



PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT : SOMALIA

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PROFILE SUMMARY

Since the 1970s Somalia has been in a state of fluctuating complex emergency, characterized by more than one interstate and internal wars, major famines, and a serious humanitarian crisis in the 1990s, partly the result of international mismanagement. The Somali conflict has centered around the appropriation of resources such as land, relief items, as well as control over the livestock trade. At the height of fighting in 1992, up to 2 million people were displaced and up to half a million had died (USCR 1998, p. 92; USCR 1995, p.75). By mid-2002, rough estimates indicated that more than 400,000 were displaced in the country (UN November 2001, p. 5). Due to chronic conflict upsurges combined with the Somali nomadic lifestyle, information on IDPs in Somalia has been very hard to collect, and has made the extent of displacement difficult to assess. However, the sporadic indicators available, typically show unparalleled levels of distress. After a somewhat hopeful start in 2001, an upsurge of inter-factional fighting and a third consecutive year of drought, have pushed Somalia back on the forsaken path and new displacements are on the rise.

From dictatorship to warlordism

In 1969 Barre's military coup instored a dictatorial regime, and its clan divide-and-rule polity, succeeded in polarizing grievances into clan-based wars and eventually splintered its own support-base. During the 1980s, the Isaak clan in the north and the Hawiye in the south were victims of persecutions and massacres, and by late 1990 there were at least 400,000 internally displaced Somalis (USCR 1991). In 1991, the loose anti-government coalition which overthrew Barre splintered and proved incapable to change pre-established war patterns. Thereafter until today, the race for power, which went hand in hand with the usurpation of public resources, erupted in violent militia wars. Warlords fought to forcibly establish their hegemony over Somalia's most fertile lands in the south -- between the Jubba and the Shabelle rivers -- as well as key ports like Mogadishu. Warlords left wrecked societies, where hungry, displaced and unemployed young men, craving for a sense of worthiness, provided an easy pool of untrained militias recruits. Since more than ten years, the people of Somalia remain some of the most vulnerable in the world, as no functioning government has provided them with civil rights and protection.

Initially received with great optimism, the Transitional National Government (TNG), presided by Mr. Abdulkassim Salat Hassan was established in September 2001. However, it has found it increasingly difficult to assert control over Mogadishu and it has no recognition from Somaliland and Puntland, which established their autonomy in 1991 and 1998 respectively. During the latest cycle of national unrest, trouble is not only restricted to the forlorn areas of southern Somalia but has spread to these historically calmer regions. The self-proclaimed Somaliland Republic in the North, was somewhat more successful in promoting grass-root peace processes and institutional change, (a multi-party system was voted in 2001), and in the aftermath of late President Egal's death, his deputy, Dahir Riyale Kahin was sworn in (UNICEF, 12 June 2002). In Puntland leader's reluctance to delegate political power when his term elapsed fuelled the worst conflict in six years in the region. Furthermore, in April 2002 the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) set up a new regional administration in the Bay and Bakol regions of southwestern Somalia. To complicate the picture, Ethiopia in violation of Somalia's sovereignty and the UN Security Council's arms embargoes, is providing ammunitions to factions opposed to the TNG, and Ethiopian troops had invaded Gedo and Bakool (UN SC 17 May 2002).

Causes of Displacement

Somalis, have fled from war-induced famines and generalized violence. Warlords purposely looted and destroyed food stocks, mined water-points, grazing lands and major trading roads, destroyed medical and administrative infrastructures, with the intent to prevent people from another clan from sustaining a livelihood. Armed factions waged battles in order to claim clan sovereignty over their supposed 'native

territories' traditionally belonging to other clans, thus forcing local populations to become loyal to their invaders, and often demanding payment in exchange of 'protection'.

The regions most ravaged by conflict, have been in the South – most notably Gedo, Bay, Bakool, Lower and Middle Juba as well as the main ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo, where the livestock trade concentrates. Since July 2001, southern Somalia has been prey to flare ups of violent confrontations. Clans opposed to the TNG and warlord factions grouped under the umbrella of the Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), have now taken up arms against the TNG forces and its allied militias, resulting in heightened clashes in the capital as well as in other parts of Southern Somalia. Bloody confrontations over the control of Kismayo port and in Lower and Middle Juba, forced many people to flee. Similarly, in Bay and Bakool, conflict between TNG and SRRC forces claimed hundreds of lives, and since March 2002 acute violence in Gedo forced tens of thousand people to flee the region.

In addition, the traditionally most fertile riverine lands, are also now situated where drought conditions are most severe. The successive crop failures and other natural calamities have pushed Somalis to move in search of water, food and medical assistance, notably to the Lower Shabelle areas of Mogadishu and Merka. As a result of the third consecutive year of drought in 2002, in the regions of Bay, Bakool, Gedo and Hiran, water reservoirs were seriously depleted and crop production severely reduced (IRIN-CEA 9 July 2001; UNICEF 7 September 2001).

Many IDPs come from the farming Bantu and Bajuni communities as well as the Rahanweyn clan, which have had a low social status in Somalia and have suffered a long history of discrimination and land dispossession. In 1999, in Baidoa (Banadir region), Aideed's militias committed human rights violations mainly against the Rahanweyn minority group. During the first half of 1999, 20,000 people were internally displaced and 30,000 fled across the border (USCR 2000, pp.115-116). While protection is granted through clan affiliation, the Bantu and Bajuni groups, politically less organized, have been particularly exposed to serious human rights abuses (Menkhaus, November 2000, p. 9).

Patterns of Displacement and Living Conditions

Tracking displaced populations in Somalia is particularly difficult as virtually all Somalis have been displaced by violence at least once in their life. Furthermore, 80 percent of Somalis live a nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyle, traditionally moving with their herds to and from grazing lands and water sources. However, wars and severe droughts have complicated and hampered these seasonal migrations, and since the 1990s families have increasingly moved to urban areas in search of humanitarian assistance. This greatly complicates the targeting of humanitarian assistance, as other urban poor or returnees are no less needy.

Scattered in overcrowded urban areas, IDPs mingle with other indigent groups and refugees who are returning in waves, especially to the north, where they enjoy some degree of stability. IDPs tend to shelter around Hargeysa (Somaliland), where there are four camps; and Bosasso in Puntland, shelters tens of thousands 10,000 IDPs (UN CHR, 26 January 2000, p.32). It is estimated that between 100,000 and 250,000 displaced persons in Mogadishu live in approximately 200 camps and squatter settlements (UN November 2001; USCR 2001). However, since 1999 there were hardly any IDP camps left in the country, and the displaced are increasingly dispersed (UN November 2001).

The combination of IDPs mingling with other indigent groups, acute insecurity and rareness of camps, makes IDP's conditions very difficult to assess. However, from the few surveys compiled, an extremely distressing reality transcends. Renewed fighting and drought mean that conditions in the camps that do exist are presumably more crowded than ever with diseases reportedly widespread. Diarrhea and dehydration are the second cause of death, reflecting the fact that less than 20 percent Somalis have access to safe drinking water and proper sanitation is lacking (US Fund for UNICEF 6 September 2000, "Water and Sanitation"; UN March 2001, p. 27). Serious outbreaks of cholera have been reported especially in Mogadishu (WHO, 23 April 2002). Cerebral malaria is the main killer in Somalia, reflecting the high levels of dislocation to zones where people are not immune against the different types of malaria parasites. The

nutritional status of IDPs, food security reports conducted during 2001 show global malnutrition rates as high as 37 percent, and the internally displaced presumably make up most of the 780,000 people in need of food assistance in 2002 (SC UK January 2002).

People situated in the Gedo region were the worst off, and Action Contre la Faim (ACF) reported an unprecedented increase in the number of IDPs admissions at its supplementary feeding centre in Luuq (ACF 26 July 2001; ACF 21 December 2001). In addition, the towns' solely available overcrowded hospital reported cases of cholera. The extreme scarcity of medical facilities, is compounded by the fact that people constantly on the move find themselves outside of the health coverage system.

Further stretching coping mechanisms to unparalleled limits, are recent economic shocks which brought Somalia to a state of economic collapse (UNDP-EUE 21 February 2001). The US closed one of the main money transfer company and the telecommunications systems in November 2001, on alleged grounds of terrorist links. Remittance companies, the single most powerful business in Somalia, generate up to US\$800 million per year. Families relying on relatives abroad for basic survival are now totally destitute. Furthermore, the livestock import ban imposed by the Gulf States since 2000, have caused considerable loss of trade-related employment, affecting at least 80% of the population. In addition, the printing of a new currency led to inflation and drastically reduced purchasing power.

Humanitarian Assistance and Access Impediments

As there are no government structures to provide citizens with social services and protection, neither to channel humanitarian assistance. In response, in 1993, the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB) was established to provide policy and operational coordination for rehabilitation and development activities. It hosts under its umbrella the UN Country Team, the NGO Consortium and the Red Cross Movement.

However, there is not one single agency specifically focusing on IDPs, but IDPs are often de-facto included into programmes targeting returning refugees. The Somali Red Crescent is the only humanitarian institution represented across the nation, since 1991, providing health care, disaster preparedness and relief. The NGO Action Contre la Faim has been the most active in assisting IDPs in Mogadishu, and was also one of the only still present in Mogadishu during the 2000 confrontations. Islamic organizations have also assisted IDP in Mogadishu.

In the absence of a widely recognized authority enforcing law and order, extortion, banditry and crime prevail in Somalia. Since the early 1990s, humanitarian agencies rely on militias and gunmen for protection. Humanitarian access has always been obstructed by unpredictable political dynamics and violence, it has however been reported that the 2001 upsurge in fighting has brought it to its lowest point since 1995. Populations in dire need of assistance, in regions of Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba and Middle Shabelle as well as the ports of Bossaso, Mogadishu, Merka and Kismayo, have experienced some of the most intense clashes in years, and have been staying off-limits of regular humanitarian work. Insecurity has been so acute in Southern Somalia, that it has been difficult to plan assistance and deliver it in due time. In Mogadishu and other seriously insecure regions, humanitarian workers are regularly kidnapped or even killed by militias, and the ambush and looting of humanitarian vehicles are common occurrences. As a result, many agencies are forced to momentarily pull out and interrupt their activities. In addition, there is a lack of permanent international presence in the country: UN staff are based in Nairobi and fly in just for some quick missions.

Given considerable access problems and donor fatigue, only 28% of funds were received for humanitarian assistance in May 2002 (UN May 2002), far from sufficient to cover the needs of displaced populations. Astonishingly, the people of Somalia have been extremely resilient and extraordinarily resistant to prolonged extreme situations. Prevalent lack of security is often a prime reason given by donors for lack of funding. However, Somaliland who achieved five consecutive years of peace, is still not recognized by the international community and suffers similar lack of assistance (USCR, December 2001, p.5).

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

General background to present situation

Conflict in Somalia began with struggle to topple Siad Barre in late 1980s

"Siad Barre seized power in 1969 and increasingly employed divisive clan politics to maintain power. Civil war, starvation, banditry, and brutality have wracked Somalia since the struggle to topple Barre began in the late 1980s. When Barre was deposed in January 1991, power was claimed and contested by heavily armed guerrilla movements and militias based on traditional ethnic and clan loyalties. Savage struggles for economic assets by the various factions led to anarchy and famine." (Freedom House 1999, "Overview")

With no central government authority, clan divisions have led to violence and lawlessness since early 1990s

- Somalia has always been divided along clan – rather than religious or ethnic – lines
- Absence of central government authority has left vacuum where violence and lawlessness prevail
- All government infrastructure has been destroyed
- The "black hole" of Somalia is said to attract criminals and subversives

"Clan loyalties are the basis for most civil organization in the vacuum left by the disappearance of central authority. Harsh Islamic law has returned a semblance of order to some areas, including parts of Mogadishu long plagued by lawlessness. Islamic courts are imposing sentences that include executions and amputations in accordance with Shari'a law. Right to free expression and association are ignored. Few autonomous civic or political groups can organize or operate safely. Several small newspapers and newsletters are published in Mogadishu, but the few independent journalists are under constant threat. International correspondents visit only at great risk. Radio stations are mainly operated by various factions, although the United Nations now sponsors new 'peace programming'. During the year, several journalists were arrested in Somaliland for criticizing the local government and suggesting that full press freedom does not exist." (Freedom House 1999, "Political rights and civil liberties")

"Virtually all the infrastructure of government - from buildings and communications facilities to furniture and office equipment - has been looted. All government archives and records, libraries, files and museums have been totally destroyed. In most of the country, there are no police, judiciary or civil service. Communications, apart from private satellite and cellular telephones and radio links, are non-existent. Electricity is not available on a public basis, but only to those who can afford generators. There is no postal service.

[...]

In both informal and formal discussions of the Security Council, member States have expressed concern about the increasingly evident effects of the lack of a functioning central government in Somalia. Somalia is being seen as a 'black hole' where the absence of law and order is attracting criminals and subversives. The Prime Minister of Yemen told my Representative that his Government was concerned about refugee flows from Somalia. He expressed fears that Somalia was being used as a transit-point for the trafficking of narcotic drugs and as a haven for terrorists. President Moi of Kenya called on the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to repatriate tens of thousands of Somali refugees living in north-eastern Kenya. He accused the Somalis of abusing Kenyan hospitality by smuggling arms into the country.

To worsen the situation, a Somali militia group disarmed a Kenyan platoon on 1 July 1999 and stole its equipment. Most of the stolen goods were returned after the Government of Kenya threatened punitive action against the perpetrators. A batch of fake Somali shillings, with an estimated value of \$4 million, arrived in Somalia on 9 and 10 April 1999, followed by a second batch, worth about \$5 million, on 8 June 1999. As a result, the value of the Somali shilling fell from about 7.5 shillings to the dollar to over 10,000 shillings to the dollar. There are now four different Somali shillings in circulation in Somalia.

As a country without a national government, Somalia remains unique. The functions that states perform, such as the provision of social services, including health and education, the regulation, for example, of the movement of goods and persons, control of the environment, airspace and coasts, and so on, as well as the representation of the Somali people in intergovernmental and international fora, are absent, notwithstanding the fact that administrations in some parts of the country, notably in north-western Somalia ('Somaliland') and north-east Somalia ('Puntland'), have begun to provide some basic services to their people.

Somalia is different from other African societies in crisis, given its fundamentally homogeneous character. There is no major religious divide, ethnic division or dispute over the allocation of wealth derived from natural resources. Rather, Somalia is a polity in crisis. It is divided on clan lines, with each clan fearful of the incursions of others. The violence, where it is not simple banditry, is mainly defensive in nature. The crucial missing ingredient is trust. Without trust, there can be no peace or security in Somalia and no central government can be re-established." (UNSC 16 August 1999, paras. 61- 64)

"Somalia is an example where effective government and the accountability of political power are no longer coterminous with a defined national territory. The growth of regional problems across boundaries creates overlapping communities of fate: the fortunes and prospects of individual communities are increasingly bound together. One of the major relationships has been the weather – drought or flooding has had an enormous impact on the whole region." (UN November 1999, p. 6)

International community responded to conflict and famine in Somalia with UN peacekeeping operation (1992-1995)

- UN deployed troops in 1992 despite threatening stance posed by Somali faction leaders
- UNOSOM troops experienced ambushes and suffered casualties in 1993
- All UNOSOM forces were pulled out by 1995

The international response to the armed conflict and the displacement situation was slowed by insecurity due to marauding factions and rampant banditry. Massive infusions of relief aid during the period from August through November 1992 helped to mitigate the impact of famine, but could not eliminate its causes (UN December 1998, p. 4). The continued violence prompted the formation of a UN peacekeeping force known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Soon after their deployment the leaders of some of the contending Somali factions began to take an aggressive, threatening stance toward the United Nations. (UN 1996, p. 9)

"Extensive television coverage of famine and civil strife that took approximately 300,000 lives in 1991 and 1992 prompted an American-led international intervention in Somalia. The armed humanitarian mission in late 1992 quelled clan combat long enough to stop the famine, but ended in urban guerrilla warfare against Somali militias.

The last international forces withdrew in March 1995 after the casualty count reached the thousands. Approximately 100 peacekeepers, including 20 American soldiers, were killed. The \$4 billion United Nations intervention had little lasting impact. Today, neighboring countries and others as far afield as Libya and Egypt are reportedly backing competing warlords." (Freedom House 1999, "Overview")

"In June 1993 Hussein Aïdeed's militia attacked Pakistani UNOSOM peace-keepers in South Mogadishu. Sporadic clashes between UNOSOM II forces and Aïdeed's militia continued until October 1993 when a small US force was ambushed, suffering heavy casualties. The United States withdrew its forces, and by March 1995 all remaining UNOSOM forces had left." (UN December 1998, p. 4)

De facto regional governments have been established since the fall of Barre regime (1991-2002)

- The Northeast region was less affected by conflict and several ports enjoyed economic expansion and Garowe was elected regional capital
- Somaliland proclaims independence in 1991 and after five years of sustained peace 97% of Somaliland voters approved a new constitution (May 2001), the UN does not recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state
- In the aftermath of the passing away of President Egal of Somaliland, Dahir Riyale Kahin his deputy was sworn in
- Northeastern "Puntland" was created in 1998; fierce internal power struggle exploded when former President Abdullahi Yusuf rejected the election of his successor President Jama Ali Jama (Nov-Dec 2001)
- RRA sets up new autonomous region: State of Southwestern Somalia (SWS), headed by former colonel of Barre's secret police (March 2002)

"External encouragement to political consolidation since 1998, however, has taken two somewhat incompatible forms. One, the so-called 'building-block' approach, has sought to encourage the emergence of regional or trans-regional political authorities, as a first step towards a re-unified Somali state with a loose federal or confederal form of government. After UNOSOM's failure at state building, this approach was initially embraced by neighboring countries, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the executive committee of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SCAB) in the late 1990s [...]. Its advocates consider it the path that can provide a more legitimate grass-roots and participatory form of governance to facilitate the task of rebuilding a war-torn society. Its critics contend that it has limited applicability in the south and that it encourages secessionism and clanism and is designed to meet foreign interests that want to keep Somalia weak and divided.

The second approach, which has regained the support of regional and international bodies, is based on reviving the Somali state through a process of national reconciliation and the formation of a national government, albeit within a federalized system." (UNDP Somalia 2001, pp.51)

"The Northeast region of Somalia was the only region that was spared from the severe levels of physical destruction wrought during the civil war [...]. The region's principal seaport, Bossaso, has also enjoyed a commercial boom, which has driven an impressive economic recovery in the region. A regional authority was established following a meeting of over 400 delegates in 1998. Garowe was selected as the regional capital, a president was elected and line ministries were appointed." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.3)

Somaliland:

The overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991 led to a *de facto* division of Somalia, with the self-proclamation of the northern Republic of Somaliland on 18 May 1991 as one of the results. (Africa South of the Sahara September 1996, pp. 842-45)

"The Republic of Somaliland has exercised de facto independence since May 1991. It is headed by President Mohammed Ibrahim Egal and based in Hargeisa, where resistance to the Siad Barre dictatorship in the 1980s was most intense. Egal has said that a referendum on independence will not take place until a peace agreement covering the rest of the country has been reached. Somaliland is far more cohesive than the rest of the country, although reports of some human rights abuses persist." (Freedom House 1999, "Political rights")

"In 1991, when the central Government of Somalia collapsed, 'Somaliland' declared itself independent and sought separation from Somalia, citing the massive discrimination its people had suffered during the regime of Siad Barre. Although, the international community and the United Nations, which upholds the territorial integrity of Somalia, have not recognized the separate status of 'Somaliland', the international community has acknowledged with deep appreciation the good level of security and stability that 'Somaliland' has achieved over the years." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 22)

"The self-declared state of Somaliland, northwestern Somalia, is the second territory in the Horn of Africa in a decade to hold a referendum for full independence. Unlike the Red Sea of Eritrea – which established internationally-recognised independence in 1993 – the Somaliland bid has not only failed to meet with international approval, but has passed by with barely an international whisper.

[...]

Held on 31 May 2001, the Somaliland referendum was characterised by poor preparation, intimidating diaspora propaganda, and an admirable openness at the polling booths. The vote for independence was combined with the vote for a new constitution which brought in sweeping political changes by Somaliland President Muhammad Ibrahim Egal. The first article of the new constitution asserted the independent status of Somaliland, and Article Nine removes the present clan-based system by laying the basis for a new multiparty system." (IRIN-CEA 10 July 2001, Part 1)

"Since 1991, a functional and modest state structure has been established, with a bicameral parliament, judiciary, police force, and municipal structures. The restoration of security has revitalized the economy and facilitated the rehabilitation of the damaged infrastructure and public services. In terms of volume of trade, Berbera port is flourishing, while Hargeisa has the only airport in Somalia that receives regular commercial passenger airlines from the Gulf States and other countries in the region. Revenue raised mainly from import duties has enabled the administration to oversee the formation of a police force, sectoral ministries and municipalities which provide a mechanism for the prioritisation of needs and planning, as well as basic education and health systems. An active local NGO sector, new business initiatives and an active media challenge the stereotypical description of Somalia as aid dependent." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.52)

"In May 2001, a resounding 97 percent of Somaliland voters approved a new constitution, affirming the self-declared nation's ten-year-old independence from Somalia.

[...]

Somaliland's five years of uninterrupted peace, one of its greatest achievements since declaring independence in 1991, currently presents the international community with a long-awaited opportunity to significantly assist many long-term Somali refugees in repatriating, reintegrating, and rebuilding their homeland." (USCR, December 2001, p.5)

"In the aftermath of the passing away of Mohammed Egal, the President of the Northwest zone of 'Somaliland,' residents of the zone have called for unity, consultative leadership, and consolidation of the nation's gains. The deputy president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, was immediately sworn in as interim President in accordance with the constitution, following an extra-ordinary session held by the three topmost councils in the zone."(UNICEF 12 June 2002)

For full analyses of the Somaliland referendum and its political consequences, please refer to the IRIN-CEA reports on this issue: Part I [External link] and Part II [External link].

Puntland:

"In contrast with 'Somaliland', 'Puntland' does not consider itself a separate entity. Rather, it describes itself as a regional government of Somalia. In her report to the previous session of the Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/1999/103), the independent expert reported on how 'Puntland' came into being in 1998. The 'Puntland' Constitutional Conference was held in Garowe, between 15 May and 30 July 1998. It was attended by 470 delegates from the Bari, Nugal, Sool and Sanaag regions, as well as hundreds of observers. None of the delegates were women. The conference ended by formulating a new 'social contract' as a basis for the restoration of effective State authority in these regions." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 28)

"The area described as the North-east of Somalia or 'Puntland' has the largest surface and the longest coastline in the country. It is an arid area with low potential for developing water resources or rain-fed agriculture. The majority of the largely nomadic population depends on the livestock trade and to a much lesser extent on fishing and dealing in frankincense. Relative peace and security have allowed an export-oriented economy to develop and the north-east is increasingly developing as a region of transition and recovery. Although a government was elected in September 1998, only the President, Vice President and nine ministers [had been appointed as of December 1998]. One of the first priorities of this Administration has been to establish proper security forces (police and prisons) and a judiciary system." (UN December 1998, p. 26)

"For the first time in over six years, the peace that has existed in the zone was broken. This followed a decision by a meeting of elders to cancel the extension of the mandate of President Col. Abdullahi Yusuf's administration that had been given by Parliament, and install an interim President. Militias of groups opposed to Col. Yusuf's regime occupied the airport and seaport, effectively taking control. Col. Yusuf responded through force, and attacked the militias at the airport.

There was fierce fighting in Bossaso for two days. On the second day, Col. Yusuf's forces withdrew from the airport and returned to Garowe. The opposition regained control of the airport. The fighting reportedly led to 20 deaths, and over 60 people injured." (UNICEF 7 September 2001)

"Formed in 1998, Puntland's administrative structures are still embryonic. Lacking the infrastructure and potential revenue sources of Somaliland the administration's impact on public services and the economy has been more limited. However, Puntland can boast active business and NGO sectors. The population of the region has increased greatly since the war as people originally from there fled the south. This has led to high levels of investment by Somalis in housing and businesses and reflects the public's confidence in the political and security situation.

Although relations with Somaliland are strained over border definitions and Puntland's southern border is intermittently insecure, the region has managed to avoid any major security threats for ten years. In June 2001, the administration's three-year term expired. The failure to agree upon a transfer of power led to a constitutional crisis, which has now threatened the region's security." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.51)

"The term of Puntland leader Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed came to an end in June. Under the Puntland Charter he was replaced temporarily by the President of the Supreme Court, Yusuf Haji Nur. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed refused to acknowledge his replacement, and supporters of both sides clashed in August in Bosasso, where around 40 people were killed. In November Jama Ali Jama was appointed by elders as the next leader, although this decision was again rejected by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Fighting between supporters of both sides broke out in November and December in Garowe, resulting in the deaths of at least 13 people." (AI, January 2002)

"Heavy fighting was reportedly raging near the village of Berta Boqorka, near the town of Qardho some 280 km northeast of Garowe, regional capital of the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeastern Somalia, on Tuesday, according to local media sources.

Forces loyal to the region's former president, Col Abdullahi Yusuf, were reportedly engaged in fierce fighting with forces loyal to Puntland's current president, Jama Ali Jama" (IRIN, 7 May 2002)

"Meanwhile, in the Northeast, former president, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, rejected the outcome of the elections of 2001 where Jama Ali Jama was elected to lead Puntland. Colonel Yusuf has retreated with his forces from Garoowe (political capital) to Galkacyo and has created a separate southwestern state, declaring himself president. Colonel Yusuf has since recaptured Garoowe. Mr. Jama retreated to Bosaso (economic capital). In the Northeast, Mr. Egal's term as leader has been extended by one year by the Parliament and he is engaged in the process of developing a multi-party system of governance in "Somaliland". (UN, May 2002, p.3)

Bay and Bakol:

"Since 1999, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) has begun to establish an administration in the two southern regions of Bay and Bakol that have been chronically insecure for most of the past decade." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.34)

Better security since then has improved the food security situation and access for international aid agencies. Although the RRA participated in the Arta peace conference, some of the leaders withdrew their support soon after it was concluded. Since then the RRA has sought to consolidate its own regional administration. While certain civil structures have been established, the RRA has yet to transform itself into an effective civilian administration." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.53)

"The Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), which controls the Bay and Bakol regions, southwestern Somalia, has set up a new regional administration, an RRA senior official told IRIN on Monday. The new autonomous region would be known as the State of Southwestern Somalia, Muhammad Ali Adan Qalinle, the governor of Baidoa, said.

This is the third regional administration to be set up in Somalia, following the establishment of Somaliland (northwestern Somalia) and Puntland (in the northeast).

The decision was reached at a meeting of the RRA central committee and over 70 elders from the Digil and Mirifle clans. The meeting, which had been in session in Baidoa, the capital of Bay Region, 240 km southwest of Mogadishu, since 22 March, elected Colonel Hasan Muhammad Nur Shatigadud, the chairman of the RRA, as president on Sunday. "He was inaugurated in Baidoa today, and will serve an initial four year term," Qalinle told IRIN on Monday. Baidoa will be the capital of the new state.

Shatigadud was a colonel in the notorious secret police, the National Security Service (NSS) of the former dictator Muhammad Siyad Barre,
[...]

The move to establish the autonomous region now is seen by Somali observers as a way for the RRA "to come to the talks as an established administration as opposed to a faction". It may also sound the death knell of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) said one observer. The SRRC is grouping of southern factions opposed to the Transitional National Government." (IRIN, 1 April 2002)

Also see IRIN-CEA report entitled "Somalia: Leader Abdullahi Yusuf chased out of Bosaso" [\[External link\]](#).

Eritreans and Ethiopians both accused of being involved in Somali civil war (1999-2002)

- Ethiopian troops accused to invade Gedo and Bakool violating state sovereignty and non-interference in a country's internal affairs
- Ethiopia accused of violating Security Council resolutions and providing arms to clans opposed to interim government
- Ethiopia and Eritrea have both been suspected of supporting clans in the Somali conflict for some time

Ethiopia in particular is accused of supporting clan factions opposed to new interim government:

"Briefing correspondents on the latest developments in Somalia, he said that in the last few weeks Ethiopian troops had continued to invade two major regions in south-western Somalia: Gedo and Bakool, capturing the capital of the Gedo region, Garbahaarrey, and a vibrant commercial centre near the Kenyan border -- Bulla Hawa. [...]

The invasion has caused many innocent civilian deaths and displacement of thousands of people, he continued. As a result of the fighting, Bulla Hawa had been burning yesterday. In Garbahaarrey, the Ethiopian troops had captured the leadership of the region, whose fate remained unknown. Ethiopian troops were also poised to attack the southern port city of Kismaayo.

Earlier, with Ethiopia's military assistance, a coup d'état had been staged in the north-east of the country, he said, where elected legitimate authorities were overthrown by force. Ethiopia also continued to flood Somalia with all sorts of weapons, including mortars, AK47s and anti-personnel mines. In the last 10 days, large weapons consignments had been shipped by Ethiopia "to its own favouring warlords" in Mogadishu and several other towns.

Ethiopia's aggression against Somalia had become a pattern in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions reaffirming Somalia's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Both resolutions and presidential statements (the latest of 30 March) adopted by the Council urged in the strongest terms that neighbouring countries should not interfere in the internal affairs of Somalia. The Ethiopian regime was also in violation of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 733 of the Security Council. The continued flow of arms into Somalia posed a threat not only to his country, but to the stability of the whole subregion of the Horn of Africa.

[...]

With regard to the national reconciliation process, Ethiopia continued to be the main obstacle to the achievement of peace and stability in Somalia, he said. It did not want to see a strong, vibrant and unified Somalia -- it wanted a "balkanized" Somalia of small fiefdoms it could dominate. He was asking Ethiopia to stop its aggression.

[...]

He also confirmed that the invasion was continuing at the time of the briefing. As it needed access to sea, Ethiopia was trying to capture Somalia's ports by force.

[...]

What form was the aggression taking? a correspondent asked. Mr. Hashi said that it was a military invasion, with Ethiopia's armed troops entering Somalia's territory.

[...]

Thus, a correspondent suggested, this was not a new, but a continuing, situation. Mr. Hashi responded that since 1996 Ethiopia had been repeatedly crossing the border, and its aggression had become a pattern.

[...]

While invading Somalia, Ethiopia could not be an honest broker in the reconciliation process. For that reason, it should be removed from the committee preparing the national reconciliation process.

[...]

The total number of people displaced by fighting in Somalia was actually unknown." (UNDIP, 17 May 2002)

"The Somali Prime Minister, Ali Khalif Galayr, has accused neighbouring Ethiopia of arming factions opposed to the interim government. Speaking on Djibouti radio and television, Galayr said that Ethiopian arms destined for faction leaders opposed to his government had recently reached the Somali capital, Mogadishu.

The interim Somali government had grown weary of keeping a low profile on Ethiopia's activities in Somalia, Galayr said. 'Ethiopia is obstinately and flagrantly continuing its interference in Somalia and is seeking to revive the civil war', AFP quoted him as saying. Galayr also alleged that an attempt to kidnap Somalia's parliamentary speaker, Abdalla Derow Issak, on Saturday [6 January 2001] had been carried out by a team armed and supported by Ethiopia." (IRIN-CEA 9 January 2001)

"By hosting a group of Somali warlords and other dissidents who this week joined forces in calling for the new regime in Mogadishu to be replaced, Ethiopia has once again shown itself to be a key player in Somalia's political turmoil.

The support Addis Ababa initially lent Somalia's nascent transitional government (STG) – by attending the talks in Arta, Djibouti last year that led to its formation – has proved short-lived.

While the United Nations, the Arab League and the Organisation of African Unity all back the STG, Ethiopia quickly became critical of its top officials, such as President Abdulkassim Salat Hassan, Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galaydh and Speaker of Parliament Abdallah Derow Issak.

After two weeks of talks in the southern Ethiopian town of Awasa, the Somali faction leaders and other opponents of the STG on Thursday set up a Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) in order to prepare the way for yet another national reconciliation conference which, in theory, will lead to the establishment of a 'legitimate' and more representative government in Mogadishu." (AFP 23 March 2001)

For more details on the supply of ammunitions delivered by Ethiopia to factions opposed to the TNG see UN Security Council document (22 May 2002) [External link]

Eritrea and Ethiopia are said to have been involved in the conflict in Somalia for some time:

"Eritrea and Ethiopia were directly involved in the inter-factional fighting, with Ethiopia supplying troops, hardware and humanitarian support to the Rahenweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in Bay and Bakol. The RRA used its increased military power to contain the advances of Hussein Aideed's forces. Ethiopia also reportedly supported the Somali Salvation Democratic Front which had formed a government in the self-proclaimed Puntland State, and a faction of the United Somali Congress–Peace Movement. Eritrea and Yemen provided arms to the Somali National Alliance (SNA) militias of Hussein Aideed. Around 200 fighters from the Ethiopian armed opposition group the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), supported by Eritrea, were also involved in the Somali conflict on the side of the SNA. Hussein Aideed attended a series of meetings on peace and reconciliation with Ethiopian government officials in October [1999]. His forces subsequently disarmed a group of OLF fighters in their base in Mogadishu." (AI 2000, "Background")

"Mogadiscio est toujours divisée entre différentes factions, avec d'un côté une alliance de circonstance entre Aideed et Mahdi, visant à mettre en place une administration centrale dans la région, et de l'autre une opposition puissante. Les deux alliances sont soutenues respectivement par l'Erythrée et l'Éthiopie, et donc indirectement parties prenantes du conflit." (ACF 2000, "Contexte")

Djibouti peace process resulted in creation of interim government (August 2000)

- Transitional National Assembly elects interim president at peace talks
- International community supports process and president

The Djibouti peace process:

"The peace process, which focuses on civil society groups rather than on faction leaders, was initiated last September [2000] by President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti. The peace conference started with a civil society technical symposium on 21 March [2000] in Djibouti and is scheduled to end on 15 July." (UNHCHR 10 July 2000, para. 5)

"A major Somali peace conference – the thirteenth peace effort since 1991 – got underway in neighboring Djibouti, attended by some 900 official Somali conferees and more than 1,000 other Somali observers. The gathering, known as the 'Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference,' was still underway at the end of July [2000]." (USCR 28 August 2000, para. 12)

"The three months have been dominated by the conference in Arta, Djibouti, hosted by the Djibouti government. Several thousand Somalis from all walks of life, many of them living in exile, succeeded in electing a clan-based 245 member parliament after four months of deliberations." (IFRC 18 October 2000, para. 4)

Creation of Transitional National Assembly and election of Somali President:

"After 10 years of civil war, Somali parliamentarians of the Transitional National Assembly at the Djibouti Peace talks held in the town of Arta elected Dr Abd-al Qasim Salad Hasan as President on the morning of 26 August 2000." (UNICEF 7 September 2000, para. 1)

"In contrast to the anarchy and civil war that had prevailed in Somalia for the past 10 years, the recent creation of the National Assembly ushered in a new era for peace and stability and constituted the first step of restoring order and central authority in the country, the President of Somalia told the fifty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly this morning, as it continued its general debate.

The spontaneous reaction of hundreds of thousands of Somalis, he said, demonstrated vividly that they wanted to leave years of civil war behind and open a new era of peace, tranquility, good governance, restoration of the rule of law and national unity. He called upon the warlords to review their positions, hear the voice of reason and respect the legitimate aspirations of the Somali people to achieve national unity, social and economic development, and durable peace." (UNGA 15 September 2000, paras. 2 and 3)

International community supports Somali assembly and newly-elected President:

"On 16 August [2000], the UN Security Council met in informal consultations after which the current President of the Council gave a statement welcoming the Somali parliament and called on all political forces in Somalia to join the ongoing peace process." (UNCU 18 August 2000, para. 2)

"The European Union is willing to enter into dialogue with the new Somali authorities and, once they have established their authority, to support their efforts to rebuild the country, while continuing to give its backing to recovery measures in all areas of Somalia where stable conditions exist.

The European Union calls on the authorities of Somaliland and Puntland to establish constructive relations with the institutions which have emerged from the Arta process. It also urges the future transitional government to establish a constructive dialogue as soon as possible with the aforementioned authorities for the purpose of re-establishing national unity in peace and with respect for the elements of stability achieved." (EU 8 September 2000, paras. 1-3)

For a detailed analysis of the Arta peace process, see November 2000 report by Ken Menkhaus [\[External link\]](#).

New government has failed to assert credibility and control in Mogadishu (2002)

- A year after the establishment of transitional government, Mogadishu remains as anarchic as ever
- Somalia remains divided, TNG faces opposition by Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), Somaliland and Puntland
- The TNG in difficult economic position due to economic shocks, lack of assistance resorted to bilateral and private financial assistance to pay its police
- The National Reconciliation Conference for Somalia due in April 2002 was postponed

"The first quarter of 2001 has been characterised by the TNG's continued attempts of the TNG to establish its credibility in Mogadishu. It has met with very limited success. Attempts to impose its authority outside the capital have been unsuccessful. [...] A number of police stations were reopened in Mogadishu, together with the central prison, while security personnel were put through training courses. But the city remained divided with four well armed factions controlling significant areas. " (IFRC 8 May 2001)

"Since its establishment in Mogadishu seven months ago, the new Transitional National Government (TNG) has struggled to assert control over the Somali capital, demobilise thousands of armed militia, and deal with rampant inflation. Initially received with great optimism in Mogadishu, the TNG has faced continued opposition from Mogadishu-based faction leaders; the newly formed southern-based Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Committee (SRRC); the self-declared independent state of Somaliland, northwestern Somalia; and the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeastern Somalia. Opposition leaders have rejected the Djibouti-hosted Somali peace talks in Arta, which led to the election of the TNG in August 2000, and have dismissed the new government as 'illegal' and 'unrepresentative' – despite the fact that it has received international recognition." (IRIN-CEA 14 May 2001)

" Efforts by the TNG to reach out to these groups have met with some limited success, and at least one major faction leader (Mohamed Qanyare) has now pledged to use his militia to support the TNG. While the TNG has been successful in improving security in the parts of Mogadishu that it controls, and continues to engage in constructive dialogue with other factions, control of the city remains divided among five small armies fuelled by emotionally intense personal, political and financial goals and objectives." (UNICEF 12 July 2001, sect. 1)

"A year after the arrival in Mogadishu of Abdulkassim Salat Hassan as head of Somalia's newly-established interim government, the Horn of Africa nation remains as anarchic as ever. [...]Salat's Transitional National Government (TNG) was set up with the approval of the international community following talks hosted by Djibouti last year.

While the new regime enjoys backing from the international community, it has yet to gain more than a toe-hold in Somalia itself, where most warlords and the two regions in the northwest and northeast reject its authority.

In some parts of central and southern Somalia, militias, who often shift alliances, currently back the TNG in exchange for 'logistical support', but without any tangible contribution to peace, experts say.

Warlords, who for a decade failed to agree on anything and whose warfare destroyed the country, have now ganged up, united in opposition to the TNG.

They met in Addis Ababa in March and launched a common front, the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), bent on TNG's destruction by setting up what they term a more 'representative' government.

The police force, itself drawn from Mogadishu's numerous clan militias, cannot venture into areas controlled by warlords opposed to the TNG, including the southcentral regions of Bay and Bakol, where TNG and SRRC forces fought in July, leaving 200 people dead and hundreds wounded.

Few expatriate aid workers are permanently stationed in Somalia since the kidnapping in March of two UN staff by gunmen, who freed them in Mogadishu after week in captivity.

Even the business community in Mogadishu, believed to be solidly behind the TNG, has yet to give up its arsenal of arms.

[...]

TNG Foreign Minister Ismail Muhumed Hurre Buba is an arch-rival of Somaliland President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal.

TNG Water and Mineral Resources Minister Hassan Abshir Farah resigned as Puntland's interior minister after political disagreements with his leader Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed.

More than 60 of the 245 transitional assembly members either hail from Somaliland or Puntland, who have on several occasions influenced the TNG to call for change in the two former northwest and northeast Somali regions.

Their calls have been compounded by a major power struggle in both Puntland and Somaliland in the past one month, the results of which could alter the political equation of the Horn of Africa nation.

In Puntland, the struggle has been between Abdullahi Yusuf and Yusuf Haji Nur, the region's former high court chairman, sacked by Abdullahi Yusuf in June, over the extension of the president's term and that of parliament.

In Somaliland, Egal has also been in a power struggle with clan elders opposed to his rule.

He recently detained the elders, resulting in demonstrations demanding their release and counter-demonstrations calling for their prosecutions earlier this week.

" (AFP 31 August 2001)

"However, the hope of attracting substantial foreign aid has not materialized as most Western donors have adopted a 'wait and see' approach and made aid conditional on signs of 'effective government'. With Mogadishu port closed, lacking revenue from livestock exports, and unable to raise taxes, the TNG has had to depend on some friendly states and members of the Mogadishu business community to finance the police force, judiciary, demobilisation and rehabilitation." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.54)

"Security conditions varied enormously throughout Somalia during the year [2001]. While the TNG struggled to exert its authority and ward off attacks by armed factions, anarchy and violence worsened, compounding persistent drought and food insecurity throughout southern and central Somalia. Puntland suffered an internal power struggle and its worst violence in six years. Somaliland remained relatively peaceful, although it, too, experienced isolated demonstrations and political violence in mid-2001." (USCR, June 2002, pp.94-97)

"Somalia remains a highly militarised and divided society, with various de facto authorities continuing to control most parts of the country, as well as sections of Mogadishu. The President of the Transitional National Government (TNG), Abdikassim Salad Hassan and Prime Minister Hassan Abshir Farah maintain that the reconciliation process with regional administrations and faction leaders is a priority. The President has visited districts including Dusa Merab, El-buur, Brava and Merka in the South. However, opposition to the TNG continues to grow stronger, with the leaders of the Northeast/"Puntland" and Northwest, as well as leaders of the opposition including the Southern Regional Resource Centre (SRRC).

[...]

In the Northeast, Mr. Egal's term as leader has been extended by one year by the Parliament and he is engaged in the process of developing a multi-party system of governance in "Somaliland". (UN, May 2002, p.3)

"Despite significant challenges, the Arta peace process still represents the most viable basis for peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. In a 28 March Presidential Statement, the UN Security Council reiterated its support to the process and urged the TNG and all local authorities "to make every effort to complete, without preconditions, the peace and reconciliation process through dialogue and involvement of all parties." The Council also pledged to tackle illicit trade of weapons and ammunition in Somalia, which has continued to fuel the conflict.

[...]A technical team comprising the frontline States – Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya - was established to convene the proposed National Reconciliation Conference for Somalia, initially scheduled to take place in April. This conference has been postponed to a later date." (UN, May 2002, p.3)

For detailed information on the political situation in the country, refer to the November 2000 paper of Ken Menkhaus [\[External link\]](#).

Intense inter-clan fighting has reignited since July 2001

- Overall security poor in Mogadishu and in Lower and Middle Juba
- Southern port of Kismayo captured by forces of Morgan's Somali Patriotic Movement, the RRA and the South Somali National Movement in August 2001

"However, in various parts of the south conflict leads to the loss of civilian life and displacement. Struggles for control of the strategic seaports of Kismayo and Merka continued, as well as numerous clashes in Gedo region. Mogadishu was the site of pitched battles between opposing warlords and businessmen supporting the TNG in June and July [2001]. Such conflict has continued to restrict agency access and operations. For large parts of the year populations in Middle and Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle, Gedo and Benadir have been off limits to UN and partner agencies." (UN November 2001)

"Heavy fighting has been continuing in Mogadishu, as militia loyal to faction leaders Husayn Ayyid and Usman Ato clashed with militia loyal to the Transitional National Government (TNG), [...] The fighting, which is concentrated in the KM-7 area of southwest Mogadishu, is taking its toll of the residents of Medina district, sources said. Medina has so far been spared the fighting. Most of the latest fighting was concentrated in north Mogadishu[...].

Monday's fighting is the latest in a series of confrontations between various groups in Mogadishu since 12 July. On 12 July, over 25 people were reportedly killed when two Abgal sub-clans, the Wa'asle and Warsangeli, fought around the Suq-Ba'ad area of north Mogadishu.

[...]

However, on the morning of 14 July, militia loyal to faction leader Muse Sudi Yalahow attacked positions of the Warsangeli militia in the Sana area of north Mogadishu. At least 20 people were reportedly killed in that battle, humanitarian sources said. The two sides used all sorts of weapons including mortars [...]."
(IRIN-CEA 16 July 2001)

"The general security situation in Mogadishu was tense and unstable. The main seaport and airport facilities remain closed. The Somalia Transitional National Government (TNG) started collecting taxes in Mogadishu. Banditry and acts of violence were reported." (UNICEF 7 September 2001)

"Somalia's transitional government suffered its biggest military blow yet Monday [6 August 2001] when forces bent on its downfall took the key southern port of Kismayo after two weeks of heavy fighting in the southern region near the city.

[...]

The forces that captured Kismayo are made up of Morgan's Somali Patriotic Movement, drawn from the Darod clan, the Rahanwein Resistance Army, and the South Somali National Movement." (AFP 6 August 2001)

"Dozens of families were Monday [3 September 2001] fleeing Somalia's southern Middle Juba region in fear of renewed interclan fighting following the deployment of rival militia forces, residents said.

[...]The JVA and Morgan have clashed in the nearby Lower Juba since July 27, leaving some 200 people dead and displaced hundreds of families, militia and medical sources said.

'Already dozens of families left and more others who can afford to get food during the voyage would go to Mogadishu and the port town of Merka,' said another Jilib resident, Asha Ibrahim." (AFP 3 September 2001)

IRIN-CEA chronology of the conflict in Somalia (1960-2000)

"**NAIROBI, 1 September (IRIN)** - The following is a chronology of recent events in Somalia leading up to the establishment of a new interim administration which will govern the country for three years, pending elections:

26 June 1960: The former British Somaliland Protectorate gains independence

1 July 1960: The former Italian colony becomes independent. The former British (northwest) and Italian (south) colonies unite

15 October 1969: Democratically elected President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke is assassinated by one of his police bodyguards

21 October 1969: The army under Major-General Muhammad Siyad Barreh overthrows the civilian government, after parliament hits deadlock trying to select a new president. The army suspends the constitution, bans all 86 political parties, and promises to end corruption. Siyad Barreh heads the 25-member Supreme Revolutionary Council, consisting of army and police officers

21 October 1970: The army junta declares Somalia a socialist country and adopts "Scientific Socialism". This signals a shift towards Soviet backing, and security organs and intelligence networks are given greater powers

21 October 1972: A written script for the Somali language is established. A modified Roman alphabet is adopted as the official orthography for the Somali language

1974: Somalia becomes a member of the Arab League

July 1977: A low-level war of attrition between Somali-backed insurgents and the Ethiopian army becomes an all-out battle between Somalia and Ethiopia, when Somalia declares war on Ethiopia. The war goes down in history as the fiercest Cold War battle on the continent, played out in the Ethiopian Ogaden region

13 November 1977: Somalia expels about 6,000 of Russian, Cuban and other Soviet allies, after the Soviet Union switched sides and allied itself with the Ethiopia

March 1978: The Somali Government announces the withdrawal of its forces from the Ogaden

8 April 1978: After the defeat of the Somali army, a group of army officers try to topple the Siyad Barreh regime. The attempted coup is crushed and Siyad Barreh tightens his grip further. He begins a process of putting power into the hands of his relatives, and sub-clan, the Darod Marehan. He also empowers the related Dulbahante and Ogadeni sub-clans

May 1988: The Somali National Movement (SNM) mounts an offensive in the north of the country, as a result of the regime's brutal post-Ethiopian war policies. Siyad Barreh responds by bombing the area. Hundreds of thousands of civilians are displaced, and many killed. It is the first real challenge to Siyad Barreh's rule, and the beginning of the proliferation of armed opposition to the regime

May 1990: A manifesto is published in Mogadishu calling for an all inclusive national reconciliation convention to avert protracted civil war. It is signed by 144 people, including politicians, religious leaders, professionals and business people, representing all Somali clans

December 1990: Armed uprising erupts in Mogadishu.

27 January 1991: Siyad Barreh flees Mogadishu. Forces loyal to the Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC) capture the city

28 January 1991: The Manifesto Group of USC appoints an hotelier, Ali Mahdi Muhammad, as president. The military wing of USC, led by General Muhammad Farah Aydid, rejects the appointment

17 November 1991: Full-scale fighting starts between the two factions of the USC

3 March 1991: A ceasefire comes into effect between the warring factions in Mogadishu

1991: Fighting erupts in the northeast region between the Al-Ittihad Islamic fundamentalists and militia loyal to the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), lead by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad

18 May 1991: The former British Protectorate of Somaliland declares independence from the rest of Somalia, in the town of Burao

July 1991: A conference was held in Djibouti, in which Ali Mahdi in which was chosen as interim president

April 1992: The United Nations Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM I, begins work in Somalia

December 1992: UNITAF forces under American leadership land in Mogadishu

February 1993: A three month conference in Borama seeks a new leader for the self-declared state of Somaliland. Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal, a former prime minister, is elected in May

March 1993: The next serious attempt at peace talks. An Ethiopian imitative evolves into a joint UN-Ethiopian sponsored reconciliation conference held in Addis Ababa

4 May 1993: UNITAF hands over to UNOSOM II

5 June 1993: 23 Pakistani peacekeepers are killed by Aydid loyalists

12 July 1993: American helicopter gunships kill over 50 unarmed Somalis holding a meeting in a private house in Mogadishu, increasing local hostility to the international intervention forces

3 October 1993: American-led forces looking for Aydid's senior aides are involved in a shoot-out, which leaves 18 Americans and hundreds of Somalis dead. The body of a dead American is dragged through the Mogadishu streets, and, caught on camera, sparks an international outcry

August 1996: Aydid dies of gunshot wounds sustained in operations against his former lieutenant, Osman Ali Atto. His son, a former American marine, Husayn Muhammad Aydid, is chosen by the clan to replace his father

November 1996: Ethiopian government-sponsored reconciliation conference brings most of the factions together. But it is boycotted by Aydid's son

November 1997: All faction leaders met in Cairo, with limited success, leaving Somalia without a national leader and Mogadishu still divided and insecure

2 May, 2000: On the initiative of the Djibouti government, the Somali National Peace Conference brings together more than 2,000 participants in Arta, Djibouti. It is the first conference where the warlords do not have control of the conference agenda

26 August, 2000: A 245-strong Transitional National Assembly, based on clan representation, elects Abdiqasim Salad Hasan as the new president of Somalia

27 August, 2000: President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan is sworn in an inauguration ceremony attended by the heads of governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen, and the host country Djibouti, along with representatives from the UN, EU, Arab league, OAU, France, Italy, Kuwait, and Libya." (IRIN-CEA 1 September 2000, as found in UN Consolidated Appeal March 2001, Annex III, p. 128)

Main causes for displacement

Mass displacement began with outbreak of civil war in 1988

- Hundreds of thousands displaced in northern Somalia after outbreak of civil war in 1988
- War moved into the streets of Mogadishu by late December 1990
- Some 400,000 persons said to be internally displaced by end of 1990

"The outbreak of civil war in northern Somalia in mid-1988, and the Somali government's brutal retaliation against civilians in northern Somalia . . . led more than 400,000 Somalis to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti and displaced hundreds of thousands of other Somalis within northern Somalia. Renewed fighting in northern Somalia led another 31,000 Somalis to flee to Djibouti. Other armed insurgent groups joined the battle against the government of President Siad Barre during 1990. Two of these groups, the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) scored major successes against the government, bringing the war into the streets of Mogadishu, the Somali capital, by late December [1990]. At year's end, chaos prevailed in Mogadishu. Foreigners were evacuated, tens of thousands of the city's residents had fled, there was fighting in the streets between government and rebel forces, indiscriminate shooting, raping, and pillaging by armed persons, and the bodies of the dead littered the capital. USCR

estimate[d] that by late 1990 there were a minimum of 400,000 internally displaced Somalis." (USCR 1991, p. 53)

For a detailed survey evaluating the reasons why Somali families were forced to flee in the early phases of the conflict, see Robert Gersony's "Why Somalis Flee: Synthesis of Accounts of Conflict Experience in Northern Somalia by Somali Refugees, Displaced Persons and Others" produced for the US State Department in 1989 [External link].

The cruel combination of clan conflict and climatic extremes resulted in repeated displacements throughout the 1990s

- Clan conflict persisted in the face of a complete collapse of government structures
- An incursion from Ethiopia forced thousands of persons to flee in 1996
- Major flooding in late 1997 resulted in the displacement of hundreds thousands more Somalis

General:

"As political confrontation and civil war degenerated into clan conflict, the remnants of government structures collapsed. What remained of Somalia's physical, economic and social infrastructure was largely destroyed. In 1991-92, the heavily populated inter-riverine areas (between the Juba and Shabelle river valleys) were very vulnerable. With crop failures and the escalation of the conflict combined with drought and flood, thousands of people became destitute. Famine resulted in mass population displacement, and widespread loss of life." (UN December 1998, p. 4)

Incursion by Ethiopian troops forced thousands of persons from their homes in 1996:

"In Western Somalia, several hundred thousand persons were temporarily uprooted [during 1996], when Ethiopian troops attacked an armed religious group based in Somalia. Most families displaced by the incident reportedly returned to their homes by September." (USCR 1997, p. 93)

Major flooding in late 1997 was particularly devastating to Somali populations:

"[F]loods inundated much of southern Somalia's fertile land in late 1997, killing approximately 2,000 people. The floods destroyed food stocks, decimated 60,000 hectares of planted crop land, displaced 230,000 people, and left a total of one million affected." (USAID 1998 Annual Summary, para. 2)

"Heavy flooding during late 1997 and early 1998 affected an estimated 600,000 people and exacerbated harsh humanitarian conditions in southern areas of Somalia. More than 2,000 people died and up to 200,000 became temporarily homeless because of the floods. The floods destroyed crops – the harvest was one-third smaller than the previous year – and ruined about 40 tons of grain in storage.

The floods particularly harmed populations already displaced by the country's warfare. Heavy rains washed away makeshift huts housing displaced families in Mogadishu. Other displaced families in the capital continued to live in abandoned government buildings, schools, factories, and houses left empty by the country's decade of instability." (USCR 1999, p.88)

Thousands forced to flee human rights abuses in Aideed-controlled areas during late 1990s

- Aideed's militia allegedly committed serious human rights abuses against people of Baidoa

- Individuals of Rahanwein minority were particularly at risk
- Due to abuses, Baidoa was called "city of death"

The Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Secretary-General reported the following after her visit to the region in late 1999:

"The independent expert visited Baidoa [Banadir region] on 17 and 18 November 1999. Aideed's militia had held this town, which was dubbed, during the peak of the Somali famine, 'the city of death', for the previous four years. During this period, the people of Baidoa and its surroundings left. Allegedly, individuals were massacred, women were raped, wells were destroyed, and villages were looted and burnt. Persons were allegedly detained without charge or trial, sometimes in containers. Their families were forced to pay to secure their release. As a result, the town, mainly inhabited by Rahanweins, was largely deserted. The Rahanwein are a minority group in Somalia, who have been widely discriminated against.

[...]

During the time Aideed's troops controlled the area, the village (Doynounay) [near Baidoa] was allegedly looted and burnt. The only building spared was said to have been the mosque.

[...]

Many serious violations allegedly took place in Doynounay. [T]he independent expert met a man who had allegedly survived a massacre. He told her that about 60 men from the village were rounded up and taken to Baidoa, where they were shot...During that time, women were allegedly raped, wells were destroyed and the village itself was burnt." (CHR 26 January 2000, pp. 20- 21)

War and drought causes of major displacement in 1999-2000

- Violence forced 50,000 persons to flee their homes in first half of 1999
- Thousands of families moved to Gode town following absence of seasonal rains in 1999
- 6,000 persons displaced by flooding of Shabelle river in 2000
- Drought severely affected families in central and southern Somalia during 2000

In the year 1999:

"A deadly combination of warfare, drought, and food shortages pushed tens of thousands of people from their homes during the year [1999], joining hundreds of thousands of Somalis uprooted in previous years.

[...]

Violence in southwestern Somalia forced at least 50,000 persons to flee their homes in the first half of 1999, including about 20,000 who fled to Kenya and 10,000 who reportedly crossed into Ethiopia. Thousands of other families reportedly fled to Mogadishu from war-racked and drought-ridden southern regions during the year, while thousands of Mogadishu-area residents temporarily fled their homes when heavy fighting erupted in Mogadishu." (USCR 2000, pp. 115-116)

"It is likely that the stress in the rural areas is extensive. Many poor rural people are said to be too weak to come to the urban centres in search of food. The UN-EUE field officer was told that in some cases people migrating to town had died along the way, and he observed first-hand people eating the meat from animals that had died from weakness or disease." (UNDP-EUE 14 December 1999, pp.1,4)

In the year 2000:

"Some 900 families or about 6,000 people have been displaced by flooding in central Somalia after the Shabelle River burst its banks, a local official said Monday [in May 2000]." (AFP 22 May 2000)

"The impact of this drought is having major effects on up to 1,200,000 people, including 300,000 children under 5 years, in the districts of Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Hiran and Middle Shabelle in Southern and Central Somalia, and the area will remain at risk up to the next harvest following the next Dyer season (January 2001). Women, children and other vulnerable people in Bakool are now starting to move in search of water, food, and basic health services." (UNICEF 20 June 2000, para. 2)

Intensification of inter-factional conflicts in Southern Somalia main causes of death and displacement (2002)

- Conflict among the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) concerning establishment of an autonomous South Western State (SWS) killed at least 20 in Baidoa (July 2002)
- May 2002 at least 62 killed and 100 wounded in Mogadishu following conflict between the Transitional National Government (TNG) and opposition loyal to Mohamed Dhere (May-June 2002)
- Hundreds of families fled Mahaday to Jalalaqsi due to heavy fighting in Middle Shabelle between the TNG and Mohamed Dhere forces (June 2002)
- Thousands of families fleeing Gedo due to fighting between Marehan sub-clans supporting the TNG and those supporting the SRRC (April 2002)
- Hundreds of families fled fight pitting forces of the Juba Valley Alliance and TNG against the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) in Bardhere which killed over 50 people (February 2002)
- Hundreds of families fled clan fight in Galkayo (January 2002)

Baidoa:

"Fresh fighting erupted in the town of Baidoa on Thursday in which at least 20 people were killed, [...]

It follows two days of relative calm after clashes on Monday in which seven people died. The fighting is pitting forces loyal to the chairman of the RRA, Hasan Muhammad Nur Shatigadud, against those loyal to his two deputies, Shaykh Adan Madobe and Muhammad Ibrahim Habsade.

[...]

The fighting, which reportedly died down by midday, intensified by late afternoon. "We have so far confirmed the deaths of at least 20 militia from both sides," a business source told IRIN. "There are reports of many civilian deaths, but it is difficult to ascertain, since it is impossible to move around."

[...]

Tension had been rising in Baidoa, the headquarters of the RRA, due to a deepening split between Shatigadud and his deputies over the establishment of the self-declared autonomous region of the South West State of Somalia (SWS). Shatigadud was declared SWS president in late March." (IRIN, 4 July 2002)

Mahaday:

"Heavy fighting once again resumed on Tuesday afternoon in Middle Shabelle region between the forces of the transitional national government (TNG) of Somalia and those of warlord Mohamed Omar Habeb best known as Mohamed Dhere.

[...]

Because of Tuesday's fighting, there have been hundreds of families who fled their villages [mainly Mahaday].

Many of these internally displaced people have reached Jalalaqsi district of Hiran region not very far away from where the fighting started.

[...]

Mohamed Dhere has accused the government of destabilizing Middle Shabelle region, while the government accused Warlord Mohamed Dhere of trying to force the people in Middle Shabelle region to support him forcefully and pay taxes." (Xinhua, 18 June 2002)

Mogadishu:

"At least 62 people were killed and more than 100 wounded in factional fighting in the Somali capital Mogadishu on Tuesday, top faction leader Hussein Mohamed Aidid told AFP." (AFP 28 May 2002)

"The security situation in Mogadishu deteriorated with an increase in kidnappings, and an upsurge in armed conflict between the Somalia Transitional National Government (TNG) and opposition groups. Militia loyal to Mohamed Dhere attacked the residence of TNG Interior Minister, Mr. Dahir Dayah. The attack caused significant casualties including death, injuries and destruction of property. Fighting broke out between TNG forces and opposition militias in North Mogadishu resulting in over 30 deaths and 60 injuries." (UNICEF, 12 June 2002)

Gedo:

"Thousands of people have fled, or are fleeing, their homes in the Gedo region of southwestern Somalia because of fighting between rival groups, local sources told IRIN on Thursday.

They have been streaming out of the border towns of Bulo Hawa, and Lugh, despite the onset of the main Gu season rains.

According to the sources, the fighting is between an alliance of the Marehan sub-clans of Rer Hasan, Hawarsame and Habar Ya'qub, which are supported by the opposition Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), and other Marehan sub-clans sympathetic to the Transitional National Government (TNG). The Marehan clan dominates the Gedo region.

Scores of people have been killed and many more wounded in the fighting, which flared up between the two groups in late March and reportedly displaced thousands of people, said Alidhuh Mahmud, head of the social affairs committee of Bardhere town in Gedo Region, and a member of the regional authority. "At least 3,000 families have been displaced, most of them from Bulo Hawa," he added. He said many of the displaced had crossed the border into the northeastern Kenyan town of Mandera. "Many others are scattered across the region," he said.

Alidhuh expressed concern not only at the plight of the Mandera refugees but also the displaced within Gedo, "who do not have shelter, food and medical assistance". "They are in urgent need of assistance," he stressed." (IRIN 25 April 2002)

Bardhere:

"Hundreds of families are fleeing their homes in the southwestern regions of Somalia for fear of renewed fighting, local sources told IRIN on Wednesday.

The exodus follows two outbreaks of heavy fighting within a week between opposing militias in the town of Bardhere.

The fighting, in which over 50 people were killed and many more wounded, occurred on 12 February and again on 18 February. It pitted forces of the Juba Valley Alliance, which supports the Transitional National Government (TNG), against those of the opposition Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC).

Families were leaving Bardhere town and the surrounding villages to the east, which bore the brunt of the fighting, and were moving in response to reports of renewed fighting and a fear that "the fighting will go on

for some time", Abdi Gesey, a Bardhere businessman, told IRIN. The two militias were reportedly receiving reinforcements and preparing to renew hostilities [...].

Humanitarian sources told IRIN that people were also leaving the town of Baidoa, about 200 km northwest of Mogadishu, for fear that the fighting might spread from Bardhere. "We have had reports of families coming from Baidoa to Buur Hakaba [about 80 km to the southeast of Baidoa] in the last two days," (IRIN, 20 February 2002)

"However, recent clashes and continuing tensions between JVA and SRRC forces in Bardhere (Gedo's most populated town) can only be expected to complicate this situation. Already, an estimated 40 people were killed, 50 wounded and an unknown number of people displaced in clashes earlier this week." (UNCU, 21 February 2002)

"However, recent clashes and continuing tensions between JVA and SRRC forces in Bardhere (Gedo's most populated town) can only be expected to complicate this situation. Already, an estimated 40 people were killed, 50 wounded and an unknown number of people displaced in clashes earlier this week." (UNCU, 21 February 2002)

Galkayo:

"About 40 people have been killed and 60 wounded in inter-clan fighting in the Mudug region of central Somalia, sources in the regional capital Galkayo told IRIN on Wednesday.

The fighting was concentrated in and around the village of Afbarwaqo, some 200 km east of Galkayo, but has now died down.

According to a local elder, Muhammad Salad Du'ale, the fighting - which broke out two weeks ago - occurred between the Sa'd sub-clan of the main Habar Gedir clan, and the Dir clan. It was sparked off by revenge killings for the deaths of eight fishermen near Afbarwaqo, but the ensuing escalation of the violence was also attributable to the scarcity of water and grazing in the area, Du'ale said.

[...]

The violence has reportedly displaced hundreds of families, who have sought refuge in areas where "there is not a single well or water point", Sheko Harir said. "Those are the ones who need immediate help." " (IRIN, 30 January 2002)

POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

Population profile

Population profile of returnees and IDPs around Hargeisa in Somaliland (June 2002)

- An estimated one out of ten households considers itself to be IDPs out of a total of 8,600 households
- 8% of households were displaced from Southern Somalia most of whom were found in Daami area
- Half households from Southern Somalia consider themselves immigrants rather than IDPs
- Among the 500 families in Aw Aden, about 6% are from Southern Somalia and consider themselves IDPs
- Among the 1,700 families living in Daami 35% are from southern Somalia
- In Stadium among 5,000 residents, about 1/5 consider themselves IDPs although they are primarily Somalis from Somaliland or Ethiopia

"In and around Hargeisa, there are now four IDP camps: Mohamed Morge, Sheick Nor, Darmi and the State house area." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

"In February, March, and April of 2002, a group of international NGOs and UN agencies coordinated their activities to conduct a broad assessment of the returnee settlement areas around Hargeisa." (Clark, June 2002, p.5)

"The assessment working group, made up of representatives from participating organizations, decided that this assessment should focus on the eight largest and most conspicuous returnee settlement areas around Hargeisa. These include the four permanent, city-planned areas of Ayaha, Aw Aden, Mohamed Mooge, and Sheikh Nur; the two neighborhoods of Daami and Sinai; and the two informal areas of Stadium and State House. The assessment developed tools and proceeded with the assessment as described in this section." (Clark, June 2002, p.13)

"Categories of people include returned refugees, IDPs, and immigrants.

[...]

The use of these terms in this report, then, does not conform with UNHCR standards; rather, it conforms with the respondents' perceptions of the terms and their own situations." (Clark, June 2002, p.20)

"Two thirds of the households living in these eight areas consider themselves to be returned refugees, while one in seven considers itself to be immigrant. One in 10 households considers itself internally displaced." (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

General population profile:

"-The total population in the 8 areas was estimated at 8,600 households, or 57,000 people.

-Households in the survey ranged in size from 2 to 18 members, with a median of 6 members.

[...]

-20% of households in the areas reported that they are female-headed.

[...]

-One half the population living in these areas is under age 15, while almost two thirds are under age 20 years." (Clark, June 2002. p.5)

"-The middle half of all area residents (25th to 75th percentiles) have lived in their settlement area for between 2 and 4 years. The duration of residence in the area did not correlate significantly with a household's current wealth.

- Over all 8 areas, 60% of households were in Ethiopian refugee camps immediately before arriving at the Hargeisa returnee settlement areas; 8% were from Southern Somalia, and 16% reported they moved there from elsewhere in Hargeisa. The remaining households reported that they had been in Ethiopia though not in a camp (9%), elsewhere in Somaliland (4%), or elsewhere abroad (2%).

- 80% of the residents are originally from Somaliland before the wars, 9% from Southern Somalia, and 8% are non-Somali Ethiopians. 3% are Somali Ethiopians.

- Daami area contains most of the Southern Somalis, and Daami and Sheikh Nur share the non-Somali Ethiopian population. The settlement areas are in general ethnically organized, and minority ethnicities tend to group together within the areas.

-One half of those families from Southern Somalia consider themselves immigrants rather than IDPs. Overall, 1 in 7 families living in the returnee settlements considers itself to be an immigrant household.

- 80% of those living in the areas plan to remain there, insh'allah.

- Of those families who consider themselves returned refugees and who returned after 1997, 51% reported receiving assistance from UNHCR." (Clark, June 2002. p.6-7)

"In summary, most of those originally from Somaliland consider themselves returned refugees, while those considering themselves immigrants are split between Southern Somalis and Ethiopians, both Somali and non-Somali. Southern Somalis often consider themselves immigrants rather than IDPs. Virtually all the non-Somali Ethiopians consider themselves immigrants." (Clark, June 2002, p.28)

Aw Aden:

"The household survey shows that around 6% of families there are originally from Southern Somalia; this group considers itself to be internally displaced. This assessment's estimated population for the area (as of March 2002) is 500 families comprising 3,500 people." (Clark, June 2002, p.21)

Ayaha:

"The focus groups revealed a small minority of Southern Somali IDPs, but the household survey did not find this population at all, perhaps because they live in a single small neighborhood.

[...]

Estimates from this assessment put Ayaha's population at 500 families, or 3,100 people." (Clark, June 2002, p.21)

Daami:

"The population of Daami encompasses Southern Somali IDPs and immigrants, Ethiopian immigrants, and minority clans, all in relatively large proportions. The Southern Somali IDPs and immigrants are primarily from Baidoa, Wajid, Beletweine, and Mogudishu, and settled in Daami in 1994 after fleeing the conflict in the South. This population is mostly of the [xxx] subclan; most had their possessions in the south looted or stolen before moving north (Medani, 2000). [...] The [other] Somalis living in the area [...] consider themselves returned refugees, while the Southern Somalis split between considering themselves immigrants and IDPs*.

[...]

This assessment estimates the population living in Daami neighborhood at 1,700 families, or roughly 10,000 people, making it the second largest returnee settlement area in this survey." (Clark, June 2002, p.21-2)

"In all areas, a majority of households say they are originally from Somaliland; this number is lowest in Daami, with a high percentage of families from Southern Somalia (35%) and non- Somali Ethiopian households (14%)." (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

"In Daami, all those from Ethiopia considered themselves immigrants, while 24 of the 35 families from Southern Somalia considered themselves not IDPs but immigrants." (Clark, June 2002 p.28)

Stadium:

"Stadium is the most central of the eight returnee settlement areas in this assessment, located on the south bank of the river next to the old Hargeisa football stadium. The land belongs to the government, which insists that the settlement there will not be a permanent one and is currently engaged in a strategy to relocate the population to permanent sites.

[...]

About 1/5 of residents consider themselves IDPs even though they are primarily Somalis originally from Somaliland or Ethiopia.

Stadium is geographically quite small (approximately 17 hectares), but is very densely populated. This assessment estimates the population at about 750 households with 5,000 people." (Clark, June 2002, p.23)

"The residents in Stadium stand out because more than 1/5 of respondents originally from Somaliland consider themselves IDPs." (Clark, June 2002 p.28)

**Note that on request of the government, names of clans have been removed.*

Recent returnees from Ethiopia who are unable to regain homes now make up portion of IDP population (2001-2002)

- Refugee returnees become IDPs as very little opportunities exist for returning to their areas of origin or to reintegrate

"In a country that has to deal with the consequences of large numbers of people who are displaced, the distinction between internally displaced (IDPs) and refugees has little relevance. In the case of Somalia, refugees as well as IDPs may be reluctant to return to their home areas since they remain replete with mines. Many former refugees are now IDPs since on-going conflict often prevents them from accessing their regions of origin. Equally significantly, demobilised militia, who may still retain their arms, have little incentive to return to their original towns or villages." (UNDP, June 2002, p.5)

"Humanitarian sources in Hargeysa said people living in the [resettlement] camps had 'come from a variety of circumstances, and a variety of places'. Some were spontaneous returnees from Ethiopia who had been living in poor, makeshift accommodation for years, while others had returned through formal, assisted repatriation programmes by UNHCR. There are also small groups of displaced people from southern Somalia – who are known as 'refugees' by the Somaliland authorities, but considered 'displaced' by international humanitarian agencies. "These are the 'invisibles'," a local source said of the southerners.

[...]

Humanitarian sources told IRIN that most returnees had congregated in the Somaliland capital rather than returning to their original home areas. Various reasons had been suggested for the phenomenon, including loss of livestock and homes, the need for cash-based employment, dislocation and habitual dependency, the source said." (IRIN-CEA 22 August 2001)

Global figures

An estimated 400,000 persons said to be displaced in Somalia (2002)

- International observers cite figures between 300,000 and 400,000 for internally displaced population
- Accurate estimates of IDPs in Somalia is impossible to establish due to incessant flow of people due to drought, conflict, seasonal migrations as well as unsettled returnees


"In this case, the vulnerable population would likely fall to near 400,000 people - roughly the same number as the caseload of internally displaced persons (IDPs)." (UN November 2001, p. 5)

"There are approximately 300,000 internally displaced persons in the country, representing approximately 4 percent of the population." (USDOS February 2001, Freedom of Movement)

"In Somalia, an estimated 350,000 of the country's 7 million inhabitants are internally displaced. This figure includes some 40-50,000 Somalis displaced in 1999. During the war to oust the Siad Barre regime, political violence, banditry and lawlessness produced famine conditions and induced mass population displacement. While there was a gradual return of IDPs to their locations of origin between 1993 and 1995, continuing violence, food insecurity and water shortages have exacerbated their living conditions." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

Total figures of internally displaced for 1992-2001 period:

Year	Estimated number of IDPs	Source
End 2001	400,000	(USCR 2002, p.6)
End 2000	300,000	(USCR 2001, p.6)
End 1999	350,000	(USCR 2000, p.6)
End 1998	250,000	(USCR 1999, pp. 87-88)
End 1997	200,000	(USCR 1998, p. 92)
End 1996	250,000	(USCR 1997, p. 92)
End 1995	300,000	(USCR 1996, p. 66)
End 1994	500,000	(USCR 1995, p. 74)
End 1992	2,000,000	(USCR 1998, p.92)



"At the peak of Somalia's upheaval in 1992, more than 800,000 Somalis were refugees in neighboring countries, and as many as 2 million people were internally displaced. Large numbers gradually returned to their home areas during 1993-95, despite sporadic violence and new population flight in some regions. Only 5,000 repatriated in 1996." (USCR 1998, p. 92)

Somaliland:

"By 1988 full scale civil war broke out in Northwest, where Siyad Barre's force attacked the city of Hargeysa in a brutal campaign against the Isaaq clan that led to charges of genocide" (IGAD/UNHCR/UNDP, December 2000, p.7)

"Siad Barre's sustained military offensive crippled agricultural production, destroyed nearly all of the region's livestock, decimated northwest Somalia's businesses, places of worship, and water infrastructure, and uprooted almost the entire population of approximately 2.5 million people.

Fleeing war, mass executions, and torture, approximately 4000,000 residents of northwest Somalia sought refuge in other countries.[...] An estimated 1.5 million additional people were displaced within northwest Somalia." (USCR, December 2001, p.15)

"It is virtually impossible to estimate the number of IDP while it seems that most of the population has been displaced at one time or another during the past ten years of conflict. There are many different categories of IDP in Somalia. These include people who moved from one part of the country to another due to civil conflict and/or fear of persecution; economic migrants who had little option but to move to urban centres in order to survive; pastoralists permanently displaced by drought; returnees who have not been able to return to their traditional areas of origin; demobilised soldiers; widows and orphans." (IGAD/UNHCR/UNDP, December 2000, p.12)

Geographical distribution

Majority of displaced persons believed to reside in and around Mogadishu (1999-2002)

- Between 100,000 and 230,000 displaced persons said to live in and around Mogadishu
- Thousands of newly displaced reached Mogadishu in early 2000
- Internally displaced reportedly make up 20 to 25% of Mogadishu population

"More than 200,000 displaced persons continued to live in some 200 Mogadishu-area camps and squatter settlements at year's end [2001]. Thousands of others remained internally displaced in relatively peaceful Somaliland, including newly uprooted civilians who had fled violence in southern Somalia." (USCR, 2002, p.94-97)

"Several thousand people fled into Mogadishu, further crowding the city with displaced families. About 230,000 displaced persons lived in some 200 Mogadishu-area camps and squatter settlements as the year ended [2000]." (USCR 2001, p. 105)

"More than 350,000 people are internally displaced and tend to live off subsistence wages for unskilled day labour, including over 100,000 in Mogadishu." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

"During the first half of the year [2000], thousands of newly displaced Somalis descended on the capital, Mogadishu; gunfights in Mogadishu and at other locations left hundreds dead; a local aid worker was killed and two international relief workers were kidnapped; and floods damaged two displacement camps and killed thousands of livestock." (USCR 28 August 2000, para. 2)

Estimates on the number of camps in and around Mogadishu vary: according to the Somali Refugee Agency SORA, there are 138 camps in Mogadishu, north and south, in which 30 per cent of the population are refugees, while the non-governmental organization Action Contre la Faim estimates that 234,000 displaced Somalis live in 201 camps in Mogadishu (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999), whereas another source indicates the number of IDPs in Mogadishu is almost 250,000 in about 150 camps in open areas, comprising approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the population of Mogadishu. (FEWS Network 26 February 1999)

Northern provinces host tens of thousands of displaced persons (2000-2002)

- The Northwest host about 11,000 IDPs, mainly in urban centers notably Hargeisa has four IDP camps: Mohamed Morge, Sheick Nor, Darmi and the State house
- Burao town as a major trading center hosts very large numbers of IDPs and several camps are located in the district
- The Northeast has no infrastructure to absorb an indeterminable numbers of IDPs from southern Somalia as well as influx of returnees
- Bossaso and Galkayo towns host about 33,000 IDPs in camps
- IDPs were said to make up 30% of Bossaso's population in 2001 and in 2000 there were an estimated 165,000 IDPs

Northwest Somalia:

"Within Somalia there is also a significant population of IDPs whose situation needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency. There are an estimated 11,000 IDPs living in Northwest Somalia,[...] primarily in Hargeysa and other urban centres." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.4)

Hargeysa District:

"In and around Hargeisa, there are now four IDP camps: Mohamed Morge, Sheick Nor, Darmi and the State house area." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

"Hargeysa town is the biggest agglomeration in the Northwest and concentrates public administration, private sector and international community interventions. Urban growth started before the war with the migration of the rural population. Since the end of the hostilities Hargeysa has undertaken significant reconstruction and rehabilitation activities and is the destination for a large number of refugees and IDPs.

Hargeysa town hosts about 60% of the returnee population, most of whom are spontaneous returnees of 1991-1997. In addition, a considerable number of refugees remaining in the Ethiopian camps (Camaboker, Rabasso, Daror) are choosing Hargeysa as their zone of repatriation." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, pp.22-23)

Burao District:

"Burao town is an important livestock trade centre, with a considerable concentration of urban population. There are also a significant number of rural populations in the district. Strongly affected by the past conflict, both urban and rural zones have to cope with the presence of a very large number of IDPs (several camps of IDP are located in the district). It also has received many spontaneous returnees during the past years.

Burao district will be a significant destination of the repatriation movement as a large number of refugees remaining in the Daror camp in Ethiopia have selected this district." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p 23)

Northeast Somalia:

"Due to its relatively unscathed status the Northeast has been the destination for many of Somalia's IDPs, particularly from the war-ravaged south. It is impossible to quantify the precise numbers of IDPs who have moved to this region since many of them have integrated into communities where they have family ties. However, it is clear that there has been a considerable influx of population into the region, which does not have the infrastructure to cope with such a population increase." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.3)

In addition to this, an estimated 33,000 IDPs are living in camps on the outskirts of Bossaso and Gal kayo [...] in Northeast Somalia, with minimal infrastructure and economic livelihood opportunities." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.4)

Bossaso District:

The total population of Bossaso District is estimated at 250,000 persons. Bossaso town suffered a moderate level of physical destruction and has to cope with poverty and environmental problems. Strongly affected by a large influx of IDPs (including an estimated 28,000 in settlements around the town [...]) the district has a limited absorption capacity because of its weak urban services. After the war Bossaso became the most important port of the Northeast, which is a unique employment source." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p 23)

"In Bossaso, for instance, IDPs are estimated to make up 30% of the population. IDPs often come from the minority groups (Bantu) and clans with low status in the community." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

"Bossaso town suffered a moderate level of physical destruction and has to cope with poverty and environmental problems. Strongly affected by influx of IDP estimated at 165,000 and returnees (close to 8,000), the district has a limited absorption capacity because of its weak urban services. After the war Bossaso became the most important port of the Northeast, which is a unique employment source." (UNHCR/UNDP, December 2000, p.34)

"Tens of thousands of people remained internally displaced in relatively calm Somaliland and Puntland, according to aid agencies. Thousands of residents from southern Somalia fled to northern areas, particularly to Puntland, hoping to escape Somalia by boat to Yemen. Hundreds drowned in overcrowded boats en route to Yemen. Another 7,000 reached Yemen during the year." (USCR 2000, pp. 115-116)

Garowe District:

Has been selected due to its role as the administrative centre of Northeast Somalia. It is experiencing a rapid urbanisation process and, as such, it has a strong potential to attract IDPs and returnees. (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p 23)

Fighting and food insecurity in southern Somalia result in the continual displacement of families (2000-2002)

- Insecurity in Gedo has displaced families to Bay and Bakol as well as across the border with Kenya
- Some 300-400 IDP families have congregated in Rabdure, Bakool since early 2001
- An upsurge in inter-clan fighting has led to new displacements in Bulo Hawo, Kismaio and elsewhere in Middle and Lower Juba
- Many IDPs reportedly moved from Lower Shabelle to Baidoa in 2000

Gedo:

"The FSAU field monitor in the region also reports that some Gedo IDPs have moved in to Bay and Bakol to flee the insecurity" (FSAU Food Security, June 2002)

"In recent weeks, fifteen to twenty thousand people are estimated to have crossed to Mandera in Kenya from Belet Hawa in Somalia. Of these, 3,700-5,000 are reported to have registered for resettlement in Dadaab refugee camp. A significant number have also integrated through kinship and clan structure with the population of Mandera town." (FSAU Nutrition Update, June 2002)

"However, the second influx from Belet Hawa town has remained in at location on the outskirts of Mandera known as BP1 (border Post 1) a few hundred metres inside Kenya. [...] Reports suggest that many of the refugees at BP1 are formerly internally displaced people from within Somalia who had been trying to make a living in Belet Hawa and who have no ties with the Mandera community. Even before these former IDPs arrived in Mandera, their nutritional status is likely to have been extremely poor." (FSAU, Food Security, June 2002)

Rabdure, Bakool:

"For poor and very poor agro-pastoralist families in Bakool region, a 25-40% food energy deficit is expected over the one-year period from July 2001 to June 2002. However, some areas and populations within these areas are more vulnerable than others due to disproportionately low rains and/or influx of IDPs. Rabdure District in Bakool Region is one such area. Within a three-kilometre radius of Rabdure town, 300-400 families have settled within the past two months. The majority of these IDPs, at least 70%, are Somalis who had settled in Barey and Kumbul areas of Ethiopia due to insecurity in early 1990s but have returned to Somalia since April 2001 due to increased tension between them and the Ethiopian communities. These people had their origins in Rabdure and so may not be absorbed in other villages outside that area. The remainder of the IDPs have come from within Bakool Region (Wajid district and the surrounding villages of Rabdure town) with their movement being triggered by rumours of food distribution. It was reported that this latter group initially came in large numbers but have been moving out

towards Elberde in search of pasture while some returned to their homes when they realised that there was no general food distribution. This trend may continue." (FSAU 16 August 2001, Bakool Update)

Bulo Hawo:

"Heavy fighting in Bulo Hawo in April claimed the lives of over eighty militia and an unconfirmed number of civilian casualties. Up to 10,000 persons fled across the border to Mandera, Kenya. Although IDPs are now slowly returning to Bulo Hawo, the area remains tense and prolonged displacement may have an impact on food security." (UNICEF 12 July 2001, sect. 1)

Middle and Lower Juba:

"Dozens of families were Monday fleeing Somalia's southern Middle Juba region in fear of renewed interclan fighting following the deployment of rival militia forces, residents said.

[...]

The JVA and Morgan have clashed in the nearby Lower Juba since July 27, leaving some 200 people dead and displaced hundreds of families, militia and medical sources said.

'Already dozens of families left and more others who can afford to get food during the voyage would go to Mogadishu and the port town of Merka,' said another Jilib resident, Asha Ibrahim." (AFP 3 September 2001)

Kismaio:

"Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced by the recent fight for control of the southern port town of Kismaio between the rebel forces and those pro-government troops." (Xinhua 28 August 2001)

Baidoa:

"The RRA [Rahanweyn Resistance Army] referred to the situation of the internally displaced persons from Lower Shabelle region who are coming to Baidoa. The harsh conditions in the town make their absorption difficult. The RRA also emphasized that the Rahanweyn in Lower Shabelle are still living under oppressive conditions." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 21)

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

IDPs tend to flee northwards to take refuge where some degree of peace and stability allowed some recovery (2002)

- Security is better in Somaliland, Bay, Bakool and Middle Shabelle
- Somaliland hosts the highest number of IDPs
- Urban-rural patterns of displacement as IDPs fled to their 'clan-areas' considerably expanded smaller regional towns during the 1990s
- This trend was further exacerbated by the lack of decentralisation of humanitarian assistance

"At the same time, this reporting period has seen modest improvements in the security situation in some regions including "Somaliland", Bay, Bakool and Middle Shabelle. Cooperation of local authorities in these regions towards maintaining peace and stability has resulted in the increased ability of humanitarian agencies to expand programmes. The Northwest/"Somaliland" hosts the highest number of IDPs who tend to flee northwards to escape drought, poverty and conflict. It also hosts the largest number of refugee returnees. It is imperative that humanitarian and development work continue as "peace dividends" in these more peaceful parts of Somalia." (UN, May 2002, p.2)

"For a time during the war this process was reverse as people fled the main towns and moved to areas that their clans came from. Consequently, the populations of previously small regional towns such as Beletweyne, Galkaiyo, Qardo or Baidoa, and rural villages such as Jeriban, rose dramatically. The population of Bosasso is estimated to have increased from 10,000 to 60,000 since 1991, as people fled fighting in Mogadishu, the Lower Juba and the interriverine areas. [...]Smaller towns are experiencing similar trends, which present a challenge for urban planning. The concentration of aid agencies in urban centers such as Hargeisa, and a lack of clear policies by the administrations on investment in rural areas, exacerbate this trend." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.58)

IDPs are largely integrated within urban and rural communities (November 2001)

"Reaching vulnerable groups in Somalia is further complicated by the dispersion of destitute populations. For instance, since 1999, there are very few IDP camps in Somalia. Rather, IDPs and other high-risk groups are integrated within larger urban communities and rural villages. This renders their vulnerability less visible and makes targeting difficult, although the suffering of poor Somalis is no less real." (UN November 2001)

Somalis are largely nomadic making it difficult to assess patterns of displacement (1993-2001)

- 80% of Somalis are said to be "pastoral nomadic" with only 20% as "urban agricultural"
- Even prior to conflict, people travelled great distances in search of food, pasture and water
- Over last years, there has been continuous movement of people from rural to urban centres

"Quantifying displacement is extremely difficult in Somalia given the prevalence of nomadic and semi-nomadic social structures. Even prior to the collapse of the central state, populations travelled great distances in search of food, pasture and water during times of stress. The protracted nature of displacement offers its own analytical challenges, particularly given the recurrence of multiple 'waves' and directions of displacement.

Displacement trends are also changing. With the decreasing volume and regularity of food relief distributions, 'food camps' no longer exist. Households now move from drought- and conflict-stricken areas toward riverine and urban areas, returning when situations improve. Populations communicate over long distances to ascertain better knowledge of localised conditions before deciding on their direction of movement. Many long-term IDPs have dispersed in large towns. They are destitute populations living in shanty camps and abandoned buildings in peripheral urban areas." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

"The Somalis are largely nomadic, roaming throughout the Horn of Africa. They live in small, temporary hamlets that are dismantled and loaded on to camels for quick and easy migration. Because of this nomadic way of life, social units tend to be small and self-sufficient...

Roughly 80% of the Somali population is 'pastoral nomadic' and only 20% can be described as urban agricultural. The social and economic life of Somalia is therefore defined by a nomadic, rural style of life with trade consisting mainly of agricultural products. Over many years there has been a continuous movement of the population from the rural areas to the big urban centres in the south like Mogadishu, where there is a now large permanent urban population, mostly dependent on agriculture." (Jama 13 December 2000 in Humanitarian Affairs Review, Nomadic culture)

"More than two-thirds of Somalia's populace are nomadic or semi-nomadic. During the dry season the nomads concentrate in villages near water sources; when the rains begin they disperse with their herds. Traditionally, nomadism is the most desirable life-style. Somalis constitute the vast majority of the population. Cultural divisions between pastoral nomads (the *Samaal*) and sedentary cultivators and herdsmen (the *Saab*) have been weakened by large migrations from the countryside into towns, but most Somalis maintain a strong loyalty to one of many clans and sub-clans." (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Micropaedia, 1993, p. 4)

Discrimination against Bantu and Rahanweyn minorities makes them particularly vulnerable to displacement and other human rights abuses (1999)

- Bantu peoples subject to human rights abuses and the taking of land by militia and bandits
- Rahanweyn minority has also been subjected to dispossession and displacement

"Non-discrimination is a fundamental principle embodied in the first paragraph of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Although Somali society appears to be homogeneous, there are several minority groups in the country. These minorities have been the main victims of the famine and the civil war. The Bantu minority lives along the banks of the Juba and Shabelle rivers, which constitute the life lines of Somalia. The Rahanweyn minority lives between these two rivers, in Bay and Bakool. While the Bantus are largely unarmed, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army is armed to some extent, although insignificantly compared to the other groups. Other minorities live in the coastal areas.

The Bantus, who are thought to descend from slaves brought to Somalia from other east African countries in the eleventh century, are considered a low-status ethnic group. They frequently suffer discriminatory practices and violence. For instance, the Bantus in the Hiran region require permission to go to Belet Weyne, the main town of the region. They have their own market and they are not allowed to mix with the rest of the population. They are brought into town for hard labour. They have less access to education and fewer economic opportunities than other Somalis. Their villages have been burnt, and Bantu women have

been raped. During the civil war, the Bantu population has been systematically pushed off their land towards the river by militias or bandits. They are now so close to the river that they face a real risk of their settlements being washed away during floods.

[...]

The Rahanweyn minority lives on fertile agricultural land and is more advanced in agriculture. It too has been subjected to dispossession and displacement." (CHR 18 February 1999, paras. 77-80)

"In Somaliland and Puntland, there are problems of discrimination against minorities and internally displaced persons. (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 5)

Families moving early to water and grazing sites as result of failed rains (July-September 2001)

- Various indications that pastoral families have moved their animals to better grazing areas earlier than normal this year
- Many families also moving to Lower Shabelle and Mogadishu in search of employment

"An inter-agency co-ordination meeting in Baidoa discussed the drought situation in the zone resulting from poor Gu rains and its effect on vulnerable communities in Bay and Bakool regions. Reports from partners in these areas indicate estimates of 50-90 per cent population migration from villages seriously affected by the drought into larger towns within the district in search of water and food. Farming communities are worst affected because of successive crop failure." (UNICEF 7 September 2001)

"The dry weather has also seriously affected the grazing and fodder conditions for livestock. Many families have already begun to take their animals elsewhere in search of better grazing while others have left the area seeking alternative means of survival. Migration is normal in this region, but this year it has started far too early." (WFP 22 August 2001)

"Nearly a million Somalis are affected by drought in large areas of their country, a minister in the new transitional government said on Sunday [15 July 2001].

[...]

Thousands of rural families had been forced to move from their homes in search of food and water, he said." (Reuters 15 July 2001)

"There are also some indications of the beginnings of population movement...That is a standard coping mechanism. When people see the rains have failed and they are not going to have much of a harvest, and they have livestock to feed, they try to move to areas where they can graze their animals or get employment. And they move considerable distances. Water is another trigger, and the water supplies throughout the south are very low indeed.

It's mainly the pastoral population who are taking their animals for better grazing, as well as people simply looking for employment. Of course, I am not speaking of massive numbers of people yet, but certainly some have started moving out, mainly to Lower Shabelle and Mogadishu...Employment opportunities in these areas are not very good." (IRIN-CEA 9 July 2001)

Somali families reportedly move regularly and even split up in order to reach resources (1999-2000)

- Families in 'Puntland' sometimes split up so that at least some benefit from refugee assistance
- More than two-third of Somalis are nomadic or semi-nomadic

- Somalis have repeatedly moved to Mogadishu seeking relatives and opportunities

"The independent expert in her report to the Commission in 1998 (E/CN.4/1998/96) reported about the situation of the internally displaced. She said that Bosasso hosted tens of thousands of internally displaced persons, who constituted about one third of the city's population. She reported that many internally displaced preferred that part of their family became refugees by crossing the Gulf of Aden by boat to Yemen in order to be eligible for refugee status and to be assisted by UNHCR, or that they continued to Saudi Arabia." (CHR, 26 January 2000, p. 32)

"Many families in the camps have been repeatedly displaced, and for some, it is their second or third time in the capital. Some arrive seeking relatives, but others come because it remains a traditional migration route – even with Mogadishu's precipitous decline, the displaced still expect the capital to provide opportunities. The majority [of IDPs] said they survived by begging, by receiving food scraps, and by earning a little cash by providing 'carrying services' to people in the market – earning about 2,000-3,000 Somali shillings a day." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

General

UNICEF targets IDP children as a priority group in need of special protection (2002)

- IDP children have needs above basic survival
- Compared to other war-ravaged countries Somali childsoldiers are not many, however, children still join the militias when most alternative survival strategies fail
- War has eroded social protection networks and minorities such as the Bantu and Ogadeni are particularly prey to abuses

"All children in Somalia have been directly affected by the conflict, but there are subgroups who have special social problems and needs - and have a right to - special care, protection and, in some cases, social reintegration over and above the basic survival and development needs of children in general. There are tens of thousands of displaced children, youth and women living in camp conditions in extreme poverty; thousands of children living on the streets; hundreds of children live in orphanages and large numbers of physically and mentally disabled and handicapped children. While compared to other war-torn countries, the number of child soldiers in Somalia is not considered to be very large, a considerable number of children under 18 live in the company of older siblings serving with militia groups or simply attach themselves with such groups. While many children benefit from some forms of support from the traditional clan assistance mechanisms, some, mostly minority groups such as Bantus and Ogadenis, who are generally marginalised by the Somali society, are particularly vulnerable, and often suffer from deprivation and abuse. Moreover, the residual impact of the decade-long conflict has weakened traditional family protection mechanisms.

Prioritisation of target groups to be assisted will be made on information derived from recent assessments. However, based on existing information, support will go to increase educational and recreational opportunities, health care and psychosocial services to children in internally displaced camps, street children and disabled children (including mine victims) and the reintegration of children currently attached to militia and being demobilised. UNICEF will continue advocacy efforts with both local and central authorities to ensure that a portion of local resources is reserved for basic social services." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.73)

Human rights abuses remain commonplace in many parts of Somalia (1998-2002)

- Widespread abuses by armed militias and clan-based factions particularly in Mogadishu during May, July and October 2001
- Islamic courts do not meet standards of fair trial and judicial competence Freedom of expression limited with peaceful demonstrator shot dead and political opponent imprisoned
- Women children and minorities are primary victims

"Fighting between rival clans and factions continued throughout 2001. Hundreds of civilians were killed in outbreaks during which indiscriminate force was used. Incidents took place mainly in the Mogadishu area and in the south and reportedly also involved Ethiopian troops supporting the Rahanwein Resistance Army. Scores of civilians were indiscriminately killed during fighting between rival clans and factions in May and

July in Mogadishu. In October, 30 people were killed in Mogadishu in fighting between government forces and militia linked to political factions. There were killings and reprisal killings of clan opponents, expulsions of members of other clans, cases of kidnapping as well as detention, and torture or ill-treatment of prisoners. Women and minorities were particularly vulnerable to abuses. None of the factions respected the principles of international humanitarian law which regulate the conduct of armed conflict and protect civilians.

In November, 18 students were reportedly shot dead by armed factions at their school near Buulo Barde in Hiran region.

In March gunmen in Mogadishu abducted four UN staff members and three from the non-governmental organization *Médecins sans frontières*. All were released unharmed several days later.

Rule of law

A process to gradually bring Islamic courts, established by faction leaders, into the national judicial system began in Mogadishu. However, there was concern that they did not meet recognized standards of fair trial and judicial competence. Several death sentences were imposed by such courts, which were reportedly immediately carried out. Concern continued that judicial administrations and police forces in Somaliland and Puntland displayed inconsistent respect for legal rights. Reports persisted by human rights defenders in Somaliland of arbitrary detentions, unfair trials, poor prison conditions and cases of torture and unlawful killing by police.

Freedom of expression

Freedom of expression was very limited in all areas of the country, with little tolerance by government authorities or armed factions of criticism by individuals or the media. Scores of journalists and others were arrested and detained without charge for days or weeks. Many were prisoners of conscience. Human rights groups continued to urge the government and factions to respect human rights.

In February, Safiyo Abdi Haji Garweyne, an 18-year-old woman, was killed and others injured when police reportedly opened fire on a crowd protesting at the arrest of a number of people following a peaceful demonstration in Bosasso, Puntland.

Suleiman Mohamed Gaal, a former Somaliland presidential candidate, was arrested in May in Hargeisa, Somaliland, and held for two weeks. He was accused of supporting the TNG. He remained on bail without charge at the end of 2001." (AI, January 2002)

Internally displaced women and children at risk (1999-2000)

- Rape and sexual abuse are common in internally displaced persons camps
- Thousands of displaced children live on the streets and in orphanages; others attached to militia groups
- Bantu, Ogadenis and Rahanweyn minorities often marginalised and even targeted in some cases

"All children in Somalia can be considered as being in 'especially difficult circumstances' but, there are subgroups who have special social problems and needs – and have a right to – special care, protection and, in some cases, social reintegration over and above the basic survival and development needs of children in general.

There are tens of thousands of displaced children, youth and women living in camp conditions in extreme poverty; many thousands of children living on the streets; hundreds of children live in orphanages; large

numbers of physically and mentally disabled and handicapped children; and, unknown numbers of children attached to militia groups.

While many benefit from some forms of support from the traditional clan assistance mechanisms, some, mostly minority groups such as Bantus and Ogadenis, who are generally marginalised by the Somali society, are particularly vulnerable, and often suffer from deprivation and abuse." (UN March 2001, p. 76)

"There are believed to be substantial numbers of children and women living in camps in extreme poverty; [...]

Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional socio-cultural structures of Somali society and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in decision-making and access to resources. Violence against women and girls, resulting either from tradition or the civil war, includes the almost universal practice of female genital mutilation and sexual violence against the displaced, particularly against members of rival clans and minority groups." (UNICEF 2000, paras. 7 and 8)

"Human rights defenders reported to the independent expert that there are many cases of sexual abuse of women and children, particularly among the internally displaced population. The situation with regard to internal displacement is making the number of street children rise. Although most of these children are 'Somalilanders', there are also other groups, including Ethiopians. An increase in the use of alcohol and hashish among children has also been cited." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 26)

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in Somali society, where the rights of women in both the private and public spheres are seriously undermined. Rape, which was uncommon in Somalia before the war, has become a weapon of war for the militia and bandits, as well as in camps for displaced persons and returnees. Women belonging to minority groups, such as the Bantus and the Rahanweyn, are particularly subject to these crimes." (CHR 18 February 1999, para. 74)

Most Somalis ensure personal security by residing in clan "home areas" (November 2000)

- Rule of law, guarantees of personal security and protection from human rights abuses vary from location to location
- Much of Somali countryside - especially Somaliland, Puntland and pockets of southern Somalia - are considered safe
- Politically weak groups such as the Bantu and Bajuni are least able to secure protection from extortion, rape and other abuses

"Notwithstanding the general perception of Somalia as 'anarchic', basic law and order is in fact the norm in most locations. Though hard data is not available, anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the Somali countryside – especially Somaliland, Puntland, and pockets of southern Somalia – is safer for local residents than is the case in neighbouring countries. There are, to be sure, shifting zones of very dangerous banditry and criminality in places like Jowhar, the lower Jubba valley, and parts of Mogadishu. It is also true that both Somali nationals and foreigners associated with an international organization or a profitable business are frequent targets of kidnapping for ransom, especially in Mogadishu. But it is important not to confuse the security problems of international aid agencies with security problems for average residents.

Public order, rule of law, and personal security throughout the country continue to be based on a combination of traditional mechanisms: kinship protection, or mutual obligations within blood-payment groups (*diya*); clan-based customary law (*xeer*) and mediation structures provided by elders or respected sheikhs; and protection of weaker social groups via the practice of *shegrad*, or adoption into a stronger clan. [...]

In practice, rule of law, guarantees of personal security, and protection of human rights in Somalia vary from location to location and according to the social standing of the individual. Most Somalis ensure their personal security by residing in the 'home areas' of their clan, where they are assured full status and protection by their kin group. Ironically, for many Somali urbanites, this arrangement can lead to a situation in which they are simultaneously 'at home' in their clan's territory, but 'internally displaced', in that they are forced to live in areas far from their actual homes in the capital city. Somalis are increasingly able to both visit and live in cities outside their clan's traditional domain, but typically as a guest of more dominant clans, an arrangement which requires time and sometimes protection money to ensure. Politically weak social groups, such as the Bantu and Bajuni, are least able to secure protection from extortion, rape, and other abuses by criminal elements of more powerful clans; they remain somewhat vulnerable no matter where they reside." (Menkhaus November 2000, p. 9)

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)

Food/nutrition

General assessment of needs situation (2002)

- 780,000 food-insecure people (12% of total population) due to prolonged drought, floods, conflict, lack of road-access, and the livestock ban increasing commodity prices
- Despite the protracted emergency situation in Somalia, hardly any agency has addressed the special needs of the internally displaced people (2002)
- The UN survey on IDPs in Somalia to strengthen needs-appropriate response, planned in January still not available (as of end of June 2002)
- Gedo is the worst hit region in terms of disease outbreaks, natural and man-made calamities, followed by Bari/Sanag, Awdal Bay, Bakool and Hiran regions
- Cholera outbreaks were reported in Mogadishu and other southern and central areas of Somalia
- Already end 2001 WFP warned 500,000 Southern Somalis suffered from serious food shortages due to failed rains in August 2001

"An estimated 780,000 people (12% of total population) in Somalia currently require food assistance" (SCF-UK, January 2002).

"In spite of the protracted crisis in Somalia, there has been minimal focus on addressing the special needs of the internally displaced persons, approximately 320,000. Most have little hope of returning to their home areas and have clustered in settlements in safer locations and urban centres. UN agencies and NGOs are undertaking limited relief activities to support them, but there remains a dearth of basic amenities and protection assistance. The UN Coordination Unit has completed a survey of the IDP situation. Based on the findings, agencies will design a strategy for both immediate and longer-term intervention to ameliorate the conditions of these displaced populations. There needs to be a deliberate effort to include IDPs in situation analyses, needs assessments, administration of relief aid and development programmes." (UN, May 2002, p.12)

"A survey on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has been completed and is in the process and the report is being finalised. This report will be used to develop common strategies for addressing the immediate to long-term needs of IDPs." (UN, May 2002, p.9)

"An IDP survey will be undertaken in anticipation of the inter-agency meeting to determine steps to respond adequately to the needs of IDPs. The need to ensure a strong linkage with IDP survey and the ongoing IDP programmes, such as UNDP's inter-agency programmes on refugee/IDPs/demobilisation, is stressed." (IASC, 9 January 2002)

"The scenarios for the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) 2002 focus on the impact of food insecurity on a projected number of 750,000 people, who are expected to become vulnerable as a result of climatic changes in the Horn of Africa including drought and flooding, conflict, increased commodity prices, the ongoing livestock ban, flooding and lack of road access. These scenarios are likely to remain valid for the rest of the year. They are currently manifested in, among others, ongoing conflict in Gedo region, high rates of malnutrition in the worst hit areas, disease outbreaks and continuing population displacement." (UN, May 2002, p.1)

"Prolonged drought and the average *deyr* rains influenced the harvests of 2001 in different regions of Somalia, leading to severe food and water shortages, as well as high rates of malnutrition. This is especially prevalent in Gedo, which is the worst hit region. Other affected regions include Bari/Sanag, Awdal Bay, Bakool and Hiran. The downturn in remittances and freezing of accounts of individuals following the closing of the offices of the Al-Barakaat Group has reduced household incomes. This year has also seen a wave of cholera outbreaks particularly in Mogadishu and the south/central parts. No wild polio virus has been isolated and few cases of meningitis have been reported." (UN, May 2002, p.2)

"In spite of an above average *deyr* harvest, food security continues to deteriorate and the estimated number of vulnerable people remains roughly the same as foreseen, although there might be a slight reduction given the favourable *gu* forecast. Traditional coping mechanisms have however been exhausted. Gedo remains the worst hit region with Bari and east Sanag regions also seriously affected by the drought." (UN, May 2002, p.4)

"The UN World Food Programme today expressed increased concern about the precarious humanitarian situation in southern Somalia, where some 500,000 people are suffering from serious food shortages due to drought and economic turmoil.

The agency warned that any further setbacks could have disastrous consequences.

The situation is particularly acute in Gedo region, and parts of Bay and Bakool, where the almost complete failure of the main *Gu* harvest in August greatly reduced the amount of food available to people. No significant improvement is expected with the upcoming *Deyr* harvest (starting in January) as the rains in much of the worst hit areas have been patchy and well below normal." (WFP, 28 December 2001)

Gedo alarming needs situation: hit by drought, floods and the most violent conflict (2002)

- Since March 2002 Gedo is cut off from food aid resulting in food intake "below any acceptable minimum"
- Understaffing and insecurity hamper supplementary feeding programmes for IDPs
- Clashes between pro SRRC and pro JVA militia have resulted in displacements and death of civilians mostly from Bulo Hawa
- Considerable disruptions in food production due to conflict and third consecutive year of drought result in alarming malnutrition rates
- UN warned that insecurity rendered people in Gedo heavily reliant on food aid and any disruptions in its delivery would have drastic consequences
- 37% children malnourished and 8% severely malnourished in Gedo December 2001
- Attendance levels in ACF feeding centre in Luuq rose five-folds in two months (August-October 2001)

"The drought also caused the outright failure of the few crops that were produced in the region. The latest fighting and insecurity has further stressed this critical situation by disrupting trade and exchange, by increasing the IDP caseload, and by preventing people from taking advantage of the modest rains through access to their herds of animals and through some agriculture. ***Prior to the outbreak of conflict, households were dependent on food aid for up to half of their daily needs and as no distributions have taken place within Gedo since the end of March and early April, food intake, especially women and children is below any acceptable minimum.*** The road from Baidoa/Mogadishu has been closed, affecting the price of both local and imported goods which have increased. Following the good start to the *Gu* rainy

season in April, rainfall in May has been extremely disappointing. The Juba and Dawa river levels have decreased and will lessen irrigation opportunities. The crops in South Gedo are well established due to good rains in April. However, in northern districts the area planted has been greatly reduced due to insecurity. Livestock condition in the region is improving due to April rains." (FSAU, Food Security, June 2002)

"In Belet Hawa District, Somalia, the therapeutic feeding centre remains operational although with skeleton staffing and with sixty children currently admitted. The most severe cases were referred to MSF-S TFC in Mandera, Kenya. Supplementary food distribution has also been started in Belet Hawa town and Beled Amin IDP village although inadequate staffing and insecurity are still major hindrances to accessibility to the distribution centres." (FSAU Nutrition Update, June 2002)

"The most significant conflict during this reporting period took place in Gedo region in April, involving pro Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) and pro Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) militia. These clashes have resulted in the death of innocent civilians and have left many injured. Approximately 6,000 people from Bulo Hawa have been displaced as a direct result of the conflict. If not contained, insecurity will disrupt planting and relief operations, with grave consequences for a region already faced with high levels of vulnerability following three years of crop failure. A recent nutritional assessment by Action Contre la Faim (ACF) and the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU) confirms alarming malnutrition rates, and reveals a high level of dependency on food aid. Banditry, as well as the underdevelopment of the transport and communication infrastructure further impedes access to these vulnerable populations." (UN, May 2002, p.2)

"Insecurity has heightened the level of vulnerability in the Gedo region, including further displacement of up to 6,000 people to Mandera in Kenya. Those in northern Gedo are heavily dependent on food aid and any disruption in the flow of food aid supplied by the World Food Programme (WFP) and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) would have immediate and drastic consequences." (UN, May 2002, p.4)

"The situation in the northern districts of Gedo region is the source of the greatest humanitarian concern in Somalia today. Despite the above average deyr harvest received in neighbouring regions, the food security situation in Gedo is unlikely to improve significantly given the impact of drought on the pastoral sector and reduced purchasing power. Continuing emergency interventions are still required to support food security, supplementary feeding and water availability. In contrast to northern Gedo, southern districts in the region received better deyr rains and were spared from poor pasture conditions. However, recent clashes and continuing tensions between JVA and SRRC forces in Bardhere (Gedo's most populated town) can only be expected to complicate this situation. Already, an estimated 40 people were killed, 50 wounded and an unknown number of people displaced in clashes earlier this week. Further instability in Gedo will delay the delivery of needed health and supplementary feeding assistance. It may also negatively impact on gu season planting and cultivation, which is approximately six weeks away." (UNCU, 21 February 2002)

"Malnutrition rates amongst children under the age of five in Gedo region have now reached very alarming levels, reflecting the extent of food shortages faced by Somali families, and their limited ability to cope. A recent nutritional survey in Belet Hawa district, in Gedo, indicated that 37 percent of children were malnourished (8% of whom severely malnourished); a 15 percent global malnutrition rate is considered a nutritional emergency." (WFP, 28 December 2001)

"ACF, based in Luuq town, is running the only feeding centres in Gedo region. Attendance levels have increased five-fold in the past two months. Over 4,300 patients are now receiving supplementary and therapeutic treatment, and the agency screens 200 new persons for admission every day. However, given the overall food deficit in the area, recovery rates are poor and rural populations are crowding into urban centres. CARE is already feeding over 240,000 undernourished people in Gedo region, and WFP is working to prevent similar hardships in Bay and Bakol regions. However, unless further international assistance is urgently committed, the current food aid supply will be exhausted by January 2002. CARE has appealed for 22,000 MT of food aid to meet humanitarian needs over the next year. Following WFP's

appeal for 20,000 MT of food aid in July 2001, only 4,300 MT has been pledged." (UNCU, 18 October 2001)

For detailed account of the complex emergency in Gedo see 'FSAU Focus Gedo', February 2002 [External link]

ACF reports dramatic increase in levels of malnutrition in Luuq (July 2001-June 2002)

- Due to insecurity no animals have returned in Gedo and land lies fallow
- Populations constantly on the move have no way to feed themselves 350,000 people in Gedo have lost their means of livelihood
- Nearly 300 severely malnourished children admitted to ACF Therapeutic Feedings Centres in Luuq
- 7,000 people some of whom walked over 100kms, admitted to ACF supplementary feeding centres in Luuq and El Bon
- 404 new admissions recorded in Luuq Supplementary Feeding Centre in July 2001 alone

"Selon Jon Cunliffe, chef de la mission Somalie d'Action contre la Faim, la situation humanitaire actuelle des populations du Gedo empire de jour en jour : " Dans cette région où les populations sont majoritairement agro-pastorales, la période actuelle correspond traditionnellement aux premières plantations de blé de l'année. Pour pallier le manque de nourriture en attendant les récoltes, les terres sont en partie utilisées pour le pâturages des animaux afin d'augmenter la production de lait. Or, aujourd'hui, du fait de l'insécurité, les terres restent en friche et on ne voit plus aucun animal dans la région. Les populations n'ont plus rien, elles se déplacent sans cesse pour fuir les zones d'affrontement et n'ont aucun moyen de se procurer de la nourriture. Si on ne leur apporte pas rapidement aide et protection, les plus vulnérables -les femmes et les enfants en premier lieu- risquent de mourir de faim, si ce n'est d'épuisement ou du fait des combats ". (ACF, 10 Juin 2002)

"Affected by three consecutive years of drought, around 350,000 people in the Gedo region (South-West Somalia) have lost all their resources and means of sustainability.

With the disappearance of pastureland and extremely bad harvests, the livestock, the main source of income for these pastoral populations, has been decimated.

In the last months, Action Against Hunger, one of the few international NGOs present on the ground, has recorded a massive increase in the number of admissions to its feeding centres. Today, nearly 300 severely malnourished children are cared for in the two Action Against Hunger Therapeutic Feedings Centres in Luuq. More than 7,000 people have been admitted to its supplementary feeding centres in Luuq and El Bon (45kms south-west of Luuq) where they receive supplementary food rations. They have travelled from other parts of the province, or neighbouring ones (Bay and Bakol also affected by the lack of food). Some of them have walked more than 100 kms." (ACF, 21 December 2001)

"Face à la forte détérioration de l'état nutritionnel des populations de la région du Gedo (sud-ouest de la Somalie), qui doivent actuellement faire face à la période de soudure -entre deux récoltes-, Action contre la Faim a décidé de renforcer en urgence ses programmes.


Cette détérioration s'est traduite par une augmentation sans précédent, ces deux derniers mois, du nombre d'enfants admis dans les centres nutritionnels d'Action contre la Faim. **Sur la ville de Luuq** le centre nutritionnel thérapeutique, qui prend aujourd'hui en charge plus de **220 personnes souffrant de malnutrition sévère** -chiffre le plus élevé depuis son ouverture en 1999-, est au maximum de sa capacité d'accueil. **Plus de 1000 enfants modérément malnutris ont également bénéficié d'une distribution de compléments alimentaires au courant de ce mois de juillet**, au sein du centre de nutrition supplémentaire d'Action contre la Faim, situé à proximité des camps de déplacés de Luuq.

Pour renforcer sa capacité d'action, *Action contre la Faim* va ouvrir très prochainement, dans un contexte de sécurité toujours difficile, un nouveau centre nutritionnel à Luuq. De nombreux déplacés qui arrivent sur Luuq étant originaires de l'est de la région, zone particulièrement vulnérable, Action contre la Faim a par ailleurs mis en place un **centre de distribution de compléments alimentaires sur la ville de Elbon** -à 45 km de Luuq-. Au premier jour de son lancement, le 21 juillet, ce centre a accueilli plus de 200 enfants. Cinq jours plus tard, ce chiffre a déjà doublé, avec près de 400 enfants admis.

Si la période de soudure est traditionnellement difficile sur le plan alimentaire pour les populations, celles-ci, du fait de multiples facteurs, semblent plus particulièrement affectées par la malnutrition cette année. La persistance de l'insécurité précarise très fortement leur quotidien. Par ailleurs, en raison de la mauvaise pluviométrie des années précédentes, les habitants n'ont pas pu effectuer de bonnes récoltes. Les familles ne disposent que de très faibles réserves de nourriture. Les céréales, plus rares sur le marché, ont vu leur prix fortement augmenter et sont en conséquence difficilement accessibles pour les populations.

Dans les causes sous-jacentes à la malnutrition, qui ne cessent d'empirer année après année, il faut souligner la quasi inexistence de soins de santé primaire dans la région, une couverture vaccinale des plus faibles et un très faible approvisionnement en eau et en structures sanitaires ; éléments favorisant tous le développement des maladies. Sur Luuq, **des cas de choléra viennent ainsi d'être déclarés**, rendant la situation encore plus précaire. Les équipes d'Action contre la Faim assistent le personnel de l'hôpital de Luuq -seule structure médicale existante-, notamment au niveau de l'approvisionnement en eau, afin de pouvoir endiguer l'épidémie au plus vite." (ACF 26 July 2001)

"In Luuq district, Gedo region, ACF has been affected by both the insecurity and by the 'hunger gap' that seems to be particularly important at this time of the year. Numbers in all of ACFs feeding structures have increased to the point of saturation. The ACF TFC in Luuq, designed to accommodate a maximum of 150 beneficiaries, has in fact surpassed this considerably; numbers continue to rise. A total of 236 admissions were recorded in the month of July 2001, with numbers continuing to increase. Around 70 admissions a week are being recorded at this time. As a result of this, and little prospect that the situation can improve in the short term, a second TFC will be opened by ACF in mid-August 2001. In addition ACF is reinforcing its technical expatriate team to assist in the training and supervision of these centres.



In the Luuq Supplementary Feeding Centre (SFC), 404 new admissions were recorded in the month of July alone. Admissions, limited to children between 6 months and 11 years old, could have been more considerable. But due to the elevated numbers, ACF was unable to screen all the potential cases during the month until the centre was re-organised to handle larger populations. This should be completed by the end of the month. Over 900 children are now in charge in this SFC." (FSAU 16 August 2001, Luuq District)

On the whole, internally displaced most vulnerable to malnutrition (1999-2002)

- Micro-nutrient deficiencies leading to increased mortality and morbidity rates particularly prevalent among under-five IDPs
- Internally displaced, children from female-headed households, and recent returnees are most vulnerable groups
- Malnutrition rates amongst the internally displaced in rural areas reportedly as high as 40%
- High mortality rate of children under five reflects the poor conditions in which IDPs live
- In northeastern Somalia, worsening nutritional conditions in Bosasso camps are cause for concern

"Micro-nutrient deficiencies, notably Vitamin A, iron and iodine, remain prevalent in Somalia, leading to increased mortality and morbidity among women and children. Non-optimal child-care practices contribute to malnutrition among children-under-five even during normal times. The most vulnerable groups include IDPs, children from female-headed households and recent returnees." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.24)

"In October [2000], the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) rated Somalia as the 'world's hungriest country.' The FAO reported that Somalia lacked one-third of the daily food intake normally needed. UNICEF found that about 40 percent of Somalis were malnourished in rural areas and at sites for internally displaced populations." (USCR 2001, p. 105)

"Malnutrition of children under five years of age is a chronic problem in southern and central Somalia, notably among IDPs and other disadvantaged groups." (UNICEF 12 July 2001, sect. 2)

"Micro-nutrient deficiencies, notably Vitamin A, Iron and Iodine, remain prevalent in Somalia, leading to increased mortality and morbidity among women and children. Non-optimal child-care practices contribute to malnutrition among children-under-five even during normal times. The most vulnerable groups include IDPs, children from female-headed households and recent returnees." (UN March 2001, p. 22)

"Good health is inextricably linked to good nutrition. UNICEF has conducted nutrition surveys in southern and central Somalia finding an average global malnutrition rate of 23%, (average severe malnutrition rates of 5%). Rates vary across regions and among different population groups and can be as high as 40% in areas with high concentrations of displaced families. UNICEF will continue to support targeted feeding in addition to a focus on behavioural changes in caring and feeding practices of children." (UN November 2000, Strategy Paper, p. 9)

"UNICEF's recent five nutrition surveys indicate that the average global malnutrition rates stand at 24.4% and the average severe malnutrition rates at 4.2%. The problem is worsened by the fact that around 30% of population are recent returnees and 20% of households are female-headed, making them more vulnerable. In rural areas and amongst IDP populations the malnutrition rate is around 40%." (UNICEF June 2000, sect. 2)

For regular, detailed information on the situation of nutrition and food security in Somalia, please refer to the UN Somalia webpage at <http://www.unsomalia.org>

IDPs in Rabdure District, Bakool in poor nutritional shape (August 2001)

- 38% acute malnutrition rates registered in Rabdure (August 2001)
- Prevalent general micronutrient deficiency with some children at risk to proceed to blindness due to vitamin A deficiency

- 67% children screened were either malnourished or at risk of malnutrition
- Incidence of respiratory infections, diarrhoea and skin diseases high among IDPs
- IDPs crowded around health facilities in hope to receive some assistance

"For poor and very poor agro-pastoralist families in Bakool region, a 25-40% food energy deficit is expected over the one year period from July 2001 to June 2002. [...] However, some areas and populations within these areas are more vulnerable than others due to disproportionately low rains and/or influx of IDPs. Rabdure District in Bakool Region is one such area. Within a three kilometer radius of Rabdure town, 300-400 families have settled within the past two months. The majority of these IDPs, at least 70%, are Somalis who had settled in Barey and Kumbul areas of Ethiopia due to insecurity in early 1990s but have returned to Somalia since April 2001 due to increased tension between them and the Ethiopian communities.[...] These people had their origins in Rabdure and so may not be absorbed in other villages outside that area. The remainder of the IDPs have come from within Bakool Region (Wajid district and the surrounding villages of Rabdure town) with their movement being triggered by rumours of food distribution by WFP. It was reported that this latter group initially came in large numbers but have been moving out towards Elberde in search of pasture while some returned to their homes when they realised that there was no general food distribution. This trend may continue.

Between 1st and 2nd August 2001, FSAU nutritionists in collaboration with the local health committee and IMC Rabdure conducted a quick nutritional assessment using Mid Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) [...] in order to determine the prevalence of risk to malnutrition and death among the under-fives in the IDP population. A child with oedema was considered seriously malnourished and not subjected to MUAC measurement.[...].

As shown in the table above, [refer to original document] total acute malnutrition was about 38%. Twenty three of the children screened were in particularly poor condition, including three who were at risk of progressing to blindness as a result of vitamin A deficiency. In total, about 67% of the children screened during the assessment were either malnourished or at risk of malnutrition. The results of the screening are consistent with data from the Rabdure-IMC health facility, which has been indicating high malnutrition rates of over 60% of children screened along with increasing attendance numbers (*actual visits*) from 615 children in May 2001 to 793 children in July 2001. All malnourished and borderline children were referred to the IMC supplementary feeding center in Rabdure. Although the assessment was not expressly stratified for comparison, the results show an indication of significant differences in malnutrition between the returnees from Ethiopia and those from surrounding villages, mainly Wajid and other villages of Rabdure itself, with the returnees appearing to be in worse condition. The difference could be explained by the fact that the people from the surrounding villages had more social network support and some had been benefiting from the WFP/UNICEF family ration to malnourished children. They also had some livestock unlike returnees who had lost their sources of livelihood or simply left them behind and had no remaining food stocks.

[...]

[T]he initial significant increase in *new attendance* since May could be explained by a corresponding influx of IDPs mainly from the surrounding villages who were mainly motivated by food distribution. The number increased significantly again in the subsequent month of arrival of IDPs from Ethiopia.

Health facility reports further indicated that the incidence of respiratory infections, diarrhoea and skin diseases was quite high among the IDPs. The IDPs currently live in clustered structures made from branches and leaves with no sanitation facilities.

Night temperatures in the area are low and it is obvious that the people have little clothing and few blankets. Although they fetch water some 3km in the Rabdure town, the water is saline thereby increasing dehydration. It was clear that the IDPs are invariably suffering from micronutrient deficiencies especially the vitamins and anemia as noted by three cases of advanced Vitamin A Deficiencies during the assessment and anemia in both adults and children.

Food scarcity resulting from failure of the last Gu only exacerbated the problem as otherwise the returnees would have been easily absorbed within the existing community social support. Although the IDPs are engaged in coping strategies like selling firewood, water and construction materials; digging toilets and seeking for community support (mobilised handouts) for their food supply, the general downturn of economic avenues occasioned by drought and inflation weighs heavily against any significant contribution to their food security. Food availability is also reported to be low in the market. In normal circumstances, a bag of sorghum costs SSh 40,000 while it is now going at SSh 120,000/bag. Gifts from the community have also reduced, as the community does not have sufficient stocks to allow sharing to take place.

At the time of the visit, no support interventions for this group were in place. Most of the IDPs were seen crowding around the IMC health facility in search of assistance, in particular hoping to be admitted to the ongoing Supplementary Feeding Programme/family ration programme. The health facility in Rabdure is also strained with additional need for supplies. Immediate needs of this group include assistance with shelter, food, medical attention and chlorinated water." (FSAU, August 9 2001)

Health

General

- 1,191 cases of cholera and 63 deaths reported to WHO between 12 March 2002 when outbreak started and 22 April 2002
- Under five mortality rates of 211 per 1000 and maternal mortality rates at 1,600 per 100,000, amongst the highest in the world
- Somalis totally dependent on international community for delivery of health services as infrastructures were ravaged by war and no medical staff have been trained since 1991
- Infectious and communicable diseases are the major prevalent health risks particularly amongst displaced populations in peri-urban settlements
- Lack of health prevention and education has led to patients' late treatment seeking behaviour

"As of 22 April, WHO has received reports of 1 191 cases and 63 deaths (CFR, 5.3 %) in the country since the outbreak began on the 12 March 2002. Five out of 18 regions are affected: Banadir (Mogadishu), Lower Shabelle (Merka), Middle Shabelle (Jilib and Haranka), Hiraan (Belet Weyne) and Bari (Bossasso) regions." (WHO, 23 April 2002)

"17.2% of the population is moderately undernourished, with severe malnutrition rates at 3.5%. Infant mortality rates stand at 125 deaths per 1,000 live births, while under-five mortality is 211 per 1,000, and maternal mortality is 1,600 per 100,000. There are major health problems caused by diarrhea, cholera, acute respiratory infections, measles, malaria and neo-natal tetanus." (UNICEF, 11 February 2002)

"Somalia ranks near the bottom of the United Nations' human development index. The health care system, along with all state services, has collapsed. Most doctors have fled the country and, apart from staff working with NGOs, no doctors or nurses have been trained in Somalia since the outbreak of war. The only available public or free health care is via the few NGOs still working in the country." (MSF 13 December 2001)

"The health status of the Somali population as a whole reflects the years of crisis the country has experienced. Average life expectancy is 47 years of age, one of the lowest in the world, while the maternal

and infant mortality rates are considered to be the highest in the world, with an infant under five mortality rate of 210 per 1000. [...]

The main health risks to the population are from infectious and communicable diseases, which are particularly prevalent in major urban centres, especially amongst the displaced populations concentrated in peri-urban settlements. Other areas of health concern include neonatal and birth related problems, nutritional deficiencies, and war and conflict-related disabilities (including mental health problems). The extent of HIV/AIDS infection in the country has not yet been established.

The Somali health care system was never very comprehensive. Before the civil war health services and health professionals were concentrated in Mogadishu. The conflict destroyed most facilities, disrupted the supply of medicines, ended all training and broke down the already poor management systems, which were based on government ministries and departments. As with other social services, the health care system in Northwest and Northeast Somalia has had to be developed from scratch.

At the moment, the health system takes a more curative than preventive approach to health problems. To date there has been little emphasis on health education, and consequently the health system is characterised by late treatment seeking behaviour among patients, low prioritisation of health care expenditure among communities and a general reluctance to pay for health services at public facilities. "(IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p. 19)

IDPs in Hargeisa indicate the lowest health services compared to other displaced populations (June 2002)

- Vaccination rates were lowest among Southern Somali
- Southern Somali women were less likely to receive prenatal care and had no access to a trained attendant
- Sheikh Nur only IDP settlement with operational public health facility (September 2001)
- Very low attendance to health facility due to unaffordable fees and unsuitable opening times
- The remaining IDP settlements in Hargeisa had no public health facilities

Interagency assesment conducted in 8 areas around Hargeisa (Somaliland) in returnee and IDP settlements (June 2002). The second largest settlement, Daami hosts about 10,000 people, of whom 35% are displaced from Southern Somalia (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

"- Southern Somalis and non-Somali Ethiopians were significantly less likely than Somalilanders or Somali Ethiopians to receive TT shots during pregnancy or to receive prenatal care.

[...]

- Measles vaccination coverage (12- to 23-month-olds) was 60%; the rate was lowest in Ayaha and Daami, and among Southern Somalis and non-Somali Ethiopians.

[...]

-Vaccination rates were lower among Southern Somalis than any other group." (Clark, June 2002, p.8)

"Not having a trained attendant was most common in Daami and Ayaha and among the Southern Somali population." (Clark, June 2002, p.58)

"The rate of under-5s receiving any vaccinations is significantly lower in Ayaha and Daami than in other returnee settlement areas, and vaccination card retention rate of those under-5s who received vaccinations is significantly lower in Daami and State House than in other areas. Southern Somali children under 5 years old and 12-23 months old were vaccinated at significantly lower rates than Somalilanders living in the areas." (Clark, June 2002, p.59)

"Generally the health services in the survey areas is poor. Only Sheikh Nur, the largest settlement, has an operating public health facility, which provides services including immunization, under five clinic, antenatal care and delivery. But even here attendance is very poor - less than fifteen people per day. The cost recovery approach adopted by the Ministry of Health and Labour may be one of the reasons why the poorest population groups sometimes cannot utilize the health services as the policy which should provide guidelines on exemption for very poor is not always regularly applied. Moreover, the public health facilities work only in the morning hours while most parents or caretakers are out of the daily bread. No outreach services other than immunization and Vitamin A distribution programmes has ever been developed for Sheikh Nur.

All the other survey areas have no public health service facilities. However, Mohamed Mooge has several private pharmacies. The construction of a health center there has been completed recently, with the assistance of UNHCR, but it is not operational yet due to some managerial and staffing issues. For the Stadiim and Fadumo Bihi settlements the nearby Iftin health center is accessible but the MCH hardly ever operates due to staffing issues. The State House and Daami communities are close enough to the Jig-jiga Yar and New Hargeisa health centers respectively." (UNICEF/MoH&L/FSAU, September 2001, p.6)

Disease poses major threat to displaced persons (1999-2002)

- Displaced suffer from cholera, malaria and tuberculosis among other diseases
- Between March and April 2002, 1 191 cases of cholera reported and 63 deaths
- Vaccination coverage is low among internally displaced
- Somalia has one of the highest incidence of tuberculosis in the world (2002)

General disease information:

"Malaria, diarrhoeal diseases and respiratory infections are the main killers of children and are the most common causes of illnesses among all age groups in Somalia. Malaria is hyper-endemic in the riverine areas of Shabelle and Juba. In other parts of Somalia, incidence rates correspond to the rainy season (October-January). Cerebral malaria accounts for around 95% of the cases. Diarrhoeal diseases and dehydration are due to the poor quality of water and lack of sanitation. Combined with malnutrition, the rate of fatality due to diarrhoeal diseases is high, especially among children and IDPs. Outbreaks of *Shigella* have been reported in Lower Juba and Bay regions." (UN March 2001, p. 27)

"As a summary statement, the status of the population's health and the health system in Somalia is very poor with periodic limited short life span improvements. The trend is downward with a few area based and disease specific exceptions. Cholera is now an annual phenomena with seasonal peaks. Exacerbated by the floods in the South, malaria continues to be a major killer. Health care for many is only available from drug vendors or traditional healers. Mental health is a growing concern.

[...]

The incidence and prevalence of communicable diseases, especially malaria, tuberculosis, and cholera remain high with sexually transmitted diseases continuing to increase. The often untenable security situation in many zones adds to the problem, rendering the delivery of health care services difficult or impossible." (WHO 6 January 2000, paras. 1 and 7)

"Poor personal hygiene and environmental sanitation are major causes of diseases among children. Improving hygiene and sanitation is critical to reducing mortality and morbidity among infants, children and mothers, especially in crowded urban, peri-urban areas and displaced persons camps. The main problems relating to personal and domestic hygiene are inter-alia: no hand-washing before eating; unhealthy food; use of contaminated water sources for drinking; and contamination of water during

household handling and storage. There is little access to excreta disposal facilities, particularly in towns, IDP camps and schools." (UN November 1999, p. 30)

Measles:

"Although measles mass vaccination campaigns are carried out regularly (UNICEF conducted nine campaigns in these regions during the last year), coverage and frequency seem insufficient to reduce transmission. Data show that coverage between and within districts varied considerably, ranging from less than 10% to more than 60%. In particular among IDPs and in rural areas coverage was low." (WHO 30 September 2000, sect. 2.3)

Cholera:

"As of 22 April, WHO has received reports of 1 191 cases and 63 deaths (CFR, 5.3 %) in the country since the outbreak began on the 12 March 2002. Five out of 18 regions are affected: Banadir (Mogadishu), Lower Shabelle (Merka), Middle Shabelle (Jilib and Haranka), Hiraan (Belet Weyne) and Bari (Bossasso) regions. Laboratory tests have confirmed *Vibrio cholerae* O1 Ogawa.

[...]

Cholera is endemic in Somalia and normally surges from December through May each year. The outbreaks tend to recede with the arrival of Somalia's annual long rainy season." (WHO, 23 April 2002)

"As described in a recent WHO evaluation of this year's cholera epidemic response, emergency preparedness was minimal and case fatality rates were extremely high in areas with either medically weak international NGOs or none at all. Such was the case in parts of Bay and Bakol region until emergency support was provided by UNICEF and Medecins Sans Frontieres." (OCHA 28-29 July 2000, draft report, sect. 2)

An outbreak of cholera was reported in March 1999 in the town of Bardere, where the IDP population is 20,000, and UNICEF has set up a treatment centre. (ACC/SCN 26 March 1999) On 28 April 1999, local elders in southern Somalia reported that a rampant cholera epidemic had killed at least 240 people in the last week, and that dozens more were becoming infected on a daily basis. "The spread of the disease has been aided by an influx of farmers and nomads to Dinsor in the last few weeks, after drought and insecurity drove them from the countryside to search for food and water in the main towns. Dinsor lies 120 km south of Baidoa, which is out of bounds for aid workers because of frequent bouts of fighting between feuding militia groups." (Reuters 28 April 1999) More than 200 people are reported to have died of cholera in southern Somalia between November 1998 and March 1999. (AFP 21 April 1999) In Mogadishu, staff on duty at Bardeira hospital say they have received about 50 suspected cases of cholera a day since mid-March 1999, although the numbers are now declining. (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999) WHO reported in April that the recent cholera outbreak in southern Somalia has been contained in urban areas but expressed concern over its possible spread to smaller villages where adequate health care may not be available. Efforts by UNICEF to chlorinate water supplies in IDP camps have also helped contain the disease." (USAID/FEWS 29 April 1999)

Tuberculosis:

"Respiratory infections are also among the main causes of morbidity and mortality, especially among children. Somalia is estimated to have one of the highest incidence rates of tuberculosis not only in the region, but also in the world. Each year, around 12,000 sputum-positive cases occur, out of which only 1 in 4 are detected and receive treatment. TB can be considered a major public health problem in Somalia and a leading cause of morbidity and mortality in the most productive age groups of the community. Lack of access to essential preventive and curative services accounts for the very high mortality of all these diseases. For this vital programme, WHO allocated US\$ 542,500 from its regular budget during the year 2001. With the support of the Government of Norway and other donors, it has implemented DOTS in various regions in Somalia and is planning to expand its network to save lives and reduce disease

dissemination. The success of implementation of DOTs in a complex emergency country like Somalia is an example for other countries in complex emergencies." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.27)

In February 1999 a doctor in Hudur, in the Bakool region, stated that "tuberculosis had spread massively among the internally displaced, who usually share their little food and water, using the same plates and cups . . . [and that] . . . essential drugs to combat this serious illness are unavailable, and it could affect the entire population of Hudur." (AFP 3 February 1999) The district commissioner of the nearby Bay region also reported that at least 700 internally displaced people in Bardale lacked food, medicine, water or shelter, and that "scabies and other skin diseases are rampant among the refugees, who mostly die of acute dysentery and respiratory-related illnesses." (AFP 3 February 1999)

Internally displaced have minimal access to health and sanitation (1998-2001)

- Somalis totally dependent on international community for delivery of health services as infrastructures were ravaged by war and no medical staff have been trained since 1991
- 250 children monthly accepted in ACF Therapeutic Feeding centers in Mogadishu
- Lack of safe water and sanitation leads to cholera outbreaks and diarrhoea, resulting in malnutrition Displaced persons cannot afford health care treatment and drugs
- Displaced who are constantly on the move find themselves outside health coverage system

"Somalia ranks near the bottom of the United Nations' human development index. The health care system, along with all state services, has collapsed. Most doctors have fled the country and, apart from staff working with NGOs, no doctors or nurses have been trained in Somalia since the outbreak of war. The only available public or free health care is via the few NGOs still working in the country." (MSF 13 December 2001)

"In the capital, where 500,000 to 700,000 Estimated figure: it is extremely difficult to refer to exact figure in the absence of an official census and frequent population movements. people live, including 150,000 displaced people, there are no safe drinking water provision systems, sanitation installations are drastically insufficient and health structures are almost entirely absent. A significant number of children are suffering from diarrhoea, the first cause of malnutrition in the town, to which can be added numerous cases of infections, such as measles or tuberculosis. More than 250 severely malnourished children are admitted each month to the two Therapeutic Feeding Centres run by Action Against Hunger in north and south Mogadishu, where the children receive intensive treatment and immunisation.

To add to this dramatic situation, cholera, an endemic disease, usually occurs from December to May and affects several thousand people each year.

Action Against Hunger is preparing to launch an anti-cholera programme amongst the most vulnerable to avoid the spread of the epidemic." (ACF, 21 December 2001)

"There has been an influx of the drought displaced people into the main towns of Gode, Imey and Danan. Many of these migrants are said to be affected by diseases such as diarrhea, tuberculosis, and pneumonia. In addition, some measles cases have been reported by Gode Hospital. The zonal Health Department is attempting to provide emergency outreach services and free provision of drugs to the migrant population since nearly all of the displaced people cannot afford to pay for health care treatment and drugs. However there are not sufficient drugs and facilities in the hospital to be able to provide this service for long without provision of additional drugs.

[...]

The existing health facilities [in Gode] are poor. There is only one hospital and one health center in the whole zone. Because of lack of capacity and vehicles, management of the health institutions throughout the

region is weak. Some drugs will need to be provided freely; however, this is likely to quickly drain medical supplies and drug stocks." (UNDP-EUE 14 December 1999, pp. 2,6)

"The civil war and the absence of a central government have wiped out the government health service. Health care is provided by NGOs and through market channels at a cost. IDPs are outside the system of health coverage and are constantly on the move, so cannot access health cards, or undergo any long-term treatments. There are too few clinics to provide for the settled population, let alone the IDPs, who come and go." (Redding and Hansen 1998, p. 83)

Health and overall welfare of people of Gedo Region considered the worst in Somalia (September 2001)

"There is little doubt that the health and overall welfare of the population of Gedo Region is already the worst in Somalia. Surveys during 2001 in neighbouring areas of Kenya showed global malnutrition rates of 20% and over. Sheer numbers of malnourished children presenting at health facilities and observations during screenings for general rations act to reinforce this suggestion. The lack of nutrition surveys in Gedo over the past one year is extremely unfortunate and in general attributable to insecurity. It is hoped that before the end of 2001 two surveys will be undertaken and the possibilities of putting monitoring systems in place are being considered." (FSAU 20 September 2001, Southern Somalia)

Water/sanitation

Few Somalis have access to clean water (1999-2002)

- Less than 20 percent of Somalis have access to clean water
- Limited access to safe water leads to serious health problems
- Many people have dug their own wells that offer dirty, unsanitary water
- New government has sanitation workers and equipment but they are yet to be mobilised

"Only 31% of the population have access to safe drinking water, with an important variation between urban areas (46%) and rural areas with (28%). Only 43 % of the population have access to adequate sanitation disposal, 39 % in rural areas and 69 % in urban areas." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.19)

"Where Mogadishu residents used to have clean running water at the turn of a shiny brass tap, they must now depend on hand-dug wells. Dirty water, hauled up from about 30 metres underground, sells at Somali shillings 2,000 (US \$0.20) per drum. People and animals use the same water supply. Among the devastated buildings, in the maze of broken streets, women with jerry cans join the goats and camels, and the queues of donkey carts. The wells are owned – but not maintained – by individuals. Aid agencies occasionally provided chlorine to treat the drinking water, but no one really monitored its use or distribution, health workers said.

Once the water system had collapsed, many people dug their own wells. The wells that used to provide the city with running water are now in the hands of militia. One set of wells is on the Afgoi road between Mogadishu and Afgoi town; the other to the north of the city, between Mogadishu and Balad. The wells are in total disrepair.

So far, efforts by the new interim government to start tackling the 10 year-old waste dump - once a beautiful coastal capital - have barely touched the tip. Mogadishu has lacked government structures and

services for almost a decade. 'You can't clean up 10 years of piled-up rubbish without a complete campaign, with the right equipment,' said one Mogadishu resident. Sanitation workers and equipment are available, but have yet to be mobilised, signed up and funded. Since establishing itself in October, the new government is struggling with other priorities: funding, peace and reliable personnel. And in a city where money, militia and warlord-run mafias have ruled since 1991, even rubbish is 'owned', explained the resident. Gangs expect nothing less than a cut from sanitation projects." (IRIN-CEA 20 December 2000)

"Less than 20 percent of Somalis have access to clean water. As families flee conflict areas, the few safe water sources that do exist are being abandoned or destroyed. Wells, generators, pumps, and pipes have been destroyed or intentionally contaminated by warring factions. Out of 175 wells in Bay and Bakool, at least 101 have been destroyed beyond repair. Only 20 wells are still functioning and the remaining 44 are being repaired." (US Fund for UNICEF 6 September 2000, "Water and sanitation")

"In largely arid Somalia, access to water is limited for human and animal consumption. Livestock, Somalia's main export, is the mainstay of the economy and is dependent upon rainfall for adequate pastures and upon ground water for watering. People require daily access to safe sources of water. In most areas however, community access to any water source is restricted, especially in the dry seasons, and access to safe water (typically from ground water sources) is available for only about 30 percent of the population, mostly in urban areas.

Poor access leads to higher prices (stretching poorer incomes to the limit) and greater distances in water collection (increasing the workload of women and girls). In turn, diarrhoeal diseases, cholera epidemics, and malnutrition of children are all directly or indirectly caused by limited access to safe water and poor personal and environmental hygiene practices.

Ground water constitutes the principal source of potable water in most areas of Somalia. Studies show that there is sufficient quantity of good quality ground water to cover the domestic needs of the whole population of Somalia. Though they are seasonal, rainwater catchments are a major water source. These reservoirs include: ware, an excavated reservoir, sometimes lined with plastic sheets, common in the south; bally, a depression in the ground which may be natural or artificial; maxiid, a hand-dug vertical pit; and berked, a cemented underground catchment mostly found in the central and northern regions." (UN November 1999, p.30)

UNICEF projects to rehabilitate boreholes and water sources (2002)

- IDPs located in war affected southern regions are at particular risk of drought and floods
- UNICEF assessed that most traditional water catchments are dry or drying up
- UNICEF appeals for funds for borehole rehabilitation which will limit large-scale population movements
- UNICEF provides safe drinking water to IDP settlements in Hargeisa
- Very poor sanitation in IDPs settlements particularly Sheikh Nur leads to easy water contamination

Objective:

"Provide timely essential and basic water supply and sanitation needs for IDPs, returnees and communities who suffer calamities.[...]

Although some crises in Somalia are relatively predictable, such as cholera outbreaks, other emergencies, such as drought or flooding, are not. The main 2001 *gu* seasonal rains in Bay, Bakol, Gedo and Hiran as well as other parts of southern and central Somalia have failed. UNICEF assessments have found that most

traditional water catchments are dry or drying up, putting additional stress on already vulnerable populations. To limit large-scale population movements and mitigate the affects of drought, UNICEF urgently requires funds to rehabilitate boreholes and other safe water sources, support training and community mobilisation activities, and provide emergency trucking of water if the situation dramatically deteriorates and this becomes necessary. Meanwhile, abnormally high rainfall in the Ethiopian highlands and dramatically increased the risk of flooding along the banks of the Juba and Lower Shabelle rivers." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.48)

Water and Sanitation in IDP settlements in Hargeisa:

"International organizations such as UNICEF and the Municipality of Hargeisa put a lot of effort in providing safe drinking water to the IDP/returnees settlements, by piping the water and establishing several kiosks. Almost every household in the survey areas has access to safe and clean water. A jerry can of 20 liters is sold at only 200 Somaliland Shillings at the kiosks. On average each household uses around 40 liters of water a day. However, it is believed that contamination of water can easily take place while handling water at household level.

The sanitation situation in most of the settlements is very poor, particularly Sheikh Nur which is located very close to an old garbage dumping site. In the Oromo settlements of Sheikh Nur, one can hardly walk in between the very congested houses without stepping on human waste matter. (UNICEF/MoH&L/FSAU, September 2001, p.6)

Desertification and poverty closely intertwined in Somalia (June 2001)

- Clearing land for agriculture, overgrazing of herds and other coping mechanisms actually contribute to problem of desertification

"Thousands of Somalis are struggling to survive in an often harsh environment, made worse by the ever-growing danger of environmental degradation and desertification.

Ironically, some efforts to earn a living – clearing land for agriculture, producing charcoal, overgrazing herds on shrinking pastureland, selling timber for construction – contribute to the problem, are jeopardizing Somali's ability to eke out a living from the land in the future.

'Somalia is caught in a vicious cycle where poverty and desertification are intertwined,' said Randolph Kent, UNDP Resident Representative. 'You can't address one problem without addressing the other.'

Several practices are contributing to desertification. Clearing land along riverbanks to create more area for agriculture is causing rivers to change course and eroding nutrient-rich soil. Land clearing is now especially intense along the Juba river, as the population of the southern port town of Kismayo swells and the demand for agricultural produce grows." (UNDP 18 June 2001)

Somalia has been noted as one of five countries expected to be water scarce by 2025. For more information on water scarcity in Africa, refer to World Vision report of April 2001 [\[External link\]](#).

Shelter and non-food items

Internally displaced live in meagre, make-shift housing (1999-2000)

- Displaced in Mogadishu congregate in make-shift camps

- Others live in abandoned government buildings, schools and factories
- Huts are made of scavenged paper, sticks, sacks and cloth

In Mogadishu, "an overwhelmingly poor but tenacious population has made homes amongst the shell-shattered houses and offices, or congregates in makeshift camps for the internally displaced. International development aid has effectively been suspended, and those displaced by war and hardship are left to a precarious hand-to-mouth existence." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

"Heavy rains in early July [2000] caused flash floods in Mogadishu, damaging buildings and washing away several hundred of the shanty structures in the displaced camps in the south of the city. The floods brought a tide of sewage through the shanty towns, raising concerns about the potential for the spread of disease." (IRIN 7 July 2000 in UN Sub-Commission on Nutrition 25 July 2000, p. 31)

"The floods [of late 1997 and early 1998] particularly harmed populations already displaced by the country's warfare. Heavy rains washed away makeshift huts housing displaced families in Mogadishu. Other displaced families in the capital continued to live in abandoned government buildings, schools, factories, and houses left empty by the country's decade of instability." (USCR 1999, p. 88)

"Makeshift camps of displaced Somalis and refugees (primarily originating from Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s) have mushroomed in the city since the fall of Siad Barre's government in 1991. Most of the dome-shaped huts are made from paper, sticks, sacks and cloth scavenged from the growing mountains of rubbish, with barriers of scrap metal delineating different sections of the camps. Some camps receive rudimentary help from humanitarian agencies or Islamic organizations, but the vast majority of internally displaced people must rely on their own survival skills." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

The overall situation of the IDPs is reported to be poor. During the rains in November [1999] they are forced to live under leaking huts with little or no plastic sheeting. Coping mechanisms include selling ground nuts, cigarettes, local tooth brushes and supplying water or cooking meals. There is a need for food, shelter and healthcare." (ACC/SCN 20 December 1999, p. 31)

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

General

Minimal access to education for the population in general (1999-2001)

- Somalia's educational indicators rank it amongst the lowest in the world with 17,1% adult literacy and 13,6% primary school enrolment
- Only about one in ten children of primary school age are enrolled in schools
- Today's youth constitutes a "lost generation"
- Quality of education on offer is generally very poor

"There has been modest gains in education, with enrolment in primary schools reaching levels similar to those pre-war, and numbers of secondary schools increasing since 1998. However with overall adult literacy of only 17.1% and a gross primary school enrolment of 13.6%, levels of educational attainment remain amongst the lowest in the world." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.38)

From UNICEF's Somalia Basic Data sheet – June 2000

Child population (millions, under 18 years):	5.0
Literacy (% male/female) (1990):	36/14
Primary school enrolment/attendance (% net, male/female) (1998)	11/6, 21/13
Primary school children reaching grade 5 (%) (1999)	20

(UNICEF June 2000, "Somalia Information")

"The future of Somalia is bleak as long as its children continue to be denied of their fundamental right to basic education. Few children in Somalia today, particularly girls have access to basic education - opportunities to develop their capabilities or learn skills that will enable them to improve their lives and that of their society. There are increasing opportunities for investment in the education sector over the long run in particular in the northern region; however, most of Somalia's children remain today uneducated, illiterate and unskilled; its present youth constitutes a 'lost generation'.

On average, only about one in ten children of primary school age are enrolled, and only two thirds of them are boys. Of the youth aged 14-18 years, almost all are out of school and without access to education or other basic services. The few operational primary schools function mainly through community and parental support. All secondary education remains confined to highly urbanised areas.

The quality of education on offer is generally very poor. About 40 percent of all teachers are unqualified; many have not completed their own primary education. The absence of a central educational authority has led to a lack of consistency in educational standards, including acceptable curricula and textbooks. Much of the pre-war school infrastructure has been destroyed. Poor families, communities, and local authorities have insufficient funds to meet even the very basic expenses related to teachers' salaries and effective supervision. The absence of any learner assessment or certification system has rendered the appraisal of the quality of education impossible.

Koranic schools have continued to operate throughout the conflict, with the support of parents and communities. These schools do not offer opportunities for secular education and are primarily religious institutions imparting knowledge of the Koran. Pilot projects have been initiated for the inclusion of some elements of basic education in the daily teaching of selected Koranic schools and the results are awaited.

Private language schools are mushrooming in most towns and some rural communities teach informally, borrowing curricula and textbooks from other countries. Some language and vocational education schools are also integrating some primary subjects on an ad-hoc basis. There is, however, a near-total lack of early childhood education, alternate forms of primary education, and adult informal education in Somalia. The potential of reaching excluded communities, such as by way of satellite schools, informal education centres, and radio, is as yet untapped." (UN November 1999, p.32)

"The civil war dealt another devastating blow to the formal education system, which completely collapsed in 1990. Many teachers and pupils were displaced and forced to seek security in their clan areas or flee to refugee camps abroad. . . . The aftermath showed that about 90% of school buildings in the country were either completely or partially destroyed. In addition, many were occupied by internally displaced persons. Almost all educational materials and equipment were looted." (UNDP 1999, Chapter 3, "History of education in Somalia")

School enrolment status in Hargeisa: the lowest among IDPs populations due to begging and discrimination (June 2002)

- On average only 13,8% of the Somali population receives primary education
- 74% of boys age 10 to 14 are enrolled in school compared to only 46% of girls
- Children of households from southern Somalia more likely to be working rather than at school
- Low enrolment among southern Somali IDPs explained by discrimination of minority clans and use of their children to beg

"Overall primary school enrolment is 13.8%, with enrolment rates of girls being slightly lower at 12.1%." (UNICEF, 11 February 2002)

Interagency assesement conducted in 8 areas around Hargeisa (Somaliland) in returnee and IDP settlements (June 2002). The second largest settlement, Daami hosts about 10,000 people, of whom 35% are displaced from Southern Somalia

"-Boys and girls are enrolled in schools at similar rates until age 10. Over age 10, girls' enrollment plateaus at below 60% before dropping off, while boys' enrollment climbs to 80% at age 13. For both sexes, a majority of those enrolled in school are enrolled in primary schools by age 10.

- Boys age 10 to 14 are enrolled in school at an aggregate rate of 74%, while girls in that age range are enrolled at an aggregate rate of 46%.

[...]

- Southern Somalis and non-Somali Ethiopians are enrolled in school at lower rates than Somalilanders, more so for girls than for boys.

- Children in households from Southern Somalia and Ethiopia (both Somali and non-Somali) are more likely to be working to bring income into the household than households originally from Somaliland."

(Clark, June 2002, p.7)

"Ayaha and Daami are near the bottom for boys' and girls' enrollment across the board." (Clark, June 2002, 43)

"The Daami focus groups addressed this issue, saying that some of the difference was due to ostracization of minority communities and that Southern Somali and Oromo families use their children to beg and they are therefore not in school." (Clark, June 2002, 44)

"In Daami, social exclusion of minority groups was reported as another major reason that Returnee Settlement Area Assessment, June 2002 children were not in school." (Clark, June 2002, p.46)

"Daami's adult population is significantly less educated than any of the others" (Clark, June 2002, p.47)

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Self-reliance and food security

IDPs around Hargeisa rely on begging more than any other vulnerable populations (June 2002)

- Men have received vocational training at four times the rate that women have
- Daami shows the highest rate of working; this is due to whole families begging
- In Daami, women tend to be household servants or beggars and men work as day laborers with daily incomes between US\$1 and US\$2
- Minority groups rely on their traditional skills to generate income
- Food security of IDPs around Hargeisa depends on their purchasing power or on kin's gifts
- Rise in costs of living, closure of remittance companies and livestock ban greatly threaten IDPs food security

Interagency assesment conducted in 8 areas around Hargeisa (Somaliland) in returnee and IDP settlements (June 2002). The second largest settlement, Daami hosts about 10,000 people, of whom 35% are displaced from Southern Somalia

"- 73% of men work to bring income into their households, while only 32% of women work to bring income into their households.

- The most common jobs are market activities and casual employment.

- Men have received vocational training at four times the rate that women have. 16% of adults have been through vocational training." (Clark, June 2002, p.7)

"Daami shows the highest rate of working; this is due to whole families begging." (Clark, June 2002, p.47)

"Daami has very few brokers compared to the standard 10-15% in other returnee settlement areas, but has an inordinate number of people relying on charity, far higher than any other area. This difference is attributable to the high number of non-Somali Ethiopians and Southern Somalis living in Daami, who are far more likely than others to be begging. Daami, State House, Stadium, and Ayaha all have lower fractions of their population working as salaried employees than other areas." (Clark, June 2002, p.48)

"In Daami, Sheikh Nur, and Stadium the women also work as household servants. On the other hand, men tend to work as construction laborers, charcoal producers, livestock brokers, and porters. Day laborer incomes were reported as between US\$1 and US\$2 per day. Some men in Sinai and Stadium generate income through donkey cart businesses, while it is worth noting that only the men in Stadium were identified as bringing in income through work as soldiers, waiters, or latrine diggers. Only in Ayaha, Daami and Mohamed Mooge were men identified as working in the livestock brokerage business.

Daami was the only area where notably different skills and trades were relied on for generating income. Immigrant and Southern Somali men work as farm laborers, livestock brokers, and construction laborers while the women beg with their children. In contrast, the minority groups rely on their traditional skills to generate income. The men work as barbers, blacksmiths, shoemakers, and rubbish collectors while the women earn money through practicing female circumcision and producing traditional items such as water pots, wedding pots, brooms, and stoves." (Clark, June 2002, p.50)

"Majority of the population in the resettlement camps falls within the very poor and poor wealth groups. The urban food economy group relies on purchases as a source of food or may have relatives in the rural areas that send them gifts in form of cereals, milk or meat. Other sources of income and food for this group include employment in construction ventures or large/small scale trade, and gifts and remittances from relatives.

The food security situation of the population in the resettlement camps of Hargeisa is greatly affected by issues that either increase the cost of foods or reduce income accessibility. Of importance in the past one year has been the cessation of construction activities in Hargeisa town, devaluation of the Somaliland shilling and impact of the livestock ban imposed by the Gulf countries in September 2000. This led to reduction in foreign income inflow culminating into decreased employment opportunities and low business activities. The resettled population in Hargeisa camps, just like any poor sections of the town have been greatly affected by these mentioned factors and their food security position compromised." (UNICEF/MoH&L/FSAU, September 2001, p.7)

Many poor families are at the end of their resources (2002)

- Internal displacement and the collapse of the industry and service sectors has led to high rates of unemployment which sustain large number of militias
- Over 100,000 IDPs in Mogadishu live off unskilled day labour and in Hargeisa 84% IDPs live with less than 40 cents per day
- Families in Bay, Bakool and Gedo in particularly poor shape
- Movement of IDP families into regions where resources are already stretched means that both IDPs and resident families are increasingly desperate
- Food availability reported to be low in underground markets

"Prior to the war it was estimated that over 70% of the population lived in the rural areas and that over 75% of the population drew their livelihoods from pastoralism and agriculture, 16% from the service sector and 8.4% from the industry [...]. There are currently no estimates of levels of income or employment for various sectors [...]. The rural sector continues to provide the main source of employment of people, but due to massive internal and external displacement and the collapse of industry and public services a high percentage of the population in both rural and urban areas is unemployed or underemployed. Lack of employment opportunities is one factor sustaining the large numbers of militia, particularly in the urban areas of southern Somalia." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.70)

"More than 350,000 people are internally displaced and tend to live off subsistence wages for unskilled day labour, including over 100,000 in Mogadishu." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.105).

"Somaliland's estimated unemployment rate in mid-2001, however, exceeded 80 percent." (USCR, December 2001, p.7)

"In Hargeisa, it is reported that 9% of the displaced rely on begging as their main source of income, and 84% are poor or destitute with household income of less than 40 cents per day". (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.186)

"The poor harvest is hitting many areas where levels of malnutrition have been relatively high for the last two years. Assessments carried out in Bay, Bakool and Gedo as well as information collected from feeding centres indicate that many poor families are at the end of their resources. Most of the poorer households have no stocks from previous years and possibilities to find jobs or generate income are very limited.

Low cereal production and resultant food shortages will impoverish, even further, families who already live on very little, and whose nutritional state is already fragile.

'I have seen myself that many of the underground food stores, which should be full at this time of the year, are now empty,' said [Kevin] Farrell [WFP's Country Director for Somalia]. 'When asked how would they cope during the next few months, many people simply told me they hoped Allah would help them.'" (WFP 22 August 2001)

"Recent escalations in tensions have once again caused displacement of populations into communities that are unable to assist because of their own limited stocks and it appears that some IDPs and resident populations are already becoming quite desperate in their search for external assistance. (See Rabdure report). This desperation has also been evident from observations at supplementary feeding centres to which women and children walk extremely long distances in search of food rations, as well as the displacement of whole families towards urban centres where such feeding programmes are already well established.

Not always coincidentally for Somalia, critical periods of stress for its people occur at a time when potential for adequate humanitarian response is also lowest. Insecurity in Southern Somalia currently poses enormous challenges for organisations attempting to monitor the situation, identify populations in need of assistance and deliver that assistance effectively.

[...]

The anticipated food scarcity resulting from failure of the Gu harvest has exacerbated the problem as otherwise the returnees would have been easily absorbed within the existing community social support. Although the IDPs are engaged in coping strategies like selling firewood, water and construction materials; digging toilets and seeking for community support (mobilised handouts) for their food supply, the general downturn of economic avenues occasioned by drought and inflation weighs heavily against any significant contribution to their food security. Food availability is also reported to be low in the market. Gifts from the community have also reduced, as the community does not have sufficient stocks to allow sharing to take place.

At the time of the visit, no support interventions for this group were in place. Most of the IDPs were seen crowding around the IMC health facility in search of assistance, in particular hoping to be admitted to the ongoing Supplementary Feeding Programme/family ration programme. The health facility in Rabdure is also strained with additional need for supplies. Immediate needs of this group include assistance with shelter, food, medical attention and chlorinated water." (FSAU 16 August 2001, Overview and Update on Bakool).

Gedo in state of complex emergency (1999-2002)

- Escaping third consecutive year of drought herders forced to move out of the region in search of pasture and water leaving behind women, children, elderly and IDPs with very little resources
- Gedo in situation of chronic depletion of livelihood assets and capacities to cope as populations are constantly on the move
- Lack of access to milk and livestock exacerbated food insecurity due to lack of employment and crop failure
- Despite start of rains in April 2002 no animals have returned in Gedo and land lies fallow due to generalized war, mines and banditry in Gedo
- Considerable rise of malnutrition among IDPs in southern areas of Gedo, Bay and Bakol experiencing severe water shortages and deteriorating livestock conditions
- Households were already dependent on food aid for half of their daily intake before fighting escalated in Gedo

"Selon Jon Cunliffe, chef de la mission Somalie d'Action contre la Faim, la situation humanitaire actuelle des populations du Gedo empire de jour en jour : " Dans cette région où les populations sont majoritairement agro-pastorales, la période actuelle correspond traditionnellement aux premières plantations de blé de l'année. Pour pallier le manque de nourriture en attendant les récoltes, les terres sont en partie utilisées pour le pâturages des animaux afin d'augmenter la production de lait. Or, aujourd'hui, du fait de l'insécurité, les terres restent en friche et on ne voit plus aucun animal dans la région. Les populations n'ont plus rien, elles se déplacent sans cesse pour fuir les zones d'affrontement et n'ont aucun moyen de se procurer de la nourriture. Si on ne leur apporte pas rapidement aide et protection, les plus vulnérables -les femmes et les enfants en premier lieu- risquent de mourir de faim, si ce n'est d'épuisement ou du fait des combats ". (ACF, 10 Juin 2002)

"The ' structural vulnerability' of Gedo region has created an ongoing situation of crisis which has been compounded by three years of successive poor rains and related drought conditions. Structural vulnerability has emerged over the the last three decades a result of a series of socio-political events causing a consistent influx of people and livestock resulting in an overcrowded and politically divided territory and fragmentation of the administration in addition to widespread insecurity. These events, in turn, have led to an increased pressure on degraded rangelands, undermined coping mechanisms, divisions within the community, sub-standard social facilities and an overall crisis in the production and exchange systems. All these elements have contributed to a deterioration in the civil and productive infrastructure and, as a consequence, to chronic depletion of livelihood assets and capacities to cope.

The situation in Gedo is often described as a ' complex emergency'. A ' complex emergency' is a highly destructive situation it radically increases the demands placed on a fragile, political, economic, environmental and social system while simultaneously destroying that very same system. (S. Lautze, 1997)" (FSAU Focus Gedo, February 2002)

"The whole population of Gedo is presently considered by the Food Security Assessment Unit Somalia and FEWS NET as vulnerable to food insecurity. [...] However, the priority areas are mainly located in the northern part of the region : Luuq, Dolo and Belet Hawa districts (northern districts consist of above 200,000 people of which roughly 55% are pastoralists, 20% are rain-fed agro-pastoralists, 15% are urban people and 10% are riverine people). The northern areas of Garbaharey district as well as Burdhubo have also been badly affected.

Prior to the most recent outbreak of insecurity in northern Gedo, (which recommenced in March 2002) several factors had already contributed to a critical food security situation which were sufficiently serious to cause low food intake and consequent malnutrition in parts of the population. (Over 30% global acute malnutrition rates were observed in children under 5)."

Three consecutive dry years, since *Gu* 1999, had seriously undermined crop and livestock production in northern Gedo. This situation worsened in May/June 2001 when herders from northern Gedo were forced to move most of their high-value cattle and camels to neighbouring regions and to Ethiopia to escape pasture and water shortages. Remaining household members were left with no access to their livestock and milk, both key income earners. To exacerbate this situation, the neighbouring Bay and Bakol regions underwent a bad crop failure during the *Gu* 2001 season. (The harvest was down by 90% in Bay in August 2001. Northern Gedo is usually heavily dependent on the sorghum belt's production for purchase and consumption).

The combination of inaccessible livestock production and low levels of rain-fed crop production in northern Gedo, low daily wage rates [...] lack of casual employment, reduced self-employment options (collection of bush products) and gradual decline in kinship support, created 'critical' food insecurity where households had few means of generating income for buying their basic food requirements.

This crisis was only alleviated by general food distributions and selective feeding programmes, which were substantially increased from September 2001 to March 2002. A joint Assessment of Household Food Access and Use in Luuq district carried out in March 2002 (by FSAU, CARE and FEWS NET), that is just before the late March/early April food aid distribution, showed that food relief was essential in providing a significant part of most households' energy requirements. About two thirds of the households had no access to milk and half of the household's cereal consumption was provided by food relief, the other half being purchased.

Since March 2002, the food security situation has deteriorated dramatically due to clan conflict which has flared up, on occasions, into active warfare. The conflict caused a large number of refugees to cross from northern Gedo into Kenya and Ethiopia (April/May 2002) as well as creating internally displaced people within Somalia. High malnutrition and mortality rates seen amongst the refugees in Mandera, Kenya, are likely to be mirrored in the population remaining in the region and on the move elsewhere in Somalia.

[...]

As in other parts of southern Somalia, above normal *Gu* rains were received in Gedo in April 2002. Pasture conditions improved significantly leading to a revival of the rangeland carrying capacity (good rains combined with a low number of animals inside northern Gedo). Following the high mortality rates that had been recorded during the prolonged dry period, the situation of the few remaining animals improved slightly, starting from the end of April. However, households that remained in Gedo have not been able to take full advantage of the good *Gu* rains. Most of the northern Gedo pastoralists were prevented from returning due to the prevailing insecurity, limiting their potential to recover. Herders awaiting the end of fighting have not been re-united with their families. Drought related stress has severely diminished calving rates, limiting the supply of valuable milk. Insecurity also hampered both rain-fed and irrigated agriculture. Coping through domestic kinship ties or social support systems were already strained and have now almost stopped as the former helpers are in need of help themselves. Trading mechanisms are not functioning normally, which are essential for poor households to buy food in times of crisis. Insecurity has affected the flow of traded cereals into Gedo from other parts of the country due to banditry and the mining of strategic roads linking major towns. In spite of the very good *Deyr 01/02* harvest in the neighbouring Bay region, the inflow of cereals remained extremely limited. Most rain-fed farmers, especially those on the western side of the Juba river did not plant their crops as they fled their land when conflict broke out. Farmers who rely on irrigation from the major rivers—the Juba and Dawa also fled and those that remained cannot afford to buy fuel which has risen in price. Subsequently, small yields are expected from the coming *Gu* harvest in August.

[...]

A major source of food for the population is food aid, although there were no major food relief distributions in northern Gedo between early April and late June 2002. Inhabitants are struggling to survive through selling animals, selling remaining assets, collection of bush products and by moving to Mandera, Kenya, Dolow Ethiopia and internally within the region." (FSAU Flash, June 2002).

"Severe vulnerability is emerging in southern Somalia following the failure of *gu* season rains in key food producing areas. Particular concern has been raised in Gedo region where NGOs are reporting a shocking rise in the number of malnourished women, children and IDPs. On 16 October, the SA CB Food Security and Rural Development Sectoral Committee appealed for immediate food aid and additional health services to protect the lives of 450,000 people in Gedo, Bay and Bakol regions alone.

Poor rains have led to high market prices, water shortages and deteriorating livestock conditions. Young men have moved out of the region with cattle and camels. This leaves women, children, elderly and displaced populations behind with dwindling food supplies and few sources of income. The situation is exacerbated by the continuing closure of the Kenya-Somalia border and devaluation of the Somali Shilling. According to regional climate experts, there is a 45 percent chance of below average rainfall in the area until the middle of next year. There is concern that Somalia's annual cholera outbreak will take an even heavier toll than normal in these conditions." (UNCU, 18 October 2001)

For detailed account of the complex emergency in Gedo see 'FSAU Focus Gedo', February 2002 [External Link].

Livestock ban has led to major income deficits for pastoralists in the North (2000-2001)

- IDPs in Mogadishu and Bossaso hit by loss of trade-related employment.
- Printing of new currency leads to hyperinflation, devaluation and reduces purchasing power and labour opportunities placing IDPs at particular risk
- Livestock production is estimated to be the main source of livelihood for 70% of the population in Somalia
- Livestock ban imposed by Gulf countries since 2000 severely eroded purchasing power undermining food security in main livestock producing areas Puntland and Somaliland
- Somaliland is particularly hard-hit with shortfall in export earnings of US 2.4 million
- On alleged links with terrorist networks the US closed Somali remittance companies the single most powerful business, generating about US\$ 800 million yearly

"Other Urban Areas, including Mogadishu Estimated Vulnerable Population: 40,000

Urban areas are largely dependent on the modern trade economy, including domestic food produce and imported commodities such as sugar, salt and non-staple items. This makes urban residents and IDPs particularly vulnerable to economic shocks that may limit increase price levels and limit market access. In addition to the livestock ban, the printing of new currency has placed a severe strain on the purchasing power of poor households. Further, opportunities for casual labour at the ports have diminished." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.5)

"Bari, Nugal and northern Mudug Estimated Vulnerable Population: 33,400

The most vulnerable pastoral population group is lying along the coast where food availability and market access are severely reduced by the impact of the livestock ban and the poor state of infrastructure. Pastoralists in the Iskushuban area are particularly affected. In general, however, northeastern pastoral areas are not considered to be severely at risk to food insecurity or cholera outbreaks at the moment. That said, poor urban households and IDPs in the surroundings of Bossaso are extremely vulnerable following the loss of trade-related employment." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.4)

Livestock ban imposed by Gulf countries since September 2000:

"The economy of northern Somalia is significantly dependent on livestock production. It is estimated that livestock production contributes to 60% of the income of Northwest Somalia and 90% of the income of the Northeast. Livestock production is estimated to be the main source of livelihood for 70% of the population. The ongoing livestock ban imposed by Saudi Arabia has had a devastating impact on the social and economic systems of Somalia. ." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR June 2002, p.17)

"The first reported outbreak of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) outside of Africa, in Saudi Arabia, has resulted in a regional ban on imported livestock from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti. [...]

Most seriously affected by the regional ban is likely to be Somalia, a country which depends heavily on export of livestock. It lacks an established government and institutions to cope with the ban, and has very limited opportunities for economic diversification. Without a recognised central government for almost a decade, Somalia has struggled to find ways to get livestock certified for export.

[...]

According to one Somali livestock expert, the ban 'reflects not just on export quality but also on local markets and the environment. It will result in the over-production of herds, without the usual market outlet, which will cause environmental damage.'

Somali sources told IRIN that there was an urgent need for international agencies to assist by helping to establish systems to 'investigate the health of animals.'" (IRIN-CEA 22 September 2000, "Introduction" and "Somalia")

"The current livestock embargo was initially imposed by the Saudi government on the 19th September 2000, following a reported outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in early September. Many of the Gulf countries followed suit some days later, banning the importation of all livestock from the main livestock exporting countries in the region. If this ban remains, and is a comprehensive ban involving all livestock species and all of the Gulf market (as was the case in the previous ban), the implications for the economy and food security are very grave. Latest reports regarding the embargo revealed sharp declines in livestock prices in northern and central regions. The knock-on effects of restricted trading are expected to reduce employment opportunities and effect access to other important income sources. The economy in the northern and central parts of the country being most susceptible." (FSAU/FEWS 15 October 2000, "Highlights")

"The last time the Saudis issued such a ban, in 1998, it was only partially enforced, due to widespread smuggling through Yemen. This time, however, Yemen appears to be clamping down as well, making this episode potentially much more disruptive." (Menkhaus November 2000, p. 7)

Ban has resulted in significant loss of income at macro and micro levels for Somalis:

"The livestock bans have particularly hurt urban populations, including returning refugees and IDPs who, being dependent on the market, are reliant on a healthy economy for access to jobs and income generating opportunities." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.68)

"Moreover, since September 2000, states on the Arabian Peninsula imposed a ban on the importation of livestock from Somalia. As a result, the income of urban and pastoralist households in Puntland and Somaliland has been severely reduced, leading to dwindling asset levels, food deficits and increased malnutrition rates." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.3)

"As a result of the ban imposed by Gulf states on livestock imports from the Horn of Africa last year, the self-declared state of Somaliland is faced with a shortfall in export earnings of US\$2.4 million. A report from the Food Security Assessment Unit (FASU) stated that the ban has brought loss of income at macro and household level especially for the urban poor and internally displaced." (UNDP-EUE 21 February 2001, Somalia)

"There has been substantial loss of income at macro and household levels, which had limited the purchase of many goods, including medicine, and had accelerated the depletion of assets. Market failure because of the livestock ban would 'threaten livelihoods for many groups'. FSAU monitors and nutritionists said there was particular concern for the urban poor and Internally Displaced Population (IDPs) in and around most towns in the north. Burao, in Somaliland, was marked out as of particular concern as it was a 'heavily livestock dependent'. Bosaso and Galkayo in the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeast Somalia, were also of concern, the report said. However, the worst effects of the livestock ban on food security had been mitigated by 'unusually good livestock production and reproduction', resulting in a high level of milk for consumption and sale." (IRIN-CEA 12 February 2001, Somalia)

Closure of remittance companies by the US because of alleged links to terrorist activity, led to the country's economic collapse:

"Families with access to overseas remittances enjoy privileged access to social services and have better food security than households without.

[...]

Remittances have long been a critical part of Somalia's economy. Currently, with very low levels of agricultural production and manufacturing, remittances from the large Somali diaspora enable the country to run a balance of trade deficit and to enjoy higher levels of food security and access to private social services than would otherwise be the case. Future trends in remittances will be a key factor in sustaining human development.

[...]

The service sector is the most dynamic part of the economy. Money transfer companies and telecommunication companies have expanded throughout Somalia and increased the range of financial services, facilitating the flow of remittances from the diaspora and commercial transactions.

These companies, which did not exist a decade ago, are amongst the most powerful businesses in Somalia today." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, pp.38-9)

"Another study estimates that remittances to Somaliland alone could be as high as US\$500 million per year. That is four times the value of livestock exports from Somaliland in a normal year [...]. Another study estimates annual remittances to Somalia of US\$800 million.

[...]

A study in Hargeisa, Burco, and Bosasso calculated that remittances constitute nearly 40% of the income of urban households.

[...]

The rural poor and the internally displaced from groups who have fewer relatives abroad receive fewer remittances and are less well served by telecommunications. One study found that while the majority of households in Hargeisa received remittances, only 5% of rural households did [...]. In Hargeisa and Bosasso, there is clear evidence of significant differential access to remittances between urban residents and displaced populations and economic migrants from southern Somalia." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, pp.104-105)

Traditional coping mechanisms eroded by protracted conflict and drought (2002)

- Economic diversification and informal employment options account between 25-60% of household economy
- Seasonal migration, adoption into another clan area and exogamy are ingrained strategies in risk-prone environments
- Changes in consumption and intake of famine foods, sacrificing short-term needs for long-term life-investment
- Mutual trust and reciprocity between kin have been considerably eroded by protracted droughts and conflicts

"Individuals and communities are not passive in the face of crisis but employ their intimate knowledge of the environment, or political and social relations to mitigate against disaster. Rural households in Somalia employ a range of strategies to cope and survive in adverse circumstances. These can include the diversification of livelihood strategies through seasonal migration for employment, changes to dietary intake, or the consumption of famine foods. Often, short-term needs are sacrificed to preserve a 'way of life'. In the absence of any formal welfare system in Somalia, resource transfers and wealth redistribution within social networks play a crucial role in the maintenance of livelihoods. Anecdotal evidence suggests

that in hard times resources from their informal networks can account for 25-60% of the household economy.

[...]

Migration is an integral part of people's way of life in Somalia and a critical coping strategy in a risk-prone environment. Migration, resettlement through adoption into another clan (*heegata*), and exogamous marriage mean that most Somali families have relatives spread among clans and over a large geographic area. These personal and familial networks can be drawn on in times of conflict or drought. Mobility as a coping strategy of pastoralists during drought, however, is restricted during conflict.

[...]

Clan affiliation and identity with a place of residence form a system for the sharing and co-operative control of resources at the level of the household, compound, community and clan. [...] [T]raditional obligations of assistance, in the form of food, shelter, and water [...]. Other forms of assistance include the loan of farmland (*hoorsi*) or a milking animal (*irmaansi*), the restocking of livestock, and the giving of credit (*amaa*). Helping those most in need is also integral to the religious and social obligations of Islam, institutionalised in the giving of *zakat* and *sadaqa*.

[...]

When widespread conflict and drought are combined, as witnessed in the early 1990s, the impact can be devastating. Production systems and household and community assets, such as food stores and livestock, were destroyed or looted and the option of migration was constrained by warring militia. As livelihood options were reduced and trust within and between clans was eroded, the geographical spread of the resource networks contracted, and families retreated to the reassuring safety of the community." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.69)

Food security situation in Somalia again critical (2001-2002)

- Somalia has one of the highest malnutrition rates in the world at 23% and peaking at 40% in areas where IDPs live
- Sanaag and Sool regions of Somaliland highly food insecure due to drought
- In 2001 an estimated 800,000 people were in need of 70,000 tons of emergency food

"Serious food shortages loomed during 2001 because of widespread crop failures caused by poor rainfall and pest infestations. In August, TNG officials pleaded for 60,000 tons of food to assist "Somalis at risk of starving." Somalia's nationwide malnutrition rate of 23 percent was one of the highest in the world, and malnutrition rates as high as 40 percent were recorded in areas with high concentrations of displaced families.

In overcrowded returnee resettlement areas in Hargeisa, the Somaliland capital, 15 percent of repatriated children suffered from malnutrition, many of whom were "likely to die," according to a UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) report. An estimated 800,000 Somalis—more than 10 percent of the population—required some 70,000 tons of emergency food assistance." (USCR, 2002, p.96-97)

"Meanwhile, the report also warned of conditions in the self-declared republic of Somaliland, particularly in the Sanaag and Sool regions. Following scattered Gu rains (April-May), these two regions continued to be "highly food insecure", and the FSAU recommended targeted food assistance for 2,000 households in Sool and 3,000 households for Sanaag. " (IRIN, 12 June 2002)

"High levels of malnutrition are consistently found among displaced populations and marginalized groups who face discrimination in access to food, health, and water. Nutritionists also stress that the cumulative damage to personal health caused by a decade of war and malnutrition cannot be healed by a single year of improved food security.

[...]

The stabilization of the conflict and the gradual improvement in food production, means that for most people continuing high levels of need arise not from conditions of acute humanitarian crisis, but from long-term structural causes of poverty." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.73)

Public participation

Gender discrimination barrier to public participation (1998-2002)

- Conflict and displacement have opened new opportunities for women's participation beyond traditional gender roles
- Women's newly acquired roles and skills as widows and household-heads needs to be carefully considered during the rehabilitation and return processes taking place in northern Somalia Women prevented from participating in decision-making and from accessing resources
- Increased role in commerce sometimes makes women more vulnerable to discrimination

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional socio-cultural structures of Somali society and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in decision-making and access to resources. Violence against women and girls, resulting either from tradition or the civil war, includes the almost universal practice of female genital mutilation and sexual violence against the displaced, particularly against members of rival clans and minority groups." (UNICEF 2000, paras. 7 and 8)

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in Somali society, where the rights of women in both the private and public spheres are seriously undermined. Rape, which was uncommon in Somalia before the war, has become a weapon of war for the militia and bandits, as well as in camps for displaced persons and returnees. Women belonging to minority groups, such as the Bantus and the Rahanweyn, are particularly subject to these crimes." (CHR 18 February 1999, para. 74)

"Female-headed households are particularly vulnerable; in some areas half of the households are headed by women, who shoulder all household responsibilities while generating family income through commerce or farming. There is throughout Somalia an increased role of women in meeting household needs, in participating in community affairs, in agricultural production and in business activities. Since the collapse of the state, the role of women in commerce has grown markedly. The element of rapid change has been important; for many women it has made them more vulnerable, while for others it has opened vistas of opportunity virtually impossible in Somalia before the war.

[...]

In line with this changing role of women in post-war Somali society, evidence is emerging of women gaining political awareness. However, gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional, socio-cultural structures of Somali society and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in formal decision-making processes and bodies." (UN December 1998, pp. 7, 47)

ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

General

Lineage identity is central organizing force in Somalia (1998-1999)

- Clan is main organizing force in Somali society
- Clan networks provide physical and social security for Somalis

"In Somali culture, clan is the inherited patriarchal lineage of ancestors, passed down orally in detail, generation to generation, determining origin, social standing, and access to territory, property and power. In times of trouble, the clan also pays a penalty for inflicting death or injury, which relieves the burden from individuals and families. At its worst, clan leads to conflict, xenophobia and control. 'But at its best, the clan works like the western world's social security welfare system. It protects, it means that all actions against you and your family will have consequences,' said a Somali source." (IRIN-CEA 15 June 2001)

"In addition to conflict, technological change, trade, religion, migration patterns and the return of the Somali diaspora have broken down geographical and social boundaries. This has resulted in fundamental local and familial changes. In the absence of a central authority, the clan represents the lowest denominator in providing group and individual protection and social security. Yet, the clan remains the most potent force in contributing to social and political division and diffusion." (UN November 1999, p. 4)

"The social context of human development in Somalia cannot be understood without reference to clan affiliation. Lineage identity is a central organizing force in Somali society. At the grassroots level, clan elders and other community leaders play a vital role in providing most of the day-to-day governance throughout Somalia, in the absence of effective state authority, and are often instrumental in maintaining local stability. One of the paradoxes of contemporary Somalia is that some of the most powerful social and economic forces are simultaneously sources of both stability and insecurity. On the one hand, clan networks provide an essential level of physical and social security to many Somali households; the clan is a vital source of group protection, social security and customary law in the absence of state infrastructure. On the other hand, clannism is a powerful force contributing to unstable alliances, diffusion of power and communal conflict over scarce resources. In the period of state collapse, it has proved to be a divisive and destructive tool in the hands of political leaders. A second force, economic and business interests, at times promotes inter-clan and inter-factional accords for the sake of improved market conditions. However, these players also resort to armed conflict in pursuit of market control and price-fixing." (UN December 1998, p. 7)

PROPERTY ISSUES

General

Most IDPs from Southern Somalia in Hargeisa rent land from private individuals (June 2002)

- Displaced from southern Somalia do not own their land and 30 out of 34 interviewed Southern Somali families paid rent

Interagency assessment conducted in 8 areas around Hargeisa (Somaliland) in returnee and IDP settlements (June 2002). The second largest settlement, Daami hosts about 10,000 people, of whom 35% are displaced from Southern Somalia (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

"- 30% of area residents report they owned property before the war and virtually all report having no access to it now, citing war and insecurity as the primary reasons why they no longer have access.

- Almost half of the residents currently own their land. The rest of the households live on land owned by the government (primarily Stadium and State House residents) or by private individuals (primarily in Daami). Three out of four households currently owning their land were allocated it by the government.

- Somalilanders are most likely to own their own land, while Southern Somalis generally do not own their land and are the group most likely to be paying rent for their land/home.

"75% of Daami residents who don't own their land pay rent on it; these residents are predominantly the Southern Somalis and Ethiopians. In Daami, 30 out of 34 interviewed Southern Somali families paid rent, while 11 out of 13 Ethiopian families paid rent. In Daami, only 4 out of 50 families originally from Somaliland pay rent." (Clark, June 2002, p.32)

Bossasso IDPs evicted from their plots by original owners (May 2002)

- IDPs recurrently evicted incur high re-settlement expenditure
- Haphazard settlements and poor sanitation contributing factors to April 2002 cholera outbreaks

"Significant proportion of the Bossasso District's population lives in the urban areas and is involved in business activities. However the high number of IDPs in Bossasso town and its environs as well the urban poor struggle to meet their daily needs. They are engaged in casual labour such as portering, house help activities, garbage collection and begging. The IDPs are constantly evicted by original owners of plots they have settled on and consequently incur high expenditure on their resettlement. The haphazard settlements have negative implications since little consideration on the environment is made resulting in poor sanitation and increased risk to diseases. On 13th April, Bossasso town received heavy showers, a most unusual occurrence in the area. Measles cases were reported in Bossasso town at the time of the assessment and a serious cholera outbreak hit Bossasso town in the week of 14th to 21st April 2002." (FSAU Nutrition Update, May 2002)

Inter-clan fighting results in land disputes and dispossession (1999-2000)

- IDPs from minority clans with a low status in the community are unable to buy land (2001)
- Jiddu clan fighters in Qoroley displacing other farmers in land dispute (October 2000)
- Bantu and Rahanweyn minorities forced off lands (1999-2000)

IDPs of minority clans only able to rent land:

" IDPs often come from minority groups (Bantu) and clans with low status in the community. One problem of the IDPs is that the major clans will not sell land to 'outsiders'/members of other clans. IDPs therefore only have access to rented land." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

Jiddu sub-clan claim to own all land in Qoroley:

"Fighting between different clans with rival claims to land has left at least 10 dead and 15 injured in Yoroley, 75 km south of the Somali capital Mogadishu, the Associated Press agency (AP) reported on Monday [23 October 2000]. The fighting, which began on Sunday and continued sporadically Monday, pitted members of the Jiddu sub-clan, which claims to own all the land around Qoroley, and farmers from other clans who it claims have occupied its land, the report said. 'The Jiddu clan fighters have started displacing all of the other farmers, by either setting their animals to graze in the others' farms or just destroying them,' AP quoted a traditional elder Abdullahi Khalif Kobleh as saying. So far, six members of the Jiddu and four from other clans had been killed." (IRIN-CEA 24 October 2000, "Ten reported dead in Qoroley land struggle")

Bantu and Rahanweyn minorities forced off lands:

"During the civil war, the Bantu population has been systematically pushed off their land towards the river by militias or bandits. They are now so close to the river that they face a real risk of their settlements being washed away during floods.

[...]

The Rahanweyn minority lives on fertile agricultural land and is more advanced in agriculture. It too has been subjected to dispossession and displacement." (CHR 18 February 1999, paras. 77-80)

"Bantus continue to be forced off their land, their property continues to be looted and their villages destroyed." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 17)

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

General

Return and reintegration of IDPs and returnees is one of the three priorities of UN 2002 Appeal

- Returnees and IDPs seem to be "de-facto" inter-changeable labels in Somalia and projects target returnees, host communities and IDPs
- Security conditions in the northeast and northwest of Somalia have attracted many displaced and returnees
- Return projects have been hampered by recurrent livestock import bans undermining absorptive capacity of the Northwest
- IOM is no longer involved in IDP return and reintegration projects in Somalia due to lack of funding

"In a country that has to deal with the consequences of large numbers of people who are displaced, the distinction between internally displaced (IDPs) and refugees has little relevance. In the case of Somalia, refugees as well as IDPs may be reluctant to return to their home areas since they remain replete with mines. Many former refugees are now IDPs since on-going conflict often prevents them from accessing their regions of origin. Equally significantly, demobilised militia, who may still retain their arms, have little incentive to return to their original towns or villages." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, pp.5-6)

"Many of the IDPs actually reside in areas to which Somali refugees will return. Therefore targeting the returnees and ignoring the IDPs would negatively affect the reintegration process especially the reconciliation aspect. Although UNHCR is not directly responsible for IDPs in Somalia and does not provide individual assistance packages to them, they will benefit from the reintegration activities in those areas receiving returnees." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.106)

"The present prevailing security conditions in many regions – particularly the northeast and northwest of Somalia – has prepared the way for the return and reintegration of many of these populations. UNHCR and UNDP's joint efforts in Somalia are part of the Regional Programme for Refugee reintegration recognising the need to promote integrated and comprehensive development to returnees and resident populations alike, in areas of return as well as former host communities. The comprehensive and lasting reintegration and rehabilitation of returnees and IDPs cannot be sustained without rebuilding the productive capacities of the affected areas." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.105)

"It is within the context of these returning, returned and internally displaced populations that the need for an integrated and coordinated approach to the situation has been identified. Although Northwest and Northeast Somalia have achieved a remarkable process of recovery and rehabilitation following the civil war, both regions are vulnerable to the heavy demands brought about by an influx of population such as the one they are currently experiencing and will continue to experience. Whilst relative economic recovery has indeed occurred in both these regions they still contain a significant population of poor and vulnerable people who struggle to survive within the current infrastructure and services and the current economic climate. The arrival of a large number of returnees will only serve to strain the existing resources and economic livelihood opportunities for both existing residents and "returning" residents." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.4)

"Since 1992, in response to these developments UNHCR has been promoting the voluntary return of refugees from the camps in Ethiopia back to northern Somalia. However, it was not until 1994 that they initiated serious plans to return the refugee population from Ethiopia. These plans were suspended later that year and the process was re-started in 1997. However, it was suspended once again in November 1998 due to the Somaliland authorities' concern about the absorptive capacity of the Northwest following Saudi Arabia's economically devastating livestock import ban." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p. 3)

"The Northeast have not yet developed such a specific plan to address repatriation and reintegration needs, but a recent statement the authorities in the Northeast highlighted the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs as a high priority on their policy agenda. A thorough assessment of the specific needs of Northeast Somalia, particularly in relation to IDPs, is a crucial factor in ensuring that a successful reintegration and rehabilitation process occurs. The first phase of this programme needs to ascertain the current situation regarding returning refugees, IDPs and demobilised militias and the existing capacity to deal with this." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.5)

"Effective refugee return inevitably depends upon the ability of refugees to integrate or reintegrate into their chosen communities. Often after years of exile, refugees enter an environment where the receiving community is frequently hostile towards them. They are typically perceived to have benefited from assistance at levels that have not been available to those in the communities to which they return. Furthermore they often make claims on property that is occupied by others. They may enter situations in which they are liable to be regarded as having deserted their communities. Such factors are relevant to many returnees and communities in Somalia. It is for this reason that sustainability will depend upon a community-based approach to a refugee return programme." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.5)

"IOM [was ...] undertaking preliminary studies with agency partners to develop a programme for return and resettlement of IDPs. IOM [was ...] planning large-scale activities to ensure an effective plan for movement and reintegrating of displaced populations into places of origin. This action plan will include pre-departure assistance, medical screening and profiling. On arrival, inputs such as income generation projects and agricultural implements will be provided. UNICEF will continue to provide resettlement kits to returning IDPs in Somalia." (UN November 2000, Strategy Paper, pp. 11-12)

IOM is no longer involved in IDP reintegration and return projects in Somalia, due to lack of funding. (Phone communication, IOM Geneva, and Nairobi Ms Mio Sato, June 2002)

Refugees and displaced persons have had little reason to return to the South (2002)

- Very few displaced return to the south due to lack of security and no economic viability in their war-ravaged areas of origin
- The unresolved issue of violent transfer of property and land along clan nepotistic policies is a major obstacle to return
- 44% IDPs from Southern Somalia in Hargeisa want to stay there
- Over 80% Southern Somalis state war as the main obstacle to return
- No social services or infrastructure in communities of origin
- Poor security is impediment to return and reintegration

"However, few of the existing displaced seem to be returning to their original homes. For some who were displaced from rural areas such as Bay and Bakol, there is little economic incentive to do so. For others who were originally residents of Mogadishu, a significant proportion do not feel it is safe or viable to return there. This is a potential obstacle for future reconciliation. First, because it reflects the continuing instability

of several regions, and second because it reflects a consolidation of population realignments and the violent transfer of property, such as land, that occurred during the war." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.61)

Interagency assessment conducted in 8 areas around Hargeisa (Somaliland) in returnee and IDP settlements (June 2002). The second largest settlement, Daami hosts about 10,000 people, of whom 35% are displaced from Southern Somalia (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

"All respondents were asked if they planned to remain living "here" for the rest of their lives, insh'allah; [...] Residents in all areas but Daami, State House, and Stadium responded "yes" in large numbers. The residents of State House and Stadium are aware that they do not own the land and that they may well be resettled, accounting for the low rate of planning to remain there. Overall, non-Somali Ethiopians planned to remain at a significantly lower rate than those from Somaliland (a rate of 71% [56-82%] versus 85% [81-89%] (P<0.05)). Those originally from Southern Somalia planned to stay at a rate of 44% [30-60%] compared to 85% [81-89%] (P<0.0001) for those originally from Somaliland." (Clark, June 2002, p.28)

"Southern Somalis report owning land before the wars at a significantly higher rate than those residents who are originally from Somaliland. Over 80% of Southern Somalis who had land before the war cited war or insecurity as a reason they could not return; the rest cited drought (under "other reason")." (Clark, June 2002, p.31)

"It is unlikely that the Somali diaspora can be attracted to return to a country where mere survival is often the main priority, development beyond aspiration and where social services and economic and administrative infrastructure have collapsed. Effectively addressing these gaps in services is crucial to the reintegration of the absolute poor, including returning refugees, IDPs and the poorest sectors of the urban and rural populations, who live on the brink of disaster.
[...]

Until security issues are addressed, recovery or progress towards it through reintegration, will remain under threat. Insecurity is a key component of recurrent emergencies in Somalia and one that needs to be taken into account in order to find viable and enduring solutions. Rehabilitation and reintegration interventions have significant potential to reduce insecurity. In particular, the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-militia during rehabilitation phases contribute to overall security in a region. Settling the militia has been a pre-requisite for lasting peace and security in current zones of recovery and transition." (UN December 1998, p. 10)

Displacement and return are occurring simultaneously as populations move to access resources (1998-1999)

- Refugees and IDPs apparently have returned to their homes with improved security conditions in many parts of the country
- Families move repeatedly to access relief aid
- Large part of the population is nomadic, moving away from homes and back again with seasons

"As security conditions continued to improve in many parts of the country, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned to their homes..." (USDOS February 2001, Freedom of Movement)

"Many families in the camps have been repeatedly displaced, and for some, it is their second or third time in the capital. Some arrive seeking relatives, but others come because it remains a traditional migration route – even with Mogadishu's precipitous decline, the displaced still expect the capital to provide opportunities. The majority [of IDPs] said they survived by begging, by receiving food scraps, and by earning a little cash by providing 'carrying services' to people in the market – earning about 2,000-3,000 Somali shillings a day." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

"The character of Somalia's displaced people is complicated by several factors. Since the civil war, virtually everyone has either had to leave the country or has been permanently displaced following fighting. A large part of the population is nomadic, and so has no fixed residence. The war has taught Somalis how to be resourceful and, therefore, they can easily 'displace' themselves if there is an opportunity to gain something by it through relief channels. These factors make it almost impossible to put a fixed number on IDPs within Somalia at any one time." (Redding and Hansen 1998, pp. 82-83)

Return in Somalia is threatened by landmines (1999)

- "Somaliland" is particularly risky area
- Populations wish to return to their communities of origin once mines are removed

"Somalia, including Somaliland, is one of the most mined countries in Africa. The independent expert is pleased that work to de-mine Somaliland is finally under way, with the support of UNDP and its Somali Civic Protection Programme. So far, up to 500 mixed anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, unexploded ordinances (UXO), artillery shells and bullets have reportedly been collected. The work is being carried out by 63 local people, trained by UNDP for the National De-Mining Agency, which was established in 1996.

Hargeisa was de-mined, although not fully, in 1993. Work on de-mining the town of Burao, mined in 1995 during the civil war, started in July 1998. De-mining resolves some of the problems of displacement. It has been noted that as soon as an area is de-mined the population return to their former places of living. Although the government has recently passed a law committing itself to destroying the mines that are being collected, this is still not carried out." (CHR 18 February 1999, paras. 112-113)

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

General

Very poor situation of access in Somalia hampers humanitarian programming (2001-2002)

- UNDP staff member released and UN operations in Mogadishu resume (May 2002)
- Gedo and Puntland off limits to international agencies with inaccessible starving populations in Gedo since April
- During most of 2001 populations in Middle and Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle, Gedo and Benadir have been off limits to UN and partner agencies
- Somalia declared by UN the most dangerous operational environment, which constraining UN response and presence in Somalia
- Humanitarian access considered at its lowest at end 2001 since the departure of UNOSOM forces in 1995

"The UNDP staff member, who was kidnapped on 28 April in Mogadishu, was unconditionally released on 25 May. The UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia welcomed the release of Prof. Abukar. On behalf of the UN, he strongly condemned attacks on humanitarian personnel and called upon all parties in Somalia to respect fully the security and safety of its staff. UN operations have subsequently resumed in Mogadishu. Recent renewed and ongoing militia fighting between the interim government and warlords may, however, affect these operations.

[...]

WFP and other agencies have not resumed operations in Gedo due to insecurity. WFP has been planning a relief distribution in Gedo since April but access continues to be a problem. Nevertheless, WFP continues to pre-position food in Mandera for Gedo distribution as soon as access becomes possible. UN air operations into the area still suspended.

[...]

International staff of aid agencies are still out of Puntland (Northeast). Authorities have advised that no aid workers should return to the area until further notice. The UN humanitarian coordinator is expected to hold discussions with the authorities." (WFP, 31 May 2002)

"Struggles for control of the strategic seaports of Kismayo and Merka continued, as well as numerous clashes in Gedo region. For large parts of the year populations in Middle and Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle, Gedo and Benadir have been off limits to UN and partner agencies." (UNICEF 11 February 2002)

"All UN agencies have a permanent presence in Somalia, although they have remained based across the border in Kenya since UNOSOM's withdrawal in 1995. With such an operation, there are a number of over-arching constraints. These include restricted and unpredictable access due to insecurity; lack of presence in much of southern and central Somalia of international partners; limited or late funding curtailing emergency prevention and preparedness, as well as longer-term activities where feasible. However, in light of the changing security dynamics in the country, UN projects and programs are increasingly being relocated to Somalia, in order to strengthen the local monitoring / response capacity in four main areas of Baidoa, Garowe, Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Additionally, a common UN House is being rehabilitated in Baidoa to accommodate further staff." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.2)

"Continuing insecurity poses the greatest constraint for UN agencies and NGOs providing relief to the most vulnerable populations in Somalia. Although large-scale factional fighting is rare, banditry, extortion and kidnapping threats are rife in the absence of any authority to enforce law and order. This was demonstrated by the attacks on ACF, MSF and UNICEF in Mogadishu in late 2000 and early 2001.

Insecurity is often related to contractual and administrative disputes, preventing the modification of project designs and slowing rapid response to emergencies by aid agencies with risk-averse project designs. To overcome these constraints, UNICEF, WFP and other UN agencies ensure flexible operational profiles, balance national staff with members of all Somali clans, and use novel forms of sub-contracting and bonded transport.

Reaching vulnerable groups in Somalia is further complicated by the dispersion of destitute populations. For instance, since 1999, there are very few IDP camps in Somalia. Rather, IDPs and other high-risk groups are integrated within larger urban communities and rural villages. This renders their vulnerability less visible and makes targeting difficult, although the suffering of poor Somalis is no less real.

Four regions in Somalia – Middle and Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and Benadir / Mogadishu – due to insecurity and lack of funding, have very little continued agency presence and programmes. Hence some 1.6 million Somalis are denied access to basic social services and relief assistance." (UN November 2001)

"The recent flare-up of fighting in Somalia has led to concern among humanitarian agencies over the impact of renewed conflict on an already vulnerable population. Fighting in the southern port of Kismayo and in the northeastern port of Bosaso has been among the heaviest seen in recent years. It comes at a time when aid workers are trying to sound the alarm over poor rains and crop failure in areas of the south, and the effects of general economic malaise as a result of a livestock export ban imposed on Somalia by the Gulf states in 2000. Randolph Kent, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, Nairobi, talked to IRIN about the need to establish essential humanitarian access in the face of the new crisis.[...]

Response of UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia when asked about the effect of upsurge of fighting in south on humanitarian access:

We are very concerned that with fighting not only in the south but also in the northeast, we will see more and more people in greater need, who are prevented from getting assistance... More than that, we are very worried that the kind of fighting going on now will create more vulnerable people. The food shortages and water shortages we have seen in recent weeks in Gedo, Bay and Bakol, possibly Hiran, and elsewhere, are intensifying, because the fighting drives people out of their homes... [it] makes their lives not just more miserable, but perhaps threatens their very existence." (IRIN-CEA 7 August 2001)

Serious challenges facing the new government regarding improvement of security and humanitarian access (2000)

- Security situation has been new president's biggest challenge and main priority
- Mogadishu business community has provided 300,000 USD per month toward establishment of a security force

"In Somalia, the Transitional National Assembly and the new Government have stated their determination to address the chronic insecurity prevailing in the South and other areas of Somalia. Opposition to the establishment of a new Government is generating new forms of instability with potential regional dimension that may pose a security concern for the humanitarian community." (UN 2001, p. 13)

"The biggest hurdle is the security situation, particularly in Mogadishu - which the new government decided was nevertheless secure enough to move to. Although the security situation has improved

considerably over the last two years, businessmen and international humanitarian staff still rely on protection from militia, and an absence of law and order means fire fights between gunmen and clans can break out without restraint. Talking to reporters after his arrival, Abdiqasim said the security situation would be his priority.

[...]

Somali political sources pointed out that, in order to succeed, the government must have a cohesive cross clan force that answers only to a centralised authority, and not to their respective clans. Presently, the militia and their 'technicals' - jeeps mounted with heavy weaponry - belong to the clan. "We have to break the link between the security forces and the clans" said a businessman. Previously, faction leaders proved unable to break the clan's grip on the militias and their weapons. They depended on clan allegiance to utilise gun men they were otherwise unable to pay or equip.

As a central authority, the interim government now faces the challenge of finding the means to pay its nascent security force - and also equip it. The Mogadishu business community, tired of large overhead costs on security, have so far pitched in to the tune of \$300,000 a month toward the establishment of a security force for Mogadishu. 'How long can they sustain this?' a Mogadishu resident posed.

Local and international expectations will focus on the ability of the new government to get a grip on Mogadishu. During the Djibouti peace process, when clan representatives negotiated power, the Hawiye, who control the capital, were given the presidency in recognition that it was the only way to reestablish peace and security in Mogadishu - after a decade of competing Hawiye sub-clans laying waste to the city. 'The Hawiye created this mess, they have to sort it out', one of the clan representatives said during the peace talks.' (IRIN-CEA 16 October 2000, "Security")

International presence in Mogadishu on a visiting basis only in 1999 and 2000

- ACF is only international NGO in Mogadishu
- Poor security has chased rest of international aid community out of capital
- Most international organisations work out of Nairobi
- Without permanent presence, information is scarce

"ACF is the only international NGO in Mogadishu with a permanent presence in both north and south Mogadishu." (UN Sub-Committee on Nutrition 25 July 2000, p. 31)

"The vulnerability of Somalia is exacerbated by the pull-out of most international humanitarian organisations, leaving Mogadishu very isolated. The threat to aid workers in Mogadishu was such that aid moved out of the capital and almost exclusively into the regions - particularly Somaliland, Puntland, and areas of southern Somalia - with expatriate presence in Mogadishu on a visiting basis only. In Mogadishu, since the pull-out of the humanitarian and military operation, expatriate staff are, in many ways, seen as a "commodity" or a "resource". Hostage-taking has sometimes resulted in huge pay-outs by local businessmen. Likewise, aid programmes are seen far more as an economic opportunity than a humanitarian effort - in terms of employment, finances and equipment. Not only an economic asset, the expatriate aid worker is also a political target, with resentment over the international military and humanitarian effort still a factor.

International organisations have therefore headquartered themselves in Nairobi and operate 'in absentia' through a skeleton local staff, which results in large proportions of available funding being used for logistics and salaries - and has increased feelings of resentment. One consequence of this is that Mogadishu has become one of the most isolated capitals in the world. Apart from the strictly controlled aid flights, no commercial flights as such operate from the capital - chartered small aircraft from Nairobi, carrying the stimulant plant qat, take only one or two passengers at a time. Information is therefore very scarce, and

dependent on the security perspective of humanitarian agencies based in Nairobi - which try to act in concert over threats, kidnappings and killings in order to protect staff and programmes. This extreme isolation of Mogadishu and lack of information in itself inhibits development.

[...]

Western humanitarian organizations maintaining a rudimentary presence in Mogadishu are ICRC, MSF Spain, Action Internationale contre la Faim, Peace and Life (Sweden), and Daily Bread from Germany. United Nations offices include representatives from UNDP, FAO, UNHCR, WFP and WHO. These humanitarian agencies presently have no permanent expatriate presence and depend on a skeleton structure of local staff. Some local Somali humanitarian organizations have made efforts to work in the camps, but lack funding. For example, the Somali Refugee Agency SORA, founded in December 1998, has mapped out the camps and compiled lists of families, adults and children, as well as the main health and sanitation problems." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

National response

The Somali Red Crescent has provided medical aid to the drought-affected throughout the conflict (2000-2001)

- Somali Red Crescent Society is only humanitarian institution represented across the nation
- It has had network of primary health care clinics since overthrow of the Barre regime in 1991

"The Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) has been active in most parts of the country during the years of conflict that have followed the overthrow of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991. It is the only humanitarian institution represented across the nation, although its leadership is still based in Nairobi, Kenya. Its network of primary health care clinics has saved many lives and supported the most vulnerable people in society, especially mothers and children. This programme continued in 2000 with support given by the Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to the Somali Red Crescent Society's. The Federation programme aimed to assist the SRCS with the development of its human resources at national and regional levels, and to strengthen its institutional capacity for disaster preparedness." (IFRC 25 May 2001)

"Although it faces difficulties in maintaining effective leadership and lacks secure resources, the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) is still the only indigenous nation-wide humanitarian institution in Somalia. It provides health care for vulnerable groups as well as activities in the field of disaster preparedness and relief. The SRCS has paid special attention to the promotion of fundamental principles and humanitarian values, disaster preparedness and disaster response, and health and care in the community. It has also tried to improve the capacity and performance of its branches despite the difficulties of operating in a fragmented society with no central administration. Core activities have included first aid training and tracing services for people dispersed by the conflict.

[...]

With the support of the Federation, the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) has managed to survive during the civil war and maintain operations in favour of vulnerable groups where all other formal structures and services have collapsed. To respond to the humanitarian needs and to continue providing the required support to SRCS, the Federation formulated a strategy intended to support SRCS efforts by focusing programme activities primarily on the health sector, and more specifically: providing essential health services through the SRCS Integrated Health Care programme; supporting the Garoe Community Hospital; improving the institutional development of the National Society; introducing a community based first aid programme in some regions of the country; and improving the emergency response capacity at branch level. Federation activities will be coordinated with the ICRC which is the lead agency in Somalia, as well as with the United Nations agencies." (IFRC 18 October 2000, paras. 1 and 3)

Islamic organizations have provided assistance in Mogadishu displaced persons' camps (1999)

"In the IDP camps, Islamic organizations provide some assistance to the displaced, but mainly during Muslim festivals. Some 20 or 30 head of sheep are delivered to each camp for the Eid festival. Otherwise, Islamic organizations are concentrating on orphanages, funding Koranic schools, or injecting money into business ventures. The main Islamic organizations operating in Mogadishu are the International Islamic

Relief Organization; Al Haramayn; Al-Islah Charity; Monazamat Al-da'wa; African Muslim Agency and Muslim Aid UK." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

International activities in 2002

Resettlement and reintegration of displaced populations is one of the three main goals set by the UN for 2002

- Three broad strategies include humanitarian action, transition and recovery, and repatriation and resettlement
- UN requests over 83 million US\$ in 2002 Consolidated Appeal (November 2001)
- Delayed, disproportionate and underfunding of priority activities seriously undermines planning and implementation of sustainable long-term projects
- Only 28, 25% of total requirements were received, almost entirely in the food sector

"Saving lives and supporting livelihoods;
Supporting good governance, peace building and economic recovery;
Assisting resettlement and reintegration of displaced populations.

The CAP 2002 represents the entirety of UN agency activities in Somalia within three broad strategies for humanitarian intervention, transitional recovery and refugee return. The CAP is, however, just one part of a broader contribution of the aid community within the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) to assist Somalia in the immediate and longer term. Later this year the UN will be consulting with key NGO and donor partners to establish priority objectives for 2002 to strengthen the overall impact of the SACB in Somalia. With this objective in mind, UN agencies are using this CAP to focus primarily on humanitarian action to address the pending crisis within Somalia – hence an appeal with a total requirement of US\$ 83,683,971 in 2002 (incorporating reduced transitional programmes). The UN Programme can be summarised as follows:

Humanitarian Action: This remains at the core of all UN operations and the CAP. The failure of the *gu* rainy season in 2001 demonstrates the vulnerability of poorer households in Somalia. After one bumper season in 2000, Somalia is now once again facing emergency conditions with increasing child malnutrition and mortality. Food security programmes, basic health services, water, sanitation and emergency education are required to help populations break away from the ‘boom and bust’ emergency cycle. [Total UN agency requirements: **US\$ 55,659,415**]

Transition and Recovery: at the same time the operational arm of the UN is aiming to support peace building in Somalia. Such a programme focuses on areas such as the promotion of the rule of law, governance, strengthening of capacity, and economic recovery programmes, particularly linked to demobilisation of armed militia. [Total UN agency requirements: **US\$ 16,732,037**]

Repatriation and Resettlement after a decade of exile many Somali refugees are moving back to Somalia, particularly from Somali Region 5 in Ethiopia into northwest regions - Somaliland and northeast regions - Puntland. Additional funding is required to support the return of Somali populations from expensive care and maintenance camps to places of origin where they will be able to resume stable lives and livelihoods. [Total UN agency requirements: **US\$ 11,292,519**]" (UN November 2001)

The UN 2002 Consolidated Appeal (CAP) was funded 29,9% from January 2002 to June 2002 out of revised requirements US\$ 83,988,971, (UN Appeal, 20 June 2002, Table I) while the UN CAP 2001 was funded 21.7% out of US\$ 140'442'999 required as of June 2002. (UN Appeal June 2002, Table I)

"Insecurity, limited resources and lack of local counterparts remain the overriding constraints in efforts to attain the strategic goals. At the time of writing, the CAP for 2002 had only received about 15% of total requirements. Although agencies have used other sources of funding where they exist to meet urgent needs, the combined impact of delayed, disproportionate and underfunding of priority activities is considerable in the longer term, with negative implications for strategic engagement. Under these conditions, it is much more difficult to plan and implement activities in a coherent, cost-effective and sustainable manner. In the absence of a central government, agencies continue to cooperate with local authorities and communities where possible." (UN, May 2002, p.1)

"Thus far, most of the priority sectors have received little or no CAP funding, with the exception of food aid, which is fully funded. Only 28.25% (including 10% carry-over) of total requirements have so far been received. For the programmes that rely solely on CAP funding, implementation has been limited. Some of the affected programmes include key inter-sectoral activities focusing on human rights and gender. Agencies have utilised core funds or funds borrowed from other projects to address urgent needs particularly in the health sector. In the Somali context, lack of or disproportionate funding has a cumulative adverse effect on the lives of many vulnerable civilians and the achievement of the overall objectives and strategies." (UN, May 2002, p.12)

See original document for full details budget updates [[External link](#)].

IDP-related activities included in 2002 Consolidated Appeal for Somalia (selected)

Mid-Year Review –2002 Somalia CAP:

"The outlined sectoral priorities are also unchanged. However, priorities for the rest of the year will include a greater focus on addressing the immediate to longer-term needs of some 300,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) located in different parts of the country." (UN, May 2002, p.1)

The total funding requested for Somalia in 2002 is USD 83,988,971

The UN 2002 Consolidated Appeal (CAP) was funded 29,9% from January 2002 to June 2002 out of revised requirements US\$ 83,988,971. (UN Appeal, 20 June 2002, Table I)

The UN CAP 2001 was funded 21.7% out of US\$ 140'442'999 required as of June 2002. (UN Appeal June 2002, Table I)

The table below only includes selected activities in the 2001 Appeal that may have a direct impact on IDPs. Several activities in the Appeal that are not included below are likely to benefit IDPs indirectly, and it is recommended to consult the [2002 Appeal document](#) if more detailed information is needed.

Appealing Agency/Activity	Appeal Requirements
UNICEF: Emergency Response in the Area of Water and Environmental Sanitation	US\$ 1,476,000
WHO: Control of Priority Communicable Diseases	US\$ 1,484,901
UNICEF: Nutritional Supplementation	US\$ 1,190,000
UNICEF/UNDP: Critical Reproductive Health (RH) Services	US\$ 655,000 for UNICEF US\$ 707,540 for UNFPA
UNICEF: Support to Children in Need of Special Protection	US\$ 870,000
ILO: Economic Recovery, Employment Creation and Support to	US\$ 2,000,000

Decentralisation	(1st.phase)
FAO: Seed Security	US\$ 400,000
UNDP: Reintegration of Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons	US\$ 2,915,000

(UN November 2001)

The IGAD, UNHCR and UNDP Programme for Reintegration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons in Somalia ready to implement (June 2002)

- Programme launched to facilitate reintegration of displaced Somalis to be implemented in Hargeysa, Burao, Bosasso and Garowe
- The programme addresses physical needs in sectors such as water, education and health, as well as long-term socio-economic requirements by strengthening policy and governance structures through participation and capacity-building
- The first phase of the programme will produce an inter-agency needs assessment in view to facilitate reintegration of IDPs and returnees
- The second phase will be in light of the assessment findings to implement projects to strengthen governance, enlarging economic opportunities and improving basic social services
- At least 670,000 beneficiaries: beyond artificial labels of 'refugee' or 'IDPs' the programme adopts an holistic perspective of displacement targeting populations at district level
- This marks an ambitious departure from traditionally unbalanced programming to which the donor and humanitarian communities alike will need to adjust in more flexible ways

"UNDP launched three new projects over the past year to support good governance, pro-poor economic growth and the reintegration of refugees, returnees and IDPs. With funding received thus far, the programmes are now ready to begin implementation across the country." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.13)

"The Programme for Reintegration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons in Somalia is part of a sub-regional initiative launched by IGAD, UNHCR and UNDP to facilitate the reintegration of uprooted populations in the Horn of Africa.

[...]

Initial implementation will be in four pilot districts - Hargeysa and Burao in Northwest Somalia and Bosasso and Garowe in Northeast Somalia. It will then expand into other areas of northern Somalia, which require support in reintegrating returning refugee and displaced populations.

((IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR , pp.1,2)

"The programme is intended to operate in two phases. The first phase entails a consultation and planning exercise that will be undertaken by a cross-sectoral Task Force with the support of a UNDP Reintegration Programme Team. These activities will be developed in close collaboration with the authorities and communities of Northeast and Northwest Somalia, and they will identify the specific needs to be met in the reintegration process and prepare a detailed proposal of interventions required to address these needs. Whilst completing this planning process there will also be an element of project implementation. Each district will identify a priority area for immediate intervention and implementation during Phase 1. The second phase of this programme will entail the implementation of the activities identified during Phase 1 of the programme. Initial implementation will be in four pilot districts - Hargeysa and Burao in Northwest Somalia and Bosasso and Garowe in Northeast Somalia. It will then expand into other areas of northern Somalia, which require support in reintegrating returning refugee and displaced populations." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR , June 2002, p.1-2)

Objectives:

"Under Phase I of this project, the Programme Management Team, with the full participation of central, district and local authorities, will undertake a planning and assessment process, which will result in the preparation of a detailed interagency, integrated development programme aimed at supporting the reintegration of refugees and IDPs within the host communities in four selected districts. At the same time, a number of development projects will be implemented in each of the programme areas." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR June 2002, 29)

Implementing partners: UNHCR and UNDP:

"Between 1993 and 2000 UNHCR spent approximately US\$12.5 million (excluding international procurement such as vehicles, pipes, pumps etc.) on its programme in Northwest Somalia which served to facilitate the repatriation and reintegration process by rehabilitating and reconstructing water, infrastructure, agriculture and environmental projects through QIP mechanisms. Although all these project initiatives have been geared to benefit directly the returnees in their respective areas of origin, the internally displaced population and the population in the impacted areas have benefited and continue to benefit from the project assistance packages.

[...]

The UNDP-Somalia Programme Strategy has three inter-linked programme objectives: (i) Peace and Security; (ii) Governance; (iii) Economic Recovery and Poverty Eradication." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, pp.7, 9)

Other UN organization involved:

UNICEF, UNESCO, UNFPA, WFP, WHO, FAO, IFAD, UNHCR, UNIFEM

NGOs involved:

Danish Refugee Council (DRC), SC-USA, SwissGroup, IRC

Target groups:

"Based on UNICEF (1998) population figures, it is estimated that the pilot phase of this project will benefit at least 670,000 persons[...].

The direct beneficiaries of this programme will be the individual families and groups (returnees, internally displaced persons and the receiving communities) of the selected districts of intervention. They will benefit from projects designed to provide essential services and generate income and livelihoods." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.23)

"In a country that has to deal with the consequences of large numbers of people who are displaced, the distinction between internally displaced (IDPs) and refugees has little relevance. In the case of Somalia, refugees as well as IDPs may be reluctant to return to their home areas since they remain replete with mines. Many former refugees are now IDPs since on-going conflict often prevents them from accessing their regions of origin. Equally significantly, demobilised militia, who may still retain their arms, have little incentive to return to their original towns or villages.

The impact of these categories of displaced people upon the communities they enter and the needs of the displaced themselves rarely benefit from a process of categorisation. In this sense, any intervention must assume a holistic perspective that does not categorise different populations within a community but instead addresses the needs of the entire community. Viewing displacement from such a holistic perspective is the only way to foster durable solutions that will positively affect communities as a whole. (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR; June 2002, pp.5-6)

"The selection of specific districts, identified through a micro regional planning process and coherent and pragmatic criteria, will allow the programme to cut through artificial separations among population segments (refugees, returnees, disperses, internal displaced persons and the local population). Instead it will

deal with the needs of the district in terms of reintegration, rehabilitation and development from a single institutional approach using the District Development Committee, DDC." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, 24)

Yet, in so saying, one is also aware of the institutional challenges as well as the programming challenges that such a perspective demands. Agency mandates will have to be more flexible, and the donor community will have to be more sensitive to funding situations in which categorisation in the past has led to imbalanced assistance." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR; June 2002, p6)

Coordination:

"Given the enormity of the task ahead and the degree of cooperation and collaboration required to carry it out, it is crucial that appropriate needs assessment and planning phases are undertaken from the outset.

The success of the programme at the regional and local levels will depend on the creation of an efficient coordination and decision-making mechanism to define and implement the programme strategy during phase I. The institutional mechanism will be articulated at three levels: (a) Programme Management Team; (b) Two Steering Committees; and, (c) Four district Working Groups." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.24)

Justification:

"The authorities of Northeast and Northwest Somalia have requested support from UNDP and UNHCR to support the process of reintegrating returning refugees and displaced populations through rehabilitation activities. It is generally agreed that to achieve this successfully a multi-sectoral, multi-agency coordinated approach and development-oriented activities are required.

UNDP and UNHCR have built upon the experience gained through the implementation of the November, 1997 agreement on "Co-operation with regard to development activities affecting refugees and returnees", and this joint proposal for Reintegration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons in Somalia was instituted subsequent to this agreement." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR June 2002, p.15)

Proposed Outcomes:

"At the end of the "Reintegration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons Programme" the expected situation in the selected districts of intervention will be:

a. **Strengthened Governance**

- a.1 District Development Committees established and trained in each district of intervention
- a.2 Community Development Committees established in each community of intervention of the Programme.
- a.3 Technical Unit established in each district of intervention of the Programme.
- a.4 Finance and administrative mechanisms established in each District Office (municipality) in the areas of intervention of the Programme.

b. **Enlargement of Economic Opportunities**

- b.1 Livestock production and trade developed in the selected districts of intervention of the Programme.
- b.2 Crop production and marketing developed in the selected districts of intervention of the Programme.
- b.3 Land tenure registration mechanisms established in the selected districts of intervention of the Programme.
- b.4 Rehabilitation activities implemented in degraded areas in the selected districts of intervention of the Programme.
- b.5 Strengthened vocational and training institutions (VTIs)
- b.6 Sustainable credit scheme in support of income generating established in the selected districts of intervention of the Programme.

b.7 Selected rural roads of high commercial value rehabilitated.

c. Improved basic social services.

c.1 Water points constructed or rehabilitated and local management systems established in order to improve access to and quality of water.

c.2 Health Centres rehabilitated/ constructed, health staff trained and local management systems established.

c.3 Sanitation infrastructure rehabilitated/ constructed and local management system established.

c.4 Delivery and quality of education system improved in formal and non-formal education sectors as well as in vocational training."(IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, 28)

Activities in 2002 aim to improve food security, health and nutrition

- Food Aid reached about 60,000 people in Gedo (December 2001) and 36,000 people in Bari/Sanag (March 2002)
- FAO to provide seed security to poor agro-pastoralist, urban dwellers and IDPs through rebuilding assets and crop diversification projects
- SACB and UNFPA projects to raise reproductive health status through better access and cooperation

Food security:

"Regarding emergency food relief, activities have focused on containing the worsening situations in vulnerable parts of the country through well-targeted Food-for-Work (FFW) activities. Direct food aid interventions took place in Gedo, reaching approximately 60,000 in December 2001, and 36,000 people in Bari/Sanag in March 2002. Rural development is an important focus and activities undertaken include rehabilitation of wells and water catchment areas, improvement of farm production and seed activities." (UN, May 2002, p.7)

"Following the partial failure of the *gu* season rains in rain-fed regions of southern Somalia communities are facing poor harvest outputs and limited water supply. Bay and Gedo regions are particularly affected with very poor rain-fed sorghum in general and complete sorghum crop failure in some areas. Pockets of vulnerability are appearing, with the heaviest burden being borne by poor agro-pastoralists, urban residents and IDPs. Most relief agencies respond to emergencies by providing direct relief in the form of food and seed aid. A recent study of the seed sector in Somalia indicates that large-scale free distribution of seed undermines the extensive local seed networks that already exist. An absolute shortage of seed tends to be the exception rather than the rule, however, there may be groups of people who do not have access to the seed they require. The proposed project aims to support the household economies of poor agro-pastoralists through rebuilding asset bases and encouraging crop diversification." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.36)

Health and nutrition:

"In conjunction with SACB health sector partners and local authorities, the main objective is to promote the reproductive health status of the Somali population by making emergency RH medical supplies available to vulnerable groups (e.g. IDPs). In addition, UNFPA will support the links and cooperation between interventions at various levels, including Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) and Community Health Workers (CHWs) at community level, MCH centres at district level and referral hospitals in regional centres of Hargeysa and Garowe." (UN Appeal, November 2001, pp.18-19)

Action Contre la Faim continually works to assist IDPs in Mogadishu (2000-2002)

- ACF admits more than 250 severely malnourished children in its Therapeutic Feeding Centres in Mogadishu
- ACF is one of only aid organizations working in north and south Mogadishu
- ACF programmes work to fight malnutrition and support clean water access

"More than 250 severely malnourished children are admitted each month to the two Therapeutic Feeding Centres run by Action Against Hunger in north and south Mogadishu, where the children receive intensive treatment and immunisation.

To add to this dramatic situation, cholera, an endemic disease, usually occurs from December to May and affects several thousand people each year.

Action Against Hunger is preparing to launch an anti-cholera programme amongst the most vulnerable to avoid the spread of the epidemic." (ACF, 21 December 2001)

"Etant l'une des rares organisations humanitaires encore présentes à Mogadishu, tant au sud qu'au nord de la ville, Action contre la Faim intervient tant auprès des populations déplacées dans les camps qu'auprès des résidents, marqués par des années de guerre civile. Elle s'emploie maintenant à lutter contre la malnutrition de la population, notamment des déplacés vivants dans la capitale et a pour objectif de développer le réseau d'eau potable. De plus, et afin de répondre à la grave crise alimentaire dans le sud, Action contre la Faim a récemment ouvert un programme nutritionnel dans la ville de Luuq, région de Gedo. Enfin, et afin d'apporter un soutien logistique à ces deux bases, Action contre la Faim vient également d'installer une base arrière dans la ville de Merca." (ACF 2000, "Contexte")

ILO project for economic recovery targetting IDPs (2002)

- Creation of employment, vocational and skill training to demobilised militias, IDPs and returning refugees

"The ILO executed project is designed to address key obstacles to economic recovery by employment creation through the rehabilitation of key infrastructure assets that impact directly on poverty reduction and improvement of living conditions. It will through the establishment of modest training facilities develop both technical and institutional capacity to maintain the improved assets. The project also aims to support decentralisation policies by ensuring a broad geographic coverage and capacity building for local and regional level planning. In addition the project will rapidly provide a source of limited term direct employment (2,000,000 workdays) and vocational skills training to demobilised militias, IDPs and returning refugees. It will also indirectly support employment opportunities by providing micro-finance and assisting in the formation of local economic development agencies in the area of operations. Drawing on experience from similar projects in the region the project will optimise the use of locally available resources, labour, local materials and skills." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.102)

CARE projects for IDPs in areas of food security (2002)

- Objectives include improve food and livelihood security for 162,860 persons displaced in southern Somalia
- Food for work projects as well as Therapeutic Feeding for will primarily target IDPs
- CARE will purchase sorghum seeds from surplus areas to sell them to areas affected by conflict and drought such as Bay, Gedo and Bakol

"CARE proposes to significantly improve the food and livelihood security of 162,860 persons displaced by the continuing conflict in Somalia, through emergency and rehabilitation activities in 6 regions of Somalia. Food for Peace commodities will be incorporated into two major project components, including Food for Work (FFW) and Emergency Food Distributions (EFD). Supplementary and/or Therapeutic Feeding for extremely vulnerable individuals, primarily recent IDPs will be conducted through the assistance of other international NGOs operating in the regions.

Project Area: 24 districts in 8 regions - Middle Juba, Hiran, Bakol, Bay, Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle and Galgadud." (Care, Project Information, 2002)

"This proposal is a request to OFDA to fund the provision of 350 metric tons of sorghum seeds to 17,500 farmers in the rain fed areas of Bay located in Southern Somalia. For the past 8 months, 158,000 people have been coping with critical food insecurity as a result of sporadic internal clan fighting, looting and limited water supply. In response, the international community, the UN, and PVOs have implemented a targeted relief assistance initiative in the regions of Bay, Bakool, and Gedo to support both residents and internally displaced populations.

The intent of this complementary project is to purchase locally available sorghum seeds from surplus regions and transport them along with CARE's food to the chronically vulnerable areas." (CARE, Project Information, 2002)

International activities in 2001

International agencies supported reintegration projects within framework of inter-sectoral strategy (2000-2001)

- By July 2001 UNICEF had received only \$2 million out of \$23 million pledged for that year
- By October 2001 WFP had received less than 40% funding
- IOM plans for reintegrating displaced populations were cancelled due to lack of funding (2002)

"UNICEF appealed to donor nations for \$23 million to support emergency operations in Somalia during 2001. By mid-July, donors had provided less than \$2 million, forcing UNICEF and other humanitarian agencies to eliminate or dramatically reduce health, education, water, and environmental sanitation programs for women, children, and repatriated refugees. By October, donor nations had provided WFP less than 40 percent of the funds needed for relief and recovery programs." (USCR, 2002, p.94-97)

"IOM is undertaking preliminary studies with agency partners to develop a programme for return and resettlement of IDPs. IOM is planning large-scale activities to ensure an effective plan for movement and reintegrating of displaced populations into places of origin. This action plan will include pre-departure assistance, medical screening and profiling. On arrival, inputs such as income generation projects and agricultural implements will be provided. UNICEF will continue to provide resettlement kits to returning IDPs in Somalia.

[...]

IOM is requesting US\$ 5 million for resettlement of displaced communities." (UN November 2000, Strategy Paper, pp. 11-12)

IOM had to cancel its return and reintegration projects for IDPs in Somalia due to lack of funding. (Phone communications IOM Geneva, and Nairobi Ms Mio Sato, June 2002)

WHO and UNICEF underfunded in Somalia (May-July 2001)

- As of May 2001, no cash had been offered for WHO programmes in Somalia
- As of February 2002, UNICEF has received only 35% of requested funding

"Health remains underfunded. According to our review, six out of 19 CAPs have produced a resounding zero response so far this year. Hardest hit are Burundi, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda where, despite enormous health needs, donors have so far offered no cash for WHO's emergency health programmes." (WHO 22 May 2001)

"Implementation of planned health, nutrition, water education and protection activities has been delayed due to the shortage of funding in 2002. While given the long-running conflict, donors have traditionally taken a cautious approach to funding operations in Somalia, the impact of diminished funding has handicapped UNICEF's ability to implement the comprehensive rehabilitation programmes necessary to make communities more self-sufficient. The need for additional resources is particularly acute now given the upsurge in conflict and population displacement in parts of southern Somalia."(UNICEF, 7 February 2002)

"UNICEF operates from six offices in Kismayo, Mogadishu, Baidoa, Jowhar, Hargeisa, and Bossaso, and 14 international staff members and 75 local professionals are permanently based in these field locations. At present UNICEF co-ordinates health, nutrition, water and education activities.

[...]

Within the framework of the 2001 CAP, UNICEF requested US\$23,215,000 to support its emergency operations. To date, UNICEF has received only \$2.03 million, approximately 9% of the requested funds. Additional funds are urgently needed to provide basic support to vulnerable communities throughout Somalia. Women, children and other vulnerable groups are particularly dependent on UNICEF assistance in southern and central Somalia, which remains hardest hit by endemic conflict, and prone to drought, flooding and other natural disasters." (UNICEF 12 July 2001, sects. 2.3)

International coordination structure

The Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB) (1998-2002)

- SACB's five sectoral committees provide close co-ordination in specific sectors
- The Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB) establishes humanitarian ground rules
- International NGOs have become implementing agencies
- MSF withdrew from SACB in July 2001 in effort to maintain neutrality

"In the case of Somalia, external donors, UN agencies, and NGOs have created a formal mechanism, the Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body (SACB) as a forum to co-ordinate development and humanitarian approaches, policies and strategies in Somalia.

The SACB is a unique structure for a unique development context, facilitating co-ordination that under normal circumstances would involve the participation of an organ of the State. The SACB's five sectoral committees provide close co-ordination in specific sectors, and play a valuable role in managing the prioritisation and programming of global issues." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.15)

"In response to the vacuum created by the absence of a Somali state many donors have turned to international NGOs to act as their implementing agencies. These NGOs have, in turn, gravitated towards structures familiar to them and used local NGOs as implementing partners and sources of local input." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.15)

"The international medical aid organisation Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) today announced that it has withdrawn from the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB). MSF fears that continued coordination through the SACB will be in conflict with the organisation's principle of neutrality and impartiality in conflict areas.

According to the organisation, the Coordination Body's mandate to 'provide policy and operational co-ordination for rehabilitation and development activities' has led some SACB actors to be increasingly involved in peace-building efforts. However, with a view to recent political developments in Somalia, MSF sees peace-building activities by humanitarian organisations as a threat to the basic principle of neutrality and impartiality in providing assistance to people in need, which could limit the access to such a population.

The organisation sees the trend within the SACB to - sometimes publicly - affirm and support peace-building through the support to Transitional National Government as a threat to the neutrality of humanitarian assistance, and understands it is not the humanitarian agencies role to strengthen any administration.

Over the last few months, MSF has tried to reverse this trend from within the SACB. However, this did not lead to satisfactory results. According to MSF, the needs of the Somali people should be the only criteria for such assistance." (MSF 11 July 2001)

"Since 1993 aid assistance to Somalia has been influenced by a unique experiment aimed at consensual decision-making between donor community, UN Agencies and NGOs. After the Humanitarian Assistance Conference in December 1993, in Addis Ababa, the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) was established to undertake most of the tasks associated with aid coordination including information sharing, common planning and implementation. It consists of donors, the UN Country Team, the NGO Consortium, and The Red Cross Movement. The NGO Consortium is a voluntary association of the approximately 60 international NGOs working in Somalia. The Red Cross Movement includes the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS).

Six years on, the SACB has become an important forum whereby the main aid constituencies in Nairobi share information within the various sectors and themes of emergency and developmental assistance. Over time the SACB has developed into a system of committees and working groups that facilitate the coordination of aid agencies. It comprises a policy level (Executive Committee) and an operational level (led by the Sectoral Steering Committee) and a public interface (the Consultative Committee)." (UNRC 4 February 2000, s ect. 1.4.A.3)

UN took new approach following Djibouti peace process (2000)

"The United Nations operating in Somalia on Tuesday [31 October 2000] launched 'First Steps: An Operational Plan to Support Governance and Peace-building in Somalia', outlining how they could help the emerging Transitional National Government, as well as the peaceful autonomous areas of 'Somaliland' and 'Puntland' in the north of the country. The UN was calling for almost US\$20 million in donor support to fund phase one of the plan, through to the end of this year, a UN press release stated. 'Now is the time for Somalia's international friends to support Somali's struggle for peace in real and tangible ways,' said UN

resident Representative and Humanitarian Coordinator Randolph Kent." (IRIN-CEA 3 November 2000 "Somalia")

UN agencies also recently drafted the Framework for UN Engagement in Somalia. The Framework includes eight principles on more effective and sustainable intervention by the United Nations. (UNRC 4 February 2000, annex 7)

International community has been putting together a post-Djibouti planning process which it discussed during the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group Meeting of 14-15 September 2000 (OCHA 14-15 September 2000, minutes of meeting)

To see the Framework for UN Engagement in Somalia, see UN Resident Coordinator 4 February 2000 document [\[Internet link\]](#).

To see the UN Operation Plan, "First Steps", see UN Resident Coordinator 31 October 2000 document [\[Internet link\]](#).

The UN Coordination Unit (UNCU) and the UN Country Team (UNCT) (1998)

- The UN Coordination Unit (UNCU) is responsible for facilitating coordination among the UN Country Team (UNCT) in Nairobi and in operational areas

"The UN Country Team (UNCT) is comprised of 13 UN agencies, several large project teams, as well as a number of organizations with observer status. Each of these organizations has a responsibility for good management towards effective achievement of its individual mandate. In addition to their individual agency responsibilities for good management, collectively the UNCT is responsible for good management in four main areas affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of interventions in Somalia" (UN December 1998, p. 19). These are (i) ensuring ongoing consensus on the priority problems, the strategies to address them, and the division of labour among UN agencies and their partners; (ii) strengthening of its 'area-base' approach through the necessary flexibility to take into account differing circumstances and attitudes in different parts of Somalia, as well as employing participatory approaches and emphasizing Somali leadership and responsibility; (iii) improving the monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian assistance and development activities, as a management tool, and (iv) continuing to seek ways to reduce and to share the high cost of operation in Somalia, such as the transport savings achieved through the UN Common Air Services.

[...]

Primary responsibility for IDPs rests with their governments. In the case of Somalia, where there is no central government, local authorities must in principle accept this responsibility, though in practice these entities are not yet sufficiently capable to provide IDPs much protection. The international community therefore must do its utmost to assist. Recently, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator was given the mandate to ensure the protection of and assistance to IDPs, and to coordinate implementation of the activities by UN Agencies and partners which are operational in Somalia.

[...]

The UN Coordination Unit (UNCU) is responsible for facilitating coordination among the UN Country Team in Nairobi and in operational areas. In Nairobi UNCU helps to assure representation of UNCT interests in various multi-agency forums, particularly the committees of the Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB). In Somalia the UNCU is responsible for facilitating and, where appropriate, assisting operational UN agencies to coordinate among themselves in terms of common issues of policy, administration, logistics, security, planning and programme implementation. UNCU's main functions are: (i) secretariat support to the UN Country Team; (ii) support to UN humanitarian affairs in Somalia; (iii) human rights advocacy, and (iv) monitoring of and reporting on UN activities in Somalia." (UN December 1998, pp. 20, 53, 64)

The NGO Consortium (1998)

- The NGO Consortium is a voluntary association of international NGOs working in Somalia

This is "a voluntary association of virtually all the international NGOs working in Somalia, i.e. currently about 25 active agencies. The Consortium, with its seven-member Executive Committee, has three main aims: exchange of information of common interest and concern, including technical information and lessons learned; orientation of NGOs new to Somalia; and a 'cascade' system for rapidly notifying members of urgent matters. Consortium members meet in Nairobi and in Hargeisa every month. Its elected executives help to represent NGO interests in the various SACB committees." (UN December 1998, p. 63)

Reference to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Known references to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (as of July 2002)

- References to the Guiding Principles Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
- Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
- Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages
- Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation

None

Other references to the Guiding Principles

None

Availability of the Guiding Principles

None

Training on the Guiding Principles

None

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFP	Agence France Presse
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
DSA	Digil Salvation Army
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FFT	Food-For-Training
FFW	Food-For-Work
FSAU	Food Security Assessment Unit
HIV/AIDS	Human Immuno-deficiency Virus (AIDS)
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICS	International Committee for Somali
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
MRR&R	Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MT	Metric Tonne
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organization of Africa Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
RRA	Rahanwein Resistance Army
SACB	Somalia Aid Coordination Body
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SSNM	Southern Somali National Movement
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
UN	United Nations
UNCHS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCU	United Nations Coordination Unit
UNDP EUE	United Nations Development Programme - Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
USAID	United States Agency for International Agency
VAW	Violence Against Women
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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