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# THE ANSO REPORT

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## YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Kabul Conference sets the stage for the exit
- Intra-AOG conflict escalates
- Risk of NGO abduction now severe
- Election violence rising
- Local militias attract instability

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## COUNTRY SUMMARY

In CENTRAL region the Kabul Conference dominated the period with delegates articulating a rather fanciful narrative of growth, stability and rights that seemed at odds with the reality of severe and deteriorating war. The conference likely marked the beginning of the end, in terms of foreign political and military commitment to Afghanistan, in that it laid the narrative tracks for the exit and transferred, albeit in word only at this stage, responsibility for all successes and failures on to the Afghan Government. The declaration of the 2014 deadline for 'full security transition' became the central outcome of the event and led to a slew of commentary on whether this is feasible or not. We feel these largely missed the point as the 'end date' is not as relevant to the conflict as the '**peak date**' after which IMF will have an ever decreasing capacity to influence the course of events. Whatever has not be achieved by then is unlikely to be and so it is from this baseline, not the final exit date, that the contours of the new conflicts will be drawn. The peak still looks set to occur in 2011. Readers would do well to remember that the +80,000

IMF present from 06-09 proved incapable of preventing massive AOG expansion during that period.

Elsewhere in CENTRAL former AOG allies the Islamic Emirate (Taliban) and Hezb-i-Islami (HiG) initiated a major clash in NIRKH, WARDAK reportedly as a result of IEA efforts to disarm the latter after accusations of intent to reconcile with the Government. This event has deep similarities to the March/April intra-AOG conflict that sparked the current round of instability in BAGHLAN and provides a useful portent of the impending character of the conflict which over time will become less dominated by the IMF vs AOG paradigm and instead see smaller, local battles between Afghan parties only.

Elections related violence was prominent with Parliamentary candidates abducted in HERAT and GHAZNI and one targeted with an IED in KANDAHAR. An ex-Parliament member's convoy was ambushed in SUROBI (KABUL) while seven civilians on a pick-nick in PARWN were murdered

for the mistaken belief that they were involved in Parliamentary campaigning. ANSO assesses that it will be intra-candidate violence that will mark this election rather than any AOG effort to disrupt it.

Abduction dominated the NGO threat profile this period with an unprecedented eleven persons taken since July 1st (many were late reported). The abductions occurred in as diverse settings as FARYAB, WARDAK, BAGHLAN & HERAT and yet all were resolved in the same way via local community intervention predicated on the NGOs impartiality and acceptance. To date all but two (the latest) have been released unharmed.

AOG capability expanded in PARWAN, KAPISA, JAWZJAN, FARYAB & NURISTAN while it was challenged by IMF in BAGHLAN and HELMAND and by flooding in KHOST.

Local militias were targeted in KUNDUZ and TAKHAR while IMF and AOG both cause civilian casualties in the south.


## PARWAN

NGOs should keep an eye on continuing contextual changes in Parwan. As noted previously, the province appears to be experiencing an increased AOG presence, likely initially spurred by AOG migration from Baghlan. With this, the new presence of AOG throughout the province, paired with a low ANSF presence, could easily result in abductions or detentions of NGO staff for NGOs which do not have acceptance in the areas they are travelling or working in. Additionally, erroneous targeting of NGOs as they

	NGO Incidents
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transit through the province from Kabul to Bamyan should be accounted for.

In an example of the last concern, AOG ambushed three vehicles—a Surf, Saracha, and pickup truck—as they were proceeding in Siagerd District on the Kabul-Bamyan Road towards Bamyan, apparently because they believed the vehicles were associated with campaigning for the upcoming parliamentary election. In actuality, the vehicles contained a family that was travelling for leisure in Bamyan. In sum, the ambush resulted in 7 family members killed and an additional 5 injured. Additionally, it marked the first incident in the district since May 2008. Also west of Chaharikar, AOG abducted a local shura member in Shinwari



District on the 25<sup>th</sup> and a Director of the District Lower Court in Ghorband District on the 26<sup>th</sup>.

NGOs which transit through the province should also note continual AOG activity in Baghram. Specifically, the district witnessed the arrest of suspected AOG and a significant find of bomb making materials and military uniforms on the 16<sup>th</sup> in Qala-e Now. Two days later an SVBIED targeted an IMF convoy in Ma Qalandar Khel. On the 25<sup>th</sup>, Qalandar Khel also was the scene for an AOG ambush on an IMF road patrol.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Ghorband Valley
- ACG activity in Chaharikar


## LOGAR

Logar became the focus of international attention on 22 July when AOG attacked an IMF armoured vehicle in Charkh District. While details are sparse, AOG killed one IMF in the apparent attack and abducted the other. Following the incident, IMF mobilised throughout the area to locate the service members, purportedly locating

	NGO Incidents
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one of the victim's corpses in Qalai Sayddan, Charkh, on the 26<sup>th</sup>. NGOs experienced misfortune during the aftermath, though, with one NGO guard being killed in an IMF operation in Dasht-e Dobar on the 27<sup>th</sup>.

Besides the above incident, AOG activity was noted throughout the province as usual. Looking at IED activity, specifically, it was somewhat limited: IED strikes were recorded in Pul-e Alam, Muham-



mad Agha, Barak-e Barak, and Charkh; and IED discoveries occurred solely in Pul-e Alam. Of note, AOG attacked a road construction site and abducted three staff on the 23<sup>rd</sup> near the Charkh District Centre.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs, especially targeting IMF
- Abduction

**NOTICE:** Your input is important for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area.

So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

## KAPISA

Tagab, Nijrab remain the primary areas of concern in Kapisa. AOG reportedly have substantial freedom of movement night in these districts. The Tagab District have the highest incident frequency. However, Alasay is reported to be unstable, with the lack of incidents reflective of a limited security presence rather than a dearth of AOG.


On 20 July in Tagab District,

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG expansion
- Low intensity factional disputes in Kohistan I & II
- AOG in Alasay, Nijrab, & Tagab

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
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AOG attacked an ANA/ANP joint patrol in the area. Two ANA soldiers and four civilians were reportedly injured during the attack. And, on 24 July Mahmud Raqi District, AOG ambushed an IMF patrol in the area. IMF responded to the attack, and the AOG withdrew from the area following a brief firefight. Furthermore on 26 July Alasay District, AOG attacked an IMF convoy on a road in the area. The IMF responded to the attack. As a result of the attack, two IMF soldiers were injured. AOG incident levels have been increased so far this month, but it is difficult to know if the incident decrease is from military operations. Likely, it is



not. Last year, AOG incidents in Kapisa dropped on drastically in July. This year they remained high in July so the recent decline may very well be attributable to a later than normal slowdown. Kapisa should still be considered an AOG shelter which serves a risky environment situation for NGOs.

The overwhelming number of incidents in Kapisa have been attacks on security forces.

## KABUL

All were quite surprised that the Kabul Conference did not result in a grandiose attack in Kabul City, as is the usual case surrounding high-profile events. The presence of some regionally important figures likely contributed to the lack of activity on the day.


There was some activity in the lead up to the conference however with the BBIED on the 18th in District 9, Kabul City targeting an IMF convoy but killing 2 and wounding 20 civilians. On the night of the 19th up to five

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Criminality in the morning
- Attention-grabbing AOG attacks targeting GoA, IMF, IOs, and comingled targets

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

107mm rockets were fired towards Kabul Airport with two of three reported to be landing inside the perimeter but causing no significant damage. Earlier that same day ANSF interdicted what they believed was a suicide attack cell in District 8 of Kabul. One of the cell, allegedly a female, detonated a vest during the raid killing only herself. Outside of these incidents, activity stuck to norms. Surobi experienced typical activity; for example, AOG attacked an IMF supply convoy, ANP check post, and a vehicle belonging to an ex-Member of Parliament on 22, 20, and 23 July, respectively. ANSF were also active in Surobi, arresting suspected AOG commanders who possessed ANA



uniforms on the 18th and another suspected AOG commander on the 25th.

AOG activity in Musayi District was also noted during the period, with IMF raids on suspected AOG houses occurring on two occasions, as well as an AOG attack on ANP and an IED discovery in the Katsang area.

The death of 3 Afghan civilians in a vehicle accident, with what was reported as a US Embassy convoy, became the scene for clashes as local witnesses set fire to the US vehicle and shouted anti-US, anti-Karzi slogans. ANP fired warning shots to disperse the crowds


## WARDAK

NGOs are cautioned about the security vacuum that exists in the province and intra-AOG clashes that have begun to occur in Nirkh. With this, a late-recorded NGO abduction—7 June—occurred in Shashgow, Saydabad. Apparent AOG stopped three NGO national staff as they were transiting through the area and detained the staff members for circa five days, during which they questioned them on where the staff members resided, their positions in the NGO, purpose of travel, and involvement in girls’ education. Although the AOG agreed to release the staff, they did not return the NGO’s vehicle,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

and it appears that the AOG solely targeted the NGO to steal one of its vehicles.

Intra-AOG clashes occurred between Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) and Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) fighters in Nirkh District on at least 19, 20, and 25 July, leading to an estimated 32 AOG fatalities (the Taliban bore the overwhelming majority of fatalities). Following the clashes, which appear to have stemmed from one Taliban member being killed in the past couple of weeks, elders intervened to try to bring about peace; however, as of yet Taliban have refused their mediation and insisted that all armed parties in the district disarm and submit to the Taliban. Reports also assert that more than 200 Taliban fighters have moved into the district following the clashes with the intent to target HIG leaders and fighters, and



Taliban have been observed digging fighting positions and emplacing heavy machine guns. Looking at probable outcomes, it is highly unlikely that HIG members would disarm due to their strength in the district—Nirkh, bordering with the apparent HIG stronghold of Chahar Asyab District.. Further migration of Taliban should be expected due to the small numbers of fighters in the district, especially because of heavy Taliban casualties as of yet. Due to HIG’s massive, native presence in the area, clashes could result in civilian casualties or, more likely, cause further clashes to result in other surrounding districts or provinces where HIG exist as a minority.

The very existence of intra-AOG conflict speaks volumes about the lack of relevance of IMF in the province.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG prevalence in Saydabad
- Abduction
- IEDs and ambushes targeting IMF/ANSF logistics convoys along Highway 1

## JAWZJAN

The low-lying AOG presence rumored in southern Jawzjan Province over the past several months suddenly came to light this period, as AOG attacks on IMF/ANSF skyrocketed. Four IED strikes against ANSF and IMF vehicles occurred in Darzab and Qush Tepa, in total killing three ANA and injuring one other. The threat of abduction for GOA and ANSF employees is also present in the

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

two districts, where the son of an ANP member and five GOA employees were abducted on two separate occasions. While the son of the ANP was released, the fate of the GOA staff is not yet known. The sudden increase in AOG activity should not come as a surprise, given that the week long IMF/ANSF operation in late March only marginally increased the ANSF presence in the area. The AOGs -- now apparently better equipped and trained -- have chosen to re-launch operations following a period of tense

quiet over the past four months. The resurgence of activity has occurred despite the promise made by GOA and foreign government donors in late April that the area that had been “cleared” of AOGs, encouraging NGOs to enter the area. In the provincial capital, political tensions were palpable following a public disagreement among high-ranking GOA officials. While additional ANSF have been deployed to protect certain GOA facilities in the wake of the dispute, actual physical confrontation between the two parties has only been rumored. Despite concerns that this conflict of personalities could turn into outward factional violence, the dispute will hopefully be resolved through diplomatic means.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Heavy fighting Darzab Qush Tepa
- Political tension Shiberghan

## KUNDUZ

A sustained level of kinetic activity was reported in Kunduz Province, comparable to last month's incident rate. The perception of insecurity has increased, however, as AOGs appear intent on displaying their perseverance in the face of an IMF/ANSF joint operation in north of Kunduz District. At least two rockets were launched considerably deeper into the city than previous rockets which typically struck the western outskirts. The rockets did not detonate, however, and may therefore be interpreted as threatening messages of AOG capability, rather than intent. Late in the reporting period, a BBIED detonated in Spinzar Football Field, killing a pro-government militia commander, an ANP officer and one of his body guards, as well as injuring 24 civilians including six children. BBIEDs are extremely

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

rare, given that AOGs require an elevated level of planning, secrecy and access to resources which they will not willingly expend on casual targets. The attack will likely have an impact on security in the militia commanders area of responsibility. Though fears have been heightened regarding a second complex attack on a private organization, no credible evidence has been received that there is actually a higher threat of suicide attacks targeting civilian institutions within the city. Much like in the aftermath of the Bakhtar guesthouse attack in Kabul, though, more credibility is lent to such threat warnings as people are more attuned to AOG capability and intent. ANSO assesses that the Private Development Organization was targeted because of its affiliation with the IMF counterinsurgency strategy. Yet IMF's confusion between PDOs and NGOs has prompted IMF to push for closer relations with the NGO community in the wake of the



attack, posing a greater challenge to NGOs who are intent on maintaining their neutrality.

IED-related incidents were reported in all but two districts, two of which occurred in atypical areas – an RCIED which detonated against an ANP vehicle in Aliabad on the main road, and an IED which injured six ANP in western Imam Sahib. IEDs also inflicted damages on IMF both east and west of the Chahar Dara Bridge. In Khanabad, a rare daytime incident of armed roadside abduction and killing underscored the continued threat of criminal attacks. Underpaid pro-government militias in the area are known to supplement their livelihoods with criminal activity, particularly along the Khanabad-Kunduz highway. In Aliabad District armed clashes continue where AOGs from southern Chahar Dara and the Kandahari belt are confronting ANP and their IMF mentors.

### KEY THREATS


- IMF Ops in North
- Indirect fire (rockets) in city

## BADAKSHAN

A second IED was discovered in Feyzabad New City this period, similar to that which was discovered last period in front of an INGO compound. The device was made up of TNT contained in a plastic bag, but not rigged to detonate. The previous device is

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

suspected to have been intended to threaten its victim into paying for local security guards, and the second device may have had the same purpose. The threat of IEDs in Kishim District is slightly more real, however, where two RCIEDs were discovered and defused.



### KEY THREATS

- IED in Faizabad & Kishim

## BALKH


The operation ongoing in Chahar Bolak and Chimtal Districts continues, as IMF and ANP have established an outpost and a checkpoint in the vicinity of Ali Zai Village, where AOGs were believed to be based. They have since moved northwards toward the main highway, conducting search operations in the Zig Zig Area. The results of the operation

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Operations in Chahar Bolak/Chimtal
- AOG east of Sholgara river
- Abduction in Kishindeh

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
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are so far are far from clear. Despite a temporary downturn in roadside incidents, the threat of abduction and armed attack against parties to the conflict continued this period on the Mazar-Shibirgan Road. An AOG checkpoint was established one evening this period, prompting an ANP response. More significantly, however, a PSC convoy of three white Hiluxes was shot down near the border between Balkh and Chahar Bolak, resulting in the death of one PSC employee and the injury of two others. While the attack was believed to have been targeted, the incident underscores the increased risk of attack against white high-profile vehicles on that



road.

Further northeast, in Balkh District, reports of an increase in openly armed men in certain areas have driven NGOs to proactively work with communities to ensure security for their projects. Much like the majority of the northern region, NGOs have been able to continue their work in areas which may be hostile towards IMF, ANSF and GOA.

## SAMANGAN


Four road construction company workers were abducted in western Dara-e Suf Payan this period, and were released after an ANP operation resulted in the death of one ANP and the injury of one other. The abduction took place in Balkal Village between Sorkha and Zeraki villages where a group of approximately 40 armed men were seen roaming the area and intimidating locals against supporting the GOA about one month ago.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction of road workers
- AOG presence

	NGO Incidents
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Local authorities believe the group may have infiltrated from neighboring Kishindeh and Sholgara districts of Balkh Province, while other theories suggest the group originated in Baghlan. While local authorities encouraged NGOs to leave the district shortly after the appearance of these armed men in late June, it is still not yet clear if the group in fact poses a threat to NGOs themselves. The security situation in Samangan Province has proven in the past to be particularly vulnerable to political manipulation, as certain figures may attempt to exacerbate the perception of insecurity for their own political




gains, particularly ahead of elections. There is apparently a genuine AOG presence in the district; however, their origins, motives and attitude toward NGOs has yet to be determined. NGOs have been able to work in much more volatile districts, where they have gained a guarantee of security from the community itself. NGOs may be able to continue operations in the district according to their own thresholds of risk and localized understanding of the security situation.

## FARYAB

Conflict dynamics in Faryab have challenged NGOs throughout the province to reassert their positions as neutral actors in the face of increasing political and military tension. A new threat of NGO abduction emerged north and east of Maymana from Kwaja Sabz Push toward Dawlatabad, east of the ring road. This threat revealed itself when Uzbek AOGs abducted a group of local NGO staff in Dawlatabad District and held them for several days before releasing them unharmed. The NGO enjoys a high degree of local acceptance in the area; however, based on the details of their abduction it may be speculated that a newly emerging AOG leadership, eager to establish themselves, was simply misguided in their choice of target. The abductors reportedly questioned the staff members whether they had been spreading Christianity, a stigma against NGOs which was recently popularized in the northern region by a journalistic expose. It quickly came to light that the NGO had no interest in proselytizing, and, due to the involvement of community elders, that they were supported by the local population. Upon their release, the abductors stated that

	NGO Incidents
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they had no intention of harming medical staff, as it was against their AOG policy. The incident highlights the risks presented to NGOs, in spite of their local acceptance, when political dynamics shift in their areas of operation. It is suspected that local Uzbek AOGs may be joining ranks with those Pashtun AOGs who have traditionally dominated pockets in the west of the province, forming an alliance which may currently span all but a few of the districts in Faryab. These emerging AOG leaders are eager to assert their authority and undermine that of the GOA, putting NGOs at increased risk. However, this risk is likely temporary until the NGOs in question are able to prove their political neutrality and local acceptance to the AOGs. In the run up to the elections in particular, NGOs may face an added risk of being targeted for political reasons. At least twice in the northern region in the past month, GOA officials have offered to become involved in NGO abduction cases, using their influence to increase pressure on AOGs. This added pressure is sure to complicate negotiation processes and put NGO workers at increased risk.



By proactively advocating for a “soft solution” involving negotiations led by village elders, as opposed to a “hard” solution involving GOA interference or the use of force, NGOs are able to maintain their neutrality and ensure continued access to their areas of operation.

Near daily reports of armed confrontation in Qaysar District has increased the threat of collateral involvement for NGOs who continue to successfully implement development projects, despite the AOG threat to GOA and military actors. In addition, NGOs are faced with the added challenge of asserting their neutrality to avoid becoming targets of AOG attack. As IMF and ANSF continue heavy-handed “kill and capture” operations, the threat of NGO abduction may be increased in this region as well, as NGOs are seen as potential collateral for prisoner exchange. To mitigate against this risk, it is integral for NGOs to ensure a maximum degree of community involvement in project implementation, as beneficiaries understand that projects will only continue if NGO security is guaranteed.

## SAR-E-PUL

The overall security situation in Sar-e Pul remained unchanged this week, with little kinetic activity reported aside from a prolonged clash between ACGs and ANP in Balkhab District, which led to the injury of three ACGs and the arrest of five others. Despite the lack of outward AOG

	NGO Incidents
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activity, GOA assess that several areas in Sar-e Pul Province are host to AOG influence, particularly Sayyad District. Sayyad District is suspected to house a significant number of AOGs who are also active in the neighboring districts in the tri-provincial area

(Jawzjan, Sar-e Pul and Faryab). On at least one occasion this reporting period, AOGs established a checkpoint in the evening hours along the Sar-e Pul-Shibirgan Highway, searching for GOA and ANSF employees. AOGs also attacked the home of a former AOG commander in Jerghan Area of Kohistanat, confirming a continued presence of AOGs in Kohistanat District, particularly in Jerghan


## TAKHAR

AOGs launched the first ANSO-recorded attack on the Khwaja Ghar DAC, epitomizing the rapid decrease in security in the district in the past four months. Six attacks on ANBP and pro-government militias have occurred in Khwaja Ghar since April 2010, up from zero recorded in the past four years. The first IED incident in the district was also reported this period, where two RCIEDs were discovered and defused on the road to the ANP Headquarters. Meanwhile in Darqad District, AOGs continued their campaign against ANP and pro-government militias. AOG attacks in both Darqad and

	NGO Incidents
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Khwaja Ghar have also become more prolonged, suggesting an increase in the number and preparedness of AOGs in northern Takhar.

In the centre of the province two IED incidents were reported, one which was discovered and removed near Pul-e Bangi on the Taloqan-Kunduz Road, and one which detonated on the road leading to the Taloqan Airport, injuring four civilians. While IEDs on the Taloqan-Kunduz Road were reported frequently last summer, thus far this year such incidents have been rare. The latter incident, however, perhaps belies a



new development, as it is the first such attack on the airport road. According to reports, the civilians injured were not likely targeted in a criminal attack, and the device therefore may have been intended for the incoming IMF troops which have increased their presence in the provincial capital over the past few months.

## BAGHLAN


The first major attack within Dahan-e Ghorri District since mid-May occurred on 20 June when AOGs attacked the ANP Headquarters in Dahan-e Ghorri District Centre from multiple directions with SAF and RPGs. Outward AOG attacks in Dahan-e Ghorri have been infrequent since an ANSF operation concluded on 17 May. The week-long operation succeeded in killing and capturing a number of AOG leaders; however, no considerable sustained ANSF presence was established in the area to deter a reconsolidation of AOG efforts. This attack may signify a re-emergence of outward AOG activity in the district, and further clashes or future military operations may be expected in response.

Later in the reporting period, a major operation was launched as ANSF/IMF attempt to reign in the areas of Pul-e Khumri which

	NGO Incidents
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had been essentially left to AOG control. Additional troop presence in Shahabuddin Triangle and Dand-e Ghorri may temporarily curb AOG attacks and presence on the main roads; however, as seen in the past levels of security will revert once troops have been withdrawn.

The threat of abduction and attacks on ANSF/IMF-affiliated targets continue to impede transit through the province. Three NGO-direct incidents were reported this period, two abductions and an illegal checkpoint on the main roads running through Pul-e Khumri. The risk of NGO abduction persists on both highways running through the province, as AOGs may be seeking ransom or collateral for a prisoner exchange. Early this month on the Pul-e Khumri-Kunduz Highway in Baghlani Jadid, armed men am-



bushed an unmarked INGO vehicle and abducted two staff members. Despite being self-proclaimed “Taliban,” the abductors demanded a ransom in exchange for the release of the staff. Twice on the Mazar-Pul-e Khumri Road NGO vehicles were stopped in Cheshmashir Area by armed men reportedly searching for “GOA, ANSF or NGOs.” While two NGO staff were abducted from this area, the circumstances of their capture and release suggested that they may have been mistaken for other high-profile passengers. The threat of armed attack against IMF/ANSF also persists on the main road west of Pul-e Khumri City, en route to Mazar, where three separate attacks took place on the road, two of which occurred between 1000 and 1300 hours.

## BADGHIS

The north-eastern districts – Murghab, Ghormach and Muqur – remain the major concern in regard to the security situation in Badghis Province. AOG activities as well as ANSF/IMF operations continue to focus on these districts. In regard to AOG activity, the current reporting cycle saw the same number of direct attacks as IED related incidents (including discoveries and premature detonations). In Murghab, AOGs clashed on 17 July due to an internal dispute in relation to the collection of illegal taxes, indicating an incoherence of interests


### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG-ANSF/IMF clashes
- IEDs in Murghab, Muqur, Ghormach and Qadis
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

even in AOG strongholds which again has a negative impact on the predictability of AOG actions and reactions. In Murghab District, both recorded IED detonations during this reporting cycle hit civilians. On 16 July in Senyha Area as well as on 25 July in Akazaiha Area, civilians on motorbikes were wounded by IED detonations.

Unusual was an IED detonation in Qala-I-Naw City, which detonated against the vehicle of the Deputy Governor. In March, NDS already seized explosive devices, which was unusual for the area as well. An increase of IED related incidents would fit into the broader picture of an increasing use of IEDs throughout the Western Region as well as a shifting AOG presence in Badghis due to IMF/ANSF operations in north-



eastern parts of the province. In addition, Qala-I-Naw District witnessed an AOG SAF attack against an ANP patrol in Laman – Sabzak Pass Area. Therefore, a further increase in AOG activity in Qala-I-Naw is not unlikely. AOG activity was also noticeable in Jawand District and again Ab Kamari District. In Jawand, an IED detonated prematurely on the main road to the DAC on 18 July, wounding an AOG member. In Ab Kamari, AOG also attacked an ANP check-post with SAF and RPGs on 23 July in Chelgazi Area, forcing ANP to withdraw.

## FARAH


A complex attack was launched in the early morning hours on 18 July in Farah City. AOG attacked four ANP check-points between 0000-0200 hrs with RPGs and SAF and the main target, the prison in Farah, between 0215-0230 hrs. After an explosion at the front gate, more than 20 prisoners escaped. Reportedly, at least half of them were killed, wounded or recaptured during the search operation afterwards.

In addition, Farah City has seen a visible increase in IED related incidents during the present reporting period. Of note, three IED incidents were recorded in a timeframe of approximately 10 hours. On 21 July at 1700 hrs, an

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

IED attached to a bicycle detonated in the vicinity of the Governor’s office. At 2100 hrs, an IED placed under a bridge detonated in Ganj Area. Five hours later, an IED exploded prematurely while being emplaced under a bridge in Yazdi Area of Farah City. So far, the majority of IED related incidents during 2010 occurred in D1, in vicinity of the governor’s office or in vicinity of the airport. A further increase – especially during the remaining summer months – cannot be excluded. In addition, NDS officers discovered an RCIED on 25 July in Tanke Haji Tahir Area of Farah City.

IEDs remain the preferred AOG tactic throughout the Province. In



Delaram Area of Bakwa, a local transport bus was hit by an IED, demonstrating the risk of civilians getting collaterally damaged. All other IED related incidents were recorded in Bala Buluk District in Shiwan Area and the District Centre Area. Bala Buluk was the major hotspot during this reporting period among the southern and western districts of the province. As already mentioned in the last report, intimidation tactics targeting those perceived as linked to security forces or the GoA were again recorded in Bakwa, where a local civilian was killed in Shahgai Area.

## HERAT

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	1

As already noted during the previous reporting period, Herat Province saw several abductions including an abduction of NGO staff. On 27 July, AOG abducted two of five NGO staff members who were present during the election of the Community District Council (CDC) in Khalawak Ha Village, Kushk District. At present local elders are involved in the negotiations for the release of the abductees. There are indications that AOG were informed about the presence of the NGO staff; however, the exact motive for the abduction still remains unclear. The incident again underlines the importance of local support for NGOs since the community prevented the abduction of three NGO staff members. Of note, Shindand – where the abduction of NGO staff took place during the previous reporting cycle – as well as Karukh are increasingly difficult areas with high levels of AOG activity.


In Gulran District, on 20 July a

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Abductions

candidate for the upcoming parliamentary elections was abducted together with two others allegedly by AOG on the main road to the District Centre in Qalae Reg Area. The abductees were released on 26 July, due to mediation efforts of community elders. Of note, this area has already experienced an IED attack targeting a politician in May and AOG distributed night letters in June, warning locals not to participate in the upcoming parliamentary election. A third abduction was recorded in Adraskan, another district with high AOG presence. On 24 July, AOG abducted a local civilian, perceived as spying for GoA and IMF. Further abductions of this kind, especially during the run-up to the elections, cannot be excluded.

Apart from abductions, the use of IEDs continues to be a major concern in Herat Province. In the Hause Karbas Area of Injil District on the main road from Herat to Zinda Jan District Centre via Pul-e Hashimi, an IED detonated while an IMF EOD team was defusing another IED, which was found by ANP earlier on 28 July.



IEDs as well as AOG activity is very unusual in this area of Injil District; however, reports suggest that AOGs try to increase their influence and presence in the area already for quite some time. The current incident alone does not necessarily indicate an increased threat level on the road mentioned above. Nevertheless, NGOs should be aware of the incident and exercise caution while travelling on the road, making sure to avoid possible targets such as ANSF/IMF or GoA vehicles and convoys.

AOG related activities in Herat Province focused on Shindand, Adraskan and Guzara districts during this reporting period, according to the incidents recorded. Herat City itself remained calm except two armed robberies in District 2 and 7. However, NDS seized approximately 500 kg of explosive materials and other IED materials in District 10. As mentioned already in the previous reports, it cannot be excluded that IED related incidents will increase also in Herat City in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in September.

**NOTICE:** Your input is important for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area.

So please remember to call or email us regularly.  
 Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.


## GHOR

After a quiet period at the beginning of this reporting cycle, Ghor Province saw again several IED related incidents as well as direct attacks by AOGs in Taywara and Pasaband districts.

On 29 July, AOG attacked the District Administration Centre (DAC) in Pasaband with SAF, RPGs and mortars around 1200 hrs. Since approximately 1300 hrs, the telecommunication networks in Pasaband District were down. The fighting between AOG and ANP lasted until the next morning when AOG withdrew from the area, after further ANSF reinforcements arrived. Compared to

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

2009, AOG activity in Pasaband is visibly higher this year. Of note, two-thirds of AOG initiated incidents in the district this year affected civilians and one-third ANSF. The latest incident again confirms the trend of an increasing AOG activity in Pasaband – also seen in the neighbouring Taywara District – including intimidation tactics and the use of IEDs. On 25 July, an IED hit and killed a civilian on a motorbike. The use of IED in Pasaband seems to have notably increased since May, with 5 out of 6 IEDs hitting civilians. In Taywara District, an IED was discovered in Arpatow Area on 28 July and AOG attacked an ANP patrol with SAF in Tangio Chardar Area on 23 July. A further increase of IED related incidents and direct attacks as well as



an influx of AOG from the neighbouring Helmand Province to both districts – which also might affect the security situation in other parts of the province – is to be expected, especially in the run-up to the parliamentary elections.

Further IEDs were discovered in Chaghcharan District on the main road of Darea Ghazy Area and in Shahrak District. In addition, in Shahrak District unknown armed men stopped a local transport vehicle and robbed the passengers of their cash and valuables in Taida Area on 24 July.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERN

- ➔ AOG attack in Pasaband & Taiwara
- ➔ IED & Armed Robbery


## LAGHMAN

On 26 July in Qarghayi, an unidentified armed group established a mobile check point on the main Jalalabad-Kabul Highway, and temporarily abducted an off duty ANP along with three other passengers from a vehicle. The group robbed the passengers of cash and mobile phones, and released them after three hours. This incident appears to be clearly motivated by criminal intent. Although it is

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

known that several ACG operate across Qarghayi, criminal activity of this quality is a very rare occurrence, especially while having the significant ANSF presence on the road in mind.

During this reporting cycle, AOG activity decreased slightly to 10 AOG-initiated incidents, in comparison to 12 such incidents recorded in the previous period. All of them occurred in Alingar, Alishing, and Qarghayi districts. Alishing accounted for three direct attacks, one IDF strike, and one IED detonation; Qarghayi saw two direct attacks and two IDF assaults, while Alingar witnessed one direct attack.



Next to the abovementioned ACG CP, the activity along the Kabul-Jalalabad Highway remained rather stagnant, with one attack against a fuel tanker and one against an ANP CP recorded.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- ➔ Direct Attacks on IMF Alingar and Alishing
- ➔ AOG activity Kabul-Jalalabad highway

## NANGARHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

On 24 July in Jalalabad City, AOG left a warning letter at the main entrance of an INGO office in Zone 2, claiming that the organization's activities are against Afghanistan's cultural and religious values, and that the NGO should stop such operations or might face severe consequences. This marks the first intimidation attempt targeting specially a NGO in Nangarhar in 2010, and it remains unclear why this organisation was targeted. Still, it is understood that the NGO's previous cooperation with a for-profit development agency might have affected the organisation's perception negatively. In late July, the overall amount of recorded AOG incidents remained relatively constant across Nangarhar, with 27 incidents reported. Still, the previously identified trend of expand-

ing AOG activity in hitherto rather unaffected areas of the province continued during this reporting cycle. For instance, on 18 July in Rodat District, AOG conducted two direct attacks, with the first one targeting an ANP CP and the second assaulting the District Administration Centre. During the latter, two mortars impacted inside an INGO clinic in the immediate vicinity of the DAC, causing damages to the building. Although it appears that the clinic was targeted rather by accident, such incidents of collateral damage involving NGOs have become more frequent in Nangarhar recently, mostly involving NGO facilities located in close proximity to potential targets such as DACs and IMF/ANSF facilities. As outlined in early July, NGOs should be aware of the elevated risk of being targeted collaterally in areas surrounding such targets. The security environment in the urban Jalalabad area remains volatile, with 2



IDF strikes and 4 IED detonations recorded inside the city and surrounding areas in Bihsud District. With one IDF assault and two magnetic IED detonations, the area surrounding the Jalalabad Airfield (JAF) remains a hotspot of AOG activity in the urban area. Additionally, displaying a rare occurrence, AOG fired a rocket into the city on 27 July, injuring a civilian. Usually, such assaults target GoA/ANSF/IMF facilities, and tend to impact in surrounding areas. This projectile impacted in the very heart of Jalalabad City near Chawk-e Talashe, with no potential target in the immediate vicinity. AOG continued to attack District Administration Centre's across the province. Next to the direct attack reported from Rodat District, ANSO recorded to two IDF strikes in Chaparhar, one direct attack in Kot, another one in Achin, and a rocket assault in Sherzad.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERN


- IED & IDF J'bad city
- DAC attacks

## NURISTAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

On 24 July, AOG again overran Barg-e Matal's District Administration Centre, and captured the district after ANSF announcing a 'tactical retreat'. After conducting 'shaping operations' against ANBP positions and the DAC several days beforehand, AOG concentrated several hundred fighters against remaining ANSF in the DAC compound, following the strategic approach already seen in the late May assault against the same target. Similar to the latter, ANSF – supported by IMF air as-

sets – recaptured the DAC on 25 July, this time without any resistance. The same day, AOG attacked the DAC of Waygal District, injuring at least four ANP. Unconfirmed reports suggest that AOG now concentrated significant manpower in areas surrounding Waygal's DAC, making a geographical expansion of AOG's 'Barg-e Matal strategy' rather likely. Additionally, AOG presence in Nurgaram remains significant, with one direct attack and one IDF strike reported from




there. Both attacks targeted ANSF, with the direct attack assaulting an ANP reinforcement convoy travelling northwards. Locals report that ANP are reluctant to oppose AOG who they see has having superior firepower and manpower.

## KUNAR

With 71 AOG-initiated incidents during this reporting period, Kunar Province continues to be the most violent province throughout the Eastern Region. As outlined in early July, the huge bulk of incidents occur in the Pech Valley area and in Kunar’s northern districts of Bar Kunar and Nari, with nearly 50 % of all AOG incidents reported from there. While early July saw a significant increase of AOG activity in northern Kunar, the overall level of reported incidents from there returned to rather usual amounts in this cycle. A possible driver behind this dynamic reallocation of AOG activity is the

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

mentioned ceasing of IMF/ANSF operations in central and eastern Kunar, allowing AOG to return to their previous areas of operation. Late July saw an unusual increase of AOG assaults in Kunar’s central and southern districts along the Jalalabad-Asadabad Road, namely in Khas Kunar, Nurgal, Chawkay, and Narang. All in all, around 14 direct attacks and three IDF strikes – all of them targeting security forces – were recorded in these districts, accounting for 24 % of all recorded AOG incidents in the province. Attacks against convoys/patrols on the JAL-Asadabad Road are frequent, particularly in Narang and Chawkay, with no clear cut pattern with regards to timing identifiable. Having said this, it is still understood that the road is particularly risky in the afternoon and late evening hours, and NGOs should avoid



road travel towards or from Asadabad after 1500 hrs.

The previously described trend towards more diversified AOG operational tactics in Kunar lost its steam in late July. IED deployment was only of marginal relevance in this cycle, and the amount of recorded IDF assaults fell from 13 to 9 incidents. Nearly 80 % of all AOG-initiated incidents were direct attacks, displaying very familiar tactical picture in comparison to the winter months. AOG intimidations as well as abductions remain high, particularly in Wata Pur District. For example, on 25 July in Quro area of Wata Pur, AOG abducted four vaccinators whilst they were conducting a vaccination campaign in the area.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG attacks Asadabad – Jalalabad
- Pech & Watapur

## PAKTYA

After a very violent period in early July, the amount of recorded AOG incidents decreased by 25 % during this cycle, with 36 AOG-initiated incidents reported. Still, the security environment in Paktya remains very violent. AOG’s tactical pattern continued to be comparatively diversified, including 16 direct attacks, 11 IED detonations, and six IDF assaults.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Additionally, at least three targeted killings were reported from Shwak and Gardez districts, with one targeting an influential tribal elder in Shwak, and the others being assassinations of civilians accused of spying for GoA/ANSF/IMF in Gardez. As seen in the previous period, AOG activity remained concentrated on Gardez and Zurmat districts, accounting together for 52 % of all AOG incidents. While Zurmat’s environment is dominated by direct attacks against security forces, AOG’s preferred tactic throughout Gardez appears to be IED emplacement, with around 55 %



of all detonated explosive devices reported from there. Incidents related to indirect fire decreased significantly compared to the previous period, with the majority recorded this time in Jani Khel district.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Direct Attacks in Zurmat
- Emplaced IED in Gardez
- IDF Jani-Khel

## KHOST

With 25 recorded AOG-initiated incidents, the overall level of AOG activity in Khost fell sharply during this period, after 58 such incidents recorded in early July. Although not fully understood, this decrease might be a result of the recent heavy rain throughout the Eastern Region, and subsequent flooding in several districts of Khost, interrupting AOG movements as well as the AOG supply chain between Khost and

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

Northern Waziristan. During this period, IEDs returned to be AOG’s preferred tactic, with 15 IED detonations reported from Mando Zayi, Khost City, Bak, Sabari, and Spera. Particularly Khost City, with IED attacks recorded, remains a hotspot of emplaced explosive devices. Additionally, two direct attacks were recorded in Tere Zayi, and 8 IDF assaults were reported from Sa-



bari, Tani, Musa Khel, and Nadir Shah Kot districts, with the majority (> 60 %) of IDF strikes occurring in Sabari.


## KANDAHAR

Kandahar Province has recorded once again an enormous number of incidents in the past two weeks. In particular, the security environment remains tense in Kandahar City and its surroundings. During the present cycle, within the city, AOG activity manifested itself particularly in District 4, with four AOG initiated incidents, followed by District 2 (three incidents) and Districts 9 and 7 (two). Next to Kandahar City, Zhari and Arghandab districts have also experienced a significant number of incidents.

In Kandahar City, the large majority of recorded incidents were related to the use of IED/RCIED, primarily targeting ANP/NDS vehicles. However, on 30 July in District 7, the car of a candidate in the upcoming elections was

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

struck by an RCIED, killing a child and wounding another two civilians. Regarding the latter, the frequency of such attacks, whether AOG/ACG initiated, will likely increase in the months preceding the Parliamentary Elections. In District 3, on 26 July another RCIED hit a private car, wounding seven civilians, including a local contractor working for IMF. Already mentioned in previous reports, drive-by killings have continued as well unabated in Kandahar City, with four incidents targeting off-duty ANP official (two times), a PSC guard and a civilian working for PRT. In addition, similar targeted killings were reported two times in Dand District and once in Maywand. Still regarding Kandahar City, besides an AOG attack on an ANP/IMF check post on 28 July, there was an attack, on 19 July in District 2 on a newly-established ANP/ANCOP checkpoint, involving both RPGs and small



arms fire. As a result, one local child was killed and ten other civilians, including a woman were wounded. Other direct attacks reported during the present cycle included those targeting IMF contracted convoys and numerous attacks on ANP check posts, and were concentrated particularly in Zhari District. Lastly, ANSF/IMF continued to be active, with several airstrikes and operations in Arghandab District

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Assassinations
- Direct Attacks on ANP

## PAKTIKA


Although the overall level of security incidents recorded across the province has dropped compared to the previous reporting period, Paktika still remains highly volatile with a total of 60 ANSO-recorded incidents. In addition, AOGs continue to be active in the province's northern and north-east districts and were responsible for more than 75% of incidents. During the present cycle, the bulk of AOG activity was concentrated in Barmal, Yosuf Khel, Yahya Khel and Omna districts. As seen in previ-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ous periods, the AOG's tactic of choice remains indirect fire targeting DACs and IMF bases. In the past two weeks AOGs have continued their attacks on before mentioned targets, particularly in Barmal (5), Omna (3), Sar Hawza (3) and Yahya Khel (2). IED deployment also continues to be high across the province, with 18 IED related incidents of which 14 devices resulted in detonation. The use of IEDs often inhere the risk for the civilians being targeted collaterally. For instance, on 26 July in Yosuf Khel District, a civilian was killed when a roadside IED struck his vehicle. The same day in Mata Khan, another civilian was wounded in a similar incident.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- AOG attack on DAC
- Airstrikes



Finally, IMF/ANSF appeared to be relatively less active than usual, with however two operations of note involving the use of air assets. One of them, on 18 July in Sar Hawza District (Tawda Chin area), resulted in the reported death of 18 AOG, including 15 Pakistani nationals.

## GHAZNI


Ghazni Province continues to inhere an extremely volatile and insecure environment. During the present reporting period the majority of AOG initiated incidents were recorded in Qarabagh, Ghazni, Muqur and Andar districts. The usual pattern of AOG direct attacks was this time concentrated on ANP check posts, particularly in Ghazni (5 attacks) and Qarabagh districts (6 attacks). Additionally, ANP/IMF convoys were ambushed seven times during the present cycle with the bulk of incidents occurring in Andar and Muqur. As it has been identified in the past, AOGs continue to use indirect fire (rockets, mor-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

tars), targeting this time mainly IMF/ANA bases and only one time the DAC in Muqur District. Of note, the DACs across the province are usually the favoured AOG targets. Worth noting, there were also two attacks on ANP/GoA high rank officials. In Ajristan, (the DAC area) an AOG attacked with SAF the vehicle of the District Chief of Police, then in Waghaz an ANP CP and the residence of the District Administrator came under small arms fire. Intimidation continued unabated, with on 16 July in Ajristan, one civilian killed and another abducted. Both apparently accused of "collaboration with the GoA". It is worth noting that abductions throughout the province appear to be on the rise. Also in Ajristan, on 17 July, AOG abducted 12 members of a local Shura. Later,

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- School attacks
- AOG Direct Fire




on 23 July in Ghazni (Piraki area) AOG abducted 10 civilians working for a local council and NSP in Ajristan District. They were released the following day. Finally, in Qarabagh on 24 July, a candidate for the upcoming Parliamentary Election was abducted in the area of Jangalak.

## HELMAND

The security situation in Helmand remains extremely insecure, with Marja, Nahri Sarraj, Lashkar Gah, Sangin and Nad Ali districts experiencing the majority of AOG initiated incidents. During the present reporting period AOGs continued to target ANSF/IMF in the form of direct attacks against mainly facilities and patrols, however the bulk of incidents were related to the use of IEDs. Regarding the latter, Marja witnessed six IED related incidents, Nahri Sarraj five then Nad Ali and Lashkar Gah districts four reported incidents. As seen in previous reports, despite the Operation Mushtarak, Marja and Nad Ali continue to be highly volatile. As

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

previously mentioned, ANSF/IMF were AOG's primary target, nonetheless four IED initiated incidents involved civilian casualties. For instance, on 27 July, in Nahri Sarraj District two locals were killed as their vehicle hit a roadside IED in Babaji village. Two days earlier, on 25 July in Marja, one civilian was killed and another wounded in a similar incident. IMF/ANSF operations have continued across the province, resulting in significant seizures of explosive materials and ammunitions as well as in killing numerous AOG members. During one of these operations, an airstrike was conducted on 23 July, in Sangin District (Regi village), kill-




ing reportedly a significant number of civilians. Casualty figures emerging from the GoA asserted that up to 47 civilians were killed, however these figures have not yet been confirmed as an investigation is ongoing. Lastly, on 30 July in Nad Ali District UK troops launched the Operation Tor Shezada (Black Prince) in order to clean up the city of Saidabad. As past practice indicates, fleeing AOG elements tend to affect the security in neighbouring areas.

## URUZGAN

In Uruzgan, AOG activity resumed after a temporary lull observed during the last reporting period. The prevalent threat remains IEDs, with 10 recorded incidents that were mainly concentrated in Tirin Kot, Dihrawud and Chora districts. Although AOGs primary target across the province were security forces, four IED related incidents resulted in civilian casualties. On 16 July, in Chora District (Khosh Qadir area) an IED struck a private car wounding seven occupants. In Tirin Kot on 24 July, an RCIED hit an ANA patrol, killing three civilian pedestrians and wounding another three. Direct AOG attacks are usually rare in Uruzgan, however during the present cycle there were five reported close range attacks. In two cases, following a heavy fire fight on the

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ground, IMF conducted airstrikes. AOG continued a campaign of intimidation and assassination that during the present cycle was focused on Khas Uruzgan District, killing four individuals accused of cooperating with the GoA. Reported ANSF/IMF operations were extremely rare during the present cycle, however following a raid on a private house apparently located in Mehrabad village. On 29 July, in Tirin Kot City, the locals staged a demonstration to protest against alleged desecration of the holy Quran that occurred during the said operation. As it had been a case in the past, regarding the emotive nature of the issue, the demonstration turned violent. The demonstrators threw stones at ANP, wounding seven ANP officials and ANP responded with warning shots. NGOs should also take into



consideration another element that will likely play an important role in shaping the security environment in Uruzgan during the coming months. After four years in Afghanistan, the Dutch withdrawal from the province is set to start on 1 August and with their replacement with a new US-led multinational taskforce (including UK, NZ and AUS forces) further incidents of local opposition to IMF presence are likely to escalate.

## ZABUL

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0


In Zabul, the overall number of incidents has dropped when compared to the previous reporting period. During the present cycle the majority of incidents in the province took place in Qalat and Shahjoi districts. As seen previously, IED deployment, during the present cycle particular concentrated in these two districts, was the AOG's tactic of choice.

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED strikes
- IMF operations

There were in total 11 IED strikes, with the majority targeting ANA/IMF/ANBP vehicles. However, on 17 July in Qalat District (Bakorzi area) an IED exploded against the convoy of the Provincial Governor, damaging one ANP vehicle. Another three IED related incidents occurred in Naw Bahar, Shinkay and Mizan districts, resulted in 8 civilians killed and another 7 wounded.

Of note, on 27 July in Qalat City, the residence of the Governor was targeted with rockets. The projectiles impacted in the area,



killling a child and wounding another two. ANSF/IMF operations have continued as well throughout the present reporting period, and were focused on Shahjoi, Qalat and Daychopan districts.

## NIMROZ


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Activity in Nimroz remains consistent with the previous reporting period. Numerous attacks, usually in the form direct attacks against ANP CPs were carried out in Khash Rod District, in the areas of Minar, Rakan and Posht-e-Hasan. Most of these attacks were ineffective and resulted in one ANP wounded and three AOG members killed. With regards to Posht-e-Hasan area, an AOG mounted an illegal check point on 18 July. Of note, illegal check

### KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG illegal checkpoints
- AOG attacks on ANP

posts have been a rather regular occurrence throughout the province over the past few months. Furthermore, the DAC of Khash Rod continued to be a target of indirect fire, with nine rockets fired on 24 July. The projectiles detonated without causing any casualties. To counter this AOG activity IMF conducted an airstrike on 18 July, targeting an AOG hideout in Naalan village area. There were reports that six AOG members were killed, including two commanders and another two were arrested. Finally, the border tensions remain a con-



cern, with an incident that occurred on 25 July, in Zaranj District (Tangi Abresham area), when Iranian border police forces fired on a group of civilians whilst they were crossing the border, killing three civilians and wounding another three.



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**ANSO ACRONYMS**

**ACG**-Armed Criminal Group / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local deputised militias) / **DC**-District Centre / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised Explosive Device / **IMF**-International Military Forces / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device

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
**MISSING**

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- ⇒ Daykondi
- ⇒ Bamiyan
- ⇒ Panjshir

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.



The slight downturn from June to July may indicate that the 2010 campaign has peaked or is just taking a break going in to the early RAMADAN celebrations.