Barelvis constituted the majority of Sunnis who migrated to Pakistan from the Indian provinces of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, following partition in 1947 (SAAG 1 July 2002). In general, they tended to be well-educated, having served in the civilian bureaucracy of the central and state governments, and thus belonged to the elite in British India (ibid.). They tended to locate in urban areas such as Karachi, spoke Urdu and did not immediately identify themselves with the native inhabitants of Pakistan (ibid.). However, according to the Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, the Barelvi movement "has been viewed as largely rural in terms of its following" and it is only in recent times that it has been "in the throes of a resurgence among urban, educated Pakistanis and Indians" (1995, 202).

In contrast, Deobandi migrants tended to come from the Indian states of Punjab and Haryana, were less affluent and spoke the same Punjabi and Seraiki languages spoken in Pakistani Punjab; thus, they had little difficulty integrating after partition (SAAG 1 July 2002).

With regard to political participation, although "[o]riginally quiescent politically, individual Deobandis, if not the school itself, began to act politically in the period before World War I" (Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World 1995, 363). In 1979 there were only 30 religious parties in Pakistan, of which seven were Deobandi and five, Barelvi (Daily Times 17 Apr. 2003). By 2003, the total number of political parties had increased to 245, of which 48 were Barelvi, while 44 were Deobandi parties (ibid.). Six of the Barelvi parties have been participating in the electoral process, of which two-the Pakistan Awami Tehrik and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)-are represented in parliament (ibid.). The same source notes that of the 14 jihadi organization following the Barelvi movement, all but two-the Lashkar-e-Islam and the Al-Barq-are inactive (ibid.).

The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World indicates that the Barelvi movement "emerged during the 1880s in the North Indian town of Bareilly, in the Rohilkhand region of the United Provinces" (1995, 200). The movement's name stems from its close association with the writings of Maulana Ahmad Riza Khan, a resident of Bareilly, whose writings-"estimated by some at one thousand"-had a "strong orientation toward the 'rational' (ma'qulat) sciences, and jurisprudence" (Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World 1995, 200-201). Barelvis "believe themselves to be the true representatives and heirs in South Asia of the earliest Muslim community, the companions and followers of the prophet Muhammad" (ibid.). They emphasized that

... a "good" Muslim accord primacy to the shari'ah (Islamic law) over tariqah (the Sufi path); and [insist] that being a "good" Muslim was contingent on personal devotion to the prophet Muhammad as a loving guide and intercessor between Allah and the individual through a chain of pirs ending in the living pir to whom each individual was bound by an oath of loyalty or bay'ah.

Barelwi ritual practice reflected this interpretation of correct belief and practice in its emphasis on activity centered on Sufi shrines, particularly the periodic observance of the death anniversaries ('urs) of the founder of the Qadiri order, Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir Jilani Baghdadi ... (ibid., 201).

The observance of death anniversaries was based on Ahmad Riza's insistence that "individual believers needed the Prophet's intercession with Allah if they hoped for Allah's forgiveness," and those who denied this intercession "on the grounds of the equality of all believers before Allah were deemed by Ahmad Riza to be guilty of arrogance" (ibid.).

The Deobandi movement was founded in 1867 as a school (madrassa or seminary) in a country town called Deoband, approximately 90 miles northeast of Delhi (ibid., 362; SSRC n.d.b). The school "was a pioneer effort to transmit the religious sciences ... by utilizing institutional forms derived from British schools" (Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World 1995, 362). It was established

... to preserve the teachings of the faith in a period of non-Muslim rule and considerable social change by holding Muslims to a standard of correct practice; central to that goal was the creation of a class of formally trained and popularly supported 'ulama' ["a body of Muslim scholars recognized as experts in Islamic sacred law and theology" (Oxford English Dictionary 2002, 1554)] (ibid.).

Its courses were in Urdu and the students were housed in dormitories, which they shared with other fellow classmates (ibid.).

Throughout the school's six-year program, hadith and the Hanafi legal tradition were emphasized "to scrutinize customary practices and to enjoin correct observance of ritual and life-cycle events" (ibid.). According to the Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, Deobandis opposed annual death anniversary celebrations at the graves of saints, food offerings for the dead that are distributed after reciting the Fatihah Chapter of the Quran, and elaborate ceremonies associated with birth, marriage, and death (ibid.). The Deobandis "provided an alternative to an intercessory religion focused on the Sufi shrines and elaborate customary celebrations" (ibid.).

Information on the Website of the India-based South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG), which contains articles that have been "provided by scholars with many years of experience in political and strategic analsysis" (SAAG n.d.), described the Barelvi movement as the "more tolerant" of the major schools of Sunni Islam found in Pakistan, when compared to the Deobandi school, which it described as "intolerant" and closely affiliated with the Saudi Arabia-based Wahabi movement (1 July 2002). Similarly, the Website of the New York-based Social Science Research Council, which is an independent, non-governmental, not-for-profit international organization established in 1923 that "supports research, education and scholarly exchange" (n.d.a), indicates that Barelvis are "more open to many customary practices" (n.d.b). The International Crisis Group (ICG) describes Barelvis as "more inclusive," in that contrary to the "puritan" Deobandis, they "follow the traditional culture of saints and Sufis" (20 Mar. 2003).

The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World indicates that the conflict between Barelvis and "other Sunni Muslim reform movements," particularly the Deobandi movement, "was primarily the Barelwi vision of the prophet Muhammad's attributes" (1995, 201). Barelvis believe, as did Ahmad Riza, that Muhammad was able to "see into the future, ... have knowledge of the unseen, ...be spiritually ... present in many places simultaneously, and ... be invested with Allah's preeminent light" (Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World 1995, 201). To deny, as Deobandis do, that Muhammad had any of these attributes was, according to Ahmad Riza, a "denial of some of the 'fundamentals of faith'" and "tantamount to apostasy from Islam" (ibid., 201-202).

The ICG, however, recently reported that

The fundamental theological issue that divides the two Sunni sects is the role of the Prophet and the status of hereditary saints. The Deobandis tend to demystify these roles, whereas the Barelvis regard saints as intermediaries to communicate with the Prophet and seek divine salvation. ... Each sect has its distinct mannerisms in saying prayers and other rituals and disputes over mosque administrations are common (20 Mar. 2003).

The Relationship Between Followers of the Barelvi and Deobandi Movements

Barelvis and Deobandis "hate each other" (Oil Daily 1 Oct. 2001). The two groups have "fought each other for years [and in 2001], their theological quarrel ... turned violent" (New Statesman 24 Sept. 2001).

One cause of this violence between Barelvis and Deobandis is the struggle for control of mosques, and thus control over the collection of related monetary donations (Newsline June 2001; The News International 21 June 2003). In June 2003, The News International reported that at least 29 mosques in Karachi had been declared disputed and were under police surveillance; followers of the Deobandi and Barelvi schools were reportedly responsible for the majority of these disputes (ibid.).

The conflict between Barelvis and Deobandis has also spilled over into the religious seminaries (madrassas, madaris), which reportedly have "spawned rival terrorist forces" (SAAG 17 Jan. 2003). In this regard, "[m]ost sectarian bombings and shootouts originate from or occur at mosques housing these schools, and a significant proportion of those killed are madrassa students" (ibid.). In 2001, Agence France Presse (AFP) reported that most of the madrassas in Pakistan belonged to the Deobandis, while "thousands" of other schools were being run by Barelvis (23 Sept. 2001). Citing a report compiled by the Sindh police department, Dawn reported in January 2003 that there are 687 madrassas belonging to the Deobandi stream and 487 belonging to the Barelvi stream in the province of Sindh alone (16 Jan. 2003). AFP, however, added that according to one Islamic political party head, "[n]one of the Pakistani madrassas provide weapons training or produce fighters" (23 Sept. 2001).

The Sunni Tehrik

The Sunni Tehrik (ST), comprised of Barelvis, was "formed in the early 1990s to counter the growing Wahabi influence on Islam in Pakistan" (SAAG 18 Jan. 2002). According to a report by the Emergency and Security Service of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the ST is "a radical expression of the Barelvi school ... whose mainstream political expression is the Jami'at-I Ulama Pakistan (JUP), headed by Mawlana Noorani" (Jan. 2002, Sec. 3.2.2). The report adds that

The ST is mainly fighting against the SSP [Sipah-e-Sahaba], in a symmetric game where the two official political expressions (JUI and JUP) of the two competing religious schools of thought compete in elections, while their two armed branches fight against each other in the streets. The Sunni Tehrik has a militant student branch, Anjuman-I Tolaba-I Islam (Society of the Religious Students of Islam) (UNHCR Jan. 2002, Sec. 3.2.2)

For information on the Sipah-e-Sahaba, please refer to PAK41794.E of 7 August 2003.

Treatment of Barelvis, Particularly Sunni Tehrik Members

In October 2000, an ST activist was killed when the police opened fire at an "angry mob" that had attacked the Baghdad and Kalri police stations in Karachi (The Nation 25 Oct. 2000). This incident was followed by protests staged by ST activists against authorities for the delay in arresting those responsible for the victim's death (ibid.).

On 18 May 2001, Maulana Saleem Qadri, chairman of the ST, was shot and killed (BBC 18 May 2001; Newsline June 2001). This led to a breakdown in law and order throughout Karachi for several days (ibid.; AP 20 May 2001), which resulted in the arrest and/or detention of anywhere from 330 to 3,000 ST activists and workers (The News 29 May 2001). In response, the ST announced a "'protest curfew'" (ibid.). On 11 April 2003, Mohammad Faisal Pehlwan, a worker of the SSP, was found guilty of murdering Qadri and was sentenced to death by an anti-terrorism court in Karachi (BBC 11 Apr. 2003; Dawn 12 Apr. 2003).

Additional information and reports of specific incidents of ill-treatment towards Barelvis in general, and ST members in particular, could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within time constraints.

With regard to the state and its treatment of the ST, the SAAG reported the following:

While banning the strongly Deobandi SSP, Musharraf has refrained from banning the strongly Barelvi Sunni Tehreek and the Tanzeem. ... By sparing the Barelvi organisations, Musharraf has sought to ensure that the majority Barelvis would not create trouble for him (18 Jan. 2002).

However, in a report written six months later, the same author indicated that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) "was afraid of a direct confrontation with the Barelvi organisations [and so] started inciting the SSP and the LJ [Lashkar-e-Jhangvi] to counter their activities" (SAAG 1 July 2002).

The Memon Tribe

Memons are a nomadic tribe without land, a country, king, crown, flag, anthem or leader (Memon.com n.d.). There are several versions of the origins and history of the Memons (please see attached versions from Memon.com), but according to the United Memon Jamat of Pakistan (UMJ), a society "established with an aim to work for educational, social and cultural uplift of the Memon community as well as other communities" (UMJ n.d.a), there is a general consensus amongst most historians that the ancestral origins of the Memon community stem from the Sindh (ibid., n.d.b). The UMJ adds that

Due to various events and circumstances, a large number of Memon families migrated from Sindh to Katch and Katiawar. As time passed, and because the Memon settlers were exposed to different cultures, traditions and customs, the outcome resulted in the division of the Community into three branches, namely Sindhi Memon, Katchi Memon and Halai (Kathiawar) Memon, who can easily be identified by their culture and geographical area. After independence of Pakistan, a huge number of Katchi and Halai Memons came to Pakistan but retained their geographical and cultural impact cast upon them in their old geographical surroundings (ibid.).

For information on the residential concentration of the Memon population in Pakistan, please refer to the attached chart from Newspk.com.

Corroborating information on the Memon tribe could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.

State Protection Available to Barelvis of the Memon Tribe

References to Barelvis of the Memon tribe as well as information on state protection available to Barelvis, in general, could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.

However, five brothers of the Memon community were gunned down and killed in Karachi in August 2003 (Dawn 13 Aug. 2003; Pakistan Today 15 Aug. 2003). That month, the All-Pakistan Memon Federation (APMF) "threatened to close all their businesses throughout the country, if the killers [were] not arrested forthwith" and "expressed dissatisfaction over the performance of the police and the Sindh government in maintaining law and order" (ibid.; see also Dawn 13 Aug. 2003). Information indicating whether those responsible were eventually arrested could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.

The attached December 2002 article from The Nation discusses a recent trend of Memon youth taking up arms in the name of jihad.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please find below the list of additional sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

References

Agence France Presse (AFP). 23 September 2001. Mazhar Abbas. "Madrassas: Islamic Schools Producing Holy Warriors." (Dialog)

Associated Press (AP). 20 May 2001. "The World: Pakistan Riots Go On; Muslim Leader Buried; Violence: Slaying is Blamed on Rival Sunni Group that Disagreed with Peaceful Tactics." (Los Angeles Times/NEXIS)

BBC. 11 April 2003. "Death Sentence for Karachi Killing." http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2939349.stm [Accessed 11 Sept. 2003]

_____. 18 May 2001. Zafar Abbas. "Pakistani Sunni Leader Killed." http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1338171.stm [Accessed 11 Sept. 2003]

Daily Times [Lahore]. 17 April 2003. Amir Rana. "245 Religious Parties in Pakistan." http://www.dailytimes.compk/default.asp?page=story_17-4-2003_pg7_24 [Accessed 26 Aug. 2003]

Dawn [Karachi]. 13 August 2003. "Karachi: Memon Community Slams Police Inaction: Killing of Five Brothers." http://www.dawn.com/2003/08/13/local1.htm [Accessed 11 Sept. 2003]

_____. 12 April 2003. Tahir Siddiqui. "SPP Activist Gets Death in Qadri Murder Case." http://www.dawn.com [Accessed 15 Apr. 2003]

_____. 16 January 2003. "Karachi: 11,000 Foreigners in Sindh Madaris." http://www.dawn.com/2003/01/16/local4.htm [Accessed 26 Aug. 2003]

International Crisis Group (IGC). 20 March 2003. "Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military." http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/asia/afghanistan_southasia/reports/A400925_20032003.pdf [Accessed 11 Sept. 2003]

Memon.com. n.d. "Version 1." http://www.memoncom/HTML/History/HistoryVer1.htm [Accessed 11 Sept. 2003]

The Nation [Lahore]. 25 October 2000. "Karachi Tense as Activist of Sectarian Group Killed in Firing." (FBIS-NES-2000-1025 30 Oct. 2000/Dialog)

The News [Islamabad, Internet version]. 29 May 2001. "Pakistan: Complete Shut Down in Karachi to Protest Sectarian Leader's Murder." (FBIS-NES-2001-0529 30 May 2001/Dialog)

The News International. 21 June 2003. A.H. Khanzada. "29 Mosques Declared Disputed, Few Kept Under Surveillance." http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jun2003-daily/21-06-2003/metro/k9.htm [Accessed 26 Aug. 2003]

Newsline. June 2001. Massoud Ansari. "The War Within?" http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewslineJune/coverstory4.htm [Accessed 26 Aug. 2003]

New Statesman. 24 September 2001. Vol. 14, No. 675. Ziauddin Sardar. "A Choice Between Satan and Madmen." (Dialog)

Oil Daily. 1 October 2001. Vol. 51, No. 189. "Prospect of Targeted Terrorist War Pushes Oil Prices." (Dialog)

Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World. 1995. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Oxford English Dictionary. 2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pakistan Today. 15 August 2003. "Slaying of Five Brothers." (Google cache). http://www.paktoday.com/slaying.htm [Accessed 11 Sept. 2003]

Social Science Research Council (SSRC). n.d.a. "Welcome." http://www.ssrc.org/ [Accessed 15 Sept. 2003]

_____. n.d.b. Barbara D. Metcalf. "'Traditionalist' Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs." http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/metcalf_text_only.htm [Accessed 11 Sept. 2003]

South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG). n.d. "Aim." http://www.saag.org/aim.html [Accessed 15 Sept. 2003]

_____. 17 January 2003. No. 585. "The J&K 'Peace Process': Chasing the Chimera." http://www.saag.org/papers6/paper585.html [Accessed 26 Aug. 2003]

_____. 1 July 2002. No. 484. B. Raman. "Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Bin Laden & Ramzi Yousef." http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper484.html [Accessed 26 Aug. 2003]

_____. 18 January 2002. No. 395. B. Raman. "Musharraf's Ban: An Analysis." http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper395.html [Accessed 26 Aug. 2003]

United Memon Jamat of Pakistan (UMJ). n.d.a. "About Us." http://www.umj.com.pk/ [Accessed 11 Sept. 2003]

_____. n.d.b. "History of Memons." http://www.umj.com.pk.history.htm [Accessed 11 Sept. 2003]

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). January 2002. No. 06/2001. Emergency and Security Service. Olivier Roy. "Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan." http://www.unhcr.ch/ [Accessed 11 Sept. 2003]

Attachments

Memon.com. n.d. "Version 1." http://www.memoncom/HTML/History/HistoryVer1.htm [Accessed 11 Sept. 2003]

_____. n.d. "Version 2." http://www.memoncom/HTML/History/HistoryVer2.htm [Accessed 11 Sept. 2003]

_____. n.d. "Version 3." http://www.memoncom/HTML/History/HistoryVer3.htm [Accessed 11 Sept. 2003]

The Nation [Lahore, Internet version]. 24 December 2002. "Pakistan: Report Traces Causes of Terrorism Taking Roots in Karachi Community." (FBIS-NES-2002-1224 26 Dec. 2002/Dialog)

Newspk.com. 2003. "Census Figures of Memon Population in Pakistan." http://www.newspk.com/pressdetails_census_fig_pakistan.php [Accessed 11 Sept. 2003]

Additional Sources Consulted

Encyclopedia Britannica

Ethnic Groups Worldwide

Nations Without States

World Directory of Minorities

Internet sites, including:

Akhbar-e-memon [in Urdu] (non-operational)

Amnesty International

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2002

European Country of Origin Information Network

Federation of American Scientists

Human Rights Watch

Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Official Website

Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)

Middle East Times

United Kingdom, Immigration and Nationality Directorate

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