



Security Council

Distr.: General
2 September 2026

Original: English

Assessment of progress achieved on the key benchmarks pursuant to paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution [2794 \(2025\)](#)

Report of the Secretary-General

Mandate source: [S/RES/2653 \(2022\)](#)

Reporting period: 19 September 2025–31 July 2026

Previous report: [S/2025/588](#)

Key topics: Haiti, sanctions, gangs

Summary

The reporting period was marked by efforts by the Haitian authorities to restore security, advance the political transition and maintain a pathway towards elections despite an exceptionally challenging security environment. These efforts, however, have yet to translate into a sustained reduction in gang violence or a significant weakening of criminal networks.

Progress against the benchmarks established by the Security Council in its resolution [2794 \(2025\)](#) remained uneven. Some progress was achieved in strengthening key State institutions. The Haitian authorities continued to expand the Haitian National Police and the Haitian Armed Forces, while the launch of the work of specialized judicial units marked an important step towards strengthening accountability and the rule of law. International support also increased, with the start of operations by the Gang Suppression Force.

Nevertheless, violence perpetrated by gangs and criminal networks remained persistently high. The severe humanitarian impact persisted, with widespread displacement, continued recruitment and use of children by gangs and high levels of conflict-related killings, sexual violence and kidnappings.

Despite strengthened implementation of the arms embargo by Haiti and regional partners, illicit trafficking of firearms and ammunition continued to sustain the operational capacity of gangs, while drug trafficking and illicit financial flows remained significant components of Haiti's broader criminal economy.



I. Introduction

1. By its resolution [2794 \(2025\)](#), the Security Council renewed for one year the territorial arms embargo on Haiti and the travel ban and assets freeze applicable to designated individuals and entities responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti. The Council also decided to review the appropriateness of the measures and requested the Secretary-General to assess progress achieved against key benchmarks by 1 September 2026, in close coordination with the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#). The present report assesses the progress achieved against those benchmarks since the issuance of the third benchmark assessment report ([S/2025/588](#)) dated 18 September 2025.

2. In preparation for the present report, the Secretariat team visited Port-au-Prince from 20 to 24 July 2026 to assess developments on the ground. The team met with key Haitian stakeholders, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Justice and Public Security, the Minister for Defence and the Minister for the Economy and Finance, as well as the Director General ad interim of the Haitian National Police and the Director General of Customs. It also held in-person and virtual consultations with representatives of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH), the Member State-led Gang Suppression Force, representatives of Haitian civil society, including women's organizations, and members of the diplomatic community.

II. Context

3. Against a backdrop of persistent insecurity, the reporting period was marked by efforts to advance the political transition and preparations for the holding of elections, as well as the start of operations by the Gang Suppression Force.

4. As outlined in the report of the Secretary-General dated 14 July 2026 on BINUH ([S/2026/574](#)), security conditions remained Haiti's most pressing challenge. Despite intensified operations by Haitian security forces and international actors, gangs retained significant operational capabilities. They continued to exercise their criminal governance in areas under their control and to expand their territorial influence beyond the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area into parts of the Centre, Artibonite and South-East departments, further eroding State authority and disrupting economic and social activity. During the latter half of 2025, gangs continued to rely on coordinated attacks, roadblocks, kidnappings, extortion and assaults on public infrastructure to maintain territorial control and criminal revenue streams.

5. On 7 February 2026, executive authority was transferred from the Transitional Presidential Council to the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé. This transfer averted a potential reversal of progress towards the restoration of democratic institutions, demonstrating a degree of institutional resilience despite the country's fragile political and security context. A second milestone was the adoption in February 2026 of the National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections, which established a shared framework for restoring security, maintaining institutional continuity and organizing elections. An electoral decree, adopted in December 2025 and later revised, introduced some reforms, while electoral authorities advanced technical preparations and the registration of political parties and voters. On 27 July 2026, the Provisional Electoral Council issued a revised electoral calendar, scheduling the first round of presidential and legislative elections for 13 December 2026, to be followed by a run-off, if required, and local elections on 21 February 2027.

6. The economic outlook remained bleak, with Haiti in 2025 experiencing its seventh consecutive year of economic contraction, as real gross domestic product declined by 2.7 per cent.¹ Persistent insecurity disrupted trade, increased transportation costs and reduced agricultural output. Prospects for recovery remained constrained by insecurity, political uncertainty and weak institutional capacity.

7. The humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate as violence, displacement and limited access to essential services compounded existing vulnerabilities. As of mid-2026, 5.8 million Haitians – half of the country's population – faced severe food insecurity, placing Haiti among the world's six most severe hunger crises.² Internal displacement increased from approximately 1.30 million Haitians in mid-2025 to 1.45 million by July 2026 (or 12 per cent of the population),³ while the forced return of refugees and migrants placed additional pressure on already vulnerable communities. During the first six months of 2026, 141,720 people were forcibly returned to Haiti, an increase of 11 per cent compared with the corresponding period in 2025, a number that may increase following the decision to end temporary protected status for Haitians residing in the United States of America.⁴

III. Progress achieved on the key benchmarks established in paragraph 16 of resolution 2794 (2025)

8. Consistent with previous resolutions, the key benchmarks established in paragraph 16 of resolution 2794 (2025) relate to the development of adequate judicial and rule of law capacity to address armed groups and criminal-related activities; the progressive reduction in the amount of violence committed by armed groups and criminal networks; and the progressive decrease in the number of incidents of illicit trafficking and diversion of arms, as well as illicit financial flows therefrom.

Benchmark (a): adequate judicial and rule of law capacity to address armed groups and criminal-related activities

9. The high levels of gang violence, combined with severe resource constraints, continued to place Haiti's justice and rule of law capacities under significant strain. While the Government has accelerated the expansion of the Haitian National Police and the Armed Forces of Haiti, it has also increasingly relied on a foreign private military company to support operations against gangs. Allegations of excessive use of lethal force underscored the urgent need for a coherent government-led security strategy that clearly delineates the roles and responsibilities of all security actors, to ensure effective coordination and that operations are conducted in accordance with international human rights law.

The Government's three pillar security approach

10. The Minister for Defence and the Director General ad interim of the Haitian National Police informed the Secretariat team that, while no formal national security strategy had yet been adopted, the Government's approach rested on three main pillars: (a) a strengthened Haitian National Police; (b) strengthened Armed Forces of Haiti, with a foreign private military company supporting operations carried out by both national security actors; and (c) international support from the Gang Suppression Force.

¹ See <https://www.imf.org/en/countries/hti#countrydata>.

² See <https://www.unocha.org/haiti>.

³ See <https://haiti.iom.int/resources/situation-report-july-2026>.


⁴ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/monthly-monitoring-forced-returns-haiti-june-2026>.

11. According to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Haitian National Police was allocated 34 billion Haitian gourdes (approximately \$261 million) for the 2025/26 fiscal year, representing 9.91 per cent of the national budget and a 9.7 per cent increase as compared with 2024/25. The Armed Forces of Haiti were allocated 4.4 billion gourdes (approximately \$34 million) for the 2025/26 fiscal year, representing 1.3 per cent of the national budget. While the international community continues to provide substantial financial and technical assistance to the Haitian security forces, persistent funding shortfalls, alongside other structural and operational challenges, have constrained their capacity to combat gangs effectively.

Increase in Haitian National Police strength

12. As illustrated in figure I below, following a period of contraction in 2024 and 2025, the overall strength of the Haitian National Police has increased to approximately 14,520 officers as at 30 June 2026 (86 per cent men and 14 per cent women; a 13 per cent increase as compared with the previous reporting period). This represents approximately 1.22 police officers per 1,000 inhabitants.

Figure I
Strengthening of the Haitian security forces



Source: BINUH.

13. The Haitian National Police is implementing its “P4000 Programme”, which aims to recruit and train 4,000 new police officers between October 2025 and April 2027. As part of this effort, the Police Command further reduced the duration of basic training from seven to four months to accelerate the expansion of the force. Between October 2025 and May 2026, two cohorts of cadets were already recruited and trained, with a third cohort, consisting of approximately 1,000 police cadets, having started training in June 2026. The Director General ad interim of the Haitian National Police expressed confidence that the compressed training programme would continue to produce officers meeting operational standards, although he also underlined that the police remained underequipped and that the gangs in many cases possessed superior weaponry and equipment. As further detailed in annex II to the report of the Secretary-

General on BINUH (S/2026/31), strengthening the Haitian National Police will require sustained investment in training, equipment and logistical support.

Continued expansion of the Armed Forces of Haiti

14. The Minister for Defence informed the Secretariat team that a new military doctrine was being developed under which the Government planned to expand the Armed Forces of Haiti to approximately 15,000 personnel. Such an expansion would enable the Armed Forces to assume primary responsibility for addressing national security threats and allow the Haitian National Police to focus on its core law enforcement functions.

15. As illustrated in figure I, as at 30 June 2026, the Armed Forces of Haiti comprised approximately 1,400 active military personnel. Despite that limited size, the Armed Forces have supported the Haitian National Police in efforts to restore security, including by maintaining a presence in areas cleared during anti-gang operations. To strengthen its operational capacity, the Ministry of Defence launched a recruitment campaign to enlist an additional 1,000 personnel, attracting approximately 17,000 applications. In July 2026, a new cohort of 665 recruits (85 per cent men and 15 per cent women) began six months of military training. Background checks were being conducted for all new recruits. The first special forces battalion was expected to complete its training in August and will actively engage gangs alongside the Gang Suppression Force.

Specialized task force in support of anti-gang security operations

16. In March 2025, a task force created by the Prime Minister launched its first operations against gangs in Port-au-Prince, with the support of a foreign private military company. During meetings with the Minister for Defence and the Director General ad interim of the Haitian National Police, it was confirmed that personnel from both the Police and the Armed Forces of Haiti had participated in the task force. It was also noted that the Police had benefitted from technological and other capabilities provided by the foreign private military company, including armed drones, as well as unarmed drones for surveillance and operational planning.

17. While the task force contributed to security operations against gangs, concerns have been raised regarding the use of lethal force during such operations. Human rights organizations have alleged that some operations, including those involving weaponized drones, prioritized the use of lethal force over the arrest and detention of gang members and, in some cases, resulted in significant casualties among the local population. The organizations have emphasized that all law enforcement operations, including those delegated to private actors, must be conducted in accordance with international human rights law.⁵

18. During discussions with the Secretariat team, both the Minister for Defence and the Director General ad interim of the Haitian National Police emphasized that the security forces were taking all precautions to bring gang members to justice and to minimize casualties among the local population during operations against gangs. They stated that certain operations in densely populated areas were prohibited and cited instances in which security forces had refrained from targeting gang leaders because of the presence of family members, including children, in the immediate vicinity. The Director General ad interim further underlined that police officers, in particular members of the specialized units, were receiving training from the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Office of the United Nations High

⁵ See A/HRC/61/74, paras. 24–28; and https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=%2Fen%2Ffiachr%2Fmedia_center%2FPRReleases%2F2026%2F077.asp&utm.

Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the legal framework governing the use of force.

International support expands with the deployment of the Gang Suppression Force

19. During the reporting period, the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti transitioned to the Gang Suppression Force, which commenced operations in June 2026 with the support of UNSOH. As at 8 July 2026, the military component of the Force comprised 1,083 personnel from Chad, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mongolia and Sri Lanka (out of an authorized ceiling of 5,500 uniformed personnel), while the civilian component comprised 16 staff members.⁶

20. In its report of 29 June 2026 (S/2026/554), the Gang Suppression Force outlined three strategic objectives: (a) removing gang control over territory; (b) securing critical infrastructure; and (c) enabling the Haitian authorities independently to contain gang violence. As additional contingents are deployed and the Force expands towards its authorized strength, its operational capacity is expected to significantly increase in the coming months.

21. Since commencing operations, the Gang Suppression Force has conducted patrols both independently and jointly with the Haitian National Police and has carried out several security operations. Furthermore, the Force has established a coordination mechanism with the task force to deconflict operations and plans to deepen cooperation with the Haitian National Police, including through the deployment of liaison officers within their respective headquarters, particularly once the Force police component becomes operational.

22. The Gang Suppression Force also conveyed its understanding that, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2793 (2025), it is authorized to take individuals into temporary custody during operations and detain them for up to 48 hours, including to allow for the documentation of the circumstances of their apprehension. Thereafter, individuals must be transferred to the custody of the Haitian National Police.

23. In this regard, on 14 July 2026, the Gang Suppression Force concluded a protocol with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security governing the transfer to the Haitian authorities of persons taken into custody during Force operations, as well as weapons and ammunition seized during its operations. The protocol provides that persons transferred to the Haitian National Police are to be treated in accordance with applicable international law and are subject to detention monitoring.

24. The Gang Suppression Force further informed the Secretariat team that a modular detention facility was being procured with the support of donors and was expected to be delivered in September 2026. Pending its arrival, a refurbished building on a Force base will be used as a temporary detention facility. Force leadership emphasized that the manner in which Haitian authorities detain and prosecute individuals apprehended during Force operations will be critical to the Force's ability to fulfil its mandate.

Strengthening of judicial capacity

25. During the reporting period, some progress was observed in the functioning of the justice system, although impunity remained widespread. Investigations into high-profile crimes advanced slowly, with no significant progress in cases involving

⁶ See S/2026/574, para. 41.

massacres and other gross human rights abuses committed by gangs recorded since 2017.

26. Thirty courts, including the Cour de cassation, remain non-operational or continue to operate from temporary premises owing to the security situation, undermining the effective administration of justice.⁷ Nevertheless, jury-assisted criminal sessions resumed on 27 July 2026, following an eight-year hiatus. In addition, the Superior Council of the Judiciary published the results of the magistrate certification process held in September 2025, noting that, out of the 112 magistrates assessed, 12 were not certified based on a lack of professional integrity or competence.

Specialized judicial units commence operations

27. On 27 May 2026, the Government inaugurated two specialized judicial units, established with technical and logistical support from BINUH, OHCHR and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), as well as international funding. Embedded within Haiti's judicial system, these units are mandated to concentrate on the most complex criminal cases, namely, mass crimes (including massacres, sexual violence and child trafficking by gangs) and financial crimes. Their establishment marks an important first step towards strengthening accountability and combating impunity.

28. According to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 10 judges, including four women, had been appointed to serve exclusively on these specialized judicial units, while 40 cases had been transferred from regular courts. The Minister noted his expectation that the specialized judicial units would help to reduce the overall duration of judicial proceedings and that continued efforts, including securing adequate resources, would be required to achieve the full operationalization of the units.

Concerns regarding the decree on the High Court of Justice

29. On 17 December 2025, the Transitional Presidential Council adopted a decree outlining the organization of the High Court of Justice, to be constituted by the Senate, with jurisdiction to prosecute and adjudicate criminal offences allegedly committed by current and former high-ranking officials during their time in office. Several civil society organizations have expressed the concern that, in the absence of a functioning Senate pending the holding of elections, the Decree effectively shields senior officials from prosecution. While acknowledging these concerns, the Minister for Justice and Public Security noted that any amendment to the decree would require broad consensus within Haitian society.

Slow progress in high-profile judicial cases

30. Only limited progress was recorded in advancing high-profile judicial cases during the reporting period.⁸ Prophane Victor, a former Member of Parliament and listed individual (HTi.006), remained in pretrial detention following his arrest in January 2025 on charges of gang financing, criminal association and links with gangs. On 21 July 2026, the Port-au-Prince Court of Appeal upheld the referral order of the investigating judge. Based on this decision, Mr. Victor and his codefendants will have to stand trial before the Criminal Court.

⁷ Conseil Supérieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire, "Rapport d'activités 2024–2025", pp. 44, 45 and 75.

⁸ See [S/2026/574](#), para. 23.

Progress in the implementation of the new Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure

31. Following the adoption in June 2025 of decrees revising the March 2020 new Penal Code and new Code of Criminal Procedure, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security continued with preparations for their implementation, including through nationwide training for judges, prosecutors and police officers. On 15 July 2026, the Minister formally launched the implementation process and announced that both codes would enter into force on 1 January 2027.

Continued overcrowding and prolonged pretrial detention in the penitentiary system

32. Conditions in Haiti's penitentiary system remained critical during the reporting period, with severe overcrowding, chronic food insecurity and inadequate medical care. The National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince, the Croix-des-Bouquets prison and the Cabaret women's prison remained non-operational following extensive damages caused by gangs in 2024, significantly reducing the prison system's capacity and further exacerbating already critical detention conditions.

33. As at 30 June 2026, Haiti's prison population stood at 7,563 detainees, including 413 women, 263 boys and 20 girls. A total of 82 per cent of detainees remained in prolonged pretrial detention, unchanged from the previous reporting period. The prison occupancy rate stood at 313 per cent, with an average living space of only 0.31 square metres per detainee.

34. In an effort to address these challenges, on 19 January 2026, the Minister for Justice and Public Security launched a national campaign to reduce prison overcrowding and prolonged pretrial detention. The pilot phase of the campaign resulted in the release of 31 detainees, including 12 children, who had been held for minor offences.⁹

Uneven implementation of individual Security Council sanctions measures and calls for additional designations

35. The Minister for Economy and Finance confirmed that Haitian financial institutions were implementing the assets freeze. According to the Panel of Experts, however, only modest amounts had been frozen. The Secretariat team was informed that, in the absence of a ministerial decree transposing the United Nations sanctions into domestic law, there was no clearly defined national process for the implementation of the sanctions measures, including freezing assets following new listings.

36. Despite these challenges, Government and civil society interlocutors emphasized the sanctions regime's important deterrent effect and called for the sanctions list to be expanded beyond the current 11 designations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, among others, expressed the view that, given that designated individuals are ineligible to stand as candidates under the Electoral Decree of 1 December 2025, additional designations could contribute to protecting the integrity of the forthcoming electoral process. Similarly, other interlocutors called for additional Security Council listings, observing that the sanctions regime had so far targeted gang leaders, while political and economic actors who financed, supported or otherwise enabled gang activity had largely escaped designation.

37. The Minister for Economy and Finance further confirmed that designated individuals and entities were also ineligible to receive public funds or be awarded public contracts, while UNSOH indicated that all prospective vendors were

⁹ See [S/2026/325](#), para. 25.

systematically screened against the Security Council's sanctions list as part of the procurement process.

Benchmark (b): progressive reduction in the amount of violence committed by armed groups and criminal networks, including the number of intentional homicides, kidnappings and incidents of sexual violence

Persistently high levels of violence committed by armed groups and criminal networks

38. Violence perpetrated by gangs and criminal networks remained persistently high during the reporting period. Since December 2025, security operations had slowed the territorial expansion of gangs in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and enabled the recovery of some areas previously under gang control. However, these gains remained fragile. No major gang leaders had been captured, and the links between gangs and influential political, economic and criminal actors continued to undermine the effectiveness and long-term sustainability of security operations.

39. Gangs have also adapted their tactics, techniques and procedures. In parts of the capital, security operations have weakened gangs' ability to expand their reach. Nevertheless, in those areas, gangs continued to exercise coercive control over movement, markets and essential services in areas under their influence or control. Outside the capital, gangs have expanded, notably in the Artibonite and Centre departments, with first incursions in the South-East department recorded in April 2026. While divisions and infighting emerged within the *Viv Ansanm* alliance (HTe.002), gang violence remained at high levels.


40. The limited capacity of State institutions to provide security has also contributed to the growing role of alternative security actors, including self-defence groups, the Protected Areas Security Brigade and private security companies. While these actors have, in some cases, enhanced local security, their continued expansion was increasingly fragmenting the security landscape. Moreover, some self-defence groups have been implicated in human rights abuses, underscoring the risks associated with armed actors operating outside effective State oversight.

Persistently high levels of killings

41. The number of killings related to gang activities or anti-gang security operations has risen significantly since 2022 and remains extremely high. From 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026, at least 5,830 people were killed (87 per cent men, 10 per cent women, 2 per cent boys and 1 per cent girls) in the context of gang-related violence.¹⁰ However, the circumstances of these killings have changed. As illustrated in figure II below, only 32 per cent of killings in the period from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026 were directly attributable to attacks perpetrated by gangs, coinciding with a reduction in inter-gang clashes following the formation of the *Viv Ansanm* alliance in February 2024. Conversely, in the same period, 61 per cent of killings occurred during security force operations targeting gangs, likely a result of the intensified pace of security operations conducted since 2025, including with the support of the task force.

¹⁰ According to BINUH, these homicide figures are not directly comparable with those presented in previous assessment reports. Earlier reports reflected the total number of homicides, including those resulting from robberies and domestic violence, whereas the present figures include only homicides relating to gangs.

Figure II
Gang-related killings in Haiti, by circumstances of death



Source: BINUH.

42. Of the 3,532 individuals killed during operations against gangs by security forces between 1 July 2025 and 30 June 2026, an estimated 85 per cent of victims were gang members (of which 0.5 per cent were children), whereas approximately 15 per cent were individuals not associated with gangs (of which 9 per cent were children). The Inspectorate General of the Haitian National Police opened investigations into all reported cases of alleged unlawful use of force by police officers. However, no investigations were concluded during the reporting period.


Sharp increase in sexual violence

43. According to the UN Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangements on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 1,899 victims of sexual violence involving armed actors were documented between 1 July 2025 and 30 June 2026. This is a sharp increase of 66 per cent from the last reporting period, during which 1,147 victims were documented.

Decrease in kidnappings for ransom

44. Between 1 July 2025 and 30 June 2026, BINUH documented 439 victims of kidnapping for ransom by gangs (61 per cent men, 30 per cent women, 5 per cent boys and 4 per cent girls). As illustrated in figure III, the number of documented kidnappings declined markedly compared with previous reporting periods, likely driven both by more selective targeting of higher-value victims by gangs, and the expansion of alternative revenue streams.

Figure III
Victims of kidnapping for ransom



Source: BINUH.


High levels of violence against and recruitment of children

45. Haiti remained designated as a situation of concern in the annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict for the fourth consecutive year (S/2026/357). With children accounting for up to 50 per cent of all gang members, they are vulnerable both as possible targets in security operations against gangs and as bystanders. During 2025, the United Nations verified 2,088 grave violations affecting 1,661 children (951 boys, 383 girls and 327 of unknown sex).

46. While the total number of verified grave violations declined by 8 per cent compared with 2024, violations remained at an alarmingly high level. As illustrated in figure IV below, the number of verified cases for recruitment and use, killing and maiming, and abduction of children all increased as compared with 2024, reflecting the growing reliance of gangs on the exploitation of children. The increased recruitment of children by gangs appears to be driven both by gang efforts to replenish their ranks following losses sustained during security operations and by the extreme economic and social vulnerability of many Haitian children.¹¹

¹¹ See <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/children-trafficked-by-gangs-rethinking-responses-en.pdf>.

Figure IV
Selected grave violations against children in Haiti



Source: report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict ([A/80/723-S/2026/357](#)).

National consensus on disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration has yet to emerge

47. Progress was made during the reporting period in strengthening Haiti's institutional framework for disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration. In February 2026, with support from BINUH, the Government re-established the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration as the national body responsible for planning, coordinating and implementing such initiatives. So far, three Commissioners have been appointed, and a strategic disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration road map has been presented to BINUH and donors. The proposed road map combines prevention and protection measures for vulnerable children, rehabilitation and reintegration for children released from gangs and justice-based responses for gang leaders.

48. The reporting period also saw initial steps to mobilize resources for a future disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration programme. The Secretary-General outlined options for United Nations and international support to a Haitian-led disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration programme (see [S/2026/449](#)). Despite these advances, a comprehensive national disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration programme, including agreed eligibility criteria, operational arrangements and sustainable financing, has not yet been finalized.

Benchmark (c): progressive decrease in the number of incidents of illicit trafficking and diversion of arms, as well as illicit financial flows therefrom, including by increasing the number and volume of arms seizures

49. Haiti's limited border management capacity continued to enable the illicit trafficking of weapons and ammunition. During meetings with the Secretariat team, the Minister for Defence underscored the challenges posed by Haiti's long and porous

land and maritime borders, the large number of unofficial crossing points and the limited operational capacity of border control authorities. During the reporting period, UNODC continued to support Haiti's Customs through the provision of infrastructure, technical assistance and border surveillance equipment, including mobile scanners and surveillance drones.

50. The Minister for Economy and Finance and the Director General of Customs informed the Secretariat team that a 10-year contract had been concluded in February 2026 with a foreign private company, to strengthen Haiti's customs and border management. The agreement provided for the training of customs officers and the deployment of scanners, drones and customs management software to strengthen border surveillance and improve revenue collection. Officials indicated that the company would be remunerated through a share of customs revenue collected under the contract, thereby linking its remuneration to revenue performance. Effective oversight and transparency in implementing these arrangements would be critical to achieving the objectives of increased revenue collection and improved customs management.

Despite strengthened implementation of the arms embargo, arms trafficking remains a major concern

51. The continued operational strength of gangs demonstrates that firearms and ammunition continue to reach Haiti's gangs despite the arms embargo, through both illicit transfers from abroad and diversions from national stocks.

52. During the reporting period, authorities in the Dominican Republic, Haiti and the United States intensified efforts to intercept illicit arms. Haiti's Customs seized 22 firearms and 18,240 rounds of ammunition. As reported by the Panel of Experts and UNODC, United States authorities similarly intercepted multiple shipments of firearms and ammunition destined for Haiti and continued to investigate and prosecute trafficking networks operating between the United States and Haiti.

53. The Director General of Customs emphasized that illicit arms and ammunition continued to arrive primarily in commercial maritime cargo from the United States, often concealed in shipping containers. Similarly, UNODC found that "the clearest supply line remains the United States-Haiti firearms corridor, operating primarily through maritime cargo channels and adaptive transnational trafficking networks".¹²

54. In addition to illicit trafficking from abroad, the diversion of State-held firearms and ammunition – whether resulting from theft, corruption or battlefield losses – continued to pose a significant challenge. The Panel of Experts informed the Secretariat team that ammunition belonging to the Haitian National Police had been found in gang stockpiles and that Police-issued firearms had on occasion been recovered from gang members. It also documented several types of ammunition that had been diverted from the Dominican Republic's national stockpiles.

55. Some progress was made in strengthening weapons tracing and information-sharing, supported by the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti and the Gang Suppression Force. The Panel of Experts informed the Secretariat team that the Multinational Security Support Mission had shared information on incidents involving the diversion of weapons and ammunition. The Force similarly confirmed that it would integrate dedicated weapons and ammunition management expertise to register items seized during its operations. Information on seized items was entered into the Internet-based firearms tracing analysis system (eTrace) and would be shared with the Panel of Experts in accordance with paragraph 1 (e) of resolution [2793](#)

¹² See [S/2026/578](#), para. 18.

(2025) to support efforts to trace illicit arms flows into Haiti, before being handed over to Haitian authorities.

56. Ultimately – in particular with the expected intensification of security operations, improved weapons and ammunition management – chain-of-custody procedures and evidence management within the security forces and the judiciary will be critical to reducing diversion and improving accountability.

57. In addition to the illicit trafficking of weapons, both the Panel of Experts and UNODC have reported that drug trafficking and the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons were significant components of Haiti's broader criminal ecosystem.

Strengthened framework to combat illicit financial flows linked to arms, but significant vulnerabilities remain

58. Illicit financial flows remained of concern as gangs expanded their illegal activities, further fuelling arms trafficking. Haiti's Financial Intelligence Unit informed the Secretariat team that Haiti continued to implement the action plan agreed with the Financial Action Task Force following its placement under increased monitoring ("grey list") in June 2021. In March 2026, Haiti presented its first national risk assessment, covering the period 2019–2024, outlining the measures taken to date to strengthen its anti-money-laundering framework, including enhanced financial intelligence and anti-corruption measures. According to Haitian authorities, the completion of the remaining measures was expected to be reported by January 2027, after which the Task Force would assess whether Haiti had sufficiently addressed the strategic deficiencies identified to exit increased monitoring.

IV. Observations

59. Overall, modest progress was achieved during the reporting period towards the first benchmark on judicial and rule of law capacity. By contrast, no significant progress was made towards the second and third benchmarks on the reduction of violence, illicit trafficking and diversion of arms.

60. **Security operations.** While acknowledging the progress made in improving security and restoring State presence in parts of the capital, I remain concerned by the continued expansion of gang activity in other areas, including the Artibonite and South-East departments. It is vital to achieve further tangible results, including through the deployment of additional Gang Suppression Force contingents. However, lasting security cannot be achieved through security operations alone. Sustained efforts to strengthen Haiti's justice and corrections systems will be critical to ensuring that security gains translate into sustainable progress in the rule of law. This will require clear command-and-control arrangements, operational protocols and robust human rights safeguards for all security actors, while ensuring that suspected gang members are arrested, prosecuted and tried. It will also require continued efforts to strengthen the capacity of the judiciary and the penitentiary system, so that criminal cases can be processed in accordance with the rule of law, with particular attention to the rights of minors.

61. **Specialized judicial units.** I welcome the beginning of the operationalization phase of the specialized judicial units, which marks an important first step towards strengthening accountability. Sustained international support will be essential to ensure that the units are adequately resourced and thus able to achieve their full potential. At the same time, I remain concerned by the persistence of widespread impunity, including among senior officials. In this regard, I note the potential

accountability gap arising from the implementation of the decree of 17 December 2025 on the organization of the High Court of Justice in the absence of a functioning Senate. I encourage continued dialogue among Haitian stakeholders to ensure that accountability frameworks are consistent with the principles of equality before the law and the fight against impunity.

62. **Arms embargo.** Effective implementation of the arms embargo established by the Security Council will remain critical to achieving progress on the benchmarks set out in resolution [2794 \(2025\)](#). I therefore encourage Member States, in particular Haiti and States in the region, to continue their efforts to strengthen its implementation, including through enhanced inspections of shipments destined for Haiti at seaports and airports, greater information-sharing and reporting on interdiction efforts to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti, and continued support to strengthen customs capacities and weapons and ammunition management in Haiti, including through technical assistance provided by BINUH as part of its broader disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration support efforts.

63. **Sanctions list.** In order to achieve progress on the benchmarks set out in resolution [2794 \(2025\)](#), I also encourage the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti, supported by the Panel of Experts, to consider the expansion of the sanctions list. Particular consideration could be given to individuals and entities that enable or sustain gang activities, including through political support, financial assistance, weapons procurement and money-laundering, with a view to both degrading the operational capacity of criminal organizations and supporting political stability and the integrity of the electoral process.

64. With the expected intensification of security operations against gangs and the holding of elections in the next six months, Haiti stands at a critical juncture. Seizing this opportunity will require sustained commitment by Haitian stakeholders to work together in the national interest, complemented by coordinated international assistance, to enable Haiti to move towards a more secure and prosperous future for its people.
