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Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher"

Summary

This Conference Room Paper supplements the information presented in the Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, of 19 February 2026 (A/HRC/61/77), entitled "*Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher*". It should be read in conjunction with this report.

Due to word limits, the mission was unable to provide detailed references and indicate all the sources it had relied on in the said report. This Conference Room Paper provides those references. It also provides additional information that it gathered following its continued investigations since the publication of the report to the UN Human Rights Council on 19 February 2026. This new information particularly relates to mass killings, brutal sexual violence including mass gang rape, and systematic abduction of women and girls by the Rapid Support Forces and the tragic consequences of these practices, as well as the plight of thousands of individuals who were detained, tortured, held for ransom or effectively disappeared.

This paper also further develops the legal basis for the conclusions that were drawn in the report, that the mass killings and related atrocities committed by the Rapid Support Forces in and around El Fasher, during its takeover, were indicators of a genocidal path. The continued investigations by the mission reaffirm the findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in the report.

I. Introduction

1. On 19 February 2026, the independent international Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan issued its findings on the situation in El Fasher, pursuant to a request contained in the Human Rights Council's resolution S-38/1 of 14 November 2025. The mission concluded that the mass killings and related atrocities committed by the Rapid Support Forces in and around El Fasher, during its takeover of the city in late October 2025, are indicators of a genocidal path. The report, "*Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher*", was presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council on 26 February 2026 at its 61st session.

2. Due to the word limit, the mission was unable to provide detailed references to the sources it had relied upon in the report. This conference room paper provides those references. It also provides information obtained during additional investigations that the mission has conducted since the presentation of the report to the Human Rights Council, particularly relating to mass killings, brutal sexual violence of immense gravity including mass gang rape, and systematic abduction of women and girl by the Rapid Support Forces and the extreme consequences of these practices, as well as the plight of thousands of individuals who were detained, tortured, held for ransom or effectively disappeared. It also develops the legal basis for the conclusions that were drawn in the report. The continued investigations by the mission reaffirm the findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in the "*Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher"* report. This supplementary paper should be read in conjunction with it.

3. In both the report and this paper, the mission applied its previously outlined methodology and guiding principles.[1] While recognizing the standard of proof of "reasonable grounds to believe", common to the United Nations investigative bodies, the mission paid particular attention to the question of whether there exists clear and fully convincing evidence, as articulated by judicial bodies, that could support the invocation of the crime of genocide.[2] It also considered whether genocidal intent was the sole reasonable inference for the conduct it documented.

4. The evidence thus far collected by the mission on the situation regarding El-Fasher includes interviews with 333 survivors. In addition to its investigative missions to Chad (from 6 to 17 January 2026) and South Sudan (from 10 to 21 January 2026), the mission conducted an online consultation with survivors who had fled from El Fasher. The conversations with survivors revealed the deep wounds left by the atrocities that were committed in and around El Fasher as well as the quest for sustainable peace, dignity and justice that the people of Sudan have long demanded and deserve. The mission is deeply grateful to all the survivors for their courage in sharing their experiences. The mission also expresses appreciation to the Governments of Chad and South Sudan for facilitating these missions, and to host communities of the Sudanese refugees for their generosity.

5. To date, the mission has reviewed more than 50 public reports and related materials pertaining to the situation in El Fasher. It authenticated, verified and

[1] See A/HRC/60/22; A/HRC/57/23; and the conference room paper containing the findings of the investigations conducted by the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, available from https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/a-hrc-57-crp-6-en.docx.

[2] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17 (1) (d) (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court); ICJ, *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro*, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Judgment, 26 February 2007.

corroborated 25 videos and held more than 45 meetings with civil society, human rights defenders, and experts, including global health experts, all in relation to El Fasher.

6. In addition to the international and regional entities mentioned in paragraph 6 of its report, the mission consulted the newly appointed United Nations Secretary General's Special Envoy for Sudan and continued its cooperation with the International Criminal Court.

7. Despite the mission's best efforts, Sudan continued its lack of cooperation with the mission. Although some officials have attempted to cooperate, fear of government reprisal has prevented this cooperation from materializing. The mission regrets this and calls on Sudan to reconsider its approach. In accordance with standard practice, on 3 July 2026, the mission shared the final draft of this conference room paper with the Government of the Sudan. No response was received.

8. The mission contacted the Rapid Support Forces for information and requested meetings with its leadership. It was followed up through various means, including letters in April, May and June 2026. The mission received a letter on 7 June 2026 responding to some of its questions. At the time of publishing the conference report paper, no meeting had occurred.

II. Sources used in the report and additional information[3]

A. Parties to the Conflict and their allies

Sudanese Armed Forces

9. As was stated in the report, the Sudanese Armed Forces remain led by the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, who exercises overall political and military authority over the operations of the Sudanese Armed Forces.[4] In the battle for El Fasher, the Sudanese Armed Forces primarily relied on the Sixth Infantry Division, and progressively consolidated alliances with Darfurian armed movements operating collectively as the Darfur Joint Protection Force ('Joint Forces'). The Joint Forces, formed in April 2023 following the outbreak of the conflict,[5] comprise armed movements that were signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement. They initially adopted a position of neutrality and non-alignment to the warring parties.

10. Some armed groups progressively aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces. By early 2024, the Joint Forces was formed and included the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army led by Minni Minawi, the Justice and Equality Movement, the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces, and factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Transitional Council. They cited widespread attacks and violations committed by the Rapid Support Forces and their allies against civilians across Darfur. Several of these movements were closely associated with the Zaghawa leadership and recruitment networks.[6]

[3] The references can be availed confidentially, as needed, for relevant judicial proceedings.

[4] A/HRC/57/23, paras. 24-26.

[5] The Joint Forces formally aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces on 16 November 2023.

[6] FFMS-D-002736. The leader of the GSLF faction that is aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces is Abdallah Yahya, while the SLM factions that are aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces are led by Minni Minawi and Mustafa Tambour respectively.

11. Other Darfurian armed movements and factions, including elements of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army led by Abdul Wahid Mohamed Nour, remained formally outside the Joint Forces and largely maintained a neutral position.

12. At the same time, internal divisions emerged within certain Darfurian armed movements. Factions associated with Al-Hadi Idris within the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army–Transitional Council, and with Al-Tahir Hajar within the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces, distanced themselves from elements aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces. These factions initially maintained a neutral position and withdrew from El Fasher, before later aligning with the Rapid Support Forces. After these splits, the Joint Forces remaining in El Fasher fully supported the Sudanese Armed Forces.

13. The Sudanese Armed Forces were also supported by locally mobilised civilian units in and around El Fasher and Popular Resistance Forces established to defend communities and strategic positions. In May 2024, the Sudanese Armed Forces formally established a National Committee to integrate the Popular Resistance Forces through recruitment, arming and financing. The Popular Resistance Forces actively defended El Fasher, alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Joint Forces, until the eventual collapse of the city's defence.[7]

Rapid Support Forces

14. As described in previous reports, the Rapid Support Forces, a highly mobile force combining regular units, intelligence, and allied militias, were part of Sudan's security apparatus at the outbreak of hostilities in 2023, with origins as an irregular militia.[8] It is led by Lt. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, with his brother, Abdelrahim Dagalo, as his second in command.

15. The Rapid Support Forces' military campaign has been reinforced by local Arab militias and tribal networks, which provided manpower, logistics and local intelligence.[9] Witnesses also reported the presence of a large number of foreign fighters among the ranks of the Rapid Support Forces.[10]

16. Survivors consistently identified the perpetrators during the take-over of El Fasher as members of the Rapid Support Forces and their allies. They also described distinctive kaki/akhbashi/sandy coloured attire, noting they were all armed with firearms, but also carried knives and whips.[11] The Rapid Support Forces use a combination of small arms, light and heavy weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery including rocket artillery, mortars, anti-tank guided missiles, surveillance drones, loitering munitions/suicide drones, drones capable of air dropping munitions as well as large armed fixed-wing drones.[12] The Rapid Support Forces also utilised electronic warfare equipment, including jamming systems and Starlink-based command terminals.[13]

17. Several survivors stated that the Rapid Support Forces and their allies recruited substantial numbers of children, using them as fighters, guards and for intelligence-gathering within the city of El Fasher and surrounding areas.[14] Witnesses described

[7] FFMS-D-004994; FFMS-D-005012; FFMS-D-005016; FFMS-D-005022.
[8] A/HRC/57/23, paras. 27-30; A/HRC/57/CRP.6, para. 91-95.
[9] FFMS-D-005130; FFMS-D-005034; FFMS-D-002167; FFMS-D-002142.
[10] FFMS-D-005128; FFMS-D-005023; FFMS-D-005509; FFMS-D-005089.
[11] See e.g. FFMS-D-005127; FFMS-D-004983; FFMS-D-004995; FFMS-D-005023; FFMS-D-005524.
[12] FFMS-D-005133; FFMS-D-005526.
[13] FFMS-D-004967; FFMS-D-004982; FFMS-D-005118; FFMS-D-005131; FFMS-D-005509.
[14] FFMS-D-004566; FFMS-D-004969; FFMS-D-005050.

seeing armed boys between 12 and 16 years of age with the Rapid Support Forces after El Fasher had been taken.[15]

B. Conflict Dynamics

18. As the report indicates, by late November 2023, the Rapid Support Forces controlled four of Darfur's five states, leaving only parts of North Darfur, including El Fasher, under control of the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allies.

19. Until late 2023, El Fasher experienced a period of relative calm under a locally negotiated ceasefire arrangement reached in May 2023.[16] The Rapid Support Forces controlled the northern and eastern sectors of the city and strategic supply routes connecting El Fasher to Nyala, Zalingei and Shangil Tobaya, while the Sudan Armed Forces retained control over the city centre, western and southern districts, including the 6th Infantry Division Headquarters and areas surrounding Zamzam and Abu Shouk displacement camps. Sporadic shelling persisted, but there were no significant clashes.[17]

20. The ceasefire progressively collapsed in early 2024. The Rapid Support Forces increasingly portrayed the city as a hostile stronghold of non-Arab armed groups aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces. The growing participation of Zaghawa fighters and commanders within the Joint Forces and Popular Resistance Forces further contributed to the perceived ethnicization of the conflict and heightened risks of retaliatory attacks against civilians perceived as being affiliated to opposing parties.[18]

21. The Sudanese Armed Forces regained control over Khartoum in March 2025. As noted in the report, with the retreat to their strongholds, mainly in Darfur, the Rapid Support Forces and their allies began attacking towns and villages surrounding El Fasher from 6 April 2024. In May 2024, they imposed a siege on the city, until they took it over in October 2025.[19]

22. The battle for the control of El Fasher was intense, characterised by widespread and indiscriminate shelling, aerial bombardments, drone attacks and repeated ground assaults affecting densely populated residential areas from both sides.[20] Although the Sudanese Armed Forces and Joint Forces and their allies continued to hold central El Fasher, the Rapid Support Forces progressively advanced through peripheral areas and temporarily entered some neighbourhoods and strategic sites, including areas surrounding the Saudi Hospital, before being repelled by counterattacks launched by the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Joint Forces and their allies.[21]

23. As the constant shelling and ground attacks in some neighbourhoods in El Fasher intensified, many inhabitants fled towards the Zamzam and Abu Shouk displacement camps for safety, seeking the protection of the Joint Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces present in their vicinity.[22] Towards the end of 2024, however, these camps became targets of repeated shelling and ground attacks, resulting in

[15] FFMS-D-004566; FFMS-D-004969.
[16] FFMS-D-002634; FFMS-D-002630; FFMS-D-002644; FFMS-D-002674.
[17] FFMS-D-005128; FFMS-D-005523; FFMS-D-002634; FFMS-D-005473; FFMS-D-005290.
[18] FFMS-D-002634; FFMS-D-005489; FFMS-D-005302; FFMS-D-005151; FFMS-D-005124.
[19] FFMS-D-005524; FFMS-D-005503; FFMS-D-005500; FFMS-D-005497; FFMS-D-005133; FFMS-005132; FFMS-D-005129.
[20] FFMS-D-005473; FFMS-D-005130.
[21] FFMS-D-005130; FFMS-D-005132.
[22] FFMS-D-005126; FFMS-D-005127; FFMS-D-005128; FFMS-D-005129; FFMS-D-005130; FFMS-D-005131; FFMS-D-005132; FFMS-D-005133; FFMS-D-005500; FFMS-D-005302; FFMS-D-005295; FFMS-D-005290; FFMS-D-005151.

civilian casualties, destruction of shelters and markets, and repeated forced displacement within already overcrowded sites.[23] Survivors described a pattern of encirclement of the camps, coordinated artillery and ground assaults from multiple directions, strengthened by drone attacks, followed by widespread killings, rape and forced displacement, with large numbers of inhabitants fleeing towards Tawila or El Fasher, while being abused and robbed of their last items.[24] The fighting intensified in July and August 2025, and the Rapid Support Forces entered the city, but they were repelled by the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allies.[25]

24. In September 2025, the Rapid Support Forces entered the city centre once again, pushing towards key military positions, including the El Fasher central market (Hajar Kado), the 6th Infantry Division Headquarters, and surrounding areas. Although the Rapid Support Forces failed to take over these military positions at that time, the city's defences were progressively weakened.[26] The defences ultimately collapsed in late October 2025 following the final large-scale offensive by the Rapid Support Forces.[27]

C. The people of El Fasher and repeated displacement

25. Evidence of what was included in the report, regarding the indications by several survivors of repeated cycles of flight and return in and around El Fasher is cited below.[28]

D. Starvation and the collapse of the food supply systems and medical services

26. Evidence of what was included in the report, regarding markets being repeatedly attacked, looted or forced to close, supply routes into the city being systematically cut, and trucks carrying food being denied entry or attacked, are referenced below.[29]

27. Since the publication of the report, the Mission has continued to receive information regarding the severe and deteriorating food shortages caused by the Rapid Support Forces' siege and the cumulative impact on the civilian population,

[23] FFMS-D-005128; FFMS-D-005500.

[24] A/HRC/60/22, para. 28; FFMS-D-005132; FFMS-D-005130; FFMS-D-005129; FFMS-D-005128; FFMS-D-005127; FFMS-D-005126; FFMS-D-005123; FFMS-D-005295; FFMS-D-005151; FFMS-D-005302; FFMS-D-005290.

[25] FFMS-D-004995; FFMS-D-005026; FFMS-D-005027; FFMS-D-004566.

[26] FFMS-D-005027; FFMS-D-005026; FFMS-D-005032; FFMS-D-005038; FFMS-D-005033; FFMS-D-005035; FFMS-D-005036; FFMS-D-005039; FFMS-D-005044; FFMS-D-005045; FFMS-D-005046.

[27] FFMS-D-004563; FFMS-D-005008; FFMS-D-004995.

[28] FFMS-D-004566; FFMS-D-004973; FFMS-D-004980; FFMS-D-005013; FFMS-D-005016; FFMS-D-005023; FFMS-D-005085; FFMS-D-005120; FFMS-D-005121; FFMS-D-005123; FFMS-D-005126; FFMS-D-005127; FFMS-D-005128; FFMS-D-005129; FFMS-D-005130; FFMS-D-005131; FFMS-D-005132; FFMS-D-005133. The mission previously reported on the major attack on Zamzam Camp, where predominantly those displaced from the Fur community lived, that was launched by the Rapid Support Forces from 11 to 14 April 2025, killing over 1,000 inhabitants. The inhabitants were chased out from the third day of the attack, with some fleeing back to El Fasher. (A/HRC/60/22, para. 28; also see https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/sudan/ohchr-sudan-rapid-support-forces-zamzam-idp-camp-north-darfur-3-days-safe-refuge-offensive-april-terror-1-en.pdf, para. 34).

[29] FFMS-D-005128; FFMS-D-005123; FFMS-D-005524; FFMS-D-005497.

particularly children, older persons and persons with disabilities.[30] Beyond physical deprivation, survivors described the siege as having a profound mental health and psychosocial impact.[31] Pregnant women were disproportionally affected by stress caused by shelling, which reportedly triggered premature labor and pre- and perinatal complications.[32]

28. Evidence of what was included in the report regarding limited medical supplies and the resulting collapse of medical services in El Fasher is included in the footnote.[33] Additional information received by the mission indicates that in Saudi Hospital, the only hospital operational at the time of the takeover, medical staff resorted to cleaning wounds with water and salt as access to medical supplies diminished.[34] Medical specialists described the shortages of supplies for treating rape survivors as further undermining the ability to provide timely and adequate care.

E. Restriction of movement and prevention of civilian escape

29. Evidence supporting what was included in the report regarding the construction of berms and blocking civilians from fleeing, is referenced in the footnote.[35] These structures contributed to cutting of food supplies, *inter alia* leading to the creation of famine conditions in the city. During the final assault between 26 and 28 October 2025, the structures also facilitated channelling both combatants and civilians into choke points and became mass killing sites.

30. Movement restrictions exacerbated the already weakened healthcare system, particularly affecting women in need of urgent maternal and reproductive care. In several cases, women who became pregnant as a result of rape resorted to unsafe abortion practices due to the lack of timely medical care, leading to severe complications, including hemorrhage and death.[36]

F. Last months of the siege

31. Evidence supporting what was included in the report regarding the shelling of the displacement camps, and the targeting of women on the basis of their gender intersecting with their ethnicity, is cited in the footnote.[37]

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[30] FFMS-D-003964, FFMS-D-004347; FFMS-D-004353; FFMS-D-004566; FFMS-D-004970; FFMS-D-004981; FFMS-D-004983; FFMS-D-005016; FFMS-D-005017; FFMS-D-005023; FFMS-D-005118; FFMS-D-005120; FFMS-D-005122; FFMS-D-005124; FFMS-D-005127; FFMS-D-005128; FFMS-D-005129; FFMS-D-005131; FFMS-D-005132; FFMS-D-005133; FFMS-D-005497; FFMS-D-005509. See also UN warns of worsening humanitarian crisis in Sudan as displacement, hunger and disease escalate | UN News.

[31] FFMS-D-004970; FFMS-D-005509; FFMS-D-004564; FFMS-D-004966.

[32] FFMS-D-005509.

[33] FFMS-D-005016; FFMS-D-005509; FFMS-D-005489; FFMS-D-005085; FFMS-D-005497.

[34] FFMS-D-005497. See also FFMS-D-005002, FFMS-D-005091.

[35] FFMS-D-004313 (27 Oct 2025); FFMS-D-004315 (27 Oct 2025); FFMS-D-005132; FFMS-D-005131; FFMS-D-005085; FFMS-D-005008; FFMS-D-004989; FFMS-D-004563; FFMS-D-004354; FFMS_0371 (27 Oct 2025); FFMS_0372 (28 Oct 2025).

[36] FFMS-D-005509; Over 500 days of siege: Women and girls trapped in El Fasher face the risk of starvation and death | UN Women – Headquarters.

[37] FFMS-D-005151; FFMS-D-005133; FFMS-D-005131; FFMS-D-005128; FFMS-D-005121; FFMS-D-005120; FFMS-D-005089; FFMS-D-005085; FFMS-D-005036; FFMS-D-005033; FFMS-D-005025; FFMS-D-004566; FFMS-D-004354; FFMS-D-004353; FFMS-D-004347; FFMS-D-004337; FFMS-D-004335. See https://x.com/UNOCHA_Sudan/status/1976235317108805841;

G. Three days of untold horror – the taking of El Fasher

32. Evidence supporting what was included in the report regarding the rapid collapse of security and humanitarian conditions in El Fasher in the days preceding the takeover, is footnoted.[38]

H. Mass killings

1. Killings throughout the city

33. Evidence supporting what was included in the report regarding killings throughout the city is referenced in the footnote.[39] As was stated in the report, survivors consistently spoke of widespread killings, including indiscriminate shootings and point-blank executions of civilians in homes, in trenches and public buildings where they were hiding, in market areas, near the airport fence, in open areas or while attempting to flee the city.

2. Mass executions at exit points

34. Evidence supporting what was included in the report regarding killings at exit points is footnoted.[40] As was stated in the report, from 26 October 2025, the Rapid Support Forces rounded up those trying to leave the city at three main exit points: on the northern axis towards Mellit, on the El Fasher–Garni road (north-west of El Fasher) and on the El Fasher–Tawila road (south-west of El Fasher). At these exit points, survivors described members of the Rapid Support Forces separating men from women and children. The men were beaten, detained, abducted, or executed, based on accusations of them supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces and/or the Joint Forces.

3. Mass executions at the berms

35. Evidence supporting what was included in the report regarding killings at the berms is footnoted.[41] As was stated in the report, the earthen berms and trenches

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https://www.unicef.org/sudan/press-releases/least-11-children-reportedly-killed-attack-mosque-sudans-north-darfur-state; https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/least-17-children-reportedly-killed-attack-displacement-centre-north-darfurs-al.

38 FFMS-D-005509; FFMS-D-005090; FFMS-D-005046; FFMS-D-005045; FFMS-D-005031; FFMS-D-005030; FFMS-D-005012; FFMS-D-005010; FFMS-D-005004; FFMS-D-004994; FFMS-D-004989; FFMS-D-004972; FFMS-D-004969; FFMS-D-004967; FFMS-D-004566; FFMS-D-004565; FFMS-D-004564; FFMS-D-004563.

39 FFMS-D-005483; FFMS-D-005036; FFMS-D-005034; FFMS-D-005030; FFMS-D-005023; FFMS-D-005021; FFMS-D-005018; FFMS-D-005014; FFMS-D-005013; FFMS-D-005008; FFMS-D-004999; FFMS-D-004990; FFMS-D-004989; FFMS-D-004988; FFMS-D-004983; FFMS-D-004981; FFMS-D-004979; FFMS-D-004974.

40 FFMS-D-005036; FFMS-D-005021; FFMS-D-005018; FFMS-D-005014; FFMS-D-005013; FFMS-D-005007; FFMS-D-005005; FFMS-D-005000; FFMS-D-004999; FFMS-D-004997; FFMS-D-004995; FFMS-D-004989; FFMS-D-004971; FFMS-D-004566; FFMS-D-004564; FFMS-D-004348; FFMS_0368 (26 Oct 2025); FFMS_0365 (26 Oct 2025); FFMS_0366 (26 Oct 2025); FFMS-D-005526.

41 FFMS-D-005481; FFMS-D-005047; FFMS-D-005036; FFMS-D-005035; FFMS-D-005030; FFMS-D-005027; FFMS-D-005021; FFMS-D-005020; FFMS-D-005019; FFMS-D-005016; FFMS-D-005015; FFMS-D-005013; FFMS-D-005012; FFMS-D-005009; FFMS-D-005008; FFMS-D-005007; FFMS-D-005006; FFMS-D-005005; FFMS-D-005004; FFMS-D-005002; FFMS-D-005000; FFMS-D-004998; FFMS-D-004996; FFMS-D-004993; FFMS-D-004989; FFMS-D-004982; FFMS-D-004976; FFMS-D-004566; FFMS-D-004565; FFMS-D-004348; FFMS-D-004335; FFMS-D-

constructed by the Rapid Support Forces around El Fasher were also locations where members of the Rapid Support Forces separated, detained and killed civilians.

4. Killings at El Fasher University

36. Evidence supporting what was included in the report regarding what happened at the university, where the Rapid Support Forces targeted the El Fasher University with shelling and drone strikes, killing and injuring civilians sheltering there and its environs, is footnoted.[42]

5. Killing at the Saudi Hospital

37. Evidence supporting what was included in the report regarding the killings at the El Saudi Hospital, where multiple survivors described witnessing mass killings at the hospital or encountering large number of corpses immediately afterwards, is footnoted.[43]

6. Continued killings and executions on the road

38. Evidence supporting what was included in the report regarding the continued killings and executions on the road, is footnoted.[44] As was stated in the report, survivors reported extreme danger while attempting to flee, often leading to dispersion of persons fleeing in groups, and members of the Rapid Support Forces opening fire on the groups. Since the publication of the report, the mission has continued to receive information regarding the killings on the roads. Verified video material as well as survivor testimonies describe encountering numerous bodies of men, women, and children along the roads to Garni and Tawila.[45]

I. Causing serious bodily or mental harm

1. Rape and other forms of sexual violence

39. Evidence of what was included in the report regarding the widespread, systematic and coordinated acts of rape and other forms of sexual violence primarily

004315; FFMS-D-004313; FFMS-D-004311; FFMS-D-004309; FFMS_0371 (27 Oct 2025); FFMS_0372 (28 Oct 2025).

[42] FFMS-D-005047; FFMS-D-005045; FFMS-D-005035; FFMS-D-005034; FFMS-D-005026; FFMS-D-005020; FFMS-D-005018; FFMS-D-005013; FFMS-D-005011; FFMS-D-005007; FFMS-D-005004; FFMS-D-005003; FFMS-D-004999; FFMS-D-004993; FFMS-D-004984; FFMS-D-004975; FFMS-D-004972; FFMS-D-004970; FFMS-D-004967; FFMS-D-004318.

[43] FFMS-D-005509; FFMS-D-005497; FFMS-D-005033; FFMS-D-005031; FFMS-D-005024; FFMS-D-005013; FFMS-D-005007; FFMS-D-005006; FFMS-D-004976; FFMS-D-004973; FFMS-D-004565; FFMS_0367 (27 Oct 2025); FFMS-D-005526. See also: https://www.who.int/news/item/29-10-2025-who-condemns-killings-of-patients-and-civilians-amid-escalating-violence-in-el-fasher--sudan.

[44] FFMS-D-005132; FFMS-D-005131; FFMS-D-005130; FFMS-D-005128; FFMS-D-005127; FFMS-D-005124; FFMS-D-005123; FFMS-D-005118; FFMS-D-005024; FFMS-D-005021; FFMS-D-005017; FFMS-D-005008; FFMS-D-005004; FFMS-D-004993; FFMS-D-004992; FFMS-D-004991; FFMS-D-004990; FFMS-D-004988; FFMS-D-004986; FFMS-D-004983; FFMS-D-004981; FFMS-D-004973; FFMS-D-004972; FFMS-D-004970; FFMS-D-004967; FFMS-D-004966; FFMS-D-004566; FFMS-D-004565; FFMS-D-004564; FFMS-D-004563. See also: Sudan: Appalling reports of summary executions and other serious violations, as RSF makes major territorial gains in El Fasher and North Kordofan | OHCHR.

[45] FFMS-D-005123; FFMS-D-004987; FFMS-D-004992; FFMS-D-004988; FFMS-D-005021.

targeted at women and girls from non-Arab communities, particularly the Zaghawa, is cited in this section.[46]

40. The mission has continued to receive information regarding the identification of perpetrators of the rapes and other forms of sexual violence. Like other survivors, women who survived sexual violence identified the perpetrators as members of the Rapid Support Forces, describing their distinctive kaki/akhbashi/sandy coloured attire. Survivors further reported the presence of foreign fighters among the Rapid Support Forces who also perpetrated acts of sexual violence.[47]

a) Mass and gang rape

41. The mission has continued to receive information regarding mass and gang rapes. The Rapid Support Forces members carried out these assaults amid broader attacks involving killings, looting, forced displacement, and abductions, often separating men from women.[48]

42. At the El Saudi Hospital, survivors described members of the Rapid Support Forces raping numerous women after storming wards, killing wounded and sick people and civilians who had sought refuge inside.[49] Another survivor reported that, on 26 October 2025, Rapid Support Forces fighters entered a *takiya* where civilians had sought refuge, attacked the people, killing numerous men, as well as women and children.[50] As the survivor attempted to flee with her husband, Rapid Support Forces fighters raped her. When the husband tried to intervene to prevent the assault, one of the fighters slit the husband's throat with a knife, killing him on the spot.[51]

43. Several witnesses described women and girls between 12 and 17 years being raped by two or more members of the Rapid Support Forces. In Shagra, during the take-over, an eyewitness reported members of the Rapid Support Forces raping large numbers of women and girls, some as young as 13 years, after halting groups attempting to escape.[52] In this same incident, between 15 and 20 women and girls were raped, including adolescents and at least one elderly woman in her seventies, who later died from injuries sustained during the assault.

44. The mission has further found that the vast majority of the mass and gang rapes took place between El Fasher city and the routes of Tawila, Garni, Jabal Wana, and Mellit, as well as in Garni, Golo and Shagra areas.[53]

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[46] FFMS-D-005490; FFMS-D-005122; FFMS-D-005120; FFMS-D-005085; FFMS-D-005036; FFMS-D-005036; FFMS-D-005024; FFMS-D-005023; FFMS-D-005020; FFMS-D-005019; FFMS-D-005005; FFMS-D-004991; FFMS-D-004990; FFMS-D-004989; FFMS-D-004988; FFMS-D-004987; FFMS-D-004986; FFMS-D-004984; FFMS-D-004983; FFMS-D-004982; FFMS-D-004978; FFMS-D-004977; FFMS-D-004976; FFMS-D-004975; FFMS-D-004974; FFMS-D-004973; FFMS-D-004972; FFMS-D-004971; FFMS-D-004969; FFMS-D-004966; FFMS-D-004922; FFMS-D-004566; FFMS-D-004565; FFMS-D-004564; FFMS-D-00969.

[47] FFMS-D-004983, FFMS-D-005023.

[48] FFMS-D-005509; FFMS-D-005490; FFMS-D-005483; FFMS-D-005122; FFMS-D-005120; FFMS-D-005024; FFMS-D-005023; FFMS-D-004992; FFMS-D-004991; FFMS-D-004989; FFMS-D-004988; FFMS-D-004987; FFMS-D-004986; FFMS-D-004983; FFMS-D-004982; FFMS-D-004981; FFMS-D-004979; FFMS-D-004976; FFMS-D-004975; FFMS-D-004974; FFMS-D-004973; FFMS-D-004971; FFMS-D-004970; FFMS-D-004566.

[49] FFMS-D-004976; FFMS-D-004973; FFMS-D-005024.

[50] FFMS-D-005122.

[51] FFMS-D-005122. See also FFMS-D-005500, reporting that the survivor's husband was killed in an attempt to protect his wife.

[52] FFMS-D-004983, FFMS-D-005497.

[53] FFMS-D-004970; FFMS-D-004975; FFMS-D-004976; FFMS-D-005024; FFMS-D-004983; FFMS-D-004986.

b) Abduction and sexual violence

45. Since the publication of the report, the mission has continued to receive information regarding the systematic abduction of women and girls and sexual violence by the Rapid Support Forces. One witness saw members of the Rapid Support Forces tie the hands of three girls she knew behind their back, force them into a vehicle and drive them away.[54] In other incidents, survivors described women and girls being beaten, restrained with their hands tied behind their back, and taken away in a Landcruiser, while men were separated and taken in a different direction.[55] Several survivors reported that abducted women and girls were transported to remote locations, including forested areas outside El Fasher, where they were raped.[56]

46. In one documented case, members of the Rapid Support Forces detained four women before subsequently tying them to a cart and dragging it behind a vehicle for about one kilometre, resulting in their death.[57]

47. The mission's findings demonstrate that women and girls were deliberately targeted for rape and gang rape, with forced nudity used to humiliate, terrorize, and subjugate the civilian population. Similar patterns documented previously in El Geneina[58] and Zamzam[59] reveal continuity and reinforce the assessment that sexual violence has been used as a weapon of war in Darfur. Reflecting on this recurring pattern in El Fasher, the International Criminal Court's Deputy Prosecutor told the United Nations Security Council on 19 January 2025 that "*the pattern of atrocities in El Geneina in 2023 have been replicated in El Fasher in 2025*",[60] underscoring that sexual violence continues to be used as a tool of war in Darfur.

c) Rape in the presence of corpses

48. Since the publication of the report, the mission has continued to receive information regarding the perpetration of rape in the presence of corpses. Survivors described being raped in rooms where bodies of recently killed civilians, including their own family members, were still lying on the ground or recently killed.[61]

49. The same pattern took place along the roads used by civilians fleeing the city. One survivor recounted the rape of a woman in front of the body of her two-year-old son in Jabal Wana, who was killed along with other children. Members of the Rapid Support Forces explicitly stated that these children should have died in 2003, stating that, had they been killed then, they would not have had to fight them when grown up in 2023.[62] Another survivor was raped next to the bodies of her parents, who had been shot dead moments earlier, and her brother, who had been slain in her presence. She said: "*They raped me in front of the bodies of my mother, my father and my slaughtered brother*".[63] Rape perpetrated in the presence of the dead, particularly when the deceased were relatives, served to inflict terror, severe mental suffering,

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54 FFMS-D-005020; see also FFMS-D-005126; FFMS-D-005123.

55 FFMS-D-005023; FFMS-D-004986; FFMS-D-004989; FFMS-D-004971; FFMS-D-004973.

56 FFMS-D-004566; FFMS-D-005497; FFMS-D-004970; FFMS-D-004566; FFMS-D-005122.

57 FFMS-D-005014.

58 Report A/HRC/57/23.

59 Report A/HRC/60/22.

60 Int'l Criminal Court on X: "#ICC Deputy Prosecutor Nazhat Shameem Khan to #UNSC: The Office has made significant progress in its investigation in Al Geneina, #Darfur. It is undeniable, based on our investigations, that sexual violence, including rape, is being used as a tool of war in #Darfur. https://t.co/9ILQgUruF5" / X.

61 FFMS-D-004973, FFMS-D-005024, FFMS-D-004975, FFMS-D-004082.

62 FFMS-D-004986.

63 FFMS-D-004982.

asserting power and domination through the combined use of sexual violence and killing.

50. The breadth of locations, the consistency of methods, and the repetition across time indicate that these acts, perpetrated by the Rapid Support Forces and their allies, were neither isolated nor opportunistic. Rather, they formed part of a deliberate pattern of sexual violence systematically deployed during the operations of the Rapid Support Forces.

d) Normalization of acts of sexual violence

51. Since the publication of the report, the mission has continued to receive information regarding the normalization of acts of sexual violence.

52. Sexual violence in Sudan has long been enabled by a climate of impunity, with the events in El Fasher reflecting a clear escalation. Acts of rape were carried out openly, repeatedly and in full view of others, with perpetrators demonstrating no fear of consequences. One survivor recalled perpetrators laughing during the assaults, compounding the degrading and terrorizing nature of the violence.[64]

53. The absence of accountability appears to have normalized rape within the Rapid Support Forces modus operandi, where sexual violence functioned as a tolerated, permitted, systematic, and integrated practice of war, rather than as an isolated or incidental by-product of the conflict.

e) The gender dimension

54. Since the publication of the report, the mission has continued to receive information regarding the gender dimension of the attacks.

55. While men and young men were subjected to mass killings - often rounded up, separated, and executed - women and girls were not spared. Survivors consistently reported that women and girls were not only harmed incidentally by stray bullets during flight; rather, they were also shot dead deliberately, including at close range and in the course of attacks by the Rapid Support Forces on civilian groups, in particular either while defending their relatives from being abducted or assaulted, or because they resisted rape.[65] In one such case, a mother was reportedly killed after attempting to stop members of the Rapid Support Forces from taking her daughters from her on the road to Tawila, while fleeing from El Fasher.[66] In another case, a survivor reported that, after being abducted and held in a house along with other women and girls, Rapid Support Forces members attempted to rape two young women.[67] When the women resisted, the perpetrators killed them immediately.[68]

56. This demonstrates that the violence used by the Rapid Support Forces was not limited to targeting men as perceived combatants or supporters; it extended to the direct killing of women and girls as part of a broader campaign of terror and collective punishment. By killing or removing men and systematically violating women and girls, the actions of the Rapid Support Forces also attacked the very structure of families and communities, undermining social continuity.

[64] FFMS-D-0370.
[65] FFMS-D-004990; FFMS-D-004989; FFMS-D-004992; FFMS-D-004969; FFMS-D-004977; FFMS-D-004982; FFMS-D-005014.
[66] FFMS-D-005120.
[67] FFMS-D-005122.
[68] FFMS-D-005122.

f) The ethnic dimension

57. Since the publication of the report, the mission has continued to receive information regarding the ethnic dimension of the sexual violence by the Rapid Support Forces.

58. Survivors reported hearing statements made by members of the Rapid Support Forces after the takeover of the city, including: “We have to empty El Fasher of the Falangiyat; “These are Falangiyat, these are slaves. Kill them, destroy them, rape them; “The Rapid Support Forces are above everything”; “Any Zaghawa we will capture, will not survive the night”; “Is there anyone Zaghawa among you? If we find Zaghawa, we will kill them all”.[69] Such expressions were accompanied by acts of killing, beatings, sexual violence and forced displacement.

59. Survivors consistently reported that women and girls perceived as non-Arab, particularly those who were or believed to be Zaghawa, were specifically targeted. One survivor reported that when she stated her Zaghawa tribe, the Rapid Support Forces fighters beat her harder and told her: “We are allergic to the Zaghawa.” They then raped her after tying her hands, and while raping her said: “Zaghawiya hein? We are your only men, no other men,” implying the erasure of the Zaghawa men and the ownership over the Zaghawa women.[70]

60. Other survivors stated that, immediately before raping women, fighters of the Rapid Support Forces used the word “marry” or “bride” or “our ladies”, referring to rape, as a form of ownership, intimidation and humiliation.[71] One survivor told the mission that, on 26 October 2025, about an hour after leaving El Fasher, on the road to Tawila, she and others fleeing were intercepted by fighters of the Rapid Support Forces.[72] These fighters separated the men from the women, and took the men away. Then the fighters picked some of the women to be raped, while forcing the other women to sit and watch the rapes. The fighters of the Rapid Support Forces told the observing women: “Sit here until we ‘marry’ your sister.”[73]

61. Meanwhile, women who identified themselves as Arab or Arab-aligned were often spared.[74] One woman avoided rape after claiming she belonged to the Fallati tribe, prompting a Rapid Support Forces member to say: “You are my cousin”.[75] Another woman described how a member of the Rapid Support Forces pulled his trousers down to rape her but stopped after she asserted she was from the Masri neighbourhood, prompting him to pull up his trousers and tell her: “Get up, my cousin” and let her leave.[76]

62. Such discriminatory treatment, consistently reported across several interviews, indicates that ethnicity was a primary criterion guiding the conduct of the Rapid Support Forces and that sexual violence was intentionally directed against non-Arab communities as part of a broader campaign of ethnically motivated violence. This widespread conduct of the Rapid Support Forces also points to a broader campaign of persecution and collective punishment. The repetition of these methods across locations and days, consistency of language used, and alignment with patterns documented elsewhere in Darfur since 2023, indicate an organized and tolerated

[69] FFMS-D-004969; FFMS-D-004975; FFMS-D-004982; FFMS-D-004989; FFMS-D-005023.
[70] FFMS-D-004974; FFMS-D-005122.
[71] FFMS-D-004989; FFMS-D-004565; FFMS-D-004969; FFMS-D-004974; FFMS-D-005085; FFMS-D-005490.
[72] FFMS-D-004989.
[73] FFMS-D-004989.
[74] FFMS-D-005490; FFMS-D-004983; FFMS-D-00498; FFMS-D-005005; FFMS-D-005118.
[75] FFMS-D-004971.
[76] FFMS-D-004981.

policy. The events in El Fasher represent both a continuation and an intensification of these methods.

g) Consequences of sexual violence

63. Since the publication of the report, the mission has continued to receive information regarding the consequences of the rapes and other forms of sexual violence.

64. Survivors reported severe physical and psychological consequences, including miscarriages, prolonged bleeding, extensive genital and anal injuries, infections, urinary retention, unwanted pregnancies, and intense trauma and social stigma. One interviewee who aborted after learning she was pregnant as a result of rape said: "My husband and I tried to have children and had never had a child, but to become pregnant after rape, no, I cannot accept it".[77]

65. Multiple victims of sexual violence died as a result of rape.[78] Accounts received by the mission indicate that, on some occasions, members of the Rapid Support Forces perpetrated rape by inserting a sharp object into the anus of the victims, leading to the death of at least one victim.[79]

66. Survivors could not access timely or sufficient medical assistance due to ongoing hostilities and destruction of health facilities, insecurity along escape routes, and deliberate obstruction by armed actors. Survivors frequently reported that they were only able to reach medical care after arriving in Tawila or Kutum, often after days of travel in extremely vulnerable conditions. Even upon arrival, care was limited, and at least two women documented by the mission died in Tawila from injuries sustained during rape combined with a prolonged lack of treatment.[80]

67. During its visit to Tine (Chad), members of the mission observed that a significant number of refugees were women and children. Women described giving birth on the road while fleeing. Many of them were also in precarious conditions after becoming heads of households after losing or being separated from male relatives.[81] Displacement, insecurity, and the absence of basic services have compounded their vulnerability, underscoring the gendered impact of the conflict.

2. Detention, torture, humiliation, extortion, ransom and disappearances

68. Evidence of what was included in the report, regarding the widespread and systematic pattern of detention and enforced disappearance of civilians and persons *hors de combat,*[82] and, acts of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,[83] committed by the Rapid Support Forces, is included in the footnotes.

69. Since the publication of the report, the mission has continued to receive information regarding different detention sites used by the Rapid Support Forces. A significant number of detained persons who were arrested in different locations while fleeing from El Fasher, were later brought back to El Fasher and detained there in different buildings, including schools, the El Saudi Hospital and former government

[77] FFMS-D-004982.
[78] FFMS-D-004983; FFMS-D-004969; FFMS-D-004988; FFMS-D-005490.
[79] FFMS-D-005082; FFMS-D-004991.
[80] FFMS-D-004988; FFMS-D-004983.
[81] See, *inter alia*, FFMS-D-005490.
[82] FFMS-D-005151; FFMS-D-004989; FFMS-D-005131; FFMS-D-005118; FFMS-D-005016; FFMS-D-004350; FFMS-D-005025; FFMS-D-005013; FFMS-D-005509.
[83] FFMS-D-005509; FFMS-D-005483; FFMS-D-005151; FFMS-D-005131; FFMS-D-005083; FFMS-D-005021; FFMS-D-005016; FFMS-D-005013; FFMS-D-004995; FFMS-D-004979; FFMS-D-004566; FFMS-D-005475.

buildings.[84] Credible sources indicate that towards the end of 2025, thousands of persons apprehended in El Fasher were transferred to Nyala. In Nyala, they were reportedly held in the main prison, 'Daqris', which was already severely overcrowded with thousands of persons previously captured by the Rapid Support Forces in other parts of Sudan and transferred to the same facility.[85]

70. Thousands of detainees reportedly remain in Nyala. Severe overcrowding, inadequate medical care, widespread physical violence, and detention conditions incompatible with human dignity, are widely reported to the mission. There is a high risk of disappearances given the lack of legal processes and denial of family and lawyers' visits.[86] Family members are neither provided with information regarding the fate or whereabouts of their relatives nor granted access to them. The risk of enforced disappearance is further heightened by the complete absence of any legal process, let alone due process. Detainees are reportedly held without any legal basis, with no access to lawyers or judicial review. At the same time, humanitarian actors and human rights monitors have been systematically denied access to detention facilities by both parties to the conflict. Some humanitarian workers were themselves detained.[87] The lack of independent oversight prevents verification of conditions, exacerbates concerns regarding the missing persons and facilitates ongoing violations. It also compounds the suffering of families seeking information about missing relatives.

71. The mission has also received additional information regarding the modus operandi employed by the Rapid Support Forces when selecting, detaining, transporting or disappearing individuals.[88] Survivors described men and boys being separated from women, girls and elderly persons.[89] Among men, former government employees, including teachers and doctors, were at heightened risk, often separated from other captives and not seen again.[90]

72. The mission has continued to receive information regarding the treatment of persons who were detained at the former children's hospital in El Fasher and the contracting of avoidable widespread illnesses. As a result of drinking contaminated water, some detainees contracted cholera which reportedly resulted in multiple deaths in custody.[91]

73. Evidence of what was included in the report regarding extortion, ransom demands and means of payment, including through a Bank app or outreach to family members on social media, in return for the release of detained persons or return of confiscated items, and the consequences for those who did not pay, is cited here.[92]

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84 FFMS-D-005151.

85 FFMS-D-005521; FFMS-D-005302.

86 https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/ffm-sudan/20260615-oral-update-ffm-sudan-62nd-hrc-en.pdf; FFMS-D-005521; FFMS-D-005522; FFMS-D-005152; FFMS-D-005302.

87 FFMS-D-005521; FFMS-D-005522; FFMS-D-005525.

88 FFMS-D-004971; FFMS-D-004973.

89 FFMS-D-005151; FFMS-D-005023; FFMS-D-005021; FFMS-D-005016; FFMS-D-005015; FFMS-D-005013; FFMS-D-005012; FFMS-D-005002; FFMS-D-005000; FFMS-D-004996; FFMS_0369 (26 Oct 2025). See also FFMS-D-005131.

90 FFMS-D-005131; FFMS-D-005509.

91 FFMS-D-005013; FFMS-D-005509; FFMS-D-004995; FFMS-D-005521.

92 FFMS-D-005481; FFMS-D-005466; FFMS-D-005151; FFMS-D-005133; FFMS-D-005131; FFMS-D-005130; FFMS-D-005020; FFMS-D-005015; FFMS-D-005013; FFMS-D-005002; FFMS-D-004999; FFMS-D-004989; FFMS-D-004976; FFMS-D-004968; FFMS-D-004565; FFMS-D-005523; FFMS-D-005475.

J. Conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction

74. Evidence of what was included in the report regarding conditions imposed in and around El Fasher, including deliberate starvation and destruction of the means of survival of the inhabitants, is cited here.[93] The mission continues to receive additional information regarding the impact on survivors, following the takeover of El Fasher. Amongst the main concerns is the high number of people, perhaps - tens of thousands, who remain missing or unaccounted for.

75. Prior to the takeover of El Fasher, the city's population was estimated at 260,000.[94] Following the takeover, the International Organisation for Migration estimated that 127,162 individuals (28,044 households) had been displaced from locations in El Fasher town and surrounding villages between 26 October 2025 and 13 January 2026.[95] On 29 October 2025 the International Rescue Committee (IRC) stated that, "despite reports of large numbers of families attempting to flee towards Tawila, IRC teams on the ground have seen fewer than 5,000 arrive".[96] Most civilians fled before, during or immediately after the takeover of El Fasher. Since that initial movement, onward arrivals to locations such as Tawila have been minimal, mostly comprising individuals released after the payment of ransom. Very few, in particular of the Zaghawa, Fur and other non-Arab remained in El Fasher after the takeover.[97]

76. Organisations that finally managed to access El-Fasher described it as a 'ghost town'. On 29 December 2025, the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan mentioned that "it was not possible to give a precise number of those remaining in al-Fashir. Those who United Nations staff did see were living inside empty buildings or in rudimentary camps using basic plastic sheets".[98]

77. On 29 January 2026, Doctors Without Borders visited El Fasher. It subsequently expressed that, "our fears are now growing that most of the civilians who were still alive when RSF seized the city have since been killed or displaced".[99] The organisation also noted that though "the visit was too limited to allow us to get more than a glimpse of El Fasher, yet this glimpse was a grim reminder of the sheer scale of the destruction that took place in the city as many of its residents were wiped out".[100]

78. Evidence of what was included in the report regarding the harm suffered by those who managed to leave El Fasher including reports of severe anxiety, psychological trauma, traumatic bereavement, and complicated grief resulting from the violence they experienced and witnessed, and the severe and long-lasting physical and psychological consequences of sexual violence, are cited here.[101] Access to

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93 FFMS-D-005021; FFMS-D-005020; FFMS-D-005019; FFMS-D-005014; FFMS-D-005011; FFMS-D-005010; FFMS-D-005009; FFMS-D-005005; FFMS-D-005002; FFMS-D-004997; FFMS-D-004995.

94 https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/08/1165731; *27 August 2025 (Sudan: 'Devastating tragedy' for children in El Fasher after 500 days of siege).*

95 DTM Sudan Flash Alert: Al Fasher (Al Fasher town), North Darfur; 02 November 2025. International Organisation for Migration, Emergency Event Tracking Report | Displacement Tracking Matrix (11 January to 4 May 2026).

96 https://www.rescue.org/eu/press-release/darfur-irc-warns-civilians-trapped-or-fleeing-el-fasher-risk-being-killed-arrivals; 29 October 2025.

97 FFMS-D-005521.

98 https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/aid-workers-find-little-life-sudans-al-fashir-after-paramilitary-takeover-2025-12-29/. See also FFMS-D-005065.

99 https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/glimpse-ghost-town-el-fasher.

100 https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/glimpse-ghost-town-el-fasher.

101 FFMS-D-004981; FFMS-D-005490; FFMS-D-005082; FFMS-D-004991; FFMS-D-004983; FFMS-D-004969; FFMS-D-004988. See also, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk ends Sudan mission, 18 January 2026.

mental health and psychosocial support remains limited to date, which aggravates and prolongs the harm.

79. The mission has also continued to receive information on the impact on children. Many children arrived in displacement sites on their own or with one parent, family member or with strangers who picked them up along the way.[102] The mission further notes that conflict embeds harm across generations and where trauma is left unaddressed, the legacy of war is not a memory, but renewed vulnerability to future violence. For children, exposure to war, displacement and trauma during critical windows of brain development can alter the foundations of learning, behaviour, attachment and long term physical and mental health.[103]

K. Acts by the leadership of the Rapid Support Forces

80. The mission has continued to receive information regarding the involvement of senior members of the Rapid Support Forces leadership in the events relating to the takeover of El Fasher. Verified video-footage, shared on the official Rapid Support Forces' Telegram channel on 26 October 2025, placed Deputy Commander Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo at the 6th Infantry Division base in El Fasher giving a speech around 10-11 am in the morning of 26 October 2025 after the Rapid Support Forces had captured it alongside other key military installations in the city.[104] The Deputy Commander was also identified in El Fasher two days after the takeover, and again on 4 November 2025, according to verified footage.[105]

81. Citing his "pivotal role" in the Rapid Support Forces' military campaign launched in Darfur by personally supervising operations that led to the killing and execution of civilians, including during the advance on the city of El Fasher, the European Union placed the Deputy Commander, Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo, on its sanctions list in November 2025.[106] He was similarly placed on the sanction list of the United Kingdom in December 2025,[107] and the United Nations Security Council in February 2026, based on, amongst others, footage believed to be of Abdelrahim Dagalo where he reportedly instructed his troops not to take any prisoners.[108]

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[102] FFMS-D-005018; FFMS-D-005065.

[103] Hazer, L., & Gredebäck, G. (2023). The effects of war, displacement, and trauma on child development. *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 10*, 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-02438-8. Bürgin, D., Anagnostopoulos, D., Anagnostopoulos, D., Doyle, M., Eliez, S., Fegert, J., Fuentes, J., Hebebrand, J., Hillegers, M., Karwautz, A., Kiss, E., Kotsis, K., Pejović-Milovančević, M., Christensen, R. A., Raynaud, J., Crommen, S., Çetin, F., Boričević, V., Kehoe, L. A., . . . Fegert, J. (2022). Impact of war and forced displacement on children's mental health—multilevel, needs-oriented, and trauma-informed approaches. *European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 31*, 845 - 853. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00787-022-01974-z.

[104] FFMS-D-005527.

[105] FFMS-D-005528; FFMS-D-005529.

[106] Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2368 of 20 November 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2147 concerning restrictive measures in view of activities undermining the stability and political transition of Sudan, Official Journal of the European Union, 20 November 2025, Annex I (listing of Abdelrahim HamdanDagalo), at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202502368.

[107] United Kingdom, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), *The UK Sanctions List*, Sudan sanctions designation of Abdul Rahim (Abdelrahim) Hamdan Dagalo, 12 December 2025. https://search-uk-sanctions-list.service.gov.uk/designations/SUD0022/Individual

[108] United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, *Narrative Summary of Reasons for Listing – Abdul*

82. Evidence of what was included in the report regarding the identification of Rapid Support Forces commanders issuing orders to kill, detain and loot, with allied Arab militias operating under the same command structure, are cited in the footnote.[109] The presence of commanders at the scene, particularly where they offer words of encouragement or otherwise signal approval while atrocities are being committed in plain view, may amount to aiding and abetting where such conduct provides moral support with a substantial effect on the crimes.[110] At the same time, their failure to intervene or take reasonable measures to prevent or repress these acts may engage their responsibility under the doctrine of command responsibility.[111]

III. Expanded Legal Analysis and Findings

A. International Crimes

83. In light of the overwhelming and consistent body of evidence the mission has collected, the mission finds that serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights amounting to international crimes have been committed by the Rapid Support Forces in and around El Fasher. The events in and around El Fasher during the prolonged 18-month siege and the subsequent takeover of the city by the Rapid Support Forces and their allies on 26, 27 and 28 October 2025 should not be considered in isolation. They were the consolidation and culmination of a widespread and systematic pattern of conduct committed in Darfur and other parts of Sudan, since the start of the conflict in mid-April 2023, carried out pursuant to a plan or policy, and with clear knowledge and intent.

84. The mission recalls the legal conclusions contained in its previous reports in which it found that the Rapid Support Forces and their allies committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, including in and around El Geneina and El Fasher.[112] Its continued investigations into El Fasher and its surroundings, as reflected in this conference room paper, confirm its previous findings. The mission recalls in particular its finding of reasonable grounds to believe that the Rapid Support Forces committed the crime against humanity of persecution on gender, ethnic and political grounds and the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare, which may also amount to the crime against humanity of extermination.[113]

1. From starvation to extermination

85. The mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces and allies committed the war crime of starvation by imposing a prolonged siege of El Fasher and surroundings, including wilfully impeding relief supplies, accompanied by daily shelling and targeted attacks on medical facilities, shelters, and food production systems that deprived the civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival that would reasonably be expected to result in starvation conditions. While not a necessary element to indicate starvation as a war crime, the mission recorded multiple accounts

Rahim Hamdan Dagalo (SDi.008), 24 Feb. 2026. At: https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/abdul-rahim-hamdan-dagalo.

109 FFMS-D-005131; FFMS-D-005490; FFMS-D-005489.

110 ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Brđanin*, Judgement (AC), Case No. IT-99-36-A, 3 April 2007, para. 273; ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al*., Judgement (TC), Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1, 22 February 2001, para. 391; ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Aleksovski*, Judgement (TC), Case No. IT-95-14/1, 25 June 1999, para. 86-87.

111 ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez*, Judgement (TC), Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, 26 February 2001, paras. 366–370.

112 A/HRC/57/23; A/HRC/57/CRP.6; A/HRC/60/22; A/HRC/60/CRP.7; A/HRC/61/77.

113 Articles 7(b) and (h) and 8(2(e)(xix) Rome Statute (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court).

of civilians who died as a result of these starvation conditions.[114] It notes that the full extent and number of such 'slow deaths' has not been documented yet.

86. Combined with multiple incidents of large-scale killings of civilians and persons *hors de combat* committed by the Rapid Support Forces during the takeover of El Fasher and its surroundings on 26, 27 and 28 October 2025 and thereafter, the mission concludes that they also committed the crime against humanity of extermination. The mission is guided by the jurisprudence considering extermination as the act of killing on a large scale committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population.[115] It also notes that there is no numerical minimum for 'large scale'[116] and that killings may be committed directly or indirectly ('causing death'), including through the commission of rape and other forms of sexual violence as another category of 'slow deaths'.[117]

87. The mission considered in making this determination the overwhelming and direct evidence of systematic and widespread direct and indirect killings of civilians and persons *hors de combat* committed on a large or mass scale and through different means. This included indiscriminate shootings, point blank executions, torture, causing death by running civilians over with cars or dragging them behind cars causing death, raping and gang-raping women and girls, in some cases resulting in their deaths or directly followed by their execution. The number of victims in single incidents of mass killings documented by the mission ranged from tens to hundreds – including men, women and children – and were frequently accompanied by statements or utterances of perpetrators expressing their intent to kill on a mass scale. Moreover, individual members of the Rapid Support Forces who refused to follow orders to kill or rape, or who objected to such acts, received punishment, including being killed themselves.[118]

2. Persecution through ethnic targeting

88. The victims of the above crimes were not randomly chosen. They were selected mainly because the Rapid Support Forces perceived them as belonging to a particular collective or group based on their intersecting gender, ethnicity and actual or perceived political affiliation to the opposing forces - whose leadership was of the same ethnicity.[119] The mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces targeted non-Arab communities in and around El Fasher, in particular the Zaghawa and Fur, imposing restrictions on movements, and carrying out killings, torture, rape of women and girls, arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances among other violations of fundamental rights with the deliberate intent to discriminate.

89. This was highlighted not only through such acts but also their accompanying statements and utterances labelling non-Arab communities, in particular the Zaghawa, as slaves and enemies of the Rapid Support Forces interfering with their plans to create a new state. The mission inferred as expressions of discriminatory intent, among others, that where perpetrators believed fleeing victims to belong to an Arab tribe they were spared and received assistance, and where they found them to belong to a non-Arab tribe, in particular Zaghawa or Fur, they were subjected to inhumane and dehumanizing acts, including killings, torture, and rape. On this basis,

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[114] Article 8(2(e)(xix) Rome Statute (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court) and Elements of Crimes (Elements-of-Crimes.pdf).

[115] ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić*, Public Redacted Version of Judgement – Volume I of IV (TC), Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, 24 March 2016, paras. 483-484.

[116] ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Stakić*, Judgement (AC), Case No. IT-97-24-A, 22 March 2006, para. 260.

[117] ICTR, *Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana*, Judgement (TC), Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999, paras. 115 – 116.

[118] See e.g. FFMS-D-004969; FFMS-D-004999.

[119] ICC, *Prosecutor v. Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman ('Ali Kushayb')*, Judgment (TC), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/20, 6 October 2025, paras. 787 and 789.

the mission confirms its previous finding in the report that the Rapid Support Forces and its allies committed the crime of persecution on gender, ethnic and political grounds in and around El Fasher in connection with other crimes under the Rome Statute.[120]

3. The hallmarks of genocide

90. Given these findings, the mission assessed, in the report, whether the body of facts and evidence could satisfy the legal elements of the crime of genocide, including whether the relevant acts were committed with genocidal intent.[121] In answering this question, the mission considered whether any of the underlying acts of genocide were committed; whether or not the targeted victims belonged to a protected group; and, whether or not the perpetrators of these acts possessed the special or genocidal intent ('*dolus specialis*') to destroy the protected group in whole or in part. While the crimes against humanity of extermination, persecution, rape, torture, imprisonment, enforced disappearance and other inhumane acts are independently established, the scale, nature and cumulative pattern of conduct documented by the mission also required consideration of whether the conduct crossed the threshold into genocide. The legal analysis that follows therefore addresses, not whether atrocity crimes occurred, but whether the specific intent required for genocide can reasonably be inferred from the totality of the evidence.

91. The mission finds that the widespread and systematic pattern of conduct of the Rapid Support Forces, in particular large-scale killings committed through different means and methods, mass-scale rape, gang-rape and other forms of torture and cruel treatment, and deliberate starvation conditions including the destruction of means of survival and denial of medical and humanitarian aid, imposed through the extended siege, was committed pursuant to a plan or policy and with knowledge and intent. This is established through numerous consistent survivor testimonies, utterances and statements made by Rapid Support Forces commanders and fighters whilst committing atrocities, verified videos and satellite imagery, and warnings issued by the Security Council and others that were ignored. It thus demonstrates that at least three of the material crimes of genocide are overwhelmingly present, namely:

(i) Killing members of the group;

(ii) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; and

(iii) Deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, in whole or in part.

92. The mission further considered whether the widespread pattern of sexual violence, forced pregnancy, denial of reproductive healthcare and related harms could constitute measures intended to prevent births within the group within the meaning of Article II(d) of the Genocide Convention. While investigations remain ongoing, the available evidence warrants continued examination of this question.

93. In the mission's assessment, the key constituent elements of the crime of genocide, engaging both individual criminal responsibility and responsibility of States under international law, are present regarding the events described in the report and this conference room paper. These include the existence of a protected group, the commission of one or more of the underlying acts enumerated in the Genocide Convention and Article 6 of the Rome Statute, and the presence of specific intent to destroy the protected group in whole or in part.

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[120] ICC, *Prosecutor v. Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman ('Ali Kushayb')*, Judgment (TC), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/20, 6 October 2025, para. 782.

[121] Article 2 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948 (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide | OHCHR); Article 6 Rome Statute (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court).

94. With regard to the existence of protected groups, in the case of *The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir*, the International Criminal Court held that the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa constitute protected groups based on their ethnicity within the meaning of Article 6 of the Rome Statute concerning the crime of genocide. The Court found these groups to each have their own language, tribal customs, and traditional links to their lands, and to be stable and identifiable, and perceived as such by both perpetrators and victims ('self-identification'). The Court considered this as the decisive criterion for determining the existence of a protected group for the purposes of genocide.[122] The mission concurs with this reasoning based on its factual findings. It found in particular that both victims and perpetrators without hesitation identified themselves and the others based on their distinct ethnicities.

95. Regarding the material acts, under category I crimes, killings committed on a large scale and by different means, including pursuing victims along the exit routes and roads out of El Fasher to prevent escape and effect further executions. Category II crimes include mass rape and gang-rape and other forms of torture and cruel treatment of victims, including acts committed in public buildings, on the roads, and in detention centres. While category III crimes concern the deliberate starvation of the civilian population through the siege of El Fasher, including through deprivation below a minimum standard of housing, hygiene and medical care, and food and water for a prolonged period of time, leading to death and 'slow death'.[123] All these acts took place despite repeated warnings, issued by the United Nations Security Council and other key international and regional entities, to the Rapid Support Forces and their allies, of impending starvation and other atrocity crimes.

96. The existence of the *dolus specialis* or specific intent to destroy the protected group in whole or in part is a distinct legal element of the crime of genocide. It has been established through jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals, that requiring direct statements by perpetrators stating their intent to commit genocide would place the bar at an unattainable high level. Such intent can instead also be inferred from the body of evidence as a whole.[124] In this regard, based on relevant jurisprudence, consideration should be given to, among other factors, the general context, scale of atrocities, systematic targeting of victims – regardless of their status as civilian or *person hors de combat* - on account of their membership in the protected group, repetition of destructive or discriminatory acts, the existence of a plan or policy, and displays of intent made during public speeches or in meetings.[125]

97. The mission's assessment is based on a careful consideration of all other possible explanations regarding intent. It finds that genocidal statements were uttered by leaders and commanders of the Rapid Support Forces, including, for example, Abdelrahim Dagalo and Abu Lulu.[126] It therefore finds that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the pattern of conduct of the Rapid Support Forces in and around El Fasher, including the scale and sequence of events, patterns of targeting, language used by commanders and direct perpetrators stating their intention to kill, eliminate, and destroy all Zaghawa and the Fur, and the cumulative impact of their acts on its victims individually and the protected group collectively, is that they acted with genocidal intent. That intent is inferred from the full body of evidence collected by the mission.

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[122] ICC, *Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir*, Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest (PTC), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, 4 March 2009, paras. 135-137; and Second Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest (PTC), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-94, 12 July 2010, para. 9.

[123] ICTR, *Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana*, Judgement (TC), Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999, paras. 115-116.

[124] See e.g. ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Karadžić*, Judgement (TC), Case No. IT-95-5/18, 24 March 2016, para. 550.

[125] *Ibid*.

[126] See above, para. 81; and A/HRC/61/77, paras. 53, 56.

4. Previous international consideration of genocide allegations in Darfur

98. The question of genocide has been associated with Sudan for decades. On 18 September 2004, the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted resolution 1564 (2004) and requested the Secretary-General to establish the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur. Significantly, the Council expressly included within the Commission's mandate the determination of whether acts of genocide had occurred in Darfur. Paragraph 12 of resolution 1564 requested the Commission to immediately "investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.[127]

99. The International Commission of Inquiry submitted its report to the Security Council on 25 January 2005.[128] In section II of its report, the Commission addressed the question of genocide directly. In paragraph 640, it concluded that "the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide." At the same time, however, the Commission observed that two constituent elements of genocide could arguably be deduced from the violations committed by Government forces and associated militias. These were, first, the *actus reus* consisting of killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction; and second, the targeting of protected groups by the perpetrators of criminal conduct.[129]

100. The Commission further recognised in paragraph 641 of its report that "in some instances, individuals, including Government officials, may commit acts with genocidal intent." It added that whether this was the case in Darfur was a determination that would have to be made on a case-by-case basis.[130] This careful formulation reflected the Commission's distinction between the identification of genocidal acts and the determination of individual criminal responsibility for genocide. It was also consistent with the Commission's principal recommendation that the situation in Darfur be referred by the Security Council to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The Security Council accepted this recommendation and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, referred the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court through resolution 1593 (2005).

101. In 2009, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court applied for a warrant of arrest against the then President, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, including on charges of genocide.[131] In its decision of 4 March 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber I declined to include genocide charges, finding that genocidal intent was not the only reasonable conclusion available from the evidence before it at that stage.[132] On appeal, however, the Appeals Chamber reversed that decision on 3 February 2010, holding that the Pre-Trial Chamber had applied an excessively demanding standard. The Appeals Chamber clarified that, at the arrest warrant stage,

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[127] Security Council resolution 1564 (2004), para. 12.

[128] Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, S/2005/60, 25 January 2005.

[129] S/2005/60, para. 640.

[130] S/2005/60, para. 641.

[131] ICC, *Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir*, Prosecutor's Application for Warrant of Arrest, 14 July 2008 (Public redacted version of the Prosecution Application, ICC-02/05-157-AnxA).

[132] ICC, *Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir*, Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest (PTC), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, 4 March 2009, para. 205.

the applicable standard is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed the crimes alleged.[133]

102. The mission considers that this jurisprudential and historical context is of direct relevance to the present situation in El Fasher. The legal and factual questions that confronted previous international mechanisms in relation to Darfur continue to arise today. The mission's findings concerning killings, serious bodily and mental harm, the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, and evidence of genocidal intent, demonstrate both continuity with earlier patterns of violence in Darfur and an escalation of methods and consequences documented during the conflict that began in April 2023.

5. Obligations of other States

103. States that render logistical, material, financial or military support to the Rapid Support Forces may also incur responsibility under international law, including under the obligations arising from the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Under Article I of the Convention, States undertake not only to punish genocide but also to prevent it. The obligation to prevent arises at the instant a State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide may be committed. It is an obligation of conduct rather than result, requiring States to employ all means reasonably available to them, within their capacity to influence the relevant actors, to prevent the commission of genocide.[134]

104. Where a State possessing the capacity to influence perpetrators continues to provide military, financial, logistical, intelligence or political support despite knowledge of a serious risk of genocide, questions may arise concerning compliance with its obligations under Article I of the Convention. Depending on the circumstances, additional questions may arise regarding complicity in genocide under Article III(e) of the Convention. The International Court of Justice distinguished in *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro* between failure to prevent genocide and complicity in genocide, noting that complicity requires positive action contributing to the commission of genocide together with the requisite knowledge of genocidal intent.[135] Continued support that substantially facilitates the commission of genocidal acts despite awareness of a serious risk of genocide may therefore engage not only obligations of prevention but also the prohibition of complicity in genocide.

105. In addition, States providing aid or assistance in the commission of internationally wrongful acts may incur responsibility under Article 16 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts where they do so with knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongful act.[136]

106. While the proceedings instituted by Sudan before the International Court of Justice against the United Arab Emirates under the Genocide Convention did not proceed because of the reservation entered by the United Arab Emirates to Article IX of the Convention concerning the Court's jurisdiction, proceedings against States that have not entered comparable reservations would not necessarily encounter the same

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[133] ICC *Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir*, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor against the "Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir" (AC), ICC-02/05-01/09-OA, 3 February 2010, paras. 33–38.

[134] ICJ, *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro*, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Judgment, 26 February 2007, para. 430. See also paras. 419–432 and 438.

[135] ICJ, *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro*, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Judgment, 26 February 2007, paras. 419-423.

[136] International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), Article 16.

jurisdictional obstacle. In this regard, the dissenting opinion of Judge Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf deserves particular attention for its discussion of the obligations of third States under the Convention and the implications of military and material support provided in the face of a serious risk of genocide.[137]

107. Pronouncements by United Nations human rights investigative bodies contribute directly to the foreseeability requirement to anticipate serious violations of international law in the context of protection of civilians. In its previous reports, the mission invoked Article 1 in its analysis of the current non-international armed conflict, recommending that other States and the international community respect, enforce and expand the Security Council arms embargo imposed in Darfur to all Sudan and halt all material support to the parties, including via private actors and transit routes. In the "*Hallmarks of Genocide*" report, the mission also called for the use of all available diplomatic, political, and preventive tools to halt further mass violence.

B. Accountability

108. Calls for accountability for international crimes committed in the ongoing conflict in Sudan, including Darfur, have continuously been issued by relevant actors at all levels, including the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council. The mission has put forward a series of recommendations for accountability measures.[138]

109. The accumulated legacy of unaddressed impunity continues to fuel the conflict and emboldens perpetrators to commit atrocities without fear of consequences. The direct impact of this has been witnessed in and around El Fasher with perpetrators filming their crimes and showcasing them on social media. Individual criminal accountability is essential. Breaking cycles of conflict and preventing further violence requires accountability not only for direct perpetrators and co-perpetrators but also for indirect ones such as institutional actors, economic interests, and business networks that enable, finance, benefit from, or sustain atrocities and the impunity that allows them to recur. This includes intermediaries, commercial entities, transportation networks, arms suppliers, extractive industry actors and other similar entities.

110. The mission has analysed the accountability landscape in its paper "*Paths to justice: accountability for atrocities in the Sudan*", and considers that the International Criminal Court is a key avenue for accountability.[139] The Court's jurisdiction, which is based on United Nations Security Council resolution 1593 (2005), remains limited to the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002.[140] On 6 October 2025, the Court issued its first judgment in the Darfur situation finding former Janjaweed leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (nickname Ali Kushayb) guilty of 27 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including persecution on ethnic, gender and political grounds, in relation to attacks carried out against members of the Fur ethnicity in Darfur, between August 2003 and April 2004.[141] The

[137] ICJ, *Sudan v United Arab Emirates*, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in Sudan, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf.
[138] A/HRC/60/CRP.7.
[139] A/HRC/60/CRP.7.
[140] S/RES/1593 (2005).
[141] https://www.icc-cpi.int/court-record/icc-02/05-01/20-1240; see also A/HRC/60/CRP.7 para. 47.

Office of the Prosecutor has confirmed it is investigating alleged crimes committed in the ongoing conflict, including the El Fasher and El Geneina incidents.[142]

111. The mission further recalls that under article III(e) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, complicity in genocide constitutes an autonomous international crime giving rise to individual criminal responsibility.[143] States, entities and individuals providing military, financial, logistical, intelligence or other forms of support with knowledge of a serious risk that such support may contribute to genocidal acts may incur responsibility under international law. The mission encourages states to pursue accountability efforts for such acts, at the domestic level, pursuant to the universal jurisdiction principle.

112. The mission is mandated to support accountability efforts *inter alia* by identifying individuals and entities responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, or other related crimes, in the Sudan, and cooperating with judicial and other entities, as appropriate.[144] To this end, its investigative strategies include the identification of entities and persons of interest in relation to the commission of international crimes with a view to developing confidential lists and dossiers.[145] It takes account of the different modes of liability recognized in international criminal law including: direct and indirect, aiding and abetting, individual and joint, co-perpetration or contributing to the commission or attempted commission of international crimes by a group of persons acting with a common purpose, as well as command or other superior responsibility that is triggered when commanders or superiors with effective command and control, or control fail to prevent or punish crimes committed by their subordinates.[146]

113. The mission continues to cooperate with the International Criminal Court. It may also cooperate with other judicial or related entities, for example at the domestic level, in the area of accountability, including in relation to regions of Sudan that currently fall outside of the jurisdiction of the Court. It has developed internal policies on cooperation to ensure responses are provided in line with its mandate and guiding principles, including of informed consent, and best practices of the United Nations Investigative Bodies. The mission is of the view that it can best support accountability through disclosure in concrete investigations and prosecutions before a competent and independent judicial body that upholds human rights standards, including fair trial rights.

114. Finally, the mission underlines that individual criminal responsibility and State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts are not mutually exclusive. It reiterates that all States are under obligation: to not provide aid or assistance in the commission of internationally wrongful acts under any circumstances, to cooperate to end any serious breach involving a gross or systematic failure of another State to abide by its obligations, and to pursue accountability. The mission calls for the immediate cessation of aid or assistance in any shape or form, in contravention of existing embargos, including provision of weapons, ammunition and logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces and its allies, and for interim reparation measures to be awarded to victims and survivors.[147]

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142 https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-office-prosecutor-situation-el-fasher-north-darfur; 10092nd meeting of the Security Council, Sudan and South Sudan, 19 January 2026.

143 Genocide Convention, Articles I, III(e) (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide | OHCHR).

144 A/HRC/RES/54/2.

145 A/HRC/57/CRP.6, para. 295.

146 Article 28 Rome Statute (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court).

147 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendations

115. **The mission reiterates the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report "*Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher*" and notes that its continued investigations have only reinforced the urgency of those findings.**

116. **The mission further notes that sustained access to medical, psychosocial, livelihood and legal assistance is essential for survivors and affected communities. The harm caused by the violations documented in and around El Fasher is profound, cumulative and generational, with consequences that will endure long after the immediate violence ends. These are not isolated harms; they form part of systematic attacks on the survival, dignity, social fabric and future of affected communities. The impact of trauma must therefore be addressed in any justice, accountability or transitional justice process, not as a secondary concern but as a central factor in understanding the root causes of the conflict, rebuilding fractured communities and preventing recurrence. The prevention of future atrocities requires not only accountability for past crimes, but also investment in healing, recognition, truth, reparations and institutional transformation capable of restoring trust and safeguarding the dignity and rights of future generations.**

117. **The mission reiterates the recommendations contained in the report, including the urgent need for an immediate cessation of attacks against civilians; unhindered humanitarian access and the lifting of restrictions impeding the delivery of food, medicine and essential services; protection of civilians and safe passage for those seeking to flee areas of violence; full cooperation with international and regional accountability mechanisms, including the International Criminal Court; support for investigations and prosecutions under universal jurisdiction; and measures to prevent further atrocity crimes, including compliance with and enforcement of the arms embargo on Darfur and the cessation of all forms of support to parties responsible for serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.**

118. **The mission further reiterates the importance of preserving evidence, protecting victims, survivors and witnesses, and ensuring that accountability efforts are complemented by broader processes aimed at truth, reparations, institutional reform and guarantees of non-recurrence.**

119. **The obligation to prevent atrocity crimes extends to addressing the conditions that allowed such crimes to occur and ensuring that affected communities can survive, recover and rebuild their lives in dignity and security.**