALP killed and another injured, and the AOG unit steal six AK-47s from the deceased local policemen. This new ANSF presence in these AOG-dominated areas of eastern Tagab is intended to prepare the




ground for the upcoming ALP programme in Alasay, expected to commence in the next two to three months. However, these attacks demonstrate the difficulty that the security forces will have in these areas, particularly with an IMF detachment on the way out without having effected significant damage to the armed opposition presence in the province.

Indeed, the armed opposition instead continues to strengthen its position in Kapisa, which this year represents the only central region province that has seen an increase in AOG-authored activity over last year's levels, and a significant increase at that. As such, the security force expansion later in the year is likely to face concerted opposition by AOG cadres in the southern districts, including a continuation of high-profile attacks in Mahmud Raqi and other parts of the province where the balance of power lies more in favour of the government.

ANSO: Total NGO Incidents, all authors, countrywide, 2006-2012

(Note: figures in red demark yearly incident peak)



WARDAK

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

While in neighbouring Logar IMF operational intensity has been high in recent weeks, in Wardak the security environment has instead been characterised by an almost exclusively intra-Afghan conflict paradigm. This is true both in the AOG-ANSF realm, as well as with regard to the annual Kuchi-Hazara conflict, which flared up again during the past fortnight.


In relation to the first dynamic, armed opposition cadres staged a number of fatally effective operations against security forces, particularly along the Kabul-Ghazni highway and in the northern districts west of Maidan Shahr. In all, nine separate AOG-authored incidents were recorded on the highway, all but one of which took place in Nirkh and Saydabad, and which together accounted for exactly half of recorded AOG kinetic activity during the fortnight. Seven of these incidents successfully targeted security forces or IMF-contracted supply convoys, with one of the incidents leading to the death of a truck driver, and three policemen injured in two of the other incidents. However, one pressure plate IED in the Haft Asyab area of Saydabad detonated against a local vehicle, killing five civilians and injuring two others – this incident demonstrating the indiscriminate nature of such IEDs, which are unfortunately the type of IED favoured by AOG cells along the highway.

With such a focus on the highway, it is understandable therefore that the only security force operation

recorded – an IMF air strike against an AOG location in the southern Saydabad village of Dandokay – was targeted against AOG cadres pressuring this strategically important transport artery; three Pakistani AOG fighters were killed in the strike.

The remaining AOG activity concentrated on the northern Maidan Shahr-Bamyan road, running through the capital district and neighbouring Jalrez, which has been a long-term focus for AOG operations. Most significantly, an IED detonation on a secondary road in the Kata Sang area of Jalrez killed five ALP, a particularly high death toll, and one that has the potential to weaken ALP resolve in the area. Also in the district, armed fighters attacked the convoy of the leading Hazara MP in the Mulakhel area as it was returning from Bamyan; fortunately for the MP, he had flown to Kabul separately, but two of his bodyguards were injured and one vehicle damaged. While it is possible that this attack was a targeted one, with foreknowledge of the convoy's identity and movement timing, it is much more likely that this was simply an opportunistic attack against a high-profile armoured vehicle convoy, which was conducting a risky maneuver by travelling through the area so late in the evening.

The other major development in the province during the period was the commencement of this year's clashes between indigenous Hazara communities and migrating Kuchis in the Behsuds and



Dai Mirdad. So far, three separate armed clashes have taken place between the rival communities, the first of which occurred in the Dahan-e Baghak area of Behsud 1, which led to the killing of one Kuchi and the injury of two Hazaras. Some days later in the Kajaw valley in Markazi Behsud a more serious clash occurred, leading to the death of four Hazaras, injuries to three, and the kidnapping of two more by armed Kuchis. Then on the final day of the fortnight, the latest clash took place in Dai Mirdad's Dasht-e Yorud, in which two local Hazaras were injured.

Complicating the picture, earlier in the fortnight armed Kuchis ambushed an ANA convoy in the Tezak area of Behsud 1, killing four soldiers and injuring two more. It is certain that there are elements of the Kuchi community working with the armed opposition, who are likely eager to exploit what is ultimately an economic conflict in order to embarrass the government and inflict the occasional casualty against the security forces. However, Kuchis most likely do this for pragmatic (rather than ideological) reasons. For one, there have been allegations previously made that ALP in the northern districts have been overly partisan in favour of local fellow Hazara communities, and this may be felt by Kuchi communities vis-a-vis other parts of the security forces and government too. As such, this issue and its resulting violence is likely to continue only as long as there is a failure by leaders of both communities to agree on a mutually acceptable solution – which, however, currently appears unlikely.

LOGAR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

Logar was home to an NGO incident during the period, which occurred in the provincial capital. After a firefight between ANP and AOG fighters, a number of casualties suspected to be from the armed opposition were brought to an NGO hospital in Puli Alam for emergency medical treatment. ANP quickly arrived on scene and removed two of the patients from the hospital prior to receiving treatment, in clear violation of established humanitarian principles. After requests by the NGO to provincial ANP leadership were rebuffed, it raised the issue with the provincial governor, who successfully intervened and had the patients returned to the hospital, albeit under armed guard; the next day, however, after they had received the necessary emergency medical treatment, the police again removed them from the hospital against the wishes of medical staff. This issue is likely to become more common if ANSF expand nationally without developing the appropriate knowledge of their obligations on these fronts.

Beyond this event, incident volumes were evenly distributed between AOG and IMF operations; however, qualitatively the IMF had a much more substantial impact on the province during the fortnight, including in the realm of civilian casualties. Clearing operations and air strikes comprised the bulk of their activities, which cumulatively led to 32 AOG fighters being killed and a further 32 detained – making Log-

ar the most casualty-heavy province in Central during the fortnight.

These operations focused on Baraki Barak (four), Puli Alam (three), Mohammad Agha and Charkh (one each). In Baraki Barak, each of the clearing operations recorded were part of a larger operation to pressure the entrenched AOG cadres operating with considerable strength in the district, and which therefore unsurprisingly generated the heaviest casualties of the period (19 of the 32 killed overall). This was also true for civilians, when an air strike during a clearing operation in Sejawand killed five AOG fighters who had staged themselves in a local house, as well as 13 civilians in neighbouring houses who had gathered for a wedding. This fatal mistake led to an angry local reaction; the following day a large convoy of villagers set out for Puli Alam, and in two separate confrontations with ANP in the Baraki Barak DAC area and on the outskirts of Puli Alam, a number of ANP were injured and one villager killed by police gunfire. While the airstrike generated a negative political reaction at the Kabul level, and caused IMF leadership to issue stricter guidelines on air strikes in populated areas, locally the result was for the armed opposition (and supportive parts of the local community) to declare that schools should be closed for three days in the district in protest. However, it was confirmed that only one school, in Sejawand



village itself, had been closed, and remains so at the time of writing.

While casualty-heavy developments focused on Baraki Barak, it was an operation in the Babus, Alozai and Sar-e Sang villages in neighbouring Puli Alam that led to the majority of detentions – 28 of the 32 in all – while also seizing a large cache of arms, motorcycles and IEDs. This operation can be understood to relate directly to the IMF priority of securing the highway, which during the period saw three AOG attacks on ANA convoys, all in the vicinity of the operation conducted. The remaining AOG activity took place in Baraki Barak, all in the form of direct attacks on ANSF targets, as well as two IDF attacks on the Puli Alam and Charkh ANP HQs.

In all, Logar continued to see considerable conflict activity primarily authored by the security forces, although overall its kinetic intensity is significantly down from last year. Much of this decrease can be attributed to a pragmatic AOG decision to reduce their presence while IMF intensity is high in this and neighbouring provinces south and southeast of Kabul – while continuing to deepen their socio-political position in local society. This strategy comes with the consequent likelihood that as IMF scale down in the province from next year, the armed opposition will be able to quickly increase their presence and operational intensity on the basis of the socio-political foundations on which they are currently building.

PARWAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0


An IO supply convoy bringing food goods to Bamyan was escorted by an AOG unit in the Tangi Lala area of Sheikh Ali, east of the DAC, with 2 of the trucks set on fire, ANP responders were quickly engaged in an SAF attack, which led to the destruction of another truck, although no casualties were inflicted on any side. The implication of targeting such a humanitarian convoy – as with previous instances of robbery of local travellers by AOG members along the road – is clear enough: that the armed opposition cadres are willing to target a range of actors to communicate their message that travel to a major provincial centre is growing more difficult, a message which seeks to embarrass the government and demonstrate AOG capabilities in the realm of political coercion.

Security developments in Parwan have focused almost exclusively on the ongoing armed opposition effort to constrict access to Bamyan along the stretch of the highway that runs through Shinwari, Ghorband and Sheikh Ali, which started to spike from the beginning of May; of the seven AOG-authored incidents in the province, five took place in this corridor, while ANSF operations were also concentrated here. Moreover, during the period these opposition efforts expanded in scope, moving away from a sole focus on attacking security forces – although these remained the primary target – to also targeting provincial political leadership and, as above, a humanitarian supply convoy.

The first incident of the month, as with those in May, saw armed opposition forces focus their kinetic attention on ANSF, with a pressure plate IED striking an ANP vehicle in the Chardeh area of the highway and injuring three ANP policemen. The next day however, another pressure plate IED struck the vehicle of the new Shinwari DG as he was moving through the Sokhta Chenar area to the DAC for the first time, quickly followed by an SAF attack by opposition fighters lying in wait. While the attack only led to some damage to the vehicle, and no casualties, the message was clear.

One point worthy of note is that these incidents demonstrated a wide geographical spread – from eastern Sheikh Ali to the Shinwari-Jabal Saraj border – and as such the existence of multiple highway-focused AOG units operating across a relatively large area. This is relevant to the commencement of ANSF clearing operations, on June 10th, in some of the side valleys that bisect the highway in Shinwari and Ghorband districts. In the first operation, focused on Dara-ye Kafshan in Shinwari, ANSF (including ALP and NDS) killed four AOG fighters and injured another three, also sustaining two ANP injuries. In another operation on the 13th, in the Abakan and Chardeh areas of Ghorband, ANSF clearing operations killed eight AOG fighters, again sustaining two ANP injuries.

However, the aforementioned



diffuse geographical spread of the armed opposition units focused on the highway will make it difficult for the security forces to effectively hold back such attacks; the relatively low number of ANSF assigned to this stretch of the highway, even during such operations, is also a significant obstacle to securing the road. A case in point was the final incident of the period, which occurred in the same area as the second ANSF operation, on the same day; an RCIED detonated in front of the convoy of the Parwan provincial governor, quickly followed by a SAF attack by opposition fighters lying in wait – in a near identical incident to the previous attack on the Shinwari DG. In the fighting, two ANP were killed and another two injured. Given the challenges of geography and a weak ratio of ANSF to AOG, we can thus expect this insecurity to persist until the Autumn in spite of likely further clearing operations.


Outside of the Highway corridor there were just two incidents of note. First, as a Panjshiri ANA commander was transiting through Syed Khel to Kabul late in the evening with his family, his convoy was stopped and attacked by three AOG fighters with automatic weapons; the commander and five members of his family were killed in the attack, with the remaining three suffering serious injuries, in what seems to have been a targeted assault rather than an opportunistic one. The other incident was more harmless, taking the form of an inaccurate and inconsequential IDF attack on Bagram Airfield.

BAMYAN

Bamyan town saw its first notable live-fire incident in more than two years this period, in an incident obscured by the fog of political sensitivity. The leading Hezb-e Wahdat figure and prominent MP had travelled to Bamyan to commemorate the first anniversary of the targeted killing of former Bamyan provincial council chair Ahmed Jawad Zohak, which had been a statement attack intended to announce a much more concerted effort on the part of the armed opposition to constrict road access to Bamyan through the Ghorband corridor - an effort that continued with force during this period too. While staying in the main party office in Bamyan bazaar, late one evening it appears that three men armed with AK-47s fired briefly at the office, which caused the office guards to

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

respond with SAF of their own. As often occurs, politically sensitive incidents such as this were initially denied by officials in the province, who instead argued that the guards had only fired warning shots at suspicious individuals, but confirmed after the Hezb-e Wahdat leader had departed for Kabul by helicopter. In spite of ongoing AOG activity along the Bamyan-Kabul highway, the current lack of demonstrated AOG incidents suggest that no armed opposition cadres operate in central Bamyan, given its ethnic homogeneity and history of opposition to the IEA. Rather, this attack was highly likely to come from an element of the Bamyan political elite that is in friction with the Hezb-e Wahdat leader and his allies, and as such was



likely intended primarily to politically embarrass him by demonstrating his vulnerability – hence the early denials.

The only other incident that took place in the province was the ANP seizure of five anti-tank mines from a coal truck driving east on the Kabul-Bamyan highway in south-eastern Shibar. This incident can be understood to be part of ongoing opposition efforts to constrict access along this stretch of the highway (see Parwan for further analysis), efforts which source a percentage of their materiel from Baghlan through Shibar district.


DAYKUNDI

Daykundi continued to see extremely low incident volumes, characterised by incidents of armed criminality and national security force actions. During this report period, four incidents were reported., two of which related to different forms of armed criminality, and two to ANP arrests.

Firstly, in the Siyah Jangal area of Kiti, two men shot and injured another local as he was riding a motorcycle, before stealing his valuables and escaping the area. The following day, in an incident catalysed by a personal dispute, an armed group opened fire at a number of farmers in Sangi Takhat's Bandar village.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Secondly, ANP arrests of individuals for possession of illegal arms/materials were reported from Shahrستان and Miramor. In the former district, in the Bazaar Ul-Qan area, ANP arrested a local man at a CP, when they discovered 3 kg of explosives in his vehicle. In the latter district's Nadak village, in the Chadsad Khana valley, ANP detained a local man after seizing two shotguns during a local search. However, the man was later released by the police after the intervention of local community representatives; this was likely facilitated by the fact that shotguns are not illegal *per se*,



as the only form of firearm that does not need governmental registration.

Such an incident pattern is likely to continue to characterise the remote province, although we can expect a small number of armed opposition incidents to emerge from the southern two districts of Kajran and Gizab.

NORTHERN REGION

SAR-E PUL


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

Two unusual incidents—an IED detonation against an NGO ambulance and a complex attack against the Sar-e Pul jail (initiating a jail break)—illustrated increasing AOG activity in Sar-e Pul province—particularly in Sar-e Pul district—as accented by the relatively new use of IEDs.

On 11 June, an ambulance constructed of an old Russian van was sent to Qush Tapa village to pick up a woman and bring her to an NGO run clinic when it hit an IED on its return. The detonation killed three passengers—including the NGO driver and two relatives of the patient—and injured an additional two (the patient and another relative). The incident marked a significant outlier in two manners, firstly, in terms of targeting trends, the increased AOG activity has thus far displayed strong tendencies towards the targeting of ANSF/IMF/ALP forces, with few other civilian casualties recorded this year due to AOG authored events, and almost none directly targeting civilians (outside of attacks on telecommunications structures). It also marked the third IED related incident to occur in the district this reporting cycle following an extensive period where IED activity was almost entirely absent. In fact, prior to these three detonations, only one other IED-related incident had occurred in the district this year, when an IED detonated against an ANSF patrol in the often contested Shiram area in mid-May.

This cycle, two of the three IED detonations occurred around Qush Tapa village (this one and a detonation on the 5th against an ANA vehicle) while the third was part of the complex attack that acted as a catalyst to the jail break in Sar-e Pul City. While it is unlikely that the ambulance was the intended target, it demonstrates not only the increased AOG activities, but a potential shift in tactics (towards IED strikes) worthy of note to NGOs. The number of casualties in the two IED strikes around Qush Tapa included the five civilians noted above as well as two ANA killed and one wounded in the strike against the ANA vehicle, with the extent of the casualties suggesting that these AOG are capable of producing capable and effective devices.

The third IED strike in the district was part of a jail break orchestrated in Sar-e Pul city on the evening of the 7th. The break—set off by a complex attack involving RPG and SAF against the jail, followed by an IED detonation that allowed prisoners to escape while the guards were engaged and thus distracted—marked a significant deviation from the usual shoot and run tactics and illegal checkpoints/abductions that AOGs have thus far typically run in the province. Unlike those prior incidents, which involved mostly spotters and a physical presence, this attack involved significant planning and assets, and created an event that the media



picked up on and which cost the relatively new provincial chief of ANP and the chief of the jail their jobs. The use of relatively powerful IEDs along with complex operations initiated inside of Sar-e Pul city (virtually unheard of in the last two years despite the shrinking sphere of GOA control outside of the city) demonstrate the capability and robust nature of AOGs that are operating in the district from the borders of Sayyad to the north-western Shiram area, a presence that continues to increase.

Almost all of the other incidents in the province—all of which took place inside Sar-e Pul district—were initiated by AOG and targeted ANSF targets, with the exception of a RPG/machine gun fire attack against a private truck in the middle of the day on 03 June, and a brief round of SAF initiated by ANP stationed at the prison on the night of the 14th, due to the misidentification of a target (likely because of increased anxiety in the wake of the previous week’s jail break). The attack against the truck occurred in the Balghali area of the Sar-e Pul – Kohistanat road, and likely marked another effort by AOG to assert themselves in the AOG stronghold, and strike back against the ongoing ALP training program existent in the mountainous southern district (although, unlike the last few periods, no actual attacks against ALP were recorded in Kohistanat this cycle). The shooting marked the second attack in this area over the last three weeks.

BADAKHSHAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

The abduction of four INGO staff in Yaftali Sufla on midday of May 22nd came to an end this reporting period (after roughly one week in captivity) when IMF—claiming actionable intelligence concerning an imminent risk to those abducted—conducted a night operation late on June 1st that resulted in at least five casualties amongst the abductors, and the safe return of all four abducted staff members. While the NGO staff were originally abducted by an ACG (from Argo or Shahri Buzorg), the abductors eventually linked up with an AOG (from Ragh) as they marched north and west from the abduction site to an isolated location where they set up camp. Various indicators suggested that the AOG/ACG had relatively low community acceptance and the abducted staff remained unharmed throughout their captivity. There are however two key issues requiring further analysis following this incident in relation to the extent of any residual threats: one stemming from the remaining fidelity and capacity of the groups responsible for the abduction and the second involving the impact of the IMF rescue. While it is unclear to what degree those involved in this abduction still pose a threat—as the initial rescue operation was followed by an operation in Argo that further depleted leadership from groups potentially involved—it is certain that this particular’s groups capacity has been deteriorated following the operation. A key related factor is

their capacity to regenerate and to what extent they will be willing to exert any form of overt presence considering the recent outcome.

The lack of a regular IMF presence throughout the province means that the risk of NGOs being overly associated with the international military due to the IMF rescue operation is primarily mitigated. However, it should be noted that the province saw no less than three IMF operations this reporting period in Shahri Buzorg, Argo, and an unrelated operation on the 14th in Warduj. How this plays out with individual NGOs will be very much dependent on where the NGOs are working, their specific local profile, and the steps they take going forward. It should be noted though that a perceived association with IMF does not necessarily affect perceptions of NGO neutrality any more than strong local ties to GOA actors in the area such as district governors, ANP, and NDS.

It is also important to situate this incident into the broader context. The abduction marks a strong outlier in a province that has witnessed 33 NGO-direct incidents over the past seven years, but not a single NGO abduction prior to this. The district where it happened had never witnessed an NGO incident, and the present case also marked the first NGO abduction to occur in the North outside of Faryab since 2010. On the other hand, as to the actors involved, the case underlined the



general security landscape of Badakhshan where the significant pockets of conservative populations, despite being rather permissive of NGO presence, overlap with cross-border drug trafficking networks that permeate a variety of provincial actors including AOG, ACG, and GOA. In this environment, the large NGO community represents a high-value and easily accessible target, in particular during movements through remote and poorly policed areas where an encounter with an armed group of criminal, political, or mixed nature is not out of place. NGO staff remain prone to the same environment-specific risks as any other entity associated with more significant financial assets would face in most remote areas. The only difference is that NGOs work to maintain strong community ties and assurances—which are directly linked to the assets those NGOs bring to communities—which provide considerably more security in areas with questionable command and control (unlike areas that are under tight GOA or AOG control). While NGOs will work to figure out where vulnerabilities in their own movements or areas of operation may be, for the meantime the incident is not indicative of a threshold event and remains a strong outlier similar in nature to other notable events in the North such as the attack on UNAMA in Mazar in April last year (that did not symbolize a change in the security situation for NGOs) or the killing of internationals in Kuran Wa Munjan in 2010 (owed directly to foreign AOG).


BALKH

Chimtal and Chahar Bolak continue to account for the majority of incident reporting in Balkh. However, increased levels of AOG activity are also being recorded in Sholgara (seven security incidents in the last month and a half, including four authored by AOG and one IED discovery) and occasionally in the northern districts, most recently in Dawlatabad (where four of the seven security incidents this year have occurred over the last month and a half, three authored by AOG with the fourth being an IED discovery). Nevertheless, while insecurity is likely to continue to display marginal increases in these peripheral districts over the summer (including potentially in Nahri Shahi—where the most active AOG leader from the area has recently resurfaced—as well as Kishindeh and Shortepa), AOGs are expected to remain focused on Chimtal and Chahar Bolak, the AOG strongholds in the province. The most recent reporting period has demonstrated trending in Chimtal and Chahar Bolak that is close to that of 2011. Of the 15 security incidents recorded, 11 occurred in these two districts, with five in Chahar Bolak—three authored by AOG and the other two being IED discoveries—and six in Chimtal, all authored by AOG. This is nearly equal to the same period in 2011 (13, six authored by AOG and five IED discoveries). While no conclusions should be made from this two week period alone, it is notable that despite the lower overall volume of security incidents the two districts have recorded thus far in 2012 (54 as compared to 71 through mid-June in 2011), the

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

districts have nearly drawn even over the last month and a half, with 27 occurring since May first, a close second to the 31 recorded over the same period in 2011. The activity has been relatively IED heavy, with this period notching two significant IED detonations (out of four) causing a relatively high volume of civilian casualties. As in Sar-e Pul, this suggests that AOGs have increased not only their presence, but their assets, and are focused on retaking land that was relatively calm over the first quarter of 2011 amidst heavy ANSF, IMF, and CIP deployments.

The more notable amongst these was an IED detonation that occurred approximately 10 meters from a mosque on the afternoon of the fifth in the Arab Mazari area of Chimtal. The detonation took place just after the conclusion of a Shura where local elders discussed the election of CDC members (with NGO staff present). The IED killed two—a village elder and a militia member—and injured four others, although the NGO staff involved in the CDC process were not directly effected by the strike. The target of the IED remains unclear, but the proximity in location and time strongly suggests it was directed against local leadership (or even the CDC process), as Arab Mazari has seen significant AOG activity, and this may have been an attempt to intimidate locals to abandon alternative governance, although attacks dedicated to the targeting of civilians remain exceptionally rare in the district this year. 12 of the last 22 incidents in Chimtal have been IED-related,



suggesting that robust IED emplacement will likely continue over the coming summer months. Of note, one of the other two IED detonations in Chimtal also killed two civilians (in Moqoriha village on the 1st), while the third was a premature detonation.

The first IED detonation of the year in Chahar Bolak (against an ANP ranger in the district center at 0900 on the 12th), killed three civilians (including a child) and injured five ANP, further illustrating the risk of collateral involvement. The IED was attached to a motorcycle, and was reported to have been remotely detonated. Although this appears to denote an outlier, the general pattern of increased activity falls in line with existing seasonal trends. AOGs are pushing to make sure their presence is felt, resulting in decreased security throughout the district, however, the vast majority still expressly target security forces. Of note to this, reports indicate that the CIPs will be turned over to the ALP program in the near future, although the exact manner this will be implemented (whether they will be trained externally, mentored by ANSF on the spot, or just turned into ALP overnight) remains unclear.

Outside of these two districts, notable incidents included an armed attack on a private construction company site that was building a bridge for an IO—setting the worksite on fire but not stealing anything or injuring anyone—in Dawlatabad, and two incidents in Sholgara (a fight between PGMs and an AOG attack on an ANP checkpoint).

JAWZJAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

This period saw two notable incidents recorded in the district; the temporary detainment of two IO contracted trucks returning from delivering food along the Qush Tapa – Darzab road on the evening of the 8th, and a rare IED detonation inside of Shibrighan City near the house of a GOA employee on the morning of the 14th. Although Jawzjan has maintained a significantly lower overall volume of incident reporting than occurred in 2011, with only 84 incidents on file through the middle of June as opposed to 121 in 2011, incident reporting—most notably that pertaining to AOGs (attacks and IED emplacement)—is increasing throughout the province, primarily in the Tri-Provincial Area (TPA—specifically in Qush Tapa, which had recorded four security incidents before late reporting), but also elsewhere in the district, as witnessed by recent IED-related activity in the less kinetic districts to the north of the province.

In the TPA, the temporary detainment of IO contracted truck drivers with their trucks (released a mere two hours later due to the fact that they were local to the area and well known amongst the community), as well as continuous targeting of CIPs suggests that the CIP project has been unable to maintain stability in the area since AOGs have moved back and reinitiated operations. AOG activity in the TPA—although still well under last year’s cumulative totals—is increasing at a rate to put it relatively in line with predicted seasonal trends, and likely to continue to increase for the coming summer months. This period, such activity took the form of an

attack on an ANP checkpoint and the assassination of two CIPs in their local residence—neither of which pose any shift to existing trends—in combination with the temporary detainment noted above. The truck stoppage occurred in the vicinity of Teraghali Arabia, a kinetic area that has been responsible for 40% of the incidents recorded in the district this year, and although the targeting of IO contracted vehicles is not new to the region, it marks an outlier to the usual incidents recorded in the district (which primarily have consisted of attacks on hard targets, specifically ANSF, IMF, or CIP). While insecurity is increasing, other than this incident, only two others have expressly targeted civilians (including the abduction and release of the son of an elder from this same area in late January).

The other notable incident in the province—and perhaps an even greater outlier than the stoppage—was the detonation of an IED in Shibrighan city against civilians (although in close proximity to a GOA official’s house) which injured 11 civilians, including the wife of the head of the election commission (whose house the detonation occurred in front of). The detonation marked only the second IED-related incident in the city this year (the first being an IED discovery in February), although others have occurred in the district along the contested Sar-e Pul – Shibrighan road. It remains unclear who planted the IED and to what end, while it likely targeted the GOA official, it was also located in close proximity to a local mosque and



only approximately 200 meters from the home of General Dustum, whose supporters have recently been investigated for obstructing the Chinese run oil project taking place in Sar-e Pul.

Rounding out the picture, two incidents this period included IED discoveries in Darzab and Mardyan. While Darzab—part of the TPA—has been a traditional AOG stronghold along with Qush Tapa (and an IED discovery is not irregular there, as activity is likely to increase the next months), any notion of increased AOG activity in Mardyan is more uncommon, and involves a location with a reasonably sized NGO population. This IED was discovered at 0800 hours on 09 June along the often travelled Mardyan – Aqcha road. Although it marked only the fourth incident recorded in the district this year, two others consisted of an IED detonation and an abduction. While in the past, there have been known to be relatively small criminal groups active in the area, multiple reports from the area suggest that Mardyan—along with Mingajik and Fayzabad—are seeing movements of AOGs throughout much of their territory, especially in the late evenings, and in fact, other IED discoveries or detonations have occurred over the last month and a half in Mingajik, Qarqin, Fayzabad, and Khaniqa, suggesting that—as reported by locals—AOG movements are increasing in the northern districts, likely in connection with increased AOG activity in Chintal and Chahar Bolak in Balkh as well as in Sar-e Pul. However, it is yet to be seen if AOG activity will increase to the level of movements being recorded, as has begun to occur in Sar-e Pul.


KUNDUZ

Two armed guards working for a private construction company implementing a project for an INGO (as financed by an IO) were killed in Khanabad. The guards were recent additions, only hired after the head of the construction company received two threatening phone calls to halt the project. Such targeting is not an exception in Khanabad, the home of a large number of competing militias, and it appears likely that a local power broker was attempting to elicit protection pay or stop a project that might benefit a rival. At this time, the attack appears to have been directed at the company, not the NGO or IO.

In a reporting period vaguely reminiscent of 2011, Kunduz recorded 29 security incidents, led by

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

nine in Chahar Dara and eight in Kunduz (traditional centers of AOG activity), but followed closely by seven in Khanabad. Although the recently increased security reporting appears unlikely to reach that of the same period in 2011 (35), the reality is that despite a slow start, AOGs are now executing a significant volume of operations (primarily against hard targets). IED-related incidents continue to make up a large portion of these (six detonations—three in Chahar Dara—and five discoveries this period), but contributed proportionately less than usual, accounting for approximately one third as opposed to nearly half this period. This suggests that AOGs are feeling more



comfortable asserting their physical presence, denoting greater confidence in their numbers and assets.

Thus far in 2012, January (38) and May (37) have recorded the highest volume of security incidents, both totals that June appears likely to surpass. Lastly, cases involving the abuse of civilians by ALP and PGM are being reported, and as IMF forces draw down, these could further fracture communities and cause increased conflict.


TAKHAR

Although no tests have yet determined what caused female students to fall ill in nine separate incidents—five of them this period—the GOA were quick to announce a number of arrests in Takhar and Kunduz in relation to the alleged poisonings, in a concerted effort to calm a civilian population that was quickly becoming anxious to the point of panic. More than 15 arrests were made this period, including those of two well known AOG commanders in Takhar and one contributing pharmacist in Kunduz (who was allegedly importing chemicals from outside the country).

The arrests began as the situation appeared to be getting out of hand, with a short, unplanned demonstration occurring in Farkhar, when parents marched to

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

an effected school and stoned the building, protesting the perceived inability of the GOA to protect their children. While the arrests appear to have calmed things down, it should be noted that the incidents (which took place primarily in Taloqan, but also in Rustaq, Farkhar, and most recently in Bangi) continued during—and even after—the arrests, although only one occurred after 05 June (when on the 14th a small number of girls fell ill in Bangi). The narrative has increased local GOA and civilian rhetoric against AOGs, but no AOG has openly taken credit (and the IEA does not denounce female education). It should be noted that the strong community pressures created a need for arrests, but whether the “poisonings” slowed down be-



cause of these or because people calmed down after the arrests remains unclear.

It is worth noting the low levels of AOG activity recently recorded in Takhar. The majority of incidents this cycle consisted of ANSF arrests (most notably in Khwaja Ghar, in conjunction with increased activity in northern Kunduz), with the most notable exception being an IED detonation in Bangi against the private residence of the head of a local Shura. The detonation marked only the third incident recorded in the district (two of them IED-related), but locals sources have held firm that it involved a personal conflict, not AOGs.

FARYAB


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

After recording 72 security incidents in May, the 19 this period represented a respite from the high level of AOG activity that has characterized the province in 2012, despite the notable inclusion of two BBIED detonations. The three most insecure districts in the province (Qaysar, Almar, and Pashtun Kot) accounted for only 12 security incidents—five authored by AOG—in contrast to a total of 44 (16 AOG-initiated) accumulated throughout May. Locals from the area have suggested that the overarching lull may be due to recent ANSF/IMF operations, but it is not expected to persist.

Suicide attacks have been extremely rare in the province, with similar acts limited to a VBIED in Maymana against an IMF patrol in

April, and only three other successful suicide attacks over the last six years (Shirin Tagab in 2011, Khwaja Sabz Posh in 2010, and Qaysar in 2008), with one attempted BBIED in Qaysar in October 2011. Neither of the current BBIEDs detonated in the vicinity of any high profile target, with the first one in Qaysar against ANBP and the second in Maymana against an undefined target, leading many to suggest it had detonated prematurely. In total the BBIEDs resulted in three deaths—two of which were the vest bearers—and 12 casualties (10 civilians and two ANBP).

In terms of IED activity, Maymana generally witnesses a relatively low volume, marking the attack as a further outlier, but



Qaysar sees a high level, although only one other IED incident—a discovery—was reported there this period. Anecdotal reports suggest that the BBIED in Qaysar was deployed against a GOA official, but detonated prematurely when the ANBP happened upon him. However, this appears impossible to confirm. Looking forward, IED-related activity is likely to continue at a significant level in Qaysar (despite the current lull), but at current, the use of BBIEDs marks a significant outlier, and these incidents do not necessarily suggest any new trend.

BAGHLAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Baghlan recorded 12 incidents this period, six of them in Baghlani Jadid, which continues to contribute the lion’s share of incident reporting. Prior to this cycle, Baghlani Jadid accounted for 58 of 121 incidents in the province this year. While the province recorded a similar 129 incidents over the same period in 2011, the 58 marked a 50% increase for Baghlani Jadid, which had accounted for only 40 the previous year. This demonstrates the highly insecure nature of Baghlani Jadid this year, but also shows that current insecurity has been more confined to the northern district, and that districts such as Puli Khumri, Dushi, and Tala Wa Barfak have seen significantly less activity in comparison to 2011.

Outside of four IED discoveries

in Baghlani Jadid, AOG focused on disrupting IMF supply chains by targeting fuel tankers. While attacks of this nature occurred on both the Tala Wa Barfak – Bamyan road and the Puli Khumri – Kunduz road, it was the exceptional number of “AOG” joining the APRP process which marked the most notable dynamic.

Twice in the last two weeks large groups joined the APRP process, first in Puli Khumri, with 83 alleged AOG members from Khost Wa Fering district joining, and then in Khost Wa Fering itself with an additional 45. While it remains doubtful that the majority of these consist of actual fighters—more likely civilians or fringe combatants trying to cash in on the process—the large number



remains significant (even though Khost Wa Fering has not recorded a single security incident since 2011, nor a single AOG related incident since 2010, suggesting that the actual combatants in the district may not equal those partaking in the APRP).

Lastly, the ALP killing of a female and two children in Baghlani Jadid marked another ALP attack against civilians, as has been previously recorded in Baghlani Jadid and Kunduz. The accountability of the various armed groups going forward will constitute a defining dynamic for the north-east as IMF withdraws.

WESTERN REGION

HERAT

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

Two incidents directly or indirectly targeting IOs occurred this cycle. In Guzara, AOG launched a RPG/SAF attack on an IO compound, leaving no casualties or damage, while in the south-east of Adraskan, two IO contracted trucks were detained by AOG.


The IO compound in Guzara has come under seven different AOG attacks since 2006, although only two of these - including the current - have occurred over the last four years. While in 2008 and prior, the attacks mainly consisted of IDF, the last two included a complex attack with suicide vectors in 2010 and this current incident. Although this does not denote the current attack as a regular occurrence, it clearly marks that the compound is actively on the AOG radar for targeting.

In Adraskan, the IO-contracted trucks were carrying food items to Ghor when they were intercepted by AOG and subsequently transferred to Shindand where the drivers were released unharmed. The release was likely connected to an ANP operation that was underway, but it appears that the drivers were not directly freed by ANP's use of force.

It is important to note that the detention of commercial trucks transferring IO/NGO items is

not uncommon to Herat province. Since 2010, six cases have been reported. The first four occurred along the Herat – Chaghcharan highway (two in Chishti Sharif in 2010, and one in Pashtun Zarghun and one in Karukh in 2011), but the most recent two cases occurred along the Adraskan–Ghor road within the last two reporting periods. While AOG incident volumes have been relatively low in areas along this road (only two AOG incidents were recorded in 2011), five incidents have already been recorded this year, suggesting that AOG presence and activities are increasing in the area. Further to this, it should be noted that the southeast of Adraskan has areas that have been heavily affected by AOG traffic from the south to the north, and due to the lack of governance and limited information access, the number of AOG incidents are likely underreported. Therefore, the chance of encountering AOG elements is significantly increased due to frequent AOG inflows as well as bad road conditions (which slow down the speed of movements through the area).

In total, Herat recorded eight AOG-authored incidents this cycle, marking a 50% decline over



the PRP, although the decrease in overall security incident volumes was limited to 8%. This change suggests a significant short term shift in the proportion of AOG to ANSF initiated incidents, in favor of the latter (from—respectively—16:14 the PRP to 8:18 this period). This was particularly visible in Shindand, where the ration was 2:6 (AOG to ANSF/IMF) as opposed to 4:1 the PRP. Of note, the last ANSF/IMF operation resulted in the arrest of the district shadow governor (DSG) and two other prominent commanders along with 13 fighters, which is likely to curtail AOG activity for a short period. A lull in conflict in both Kushk and Kushki Kuna marked other contributing factors to this decline.

In contrast, AOG activity appeared in Herat City, although it remained confined to suburban districts. Despite no effective detonations, two IEDs were located by ANP in the city, while in Injil, a RCIED detonated against ANP vehicle. AOG activity in the city has consisted primarily of IED attacks against high-profile targets in urban areas, reinforcing the need for NGOs to maintain sufficient distance from potential targets.


FARAH

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

After the intensification of AOG activity the PRP, the volume declined by 45 % this cycle, with 15 AOG authored incidents. This appears to be an operational pause for the reorganization of dispersed AOG units, and AOG volumes are likely to rise again towards the middle of the summer. However, the pattern of geographical distribution of AOG operations remained unchanged. Bala Buluk and Bakwa authored 53% of the total AOG incidents, while the central districts (Khaki Safed, Pusht Rod, and Farah) were responsible for most of the rest. In terms of tactical patterns, close range attacks with SAF and RPGs became more dominant as IED attacks decreased, with the proportion between these chang-

ing from 12:10 to 8:4, particularly as evidenced in Bala Buluk and Bakwa. In the central districts, two incidents of targeted killings occurred. In the first case, AOG shot and killed an ALP member riding on a motorbike and captured his rifle and motorbike in Pusht Rod. In the second case, two AOG members riding on a motorbike shot and killed one NDS official (the operational deputy head), while he was working on his house in PD1. Target killings are likely to continue - particularly in urban areas - as conflict re-intensifies toward the middle of the summer.

ANSF/IMF stretched their operations into the heart of Gulistan, a traditional AOG stronghold, re-



sulting in the deaths of two AOG members and injuries of eight others. It appears likely that ANSF/IMF will build ALP/PGMs in the area, as announced by the MOI in April, an important feature to be monitored in the future.


BADGHIS

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

This reporting period, AOG activity in Badghis continued to decline, with eight AOG incidents recorded, accounting for a 23% drop from the PRP attributed to decreased AOG activity in Ghormach and Muqur, which recorded only one AOG-authored incident each. As for Qadis, another AOG active district, the number of AOG incidents remained unchanged but the geographical focus of AOG operations shifted from Darae Boom area to Khair Khana area due to successful negotiations between ALP elders

and moderate AOG cadres after the withdrawal of IMF from the area the PRP. Stability in Darae Boom will be largely dependent on how radical AOG cadres in neighboring Nakhchirestan will react to moderate AOG cadres and ALPs.

In Murghab—the focal point of conflict—the low volume of AOG activity remained almost unchanged, while IMF military operation gained momentum. In total, three major operations—one of which involved an effec-



tive air strike—resulted in the death of four prominent AOG commanders and four other AOG members, as well as the arrest of 9 AOG members.


GHOR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

Unlike other provinces in the West, AOG activity continued to rise this reporting period with eight AOG incidents, roughly double that of the PRP. This increase was mainly attributed to the further deterioration of the security situation in Pasaband as migration of Helmandi AOG continued to increase following the end of the poppy harvest. While five AOG incidents in total were recorded in the district, it is important to note that all of them occurred within the first four days of the month. Particularly, on the 4th of June, a local armed group affiliated with Helmandi AOG assaulted an ANP CP in Kakuri village. The ANP repelled the attack with the assistance of armed villagers in a clash that resulted in the death of three villagers and injuries of three others and two ANP. The following day, ANP and the locals conducted a


clearing operation around the village which led to a protracted fight, resulting in the death of seven AOG members and four villagers, as well as injuries to four AOG members, six villagers, and two ANP. These altercations reiterate the fact that the MOI has likely begun implementing ALP/PGM programs in Ghor, which are likely to increase tensions in the future.

In the north, AOG activity in Charsada has risen after nearly a month long lull. AOG under the District Shadow Governor attacked an ANP CP in Kanak village on two separate occasions. However, during the second attack, ANP conducted a preemptive strike against them, resulting in the death of the district shadow governor (DSG) and two of his bodyguards. It is important to note that his death, along with



ineffective coordination between north and south AOG cadres in the province, is likely to disrupt AOG operations in the short-term.

Of note to the NGO community, AOG affiliated with the Charsada IEA cadre responsible for the killing of an international NGO staff last month killed the Provincial Primary Court Judge, who had been abducted and transferred to Murghab Valley in late May. While the motivations of this particular group and their interplay with the local AOG landscape are yet to be assessed, their demonstrated focus on ‘soft targets of value’ emerges as a feature worth monitoring in the coming months.



EASTERN REGION

NANGARHAR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	14
This Report Period	2

Nangarhar’s two NGO incidents during the first half of June both took the form of robberies of demining worksites by armed opposition cadres. In Hesarak and Rodat districts, armed groups approached demining field sites and proceeded to steal those pieces of equipment that are valuable for their IED construction and emplacement activities. However, while in Hesarak the armed individuals fired in the air to scare off the deminers, in Rodat they merely identified themselves as belonging to the IEA and calmly stated they were going to take some of the equipment, to which the deminers wisely agreed. Such incidents are unfortunately a fact of life for demining work, given the multiple applications of their equipment, and are extremely hard to prevent; instead, instructing field staff to comply entirely with armed opposition figures who approach in such a manner is the best course to minimise any potential for the use of violence in the acquisition of the equipment.

In the wider conflict, AOG-authored incident levels have fallen slightly from May levels, consistent with the pattern witnessed last year in the province, where May saw the provincial peak after which volumes fell until the end of Ramadan, after which they began to rise again. Also of significance, overall opposition incidents do not demonstrate a significantly different rate this year when compared to 2011, similar to its neighbours Kunar and Laghman, which

have also seen a sustainment of AOG operational intensity when compared with last year. For Nangarhar, this sustained level of activity points most directly to the fact that in spite of ongoing IMF stabilization efforts, particularly during the winter lull, armed opposition cadres in the province remain stubbornly powerful and well-entrenched.

One of the most overt manifestations of this continuing power was seen in Chaparhar during the period, where on the evening of the 7th, opposition fighters established illegal vehicle CPs on the main district road in Terelay, Shaghal Dara and Sra Qala, all in close proximity to Khalis Family Colony and the outskirts of Jalalabad city. Similarly, the continuing occurrence of high-profile suicide attacks during the period – after last period’s failed BBIED attack – also pointed to ongoing AOG resilience in the province and in rear areas across the border in Pakistan, even if only one of them managed to strike its target. Firstly, a SVBIED struck an IMF convoy on the Torkham Highway in Rodat, near to Bati Kot from where it was likely staged, causing damage to one IMF vehicle. The others were less effective. In the Joy 25 area of Shinwar, ANP shot and killed a BBIED operative who was trying to approach an IMF EOD team as they were defusing an IED. Then on the 15th, two BBIED operatives riding towards Jalalabad in the Ghani Khel



area had one of their vests prematurely detonate, killing both individuals. Moreover, ANP seizures of two extremely large caches of explosive materials – one in Ghani Khel bazaar and the other in northern Goshta – further indicate the scale of operations that the armed opposition continue to plan in the province, while also demonstrating the ongoing success ANSF are having in disrupting significant percentages of such shipments.

Other developments of significance were two AOG operations targeted at ANSF and GOA leadership, and an IMF air strike in AOG-saturated Bati Kot, which killed eight AOG fighters who were sleeping in an open area near Chardeh. In Bati Kot, on the main highway, an IED struck the vehicle of the Kot COP, but failed to kill him. However, a SAF attack in Shinwar against the district Criminal Investigation Department (CID) chief killed him and injured his bodyguard.

Finally, the first instance of AOG targeting of a girls’ school in Khogyani was recorded during the fortnight. In the Bar Beyar area on the 10th, an armed opposition group set fire to a girls’ school, which led to both structural damage and the loss of some of the materials inside the building. This is the latest in a series of nationwide incidents involving girls’ schools, and its occurrence in an area not known for such AOG social conservatism may indicate a broader change in thinking at the local level amongst AOG cadres in the province.


NURISTAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

In what can only be understood to be deep concern about developments in a province that has represented the greatest AOG victory against international military forces in the past decade, IMF re-entered Nuristan in a meaningful way after almost three years of absence from the province, having been beaten into strategic retreat by numerically and tactically superior armed opposition cadres. Their newfound presence has been established in the very district from which they beat their final retreat in October 2009 – Kamdesh – and represents what appears to be a last-ditch effort to conduct conventional clearing operations in advance of the withdrawal of IMF ground forces from neighbouring northern Kunar this Autumn, which will also be when these recently deployed forces will be removed. Yet, while there may be some kinetic effect from these new forces, in the form of AOG fighters killed, the sheer number of security forces required to have any hope in rolling back what appears to be an inexorably rising tide of AOG dominance in the province are highly unlikely to manifest themselves. As such, even efforts by these forces to improve the effectiveness of recently deployed ANA units to Kamdesh are not likely to prevent AOG consolidation of authority away from the district centre, where a surrounded and harassed HIG presence

maintains a degree of nominal governmental authority – although in reality only for its HIG constituency. Indeed, the HIG leadership came under renewed – and escalated – assault during the period in neighbouring Nari, when IEA cadres launched a SVBIED and BBIED strike against the leading HIG commander and a number of other Kamdeshi HIG leaders when they were meeting with security forces in the district (see Kunar section for more).

Because of the new IMF presence, it is not however surprising that AOG operations in Kamdesh decreased during the period, as they adjusted to the presence of their new neighbours, who have already started shelling and conducting airstrikes on areas thought to be home to an AOG presence. As such, the only significant kinetic operations recorded in the district during the period were security force clearing operations, one of which, conducted by ANBP before the arrival of IMF, killed eight AOG fighters in Patigal village on the 6th. Yet prior to IMF deployment, there were some political developments on the AOG side in Kamdesh; most notably, district AOG leadership informed local communities that they could receive food and other assistance from the armed opposition (sourced from Chitral) in exchange for their political support,



in a clear attempt to augment their political position vis-à-vis those district communities not closely tied to HIG.

In the coming months in Kamdesh, we can expect significant conflict activity in the district, including civilian casualties, road blockages and environmental damage, caused by an IMF presence that will be both eager to do something with the short time it has, and concerned about the sort of large massed AOG attacks on their facilities that progressively drove them from the province three years ago.

Elsewhere in Nuristan, a further drone strike took place in Waygal, this time in Aranch, which killed four AOG members, including a mid-level IEA commander, and injured an additional three. The individuals were reportedly on their way to funeral prayers for the former deputy shadow governor of the province, who had been killed in the drone strike that took place the previous period. In Wama, north of Waygal, NDS arrested two students as they were smuggling IEDs into their *madrassa*, likely as storage in advance of operations in the provincial capital Parun; this is unusual for the town, and thus of some concern, although primarily for GOA officials and ANSF. Finally, in Nurgaram, an IED struck an ANA vehicle in Baba, injured five soldiers, while a SAF attack was also staged against the former PRT base, which led to the injury of one AOG fighter.

LAGHMAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

In Dawlat Shah, Alishing and Badpakh districts, and with little in the way of media announcements, IMF withdrew and handed over security responsibilities to ANSF, leaving behind just a small advisory contingent. This unpublicised transition took place weeks after provincial IMF and GOA leadership pushed to bring significant numbers of HIG fighting cadres into the APRP in Dawlat Shah, which can now be understood as preparation to experiment with leaving this outlying district effectively in HIG hands, similar to efforts underway elsewhere in the eastern region.

However, significant security challenges remain, in the form of numerous local AOG cadres that have not been effectively rooted out – and are likely to see the IMF withdrawal as a retreat, as their neighbours in Nuristan did in 2009, and in Kunar’s Pech valley in 2011. The continued presence of such cadres was made bluntly clear the day before the announcement, when an AOG unit established an illegal CP during mid-morning in the Zar Qamar area of the main Mehtarlam-Alishing road; this is not a sign of improving security in the district, and further indicates a confident and expanded AOG presence in the district as IMF are withdraw-

ing - likely also drawing strength from opposition cadres across the mountains to the west in Kapisa, where the armed opposition are also developing their capabilities. Moreover, as it is doing across the region, the opposition was also recorded in Alishing implementing its increasingly political position, aimed at influencing local society; in the Arian area of the district, opposition members were forcibly collecting financial and goods taxation when they were accosted by ANP. While on this occasion their work was disrupted by police, most of these incidents go unreported, but anecdotal evidence indicates it is slowly but surely increasing. Across Laghman the IEA have significantly increased such work in the past six months, particularly in Alingar, and the withdrawal of IMF will only benefit them in this regard.

In Mehtarlam district, the first part of the province to transition, this past fortnight gave a taste of what lies in store for the newly-transitioned districts. In the Omarzai area, an RCIED struck a motorcycle being driven by a NDS official with another NDS official riding on the back: one was killed and the other badly wounded. In Besram, close to Mehtarlam town on the main road



to Alingar, the only district that continues to feature an active conventional IMF presence, another RCIED struck an IMF supply truck, causing damage. South of the town, there were also three hit-and-run SAF/RPG attacks against ANP CPs; in one, in Palawan Baba, IMF air assets responded and killed two AOG fighters. This level of post-transition AOG activity in a major provincial center with a significant ANSF presence and a highly active NDS raises considerable concerns about the near term future of more rural and AOG-saturated districts that have just undergone the same change.

In Qarghayi, another transitioned district, AOG cadres have continued to increase the pressure on the ANSF in the Tangi area, attacking CPs on a number of occasions, as well as attacking the convoy of a Shinwari senator as it was transiting through the area in the evening – injuring two bodyguards but not the senator himself. As with previous attacks against high-value GOA officials in Qarghayi, it appears that the opposition has effective surveillance and intelligence inputs to assist them in such targeting.

ACRONYMS:

Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms.

KHOST

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	1


Khost saw a NGO incident when a UXO detonated while a deminer was attempting to defuse it in southern Tani district; the detonation injured the individual involved.

More broadly, while Khost was not involved in any of the complex attacks that struck Gardez, Jalalabad, Puli Alam and Kabul on April 15th, at midday on June 1st, a very large SVBIED was detonated at the east gate of Salerno base, the main conventional IMF base in Khost province. The IED, rigged to a Hino truck, breached the main gate and partially collapsed the base’s main dining hall and shop, which allowed a 14-strong team of AOG infantry operatives to breach the base’s perimeter defences and engage the Afghan and international forces staged inside. These operatives were killed within a short time, while the security forces inside the base also suffered significant casualties; due to intentional information secrecy, the exact numbers of these casualties aren’t known, although at least one IMF soldier died of injuries sustained in the firefight. There were also at least 20 civilians injured in the incident, but this too, as with the extent of the structural damage and the AOG success at breaching such a major IMF facility, were initially kept private by IMF, likely due to concerns about the perceptions that such an attack would generate.

This incident highlights the sus-

tained resilience of the Haqqani network, which is entrenched just across the border; in particular, the large numbers of fighters deployed and killed for this operation – just as with the dozens that comprised the multi-city complex attacks last month – demonstrate the significant manpower that the faction continues to enjoy both within Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s tribal areas. As in other neighbouring provinces this year, the use of spectacular attacks such as this is partly about an economy of force effort; for Khost, AOG-authored incident levels are about 40% lower than last year, much of which is accounted for by drops in Sabari and other rural districts, where a heavy IMF focus has made some dents in AOG freedom of operation.

However, as in other provinces in the east, this economy of force effort is accompanied by a growing political role of the opposition leadership vis-à-vis local society – most notably demonstrated by the appointment of a Haqqani family member to the position of shadow governor for Khost earlier in the year, a sign of the growing importance the network places on political relationships in the crucial border province. Moreover, the level of opposition activity in Khost remains relatively high when compared to neighbouring provinces, consistent with its generally greater conflict intensity. AOG-generated insecurity focused around IED deployment in



Nadir Shah Kot, Bak, Tani and Tere Zayi, with ANSF and other security force-related targets on the receiving end of the majority of the incidents. From the IMF side, a small number of operations were recorded, particularly in Khost district’s Kundai area, as well as in Sabari; in all, 22 AOG fighters were arrested across the operations.

Finally, in an unusual development that also points to the operational adaptability of the Haqqanis, AOG fighters staged multiple incursions from Waziristan into Jaji Maidan, a district which has remained utterly and improbably free of conflict in the last decade – all the more remarkable for its proximity to Bak and Sabari. It is estimated 320 families fled their homes as a result of the incursions, which targeted local residences and killed one local. It is likely that the Haqqani network has finally decided to open up access routes through Jaji Maidan, given security force pressure both to the north in northern Paktya, and to the south in eastern Khost. It is a tactically sound time for them to do so, as it is late in the day for the government to authorise and roll out another ALP or substantially increase conventional forces in the district, which is also effectively inaccessible to security forces by road, given the intense insecurity in the districts between Jaji Maidan and Khost city; as such, we are likely to see more such activity in the coming weeks, and as it occurs the strategic priorities of the armed opposition with regard to this new front will become clearer.


KUNAR

As with its southern neighbours Nangarhar and Laghman, Kunar's conflict intensity has remained roughly consistent with last year's levels, and the lack of security gains raises questions ahead of the October IMF withdrawal from the northern districts of the province, which indeed have seen a notable deterioration in security in recent months - as AOG cadres have focused on strengthening their position and infiltration capabilities in these areas over the past eight months. Most notably in Nari, at the end of the period the armed opposition launched a SVBIED attack against the main IMF/ANSF base in the district, followed by a BBIED operative who attempted to detonate his vest in the base's vicinity, but failed to do so before being shot dead. The detonation came while senior Kamdeshi leadership, primarily of a HIG complexion, were meeting security forces in the base - and can therefore be understood to be a clear escalation in IEA efforts to pressurise Kamdeshi's reconciled HIG leadership, as part of their agenda to secure stronger infiltration routes into, and more *de facto* political control in Nuristan.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Across the province, a total of 42 separate SAF attacks were staged by armed opposition forces against ANSF and IMF targets, although only a small number led to fatalities. However, there were some notable incidents beyond the general static of the conflict.


First, on two separate occasions AOG figures shot and killed GOA officials reaching out to them in regards to joining the APRP process. In Nari's Saw valley, where a significant deterioration of security has taken place in the past three months, an armed group shot and killed two APRP officials after inviting them to the area for negotiations. Similarly, in Dangam an NDS officer was shot dead while trying to convince AOG fighters to join the APRP. Both of these incidents demonstrate the broad unwillingness of much of the province's internally fragmented but externally powerful armed opposition to countenance such negotiations, and thus the likelihood that even were there to be a dramatic de-escalation of conflict in neighbouring provinces (which remains highly improbable), Kunar is very



unlikely to be able to stabilise itself.

In a second incident worthy of note, a *mullah* using his house as an IED factory near the Chawkay bazaar saw his house catch fire, with the resulting combination of fire and explosives causing a large detonation that injured him and four of his family members. There was a distinct intensification of mortar fire from Pakistan in the traditional districts of Dangam and Khas Kunar, related to increased efforts by TTP cadres to target their Pakistani military adversaries from rear positions inside these Afghan districts. As has happened on multiple previous occasions, this has led to the displacement of dozens of local families.

The only notable IMF operation was a combined ground/air operation in the Sundrey area of Manogai, in which the nephew of one of the most important AOG commanders in the Pech valley was killed, alongside a colleague.




PAKTYA

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Paktya’s AOG-authored incident levels increased slightly on May’s levels, but by much less than the growth rate seen in June 2011, which saw a near doubling over the level of May 2011. However, this is likely partly a function of the later start to the fighting season in Paktya, given the intense cold weather and extensive snow cover seen this year, and as such it would not be surprising for current levels to continue upward in the coming six weeks. Supporting evidence for this is found in the seriousness of some of the events recorded in the past two weeks in the province. Most significantly, while returning to Gardez from the Chawni area, having conducted a clearing operation, an IMF vehicle was struck by a large IED, killing four IMF soldiers in what was likely intended as a high-profile statement attack in advance of this summer’s fighting (which in Paktya starts and ends

later, given the geographical and climatic conditions found there). Also in the area of the provincial capital, an IED detonated as an AOG member was carrying it to an unknown location, killing him in the vicinity of the Kabul Bank branch in the city, as well as injuring 20 civilians.

Outside the town in the wider district, in an indication of the numbers of AOG fighters that have returned to the provincial center, the first illegal CP of the season on the Kabul-Gardez road was recorded on the evening of the 8th, in Loya Tera, which was however disrupted by ANP responders who caused the AOG to flee. Also on the main road, on three separate occasions AOG fighters attacked ANSF convoys in the Tandan area before withdrawing. There was also a significant number of IED discoveries in and near to Gardez town, in an



indication of the AOG focus on this urban area as part of their desire to publicly announce their presence and proximity to the government and security forces.

Elsewhere, there were a small number of IEDs on the Khost road, in Shwak and Wuzza Zadrán, which resulted in no fatalities; the only fatal IED strike apart from the aforementioned Chawni strike occurred in the north in Ahmadabad, which killed two ANA soldiers. From the IMF side, only two of their five operations were significant. First, a combined ground and air operation in Zurmat killed six AOG fighters, including a Pakistani, while another such combined operation led to the death of five AOG fighters in Jani Khel, including a mid-level commander, and the arrest of five more.

NOTICE:

Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

SOUTHERN REGION


GHAZNI

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Ghazni Province has witnessed another period of high insecurity, contributing to the overall increase of security incidents in the South Region. What is striking about the incident profile in Ghazni is that it is almost entirely fueled by a rising work-rate on the part of AOG units in the province, with 31 direct attacks and targeted killings recorded over the past two weeks. Unusually, AOG displayed a willingness to both inflict and absorb casualties, unlike the standard hit-and-run tactics commonly used by Ghazni-area AOG. A prolonged attack on the DAC of Rashidan district in which AOG fighters employed heavy machine guns and RPGs, resulted in the deaths of one ANP officer and three AOG fighters. An attack two days later on the DAC of Khogyani district, also involving the use of heavy weapons, ended in the deaths of two AOG fighters. Lastly, three direct attacks on vehicle convoys appeared to reinforce the perception that AOG are determined to engage in more prolonged firefights. First, a well-coordinated ambush of the province’s Chief of Police convoy killed two ANP bodyguards in the Baraki area of Rashidan district, during which AOG fighters employed both heavy machine gunfire and SAF. This was followed two days later by an ambush which took place near the area of Nani, near Ghazni district’s DAC, as an IMF logistical convoy was attacked with RPG fire as well as SAF. The

hour-long exchange resulted in two AOG fighters wounded and two PSC guards killed. The third ambush by AOG occurred the following day when an AOG force returned to Khogyani’s DAC to ambush a joint IMF/ANP patrol, producing a fire-fight which left two AOG fighters dead and another wounded and detained.

The pace of indirect AOG attacks did not falter even though direct attacks had risen, and there were seven incidents of mortar or rocket fire during the report period. As has usually been the case, the majority of these attacks produced no damage or injuries however in two cases serious collateral damage took place. Two mortar rounds fired towards an ANP post in the area of Puli Matay in Muqur district struck a nearby civilian residence, killing two children and wounding three ANP officers. In another incident, AOG fired three mortar rounds towards the DAC of Qarabagh that actually struck a nearby public health clinic and severely wounded one woman and two children. A final AOG engagement deserves some notice. In the Qalbi area of Qarabagh district AOG fighters appeared to successfully down an IMF helicopter with ground fire. IMF issued a rare acknowledgement of the success of the AOG attack; it is far more usual for IMF sources to speak vaguely of ‘technical/mechanical issues’ when helicopters have



crashed in the past. Two IMF soldiers were killed in the attack.

IED incidents remained a threat in the province, with 13 separate strikes recorded over the past two weeks. Roadside IEDs wounded a total of 12 ANP/ANA soldiers in four incidents; in the first, a roadside IED struck an ANSF foot patrol resulting in the deaths of two ANP and serious injury to three others. In Dih Yak district, near the area known as Qala-e-Jawz, three of the district governor’s bodyguards were wounded by a RCIED as it detonated as his convoy was passing. In the third incident, an ANA vehicle was struck by an IED near the village of Chardewar in Andar district, wounding the five ANA soldiers travelling inside. The last major IED incident occurred in Ghazni’s Deh Khudai Dad area as another six ANA soldiers were wounded – two severely – when a roadside IED struck their patrol vehicle. However, ANSF personnel were not the greatest victims of IEDs during the report period; rather, civilians took the brunt of fatalities, with a total of nine civilians killed and four injured in three separate incidents. In the Wacha Kala area of Gelan district, an IED hit a civilian vehicle, killing all four occupants. The next day, in Khogyani’s Pul-e-Dawab area, a roadside IED caused the deaths of three more civilians, two female and one male. In the last incident, also in Khogyani district, one male and one female civilian were killed as an IED struck the taxi they were travelling in.

KANDAHAR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Kandahar has reclaimed the dubious distinction of having the most security incidents in the South region—76 in total. The vast majority of these were direct attacks by AOG and IED strikes, so the past two weeks were particularly bloody, made even more so by a complex suicide attack in Daman district which resulted in an exceptional number of civilian fatalities, with at least 22 civilians killed and another 24 wounded. Targeting the entrance to a major logistics facility which services Kandahar Airfield, an SVBIED attacker drove into the area and detonated his device, killing and wounding a number of the civilian workers and drivers who usually congregate there. In the aftermath, while assistance was beginning to organize, another individual – various reports cite either a BBIED on foot, or an BBIED on a motorcycle – moved into the crowd and detonated his device. GOA spokesman quickly condemned the claims of responsibility coming from AOG leadership, stating that this demonstrated clearly the callousness and extremism of AOG actions, with the number of civilian casualties making it hard to argue with such statements. Although logistics operations supporting IMF units have been regularly targeted as ‘legitimate’ targets by AOG, the specific manner in which this attack was carried out – clearly seeking to maximize casualties through its two stages – suggests an abandonment of the secondary aim of AOG strategy, the attempt to appear measured in its fight against the ‘foreign invaders and their Afghan puppets’. It remains to be seen if this abandonment is temporary or marks a

broad change in approach.

Other AOG actions included another 32 direct attacks, primarily targeting ANP posts and personnel. Panjwayi district itself hosted six direct AOG attacks during the last two weeks, with the most significant occurring in the DAC of Panjwayi when a fire-fight between AOG and ANP began after an ANP patrol came under SAF, resulting in the death of one ANP officer and serious injuries to another three. The DAC of Shah Wali Kot also hosted several incidents including an AOG ambush, using heavy weapons and RPGs, of a joint IMF/ANSF patrol. Two IMF soldiers and one ANP were seriously wounded in the exchange. Khakrez district was the scene for several other violent clashes, including an AOG attack on an ANP post near the village of Sagay during which three ANP officers were killed and another four were wounded. Targeted killings figured prominently during the report period. In the DAC of Maruf district, two AOG gunmen riding on a motorcycle shot and killed an off-duty ANP officer outside of his residence. In Zhari’s Sechap village another AOG gunman on a motorcycle shot and killed an ANP officer just outside of his post, after which the gunman managed to escape. Lastly, in Kandahar City’s District 2, an ANP officer was shot and killed by yet another lone AOG gunman riding on a motorcycle past an ANP checkpoint.

IEDs were a major part of the incident profile for Kandahar over the past two weeks, with 33 separate IED incidents recorded. Six of these involved fatalities and as



usual civilians bore the brunt of the strikes – near the village of Deh Babur in Ghorak district, a roadside IED struck a taxi, killing four of its civilian passengers and seriously wounding another three. In Daman’s DAC another IED struck a Zaranj motorcycle, killing the two civilian riders and destroying the vehicle. Two other IED strikes, in Zhari and Arghandab districts, resulted in a total of six civilians wounded. IEDs struck IMF/ANSF targets as well, with the most serious of these incidents taking place in the area of Shinkanay of Arghistan district when three ANP officers were killed and another two injured by an RCIED strike against their patrol vehicle. An ANP search operation conducted in the same area following the attack uncovered a sizable cache of weapons and explosives, including four prepared suicide vests and several radios. One IMF soldier was killed and another two were wounded near the DAC of Khakrez when their vehicle was struck by another RCIED. A subsequent joint IMF/ANSF operation in the area netted several prepared IEDs in a abandoned house.

IMF/ANSF operations during the report period appeared to be limited to search and seizure operations, with a few notable exceptions. A joint IMF/ANBP patrol in Spin Boldak district (in the area of Wankay, lying on the border with Pakistan) encountered an AOG force and after a lengthy fire-fight, killed a reported 14 Pakistani fighters. Although foreign fighters have been encountered throughout the South region by IMF/ANSF, they have usually been in small numbers – one or two advisors or specialists (such as IED-makers). A force of more than 14 fighters is certainly unusual and it will be important to monitor this area to see if similar infiltrations are attempted.


ZABUL

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Incident levels in Zabul province appear to level off after experiencing a surge in early May, with the majority of incidents related to IMF/ANSF activity – primarily patrols and search operations. The lull in AOG activity in Zabul province is continuing on from the previous report period, as fighters launched only a handful of attacks during the past two weeks. Those that were undertaken – numbering only six – appeared to go badly for the AOG fighters. Two AOG fighters were killed by ANP fire during a botched ambush in Qalat district’s Bawari village on 3 June, and on the following day in the same village, another attempted ambush resulted in the deaths of two more AOG fighters, with another six fighters wounded and detained.

IMF/ANSF operations appeared

to continue the ill fortune of AOG units in the province, as some of the 18 incidents attributed to IMF/ANSF activity involved substantial numbers of casualties on the part of the AOG fighters engaged. In the Khwazi area of Qalat district IMF soldiers killed four AOG fighters during a raid on a suspected hideout, and in Daychopan’s DAC an IMF/ANSF patrol engaged a small AOG force, killing two fighters before the rest fled. Another focus of the fighting, however, appeared to be in the district center of Atghar district, where an operation led by NDS officers resulted in the deaths of four AOG fighters as they resisted arrest, and the detention of another three fighters who surrendered after a brief firefight. Later that day ANP officers



located and control-detonated two IEDs in the same location.


The IED strikes which were reported – four in all – appeared to harm AOG more than their intended targets. In Shamulzayi’s DAC an IED detonated while being emplaced, killing four AOG fighters. Near the village of Chishmo, in Shahjoy district, an AOG fighter was killed and another three arrested by ANP when the IED they were attempting to plant exploded prematurely. The other two incidents, an AP mine strike against an ANP foot patrol in Qalat and a roadside IED strike against an NDS vehicle in Naw Bahar, did not result in serious casualties.

URUZGAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

There was a slight rise in the number of security incidents during this report period over the last, however direct AOG attacks were down over the past two weeks, and the limited number that did take place – five in total – appeared to adversely affect both sides of the clashes. Chora district’s Noori village was the site of an AOG attack on an ANP post, and a heavy exchange of fire left one ANP officers and two AOG fighters dead, with another two AOG fighters wounded and detained. A similar attack which took place in the area known as Shalay Nawa in Khas Uruzgan ended in worse fashion for the AOG fighters involved; under attack from a force of ANP reinforcements, 11 AOG fighters

were reported killed. In an attempted suicide attack on an ANP post near Tirin Kot’s Khwaja Ahmad area, AOG gunmen forced a young boy to lead a donkey with explosives strapped to its back towards a nearby checkpoint. The explosives, however, detonated prematurely, killing the child and the animal but leaving the ANP personnel unscathed. In another incident involving potential suicide bombers, ANP officers near the DAC of Tirin Kot engaged with four AOG members, including two who were equipped with BBIED. After an exchange of fire, the two individuals detonated their devices, killing themselves and wounding one of their fellow fighters.



As is usually the case with Uruzgan province, IEDs posed the greatest threat with 22 incidents reported. Civilians made up the largest list of fatalities. In Khas Uruzgan district, a roadside IED struck a civilian vehicle, killing its three passengers, and on the same day, 3 June, another IED hit a civilian truck near the DAC of Tirin Kot, killing two civilians and wounding another two pedestrians who were near the blast site. Lastly, two more civilians were killed by a roadside IED detonation in the Kikha area of Tirin Kot, as their vehicle was struck passing through a crossroads.

PAKTIKA


Security incidents in Paktika province were divided between AOG direct attacks, IMF/ANSF operations and IED strikes. The relative lull in AOG activity seen during the previous report period appears to be over, with fighters launching eight direct attacks against DACs in the province, as well as striking ANSF posts in rural areas on nine occasions. IDF against the DACs of Barmal, Gomal and Gayan did not appear to cause any significant effects, however SAF and RPG attacks against an ALP checkpoint in Chenakha village of Urgun district resulted in the deaths of four AOG fighters and severe injuries to another five, signifying a rare victory for the new ALP forces in the area. The attack had been preceded earlier in the day by an IED strike against an ALP patrol

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vehicle that had killed one ALP recruit in the same area. In Sarobi district AOG fighters engaged an ALP post with heavy weapons, killing two ALP recruits and a civilian, and enabling them to abduct an additional four ALP recruits.

IMF/ANSF operations experienced some successes during the report period, as several operations netted a number of both AOG fighters. In Sarobi's DAC an IMF patrol arrested five AOG members including their commander and seized a small assortment of ammunition and weapons during a night-time operation. Similarly, a night operation in Sharan resulted in the detention of another three AOG fighters near the DAC.

IED strikes were limited in num-




ber, however the incidents that did take place produced fatalities for both targets and initiators. A roadside IED near the DAC of Jani Khel district caused the deaths of two ANP officers, while a similar strike near Gomal's DAC took the lives of two ANBP officers and severely wounded another two of the border force. In the village of Babo Khel, in Jani Khel district, however, four AOG fighters were killed as they were emplacing a roadside IED that detonated prematurely. In the final IED incident involving fatalities, a child was killed and five others wounded when an IED exploded in front of an ALP post.

HELMAND

Helmand province witnessed a large number of security incidents of all types during the report period and, although the pace of AOG direct attacks was somewhat subdued, IED strikes continued to be a major contributor to fatalities and injuries. The last two weeks also featured several large operations conducted by joint IMF/ANSF units which appeared to be impactful against local AOG forces. The majority of IMF/ANSF actions were in response to earlier AOG attacks. On 2 June, a sizable AOG force attacked an IMF/ANSF patrol near the DAC of Kajaki district with heavy weapons and SAF, disengaging before any casualties could be inflicted on either side. The next day, a joint IMF/ANSF

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force returned to the DAC and engaged the AOG unit once more, killing 26 of its fighters and seizing a substantial amount of ammunition. Similarly, on 3 June an ANP officer was kidnapped by AOG gunmen in the village of Payand as he travelled from his residence to his duty post. Responding in substantial numbers, a joint IMF/ANSF search party located the abductee and engaged his kidnappers. The ANP officer was freed, however one IMF soldier was killed and another seriously wounded during the rescue mission. On 8 June, two ANP officers were killed when an RCIED detonated against their vehicle in Joy Draz village in Musa Qala district; a responding force



of IMF/ANSF promptly arrested seven AOG fighters in the area and seized some radios. Lastly, following an IED strike in the area of Shurshurak in Nawa-i-Barakzayi district that seriously wounded the head of the Tazkeera (Afghan ID card) program on 11 June, a force of ANA soldiers arrested several civilians (a woman and her two children) who were found in a parked car found to contain IED materials and several completed IEDs.

NIMROZ



	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

This report period was unique for Nimroz province in that there were no recorded incidents over the last two weeks. This is in no way to imply that there were no security incidents at all, as the same dynamics which make reporting challenging also enhances its value to AOG. The province’s vastness, remoteness and sparse population – the most sparsely populated province in the country – make it a transit point for the influx of men and materiel from Iran and Pakistan.

However, this absence of recorded incidents does raise the question of whether security is improving. A brief glance at the last two years suggests this current situation is unusual; the first two weeks of June 2010 featured 13 incidents, and the same period for 2011 had 23 incidents. However, this period does match the overall trend for Nimroz for 2012. On a year to year basis, Nimroz in 2012 is certainly experiencing lower incident levels than in the recent past; 2010 witnessed 173 incidents of all types for the province and in

2011 this number rose to 209. By contrast, this current year has seen only 48 security incidents of all types take place, and therefore at this rate Nimroz will remain well below historical trend lines.

It is also important to note that the overwhelming majority of incidents in Nimroz consistently take place in Khash Rod district, as the district hosts the main highway leading to Helmand and access to the Herat-Kandahar Highway, and the security environment of the district and by extension the province can be considered as being shaped by what happens in Helmand. A clear example of this effect was witnessed during 2010’s Operation Moshtarak focused on Helmand’s Marja district. Large numbers of AOG fighters routinely crossed back into Nimroz to re-group, replenish and carry on what turned out to be a long grinding chapter of the conflict. This influx produced a surge of related incidents in Khash Rod. Of note, the same district has also hosted 13 out of 16 incidents di-



rectly or indirectly impacting NGO or IO providers of humanitarian aid and development assistance since 2006. Of these, the large majority pertained to AOG activity in 2006 and 2007.

The present lull therefore can be seen as suggesting AOG operations in Helmand no longer require Nimroz, or that the heavy IMF presence in the Delaram area has impeded AOG ability to move through the area.

ANSO STAFF AND VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT:

We are pleased to announce that our colleague **Mr. Rory Brown** has taken over his new role as **ANSO RSA Central**, based in Kabul, as of the 1st of June 2012.

Until the arrival of the new RSA East in July, Rory Brown will also cover the Eastern Region. His contact details are included on the last page of this report.

*

We are presently recruiting for **ANSO RSA South** position based in Kandahar and **ANSO RSA Mobile**. If you have a solid working experience from a conflict environment, a NGO mindset combined with an analytical background, and a desire to be challenged, all the while being a member of a close knit team, you are encouraged to forward a cover letter, CV, and 2 substantive writing samples to jobs@ngosafety.org.

Please refer to the appropriate vacancy in the subject line of your email.

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MISSING THIS PERIOD:

ANSO did not provide analysis for the following areas:

☞ Panjshir, Samangan

These areas will be included in subsequent reports. If you have any information that would help us better understand the dynamics, please contact your local ANSO office.

ANSO is overseen by an NGO Advisory Board. If you have any questions or feedback, good or bad, let them know on:

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NGO can register up to five persons to each of ANSO mailing lists. For a registration form please contact:

Registration.afg@ngosafety.org



ANSO REGIONAL DIVISIONS

COMMON ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local deputised militias) / **DC**-District Centre / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised Explosive Device / **IMF**-International Military Forces / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device / **PDO**-Private Development Organisation / **ALP**-Afghan Local Police / **LDI**-Local Defence Initiative / **IEA**-Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) / **PSG**-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / **DSG**-District Shadow Governor (IEA) / **PGM** - Pro-Government Militia / **APRP** - Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program