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Twenty-third report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat

I. Introduction

1. In adopting its resolution [2253 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council expressed its determination to address the threat posed to international peace and security by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant¹ (ISIL, hereinafter referred to as “Da’esh”)² and associated individuals and groups and requested that the Secretary-General provide an initial strategic-level report on the threat, followed by updates every four months. In its resolution [2734 \(2024\)](#), the Council requested that the Secretary-General continue to provide, every six months, strategic-level reports that demonstrate and reflect the gravity of the threat posed by Da’esh to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, particularly that reflect the impact of these efforts. It further requested that the latest biannual report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions [1526 \(2004\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities be annexed to this report.

2. The present report is the twenty-third such report.³ It was prepared by the Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), with the input of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and in close collaboration with the Monitoring Team and other United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities.

3. During the reporting period, the threat posed by Da’esh and its affiliates to international peace and security remained persistent. Despite sustained counter-terrorism pressure, including leadership losses and disruptions to its central command, the group continued to demonstrate resilience and adaptability through decentralized networks, evolving tactics and the continued ability of regional affiliates to sustain operations. The United Nations continued to support Member States in countering this

¹ Listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

² In line with General Assembly resolution [75/291](#).

³ See [S/2016/92](#), [S/2016/501](#), [S/2016/830](#), [S/2017/97](#), [S/2017/467](#), [S/2018/80](#), [S/2018/770](#), [S/2019/103](#), [S/2019/612](#), [S/2020/95](#), [S/2020/774](#), [S/2021/98](#), [S/2021/682](#), [S/2022/63](#), [S/2022/576](#), [S/2023/76](#), [S/2023/568](#), [S/2024/117](#), [S/2024/583](#), [S/2025/72](#), [S/2025/496](#) and [S/2026/57](#).



threat, including through the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant Security Council resolutions.

II. Threat assessment

A. Overview and evolution of the threat⁴

4. The threat from Da'esh and its affiliated groups waned in some theatres, as they were hindered by leadership disruptions, including the geographic dispersal of senior figures, and sustained counter-terrorism efforts. The killing of Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al-Mainuki (not listed) on 16 May during a joint Nigeria-United States of America operation in Metele, Borno State, Nigeria marked a significant setback for the group. He had held several key positions, including deputy leader of Da'esh and head of the General Directorate of Provinces, as well as the head of the Al-Furqan "office" of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP, QDe.162). His death is likely to affect Da'esh's ability to coordinate across its global network.

5. Despite these developments, ISWAP remained the most active Da'esh affiliate, carrying out more attacks than any other affiliate in the first half of the year. Member States reported that ISWAP had acquired several commercial drones, some of which were assessed to have been used in operations across both the Sahel and the Lake Chad basin.

6. In the Sahel, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS, QDe.163) posed a growing threat, significantly enhancing its operational capabilities. The attack on the international airport in Niamey, the Niger, on 29 January demonstrated its ability to conduct complex urban operations. The group was estimated to have around 2,000 members, with the Niger remaining its primary area of operations, accounting for 75 per cent of its claimed attacks in 2026. In Mali, ISGS carried out opportunistic attacks concentrated in the Gao and Ménaka regions, where it was already established, while also expanding its presence in north-western Nigeria, partly through the recruitment of individuals linked to the local group known as Lakurawa (not listed).

7. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF, not listed) continued to pose a significant security threat. With an estimated 1,500–2,000 members, including around 600 adult male fighters, the group remained active in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces while expanding into Tshopo and Haut-Uélé Provinces. Between January and May, ADF conducted over 80 attacks, resulting in more than 400 deaths, displacing many civilians.

8. In Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique, Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a (not listed) increased in strength to an estimated 400–500 fighters. Between January and March, the group intensified recruitment efforts, calling for new members and exploiting illegal migration routes to facilitate the movement of recruits from east and southern Africa.

9. In Somalia, Member States reported no significant leadership losses in Da'esh, with leader Abdulqadir Mumin (not listed) assessed to be alive. Da'esh in Somalia has maintained a limited presence in Puntland, with 150–250 fighters concentrated mainly in the Cal Miskaat mountains, while its operational capacity and territorial influence remained constrained by counter-terrorism pressure. Although foreign

⁴ More information on the threat posed to international peace and security by Da'esh and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities may be found in the thirty-eighth report of the Monitoring Team (S/2026/651).

terrorist fighter inflows decreased, illicit transit and migration routes remained a latent risk that could be reactivated if counter-terrorism pressures eased.

10. In North Africa, Da'esh sporadically reactivated cells in parts of the region. In Tunisia and Morocco, its presence remained limited, with small numbers of fighters and networks maintaining cross-border links, particularly with Sahel-based elements. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Libya (ISIL-Libya) remained weakened, with an estimated 100 fighters operating in small cells in the Fezzan region, supported by hundreds of sympathizers and increasingly relying on online propaganda and recruitment.

11. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Yemen (ISIL-Yemen) remained weak but benefited from the deteriorating security situation in the country in early 2026. It maintained an estimated 150 fighters, prioritizing movement of members to the Sahel, indicating an outward-focused shift despite limited local strength. Da'esh spokesperson Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari (not listed) was reported to be in Yemen.

12. In the Syrian Arab Republic, Da'esh maintained up to 3,000 fighters as the transfer of control in parts of the north-east to the Syrian Government in early 2026 altered the threat landscape. Two Member States reported that more than 5,700 Da'esh-affiliated detainees had been transferred to Iraq, while the fate of approximately 3,000 remaining prisoners was unclear. In January, at least 150 Da'esh fighters, including around 20 senior members, escaped from Shaddadi prison, but some were later recaptured. Around 15,000–20,000 individuals, mostly women and children believed to have family links to Da'esh, previously held at Hawl camp also remained unaccounted for following the camp's closure on 22 February, raising significant concerns among Member States and prompting calls for heightened vigilance. Most were assessed to have moved to Idlib and its surrounding area. More than 1,000 of the unaccounted-for individuals were assessed to have joined Da'esh or other armed groups, while others sought to join Syrian Government forces. Rawj camp remained operational, with approximately 2,500 third-country nationals detained.

13. Da'esh prioritized hit-and-run attacks against religious, political and military sites in the Syrian Arab Republic, shifting operational tactics to urban areas away from the central desert area. Several plots against the President, Ahmad Al-Sharaa, and senior government officials, including one in early 2026 against the President, were disrupted. During the reporting period, several Member States assessed Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah (not listed), which had claimed responsibility for an attack on a Shia mosque in Homs on 26 December 2025, to be a front group used by Da'esh.

14. Da'esh in Iraq was at its weakest, largely due to sustained counter-terrorism pressure by Iraqi security forces, with a strength assessed in the low hundreds of fighters, able to carry out unsophisticated operations only. The group maintained a limited presence in desert areas, generating an estimated \$500,000 annually, enough to sustain basic operations. Some Member States assessed that these constraints had led the group to adopt a more selective recruitment approach, prioritizing capable youth and foreign terrorist fighters.

15. The Da'esh threat in North America and parts of Europe remained contained. It was still primarily driven by domestic lone actors inspired by online propaganda, who were involved in small-scale attack plots and lacked direct ties to the group or its regional affiliates.

16. The threat posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K, QDe.161) remained a significant concern to Afghanistan and the broader region. Notwithstanding setbacks incurred due to actions by Pakistan and the de facto authorities in Afghanistan, the group retained its intent to conduct external operations

and was rebuilding its capacity to undertake infrequent, high-profile mass casualty attacks. On 19 January, ISIL-K claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in central Kabul at a Chinese restaurant, killing 12 and injuring 15. In Pakistan, on 6 February, a suicide bomber detonated explosives during Friday prayers at the Khadija Tul Kubra Shia Mosque in Islamabad, killing 32 and injuring more than 150. While responsibility for the attack was claimed by a group calling itself “ISIL in Pakistan”, some Member States assessed that it had been carried out by ISIL-K.

17. In South-East Asia, the threat from Da’esh-linked entities continued to be fragmented and decentralized. The operational capacity of Da’esh in South-East Asia and affiliated regional networks declined, but risks persisted through dispersed cells, self-radicalized actors, online recruitment and loosely connected Da’esh-inspired networks.

18. Despite lacking the capacity to provide coherent direction to its affiliates, the propaganda and ability of Da’esh to incite violence persisted, reinforcing established trends such as its focus on Africa and an emphasis on regional affiliates. It also sought to exploit regional instability, including the conflict in the Middle East, by urging followers to take up arms.

19. Da’esh continued to rely primarily on locally generated revenue streams in areas under their control, with some affiliates increasingly venturing into kidnapping for ransom, often involving relatively small demands. Several affiliates also showed increased use of cryptocurrency alongside the continued use of traditional banking systems and informal value transfer systems.

20. The use of artificial intelligence has become a recurring feature uncovered in counter-terrorism investigations. Several individuals affiliated with Da’esh have increasingly used artificial intelligence tools to obtain guidance on improvised explosive device construction, target selection, counter-surveillance, evading law enforcement and travel to conflict zones.

B. Situation of suspected Da’esh members and their family members in conflict zones

21. During the reporting period, there were major shifts in the geopolitical and security landscape in the Middle East. These led to the closure of Hawl camp by the Syrian authorities in February 2026 and the relocation of the remaining Syrian families to Akhtarin camp in northern Aleppo Governorate. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), thousands of third-country national children, including more than 4,000 who had departed from Hawl camp, remained vulnerable to further victimization, trafficking and recruitment.

22. The Government of Iraq completed its last repatriation, comprising 55 households (193 Iraqi individuals, including 106 females and 87 males), in February 2026. Between May 2021 and February 2026, a total of 21,536 individuals from Iraq (12,803 female and 8,733 male) were repatriated from Hawl and Rawj camps. Iraqi authorities reported that more than 280 Syrian children were among those transferred from north-east Syria to Iraq.

III. Updates on responses to the evolving threat

23. The United Nations supported Member States in preventing and countering the threat posed by Da’esh and other terrorist groups through coordinated programming, policy support and capacity-building. Efforts were focused on rehabilitation and

reintegration; strengthening national and regional capacities to address evolving threats; preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons; countering terrorist travel; and addressing the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorism purposes. The United Nations facilitated international cooperation, information-sharing and the exchange of good practices through assessment visits, technical assistance, research, and policy guidance for dialogue and coordination.

24. On behalf of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, its Executive Directorate conducted follow-up visits to Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Tajikistan and Togo to assess and provide recommendations on the implementation of Security Council resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) and subsequent relevant resolutions. The Executive Directorate highlighted, through these visits, sustained regional cooperation and a focus on social cohesion and resilience, as well as the evolving nature of the terrorist threat in many regions.

25. During its assessment visits and dialogue with Member States, the Executive Directorate identified the use and weaponization of unmanned aircraft systems for terrorist purposes as a global concern, including in parts of Africa. This underscores the need for enhanced coordination and information-sharing at all levels and for the implementation by Member States of the Committee's Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles (2023).

26. In June, on the occasion of the ninth review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Counter-Terrorism Week at the United Nations brought together more than 1,100 participants representing 126 Member States, 31 regional and international organizations and 17 United Nations entities, as well as academia, civil society and the private sector, to advance implementation of the Strategy and its review resolutions while reinforcing global cooperation to address evolving terrorism threats. The Counter-Terrorism Week included the United Nations High-level Conference of Heads of Counter-Terrorism Agencies of Member States and approximately 40 side events addressing emerging threats and priorities, including efforts to counter Da'esh and support repatriation, rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives, in support of the Strategy's four pillars.

A. Prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals associated with Da'esh

1. Prosecution and investigation

27. The United Nations assisted Member States in strengthening institutional and legal frameworks to ensure that the investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences are conducted in accordance with international human rights standards. In Tajikistan, from January to May, the European Union-United Nations Global Terrorism Threats Facility, implemented by UNOCT, strengthened the capacity of the Ministry of Justice to operationalize its digital forensics laboratory and strengthen the use of digital evidence in terrorism investigations and prosecutions through mentoring and advisory support.

28. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) supported Chad in developing standardized screening processes for persons formerly associated with Boko Haram and ISWAP and assisted Nigerian authorities in developing data protection practices for screening, rehabilitation and reintegration, in line with national law and international standards. In Nigeria, UNODC continued to engage criminal justice authorities to promote respect for fair trial guarantees in terrorism-related cases. UNODC strengthened forensic capacity to investigate and prosecute conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence in Borno State through trainings for investigators and justice system actors, the provision of essential equipment to a

sexual assault referral centre in Maiduguri and the development of specialized investigative tools.

2. Rehabilitation and reintegration

29. In Iraq, the United Nations facilitated the strengthening of rehabilitation and reintegration frameworks for returnees from the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) enhanced coordination between reception, rehabilitation and reintegration processes, facilitating transitions to community reintegration. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) strengthened coordination and monitoring systems, including through the roll-out of a monitoring tool to collect data on the reintegration of Hawl camp returnees in Iraq and to identify gaps in assistance, services and community acceptance. UNICEF complemented these efforts by supporting services for affected children and families and facilitated family tracing and reunification, benefiting more than 500 unaccompanied and separated Iraqi children. In January and June, the European Union-United Nations Global Terrorism Threats Facility, implemented by UNOCT, strengthened the capacity of 54 Iraqi security personnel to provide trauma-informed support to help prevent and respond to risks of sexual and gender-based violence associated with the repatriation of Iraqi families from the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic.

30. In Iraq, IOM continued to support the reintegration of individuals returning from the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic through the Information, Counselling and Referral Service, a Government-aligned case management system that enables structured socioeconomic profiling and targeted service delivery by linking returnees with mental health and psychosocial support, reconciliation mechanisms and livelihood opportunities. During the reporting period, it completed the profiles of 1,863 individuals (1,162 women and 701 men), bringing the cumulative total to 8,292 individuals, of whom 3,927 were referred to key support services. Beyond Iraq, UNODC trained authorities and communities in Maldives on early warning systems and community-based reintegration of returnees. UNODC strengthened the role of women community leaders in Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger in gender-sensitive approaches to prevention and reintegration and in identifying early signs of radicalization to terrorism.

31. UNDP provided technical assistance and delivered multisectoral reintegration support, including on livelihoods, psychosocial assistance, legal aid and social cohesion interventions, reaching more than 11,700 people, including returnees from Hawl camp. In Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, UNODC piloted a risk and needs assessment tool covering more than 900 prisoners, supporting individualized risk assessment and rehabilitation planning in custodial settings. In Indonesia, it enhanced rehabilitation capacities by providing training activities on psychosocial assessment, case management, and neuroscience and adolescent development to support tailored responses.

B. International and regional cooperation

32. The United Nations advanced cooperation during the reporting period by promoting technical assistance and capacity-building, including through platforms supporting joint analysis, prevention and early warning. The Counter-Terrorism Early Warning Network for Central Asia, implemented by UNOCT in partnership with the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, facilitated regional capacities for risk analysis and information-sharing on threats associated with Da'esh, including those related to Afghanistan. In June, UNOCT and

the Regional Centre also organized the third meeting of the Central Asia Regional Expert Council on the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Returnees from Conflict Zones, providing an important forum for regional and international exchange of expertise. In East Africa, UNDP supported the first quarterly workshop of the subregional community of practice for the prevention of violent extremism, which contributed to the launch of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's strategy for preventing and countering violent extremism.

33. In April, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate held technical consultations to review the implementation of the 2025 national counter-terrorism strategy of Mozambique and engaged with Sri Lanka on developing a national counter-terrorism strategy.

34. The United Nations also promoted the exchange of good practices to address evolving terrorist threats. In March, UNODC convened the inaugural meeting of the points of contact under the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and supported a coordination round table among Algeria, Libya and Tunisia on cases involving foreign terrorist fighters and returnees. In May, UNOCT, the Mine Action Service and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate convened a regional workshop for Kenya, Somalia and Uganda to strengthen cooperation and exchange operational practices on countering the terrorist use of improvised explosive devices.

35. In May, UNOCT, supported by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, convened the second Conference of West African Experts on Countering Terrorist Threats to Vulnerable Targets in Rabat, Morocco, strengthening subregional cooperation by sharing good practices and institutional approaches to protect critical infrastructure and other vulnerable targets.

36. The fifth edition of the Marrakesh Platform, convened by UNOCT and Morocco in June 2026, brought together 80 heads of counter-terrorism and intelligence agencies from 71 Member States and facilitated over 800 bilateral exchanges. The Platform showcased progress under the Global Fusion Cells Programme of UNOCT and advanced sustainable capacity-building through the integration of training methodologies into national intelligence training academies.

C. Coordination and coherence across United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities

37. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, comprising 46 member and observer entities, continued to strengthen system-wide coordination in support of the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. During the reporting period, the Compact enhanced coordination across the United Nations system to deliver tailored technical assistance to Member States, including at the regional level. Through four quarterly coordination meetings and sustained collaboration across its working groups, the Compact advanced joint technical guidance, supported multi-entity initiatives, including in the context of the UN80 Initiative, and strengthened engagement with regional organizations and other multilateral partners, fostering more coherent policy development, joint programming and technical assistance.

38. In June, the Coordination Committee of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, in line with action 12 of work package 24 of the UN80 Initiative action plan, adopted an action paper, which identified eight areas of action. These areas include strengthening strategic coordination and financing, enabling more effective joint delivery, enhancing linkages between Headquarters and

regional and country-level efforts, advancing system-wide communications and reinforcing integrated monitoring, measurement and reporting through a unified results framework.

D. Supporting the victims of Da'esh

39. The United Nations further strengthened efforts, including through policy guidance and capacity-building initiatives, to support victims of terrorism. In April, UNOCT launched the *Gap Analysis of Digital Tools to Support Victims of Terrorism*,⁵ which contains recommendations for Governments and the private sector on harnessing new and emerging technologies to improve assistance to victims of terrorism. The analysis found that digital tools can strengthen the accessibility, timeliness and inclusiveness of victim support while promoting safe, rights-based and victim-centred assistance throughout recovery and access to justice.

40. At the national level, the United Nations supported Member States in enhancing victim-centred approaches and strengthening capacities. In Nigeria, UNODC, with UNOCT, delivered a two-day workshop to victims and survivors of terrorism, civil society organizations, government institutions and development partners on the rights and needs of victims of terrorism. In Mozambique, UNODC provided specialized training on gender- and age-sensitive approaches to victim assistance. In Burkina Faso, it supported the development of the national road map for the care of victims of terrorism, strengthening national assistance frameworks.

E. Border management and law enforcement

41. The United Nations supported Member States in border management and law enforcement capacities to prevent and respond to the threat posed by Da'esh, including through support for criminal justice practitioners, border authorities and specialized agencies. In Central Asia, UNOCT and UNODC concluded a five-year project resulting in strengthened capacities of more than 900 criminal justice practitioners in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and established national focal points and a regional community of practitioners. UNOCT supported the operationalization of regional centres responsible for secondary inspection, rapid response and border guard training in Tajikistan, located along the border with Afghanistan. This included the development of comprehensive training programmes on nuclear and radiological threats for the Tajikistan border troops and newly recruited personnel from regional centres, as well as capacity-building for trainers at the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Safety and Security Agency of Tajikistan to enable them to deliver this training programme.

42. The United Nations reinforced the efforts of Member States in strengthening measures to prevent Da'esh from acquiring and using conventional and non-conventional weapons, including weapons of mass destruction; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material; small arms and light weapons; improvised explosive devices; and unmanned aircraft systems. UNOCT organized 11 capacity-building events and 5 outreach activities, reaching 684 beneficiaries, including more than 100 women, to strengthen capacities and raise awareness of measures to prevent the acquisition and use of such weapons, including the international legal framework on radiological and nuclear terrorism.

⁵ Available at https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/default/files/2026-04/VoT_Gap_Analysis_Digital_Tools_Report_Apr2026-Web.pdf.

43. The multi-entity United Nations Countering Terrorist Travel Programme, implemented by UNOCT, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, UNODC, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and IOM, assisted 90 beneficiary and partner countries in strengthening border management and threat detection through the collection, analysis and use of advance passenger information and passenger name record data, in line with international standards and human rights principles. Through the Programme, the United Nations strengthened regional cooperation and information exchange through six regional informal working groups across Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and supported Lebanon in developing a technical assistance road map for implementing advance passenger information and passenger name record systems, bringing the total number of Member States assisted to 50. The Democratic Republic of the Congo adopted a passenger data legal framework, bringing the total number of Member States supported in this area to 18, while the Republic of Moldova operationalized its Passenger Information Unit using the United Nations-owned goTravel software, bringing the total established with Programme support to seven. At the national level, Tonga joined the Programme as a new beneficiary, while Indonesia formalized its participation through an implementation agreement with UNOCT. Capacity-building activities delivered under the Programme in Indonesia, Nigeria, the Philippines and Tunisia reached 294 participants.

44. In West Africa, UNODC provided mentoring and follow-up support on criminal cases involving firearms-related offences, resulting in the termination or adjudication of all 47 cases under Operation KAFO V, a regional law enforcement initiative to combat illicit firearms trafficking and strengthen cross-border cooperation. UNODC subsequently supported Operation KAFO VI, bringing together the Governments of Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, the Niger and Togo to strengthen regional cooperation against illicit firearms trafficking and related crime, including trafficking linked to terrorist groups such as ISWAP and ISGS. The Operation trained more than 1,700 officers and led to the seizure of weapons, ammunition, explosives and drugs valued at more than \$20 million.

45. As part of a global programme led by UNOCT and implemented in partnership with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations and INTERPOL, the United Nations supported 16 Member States and strengthened the capacities of more than 300 officials to protect critical infrastructure and public places. National-level activities were conducted in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, while subregional support was delivered through the West African Network of Experts on Countering Terrorist Threats against Vulnerable Targets, which facilitated the exchange of good practices and adopted its 2026–2027 workplan. Through the same programme, the United Nations developed technical guidance on the protection of public transport and oil and gas facilities. In June, the programme convened an expert meeting in Madrid to support the implementation of guidance on the protection of public transport and the exchange good practices on risk management, resilience and public-private partnerships. In January, in partnership with the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre, UNOCT also convened a regional expert meeting in Addis Ababa for Eastern African countries to strengthen coordination and risk management related to energy infrastructure protection.

46. UNOCT strengthened Member States' capacities to prevent and respond to terrorism-related risks associated with major sporting events through targeted training, technical assistance and the exchange of good practices. In preparation for the 2027 Africa Cup of Nations, UNOCT supported Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania through technical advisory assistance, stakeholder consultations and site

assessments to strengthen integrated event security. In Hungary, UNOCT co-organized a study visit in May, ahead of the 2026 Champions League Final of the Union of European Football Associations, for senior officials from six Member States to exchange good practices on event security and also engaged 10 countries in Southern Africa to identify regional capacity-building priorities for the security of major sporting events.

47. Building on guidance on maritime security and counter-terrorism developed previously with African Member States,⁶ UNOCT developed a tailored training initiative covering 24 good practices to counter terrorist travel by sea and related illicit activity, including foreign terrorist fighter movement at sea, port screening, advance passenger information and passenger name record systems, INTERPOL connectivity and the prosecution of maritime terrorism offences, supporting the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions.

48. In January, UNOCT, jointly with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and in cooperation with INTERPOL, launched a 12-month initiative to strengthen border security and information-sharing across Benin, Burkina Faso, the Niger and Togo to counter the cross-border mobility of Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (QDe.159) and Da'esh-affiliated groups. The initiative introduced multilayered surveillance systems, biometric capabilities and interoperable information-sharing mechanisms. In Ghana, through the Integrated Border Stability Mechanism for West Africa, UNOCT strengthened the tactical preparedness, operational coordination and sustainable training capacities of the Ghana Immigration Service.

49. UNOCT supported the integration of a standardized investigations curriculum at the National Criminal Investigations Academy in Kenya and delivered training-of-trainers courses to strengthen national ownership and sustainable training capacities. UNOCT also advanced specialized training resources related to kidnappings, hostage-takings and investigative interviewing through scenario-based and human rights-compliant approaches.

50. UNOCT supported Ghana, Kenya and Senegal in strengthening capacities to address terrorist threats involving unmanned systems. In Ghana and Kenya, UNOCT trained national security officials on the use of unmanned aircraft and underwater systems for territorial surveillance, incident response and maritime security. In Senegal, UNOCT also provided 16 unmanned aircraft systems equipment, eight payloads and software to eight national security entities following engagement under the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces.

F. Countering the financing of terrorism

51. The United Nations supported Member States in strengthening capacities to counter the financing of terrorism, including through enhanced border security, detection capabilities and inter-agency cooperation. UNOCT strengthened capacities to detect, prevent and counter the financing of terrorism through targeted training at the national and regional levels. In April, UNOCT and the Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition delivered a training course in Comoros for 30 officials from government, academia and civil society on terrorism financing risks, international standards and legal frameworks. In June, UNOCT and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group conducted a regional training in Kenya for

⁶ See Office of Counter-Terrorism, "Navigating the nexus: good practices at the intersection of maritime security and counter-terrorism in Africa" (New York, 2025).

financial intelligence units, law enforcement, prosecutors and other competent authorities to strengthen terrorism financing investigations, financial intelligence, inter-agency cooperation and responses to emerging risks, including virtual assets and cross-border financial flows. The training also incorporated dedicated human rights and gender modules to inform future capacity-building efforts.

52. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate advanced analysis of emerging trends in terrorism financing through engagement with experts. In February⁷ and April,⁸ it convened discussions on the use of propaganda ecosystems to facilitate terrorism financing and the evolving links between terrorism and organized crime. Participating national authorities highlighted the need to strengthen capacity-building and operational cooperation to address vulnerabilities exploited by terrorism financing networks.

53. In May, the Executive Directorate also contributed to the discussions of the fifth ministerial conference on countering the financing of terrorism, entitled “No Money for Terror”, organized by the Government of France, on obstructing the financing strategies of terrorist groups that rely on territorial control, preventing the misuse of financial innovations for terrorism financing and addressing the nexus with organized crime.⁹ It contributed to several¹⁰ reports¹¹ of the Financial Action Task Force examining terrorism-financing vulnerabilities and the measures needed to enhance partnerships and information exchange.

G. Countering terrorist use of information and communications technologies and new technologies

54. UNOCT continued to support Member States in addressing the use of information and communications technologies by Da’esh and its affiliates, including through counter-terrorism policy development, strengthening of public-private partnerships and international police cooperation. UNOCT assisted Malaysia and Uzbekistan in developing and integrating whole-of-government approaches to new technologies in their counter-terrorism strategies while respecting human rights. To foster multi-stakeholder approaches to address terrorist use of new technologies, UNOCT, in collaboration with INTERPOL, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, and Tech Against Terrorism convened a series of public-private partnership tabletop exercises in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and the Philippines. More than 90 counter-terrorism officials and private sector representatives developed ways to build robust

⁷ <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/news/cted-technical-meeting-explores-linkages-between-terrorism-and-organized-crime-across-west>.

⁸ <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/news/cted-hosts-insight-briefing-how-propaganda-ecosystems-enable-terrorist-financing>.

⁹ Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, “CTED Executive Director addresses the Fifth Ministerial Conference “No Money for Terror 2026” on countering the financing of terrorism”, May 2026. Available at <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/news/cted-executive-director-addresses-fifth-ministerial-conference-%E2%80%9Cno-money-terror-2026%E2%80%9D>.

¹⁰ “Detecting and disrupting terrorist financing activity through social media, instant messaging applications and streaming platforms (SMSPs)”, June 2026, public synopsis available at <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/publications/detecting-and-disrupting-tf-activity-through-smtps.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf>.

¹¹ Financial Action Task Force (FATF), “Targeted report on stablecoins and unhosted wallets – peer-to-peer transactions”, March 2026, available at <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/publications/targeted-report-on-stablecoins-and-unhosted-wallets.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf>.

public-private partnerships that enhance collective capacity to prevent and counter terrorism.

55. To support parliamentary oversight and legislative responses to the use of artificial intelligence in counter-terrorism, UNOCT collaborated with member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and trained more than 80 parliamentarians on the regulation, governance and oversight of artificial intelligence. These efforts contributed to the development of regional baseline approaches for the use of artificial intelligence in countering terrorism while promoting effective and human rights-compliant responses.

56. UNOCT strengthened the responsible use of emerging technologies to prevent and counter Da'esh and other terrorist threats through the publication of the *Practice Guide on Artificial Intelligence and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism*,¹² which provides practical guidance on governance, risk management and human rights safeguards. The pilot training strengthened the understanding of 22 practitioners from 10 countries of artificial intelligence-related risks through real-world scenarios and a risk assessment framework. Early results indicated growing demand for support to integrate artificial intelligence into programming related to preventing and countering violent extremism.

57. UNODC provided technical assistance to Pakistan on artificial intelligence and cryptocurrency analytics and conducted training on countering terrorist use of unmanned aircraft systems. In Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger, it built capacities on handling criminal acts related to radicalization to violence facilitated through the Internet and technology.

58. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate concluded a joint project with UNODC, UNOCT and Tech Against Terrorism to strengthen the capacity of Somalia to detect and disrupt the use by Da'esh of information and communications technologies.¹³ The project produced road maps to guide follow-up implementation in response to the growing exploitation of digital technologies by terrorist groups.

59. UNOCT strengthened prevention-oriented responses to the use of digital platforms by terrorist actors through youth engagement, capacity-building and research on emerging online environments. During the reporting period, 34 young gamers and community moderators from Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines strengthened their capacities in moderation, facilitation, online safety and risk identification through a multi-session training programme delivered by means of gaming-adjacent platforms. Early results indicated sustained engagement, peer-to-peer learning and the emergence of youth-led initiatives to promote safer and more inclusive digital communities. In May, a subset of participants further strengthened leadership capacities through in-person training, including through applied simulations, policy engagement and co-development of practical tools.

H. Countering terrorist narratives and engaging with communities to prevent and counter violent extremism conducive to terrorism

60. During the reporting period, UNOCT strengthened national and civil society capacities for preventing and countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism. This support included advice for the establishment of a specialized centre at the

¹² Available at https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/default/files/2026-02/PCVE_%26_%20AI_Practice_Guide_2026_Web.pdf.

¹³ www.un.org/en/unpdf/peace-and-security-2024-07.

International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan, the organization of a round table with civil society organizations and a training-of-trainers course on monitoring and evaluation. UNODC advanced youth engagement initiatives in Nigeria on child recruitment and the reintegration of conflict-affected children and facilitated dialogues between communities and justice and security actors in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo.

61. United Nations strategic communication efforts further supported Member States in countering misinformation and strengthening community resilience. In Iraq, IOM combined tribal engagement, prevention of violent extremism and social cohesion approaches to mitigate the reintegration risks associated with returnees from the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic.

62. UNDP strengthened prevention efforts through support to the subregional community of practice in East Africa, whose first quarterly workshop, in April, culminated in the launch of the revised Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and through seven community-level early warning and response mechanisms in Kenya, which reached more than 66,000 people. In Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo, UNDP also supported community dialogue, media training and civil-military engagement and strengthened capacities to counter misinformation and hate speech. In Somalia, UNDP integrated mental health and psychosocial support into education and training programmes, which strengthened resilience, work-readiness for young people.

IV. Observations

63. Sustained counter-terrorism efforts have continued to constrain Da'esh in several theatres, disrupting its leadership and disrupting its ability to coordinate across its global network. However, these gains have not diminished the overall threat. Da'esh and its affiliates have demonstrated considerable resilience and adaptability, with affiliates increasingly shaping the operational landscape according to local dynamics. The growing operational capabilities of Da'esh affiliates in parts of Africa, the continued threat posed by ISIL-K and the uncertain security environment in the Syrian Arab Republic underscore the need for sustained vigilance and comprehensive responses grounded in international law.

64. The increasingly diverse nature of the threat reinforces the importance of regional and international cooperation. No single approach can effectively address the evolving tactics, financing methods and operational structures employed by Da'esh and its affiliates across different regions. Strengthened information-sharing, border management, criminal justice cooperation, financial investigations and regional partnerships remain essential to preventing terrorist mobility, disrupting support networks and responding effectively to evolving threats.

65. The growing exploitation of artificial intelligence, unmanned aircraft systems, encrypted communications, digital platforms and virtual assets demonstrates that technological innovation continues to reshape and advance the terrorist threat. At the same time, these technologies present important opportunities to strengthen prevention and counter-terrorism efforts when developed and used responsibly. I call upon Member States to strengthen governance, oversight and international cooperation, including with the private sector, to prevent the misuse of emerging technologies while safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms.

66. Recent developments in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic illustrate both the progress achieved and the challenges that remain in addressing the legacy of Da'esh.

As efforts increasingly shift from large-scale camp management towards longer-term accountability, rehabilitation and reintegration, sustained international engagement will remain indispensable. I call upon Member States to continue efforts to facilitate the safe, voluntary and dignified repatriation of their nationals, in accordance with international law. Durable solutions must continue to uphold international law, support victims of terrorism, strengthen community resilience and reduce the risk of renewed terrorist radicalization and recruitment.

67. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, led by UNOCT, continues to demonstrate the value of a coherent and coordinated United Nations response. As terrorist threats become increasingly interconnected and adaptive, effective and sustained multilateral cooperation will remain indispensable. The United Nations will continue to support Member States through the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant Security Council resolutions, anchored in the rule of law, human rights and gender equality.

Annex

Thirty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution [2734 \(2024\)](#) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities

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