AUSTRIAN RED CROSS

ACCORD
Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation

COI report: Ethiopia - Oromia

November 2026

(Reporting period: January 2025-August 2026)

Bundesministerium Inneres

UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency

ACCORD is co-funded by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, UNHCR and the Ministry of the Interior, Austria.

ACCORD - Austrian Centre for Country of
Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation

COI report: Ethiopia - Oromia

November 2026

This report serves the specific purpose of collating legally relevant information on conditions in countries of origin pertinent to the assessment of claims for asylum. It is not intended to be a general report on human rights conditions. The report is prepared within a specified time frame on the basis of publicly available documents as well as information provided by experts. All sources are cited and fully referenced.

Please note that due to a lack of knowledge of the Amharic and Oromo languages as well as Dutch, these translations have been made using translation tools: several tools, including AI-assisted, were used to ensure a result as accurate as possible. There is nonetheless an increased risk that these translations/summaries may contain inaccuracies.

This report is not, and does not purport to be, either exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed, or conclusive as to the merits of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Every effort has been made to compile information from reliable sources; users are recommended to directly refer to original materials used in this product and assess the credibility, relevance and timeliness of source material with reference to the specific research concerns arising from individual applications.

© Austrian Red Cross/ACCORD

An electronic version of this report is available on www.ecoi.net.

Austrian Red Cross/ACCORD
Wiedner Hauptstraße 32
A- 1040 Vienna, Austria

Phone: +43 1 58 900 – 582
E-Mail: accord@redcross.at
Web: http://accord.redcross.at/

This response was commissioned by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Division of International Protection. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it endorse, its content.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations 4
Introductory note 5
1 Background information 5
1.1 Map 5
1.2 Demography of the region 5
1.3 Key political developments since January 2025 impacting the region 7
1.3.1 Background Information 7
1.3.2 Political System 8
1.3.3 Political Developments 9
1.3.4 National Dialogue 12
1.4 Overview of the economy in the region 13
1.5 Access to basic services, humanitarian conditions and level of humanitarian access in the region 14
1.5.1 Food security 15
1.5.2 Access to Education 16
1.5.3 Access to Health Care 16
1.5.4 Explosive Remnants 17
1.5.5 Situation of IDPs 17
1.5.6 Humanitarian Access 18
2 Security situation 18
2.1 Information environment and limitations of verification 18
2.2 Main armed actors, tactics and weapons used 19
2.2.1 Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) 19
2.2.2 Federal and regional police forces, Oromia Special Forces (OSF), Koree Nageenyaa 19
2.2.3 Gaachana Sirnaa and local militia 20
2.2.4 Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) – referred to by the government as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane 21
2.2.5 Fano militia 21
2.3 Territorial control 22
2.4 Security developments and trends since January 2025 23
2.5 Security incidents 25
2.6 Civilian casualties 27
2.7 Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war 29
2.8 Conflict-induced displacement and return 31
3 Human rights situation 32
3.1 General overview 32
3.1.1 Human rights violations by state actors 34
3.1.2 Human rights violations by non-state actors 38
3.2 Women and girls 41
3.2.1 Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) 41
3.2.2 Non-conflict-related sexual gender-based violence (SGBV) 43

3.2.3 Access to assistance for victims of GBV and conflict-related sexual violence ... 44
3.2.4 Female Genital Mutilation or Cutting (FGM/C) and early/forced marriage ... 44
3.3 Returnees ... 45
3.3.1 Returnees from abroad ... 46
3.3.2 IDP returnees ... 46
3.3.3 Situation of IDPs from Oromia in other regions ... 48
3.4 Attacks on Christians in Arsi Zone ... 49
Sources (all sources accessed on 13 November 2026) ... 51

List of Abbreviations

AFNM	Amhara Fano National Movement
BPLF	Benishangul Peoples' Liberation Movement
BTI	Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index
CRSV	Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
E.C.	Ethiopian Calendar
EDF	Eritrean Defense Forces
ENDC	Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defence Forces
EOTC	Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
EZEMA	Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FGM/C	Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting
G.C.	Gregorian Calendar
GAGE	Gender & Adolescence Global Evidence
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
NFI	Non-Food Items
NIHS	National Integrated Household Survey
OLA	Oromo Liberation Army
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
OSF	Oromia Special Forces
PP	Prosperity Party
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SRH	Sexual and Reproductive Health
TPLF	Tigray Peoples Liberation Front
WBO	Waraana Bilisumma Oromoo

Introductory note

The situation in Ethiopia is currently evolving very rapidly. However, the reporting period of this report ends in August 2026. Please note that the situation in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital city, which is also the capital of Oromia Region, is out of the scope of this report due to its status as a chartered[1] city.

1 Background information

1.1 Map



(A crop of the Oromia Region from a UNOCHA Ethiopia reference map, UNOCHA, 12 December 2023)

1.2 Demography of the region

Oromia Region stretches across Ethiopia's central, western and southern parts (UNOCHA, 12 December 2023) and is the country's largest regional state, covering an area between about 290,000km^2 (Østebø, January 2025, p. 9) and 364,219km^2 (OCTB, undated). It shares borders with all other regions of Ethiopia except for Tigray Region in the north. Moreover, it shares international borders with South Sudan to the west and Kenya to the south (UNOCHA,

[1] Addis Ababa is self-administered city in according with Ethiopia's constitution and the Addis Ababa city government chartered proclamation (Gebre-Egziabher, August 2025, p. 10).

12 December 2023). Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital city, is also the capital of Oromia Region and is referred to as Finfinne in the Oromo language.

In September 2026, the Oromia Regional State Council (Caffee Oromia) approved a plan to change the region's administrative division and reorganize the existing 21 zones[2] into 6 larger "clusters" (Advocacy for Oromia, 29 September 2026) or zones, namely East, Southeast, South, West, Southwest and Central Oromia zones. Each cluster will be led by an administrator with the rank of vice president (OBN English, 29 September 2026).

Oromia is not only the country's largest but also its most populous regional state (Østebø, January 2025, p. 9). At the last national census, held in 2007, Oromia's population amounted to around 26,993,933 (ESS[3], 2007, p. 7). As of July 2026, the ESS projected Oromia's population at about 43,589,000, including 21,831,000 men and 21,758,000 women (ESS, October 2026, p. 7) of a total population of 113,806,002 (ESS, October 2026, p. 21). According to the ESS' projection, most of Oromia's population resides in rural areas (35,227,000), while the urban population numbers 8,362,000 (ESS, October 2026, p. 7). East Hararge (also: East Hararghe) is the region's most populous zone, with a projected population of about 4,276,414 (ESS, October 2026, p. 11).

The Oromo, Ethiopia's largest ethnic group with about 35 percent of the total population (Al Jazeera, 29 May 2026), constitutes also the majority in Oromia. According to the 2007 census, roughly 88 percent (about 23,709,000) of the region's population were Oromo, followed by the Amhara (about 1,944,000 or 7.2 percent) and more than 80 other ethnic groups, such as the Gedeo, Guragie (also: Gurage) and others (ESS, 2007, pp. 78-79).

Oromo (also: Afaan Oromoo, Oromigna) is the most widely spoken primary language in Ethiopia (Translators without Borders, February 2021). In Oromia Region, more than 87 percent of the region's population declared Oromo as their mother tongue, according to the 2007 census, followed by Amarigna, Gedeogna, Guragiegna, Somaligna, and more than 80 other languages (ESS, 2007, pp. 96-97). Oromo is also one of the country's five official languages (Al Jazeera, 29 May 2026). It had been given the status of federal working language together with three other languages in February 2020 by the country's Council of Ministers. Until then, Amharic had been the country's only official federal government language (Africanews, 4 March 2020). Since 1991, the language is officially written in the Qubee alphabet. Previously, also other scripts had been in use, such as Arabic and Geez, the latter being used to write Amharic (Gemeda, 1 August 2020).

According to the above mentioned 2007 census, the literacy rate of the total population of Oromia aged 5 years or over was at 39.1 percent. The rate was higher among men (46.8 percent) than women (31.4 percent) (ESS, 2007, p. 233). The 2011 Ethiopian Welfare

---

[2] West Hararge, East Hararge, Arsi, Bale, West Arsi, East Bale, Guji, West Guji, Borena, East Borena, East Wellega, West Wellega, Kelem Wellega, Horo Gudru Wellega, Ilu Aba Bora, Buno Bedele, Jimma, East Shewa, North Shewa, South West Shewa and West Shewa (Advocacy for Oromia, 29 September 2026). A map depicting the state's zones can be found here: MapAction: Ethiopia: Zone (admin 2) map for region (27 Jun 2023), 27 June 2023, p. 9, https://reliefweb.int/attachments/cea95c84-0f52-4592-a77b-cf34cf2cae0e/Binder1.pdf

[3] As of 2007, the entity's official name was Central Statistical Agency (CSA); it was renamed Ethiopian Statistical Service (ESS) in 2014 (ESS, undated). For matters of consistency and clarity, the current denomination (ESS) is used throughout the report.

Monitoring Survey, while covering a slightly different population group with all persons aged 10 years or more, indicated a total literacy rate of 45.4 percent (including 55.1 percent of men and 36 percent of women) as of 2011 (ESS, 27 April 2012, p. 3).

In terms of religion, about 49 percent of Oromia's population identified as Christian[4] in the 2007 census (if added up, 13,107,963 of a total of 26,993,933), while about 48 percent (12,835,410) identified as Muslim, 3.3 percent (887,773) as adhering to traditional beliefs and 0.6 percent (162,787) as following 'other' faiths (ESS, 2007, p. 112). The US Department of State (USDOS) notes in its report on religious freedom for 2023 that estimates for adherents of the traditional Oromo religion, called *Waaqeffanna*, ranged from 300,000 to over a million, with their number reportedly growing among the Oromo community (USDOS, 26 June 2024, Section I). According to Østebø, Oromo Muslims are predominantly living in Oromia's east, Orthodox Christians in the central parts and Protestant Christians in the western parts (Østebø, January 2025, pp. 9-10). Another source describes Wellega as predominantly Protestant, Shewa as having a "substantial Orthodox Christian population" and the remaining parts of Oromia as predominantly Muslim areas (Biru, 30 September 2026).

According to the 2024-25 Demographic and Health Survey by the Ethiopian Statistical Service (ESS), the total fertility rate of women aged 15 to 49 in Oromia is 4.2 children for the 3 years preceding the survey[5], compared to the national total fertility rate of 4.0 children per woman (ESS, July 2026, pp. 91-92).

According to a subnational country analysis on Ethiopia for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2019 by scientist Awoke Misganaw and other authors, the average life expectancy for all genders in Oromia Region in 2019 was 70.03 years compared to 68.84 years on country-wide level. The average life expectancy for women in Oromia was 71.05 years and for men 69.1 years, compared to 70.8 and 67.13 years, respectively, on national level (Misganaw et al., 13 March 2022, p. 27).

Ethiopia is home to more than 1 million refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea, which makes it the third largest refugee hosting country in Africa, according to UNHCR. Oromia Region hosted 5,659 of countrywide 1,023,565 refugees and asylum seekers as of 31 August 2026 (UNHCR, 30 September 2026). About 152,000 persons were displaced in Oromia region following the outbreak of inter-communal violence between Oromo and Somali communities in July 2025 (UNOCHA, 8 October 2025, p. 1). For more information on conflict-induced displacement, see also section 2.8 below. Displacement was also recorded due to natural disasters such as flooding, volcanic activity (UNOCHA, 10 October 2025, pp. 4-5) and earthquakes (UNOCHA, 10 January 2025, p. 2).

1.3 Key political developments since January 2025 impacting the region

1.3.1 Background Information

The Oromo came under Ethiopian rule in the late 19th century, after being forcefully incorporated under Emperor Menelik. Under his rule, the Orthodox Christian Amhara were the dominant group, while other ethnic and religious groups in the south remained neglected

[4] Answers were categorized into three groups, namely Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic (ESS, 2007, p. 71).

[5] Data for the survey was collected in the period 1 August 2024 to 14 April 2025 (ESS, July 2026, p. 1).

(Østebø, January 2025, p. 10). Since then, the Oromo have remained underrepresented and with little influence within Ethiopia, despite the size of their population. Oromo cultural, social and political movements continued to face oppression in the 1960s and early 1970s (UCDP, undated). Emerging Oromo ethno-nationalist ideas in the early 1970s among students at Addis Ababa University led to the formation of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which perceived the Oromo's forceful incorporation into Ethiopia as internal colonisation and called for secession and the establishment of a separate republic of Oromia. The OLF launched its armed struggle in 1976 (Østebø, January 2025, p. 10), or according to another source, in 1974, against the Dergue military regime until 1991, and against the subsequent government dominated by the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF). In 2018, Abiy Ahmed, an Oromo, became prime minister. Talks between his government and the OLF's leadership led to an agreement between the parties and the OLF's return from their exile in Eritrea. Ensuing confusion about the provisions of the - undisclosed - agreement, the disarmament of OLF fighters and reports about the mistreatment of fighters who did disarm and enter rehabilitation camps led to a split within the OLF in 2019. The group's western commander, known as Jaal Marro, refused to disarm and announced the establishment of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and the continuation of the armed struggle, while the remaining OLF registered as political party later the same year (UCDP, undated). In that function, the OLF continues to campaign for Oromo self-determination. According to a report by the UK Home Office of March 2026, "[t]he exact nature of the current relationship and/or separation between the OLF and the OLA is uncertain, with some sources suggesting that the OLF and OLA continue to be closely linked" (UK Home Office, March 2026, p. 2).

According to Bizuneh Yimenu, a teaching fellow at the University of Birmingham, "the underlying causes of conflict in Oromia are deeply rooted and complex", stemming "from a combination of historical injustices, marginalisation under previous regimes, ethnic tensions [and] competition over resources" (Yimenu, 18 February 2024). The Associated Press (AP) notes in February 2026, that "[a]lthough Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is from Oromia — and the Oromo make up roughly 35% of Ethiopia's population — many Oromo say that they are still marginalized in Ethiopia's federal system, which grants resources and self-governance rights based on ethnicity" (AP, 2 February 2026). Similarly, Aaron Stanley, Deputy Director and Fellow of the Africa Program of the Center for Strategic & International Studies' (CSIS), a US-American non-profit policy research organisation, notes that "the ongoing regional insurgencies led by the Fano in Amhara and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in Oromia are, at root, contests over the terms of the federal arrangement" and "are fueled by the federal system's contested legitimacy" (Stanley, 18 June 2026).

1.3.2 Political System

Ethiopia is a federal democratic republic. The president is indirectly elected by the legislature for a maximum of two six-year terms. The government is led by the prime minister, who is selected from the House of Peoples' Representatives and is the leader of the majority party or coalition. The parliament or national assembly consists of two houses: the House of the Peoples' Representatives and the House of Federation. The House of Peoples' Representatives has up to 550 seats, with at least 20 of them reserved for minority nationalities and peoples, and members are directly elected for 5-year terms. The House of Federation has 153 seats and

members are selected by State Councils or by direct elections organised by these councils for 5-year terms (IFES, 23 June 2026; see also House of Peoples' Representatives, undated).
Oromia's regional council, the region's legislative body or "Caffee Oromia", has 537 seats (Addis Standard, 6 April 2026). According to the Oromia Regional State Revised Constitution of 2001, members of the regional council are directly elected for a five-year term on the basis of universal suffrage (Article 48 (1)) and by plurality voting (Article 48(2)) (Oromia Regional State Revised Constitution - Proclamation No. 46/2001 [English Version], 27 October 2001, pp. 22-23). The regional council elects a regional president for a five-year term. The council also elects a speaker and deputy speaker of parliament (Borkena, 29 September 2026).
In the 2021 general elections, the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) under Abiy Ahmed had won the majority in both, federal and regional council elections, including 513 of the 537 seats in the Oromia Regional Council (The Reporter Ethiopia, 17 July 2021). Two major opposition parties, the OLF and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) had boycotted the elections due to a crackdown against the parties such as the arrest of senior leaders, closure of party offices and an unstable security situation (Addis Standard, 6 April 2026).

1.3.3 Political Developments

In September 2024, following an internal conflict within the OLA – or OLF-Shane as the group is referred to by the government[6] – a faction led by Sagni Nagasa (also known as Yadesa Negassa, Sanyi Nagasa or Jaal Senay Negasa) separated from OLA. On 1 December 2024, the splinter group signed a peace agreement with the Oromia regional government (CGRS-CEDOCA, 14 May 2025, p. 3) and former combatants reportedly entered a disarmament and rehabilitation programme the following month (International Crisis Group, undated). The Ethiopian newspaper Addis Standard notes that while no numbers were officially disclosed, more than 800 combatants operating in the West Shewa Zone reportedly accepted the peace deal and entered "designated camps" for demobilisation. OLA reportedly described the situation as "fabricated drama", claiming that the break-away group under former Central Zone commander Nagasa had been dismissed from OLA several months earlier for "misconduct". Nagasa for his part had accused OLA leader Kumsa Diriba (also known as Jaal Marroo) of authoritarianism, according to the Addis Standard (Addis Standard, 4 December 2024). In February 2025, Nagasa was appointed by the Oromia regional government as a security advisor to the President of Oromia. Two other former OLA commanders were also appointed to senior government positions in the Oromia Attorney General's Office and the Bureau of Administration and Security, respectively (Addis Standard, 21 February 2025). Violence decreased across Oromia "likely owing to [the] peace deal", as the International Crisis Group notes in February 2025, although OLA continued to attack government officials and civilians in several zones. The insurgency persisted during the reference period, with escalations observed by the International Crisis Group in August 2025, early 2026 and during the election period in May and June 2026 (International Crisis Group, undated).
In June 2026, general elections were held for seats in the Federal Parliament as well as for seats in the regional or federal city administration councils (Ethiopia Election, 27 May 2026).

[6] Among the Oromo-speaking population, the group is known as Waraana Bilisumma Oromoo (WBO) (Amnesty International, March 2026, p. 10).

In an article of April 2026, the Addis Standard analyses the development of Oromia's political landscape in the period 1995 to 2026, pointing to a "gradual narrowing of political space that would shape subsequent elections in Oromia" since 2005 (Addis Standard, 6 April 2026). In the context of preparations for the nationwide general elections scheduled for June 2026, the Addis Standard explains:

> "Since the adoption of the 1995 constitution[7], Oromo political movements, particularly the Oromo Liberation Front and later the Oromo Federalist Congress, have framed electoral participation as part of a broader struggle for self-administration and political recognition. However, recent electoral politics in Oromia has consistently unfolded amid armed conflict, party fragmentation, arrests of opposition leaders, and closure of political offices, factors that have shaped both participation and outcomes over time." (Addis Standard, 6 April 2026)

The source further notes that already in February 2025, the two opposition parties OLF and OFC had proposed the establishment of a "Transitional National Unity Government of Oromia", referring to the "worsening political and security crises" and promoting "democratic governance, self-determination, and security reform" (Addis Standard, 6 April 2026; see also OFC, 23 February 2025). In a March 2026 statement, OLA reportedly dismissed the upcoming elections as "a performance staged for foreign consumption", with key opposition parties either having withdrawn or participating only to prevent deregistration or exposing the process's shortcomings (Addis Standard, 24 March 2026). The BBC similarly quotes Merera Gurdina, a member of the opposition OFC, as saying that the upcoming elections were the "least competitive in Ethiopia's recent history" and that the OFC was participating "mainly to avoid deregistration". While the government declared 97 percent of areas in Oromia and Amhara as ready to hold elections despite the ongoing insecurity, this view was rejected by the Coalition for Ethiopian Unity, an opposition alliance[8], which claimed that they were not able to campaign in these regions due to a lack of "enabling conditions", according to the BBC (BBC, 1 June 2026). The Addis Standard quotes in its article of April 2026 not only a senior OLF member as saying that it was difficult for the party's candidates to campaign outside of Addis Ababa due to the unstable security situation. Also, residents across several zones in the region were reportedly telling the source that "the region's persistent insecurity [was] already undermining their ability and willingness, to participate in the upcoming 7th general election, with many saying they [were] avoiding voter registration due to safety concerns" (Addis Standard, 6 April 2026). By the end of May 2026, following a similar statement by the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM), OLA announced a region-wide ban on transportation and movement until 2 June (APA, 1 June 2026) or 4 June 2026 (Addis Standard, 30 May 2026).

---

[7] The 1995 Constitution formalised "ethnic federalism", introducing ethnicity as "the sole organizing principle of the state" (The Reporter Ethiopia, 8 November 2025).

[8] The alliance includes the following parties: Enat Party, All Ethiopian Unity Organization, Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), One Ethiopia Democratic Party and the Amhara Ghionawi Movement (Borkena, 21 September 2025).

In the general elections of 1 June 2026, 501 of a total of 547 seats for the House of Peoples' Representatives were open for election. Voting was not held in 38 constituencies in Tigray and 8 in Amhara (The Reporter Ethiopia, 21 June 2026), due to security concerns (RFI, 31 May 2026). On election day, 143 polling stations across the country reportedly did not open due to security-related problems. Moreover, the voting process was interrupted in some parts of Oromia and Amhara for security reasons (Addis Standard, 1 June 2026). OLA and the Amhara Fano militias rejected the elections and their results (BBC, 21 June 2026).

In July 2026, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) published certified results for 486 of the 501 constituencies that participated in the parliamentary elections. Of these 486, the ruling Prosperity Party won 438 seats, while 48 seats were won by various opposition parties and independent candidates. In the remaining constituencies, the NEBE would reportedly schedule recounts or renewed elections due to "procedural irregularities and tallying discrepancies", according to Ethiopia Election (Ethiopia Election, 28 August 2026; see also The Reporter Ethiopia, 21 June 2026).

With regard to the elections for the Oromia Regional Council, the Prosperity Party won 523 of 528[9] seats, 4 seats were won by independent candidates and 1 seat was won by the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA) party (Electionwatch.et, undated; The Abyssinian Times, 22 June 2026).

In a preliminary statement of 3 June 2026, the African Union Election Observation Mission (AUEOM) to Ethiopia describes the voting process as "conducted in a generally peaceful and orderly environment, with 99% of polling stations visited assessed as peaceful" (AUEOM, 3 June 2026, p. 6), saying that 27 observer teams were deployed across eight regions on election day (AUEOM, 3 June 2026, p. 2) and noting "that voting did not take place in the Tigray Region and in some parts of the Oromia and Amhara regions due to prevailing security and operational challenges" (AUEOM, 3 June 2026, p. 3). On the other hand, the Associated Press (AP) reports that regional observer missions "were criticized for not deploying more personnel across the country" (AP, 21 June 2026), including by the OFC, which reportedly also rejected a separate EU statement (Addis Standard, 11 June 2026). The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) notes that several opposition political parties rejected the result, describing the election as not credible. The OFC reportedly observed "partiality by election workers, intimidation of voters and the harassment and removal of opposition party representatives" in those areas where voting was possible (DFAT, 19 August 2026, p. 20). The AP similarly notes that "with most of the ruling party opponents prevented from participating", "[t]hose who chose to run in the election complained that it was neither free nor fair and that the political environment was rife with fear and intimidation" (AP, 21 June 2026).

The EZEMA party, for its part, pointed to an alleged bias in international media coverage of the elections, without, as the Addis Standard notes, addressing "concerns raised by media organizations, including restrictions faced by Addis Standard and other independent outlets during the electoral period" (Addis Standard, 5 June 2026a). According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), interviews with 11 journalists conducted ahead of the elections revealed "parallel pressures that are rarely visible from outside Ethiopia" and "[i]nformal

[9] NEBE published results for 528 seats (NEBE, undated). No information could be found regarding the remaining 9 seats.

warnings, ultimatums from regional officials, and lobbying via community elders have all hollowed out election coverage long before the first ballot is cast" (CPJ, 29 May 2026).

1.3.4 National Dialogue

Muktar Ismail, a former advisor to the President of Somali Region, claims in an article for the online edition of the Journal of Democracy of May 2026 that the ruling Prosperity Party would favour a more unified system over the current constitutionally enshrined ethno-federalism and that the National Dialogue Commission established in 2022 was expected to suggest changes in that respect. An electoral victory for the ruling Prosperity Party would "provide the political leverage and perceived mandate needed for such constitutional changes", according to the author (Ismail, May 2026), although, according to Aaron Stanley from the CSIS in his abovementioned article of June 2026, attempts to change the ethno-federalist system would rather exacerbate than transcend ethnic tensions (Stanley, 18 June 2026).

The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains in a report from August 2026 with reference to various sources that the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (ENDC) was tasked with initiating a national dialogue aimed at national reconciliation and lasting peace. The ENDC, however, was perceived by the opposition and civil society as not inclusive enough and as being dominated by the ruling Prosperity Party (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, pp. 21-22). In June 2026, the ENDC reportedly identified eight areas of focus based on consultations in more than 1,200 woredas[10], including nation-building, form and structure of the government, status of the federal cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, religious issues, rule of law, institutions and human rights, socio-economic matters, including the concerns of farmers and pastoralists, corruption and good governance, as well as peacebuilding and conflict resolution (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 22; ENA, 24 June 2026). The National Dialogue was rejected by the Tigray Council, the AFNM and the OLA in July 2026, stating that it lacked inclusivity and neglected the groups and communities' grievances (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 22). In a report from August 2026, the Addis Standard analyses the National Dialogue's independence, composition and inclusiveness, and decision-making procedures. In its conclusion, the source describes the National Dialogue as "one of the most ambitious experiments in inclusive deliberation attempted in contemporary Africa" (Addis Standard, August 2026, p. 29), and further notes:

> "Its legal architecture shows real procedural sophistication — the nested structure of the Thematic Working Groups, the cross-validation system, supermajority consensus thresholds, multi-modal inclusion mechanisms — and its eight thematic agendas confront directly the foundational questions of state structure, identity and governance that have sustained Ethiopia's protracted social conflicts.
>
> Yet procedural ingenuity alone cannot resolve the severe legitimacy deficits built into the process. The continued exclusion of the primary armed groups — the TPLF, OLA and Fano — means the dialogue proceeds apart from the active conflicts reshaping the country's political landscape. Reliance on 4,000 non-elected delegates undermines its democratic

[10] The country's second-lowest administrative level. In declining order, the country's administrative levels are: federal, regional, zonal, woreda and kebele (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2026, p. 7).

> mandate in a context of already-low public trust. That deficit is compounded by the Regional Representatives Group's structural imbalance, where Oromia's vote counts the same as Gambella's, Harari's or Dire Dawa's. Pursuing transformative political and constitutional reform through a process that lacks explicit constitutional grounding risks reproducing the very legal and structural instability it was established to resolve." (Addis Standard, August 2026, p. 29)

1.4 Overview of the economy in the region

In a report of 2022, the Oromia Planning and Development Commission (OPDC) of the regional government describes the regional state's economic situation as follows:

> "Agriculture is the dominant sector of the regional economy. It determines the growth of all other sectors and consequently, the whole region economy. The sector is dominated by small-scale farmers who practice rain-fed mixed farming by employing traditional technology, adopting a low input and low output production system. It provides foodstuffs, industrial raw materials, generates employment for the majority of the rural population which constitutes about 85% of the region as a whole. Agriculture accounts for the largest share of the export items and constitutes the largest proportion of the regional gross domestic product." (OPDC, January 2022, p. 8)

The Oromia Agricultural Research Institute (OARI) notes on its website that 37 percent of Ethiopia's livestock are produced in Oromia. Moreover, the state accounts for nearly 50 percent of the country's grain production, including cereals, pulses and oil crops (OARI, undated), with the majority of residents working in the agricultural sector, making Oromia one of Ethiopia's 'breadbaskets'. Other crops grown for domestic consumption and export include coffee, teff[11], maize and barley (Yimenu, 18 February 2024). According to the OARI's website, almost 70 percent of Ethiopia's coffee is cultivated in Oromia (OARI, undated), while another source notes that - based on data from the Ethiopian Coffee and Tea Authority (ECTA) - over a 3-year period covering the marketing years 2023/24 to 2025/26, Oromia reportedly accounted for 59.5 percent of the country's total coffee production (USDA, 20 May 2026, p. 4). According to a study by Semeneh Bessie, Director of the Partnership and Communication Division of the Ethiopian Economics Association (EEA), and other researchers, coffee and khat[12] are the two main cash crops produced in Oromia, and the region is the primary contributor to Ethiopia's exports (such as gold and cattle), as well as the country's largest producer of cereal crops. Moreover, Oromia is the region with the highest number of livestock (Bessie et al., August 2024, p. 63). Particularly in East and West Hararge zones, half of household income is usually generated by khat production (FEWS NET, October 2025, p. 3).

Apart from agriculture, Oromia's other economic sectors included the production of "textile and garments, leather products, chemicals, construction materials and pharmaceuticals", as well as the mining of minerals like gold, platinum, iron ore, limestone (Yimenu, 18 February 2024), tantalum, gemstones and others (Oromia Sovereign Fund, undated). The majority of

[11] *Eragrostis tef*, a tropical grain native to Ethiopia (Abebe et al., 23 September 2025).

[12] *Catha edulis*, an evergreen perennial shrub, whose buds and leaves are chewed as a stimulant (Abdurehim et al., 1 September 2025, p. 2).

Ethiopia's commercial mining sites are reportedly located in Oromia (The Reporter Ethiopia, 6 September 2025), such as the Sakaro and Lega Dembi gold mines (OIIB, undated). Oromia Region hosts several public Special Economic Zones (SEZs), including Adama and Jimma SEZs (EIC, undated (a); ENA, 3 December 2024) and the Gada Special Economic Zone (GSEZ) (Dereso, 18 March 2026, pp. 166-167; GSEZ, undated). Oromia Regional State is also home to the Eastern Industry Zone (EIZ)[13], a Chinese privately-owned SEZ in Dukem city, about 30km southeast of Addis Ababa city (Kumera & Woldetensae, 5 May 2023, p. 5). However, the Bertelsmann Stiftung notes in its country report from 2026, which forms part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) and covers the period 1 February 2023 to 31 January 2025, that the levels of foreign direct investment in the country remain 'cautious' due to the unresolved conflict with insurgent groups in Oromia and Amhara regions (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2026, p. 22).

According to the findings of the National Integrated Household Survey 2024-25 by the Ethiopian Statistical Service (ESS), the national average unemployment was at 9.6 percent (ESS, 5 September 2026, p. 27). In Oromia Region, the total unemployment rate was at 10.5 percent, while the youth unemployment rate for persons aged 15 to 35 years was at 14.4 percent. Youth unemployment was higher in urban than in rural areas, with 22.2 and 12.3 percent, and higher for women than for men, with 20.8 and 9.1 percent, respectively (ESS, 5 September 2026, pp. 27, 30).

Based on World Bank and national data from 2018, the EEA calculated Oromia's absolute poverty rate at 38.8 percent in the period 2021/22, and thus above the national average of 33 percent (EEA, August 2024, p. 8).

1.5 Access to basic services, humanitarian conditions and level of humanitarian access in the region

UNOCHA notes in a report covering humanitarian funding in 2025 under the Ethiopia Humanitarian Fund (EHF) mechanism that as of January 2025, the humanitarian situation in Ethiopia remained critical due to several factors, "including ongoing conflicts, particularly in Amhara and western Oromia" (UNOCHA, 17 July 2026, p. 3). The Bertelsmann Stiftung points in its report from 2026 to conflict-related limitations in terms of access to basic services:

> "While conditions have improved in the Tigray region, some populations in the Amhara and Oromia regions lost access to government services such as banking, telecommunications and electricity because of the ongoing conflict." (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2026, p. 15)

CEDOCA, the COI unit of the Belgian Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS), observes in a May 2025 report that the "conflict profoundly impacts the daily lives of civilians, who have limited access to essential services such as healthcare and education in conflict zone" (CGRS-CEDOCA, 14 May 2025, p. 3). Similarly, the Global Protection Cluster (GPC), a network of several organisations focused on protection work in humanitarian crises, notes that as of July 2025 armed groups in Oromia reportedly continued to attack public

[13] On its website of private SEZs, the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) mentions an Eastern SEZ located in Addis Ababa, but does not offer more detailed information (EIC, undated (b)).

infrastructure including administrative buildings, health facilities and schools, thus hindering the population's access to basic services (GPC, 13 August 2025, p. 1). As of February 2026, 116,151 children in western Oromia lacked access to basic social services due to the ongoing conflict and displacement, according to GPC (GPC, 7 April 2026, p. 6).

1.5.1 Food security

According to a multi-sectoral needs assessment conducted by Caritas Germany together with the Ethiopian Catholic Church, the Social and Development Commission (ECC SDCO) and Caritas Switzerland in December 2025 in four zones in Amhara (North Gondar, Wag Himera) and Oromia (West Wellega and Kelem Wellega) regions, communities across both regions "face systemic vulnerabilities driven by recurrent climatic hazards, active conflict, and severe macroeconomic pressures" (Caritas Germany et al., January 2026, p. 2). The authors further note:

> "This convergence has triggered structural economic fragility, with average household food expenditure reaching an unsustainable 223% of reported income. Consequently, over 90% of the population cannot maintain an acceptable diet. With financial buffers exhausted, 43% of households now resort to irreversible emergency coping strategies, such as the distress sale of their last productive livestock.
>
> This economic collapse cascades directly into acute public health and protection crises. Severe acute malnutrition currently affects over 15% of children under five – a crisis fueled by a profound lack of basic sanitation infrastructure, with 70% of households lacking toilet facilities." (Caritas Germany et al., January 2026, p. 2)

The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) notes in a report from October 2025 that Crisis (IPC Phase 3)[14] conditions were ongoing in the lowland areas of East and West Hararge zones, where poor households had few to no own-produced food stocks left due to "near-total failure of the 2025 *belg*[15] and *meher* harvests". Affected households were resorting to coping strategies such as atypically selling livestock, informal labour and atypical migration in search of work, sending children to relatives (where they are expected to work for food), as well as consuming smaller and less frequent meals. Levels of acute malnutrition appeared to be rising especially in lowland areas of East Hararge zone, given the rising number of children with severe acute malnutrition being admitted to therapeutic feeding programs. In contrast, according to the source, midland and highland areas of the East and West Hararge zones continued to face IPC Phase 2 (Stressed) conditions, with households still being able to consume food from their own production despite a low *meher* harvest and lower-than-average purchasing power (FEWS NET, October 2025, p. 5). According to the source's estimates, Emergency conditions (IPC Phase 4) would "most likely" appear in lowland areas of East Hararge

[14] The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) system allows for the classification of acute food insecurity on household and area level according to a five-phase scale ranging from Phase 1 (Minimal) to Phase 5 (Emergency) with specific predefined criteria described for each IPC Phase (FEWS NET, undated).

[15] Belg (February to May) and meher (beginning around September/October) seasons are two key rainfall and harvest periods (FEWS NET, October 2025, p. 2).

zone in early 2026 (FEWS NET, October 2025, p. 1). The same source notes as of May 2026, that lowlands of East and West Hararge zones would continue to face Emergency and Crisis conditions, respectively, with some improvement expected from June 2026 on, although for some areas only to a "limited" extent before the main *meher* harvest in September 2026 (FEWS NET, 10 May 2026, p. 4).

1.5.2 Access to Education

The Bertelsmann Stiftung notes in its report from 2026 that "[t]he education sector has been particularly hard hit" by the ongoing conflict, "with a drop in enrollment seen especially in conflict-affected areas" (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2026, p. 15). A UNICEF report from January 2025 explains that by late 2024, about 3.2 million children across Oromia Region were out of school due to conflict, natural disasters and displacement (UNICEF, 2 January 2025, p. 2). In an article from September 2025, the Ethiopian media outlet Addis Standard reports about conflict-related school closures in three zones in Oromia Region, including West Shewa, North Shewa and West Wellega zones, where children were left without access to education as schools remained closed or destroyed due to the ongoing conflict. According to residents in Ada'a Berga District, West Shewa Zone, quoted by the Addis Standard, at least ten primary and secondary schools in the district had closed, with teachers abandoning rural schools and moving to urban areas for security reasons. While those students who could afford it followed them to continue their studies, others dropped out of school and started working as farmers or joined local monasteries, turning to a religious education. According to a university student from Nedjo District, West Wellega Zone, most schools had been closed since 2018 (Addis Standard, 19 September 2025). The GPC notes that as of August 2025, access to education was "hampered" in all four Wellega zones due to "non civilian occupation of schools" and damaged school buildings (GPC, 9 September 2025, p. 6), while according to UNOCHA, all school-aged children in assessed locations across the Oromia-Somali regions' border zone were out of school due to "damaged infrastructure, the displacement of teachers and the use of schools as IDP shelters" (UNOCHA, 8 October 2025, p. 1).

1.5.3 Access to Health Care

The Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition (SHCC) and Insecurity Insight state in a report on violence against healthcare covering 2025 that "[o]ngoing violence in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray affected the delivery of health services in 2025, particularly in hard-to-reach areas because of insecurity and the activity of armed groups". Moreover, the source states, conflict-related displacement in Oromia and the Oromia-Benishangul-Gumuz border region further strained the already limited resources of host communities' health facilities (SHCC & Insecurity Insight, May 2026, p. 44). Insecurity Insight reports with reference to ACLED data that suspected Fano fighters occupied a health centre in Sire Doro, Kiremu District, East Wellega Zone in February 2026 (Insecurity Insight, 3 March 2026, p. 2). Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reports in August 2026 on the launch of a healthcare programme in East Wellega and West Wellega zones aimed at offering access to essential health services to host communities and IDPs in hard-to-reach places, and describes the challenges these populations are facing:

> "In these rural zones, limited movement of patients, staff and supplies – along with shortages of medicines and medical equipment, financial barriers and weak referral

systems – have made it harder to deliver timely, quality healthcare. Some facilities have operated at reduced capacity or faced temporary interruptions.

As a result, communities have experienced untreated illness, challenges in sustaining immunisation and maternal health services, a high burden of malaria along with a greater risk of disease outbreaks, and increased pressure on the health facilities that remain functional." (MSF, 20 August 2026)

1.5.4 Explosive Remnants

As of August 2025, GPC mentions the ongoing presence of explosive remnants of war across Oromia and several other regions, affecting the population's access to farms, grazing routes, water sources, schools and health facilities, and thus undermining livelihoods and increasing food insecurity (GPC, 5 September 2025, p 8). For more information on conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war, please see below, section 2.7.

1.5.5 Situation of IDPs

As of May 2025, GPC describes the challenging humanitarian situation for IDPs, particularly in the Wellega zones in Western Oromia, including limited livelihood opportunities, insufficient food and malnutrition, leading to the death of seven children at an IDP site in Jardega Jarte Woreda during the previous three months, as well as inadequate shelter, and lack of access to health care and education (GPC, 10 June 2025, pp. 5-7). UNOCHA names the same issues when describing the situation of IDPs in the Oromia-Somali regions border zone as of October 2025 and additionally mentions water scarcity and lack of sanitation in IDP sites, which increases the risk of communicable disease outbreaks (UNOCHA, 10 October 2025, p. 1).

In an August 2025 report on the situation of IDPs in four regions,[16] including Oromia, the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), an independent non-profit human rights organisation established 1991, notes that IDPs faced "significant shortcomings in humanitarian assistance", as well as overcrowded sites, inadequate shelters and essential items such as mattresses and blankets, a lack of hygiene products and difficulties in accessing medical services and education (EHRCO, August 2025, p. 58).

The Addis Standard reports in July 2025 about a cholera outbreak in the Fentale District of East Shewa Zone, allegedly causing the death of six IDPs. A district official reportedly linked the deaths to a lack of clean drinking water and noted that humanitarian assistance, previously provided at displacement sites, had declined. The head of East Shewa Zone's Health Office reportedly confirmed more than 150 cases of cholera but denied reports of deaths linked to the outbreak (Addis Standard, 16 July 2025).

[16] The EHRCO visited 46 IDP shelter sites across Afar (5 sites), Amhara (22 sites), Oromia (15 sites) and Benishangul-Gumuz (4 sites) regional states (EHRCO, August 2025, p. 1).

1.5.6 Humanitarian Access

As of February 2025, UNOCHA classified 4 woredas in 3 zones[17] in Oromia Region as "Hard to reach" areas, including Ibantu (East Wellega Zone), Ginde Beret and Abuna Ginde Beret (West Shewa Zone) and Dera (North Shewa Zone) woredas, according to a data set on humanitarian accessibility in Ethiopia at woreda (district) level. The remaining parts of these 3 zones and (the woredas of) 13 additional zones were classified as either "accessible" or "partially accessible". UNOCHA classified all woredas in 6 zones as "accessible" (Bale, Borena, East Bale, Jimma, Shager City and West Arsi zones) as of February 2025 (UNOCHA, 18 September 2025).

By the end of the reporting period, as of August 2026, UNOCHA classifies 2 woredas in West Shewa Zone - Ginde Beret and Abuna Ginde Beret woredas as "Hard to reach" areas and the remaining parts of West Shewa Zone as well as of 15 additional zones as either "partially accessible" or "accessible". The source classifies all woredas in 6 zones (Bale, Borena, East Bale, Jimma, Shager City and West Arsi zones) as "accessible" as of August 2026 (UNOCHA, 15 September 2026).

A map by UNOCHA depicting the status as of 31 October 2025, shows the central and eastern areas of Oromia Regional State, as well as the southern border region as "accessible". The northwestern area, parts of the southern area and some areas in the state's centre are shown as "partially accessible", facing "occasional constraints" that affect humanitarian access (UNOCHA, 10 November 2025a). According to UNOCHA, five woredas were classified as hard-to-reach, primarily due to "localized insecurity and the presence of various armed actors". In West Shewa zone access conditions deteriorated somewhat in October 2025 compared to the two previous months (UNOCHA, 10 November 2025b).

The GPC similarly describes access challenges in 2025:

> "Access challenges were most acute in Amhara [….], and in parts of Oromia, including West and East Wellega, Horo Guduru, and West Guji, where shifting security conditions, road closures, and administrative barriers repeatedly disrupted safe and reliable movement. Trend analysis further shows that access challenges are not only widespread but also highly unstable." (GPC, 2 February 2026, p. 2)

Obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian aid reportedly included insecurity (WFP, 21 January 2026, p. 1; WFP, 22 June 2026, p. 1), fuel shortages (GPC, 7 April 2026, p. 2; WFP, 22 June 2026, p. 2), lack of funding (GPC, 9 September 2025, p. 4; UN, 22 April 2025), or by limited capacities of partners and local government (UNOCHA, 8 October 2025, p. 1).

Moreover, the humanitarian situation in several regions across Oromia was affected by natural disasters such as flooding, drought and seismic activities (UNOCHA, 10 October 2025, pp. 3-5).

2 Security situation

2.1 Information environment and limitations of verification

Several sources point to limitations in terms of independently available information (Debela, 10 March 2026; The Reporter Ethiopia, 10 May 2025; Østebø, January 2025, p. 7). According to Getu Saketa Roro, the co-founder of Human Rights League of the Horn of Africa quoted by AP,

[17] UNOCHA's list includes 22 zones, including the 21 zones listed in footnote 1 and Shager City.

"the human rights situation — as well as the overall humanitarian crisis in Oromia — is underreported" (AP, 2 February 2026), while the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect in a joint statement with other organisations notes with regard to Oromia that "independent monitoring remain[s] severely constrained" and that the "absence of monitoring by independent human rights organizations [….] has further entrenched cycles of violence and retaliation in the region" (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect et al., 20 February 2026). In an article from July 2026, the Reporter Ethiopia quotes the EHRC stating in a review of the previous five years that security conditions in Oromia and other conflict-affected areas "hampered human rights monitoring and investigation field data collection" (The Reporter Ethiopia, 11 July 2026).

2.2 Main armed actors, tactics and weapons used

CEDOCA describes the main armed actors involved in the conflict in Oromia as follows:

> "The conflict in Oromia is characterised by a complex patchwork of armed actors. Alongside the federal armed forces (the army and the police) and the regional security institutions, there are difficult-to-identify actors in both zones, including OLA splinter groups, local Oromo militias, and ethnic militias from the neighbouring regional states of Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz. There are also armed civilian groups, which often consist of local farmers and young people." (CGRS-CEDOCA, 14 May 2025, p. 3)

2.2.1 Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF)

The Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) comprise about 503,000 personnel (including army, air force, Republican Guard and navy), and while all ethnic groups should be equally represented in the ENDF, there was "an unofficial strategy to boost the recruitment of Oromo personnel to reduce the influence of Tigrayans", according to in-country sources quoted by DFAT (DFAT, 19 August 2026, p. 33). According to the Center for African Security Studies (CASS), a research institute with a focus on African security and political affairs, the army "enjoys the support of political factions and militias linked with the Oromo" (CASS, 12 February 2026). Østebø notes in his 2025 report for NOAS that the ENDF has been one of the main actors combating the OLA (Østebø, January 2025, p. 23).

2.2.2 Federal and regional police forces, Oromia Special Forces (OSF), Koree Nageenyaa

Other state forces operating in Oromia Region include the Ethiopian Federal Police, Oromia Police, and the Oromia Special Forces (OSF). The OSF, as all Regional Special Forces, was disbanded in 2023. Østebø notes that while there were ongoing discussions regarding the OSF's actual dissolution, the ENDF appeared to be the main force fighting the insurgents (Østebø, January 2025, p. 23). On the other hand, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that according to three confidential sources, the OSF continued to fight alongside the ENDF (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 31).

The Oromia Gada Commando (also Geda Commando), a regional security force (Borkena, 26 August 2026) is mentioned as actor in clashes with the Bizamo Command (see below) in East Wellega Zone in late August 2026 alongside the ENDF (Addis Standard, 21 August 2026) and local kebele militia (ACLED, 28 August 2026).

Østebø points to the existence of an informal security structure, namely the Koree Nageenyaa (also Kore Negegna) or Security Committee, whose existence became publicly known through a Reuters report of February 2024[18]. According to Reuters, the Koree Nageenyaa was responsible for several extrajudicial killings in Oromia, was headed by Oromia Regional President Shimelis Abdisa and had links to the Oromia branch of the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) (Østebø, January 2025, p. 31). Østebø further notes that the Koree Nageenyaa operated on regional, zonal and district levels across Oromia parallel to official institutions[19] and that at district level its members included senior officials. A similar structure reportedly existed on kebele level. According to interlocutors, the Koree Nageenyaa met at ad-hoc basis and its jurisdiction remained unclear (Østebø, January 2025, p. 32).

2.2.3 Gaachana Sirnaa and local militia

Gaachana Sirnaa translates as "shield of the system" (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 31), "protector of the system" or "protector of the regime" (Østebø, January 2025, p. 32). Sources describe the group as an informal militia (Addis Standard, 12 May 2026) or civilian militia (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 31), which is trained and armed by the Oromia regional authorities. According to a former Oromia official, this security structure was established by Oromia regional law through Proclamation No. 245/2022 of 22 March 2022 although recruitment, training and deployment had started already a year earlier (Addis Standard, 12 May 2026). The proclamation stipulates that members shall be directly selected by the residents of the kebele (Article 11 (1)). Potential members must have lived in the respective kebele for at least two years (Article 11 (2)(b)) and be between 18 and 56 years old (Article 11 (2)(d)) (Proclamation to Determine Oromia Region Gachana Sirna, Number 245/2022, 22 March 2022).

The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes in its August 2026 report based on several sources that the group's tasks include identity checks, monitoring suspicious groups and individuals, operating checkpoints and reporting (suspicious) situations. Members are required to hand detained suspects over to a higher authority. Gaachana Sirnaa operate within their own localities and wear vests in the colours of the Oromia regional flag - red, white and black. The Ministry notes that, based on available news photos, Gaachana Sirnaa members appear to be unarmed (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, pp. 31-32), although according to the proclamation, they have the right to carry arms. Implementation, however, appeared to vary across the region (Østebø, January 2025, p. 33).

Service in the Gaachana Sirnaa was unpaid, although according to one source quoted by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, members were compensated with free food and worked in shifts to have time to earn an income elsewhere (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 32).

---

[18] Reuters: In Ethiopia, a secret committee orders killings and arrests to crush rebels, 23 February 2024, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ethiopia-violence-committee/

[19] Including the Biiroo Bulchiinsaafi Nageenyaa (Office of Administration and Security) at regional level, Bulchiinsaa Nageenyaa (Peace and Security Office) at zonal and district level, and Mana Marii Nageenyaa (Security Council) at regional, zonal and district level (Østebø, January 2025, p. 31).

Local militia is also organised at kebele level. It has existed before the Gaachana Sirnaa, but since the creation of an Office of the Militia in Oromia in 2021 their number has increased and they were granted wider authority. Militia members receive uniforms, which the local population has to pay, and are sometimes armed. Both, local militia and Gaachana Sirnaa, are formally under the local administration, but de facto appear to be accountable to the Koree Nageenyaa (Østebø, 29 January 2025).

2.2.4 Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) – referred to by the government as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane

The current OLA-led insurgency began in 2019, extending from Wellega to central Shewa (also Shoa) and southern Guji (Østebø, January 2025, p. 5), following a split within the OLF between its political leadership, who renounced its armed struggle for self-determination in 2018, and a small group of fighters who refused to disarm (Østebø, January 2025, pp. 20-21). OLA's insurgency was met by the government with a heavy-handed military response (Gedebo & Lanfranchi, 29 May 2026, p. 6; Østebø, January 2025, pp. 5, 23). The OLA has been designated a "terrorist organisation" by the Ethiopian authorities since May 2021 (UK Home Office, March 2026, p. 2). Two rounds of peace negotiations in 2023 failed to bring tangible results (Østebø, January 2025, p. 5).

The OLA was traditionally strong in Western Oromia (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 42; Østebø, January 2025, p. 5) but is active across the entire region and mainly controls the rural areas (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2026, p. 6), while the ENDF and pro-government militias control provincial cities and towns (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 42), such as, for example, Dembi Dollo town in Kelem Wellega Zone (Ethiopia Insight, 24 July 2025). In terms of the OLA's tactics, the CGRS-CEDOCA explains that "[a]s the OLA operates in remote areas, the conflict mainly takes place in rural regions and villages. As a guerrilla movement, the OLA carries out hit-and-run attacks on government infrastructure in urban areas" (CGRS-CEDOCA, 14 May 2025, p. 3). Another source explains, based on interviews with confidential sources, that the group mainly used small arms such as the AK-47, and its operations included attacks on army convoys and patrols in rural areas, occasional attacks on the outskirts of towns, abductions for ransom and assassinations (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 35).

2.2.5 Fano militia

The Addis Standard notes in July 2025 that Fano militia confirmed its presence in some parts of Oromia, including West Shewa Zone, claiming that the organisation was established in the region in December 2024 to "defend Amhara residents" against attacks. However, according to the OLF (Addis Standard, 23 July 2025), and regional authorities, these armed militias crossed into Oromia from neighbouring Amhara Region (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2026, p. 6). One source alleges that Fano operates in Western Oromia "in coordination and alliance with locally organized Amhara militia" (Regassa & Abeshu, 3 March 2025), while according to another source, "[c]landestine federal forces, masquerading as Fano Amhara fighters and as OLA fighters, have been established in at least the Showa and Wallega zones", where they were responsible for killings, "with the sole purpose of spreading discord and hostility between Oromo and Amhara peoples" (OSG, 2 March 2026, p. 3; see also Addis Standard, 21 August 2026). According to ACLED's senior analyst for East Africa, Fano militias have been active in

Western Oromia since April 2022, following outbreaks of violence against ethnic Amhara by the OLA. The group has increased its activities in the Wollega zones in Western Oromia since 2025, a development which the senior analyst relates to the establishment of the Wellega Fano militia's Bizamo Command in Horo Gudru and East Wellega Zones in December 2024 (ACLED, 28 August 2026). In August 2026, the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) claims that the Bizamo Command has come under its command (ACLED, 28 August 2026) under the name of "Aisha Seyid 4th Command" (Addis Standard, 21 August 2026).

2.3 Territorial control

In its August 2026 country of origin information report on Ethiopia, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs reproduces a map by the research-led intelligence firm Aldebaran Threat Consultants (ATC) showing territorial control at zone level as of 8 July 2026. The Wellega zones and Ilu Aba Bora Zone in the west, the Shewa zones in the north and the West Hararge, Arsi and West Arsi zones as well as the northern part of Bale Zone in central Oromia are marked as areas of "OLA Presence". The map shows Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) "Control" in Oromia's South (Buno Bedele and Jimma, the Borena and Guji zones) and East (East Hararge and East Bale zones) as well as in the area surrounding Addis Ababa (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 115). The map can be found on page 115 of the report:

- Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Algemeen ambtsbericht Ethiopië, August 2026 https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2143744/Algemeen_ambtsbericht_Ethiopie_(augustus_2026).pdf

In September 2026, Martin Plaut, a journalist specialising in the Horn of Africa, shared several conflict maps on his blog (Plaut, 29 September 2026). They include a map created by the social network X user Ethiomapping. The map has selectable layers, including "events up to the alliance"[20] and "events up to March" 2026. According to the layer entries, these show incidents recorded between February and September 2026, including activities of the conflict parties in Oromia Region (Ethiomapping, undated). The map can be accessed at:

- Ethiomapping: The Ethiopian Conflict Map, Google Maps, undated https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1oj0q2UidTVIs2XagoumCDRZ-1X-NI_o&usp=sharing

[20] On 20 September 2026, seven Ethiopian armed groups established an alliance with the stated aim of removing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government (Al Jazeera, 21 September 2026). The Tsemdo coalition (Borkena, 20 September 2026), formally announced as the Ethiopian Peoples' Forces Alliance for Survival, reportedly includes the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM), the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (Ugugumo), the Benishangul Peoples' Liberation Movement (BPLF), and the Gumuz Peoples' Democratic Movement (GPDM) (Al Jazeera, 23 September 2026).

In May 2026, Al Jazeera publishes an animated map showing armed violence in Ethiopia from 2022 to May 2026, including violence in Oromia Region. The map is based on data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) and is available at:

- Al Jazeera: A visual guide to Ethiopia's ethnic groups and conflict areas, 29 May 2026 (15 May 2026), (published on Flourish)
  https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/29123025/embed

The DFAT points to the presence of "command posts" across Oromia since 2020:

> "Command posts grant a committee of military personnel a broad range of powers in a declared area. Alongside national or regional command posts, subordinate command posts have been established at local levels. Command posts have also comprised other state and non-state actors such as local militias, regional special forces, federal and regional police. According to the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, since 2020, Amhara, Oromia and Tigray have all been subject to command post rule at various times, with large areas of Oromia administered by command posts without a state of emergency in force. The Commission found command posts acted with complete impunity." (DFAT, 19 August 2026, p. 33)

2.4 Security developments and trends since January 2025

January 2025 to August 2026

In early 2025, violence decreased across Oromia Region following a peace agreement between the Oromia regional government and an OLA-faction led by Sagni Nagasa in December 2024, with hundreds of former fighters entering rehabilitation camps (ACLED, 5 February 2025). While ACLED recorded a 60-percent decline in armed confrontations between security forces and the OLA in the period 1 December 2024 until mid-February 2025, violence against civilians by various groups, including state forces, continued (ACLED, 21 February 2025). Clashes between OLA and security forces continued to be reported in January 2025 in West and East Wellega, East Arsi, West Guji, East, North and West Shewa Zones. In North Shewa, suspected OLA fighters reportedly kidnapped around 50 civilians (International Crisis Group, undated). In February 2025, OLA fighters reportedly killed two local officials in North Shewa Zone (ACLED, 5 March 2025). In March and April 2025, large-scale fighting further declined, however, violent incidents continued to be recorded (International Crisis Group, undated), such as the abduction of at least 56 civilians by suspected OLA fighters from a bus travelling in North Shewa Zone (Addis Standard, 19 March 2025), or the abduction of about 50 people travelling in Arsi Zone in late April 2025 by unidentified gunmen (International Crisis Group, undated). The GPC reports on an increase in clashes between government security forces and non-state armed groups in Abe Dongoro Woreda, Horo Gudru Wellega Zone in March 2025, resulting in an unspecified number of civilian casualties (GPC, 14 April 2025, p. 1). In early April 2025, the ENDF reportedly killed a senior OLA commander in Haro Limu Woreda, East Wellega Zone after receiving information that he was travelling in the area. The killing triggered "retaliatory" attacks by OLA fighters targeting families of former members in the area whom they accused of having helped the military and killing at least 18 people in the period 7 to 12 April (ACLED, 30 April 2025; see also Addis Standard, 16 April 2025).

Clashes between OLA and security forces persisted over the following months, including in West Wellega, East Wellega, West Shewa and North Shewa zones in May 2025 (International Crisis Group, undated) and in Kelem Wellega, West Arsi and South West Shewa zones in June 2025. About 20 OLA fighters reportedly surrendered to security forces in Guji and Borena zones in June 2025 (International Crisis Group, undated). Between 24 May and 6 June, ACLED recorded attacks by OLA fighters in Arsi Zone, Oromia Region and Metekel Zone, Benishangul-Gumuz Region, including killings, abductions and looting (ACLED, 11 June 2025).

In July 2025, OLA fighters reportedly killed at least 16 persons in an attack on local officials and pro-government militias in Degem District, North Shewa Zone, and suspected OLA fighters killed at least 14 civilians in Nono District, West Shewa Zone (International Crisis Group, undated). On 11 July, Fano militias in Oromia Region claimed to have killed 280 government soldiers in Kiremu District, East Wellega Zone (International Crisis Group, undated; Borkena, 11 July 2025). Suspected Fano fighters reportedly killed at least 25 civilians in an attack in Horo Gudru Wellega Zone in late August 2025 (International Crisis Group, undated). A long-standing border conflict between Oromia and Somali regions escalated in July 2025, resulting in civilian deaths and large-scale displacement (UNOCHA, 8 October 2025, p. 1).

August 2025 saw the "first significant escalation" in clashes between OLA and security forces since December 2024. In a prison break in Gida Ayana town, East Wellega Zone, in early August, OLA freed more than 150 inmates. Fighting continued on lower level in September and October 2025. In November 2025, OLA rejected accusations of being responsible for deadly attacks on Orthodox Christians in Arsi Zone, claiming that government proxies were behind the attack (International Crisis Group, undated). For further information on attacks on Christians in Arsi Zone, see section 3.4. The same month, alleged OLA fighters reportedly crossed into neighbouring Benishangul-Gumuz Region, killing more than 40 civilians in Metekel Zone (Addis Standard, 24 November 2025). After a similar attack in July 2025, a local party official had pointed to "Shene militants" as the perpetrators, while OLA had denied any responsibility for the attack (Addis Standard, 11 July 2025).

Violence against civilians continued in late 2025 and early 2026, with OLA reportedly killing two Orthodox Tewahedo priests and abducting 11 telecom workers in West Wellega Zone. Beginning with February 2026, violence increased, following the redeployment of ENDF units further north, and clashes between OLA and security forces were reported in North Shewa Zone, East and West Shewa Zones and centre and western Oromia Region (International Crisis Group, undated). Violence was reported during election period in late May-June 2026, but "returned to normal levels" after election day. ACLED recorded nine armed clashes between OLA and security forces on 1 June, primarily in the East Wellega Zone, and attacks in Arsi Zone, targeting mostly Orthodox Christians (ACLED, 6 July 2026).

Clashes between OLA and security forces decreased again in July and August 2026 (International Crisis Group, undated). On 19 August 2026, the Fano's Bizamo Command reportedly attacked a military convoy in Tulu Lencha area, East Wellega Zone. The convoy had been escorting civilian vehicles, including two ambulances, and at least 16 people, including civilians and soldiers, had been killed in the attack, according to ACLED (ACLED, 28 August 2026).

2.5 Security incidents

Between 1 January 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED[21] recorded 1,089 security events (resulting in 2,859 fatalities)[22] in Oromia Region. Of these 1,089 recorded incidents, 671 were recorded as battles, 12 as explosions or other forms of remote violence and 406 as violence against civilians.[23] In 2025, incidents peaked in September 2025 with 152 recorded events. Peaks were also recorded in May, June and August 2026, with 81, 71 and 70 events respectively (ACLED, as of 23 September 2026).



(ACLED, as of 23 September 2026)

[21] For detailed information on ACLED's methodology, please see their Codebook (ACLED, undated).

[22] Please note that ACLED does not differentiate between civilian and non-civilian casualties (ACLED, undated).

[23] ACLED codes security-related incidents as follows: battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots, protests and strategic developments. Violence against civilians covers events in which an organised armed group deliberately uses violence against unarmed non-combatants (ACLED, undated). Please note, that for the purpose of this chapter, only the event types of battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians were included.

During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in all zones[24] of Oromia. The highest number was documented in East Wellega Zone (248 incidents), followed by Arsi Zone (169 incidents) (ACLED, as of 23 September 2026).



(ACLED, as of 23 September 2026)

In its August 2026 report on Ethiopia, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs cites data from Aldebaran Threat Consultants (ATC)[25], which recorded 1,831 violent incidents in Oromia Region in 2025, of which 936 involved violence against civilians. For the period from 1 January to 30 June 2026, ATC recorded 743 violent incidents in the region, of which 332 involved violence against civilians. Regarding the collection of data on security events, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that ATC data, similar to ACLED data, may be subject to underreporting (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 53).

Intercommunal / regional-border violence

Several sources reported on intercommunal or violence along regional borders during the reference period, including between East Guji Zone in Oromia Region and East Sidama Zone in Sidama Region (Addis Standard, 29 July 2026; Wazema Briefings, 21 May 2026), and along border areas between Sidama Region and West Arsi Zone in Oromia Region in March 2026,

[24] ACLED lists 20 zones, which slightly differ from the zones listed in footnote 1 of section 1.2. ACLED's list includes West Hararge, East Hararge, Arsi, Bale, West Arsi, Guji, West Guji, Borena, East Wellega, West Wellega, Kelem Wellega, Horo Gudru Wellega, Ilu Aba Bora, Buno Bedele, Jimma, East Shewa, North Shewa, South West Shewa, and West Shewa zones. In addition, it includes Finfine Special Zone but does not include East Bale and East Borena zones.

[25] ATC describes itself as a "specialist geopolitical risk and intelligence firm" and has its own website: https://aldebaran-tc.com/

when a dispute between individuals "escalated into wider violence" (Addis Standard, 29 July 2026). Violence was also reported along border areas of Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz regions (DG ECHO et al., 6 June 2025; Addis Standard, 24 November 2025) and of Oromia and Somali regions (Addis Standard, 29 August 2025; UNOCHA, 8 October 2025, p. 1). ACLED reports on deadly violence in the context of a border conflict between Guji Zone, Oromia Region and Kore Zone, South Ethiopia Region (ACLED, 20 March 2025).

Road Security

Oromia's main roads were reportedly relatively safe during daytime but not at night (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 42). GPC points to insecurity along key routes in Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz regions (GPC, 6 October 2026, p. 11). The road between Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz regions has reportedly been closed for years due to security problems (Addis Standard, 23 September 2025), while official information regarding the closure of a key road linking communities in Oromia and Somali regions was "conflicting" (Addis Standard, 15 October 2025). In October 2025, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission reportedly "expressed concern about the ongoing restrictions on freedom of movement" in Oromia and other regions, caused by roadblocks and checkpoints, and incidents of attacks by armed groups on main transport routes (BAMF, 27 October 2025, p. 5; see also Borkena, 10 April 2025).

2.6 Civilian casualties

Between January 2025 and 31 August 2026 ACLED recorded 412 security events coded as "civilian targeting"[26] resulting in 848 fatalities. Of these, 123 incidents (122 incidents recorded as violence against civilians and 1 incident recorded as explosions/remote violence) involved OLF-OLA, 86 (85/1) involved an Unidentified Armed Group, and 54 (50/4) involved Military Forces of Ethiopia (ACLED, as of 23 September 2026).



(ACLED, as of 23 September 2026)

[26] Incidents where civilians are reported to be the main or only target (ACLED, undated).

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)[27] recorded 630 events in Oromia Region between 1 January and 31 December 2025, of which 351 resulted in 629 civilian deaths.[28] Most civilian deaths were recorded in West Wellega (120), East Wellega (117) and West Shewa (93) zones.[29] According to the UCDP data for 2025, 12 civilian deaths were recorded in 8 of 262 events coded as state-based conflict between the Government of Ethiopia and the OLA. In addition, UCDP coded 464 civilian deaths in 309 of 314 events of violence by the Government of Ethiopia against civilians. It coded a further 123 civilian deaths in 28 of 29 events of violence by Fano against civilians and 7 civilian deaths in 30 events of violence by the OLA against civilians (UCDP, 9 June 2026).

Between January and August 2026, UCDP[30] recorded 185 events, of which 100 recorded 270 civilian deaths, with most recorded civilian deaths in East Wellega (92), Arsi (61), and North Shewa (20) zones. In 2 of 53 events coded as state-based conflict between the Government of Ethiopia and the OLA, 2 civilians died. Moreover, UCDP recorded 13 civilian deaths in 5 of 32 events coded as state-based conflict between the Government of Ethiopia and Fano. UCDP coded 171 civilian deaths in 75 of 77 events of one-sided violence by the Government of Ethiopia against civilians, 7 civilian deaths in 3 events of one-sided violence by Fano against civilians and 6 civilian deaths in 2 events of one-sided violence by the OLA against civilians.

[27] Please see UCDP's Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Codebook for information on the methodology used in data collection and presentation: UCDP: UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset Codebook (Version 21.1), 2021, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ged/ged211.pdf

[28] These figures do not include deaths of unknown status, coded as "deaths_unknown".

[29] UCDP's list of zones differs from the list of zones listed in footnote 1 of section 1.2 as well from ACLED's list. UCDP lists 17 zones and 3 special zones, including West Hararge, East Hararge, Arsi, West Arsi, Guji, West Guji, Borena, East Wellega, West Wellega, Kelem Wellega, Horo Gudru Wellega, Ilu Aba Bora, Buno Bedele, East Shewa, North Shewa, South West Shewa, and West Shewa zones as well as Adama, Finfine and Jimma special zones. It does not include Bale, East Bale and East Borena zones.

[30] UCDP Candidate Events Dataset contains the same variables as UCDP GED but is released monthly rather than annually, and not all of its events will be included in the final GED. To allow early release, Candidate relaxes some of UCDP's inclusion criteria and flags events with higher uncertainty through a code status variable. Please see UCDP's Candidate Events Dataset Codebook for information on the methodology used in data collection and presentation: UCDP: UCDP Candidate Events Dataset Codebook, Version 1.5, 2026, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/candidateged/ucdp-candidate-codebook1.5.pdf



(UCDP, 9 June 2026; UCDP, September 2026)

According to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ATC recorded 5,474 conflict-related deaths in Oromia Region in 2025, including 588 civilian deaths. For the period from 1 January to 30 June 2026, ATC recorded 2,153 conflict-related deaths (including 252 civilian deaths) in the region. ATC further recorded a total of 3,741 conflict-related injuries (including 83 civilians) in the region in 2025, and 1,355 conflict-related injuries (including 63 civilians) between January and June 2026 (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 54).

2.7 Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

In its Protection Analysis Update as of August 2025, the Global Protection Cluster (GPC) points to the impact of the conflict on public infrastructure in Western Oromia:

> "The destruction and non-civilian use of infrastructure, including homes, schools, health centers, and water systems, has contributed to the collapse of basic service provision and poses severe protection risks to the communities usually served by these facilities. Hundreds of education and health facilities have been rendered non-functional across western Oromia due to ongoing violence." (GPC, 5 September 2025, p. 7)

According to an ICRC delegate in West and Kelem Wellega zones, "[t]he conflict has also ravaged existing infrastructure, be it schools, health facilities, water points" (ICRC, 1 August 2025). UNICEF and the Global Education Cluster note in a joint report covering the period from January to March 2025 that 100 more schools were damaged in the respective period, most of them in Oromia Region and due to conflict (UNICEF & Global Education Cluster, 29 April 2025, p. 1). In a previously mentioned article from September 2025 by the Addis Standard on conflict-related school closures in the West Shewa, North Shewa and West Wellega zones, residents interviewed by the source are quoted as saying that some school buildings have been burned, destroyed or looted by armed groups or used as military camps by armed groups or government forces (Addis Standard, 19 September 2025). As of August 2025, the GPC mentions limitations in terms of access to education due to damaged school buildings in all four Wellega zones (GPC, 9 September 2025, p. 6).

Armed groups reportedly destroyed "newly constructed kebele offices in Dugda Dawa and Bule Hora woredas", West Guji Zone, in June 2025 (GPC, 7 July 2025, p. 1), and attacked "public infrastructure including kebele offices, health facilities and schools" in Oromia Region in July 2025 (GPC, 13 August 2025, p. 1).
Schools were not only damaged by armed conflict but also used to store weapons and some explosive remnants remain in the premises, as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) describes in an article from April 2025 in the context of a visit to schools in Anfilo and Gidami woredas in Kelem Wellega Zone, western Oromia (ICRC, 4 April 2025):

> "The Director at Ashi Elementary School explains: 'Some of the classrooms were used to store weapons. We are scared to open them, not knowing what could explode…' These schools have been occupied by arms carriers and bear the scars of violence. Infrastructure is damaged and explosive remnants are scattered throughout the premises." (ICRC, 4 April 2025)

The GPC also mentions the ongoing presence of explosive remnants of war in conflict-affected areas:

> "The presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) continues to result in deaths, injuries, and forced displacement across several regions, including Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia, Somali, and Gambella. […]
>
> Landmines and ERW contamination entrench displacement, restrict recovery, limit movement and pose a persistent barrier to safety and dignity for affected populations. In conflict-affected regions such as Tigray, Afar, Amhara, and parts of Benishangul-Gumuz and Oromia, communities are often unable to access farms, grazing routes, water sources, schools, and health facilities due to fear of triggering hidden explosives—undermining livelihoods and exacerbating food insecurity." (GPC, 5 September 2025, p. 8)

Ethiopia reportedly requested an extension of the deadline to clear landmines under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention until December 2030 (The Reporter Ethiopia, 16 August 2025), noting in its request that there were 13 mined locations across seven woredas of Oromia Region, covering a total surface of 1,121,105 square metres (Government of Ethiopia, 7 August 2025, p. 12). An extension was granted until 31 December 2030 (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, 5 December 2025, p. 1).
In its report of human rights violations against civilians for 2025, OLLAA points to the conflict-related destruction of civilian property:

> "The destruction of civilian property was systematically used as a method of punishment and intimidation by all parties to the conflict. Government security forces, OLA fighters, Fanno militias, and Somali Regional State forces were all implicated in burning homes, destroying crops, and looting livestock and displacing people from their homes." (OLLAA, 13 May 2026, p. 11)

In the context of intercommunal violence involving districts in East Sidama Zone (Sidama Region) and East Guji Zone (Oromia Region), the Addis Standard reports about the destruction of homes, schools and farmland (Addis Standard, 29 July 2026), as well as about incidents of

looting of property, including of livestock (Addis Standard, 25 May 2026). In renewed regional border violence between Oromo and Somali communities, East Borena zonal officials reported the looting of several properties and of more than 5,700 livestock, according to UNOCHA (UNOCHA, 8 October 2025, p. 1; see also OLLAA, 13 May 2026, p. 11).
In the context of the 1 June 2026 elections, the International Crisis Group reports on attacks by the OLA against Orthodox Christians in East Arsi Zone, "resulting in around 30 casualties, displacement, and destruction of homes and churches" (International Crisis Group, undated). For more information on attacks against Christians in Arsi Zone, see below, section 3.4.

2.8 Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to UNHCR, Oromia hosts 749,534 IDPs and 209,072 IDP returnees as of 31 August 2026 (UNHCR, September 2026). However, UNHCR's figures are based on information from IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) National Displacement Report No. 20 from January 2025, which in turn is based on figures collected in the period July to August 2024 (IOM, 20 January 2025, pp. 8, 32).
According to Human Rights First Ethiopia, an Ethiopian civil society organisation, quoted by the Reporter Ethiopia, more than 84,000 displaced persons remain within Oromia, in addition to almost 520,000 IDPs from Oromia sheltering in Amhara Region (The Reporter Ethiopia, 25 April 2026). It is not clear what data this figure is based on.
The GPC reports the displacement of 1,600 individuals in Abe Dongoro Woreda, Horo Gudru Wellega Zone due to an attack by non-state armed groups and 1,937 individuals from Haro Limu and Kiremu woredas, East Wellega Zone, in April 2025 (GPC, 30 April 2025, p. 1). Similarly, armed conflict reportedly led to the displacement of 5,180 individuals in East Wellega Zone in May 2025, "adding to existing caseload of 7,743 IDPs in Sassiga woreda" (GPC, 10 June 2025, p. 1). The EU's Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) and partner organisations report in June 2025 that intercommunal violence between communities from Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz regions led to the displacement of more than 11,000 individuals (DG ECHO et al., 6 June 2025).
Displacements are also reported in August 2025, including the alleged displacement of about 1,000 people from Homa Galesa Kebele, Abe Dongoro Woreda, to neighbouring kebeles following attacks by unknown armed groups in late August 2025 and of about 40 households in Chinaksen Woreda, East Hararge Zone between 10 June and 15 August 2025 due to conflict (GPC, 9 September 2025, p. 1).
UNOCHA notes that as of October 2025, renewed inter-communal violence between Oromo and Somali communities led to the displacement of 151,972 people across Arero, Dhas, Gumieldalo, and Wachile districts in East Borena Zone, according to the estimates of local authorities (UNOCHA, 8 October 2025, p. 1).
Thousands of people were reportedly displaced in late July 2026, due to violence along the border between East Guji Zone, Oromia Region and East Sidama Zone, Sidama Region (Addis Standard, 29 July 2026).
A total of about 20,000 people were displaced in Kiremu (Kiramu) and Sasiga Woredas (East Wellega Zone) and in Abe Dongoro Woreda (Horo Gudru Wellega Zone) in August 2026 due to ongoing conflict and insecurity (GPC, 5 October 2026, p. 2).

In 2025, displacement was also recorded due to natural disasters, including floods, and, in the Oromia-Afar border region, seismic activity (IDMC, 2026, p. 22; UNOCHA, 10 October 2025, pp. 4-5).

3 Human rights situation

3.1 General overview

Several sources observe that civilians are being subjected to human rights violations by both sides in the armed conflict between government security forces and OLA: Volker Türk, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, states in a speech at the 62nd session of the Human Rights Council that "the armed conflict in Amhara and Oromia continues unabated, as the warring parties kill, abduct, rape, arrest and detain civilians" (OHCHR, 15 June 2026). The Associated Press (AP), in an article from February 2026, quotes a regional spokesperson for Amnesty International saying that their research "puts both the OLA and the government forces in the middle of the conflict in terms of summary executions, in terms of torture, in terms of abductions, in terms of rape of women" (AP, 2 February 2026), while another source notes that "fighting between government forces and the Oromo Liberation Army continues, amid widespread reports of extrajudicial killings, mass arrests, property destruction, forced military conscription, enforced disappearances and collective punishment of civilian populations" (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect et al., 20 February 2026). The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), a constitutionally established independent federal state body, notes in an executive summary of its annual human rights report covering the period June 2024 to June 2025 the following:

> "Civilians have been killed and subject to injuries due to attacks during the armed conflict between Government forces and armed groups in the Amhara region (commonly known as 'Fano') and the Oromo Liberation Army (commonly known as 'OLF Shene') in Oromia region. […] Similarly, individuals who were not part of the conflict have been victims of human rights violations in the context of the continued armed conflict between government forces and the Oromo Liberation Army (commonly known as 'OLF Shene') in Oromia region resulting in death, injury and destruction of property." (EHRC, 22 August 2025, p. 2)

Similarly, CEDOCA, the COI unit of the Belgian Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS), states in a May 2025 report:

> "Civilians caught between rebels and government forces are victims of violence perpetrated by all parties to the conflict. They are caught in the crossfire of clashes between armed groups and are subject to inter-communal violence, as well as to arrests, arbitrary detention, extrajudicial executions, the destruction of property, sexual violence, enforced disappearances, abductions, intimidation, extortion and forced recruitment." (CGRS-CEDOCA, 14 May 2025, p. 3).

Likewise, in his January 2025 report on the security and human rights situation in Oromia Region for the Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers (NOAS), Terje Østebø observes that "[c]ivilians face threats from multiple actors, including government forces, insurgents, and criminal groups" (Østebø, January 2025, p. 5) and the AP quotes a farmer from the Wellega

zones saying that "[o]ne party hurts you because they say you belong to the other" and "[y]ou suffer because they say your family member is affiliated with the government or OLA" (AP, 2 February 2026).

Movement restrictions

In a report from October 2025, the EHRC points to curfews, movement restrictions, road checkpoints set up by government security forces, orders and measures leading to road closures, attacks, abductions, the looting and destruction of property on roads in regions across Ethiopia where it conducted human rights monitoring and investigations, including in Oromia, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella (EHRC, 11 October 2025). According to a joint letter by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and other organisations, civilians in Oromia Region are "routinely" facing movement restrictions (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect et al., 20 February 2026). ACAPS, an information provider focused on humanitarian data and analysis, notes in a July 2026 report on humanitarian access in crisis-affected countries with reference to several sources that "[a]rmed clashes, compounded by security-related barriers such as road closures and checkpoints, limited civilian and humanitarian movement in conflict-affected areas in western Amhara and western/southern Oromia". Moreover, especially in Oromia's conflict-affected rural western and southern zones, "civilians also faced arbitrary detention and movement restrictions imposed by security forces and armed groups, with movement between locations increasingly dangerous owing to armed banditry, extortion, and active fighting" (ACAPS, July 2026, p. 15). The OLA reportedly announced a "total ban" on movement across the Oromia Region in the context of the 1 June 2026 general elections, although, according to the International Crisis Group, "their ability to enforce [the] ban [was] limited" (International Crisis Group, undated).

In terms of movement between the regions, the Addis Standard reports in May 2026 on the abduction of passengers from a public transport bus by armed men in North Shewa Zone. The bus had been travelling on the Addis Ababa-Debre Markos route where, according to the source, "similar incidents have repeatedly been reported in recent months". In the same area on the same route, 56 passengers had been abducted in an attack in March 2025. The Addis Standard notes that repeated attacks and kidnappings along key roads in Oromia and Amhara regions, "have raised alarm among travelers and transport operators, many of whom say insecurity is increasingly disrupting public transportation and civilian movement" (Addis Standard, 21 May 2026). For more information on abductions, see also section 3.1.2.3.

The EHRC notes in its human rights report covering the situation from June 2025 to June 2026 [June 2017 E.C. to June 2018 E.C.], that due to security challenges in Oromia and Amhara regions, residents from Benishangul-Gumuz Region face considerable difficulties travelling by road to Addis Ababa (EHRC, 9 October 2026, pp. 35-36). The activities of armed groups along roads passing through Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz and Amhara regions to the capital city have also disrupted the transport of food and essential goods, resulting in high living costs for residents (EHRC, 9 October 2026, p. 66). An opinion piece published by the Ethiopian news site Addis Standard points to criminal activities such as repeated taxation at unauthorized checkpoints and abductions for ransom that have developed along khat transportation routes, particularly the Hararge-Addis corridor (Ahmed, 8 July 2026).

3.1.1 Human rights violations by state actors

3.1.1.1 Extrajudicial killings

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) notes in its report from August 2026 that several national and international human rights organisations reported "numerous cases of extrajudicial killings" in the context of the ongoing conflicts in Oromia and Amhara regions and in other parts of the country, including by the ENDF and regional police forces (DFAT, 19 August 2026, p. 30). Similarly, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect observes in a joint statement with other rights organisations from September 2026 that government forces have been implicated in extrajudicial killings (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect et al., 10 September 2026) and in an article from July 2026 describes the situation in more detail:

> "Despite a December 2024 peace agreement signed by the federal government and an OLA faction, government forces continue to commit enforced disappearances and attacks on civilians, including through air and drone strikes and extrajudicial executions of individuals perceived to support the OLA." (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 15 July 2026)

In its human rights report for 2025, the Oromo Legacy Leadership and Advocacy Association (OLLAA) documented up to 140 extrajudicial killings of civilians committed by federal and regional security forces. According to OLLAA, killings were often justified with the victim's alleged support or sympathy for OLA and often committed during security operations. OLLAA also mentions the killing of civilians while practising the Oromo traditional Waaqeffanna religion, or for refusing forced recruitment into government-linked local militia (OLLAA, 13 May 2026, pp. 8-9). For more information on forced recruitment, see further below, in this section. For more information on civilian casualties, see above, section 2.6. The Oromia Support Group (OSG), a non-governmental human rights and advocacy organisation with a focus on Oromia Region, states in a report submitted[31] to the UN Human Rights Council's 61st session in January 2026 that the group has documented "a small fraction of the extrajudicial killings by government forces". According to the OSG, the group recorded 7,340 Oromo civilian killings since the end of 2018, including 1,064 since the beginning of 2025 (OSG, 2 March 2026, p. 2).
The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes in a report of August 2026 with reference to confidential sources that although relations between the government and the opposition political party OLF had improved, members and supporters of OLF faced arbitrary detention, torture, and extrajudicial executions, as the authorities tended to view the OLF in the regional context of Oromia as an extension of the OLA (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 62).

[31] According to the OSG, the statement was submitted to the UN Human Rights Council with the assistance of OSG Australia, which has consultative status with the UN (OSG, 3 March 2026, p. 3).

3.1.1.2 Arbitrary detention

The OLLAA recorded 116 cases of arbitrary detention across Oromia in 2025, including eight cases involving torture or inhumane treatment and three cases of enforced disappearance, and explains in more detail:

> "Government security forces routinely detained individuals based on alleged links to the OLA, including accusations of providing food, logistical support, or having family members associated with the group. Affiliation with opposition political parties was also a recurring basis for detention." (OLLAA, 13 May 2026, p. 11)

The Swiss Refugee Council (Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe, SFH) notes with reference to unnamed sources that in 2026, individuals suspected of having links to OLF or OLA continue to face arbitrary arrest and detention (SFH, 27 May 2026, pp. 13, 17). Similarly, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its August 2026 report quotes a confidential source saying that individuals could easily fall under the suspicion of having links to the OLA, including by criticising the government, giving food to OLA fighters, having an OLA-affiliated relative, or hailing from a rural area where OLA was active. Moreover, according to another source quoted in the ministry's report, family members of alleged OLA fighters might face threats, intimidation, house searches and detention if they failed to comply with a demand by the authorities to the effect that they persuade their respective relatives to leave the group (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 43).

The EHRC states in its August 2025 summary report that the "deprivation of liberty and arbitrary detentions for reasons said to be 'command post' or 'current situation'" in the context of ongoing armed conflicts in the Oromia and Amhara regions and some other areas of Central and Southern Ethiopia regions "continued to be a serious concern" (EHRC, 22 August 2025, p. 3). The EHRC further notes:

> "In Oromia Region, related to the ongoing armed conflict, individuals have also been arbitrarily and unlawfully detained in police stations under 'current situation.' It is particularly alarming that arrests and illegal detentions are conducted without court warrants, with detainees frequently moved between different police stations." (EHRC, 22 August 2025, p. 3)

3.1.1.3 Detention conditions and access to justice

Moreover, detainees often faced prolonged detention and other abuses, according to the EHRC quoted by the Addis Standard:

> "The Commission said it found suspects held in detention for prolonged periods without being brought before a court or charged, often under the pretext of 'current affairs.' It also noted cases where family members were detained in place of suspects in areas with security concerns, and individuals acquitted by courts remained in custody under similar justifications.
>
> EHRC further reported that some individuals were detained in police stations without a court order over civil matters, while others faced threats, intimidation, and beatings during arrest and interrogation. Suspects held far from their localities were also found to suffer

> food shortages due to limited access to nearby food vendors." (Addis Standard, 26 September 2025; see also EHRC, 25 September 2025)

In its human rights report covering the period June 2025 to June 2026, the EHRC similarly notes that in the context of the armed conflict, and despite some improvements, arrests without court order on the grounds of 'current affairs' continued. Ongoing delays in bringing detainees before a court, the denial of the right to bail and prolonged detentions were also confirmed. The EHRC provides some examples where police officers did not implement a court's order and suspects were kept in prolonged detention although a court had granted their release on bail (EHRC, 9 October 2026, pp. 49-50). In one case, the district court of Dabo Hana Woreda (District) reportedly ordered deductions to be made from the salaries of police officers who had failed to implement the court's previous orders to respect the right to liberty for suspects held in unlawful detention, and the district finance office carried out the order. The police subsequently arrested one of the court's judges and the head of the Woreda Finance Office, according to the EHRC. Moreover, the EHRC notes that most of the police stations monitored lacked (sufficient) food for suspects, detention rooms were overcrowded, had no windows and hygiene conditions were poor (EHRC, 9 October 2026, p. 50).
OLLAA similarly describes how detainees reported on their situation:

> "Detainees were held in both officially recognized facilities and unofficial detention sites, including military bases and temporary camps. Victims reported torture, inhumane treatment, prolonged detention without charge, denial of legal counsel, and restricted contact with family members. In several cases, detainees or their families reported being asked to pay money in exchange for release." (OLLAA, 13 May 2026, p. 11)

OLLAA and three other sources mention cases of security forces demanding money for the release of detained individuals (OLLAA, 13 May 2026, p. 11; AP, 2 February 2026; Borkena, 30 April 2025; Østebø, 29 January 2025). Terje Østebø, professor at the Center for African Studies and the Department of Religion at the University of Florida, points to reports about security forces using accusations of OLA affiliation or support as a means to extort money from individuals (Østebø, 29 January 2025; TNH, 23 April 2025). However, Østebø notes that "for the militia and local administrators, extortion is not about amassing wealth but about surviving" and that "[m]ilitia members are paid little or no salary, and one source said that militia members explained that collecting money was the way they could 'feed their families'" (Østebø, 29 January 2025). A similar observation is made by the OSG in its submission to the Human Rights Council:

> "Poorly paid and poorly trained local militias engage in looting and extorting spurious and arbitrary taxes from rural and urban areas where people are unable to sustain themselves economically or access adequate health care or education.
>
> A 'dog-eat-dog' situation has developed whereby militia members depend for their and their families' survival on looting and extortion from people with nothing left to give.
>
> Reasons, if any are given, for the extortion of money include financing the building of local administrative buildings, 'health insurance', arming and feeding federal and local security

forces, bribes for the release of prisoners and victims of forced conscription, and licences for businesses and vehicles." (OSG, 2 March 2026, p. 2)

3.1.1.4 Forced recruitment

According to an article by the Addis Standard from August 2026, reports on forced conscription "are resurfacing in several parts of Oromia", including the Sheger City area around Addis Ababa, East Hararge and East Bale zones, with some families claiming that their relatives disappeared while travelling and that they subsequently received demands to pay for their release. These reports "come against a broader backdrop of longstanding practice of coercive recruitment and arbitrary detention in Oromia", according to the Addis Standard, which also points to a December 2024 report by the EHRC on the same issue, including cases involving minors (Addis Standard, 13 August 2026; see also EHRC, 5 December 2024). In an article from January 2025, Voice of America (VOA) quotes the acting chief of the EHRC saying that Oromia Region's security forces, in reaction to the commission's objections, were visiting detention centres and releasing those unwilling to join as well as children under the age of 18 (VOA, 10 January 2025). Another source reports in May 2025 that the EHRC was conducting an investigation on allegations of forced conscription of young men by the ENDF, which dismissed the claims (The Reporter Ethiopia, 3 May 2025).

In an article from May 2026, Wazema Radio, an independent non-profit media organisation based in Addis Ababa, quotes residents from East and Horo Gudru (also Horo Guduru) Wellega zones saying that they were fleeing from their areas to avoid forced military recruitment by government military forces and local militias. Residents were reportedly taken by security forces from their homes, markets, places of worship and celebratory or funeral gatherings. In East Wellega, particularly in the Gida Ayana and Kiremu woredas, residents were pressured by security forces to undergo militia training in the Gaachana Sirnaa framework. Moreover, residents reportedly pointed to the existence of groups operating outside formal security structures while having leaders known to the government authorities (Wazema Radio, 5 May 2026). SFH quotes in its May 2026 report an unnamed contact person saying that forced conscription was mainly attributed to the government, particularly in Western Oromia where young people were conscripted into the defence forces and adults forced to join local Kebele-militia. Another unnamed contact person attributed the reported cases of forced conscription mainly to the national army. Joining local militias, on the other hand, was rather motivated by the expectation of gaining material advantages, particularly through the opportunity to profit from abuses against the population in a difficult economic environment, according to the source (SFH, 27 May 2026, p. 15).

In terms of recruitment into the civil defence force known as Gaachana Sirnaa (see above, section 2.2.3), the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs writes in its August 2026 report that according to a confidential source consulted for the report, it appeared that in urban areas most members were linked to the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) and served on a voluntary basis, while in rural areas, recruitment appeared to be of a forced nature. Another source quoted in the report informed about a protest against alleged forced recruitment by the Gaachana Sirnaa in Jarso district in August 2026, where a man was reportedly shot dead by security forces (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, pp. 77-78).

In Horo Gudru Wellega Zone, farmers were reportedly forced to attend militia training under the Gaachana Sirnaa system to get access to agricultural supplies (Addis Standard, 3 April 2025).

Five women interviewed by Amnesty International for a report on sexual violence in Oromia said that they were targeted by OLA fighters because male relatives were members of the government militia and "added that their male family members had been forcibly recruited by local officials to join security forces, primarily the government militia" (Amnesty International, March 2026, pp. 16-17). For more information on the human rights situation of women and girls, see below section 3.2.

In its abovementioned article from August 2026 on families claiming that their relatives disappeared and were forcibly recruited, the Addis Standard notes that it was not possible to establish into which armed formation the individuals in question had been recruited and continues:

> "The absence of independent confirmation leaves an important question unresolved: whether the cases represent a renewed state recruitment drive, coercive regional militia mobilization, criminal abduction carried out under the cover of military recruitment, or a combination of these practices." (Addis Standard, 13 August 2026)

3.1.1.5 Other violations

In the same sense, the Addis Standard reports on the presence of "broader patterns of coercion, dispossession, and informal enforcement" across Oromia Region. Based on interviews with residents in Shashemene (West Arsi Zone), Assela (Arsi Zone), Batu (Zway) (East Shewa Zone), Bishoftu, and Ambo (West Shewa Zone), the source notes that "coercive practices are described as being carried out by actors whose identities and affiliations are not clearly defined, often operating in ways that intersect with formal institutions", including incidents of disputed land transfers, coerced transfer of financial or business assets, coercion into marriage, and informal payments collected at checkpoints and within neighbourhoods in Batu (Zway) by informal groups, including individuals whom locals identified as part of the Gaachana Sirnaa. In Ambo, in the context of the activities of a so-called "120" group, residents reportedly mentioned incidents of public beatings, arbitrary detention, and extortion. According to the Addis Standard, residents who communicated with media outlets appeared to have been "singled out" for detention in unknown places and without contact, while "individuals alleged by residents to be associated with organized groups continue to operate in the city" (Addis Standard, 12 May 2026; for information on the "120" group, see also OSG, 12 June 2026, pp. 6-7).

Two sources report on incidents involving the judiciary: The Addis Standard reported in January 2025 that the Yaya Gulele District Court in North Shewa Zone had to suspend its operations after the court's two judges left the district following beatings and intimidations by government security forces. The court reportedly had operated with only two judges due to security concerns (Addis Standard, 22 January 2025). The EHRC notes in its human rights report of August 2025 that "in the Oromia region, judges and prosecutors have faced harassment for allegedly granting or cooperating in granting bail to suspects" (EHRC, 22 August 2025, p. 6).

3.1.2 Human rights violations by non-state actors

3.1.2.1 Killings

In their joint statement from September 2026, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and co-authors note that not only government forces but also "the OLA, Fano and other

armed actors continue to be implicated in serious violations against civilians" and that "Fano forces have been implicated in killings of civilians and forced displacement, while the OLA has been accused of abductions, killings and rape" (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect et al., 10 September 2026). In 2025, the OLLAA documented the killing of more than 17 civilians by OLA, "primarily targeting individuals accused of cooperating with government security forces or providing information to authorities". Victims were often killed after having been abducted (OLLAA, 13 May 2026, p. 10). According to Østebø, extrajudicial killings are also committed by OLA and other unidentified armed actors, with OLA "regularly" targeting local officials (Østebø, January 2025, p. 41). ACLED reports about the killing of two local officials in February 2025 in North Shewa Zone by OLA members (ACLED, 5 March 2025).

Østebø points to OLA killing persons suspected of collaborating with the authorities (Østebø, January 2025). The EHRC notes in its human rights report for the period June 2024 to June 2025 that OLA committed "numerous human rights violations" including the killing of persons kidnapped for ransom in case the ransom could not be paid (EHRC, 22 August 2025, pp. 2-3). OLLAA reported a similar case in Dugda Woreda in December 2025 (OLLAA, 13 May 2026, p. 10). Three women interviewed by Amnesty international for a report on sexual violence in Oromia reported that male family members had been killed by OLA fighters when trying to defend them (Amnesty International, March 2026, p. 22). For more information on the human rights situation of women and girls, see below section 3.2.

According to an unnamed contact person quoted by the SFH, the OLA also began to target relatives of former fighters who returned to their communities after the December 2024 peace agreement with the government (SFH, 27 May 2026, p. 19); a claim that was reportedly also made by the Oromia authorities (Addis Standard, 20 May 2026).

3.1.2.2 Forced recruitment by OLA

The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs points in its report from August 2026 to a BBC Monitoring media report about the forced recruitment of students and farmers in western Oromia by OLA in early May 2026, forcing them to fight against Fano. At least 16 farmers were reportedly killed in the fighting (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 78). Wazema Radio appears to refer to the same incident, noting that forced recruitment of students and farmers by OLA was reported from the Jardega Jarte Woreda of Horo Gudru Wellega Zone (Wazema Radio, 5 May 2026). According to an unnamed source quoted by the SFH, incidents of forced recruitment by the OLA occurred rather rarely and young people were more likely to join the group for political, economic or social reasons (SFH, 27 May 2026, p. 15).

3.1.2.3 Abductions

According to some confidential sources quoted by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, abductions for ransom have become a source of income for the OLA. The ministry further notes that according to an ATC report of May 2026, more than thousand people had been kidnapped by the OLA over the preceding 18 months (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 41). In its article from February 2026, the AP notes that "[a]rmed banditry is also prevalent, and kidnapping has become a particular issue. It is not always clear who is responsible for the abductions" (AP, 2 February 2026). The EHRC notes in its summary report from August 2025:

> "Alongside the unlawful and arbitrary detentions committed by the government, kidnapping carried out by armed groups and bandit groups have continued to undermine the right to liberty and other fundamental human rights. The perpetrators kidnapped civilians and moved them to unknown locations, subsequently demanding substantial ransoms for their release. Large number of kidnapped civilians who are unable to pay the requested ransom were subjected to multiple human rights violations, including loss of life. The report highlighted the human rights violations associated with kidnapping particularly in the Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and Oromia regions. Of particular concern, the report indicates that women have been subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence while in captivity." (EHRC, 22 August 2025, p. 4)

In one incident, the Oromia regional prosecutor was killed and three others abducted while travelling in Jimma Arjo Woreda, East Wellega Zone in November 2025 (Addis Standard, 27 November 2025). The three men, who were released a few days later, reportedly claimed that the perpetrators were OLA fighters, while according to the OLA, the incident occurred in the context of a clash with security forces (Addis Standard, 8 December 2025). Several incidents of abductions by armed groups were reported during the reference period. In North Shewa Zone, incidents were reported along the Addis Ababa-Debre Markos road near Ali Doro town in March 2025 (Addis Standard, 19 March 2025) and May 2026 (Addis Standard, 21 May 2026); in Wara Jarso Woreda in August 2025 (Wazema Briefings, 8 August 2025) and in East Shewa Zone in June 2026 (HRFE, 7 July 2026). The GPC points to abductions of humanitarian workers in East and West Wellega zones in November 2025 (GPC, 10 December 2025, p. 2).

3.1.2.4 Ethnic violence

Several sources mention attacks targeting ethnic Amhara in Oromia Region (AP, 2 February 2026; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 15 July 2026), with "little mitigating action by local officials", according to the Bertelsmann Stiftung (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2026, p. 29). The Amhara Association of America (AAA), an Amhara advocacy organisation, claims in a statement from November 2025, that the "frequency and intensity of deadly violence targeting ethnic Amhara and EOTC [Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, note ACCORD] communities" in Oromia regional state has "exponentially increased" since Prime Minister Abiy came to power (AAA, 26 November 2025). The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes in its report from August 2026 that according to four sources, the OLA was responsible for acts of ethnic violence against Amhara in Oromia Region without further quantifying the violence. According to one of these sources, OLA mainly attacked ethnic Amhara in the Oromia-Amhara border area, while another source reportedly indicated that ethnically motivated attacks by OLA seemed to have decreased in recent years (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 42).

On the other hand, AP mentions attacks by "insurgents from the region of Amhara" (AP, 2 February 2026), while the SFH quotes a contact person stating that violence continued in western Oromia with Fano militia attacking civilians and security forces (SFH, 27 May 2026, p. 6). In an article for the Addis Standard the university researchers Asebe Regassa and Gemechu Abeshu state that Fano's activities in East Wellega and Horo Gudru Wellega zones have been "driven by the ideology of establishing 'Greater Amhara'" and have been "linked to severe human rights abuses, including massacres, forced displacement, and sexual violence".

According to the authors, the large-scale displacement and insecurity caused by conflict have affected economic activities in the region, causing food insecurity and famine among the population while also disrupting their access to basic services such as health care and education (Regassa & Abeshu, 3 March 2025). In its human rights report for 2025, the OLLAA documents the killing of at least 29 civilians by Fano militias, noting that the attacks were often based on ethnicity and occurred primarily in western and central Oromia (OLLAA, 13 May 2026, p. 10). During the reference period, incidents of killings or abductions attributed to Fano militia were reported in Horo Gudru Wellega Zone (Addis Standard, 3 April 2025; Addis Standard, 3 September 2025), East Wellega Zone (Addis Standard, 7 May 2025; ACLED, 28 August 2026; see also BBC, 21 August 2026), and West Shewa Zone (Addis Standard, 23 July 2025).

3.1.2.5 Intercommunal violence

The Addis Standard reports about civilian deaths and displacement in the context of intercommunal violence in the border area of Oromia and Sidama regions, involving districts in East Guji Zone (Oromia) and East Sidama Zone (Sidama), in May 2026 (Addis Standard, 25 May 2026) and July 2026. The source points to a "long-running" dispute over Gubboo Heema village, claimed by both sides, and quotes residents from both communities claiming that an "incomplete reconciliation process" following the previous outbreak of violence led to renewed clashes, as the process had involved government officials and security authorities but none of the directly affected communities (Addis Standard, 29 July 2026). In July 2025, intercommunal violence in the border area of Oromia and Somali regions following territorial disputes in Wachile, Dhas, Gumi Idalo (also Gumi Eldalo) and Arero woredas (East Borena Zone) similarly led to civilian deaths and displacement (UNOCHA, August 2025, p. 2).

3.2 Women and girls

3.2.1 Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV)

According to the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), "both women and children remain disproportionately at higher risk of human rights violation" (EHRC, undated). In its 2024/2025 summary report on the human rights situation, the commission states:

> "In the 2024/2025 fiscal year, the human rights situation of women and children continues to be a major concern, particularly in areas where conflict persists, in post-conflict parts of the country where necessary reconstruction has not taken place, and in areas affected by natural disasters […] and in regions facing other challenges, including displacement of persons.
>
> As indicated in various sections of the report, women and children have been killed in attacks carried out by different actors during armed conflicts and security incidents. They have also been subjected to physical and psychological violence, including rape." (EHRC, 22 August 2025, p. 9)

The GPC notes that "conflict and humanitarian crises have significantly exacerbated gender-based violence (GBV), with violence often used as a tool of warfare, intimidation, and retaliation, often as both a humiliation technique, as well as with intent to destroy ability to reproduce or have children" (GPC, 5 September 2025, p. 11). Other sources observe that

"[w]omen and girls continued to face conflict-related sexual violence amid the ongoing armed conflicts" (Amnesty International, 21 April 2026) and that women and girls in Oromia and other regions "have been significantly affected by war and insecurity", with reports indicating the occurrence of CRSV committed by the ENDF, the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF), Fano and others, as well as "widespread abuses […] amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity" (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect et al., 16 March 2026). In a report covering the period January to March 2026, the Organization for Justice and Accountability in the Horn of Africa (OJAH) observes a "surge in conflict-related sexual violence during armed raids on rural villages" in Oromia Region, and at the same time points to an underreporting of incidents "due to infrastructure collapse and social stigma" (OJAH, 2026, p. 3).

In March 2026, Amnesty International published a report on conflict-related sexual violence[32] and mass displacement in Oromia Region, particularly in the Sayo and Anfillo Woredas of Kelem Wellega Zone. Of ten women interviewed for the report, seven were under the age of 18 when they were subjected to sexual violence, and five had been subjected to sexual slavery and gang rape. All ten women reportedly identified the perpetrators as OLA fighters; in one case the perpetrators were identified as an ENDF soldier and OLA fighters (Amnesty International, March 2026, pp. 5-6). In this context, Amnesty International points to "a consistent pattern of abuse whereby OLA fighters targeted female family members as an act of reprisal against those who joined government forces" and quotes five women as saying that they were explicitly told so by OLA fighters, although according to the women, their male relatives had been forcibly recruited by local officials (Amnesty International, March 2026, pp. 16-17).

The OLA rejected the report's findings in a press release. The armed group condemned sexual violence and called for independent investigations but claimed that Amnesty International's report suffered from "methodological weakness, basic factual errors, and a singular focus", ignoring the "well-documented phenomenon of armed actors impersonating the Oromo Liberation Army" and failing to reliably identify the perpetrators (OLF-OLA, 6 March 2026, p. 5).

Two sources quoted in the August 2026 report by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs point to acts of sexual violence committed by OLA fighters. According to one source, fighters approached girls asking them to "braid" their hair (referring to the hairstyle of dreadlocks that many fighters wore), leaving the girl with the choice of either facing sexual slavery, if she accepted, or the risk of retaliatory actions against her and/or her family, in case she refused. According to the same source, the practice was common in Shewa and Wellega zones, without further quantifying its frequency, while according to the second source, no quantitative data were available on acts of sexual violence by the OLA (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, p. 94). In its report on conflict-related sexual violence of April 2026, the UN Security Council points to seven verified cases of rape and gang rape of women and girls in Oromia and Tigray regions in 2025, committed by various perpetrators including members of the OLA, government-affiliated militia, ENDF, Oromia and Amhara regional police, and the EDF.

[32] Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) refers to "rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage, and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls, or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict", as defined in a report by the UN Secretary-General (UNSG, 3 June 2020, p. 3).

According to information provided by the government, two members of the Oromia police force as well as one member of a government-linked militia were convicted of rape and sentenced to prison terms from 11 to 15 years in 2025 (UN Security Council, 21 April 2026, p. 24).

In its March 2026 report on sexual violence in Oromia, Amnesty International notes that "multiple humanitarian and human rights agencies […] have documented a pattern of forced displacement of women and girls" in Kelem Wellega Zone and that several experts consulted by Amnesty International had confirmed these findings. One expert quoted in the report described the situation as follows:

> "'Women cannot live in the rural areas [of the Kellem Wallga Zone] anymore. There is a high rate of migration of women to the nearest town, where most are forced to do daily labor for survival, such as housework. One of the major factors for this is the forced conscription of men by the government to join the local militia that is fighting the OLA. It is very rare to find someone who joins the government militia voluntarily, as they know that OLA fighters will commit revenge attacks against their families. If OLA fighters hear that someone joined the militia, they will attack the remaining family members, mainly women.'" (Amnesty International, March 2026, pp. 18-19)

3.2.2 Non-conflict-related sexual gender-based violence (SGBV)

Amnesty International notes in its human rights report for 2025 that GBV "worsened due to the collapse of the rule of law following prolonged conflict" (Amnesty International, 21 April 2026) and GPC makes a similar observation:

> "The breakdown of both formal and community-based protection systems—particularly in conflict-affected regions such as Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and Afar—has increased the vulnerability of women, girls, and other at-risk groups to intimate partner violence, abduction, trafficking, child recruitment, and survival sex." (GPC, 5 September 2025, p. 11)

In Oromia Region, 28 percent of women aged 15-49, who ever had a husband or intimate partner have experienced physical, sexual, or emotional violence committed by their husband or intimate partner, according to the 2024-25 Demographic and Health Survey by the Ethiopian Statistical Service (ESS, July 2026, p. 365). The percentage of women of this age group who have experienced sexual violence by any perpetrator is 6.2 percent. Among women aged 15 to 49 who have ever been pregnant, 3.5 percent have experienced physical violence during pregnancy (ESS, July 2026, pp. 371-372). Maat for Peace, Development and Human Rights, an Egyptian non-profit organisation, notes that "[f]ield reports reviewed by Maat indicate a concerning rise" in GBV against children, especially in conflict-affected regions such as Oromia, Amhara, Afar and Tigray (Maat for Peace, Development and Human Rights, April 2025, p. 7). The GPC mentions a rise in GBV against children particularly in East Wellega Zone, as of May 2026 (GPC, 10 August 2026b, p. 2). According to a study by a team of researchers for the Gender & Adolescence Global Evidence (GAGE) on the situation of young people in East Hararge Zone from December 2025, girls and young women rarely reported in the context of surveys that they had experienced sexual violence, while qualitative research revealed that sexual harassment was "rampant" but not recognised as a form of sexual violence, and often started "even before puberty". Forced abduction was equally rarely seen as form of sexual violence, as

"it almost universally leads girls to agree to marriage" (Presler-Marshall et al., December 2025, p. 29).

3.2.3 Access to assistance for victims of GBV and conflict-related sexual violence

Amnesty International notes in its March 2026 report that according to experts interviewed by the organisation, there are health care centres in the Sayo and Anfilo Woredas of Kelem Wellega Zone that offer assistance to victims of sexual violence such as post-rape care and other sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services, although they are lacking equipment and trained staff. However, many victims reportedly are reluctant to seek assistance out of fear for their safety and of societal stigmatisation, as seeking SRH services is associated with the perception of having received abortion care (Amnesty International, March 2026, p. 20). Fear of retaliation and the "normalization of abuse" were other reasons for victims not to report incidents or to seek assistance (GPC, 6 October 2026, p. 6). The study on the situation of young people in East Hararge Zone for GAGE quotes respondents to the study agreeing that "rape is rarely reported, as the survivor is shamed and required to marry her rapist" (Presler-Marshall et al., December 2025, p. 29).

Moreover, in a report covering the humanitarian situation as of August 2025, GPC notes that only a limited number of organisations offering protection services was present in East Oromia. This lack of available services affected access to services for victims of GBV and conflict-related sexual violence in the area, with many cases going unreported in those woredas where no GBV services were available. Likewise, child protection services were not available in many woredas of East Hararge Zone, leaving most of the cases unattended (GPC, 9 September 2025, p. 4). In a Humanitarian Situation Report for the period January to February 2026, UNICEF states that in Oromia Region 115 women and girls across nine woredas received "comprehensive GBV services" (UNICEF, 9 April 2026, p. 6).

As of January 2026, most protection services across Oromia Region were "damaged and not available", according to a GPC assessment. The source further notes that only two of twelve assessed safe spaces for women and children "remain functional" while "83 % of existing safe spaces [are] currently non-functional due to conflict" (GPC, 10 August 2026a, p. 3). A map showing a total of 28 safe houses across Ethiopia, also indicates the presence of 2 safe houses in Oromia Region (GBV AoR & MoWSA, 2026a). Of nationwide 122 One Stop Centres, 42 are located in Oromia, according to another map by the same source (GBV AoR & MoWSA, 2026b).

3.2.4 Female Genital Mutilation or Cutting (FGM/C) and early/forced marriage

Under Article 565 of the Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, female genital mutilation (FGM) is a criminal offence punishable by a fine of at least 500 Birr [approximately USD 3][33] or a prison sentence of at least three months. The infibulation of female genitalia, which the WHO classifies as 'Type 3' (WHO, 31 January 2025), is punishable with imprisonment of at least three years (Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 9 May 2005, Article 565-566).

[33] Currency calculation based on the exchange rate from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), undated, https://commission.europa.eu/funding-and-tenders/procedures-guidelines-tenders/information-contractors-and-beneficiaries/exchange-rate-inforeuro_en

The Revised Family Code sets the legal minimum age for marriage at 18 years (Article 7) and free and full consent is required for both partners (Article 6). However, Article 7(2) provides an exception, under which special permission to marry from the age of 16 may be granted by the Minister of Justice if a request is submitted by the future spouses, or the parents or guardian of one of them (The Revised Family Code, 4 July 2000, Articles 6 and 7). Marrying a minor outside these conditions is punishable by up to seven years of imprisonment, depending on the age of the minor (Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 9 May 2005, Article 648).
The GPC points to motives for the persistence of GBV, including the practices of FGM/C and child marriage:

> "Underlying drivers of GBV remain rooted in persistent gender inequalities, harmful social norms, unequal power relations, poverty and limited awareness of rights and available services. Ongoing insecurity in some locations, coupled with widespread impunity and weak law enforcement, has contributed to the normalization of harmful practices, such as FGM and child marriage. Such practices are reinforced by social expectations, weak accountability mechanisms and unequal power relations, especially in rural and displaced communities, where local norms and traditional elders assume a prime role in adjudicating related cases." (GPC, 6 October 2026, p. 6)

According to UNICEF, the practices of child marriage and Female Genital Mutilation or Cutting (FGM/C) remained "deeply" rooted in Oromia Region due to social and cultural norms (UNICEF, 27 March 2025). In terms of child marriage, Oromia had the highest percentage of girls married before their 18th birthday (35 percent), and almost half of women and girls aged 20 to 24 years (48 percent) are married (UNICEF, 14 February 2025). Moreover, 69 percent of girls and women aged 15 to 49 years in Oromia have undergone FGM/C, compared to a nationwide share of 58 percent, according to the 2024-25 ESS Demographic and Health Survey. Survey data indicated a decline in the prevalence of FGM/C by 28 percent since the year 2000 (ESS, July 2026, p. 390). 67 percent of respondents in the study on young people in East Hararge reportedly believe that FGM is required by religion (61 percent females and 79 males), and only 30 percent of young males declared themselves willing to marry a female that has not undergone FGM (Presler-Marshall et al., December 2025, pp. 30-31). The authors of the study note that although both FGM/C and child marriage were prohibited by law, both remained common in Oromia Region (Presler-Marshall et al., December 2025, p. 3).

3.3 Returnees

On a nationwide level IOM considers the situation of IDPs and returnees as follows:

> "Living conditions for IDPs in displacement sites as well as individuals who have returned or relocated are dire, and needs remain high. Safe access to water and sanitation, basic health services, shelter and critical non-food items (NFIs) are urgent for all. A shrinking humanitarian funding environment has led to a reduction of humanitarian assistance, further increasing the pressure on already stretched national response capacities." (IOM, 25 September 2026, p. 6)

3.3.1 Returnees from abroad

Findings of the National Integrated Household Survey (NIHS) 2024/25 reveal that 38.1 percent of returned migrants across Ethiopia intend to migrate again due to a lack of employment opportunities (ESS, September 2026, p. 17). The majority of returnees come from Saudi Arabia (58.9 percent), followed by Sudan (9.7 percent) (ESS, September 2026, p. 15). In the period January to March 2026, the number of returns organised by the government of Saudi Arabia to Ethiopia was at 26,400, compared to 12,800 in the same period in 2025, meaning the number has more than doubled. After Tigray and Amhara, Oromia was one of the regions most people returned to, with 29 percent of the total number of returnees from Saudi Arabia returning to that region in the first quarter of 2026 (IOM, 12 August 2026, p. 5; see also The Reporter Ethiopia, 15 August 2026).

In December 2025, IOM published a study on the situation of returnees from Sudan to Oromia and Tigray regions. Based on interviews with more than 600 returnees to Jimma Zone in Oromia Region (IOM, 1 December 2025, p. 6), IOM identifies insufficient income (71.9 percent), unemployment (70 percent) and the lack of jobs/livelihoods (57.3 percent) as the main difficulties reported by the returnees. In terms of support received upon return, 40 percent stated that they received support (including social, psychosocial and/or economic support) from the government, 29.9 percent said they received support from non-government actors or the private sector, 12.5 percent from their family, and 44.7 percent said that they did not receive anything. As reasons for not receiving support, 85.2 percent of respondents in Oromia Region stated that services were not available in the area of return (IOM, 1 December 2025, pp. 16-17).

DFAT describes that in general returnees are met with societal stigmatisation, in many cases by their own families and communities who perceive their return as having failed (DFAT, 19 August 2026, p. 37). According to a confidential source interviewed in April 2026 for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs' country report, there were returnees who had been detained and interrogated upon their return because they had applied for asylum abroad, had expressed negative views about the Ethiopian government and/or were suspected of supporting armed opposition groups in Ethiopia, without clarifying the frequency of such incidents nor how the respective returnees had come to the attention of the authorities. Another source was reportedly not aware of returnees facing problems by the authorities for having applied for asylum abroad (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, pp. 104-105). According to IOM, Oromia “has a regional government programme focused on facilitating migrant reintegration”, usually organised as a collaborative effort of the government, the local community and NGOs (IOM, 31 December 2025, p. 22).

3.3.2 IDP returnees

As previously mentioned, UNHCR reports 209,072 IDP returnees in Oromia as of 31 August 2026 (UNHCR, September 2026), however, basing this figure on information from IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) National Displacement Report No. 20 from January 2025, which in turn is based on figures collected in the period July to August 2024 (IOM, 20 January 2025, pp. 8, 32).

Human Rights First Ethiopia, an Ethiopian NGO, which filed a lawsuit against several national and regional authorities, among them the Oromia regional government, reportedly accuses the Oromia regional government of falling short in supporting IDPs to come back and reintegrate

in the region (The Reporter Ethiopia, 27 December 2025). The Addis Standard reports about church leaders of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) asking the government to facilitate returns after members of the Orthodox Christian communities have been displaced by attacks in late May and early June 2026 (Addis Standard, 5 June 2026b). For more information on the attacks on EOTC members, see section 3.4.

According to Borkena, the government has organised three rounds of forced returns since 2024, moving approximately 2,745 IDPs from Debre Birhan in Amhara to West Shewa and Wellega zones in Oromia. However, the source claims that these operations had not ensured a safe and dignified return, and that due to ongoing insecurity many returnees have since then left the area again, experiencing secondary displacement (Borkena, 5 July 2025). The GPC similarly points to the situation of IDPs and returnees, particularly in conflict-affected regions such as Oromia during the reference period:

> "Safe, voluntary, and dignified returns or relocations of IDPs remain a critical protection concern across Ethiopia. Many IDPs in Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, and Benishangul-Gumuz are unable to return home due to ongoing conflict, landmines, damaged or occupied infrastructure, and unresolved disputes over land and resources. Where returns or relocations do occur, they are often ad hoc and lack adequate support for shelter, livelihoods, and access to essential services, exposing returning populations—particularly women, children, older persons, and persons with disabilities—to heightened protection risks, including those related to secondary displacement where the areas of return or relocation are not suitable." (GPC, 5 September 2025, p. 9)

> "Returnees may encounter occupied or destroyed homes, disputed ownership, missing documentation and limited access to formal dispute resolution mechanisms, increasing risks of secondary displacement, protracted housing and land disputes, and tensions between returnees, host communities and other affected populations. Similar challenges continue to affect parts of Amhara, Afar and Oromia, where insecurity and uneven restoration of public institutions continue to limit access to legal and administrative services." (GPC, 6 October 2026, p. 13)

The same source also points to the situation of IDP host communities, particularly in the context of violence across regional borders:

> "Efforts to initiate political dialogue remain inconclusive, while tensions with few neighbouring woredas continue to influence dynamics in border areas, fuelling cross-regional displacement, especially along the border with Somali. A substantial population of these IDPs are living in overcrowded and underserved displacement sites, with minimal access to protection services, basic assistance, and durable solutions. The prolonged displacement has been also placing immense pressure on overstretched host communities, further compounding existing vulnerabilities and intercommunal tensions." (GPC, 5 September 2025, p. 3)

IDPs from Kiremu Woreda, East Wellega Zone, and Dano Woreda, West Shewa Zone, living in IDP camps in Amhara Region reportedly were required by Oromia local officials to pay taxes on properties they left behind or risk having the land confiscated in case of non-payment (Addis Standard, 15 August 2025).

GPC states that across Oromia and Amhara, continuing violence and ethnic tensions have prevented displaced people and minority groups from obtaining services. In some locations within both regions, up to 30-40 percent of IDPs and returnees said they could not access essential services or do not have civil documentation, according to the GPC (GPC, 5 September 2025, p. 10).

3.3.3 Situation of IDPs from Oromia in other regions

In its human rights report covering the period from June 2016 E.C. to June 2017 E.C [June 2024 to June 2025], the EHRC notes that in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region there had been instances of mass arrests of IDPs from Oromia, Amhara and other regions, as well as forced returns to their places of origin, on the grounds that they posed a security threat (EHRC, 4 August 2025, pp. 69-70).

In an article from October 2025, Refugees International, a US-based international non-profit organisation advocating for the rights of displaced persons, points to the situation of IDPs in Qoloji Babile District in Somali Region. The source notes that many of them are ethnic Somali from Oromia Region who had been displaced in the context of violent clashes in 2016 and 2017. Since then, at least 100,000 IPDs in the district have been without a national identification card after losing their cards in the conflict, and therefore continue to face difficulties:

> "The lack of IDs has severely limited their freedom of movement outside the camp where they were displaced and has restricted their access to social, medical, and economic opportunities because many essential government services in Ethiopia are linked to the national ID. They cannot even activate a SIM card to access cellular services. […]
>
> The impact is also hitting the next generation. A mother said her twelfth-grade daughter was nearly barred from taking the national exam because she lacked a national ID, but was eventually allowed to take it after securing a support letter from the local authority. She said the children and youth in the IDP settlement are a 'lost generation" due to a lack of documentation, limited access to education and employment, and growing hopelessness.'" (Refugees International, 7 October 2025)

In a report covering the period May to June 2025, UNOCHA points to the situation of IDPs in three IDP sites (China, Woinshet, and Bakelo) in Debre Birhan in Amhara Region, where since 2021 more than 22,000 ethnic Amhara who had been displaced from Oromia Region, have sought refuge (UNOCHA, 14 July 2025, p. 2):

> "The displaced face acute shortages of food, shelter, water, sanitation, healthcare, and protection services. Food distributions are irregular and insufficient, and recent arrivals are currently excluded due to a lack of registration. […]
>
> Shelter conditions are particularly poor in China and Woinshet camps, where facilities are collective, substandard, and deteriorating. In China camp, nearly 900 IDPs have been living in a single warehouse for the past three years. While Bakelo site offers relatively better conditions, humanitarian partners are concerned that the individual shelters are becoming increasingly damaged, and not suited for the rainy season. The WASH situation is critical across all sites, while non-food items such as blankets, mattresses, and kitchen utensils are

in extremely short supply. Many IDPs have not received NFIs for over two years, and some have never received them at all." (UNOCHA, 14 July 2025, p. 2)

No information could be found on the situation of ethnic Oromo IDPs outside Oromia Region.

3.4 Attacks on Christians in Arsi Zone

According to a July 2026 report by the EHRCO on human rights violations in the East Arsi Zone, armed groups operating in the area were responsible for numerous human rights violations, including "loss of life, physical injuries, property destruction, enforced disappearances, abductions, looting of churches, and the burning of numerous homes, specifically targeting followers of the Orthodox Tewahedo Christian faith". Based on data collected for the period from 2014 E.C. to 24/9/2018 E.C. (i.e., 2021/2022 to 1 June 2026 G.C.), the EHRCO reports that several[34] hundred Christians were killed in the area, including in Shirka Woreda (116 victims), Robe Woreda (47 victims), Munisa Woreda (19), Honkolo Wabe Woreda (20), Jeju Woreda (101), Merti Woreda (117), Sire Woreda (3), Aseko Woreda (5) and Guna Woreda (26 victims). In addition, the EHRCO recorded the killing of four members of local government armed forces (militia) (EHRCO, July 2026, pp. 7-8).

The Addis Standard quotes a local church source saying that attacks on Christians in the area began in 2021 and that since then about 190 people had been killed. According to a statement by the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC), more than 25 Christians had been killed in October 2025, without naming a perpetrator (Addis Standard, 29 October 2025). The International Crisis Group reports that the OLA was accused of being responsible for the attacks, while the armed group blamed government proxies (International Crisis Group, undated). In a statement issued in early November 2025, the Catholic Bishops' Conference of Ethiopia (CBCE) mentions killings and the destruction of property belonging to Catholic Christians in West Hararge Zone in October 2025, as well as attacks on followers of the EOTC and the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council in Arsi Zone (ACI Africa, 5 November 2025). In a press release from March 2026, the EHRC states that since October 2025, renewed attacks against civilians in various woredas of Arsi Zone committed by the OLA "resulted in loss of lives, bodily injuries, and destruction of property, as well as the displacement of residents due to security concern", including an attack on 26 February 2026 in Jawi Kebele, Shirka Woreda and Geba Kebele, Robe Woreda (EHRC, 4 March 2026). In the Shirka Woreda attack, 21 Orthodox Christians were reportedly killed, survivors were abducted and homes and properties were burned. Religious institutions including the EOTC, the Inter-Religious Council of Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council issued statements condemning the attack. The attack was reportedly also condemned by the OLA, which claimed that it was carried out by "mercenaries" trying to incite inter-religious and inter-ethnic tensions (Addis Standard, 3 March 2026). In the same sense, the OSG attributes the attack to "Government Shane", that is, "Prosperity Party forces masquerading as OLA" with the aim of "foment[ing] hatred between Amhara and Oromo people" (OSG, 12 June 2026, p. 59).

[34] The Addis Standard writes with reference to the EHRCO of "at least 432" civilians killed (Addis Standard, 28 July 2026). However, adding up the numbers provided by the EHRCO, which are also published in the article, results in at least 454 civilian deaths since 2021/22.

In the context of the 1 June 2026 elections, the International Crisis Group reports on attacks by the OLA against Orthodox Christians in East Arsi Zone, "resulting in around 30 casualties, displacement, and destruction of homes and churches" (International Crisis Group, undated). According to the African Press Agency (APA), there had been reports on incidents where OLA fighters were "selectively beheading members of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, burning villages and churches, and destroying properties", killing at least 35 people in localities around Teleta Gabriel in Aseko Woreda (APA, 7 June 2026), while an eyewitness quoted by the Addis Standard describes armed groups moving through villages with Kalashnikov rifles, attacking "anyone in their view", looting livestock, grain stocks and church assets and burning homes. According to statements by EOTC officials, the historic Teleta Holy Gabriel Church was completely destroyed by fire, and a second church was looted and destroyed. Residents reportedly asked local authorities for help before the violence escalated. However, the promised arrival of national defence forces never materialised (Addis Standard, 2 June 2026). Based on its own investigation, the EHRC states that local security forces were deployed when armed movements were observed around Teleta Chefa Kebele, Aseko Woreda, from 30 May 2026 onwards, leading to clashes with "the armed group commonly known as 'OLF-Shene'". Subsequently, the OLA attacked residents, killing two Christians and a Muslim, burning down the Gabriel Church and damaging the fence of a mosque, looting public and private property and displacing more than 2,650 residents, according to the EHRC (EHRC, 7 June 2026). ACLED similarly mentions clashes between "OLA/OLF-Shane" members and regional and local security forces in Teleta Chefa Kebele on 31 May 2026 and attacks by the armed group on "mostly Orthodox Christian civilians" in Aseko Woreda, Arsi Zone, during which more than 200 properties were destroyed (ACLED, 6 July 2026). The EHRCO recorded five persons killed in Teleta Chefa Kebele, Aseko Woreda on 31 May 2026 [date indicated as 23/9/2018 E.C.] (EHRCO, July 2026, pp. 26-27).

The OLA, on the other hand, rejected responsibility for the attack. In a statement, the group accused government officials of having "systematically fomented division among the people" in Arsi Zone, including the Aseko area, for several years, setting "Oromos against Amharas, Muslims against Christians". The group claimed that in the context of the elections, "regime operatives in the region actively ignited and abetted communal violence", leading to deaths of civilians (OLF-OLA, 4 June 2026).

In its August 2026 report, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that there was some uncertainty surrounding the violence in East Arsi. According to a confidential source quoted in the report, the violence appeared to have religious and ethnic aspects, as most of the victims were Amharas and most of the perpetrators were Oromo. Regarding the perpetrators of the violence, a confidential source reportedly indicated that an OLA faction was responsible for the February 2026 attack. According to the source quoted in the report, the respective local OLA faction combined some form of Oromo nationalism with Muslim fundamentalism, although the OLA, in general, was secular in its orientation but, due to its loosely organised structure, did not fully control local groups and fighters (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2026, pp. 75-76).

Sources (all sources accessed on 13 November 2026)

- AAA – Amhara Association of America: Emerging Patterns of Human Rights Violations against Amhara Civilians in Ethiopia, 26 November 2025 https://www.amharaamerica.org/post/emerging-patterns-of-human-rights-violations-against-amhara-civilians-in-ethiopia
- Abdurehim, Ahmed Mohammed; Mohammed, Jema Haji; Edriss, Abdi Khalil; Ibrahim, Kedir Jemal: Shifting from coffee to khat (Catha edulis) cultivation in eastern Ethiopia provides insights from a farm household analysis, Discover Sustainability Volume 6, article number 891 (2025), published online 1 September 2025 https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s43621-025-01773-x.pdf
- Abebe, Boyiza Samson et al.: Nutritional Characteristics, Health-Related Properties, and Food Application of Teff (Eragrostis tef): An Overview, International Journal of Molecular Sciences Volume 26 No 19, 23 September 2025 https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12524473/
- Abyssinian Times (The): EZEMA Gains 13 Parliamentary Seats as OLF Misses Out Entirely, 22 June 2026 https://abyssiniantimes.com/en/article/EZEMA-Gains-13-Parliamentary-Seats-as-OLF-Misses-Out-Entirely
- ACAPS: Humanitarian Access Overview. Access conditions in crisis-affected countries, July 2026 https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20260810_ACAPS_Global_humanitarian_access_overview_July_2026.pdf
- ACI Africa – Association for Catholic Information in Africa: Ethiopia's Bishops Condemn Deadly Attack Near Catholic Parish, Call for Government Protection, 5 November 2025 https://www.aciafrica.org/news/18449/ethiopias-bishops-condemn-deadly-attack-near-catholic-parish-call-for-government-protection
- ACLED – Armed Conflict Location & Event Data: Ethiopia situation update, 5 February 2025 https://acleddata.com/update/ethiopia-situation-update-5-february-2025
- ACLED – Armed Conflict Location & Event Data: Ethiopia situation update (19 February 2025), 21 February 2025 https://acleddata.com/update/ethiopia-situation-update-19-february-2025
- ACLED – Armed Conflict Location & Event Data: Ethiopia situation update (5 March 2025), 5 March 2025 https://acleddata.com/update/ethiopia-situation-update-5-march-2025
- ACLED – Armed Conflict Location & Event Data: Ethiopia situation update (19 March 2025), 20 March 2025 https://acleddata.com/update/ethiopia-situation-update-19-march-2025
- ACLED – Armed Conflict Location & Event Data: Ethiopia situation update (30 April 2025), 30 April 2025 https://acleddata.com/update/ethiopia-situation-update-30-april-2025
- ACLED – Armed Conflict Location & Event Data: Ethiopia situation update (11 June 2025), 11 June 2025 https://acleddata.com/update/ethiopia-situation-update-11-june-2025
- ACLED – Armed Conflict Location & Event Data: Africa Overview: July 2026, 6 July 2026 https://acleddata.com/update/africa-overview-july-2026

- ACLED – Armed Conflict Location & Event Data: Is Fano militias' activity increasing in the western part of Ethiopia's Oromia region?, 28 August 2026 https://acleddata.com/expert-comment/fano-militias-activity-increasing-western-part-ethiopias-oromia-region
- ACLED – Armed Conflict Location & Event Data: Data Export Tool, data covering 1 January 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 23 September 2026 https://acleddata.com/conflict-data/data-export-tool
- ACLED – Armed Conflict Location & Event Data: Codebook, undated https://acleddata.com/methodology/acled-codebook
- Addis Standard: News: Oromia regional gov't reports OLA fighters entering camps after peace deal; armed group rejects reports, 4 December 2024 https://addisstandard.com/oromia-regional-govt-reports-ola-fighters-entering-camps-after-peace-deal-armed-group-rejects-reports/
- Addis Standard: News: Yaya Gulele district court in Oromia suspends operations after judges report assault, intimidation by security forces, 22 January 2025 https://addisstandard.com/yaya-gulele-district-court-in-oromia-suspends-operations-after-judges-report-assault-intimidation-by-security-forces/
- Addis Standard: News: Oromia regional government appoints three former OLA commanders after peace deal, 21 February 2025 https://addisstandard.com/oromia-regional-government-appoints-three-former-ola-commanders-after-peace-deal/
- Addis Standard: News: Over 56 passengers abducted in armed attack on bus en route from Addis Abeba to Debre Markos in North Shewa zone, Oromia, 19 March 2025 https://addisstandard.com/over-56-passengers-abducted-in-armed-attack-on-bus-en-route-from-addis-abeba-to-debre-markos-in-north-shewa-zone-oromia/
- Addis Standard: News: More than 20 killed, three abducted in Oromia's Horo Guduru Wollega zone; officials blame Fano militants, 3 April 2025 https://addisstandard.com/more-than-20-killed-three-abducted-in-oromias-horo-guduru-wollega-zone-officials-blame-fano-militants/
- Addis Standard: News: Series of 'retaliation' attacks in Oromia's Haro Limu district claims 29 lives; residents link deaths to recent killing of OLA figure by gov't forces, 16 April 2025 https://addisstandard.com/series-of-retaliation-attacks-in-oromias-haro-limu-district-claims-29-lives-residents-link-deaths-to-recent-killing-of-ola-figure-by-govt-forces/
- Addis Standard: News: Ten people abducted in East Wollega zone of Oromia; residents identify alleged perpetrators as 'Fano militia', 7 May 2025 https://addisstandard.com/ten-people-allegedly-abducted-in-east-wollega-zone-of-oromia-residents-identify-perpetrators-as-fano-militia/
- Addis Standard: News: OLA denies involvement in Metekel civilian Attacks, willing to review 'any evidence' presented by local party, 11 July 2025 https://addisstandard.com/ola-denies-involvement-in-metekel-civilian-attacks-willing-to-review-any-evidence-presented-by-local-party/
- Addis Standard: News: Six IDPs die of Cholera in Fentale, Oromia, as humanitarian crisis deepens; zonal health official denies fatalities, 16 July 2025 https://addisstandard.com/six-idps-die-of-cholera-in-fentale-oromia-as-humanitarian-crisis-deepens-zonal-health-official-denies-fatalities/

- Addis Standard: News: Fano armed group denies involvement in recent civilian killings in West Shewa, confirms its presence in parts of Oromia, including West Shewa, 23 July 2025 https://addisstandard.com/fano-armed-group-denies-involvement-in-recent-civilian-killings-in-west-shewa-confirms-its-presence-in-parts-of-oromia-including-west-shewa/
- Addis Standard: News: Displaced people in Amhara region shelters allege threats of land confiscation over unpaid taxes by officials in Oromia, 15 August 2025 https://addisstandard.com/displaced-people-in-amhara-region-shelters-allege-threats-of-land-confiscation-over-unpaid-taxes-by-officials-in-oromia/
- Addis Standard: Three killed, many displaced as clashes continue along Oromia–Somali border, 29 August 2025 https://addisstandard.com/three-killed-many-displaced-as-clashes-continue-along-oromia-somali-border/
- Addis Standard: News: Over 25 killed in armed attack in Horo Guduru Wollega Zone; residents, MP accuse Fano militants, 3 September 2025 https://addisstandard.com/over-25-killed-in-armed-attack-in-horo-guduru-wollega-zone-residents-mp-accuse-fano-militants/
- Addis Standard: Analysis: From classrooms to military camps: Years of conflict in Oromia push millions of children out of school, 19 September 2025 https://addisstandard.com/analysis-from-classrooms-to-military-camps-years-of-conflict-in-oromia-push-millions-of-children-out-of-school/
- Addis Standard: News: Benishangul Gumuz–Oromia road closure deepens hardships, MP says, 23 September 2025 https://addisstandard.com/benishangul-gumuz-oromia-road-closure-deepens-hardships-mp-says/
- Addis Standard: News: Suspects in Oromia subjected to threats, intimidation and beatings during arrests, interrogations: EHRC, 26 September 2025 https://addisstandard.com/news-suspects-in-oromia-face-threats-intimidation-and-beatings-during-arrests-and-interrogations-human-rights-commission/
- Addis Standard: Analysis: East Borana residents report two month closure of Nagelle Borana–Moyale road amid conflicting official claims and stalled peace efforts, 15 October 2025 https://addisstandard.com/east-borana-residents-report-two-month-closure-of-nagelle-borana-moyale-road-amid-conflicting-official-claims-and-stalled-peace-efforts/
- Addis Standard: News: More than 25 civilians killed in East Arsi zone, Oromia, in October, Orthodox Church says, 29 October 2025 https://addisstandard.com/more-than-25-civilians-killed-in-east-arsi-zone-oromia-in-october-orthodox-church-says/
- Addis Standard: News: Over 40 civilians, including children, killed in latest attack in troubled Metekel Zone, Benishangul-Gumuz region, 24 November 2025 https://addisstandard.com/over-40-civilians-including-children-killed-in-latest-attack-in-troubled-metekel-zone-benishangul-gumuz-region/
- Addis Standard: News: Oromia regional prosecutor killed, three abducted in alleged armed group attack in East Wollega, 27 November 2025 https://addisstandard.com/oromia-regional-prosecutor-killed-three-abducted-in-alleged-armed-group-attack-in-east-wollega/

- Addis Standard: Two abducted prosecutors reunited with families, one receiving medical treatment in Addis Abeba, 8 December 2025 https://addisstandard.com/two-abducted-prosecutors-reunited-with-families-one-receiving-medical-treatment-in-addis-abeba/
- Addis Standard: News: Religious councils, OLA condemn killing of civilians in East Arsi, call for swift accountability, 3 March 2026 https://addisstandard.com/news-religious-councils-ola-condemn-killing-of-civilians-in-east-arsi-call-for-swift-accountability/
- Addis Standard: News: OLF-OLA joins Fano in criticizing Ethiopia's upcoming election, calls it a 'hollow ritual', 24 March 2026 https://addisstandard.com/olf-ola-joins-fano-in-criticizing-ethiopias-upcoming-election-calls-it-a-hollow-ritual/
- Addis Standard: #Election2026 - Oromia at a crossroads: electoral contests, shrinking political space, and the risk of a de facto one-party region once again, 6 April 2026 https://addisstandard.com/election2026-oromia-at-a-crossroads-electoral-contests-shrinking-political-space-and-the-risk-of-a-de-facto-one-party-region-once-again/
- Addis Standard: In-depth Analysis: Shadow Governance: How coercion, extortion, and impunity are reshaping everyday life in Oromia, 12 May 2026 https://addisstandard.com/in-depth-analysis-shadow-governance-how-coercion-extortion-and-impunity-are-reshaping-everyday-life-in-oromia/
- Addis Standard: News: Oromia accuses armed group who 'reject peace overtures' of 'targeting' former OLA members who surrendered, 20 May 2026 https://addisstandard.com/oromia-accuses-armed-group-who-reject-peace-overtures-of-targeting-former-ola-members-who-surrendered/
- Addis Standard: News: Passengers on Addis Abeba–Debre Markos bus abducted by gunmen in North Shewa, Oromia Region, 21 May 2026 https://addisstandard.com/passengers-on-addis-abeba-debre-markos-bus-abducted-by-gunmen-in-north-shewa-oromia-region/
- Addis Standard: News: Days-long deadly clashes in Oromia's East Guji, Sidama region border areas subside after destruction, displacement, 25 May 2026 https://addisstandard.com/sidama-regional-government-states-conflict-between-east-guji-zones-and-sidama-region-has-ceased-residents-describe-severity-of-the-incident/
- Addis Standard: News: Oromia police assure 'voters' security' as Oromo Liberation Army imposes transport ban ahead of Ethiopia election, 30 May 2026 https://addisstandard.com/oromia-police-assure-voters-security-as-oromo-liberation-army-imposes-transport-ban-ahead-of-ethiopia-election/
- Addis Standard: News: Election Board says 143 polling stations failed to open over security problems; voting interrupted in 'certain areas' of Oromia and Amhara regions, 1 June 2026 https://addisstandard.com/election-board-says-143-polling-stations-failed-to-open-over-security-problems-voting-interrupted-in-certain-areas-of-oromia-and-amhara-regions/
- Addis Standard: News: Several killed as armed attacks ravage East Arsi; Churches burned, residents seek refuge in forests, 2 June 2026 https://addisstandard.com/several-killed-as-armed-attacks-ravage-east-arsi-churches-burned-residents-seek-refuge-in-forests/

- Addis Standard: News: Ezema criticizes ruling party practices, electoral management and international media coverage of June 1 election, 5 June 2026a https://addisstandard.com/ezema-criticizes-ruling-party-practices-electoral-management-and-international-media-coverage-of-june-1-election/
- Addis Standard: Orthodox Church delegation meets federal, Oromia officials after deadly East Arsi attacks, 5 June 2026b https://addisstandard.com/eotc-delegation-meets-federal-oromia-officials-after-deadly-east-arsi-attacks-that-killed-at-least-13-displaced-hundreds/
- Addis Standard: News: Oromo Federalist Congress rejects Ethiopia's election as 'Sham,' warns of deepening legitimacy crisis, 11 June 2026 https://addisstandard.com/oromo-federalist-congress-rejects-ethiopias-election-as-sham-warns-of-deepening-legitimacy-crisis/
- Addis Standard: News: Local rights group says 432 civilians killed in targeted attacks on Orthodox Christians in East Arsi since 2021; thousands displaced, 28 July 2026 https://addisstandard.com/local-rights-group-says-432-civilians-killed-in-targeted-attacks-on-orthodox-christians-in-east-arsi-since-2021-thousands-displaced/
- Addis Standard: News: Renewed Oromia-Sidama border clashes leave several dead, school burned, crops destroyed as residents question peace efforts, 29 July 2026 https://addisstandard.com/renewed-oromia-sidama-border-clashes-leave-several-dead-school-burned-crops-destroyed-as-residents-question-peace-efforts/
- Addis Standard: The Quest for Consensus. Evaluating the Ethiopian National Dialogue's Architecture and Limitations, August 2026 https://addisstandard.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/The-Quest-for-Consensus-Addis-Standard-Special-Edition.pdf
- Addis Standard: Analysis: Forced conscription resurfaces across Oromia as Ethiopia continues to grapple with security crises, 13 August 2026 https://addisstandard.com/forced-conscription-resurfaces-across-oromia-as-ethiopia-continues-to-grapple-with-security-crises/
- Addis Standard: In-Depth Analysis: In Oromia's Gida Ayana, old fault lines reopen as a multi-front conflict leaves civilians caught in the crossfire, 21 August 2026 https://addisstandard.com/in-oromias-gida-ayana-old-fault-lines-reopen-as-a-multi-front-conflict-leaves-civilians-caught-in-the-crossfire/
- Advocacy for Oromia: Oromia Restructures: Six New Administrative Clusters and Their Administrators, 29 September 2026 https://advocacy4oromia.org/2026/09/29/oromia-restructures-six-new-administrative-clusters-and-their-administrators/
- Africanews: One to five: Ethiopia gets four new federal working languages, 4 March 2020 https://www.africanews.com/2020/03/04/one-to-five-ethiopia-gets-four-new-federal-working-languages/
- Ahmed, Abdunasir Isak: The 'Green Gold' Trap: Ethiopia's booming Khat economy, hidden national costs, Addis Standard, 8 July 2026 https://addisstandard.com/the-green-gold-trap-ethiopias-booming-khat-economy-hidden-national-costs/

- Al Jazeera: A visual guide to Ethiopia's ethnic groups and conflict areas, 29 May 2026 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/29/a-visual-guide-to-ethiopias-ethnic-groups-and-conflict-areas
- Al Jazeera: A visual guide to Ethiopia's ethnic groups and conflict areas, 29 May 2026 (15 May 2026), (published on Flourish) https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/29123025/embed
- Al Jazeera: Ethiopian armed groups forge alliance against government, 21 September 2026 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/21/ethiopian-armed-groups-forge-alliance-against-government
- Al Jazeera: Can Ethiopia's seven-group rebel alliance challenge Abiy Ahmed?, 23 September 2026 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/23/can-ethiopias-seven-group-rebel-alliance-challenge-abiy-ahmed
- Amnesty International: 'No One Came To My Rescue': Gang rape, sexual slavery, and mass displacement of women in Oromia, Ethiopia [AFR 25/0774/2026], March 2026 https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2137730/AFR2507742026ENGLISH.pdf
- Amnesty International: The State of the World's Human Rights; Ethiopia 2025, 21 April 2026 https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2139291.html
- Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention: Decisions on the request submitted by Ethiopia for an extended deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, 5 December 2025 https://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/_APMBC-DOCUMENTS/Meetings/2025/22MSP-Ethiopia-Art5-ExtReq-Decision.pdf
- AP – Associated Press: 'Executions, torture, abductions, rape': Ethiopia's hidden conflict, 2 February 2026 https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-oromia-autonomy-conflict-563190d9684ad484166171cca16365ca
- AP – Associated Press: Ethiopia's ruling party retains parliamentary majority in election marred by insecurity, 21 June 2026 https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-election-abiy-ahmed-e74f12119a40465e31f4d18941dbf89b
- APA – African Press Agency: Restive regions excluded as Ethiopia vote, 1 June 2026 https://apanews.net/restive-regions-excluded-as-ethiopia-holds-elections/
- APA – African Press Agency: Ethiopia's Oromia: 35 Christians killed in ethno-religious tensions, 7 June 2026 https://apanews.net/ethiopias-oromia-35-christians-killed-in-ethno-religious-tensions/
- AUEOM – African Union Election Observation Mission to the 1 June 2026 General Elections in The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Preliminary Statement, 3 June 2026 https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/preliminary-statement-aueom-ethiopia-2026-3-june-.pdf
- BAMF – Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge: Briefing Notes (KW44/2025), 27 October 2025 https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Behoerde/Informationszentrum/BriefingNotes/2025/briefingnotes-kw44-2025.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3

- BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation: Voting suspended in parts of Ethiopia over security concerns, 1 June 2026
  https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn0pngz2rego
- BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation: Ethiopia PM's party wins landslide as fears grow of new conflict, 21 June 2026
  https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz750q5e3w3o
- BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation: What do we know about the attack by 'Cross' militants in Gidda Ayana? [Afaan Oromoo], 21 August 2026
  https://www.bbc.com/afaanoromoo/articles/cx2v0p345w0o
- Bertelsmann Stiftung: BTI 2026 Country Report - Ethiopia, 2026
  https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2138367/country_report_2026_ETH.pdf
- Bessie, Semeneh et al.: Dynamics and Impact of Rural Out-Migration on Welfare of Migrant-Sending Households in Oromia Region of Ethiopia, In: Proceedings of the second regional conference on the Oromia Regional State economic development (Ethiopian Economics Association (EEA) (ed.)), August 2024, pp. 54-93
  https://eea-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Proceeding-of-the-2nd-Rgional-Conference-of-Oromia-Region.pdf
- Biru, Yonas: Oromia's Six New Regions: The Final Dagger in the Heart of Oromummaa, Borkena, 30 September 2026
  https://borkena.com/ethiopia-oromias-six-new-regions-the-final-dagger-in-the-heart-of-oromummaa/
- Borkena: Danger on the Road: Rising Insecurity Along the Addis Ababa–Selale–Gojjam Highway, 10 April 2025
  https://borkena.com/ethiopia-rising-insecurity-along-the-addis-ababa-selale-gojjam/
- Borkena: Unlawful Detentions Reported in Adama as Oromia Forces Face Accusations, 30 April 2025
  https://borkena.com/ethiopia-unlawful-detentions-reported-in-adama-as-oromia-forces-face-accusations/
- Borkena: Forced Returns and Secondary Displacement of IDPs from Debre Birhan – Situation Update, 5 July 2025
  https://borkena.com/ethiopia-forced-returns-and-secondary-displacement-of-idps-from-debre-birhan/
- Borkena: Ethiopia: Fano Claims 280 Government Troops Killed in Wollega Clashes, 11 July 2025
  https://borkena.com/ethiopia-fano-claims-280-government-troops-killed-in-wollega-clashes/
- Borkena: Coalition For Ethiopian Unity Movement Formally Announced, 21 September 2025
  https://borkena.com/coalition-for-ethiopian-unity-movement-formally-announced/
- Borkena: Geda Commandos Reportedly Kill Dozens of Ethnic Amharas in East Wollega, 26 August 2026
  https://borkena.com/ethiopia-geda-commandos-reportedly-kill-dozens-of-ethnic-amharas-in-east-wollega/

- Borkena: Explainer: What Is the “Alliance for Survival,” Ethiopia’s New Armed Opposition Coalition?, 20 September 2026 https://borkena.com/explainer-what-is-the-alliance-for-survival-ethiopias-new-armed-opposition-coalition/
- Borkena: Oromia Regional Council Re-Elects Shimelis Abdisa as Regional President, 29 September 2026 https://borkena.com/oromia-regional-council-re-elects-shimelis-abdisa-as-regional-president/
- Caritas Germany et al.: Humanitarian Needs Assessment Brief - Ethiopia: Amhara and Oromia regions (2025-2026), January 2026 https://movimentar.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Brief-of-Humanitarian-Needs-Assessment-2025-2026-Ethiopia-Amhara-and-Oromia-regions-compressed-1.pdf
- CASS – Center for African Security Studies: Ethiopia’s Amhara Conflict Hits a Complex Stalemate [Blog], 12 February 2026 https://www.cass-center.org/public/en/blog/ethiopias-amhara-conflict-hits-a-complex-stalemate
- CGRS-CEDOCA – Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (Belgium), COI unit: Ethiopie: Veiligheidssituatie in Oromia, 14 May 2025 https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2125418/coi_focus_ethiopie._veiligheidssituatie_in_oromia_20250514.pdf
- CPJ – Committee to Protect Journalists: ‘Under the shadow of fear’: censorship is Ethiopia’s real election story, journalists say, 29 May 2026 https://cpj.org/2026/05/under-the-shadow-of-fear-censorship-is-ethiopias-real-election-story-journalists-say/
- Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Proclamation No. 414/2004, 9 May 2005 https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1193932/1504_1227611462_criminal-code-of-the-federal-democratic-republic-of-ethiopia-2004.pdf
- Debela, Ewnetu B.: Breaking Silence, Demanding Accountability: Confronting war crimes in Oromia, Addis Standard (ed.), 10 March 2026 https://addisstandard.com/breaking-silence-demanding-accountability-confronting-war-crimes-in-oromia/
- Dereso, Nanesa Wata: The Need to Harmonize Competing Interests in Land Acquisition at Ethiopia’s Special Economic Zones: Insights from the Gada SEZ, Mizan Law Review, Volume 20 No 1 (2026), 18 March 2026 https://www.ajol.info/index.php/mlr/article/view/319891/300949
- DFAT – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 19 August 2026 https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/country-information-report-ethiopia.pdf
- DG ECHO – European Commission’s Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations et al.: Ethiopia - Conflict displaces over 11,000 people, 6 June 2025 https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO-Products/Echo-Flash#/echo-flash-items/29126

- EEA – Ethiopian Economics Association: Poverty and pro-poor growth in Ethiopia, August 2024 https://eea-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Working-Paper-No.-25_2024.pdf
- EHRC – Ethiopian Human Rights Commission: Oromia Region: Regarding the unlawful detention of people, including children [Amharic], 5 December 2024 https://ehrc.org/%E1%8A%A6%E1%88%AE%E1%88%9A%E1%8B%AB-%E1%8A%AD%E1%88%8D%E1%88%8D-%E1%88%95%E1%8D%83%E1%8A%93%E1%89%B5%E1%8A%95-%E1%8C%A8%E1%88%9D%E1%88%AE-%E1%88%B0%E1%8B%8E%E1%89%BD%E1%8A%95-%E1%8A%A8%E1%88%95/
- EHRC – Ethiopian Human Rights Commission: Annual Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ethiopia. From June 2016 E.C. to June 2017 E.C. [Amharic], 4 August 2025 https://ehrc.org/download/%e1%89%a0%e1%88%95%e1%8b%ad%e1%8b%88%e1%89%b5-%e1%8b%a8%e1%88%98%e1%8a%96%e1%88%ad-%e1%88%98%e1%89%a5%e1%89%b5-%e1%8b%a8%e1%8a%a2%e1%89%b5%e1%8b%ae%e1%8c%b5%e1%8b%ab-%e1%8b%93%e1%88%98%e1%89%b3-2/?wpdmdl=34130&refresh=6af0cca3495681794165923
- EHRC – Ethiopian Human Rights Commission: Executive Summary: Annual Ethiopia Human Rights Situation Report (from June 2024 to June 2025), 22 August 2025 https://ehrc.org/download/executive-summary-annual-ethiopia-human-rights-situation-report-from-june-2024-to-june-2025/
- EHRC – Ethiopian Human Rights Commission: Oromia: Discussion on the human rights treatment of suspects [Amharic], 25 September 2025 https://ehrc.org/%e1%8a%a6%e1%88%ae%e1%88%9a%e1%8b%ab%e1%8d%a6-%e1%89%a0%e1%89%b0%e1%8c%a0%e1%88%ad%e1%8c%a3%e1%88%aa%e1%8b%8e%e1%89%bd-%e1%88%b0%e1%89%a5%e1%8a%a0%e1%8b%8a-%e1%88%98%e1%89%a5%e1%89%b6%e1%89%bd/?fbclid=IwY2xjawNDFYdleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBicmlkETBqMDdlbzlWUXhHaUVKRGsxAR4EqzO_xTwRytyWWNIjM2SfpQKrIxJ6In6ezLJe4yH01fKIGED87SmkRWfDsw_aem_nKtxtQ7mSISJ_KdTGUk2og
- EHRC – Ethiopian Human Rights Commission: Measures that would enable the full exercise of people's freedom of movement should be taken immediately [Amharic], 11 October 2025 https://ehrc.org/%e1%8b%a8%e1%88%b0%e1%8b%8e%e1%89%bd%e1%8a%95-%e1%8a%a8%e1%89%a6%e1%89%b3-%e1%89%a6%e1%89%b3-%e1%8b%a8%e1%88%98%e1%8b%98%e1%8b%8b%e1%8b%88%e1%88%ad-%e1%8a%90%e1%8c%bb%e1%8a%90%e1%89%b5-%e1%89%a0/
- EHRC – Ethiopian Human Rights Commission: Human Rights Violations Resulting from Attacks in Arsi Zone of Oromia Region, 4 March 2026 https://ehrc.org/human-rights-violations-resulting-from-attacks-in-arsi-zone-of-oromia-region/
- EHRC – Ethiopian Human Rights Commission: Oromia: Concerning Recent Human Rights Violations in Aseko Woreda, Arsi Zone, 7 June 2026 https://ehrc.org/oromia-concerning-recent-human-rights-violations-in-aseko-woreda-arsi-zone/

- EHRC – Ethiopian Human Rights Commission: Annual Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ethiopia. From June 2017 E.C. to June 2018 E.C. [Amharic], 9 October 2026 https://ehrc.org/download/%e1%8b%a8%e1%8a%a2%e1%89%b5%e1%8b%ae%e1%8c%b5%e1%8b%ab-%e1%8b%93%e1%88%98%e1%89%b3%e1%8b%8a-%e1%8b%a8%e1%88%b0%e1%89%a5%e1%8a%a0%e1%8b%8a-%e1%88%98%e1%89%a5%e1%89%b6%e1%89%bd-%e1%88%81%e1%8a%94-2/?wpdmdl=39512&refresh=6af200323fdae1794244658
- EHRC – Ethiopian Human Rights Commission: EHRC's Women's and Children's Rights Division, undated https://ehrc.org/areas-of-work/women-and-child-rights/
- EHRCO – Ethiopian Human Rights Council: The Situation of the Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Ethiopia, EHRCO's 157th Special Report, August 2025 https://t.me/ehrco/2292
- EHRCO – Ethiopian Human Rights Council: 158th Special Report on Human Rights Violations Committed in Various Woredas of East Arsi Zone, Oromia Region, July 2026 https://t.me/ehrco/2402
- EIC – Ethiopian Investment Commission: Public SEZs, undated (a) https://investethiopia.gov.et/sezs/public-sezs/
- EIC – Ethiopian Investment Commission: Private SEZs, undated (b) https://investethiopia.gov.et/sezs/private-sezs/
- Electionwatch.et: Oromia, undated https://electionwatch.et/results/region/oromia/
- ENA – Ethiopian News Agency: Ethiopia Upgrades 10 Industrial Parks to Special Economic Zones for Attracting More FDI, 3 December 2024 https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_5560716
- ENA – Ethiopian News Agency: National Dialogue Commission Unveils Eight Major Agenda Pillars to Shape Ethiopia's Future, 24 June 2026 https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_9097922
- ESS – Ethiopian Statistical Service: 2007 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia, 2007 https://ess.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/national-population-and-housing-census-report-2007.pdf
- ESS – Ethiopian Statistical Service: Ethiopian Welfare Monitoring Survey 2011. Summary report, 27 April 2012 https://catalog.ihsn.org/index.php/catalog/3124/download/46161
- ESS – Ethiopian Statistical Service: Demographic and Health Survey 2024-25, July 2026 https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR399/FR399.pdf
- ESS – Ethiopian Statistical Service: National Integrated Household Survey (NIHS) 2024/25. Key Findings Report on the Migration Indicators, September 2026 https://ess.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2024_25_nihs_migration_key_finding.pdf
- ESS – Ethiopian Statistical Service: National Integrated Household Survey (2024/25) Labour Force Module. Key Findings Report on Labour Market Indicators, 5 September 2026 https://ess.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/nihs_lf_key_findings-2.pdf
- ESS – Ethiopian Statistical Service: Population Projection by Sex, Area and Density by Region, Zone and Wereda: July 2026, October 2026 https://ess.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/projected-pop.-size-as-of-2026.pdf

- ESS – Ethiopian Statistical Service: Ethiopian Statistical Services History, undated https://ess.gov.et/about-ess/history/
- Ethiomapping: The Ethiopian Conflict Map, Google Maps, undated https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1oj0q2UidTVIs2XagoumCDRZ-1X-NI_o&usp=sharing
- Ethiopia Election: Ethiopian Election 2026: All You Need to Know About Registered Candidates, Ethiopia Insider, 27 May 2026 https://ethioelections.com/2026/05/18040/
- Ethiopia Election: Crunching the Vote: An In-Depth Look at Ethiopia's 7th General Elections, Ethiopia Insider, 28 August 2026 https://ethioelections.com/2026/08/18442/
- Ethiopia Insight: Under Two Flags: Life in Divided Dembi Dollo, 24 July 2025 https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2025/07/24/under-two-flags-life-in-divided-dembi-dollo/
- European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), undated https://commission.europa.eu/funding-and-tenders/procedures-guidelines-tenders/information-contractors-and-beneficiaries/exchange-rate-inforeuro_en
- FEWS NET – Famine Early Warning Systems Network: Emergency (IPC Phase 4) likely to emerge in early 2026 in Oromia amid crop failures. Ethiopia - Food Security Outlook October 2025 - May 2026, October 2025 https://fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia/food-security-outlook/october-2025/print
- FEWS NET – Famine Early Warning Systems Network: High fuel prices and market dependence ahead of lean season strain food access. Ethiopia – Food Security Outlook Update April – September 2026, 10 May 2026 https://fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia/food-security-outlook-update/april-2026/print
- FEWS NET – Famine Early Warning Systems Network: What is the IPC?, undated https://fews.net/about/integrated-phase-classification
- GBV AoR – Gender-Based Violence Area of Responsibility & MoWSA – Ministry of Women and Social Affairs: Mapping of Safe Houses, 2026a https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiMmI0ZjA0NjgtNTE3NC00MTc4LTk4YjctODYyZjI0ZWQwZGFjIiwidCI6IjBmOWUzNWRiLTU0NGYtNGY2MC1iZGNjLTVlYTQxNmU2ZGM3MCIsImMiOjh9
- GBV AoR – Gender-Based Violence Area of Responsibility & MoWSA – Ministry of Women and Social Affairs: One Stop Centers, 2026b https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiNGEzZGFiMTYtMzkyNS00MmNmLTlhNTgtZTE3OGQ2OGYyMTJhIiwidCI6IjBmOWUzNWRiLTU0NGYtNGY2MC1iZGNjLTVlYTQxNmU2ZGM3MCIsImMiOjh9
- Gebre-Egziabher, Tegegne: Addis Ababa: City report, August 2025 https://www.african-cities.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/ACRC_Working-Paper-31_August-2025.pdf
- Gedebo, Amanuel Dessalegn & Lanfranchi, Guido: Ethiopia at the polls in 2026: Managed elections, unmanaged conflicts, Clingendael, 29 May 2026 https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2026-05/PB_Managed_elections_unmanaged_conflicts.pdf

- Gemeda, Guluma: The History and Politics of the Qubee Alphabet, Curate Oromia, 1 August 2020 https://curateoromia.com/the-history-and-politics-of-the-qubee-alphabet/
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect: Ethiopia, 15 July 2026 https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/ethiopia/
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect et al.: Ethiopia on the Brink: International community must act urgently to prevent mass atrocities, 20 February 2026 https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/ethiopia-on-the-brink-international-community-must-act-urgently-to-prevent-mass-atrocities/
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect et al.: Joint Open Letter to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Regarding the Situation of Women and Girls in Ethiopia, 16 March 2026 https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/joint-open-letter-to-the-committee-on-the-elimination-of-discrimination-against-women-cedaw-regarding-the-situation-of-women-and-girls-in-ethiopia/
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect et al.: Ethiopia: Renewed Escalation Demands Urgent International Action to Prevent Further Atrocities, 10 September 2026 https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/ethiopia-renewed-escalation-demands-urgent-international-action-to-prevent-further-atrocities/
- Government of Ethiopia: Request for the third extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas, in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. For the period of January 2026 – December 2030 [revised version], 7 August 2025 https://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/_APMBC-DOCUMENTS/Meetings/2025/22MSP-Ethiopia-Art5-ExtReq-Revised.pdf
- GPC – Global Protection Cluster: Ethiopia Monthly Protection Overview – March 2025, 14 April 2025 https://reliefweb.int/attachments/13096be3-419b-4398-a529-e538f77c5544/NPC%20Monthy%20Protection%20Overview%20Ethiopia-March-2025%20.pdf
- GPC – Global Protection Cluster: Ethiopia Monthly Protection Overview – April 2025, 30 April 2025 https://reliefweb.int/attachments/d0a988c9-c8d7-4a84-92e2-92488dcb3d32/Monthly%20Protection%20Overview_April%202025.pdf
- GPC – Global Protection Cluster: Ethiopia Monthly Protection Overview – May 2025, 10 June 2025 https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/monthly_protection_overview_may_2025.pdf
- GPC – Global Protection Cluster: Ethiopia Monthly Protection Overview - June 2025, 7 July 2025 https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/monthly_protection_overview_june_2025.pdf

- GPC – Global Protection Cluster: Ethiopia Monthly Protection Overview - July 2025, 13 August 2025 https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-08/ethiopia_monthly_protection_overview_july_2025_final.pdf
- GPC – Global Protection Cluster: Ethiopia Protection Analysis Update: The Critical Need for Protection amongst Conflict, Violence and Climate Shocks – August 2025, 5 September 2025 https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/ethiopia_protection_analysis_update_august_2025_final.pdf
- GPC – Global Protection Cluster: Ethiopia Monthly Protection Overview - August 2025, 9 September 2025 https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/ethiopia_monthly_protection_overview_august_2025.pdf
- GPC – Global Protection Cluster: Ethiopia Monthly Protection Overview – November 2025, 10 December 2025 https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/ethiopia_monthly_protection_overview_november_2025.pdf
- GPC – Global Protection Cluster: Ethiopia Protection Cluster Summary 2025, 2 February 2026 https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/ethiopia_protection_cluster_2025_summary.pdf
- GPC – Global Protection Cluster: Ethiopia Monthly Protection Overview – February 2026, 7 April 2026 https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2026-04/ethiopia_monthly_protection_overview_february_2025.pdf
- GPC – Global Protection Cluster: Ethiopia Monthly Protection Overview – January 2026, 10 August 2026a https://reliefweb.int/attachments/96e6a574-3039-44c3-827c-573db3d5a667/1._20Ethiopia_20Monthly_20Protection_20Overview_January_202026.pdf
- GPC – Global Protection Cluster: Ethiopia Monthly Protection Overview – May 2026, 10 August 2026b https://reliefweb.int/attachments/b66ffb7d-4a8e-4f4a-80d5-4c168a01fe61/3.%20Ethiopia%20Monthly%20Protection%20Overview_May%202026.pdf
- GPC – Global Protection Cluster: Ethiopia Monthly Protection Overview – August 2026, 5 October 2026 https://reliefweb.int/attachments/c7ea2039-291e-4efe-ba3f-bbbfc358086d/1._20Monthy_20Protection_20Overview_August_202026.pdf
- GPC – Global Protection Cluster: Ethiopia Protection Analysis Update: The Critical Need for Protection amongst Conflict, Violence and Climate Shocks - August 2026, 6 October 2026 https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2026-10/PAU26_11_Ethiopia%20Protection%20Analysis%20Update_Sep%202026.pdf
- GSEZ – Gada Special Economic Zone: About Us, undated https://www.gadasez.et/about-us-1

- House of Peoples' Representatives of FDRE: Powers, Functions and Organization of the Council [Amharic], undated https://www.hopr.gov.et/Home/AboutUs
- HRFE – Human Rights First Ethiopia: Situational Analysis: May – June, 2026, 7 July 2026 https://hrfe.org/situational-analysis-may-june-2026/
- ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross: Ethiopia: Raising awareness about weapon contamination among schoolchildren in Oromia, 4 April 2025 https://www.icrc.org/en/article/ethiopia-raising-awareness-about-weapon-contamination-among-schoolchildren-oromia
- ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross: Ethiopia: "Many pregnant women have died due to lack of medicine and health services", 1 August 2025 https://www.icrc.org/en/article/ethiopia-many-pregnant-women-have-died-due-lack-medicine-and-health-services
- IDMC – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre: GRID 2026; Global Report on Internal Displacement, 2026 https://api.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/2026-05/IDMC-GRID-2026-Global-Report-on-Internal-Displacement.pdf
- IFES – International Foundation for Electoral Systems: Election Guide Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 23 June 2026 https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/5073/
- Insecurity Insight: Attacks on Health Care. Bi-Monthly News Brief, 04-17 February 2026, 3 March 2026 https://reliefweb.int/attachments/3d32563b-4935-44a8-a3dd-0acd9eebd20c/117.-04-17-February-2026-Attacks-on-Health-Care-News-Brief.pdf
- International Crisis Group: Tracking Conflict Worldwide. Ethiopia, January 2025 to August 2026, undated https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location_region%5B0%5D=1&location%5B0%5D=116&crisis_state=&created=custom&from_month=1&from_year=2025&to_month=9&to_year=2026&page=0
- IOM – International Organization for Migration: DTM Ethiopia — National Displacement Report 20 (July – August 2024), 20 January 2025 https://dtm.iom.int/dtm_download_track/73306?file=1&type=node&id=49241
- IOM – International Organization for Migration: Returning home from Sudan – Insights into the journey and return of Ethiopian Migrants, 1 December 2025 https://dtm.iom.int/dtm_download_track/89816?file=1&type=node&id=60086
- IOM – International Organization for Migration: Local Migration governance Indicators – Profile 2025 – Oromia Regional State (2025), 31 December 2025 https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/pub2025-082-r-mgi-local-oromia-regional-state-en.pdf
- IOM – International Organization for Migration: Migration along the eastern route - Report 63, 12 August 2026 https://dtm.iom.int/dtm_download_track/102796?file=1&type=node&id=67306

- IOM – International Organization for Migration: Ethiopia Crisis Response Plan 2026, January – December 2026, 25 September 2026 https://crisisresponse.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1481/files/appeal/pdf/2026_Ethiopia_Crisis_Response_Plan_2026--2026.pdf
- Ismail, Muktar: Ethiopia Is About to Hold Another Sham Election, In: Journal of Democracy, online exclusive, May 2026 https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/ethiopia-is-about-to-hold-another-sham-election/
- Kumera, Eyasu & Woldetensae, Berhanu: Socio-spatial transformation: The case of Eastern Industry Zone and Bole Lemi-1 special economic zones, central Ethiopia, In: Heliyon Volume 9, Issue 5, 5 May 2023 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844023030244/pdfft?md5=117ead8fc90a4c5127d60d4a412f308c&pid=1-s2.0-S2405844023030244-main.pdf
- Maat for Peace, Development and Human Rights: Maat for Peace' Report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child Regarding Ethiopia, April 2025 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/DownloadDraft.aspx?key=otJxCX3z85svnnl3fU1XkFfGgB+WJtCR4cm83PVBMTJH4esioekscLaM0hV6IYbx
- MapAction: Ethiopia: Zone (admin 2) map for region (27 Jun 2023), 27 June 2023 https://reliefweb.int/attachments/cea95c84-0f52-4592-a77b-cf34cf2cae0e/Binder1.pdf
- Misganaw, Awoke et al.: Supplementary appendix - Progress in health among regions of Ethiopia, 1990–2019: a subnational country analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2019, In: Lancet 2022 (399:10332), 13 March 2022 https://ars.els-cdn.com/content/image/1-s2.0-S0140673621028683-mmc1.pdf
- MSF – Médecins Sans Frontières: Ethiopia: MSF launches new healthcare programme in Oromia region, 20 August 2026 https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2143822.html
- NEBE – National Election Board of Ethiopia: Statistical information on the voting process of the 7th General Election. Number of seats won by candidates elected to the Regional Council [Amharic], undated https://nebe.org.et/sites/default/files/%E1%8A%A0%E1%88%BD%E1%8A%93%E1%8D%8A%20%E1%8D%96%E1%88%88%E1%89%B2%E1%8A%AB%20%E1%8D%93%E1%88%AD%E1%89%B2%E1%8B%8E%E1%89%BD%20%E1%8A%A5%E1%8A%95%E1%8B%B2%E1%88%81%E1%88%9D%20%E1%8B%A8%E1%8C%8D%E1%88%8D%20%20%E1%89%
- Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Algemeen ambtsbericht Ethiopië, August 2026 https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2143744/Algemeen_ambtsbericht_Ethiopie_(augustus_2026).pdf
- OARI – Oromia Agricultural Research Institute: The Agricultural Transformation in Oromia, undated https://iqqo.gov.et/en/content/agricultural-transformation-oromia
- OBN – Oromia Broadcasting Network English: Oromia Restructures 21 Zones into Six Administrative Zones [Facebook Post], 29 September 2026 https://www.facebook.com/OBNEnglish/posts/oromia-restructures-21-zones-into-six-administrative-zonesobn-cyber-media-septem/1562707949205952/
- OCTB – Oromia Culture and Tourism Bureau: Facts About Oromia Regional State, undated https://web.archive.org/web/20260612113100/https://www.oromiatourism.gov.et/

- OFC – Oromo Federalist Congress: Facebook post, 23 February 2025 https://www.facebook.com/OromoFederalistCongressParty/posts/pfbid02Xoxv4PifzEPnRy89byJFiebfMvjRUWrU3nVpuB4oswzZbtRKmNjsRNdszrVECx3il
- OHCHR – Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Türk says ultimate trajectory for human rights is larger freedom, 15 June 2026 https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2026/06/turk-says-ultimate-trajectory-human-rights-larger-freedom
- OIIB – Oromia Investment and Industry Bureau: Portfolio Single: Shakiso Gold Mining, undated https://investinoromia.et/portfolio/shakiso-gold-mining/
- OJAH – Organization for Justice and Accountability in the Horn of Africa: Civilian Vulnerability and Systemic Human Rights Violations. Human Rights Monitoring Report in Six High Risk Regions in Ethiopia. Reporting Period January – March 2026, 2026 https://o-jah.org/api/media/file/civilian-vulnerability-2026.pdf
- OLF-OLA – Oromo Liberation Front – Oromo Liberation Army: Amnesty's Report: Investigative failure, the Weaponization of Narrative and Portrait of Bias (OLF-OLA Press Release), 6 March 2026 https://qbo-abo-wbo.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Amnesty-int-report-dh.pdf
- OLF-OLA – Oromo Liberation Front – Oromo Liberation Army: Another Round of Massacre in Arsi (Olf-OLA Press Release), 4 June 2026 https://x.com/OLF_OLA/status/2062610847059571169
- OLLAA – Oromo Legacy Leadership and Advocacy Association: Violence and Impunity: Civilian Suffering in Oromia, Ethiopia, 2025 Annual Report, 13 May 2026 https://ollaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2025-Annual-Report.docx.pdf
- OPDC – Oromiya Planning and Development Commission: Trends and Status of Socioeconomic Sectors, January 2022 [2014 E.C.] https://oromiaplan.gov.et/sites/default/files/Trend%20Analyis.pdf
- Oromia Regional State Revised Constitution - Proclamation No. 46/2001 [English Version], 27 October 2001 https://fjli.gov.et/Tedocs/E83/C/THE%20OROMIA%20NATIONAL%20REGIONAL%20STATE%20CONSTITUTION.pdf
- Oromia Sovereign Fund: O-Mining Group: Overview of the Group, undated https://osf.et/om/o-mining-group
- OSG – Oromia Support Group in Australia Inc.: Written statement submitted by Oromia Support Group in Australia Inc., a non-governmental organization in special consultative status [31 January 2026] [A/HRC/61/NGO/294], HRC (ed.), 2 March 2026 https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g26/027/09/pdf/g2602709.pdf
- OSG – Oromia Support Group: Report 72; Human Rights Abuses in Ethiopia, 3 March 2026 https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/OSG-Report-72-3-March-2026.pdf
- OSG – Oromia Support Group: Report 73; Human Rights Abuses in Ethiopia, 12 June 2026 https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/OSG-Report-73-12-June-2026.pdf
- Plaut, Martin: Ethiopia conflict maps, 29 September 2026 https://martinplaut.com/2026/09/29/ethiopia-conflict-maps/

- Presler-Marshall, Elizabeth et al.: Young people's well-being and development in East Hararghe, Oromia region, Ethiopia. GAGE endline evidence, GAGE (ed.), December 2025 https://gage.odi.org/young-people-s-well-being-and-development-in-east-hararghe-oromia-region-ethiopia-gage-endline-evidence/
- Proclamation to Determine Oromia Region Gachana Sirna, Number 245/2022, 22 March 2022 https://www.gonfaatoma.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Labsii-245-bara-2014.pdf
- Refugees International: Ethiopia's IDPs Still Need an Easy Fix: ID Cards, 7 October 2025 https://www.refugeesinternational.org/ethiopias-idps-still-need-an-easy-fix-id-cards/
- Regassa, Asebe & Abeshu, Gemechu: Op-ed: Wollega Under Siege: Unraveling layers of violence, displacement in Western Oromia, Addis Standard, 3 March 2025 https://addisstandard.com/wollega-under-siege-unraveling-layers-of-violence-displacement-in-western-oromia/
- Reporter Ethiopia (The): Interpreting the Election Results, 17 July 2021 https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/11688/
- Reporter Ethiopia (The): Rights Commission Launches Investigation into Allegations of Forced Conscription, 3 May 2025 https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/44983/
- Reporter Ethiopia (The): The Silent Conflict: What Is Really Happening in Oromia?, 10 May 2025 https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/45060/
- Reporter Ethiopia (The): Ethiopia Requests UN to Extend Landmine Clearance Deadline for Third Time, 16 August 2025 https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/46490/
- Reporter Ethiopia (The): Oromia Mining Development Chief Says Mining Sector Lags in Reform Efforts, 6 September 2025 https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/46871/
- Reporter Ethiopia (The): The Faultlines of a Nation: Ethiopia's Ethnic Federalism and the Need for Constitutional Reform, 8 November 2025 https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/47667/
- Reporter Ethiopia (The): High Court to Rule on Human Rights First IDP Lawsuit on Friday, 27 December 2025 https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/48388/
- Reporter Ethiopia (The): Adjournments Hobble Human Rights First IDP Lawsuit, 25 April 2026 https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/50377/
- Reporter Ethiopia (The): Board Announces Landslide Win for Prosperity Party, 21 June 2026 https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/51345/
- Reporter Ethiopia (The): Rights Commission Closes Chapter, Embarks on New Five-Year Strategy, 11 July 2026 https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/51798/
- Reporter Ethiopia (The): Saudi Deportations Double as Migrant Protection Concerns Mount, 15 August 2026 https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/52313/

- Reuters: In Ethiopia, a secret committee orders killings and arrests to crush rebels, 23 February 2024 https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ethiopia-violence-committee/
- Revised Family Code (The), 4 July 2000 https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1318013/1226_1276501420_4c0ccc052.pdf
- RFI – Radio France Internationale: Ethiopia election overshadowed by war, instability and muted opposition, 31 May 2026 https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20260531-ethiopia-election-overshadowed-by-war-instability-and-muted-opposition
- SFH – Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe: Äthiopien: Situation in Oromia, 27 May 2026 https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2143828/260527_ETH_rapport_thematique_Oromia_final_D.pdf
- SHCC – Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition & Insecurity Insight: Care in the Crosshairs. Violence Against Health Care in Conflict 2025, May 2026 https://www.insecurityinsight.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025-SHCC-Annual-Report.pdf
- Stanley, Aaron: After the Supermajority: Ethiopia's Trajectory Following the 2026 Election, CSIS, 18 June 2026 https://www.csis.org/analysis/after-supermajority-ethiopias-trajectory-following-2026-election
- TNH – The New Humanitarian: "I am going to Saudi Arabia, or my grave": The exodus of Ethiopia's frustrated youth, 23 April 2025 https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2025/04/23/ethiopia-frustrated-youth-south-south-migration-africa
- Translators without Borders: Language map of Ethiopia, February 2021 https://translatorswithoutborders.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Ethiopia-Language-Map-Static-EN-2.pdf
- UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program: UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset Codebook, Version 21.1, 2021 https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ged/ged211.pdf
- UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program: UCDP Candidate Events Dataset Codebook, Version 1.5, 2026 https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/candidateged/ucdp-candidate-codebook1.5.pdf
- UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program: UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global, Version 26.1, 9 June 2026 https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ged/ged261-xlsx.zip
- UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program: UCDP Candidate Events Dataset (UCDP Candidate), Version 26.01.26.09 (global), September 2026 https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/candidateged/GEDEvent_v26_01_26_09.csv
- UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Ethiopia: Oromiya, undated https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/413
- UK Home Office: Country Policy and Information Note Ethiopia: Oromos, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), Version 2.0, March 2026 https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2138312/ETH_CPIN_Oromos__OLF_and_OLA.pdf

- UN – United Nations: Hunger stalks Ethiopia as UN aid agency halts support amid funding cuts, 22 April 2025
  https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/04/1162456
- UN Security Council: Conflict-related sexual violence; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2026/321], 21 April 2026
  https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2145200/secretary-general-2026report-on-sexual-violence-in-conflict.pdf
- UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Ethiopia; Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons; As of 31 August 2026, September 2026
  https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2145977/Ethiopia_Refugees_and_IDPs_statistics_August_2026.pdf
- UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Ethiopia: Refugees and Aslyum-seekers as of 31 August 2026, 30 September 2026
  https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/124295
- UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund: UNICEF Ethiopia Humanitarian Situation Report No. 9, October - November 2024, 2 January 2025
  https://reliefweb.int/attachments/c4b8932e-b711-448b-8aff-da821a9281de/UNICEF%20Ethiopia%20Humanitarian%20Sitrep%20No.%209%20October-November%202024.pdf
- UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund: Uniting for Change - How community conversations are shaping a safer future for girls, 14 February 2025
  https://www.unicef.org/ethiopia/stories/uniting-change
- UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund: Empowering Girls in Oromia. A Path to Ending Child Marriage, 27 March 2025
  https://www.unicef.org/ethiopia/stories/empowering-girls-oromia
- UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund & Global Education Cluster: Ethiopia Education Cluster Quarterly Newsletter Jan - March 2025, 29 April 2025
  https://reliefweb.int/attachments/39591ec0-5fbd-406c-819d-98ae1d266ea4/EEC%20Q1%202025%20Final%2004292025.pdf
- UNICEF: Ethiopia Humanitarian Situation Report No.1, Jan - Feb 2026, 9 April 2026
  https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/unicef-ethiopia-humanitarian-situation-report-no1-jan-feb-2026
- UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Ethiopia: Administrative map (as of January 2024), 12 December 2023
  https://www.unocha.org/attachments/b75434c6-f754-413e-a292-d32086245cb1/21_ADM3__ETH_12122023_A0L.pdf
- UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Ethiopia: Seismic Situation in Afar and Oromia, Flash Update #2 (as of 10 January 2025), 10 January 2025
  https://reliefweb.int/attachments/228cbedf-4cb1-40e2-90d0-2b277b569d64/Ethiopia%20-%20Flash%20Update%20%232%20-%20Seismic%20situation%20in%20Afar%20and%20Oromia%20-%2010%20January%202025.pdf

- UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Ethiopia: Humanitarian Update, May-June 2025, 14 July 2025 https://www.unocha.org/attachments/8c6e34d8-3a2e-416b-a13f-4a2447eb1e13/May-June2025_Humanitarian_Update.pdf
- UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Joint - Multi - Sectoral Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) Report: Oromia - Somali Renewed Intercommunal Conflict, East Borena Zone, Oromia Region, Ethiopia, August 2025 https://www.unocha.org/attachments/7f4862f8-4f2b-4338-9a38-895babd2d28d/MIRA%20Report%20East%20Borena%20IDP%20Situation%20August%2025_Oromia_v6_19082025.pdf
- UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Ethiopia – Humanitarian Access. National Access Map Data February 2025, 18 September 2025 https://data.humdata.org/dataset/c3d8187a-e3fc-43b9-b684-facb881486e0/resource/233bd206-d03a-4eae-9103-da538a6d7ad0/download/eth_accessibility_woreda_feb-2025_pcoded.xlsx
- UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Ethiopia: Renewed violence in districts bordering Oromia and Somali regions (as of 1 October 2025), 8 October 2025 https://www.unocha.org/attachments/bde1dbda-c9f0-4510-ab99-2a3639c78cb5/Snapshot%20-%20conflict%20in%20districts%20bordering%20Oromia%20and%20Somali%20regions_3%20Nov%202025%20.pdf
- UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Ethiopia: Humanitarian Update, July-September 2025, 10 October 2025 https://reliefweb.int/attachments/700d9ce9-7c9c-43e3-b13d-3136cc1066ca/July-Sept_Humanitarian_Update.pdf
- UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Ethiopia: National Access Map (As of 31 October 2025), 10 November 2025a https://www.unocha.org/attachments/5fc41e00-a4de-4758-9cc0-cc013e159de4/ETH_National_Access_Map_31102025_A4L_O%202%20%28002%29.pdf
- UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Ethiopia: National Access Map (As of 31 October 2025), 10 November 2025b https://reliefweb.int/map/ethiopia/ethiopia-national-access-map-31-october-2025
- UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Ethiopia Humanitarian Fund 2025 Dashboard (From January to December 2025), 17 July 2026 https://www.unocha.org/attachments/0b5a62af-22c5-4d0b-ba70-799387b871cf/2025%20EHF%20allocations%20dashboard%20FINAL.pdf
- UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Ethiopia – Humanitarian Access. National Access Map Data August 2026, 15 September 2026 https://data.humdata.org/dataset/c3d8187a-e3fc-43b9-b684-facb881486e0/resource/76f90767-0c69-48a1-8167-1232e22eb713/download/eth_national-access-map-data_august-2026.xlsx

- UNSG – United Nations Secretary General: Conflict-Related Sexual Violence. Report of the United Nations Secretary-General [S/2020/487], 3 June 2020 https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/report/conflict-related-sexual-violence-report-of-the-united-nations-secretary-general/2019-SG-Report.pdf
- USDA – United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service: Coffee Annual - Ethiopia, 20 May 2026 https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/gain-report/2026/05/Coffee%20Annual_Addis%20Ababa_Ethiopia_ET2026-0005.pdf
- USDOS – US Department of State: 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Ethiopia, 26 June 2024 https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2111862.html
- VOA – Voice of America: Report says Ethiopia forces military recruitment, including minors, 10 January 2025 https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-accused-of-forced-military-recruitment-including-minors/7932201.html
- Wazema Briefings: Transport Disruptions in Amhara Region [Substack by Wazema Radio], 8 August 2025 https://wazema.substack.com/p/transport-disruptions-in-amhara-region
- Wazema Briefings: Deadly communal clashes erupt along Sidama–Oromia border [Substack by Wazema Radio], 21 May 2026 https://wazema.substack.com/p/deadly-communal-clashes-erupt-along
- Wazema Radio: Residents of the East and Horo Guduru Wollega zones in Oromia have stated that they are facing difficulties as both the government and armed groups conduct forced military recruitment [Amharic], 5 May 2026 https://wazemaradio.com/%e1%89%a0%e1%8a%a6%e1%88%ae%e1%88%9a%e1%8b%ab-%e1%89%a0%e1%88%9d%e1%88%b5%e1%88%ab%e1%89%85-%e1%8a%a5%e1%8a%93-%e1%88%86%e1%88%ae-%e1%8c%89%e1%8b%b5%e1%88%a9-%e1%8b%88%e1%88%88%e1%8c%8b-%e1%8b%9e/
- WFP – World Food Programme: WFP Ethiopia Country Brief; December 2025, 21 January 2026 https://reliefweb.int/attachments/c1192343-cc1c-4d9a-9979-ebc829e0c95c/WFP%20Ethiopia%20Country%20Brief%20December%202025.pdf
- WFP – World Food Programme: WFP Ethiopia; Country Brief; June 2026, 22 June 2026 https://reliefweb.int/attachments/03f04945-f5bd-4cc8-83ef-a72ba2ee8ced/WFP%20Ethiopia%20Country%20Brief%20June%202026.pdf
- WHO – World Health Organization: Female genital mutilation, 31 January 2025 https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/female-genital-mutilation
- Yimenu, Bizuneh: Oromia makes up a third of Ethiopia's landmass and is key to its fortunes: expert unpacks its significance, The Conversation, 18 February 2024 https://theconversation.com/oromia-makes-up-a-third-of-ethiopias-landmass-and-is-key-to-its-fortunes-expert-unpacks-its-significance-222928

- Østebø, Terje: Maintaining Control through Lawlessness: The Security and Human Rights Situation in Oromia, Ethiopia, NOAS, January 2025 https://www.noas.no/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/The-Political-and-Security-Situation-in-Oromia-Final-1.pdf
- Østebø, Terje: Op-ed: Human Rights Under Siege: How security forces in Oromia fuel terror, fear to control residents through lawlessness, Addis Standard, 29 January 2025 https://addisstandard.com/human-rights-under-siege-how-security-forces-in-oromia-fuel-terror-fear-to-control-residents-through-lawlessness/