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Sudan

Trend Analysis Report

Three Years Too Long: Analysis of Trends and the Devastating Human Rights Impacts of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sudan from 15 April 2023 to 15 April 2026

I. Introduction

1. Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) in Sudan is unprecedented in terms of the scale, prevalence and brutality of its widespread use as a weapon of war. This report analyzes the magnitude of CRSV over three years of conflict in Sudan, the way in which it has been directly linked to the conflict and employed as a tactic to terrorize the civilian population, and the profound, wide-ranging, and long-term impacts on victims, their families and communities. The paper identifies and analyses the main trends and patterns of CRSV from 15 April 2023 until mid-April 2026, including the links to conflict dynamics. It examines the individual and collective impacts on victims, families, society and beyond. These impacts risk undermining peace, security and social cohesion in Sudan for years to come.

2. A longstanding environment of impunity for serious violations of international law, including sexual violence, has exacerbated the situation.[1] Justice and accountability for CRSV are essential to advance sustainable, meaningful peace. Without justice anchored in the rights, voices and choices of victims, peace efforts will not be sustainable – laying the ground for renewed cycles of violence and harm.

3. This report is intended to inform efforts to address CRSV in Sudan – encompassing prevention, accountability and holistic victim-centred responses – and to ensure these considerations are taken into account in initiatives towards a cessation of hostilities and resolution of the conflict.

II. Methodology

4. On 25 September 2019, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Government of the Republic of the Sudan signed an Agreement to establish an OHCHR Country Office in the Sudan. Pursuant to this Agreement, and in accordance with the High Commissioner's global mandate under United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/141, the OHCHR Sudan Country Office monitors and reports on the human rights situation in the Sudan. OHCHR works closely with other UN entities and agencies in Sudan and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict on issues related to conflict-related sexual violence, and is a member of the Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangement Working Group in Sudan.

5. This report is based on human rights monitoring undertaken by OHCHR including through field missions inside and outside Sudan and remote monitoring to interview victims, witnesses and responders. Information was gathered and analyzed in line with OHCHR's human rights monitoring methodology, including the principles of "do no harm" and a "survivor-centred approach". Individual interviews were trauma-informed and conducted with due regard to safety, consent, confidentiality, and the specific risks faced by victims of sexual violence in conflict settings. Information gathered was corroborated to establish facts and analyze violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and violations and abuses of international human rights law (IHRL) in the context of the ongoing hostilities. The standard of proof of "reasonable grounds to believe" was applied, meaning where, based on a reliable body of verified information, an ordinarily prudent observer would have reasonable grounds to believe that the facts took place as described, and where legal conclusions are drawn, that these facts meet all the elements of a violation.

6. In this report, to mitigate the risk of identifying specific individual victims, where the number of documented incidents is below ten, detailed geographic

[1] Over 65 per cent of the parties listed in the annual report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence, including parties to the conflict in Sudan, are persistent perpetrators, appearing in the annex for five years or more (S/2026/321).

references and cross-tabulation of multiple potentially identifying elements—such as location and alleged perpetrator profiles—are deliberately omitted for the safety of individual victims.

III. Legal framework

7. A non-international armed conflict is ongoing in the Sudan between SAF and RSF, supported by their respective allied armed movements and militias, since 15 April 2023. In this situation, conventional and customary IHL, as well as international human rights law, apply concurrently.[2]

8. Under IHL, rape and other forms of sexual violence are prohibited in both international and non-international armed conflicts. The prohibition of "violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons . . . cruel treatment such as torture", "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault", and "slavery and the slave trade in all their forms" is among the fundamental guarantees set out in Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which applies to non-international armed conflict such as that occurring in Sudan.[3] IHL requires parties to the conflict to treat humanely every person who is not taking an active part in hostilities or who is placed hors de combat and prohibits violence to life and person, including cruel treatment and torture as well as outrages upon personal dignity. Sexual violence is incompatible with the obligation of humane treatment and often violates the prohibition of outrages upon personal dignity.[4] Rape and other forms of sexual violence may amount to torture and other cruel or inhuman treatment and thus violate the IHL prohibitions of violence to life and person.[5] Further, IHL prohibits any act or threat of violence whose primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population, such as through attacks designed to induce fear, assault, rape, abuse and torture of women and children.[6]

9. Under IHRL, sexual violence also violates multiple fundamental human rights, notably the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which is non-derogable at any time, including in time of public emergency. Sexual violence is prohibited by a number of IHRL instruments to which Sudan is a party. Articles 7, 9, and 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide that: "no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment", "everyone has the right to liberty and security of person" and that "all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person". Rape and other forms of sexual violence can amount to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.[7] The Convention on the Rights of the Child further requires States Parties to protect children from "all forms of physical or mental

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2 The applicable legal framework is set out in annual reports of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights Council: see A/HRC/55/29 and A/HRC/50/22.

3 Article 4(2), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II), 8 June 1977.

4 Commentary of 2025, Common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions, para. 792, 796 – 798.

5 Commentary of 2025, Common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions, paras.793 -795.

6 Art. 13(2) of Additional Protocol II, Customary IHL Rule 2.

7 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 1: "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person... when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity for a number of impermissible purposes including interrogation, intimidation, punishment, retaliation, humiliation and discrimination of any kind."

violence. . including sexual abuse".[8] Where armed groups and other non-State actors exercise government-like functions and control over territory, they must respect human rights standards when their conduct affects the human rights of individuals under their control.

10. The commission of sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery, is a gross violation or abuse of IHRL and a serious violation of IHL and constitutes a war crime, including as an outrage upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating or degrading treatment.[9] If committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, these acts may further amount to a crime against humanity.[10]

IV. Findings

11. From 15 April 2023 to mid-April 2026, OHCHR has verified 546 incidents of CRSV related to the current conflict, that affected at least 838 victims (539 women, 284 girls, eight men and seven boys) in 16 of the 18 states of Sudan. In addition, OHCHR has received reports of a further 320 incidents, including in the remaining states, that the Office is still working to verify; further information continues to be received and verified as victims reach safety or are able to report.[11] These figures represent the tip of the iceberg of the actual magnitude of incidents and victims of CRSV, as severe and persistent underreporting and verification challenges continue to constrain the ability to capture the full scale and reality of sexual violence. Major reasons include stigma, insecurity, lack of medical services and protection mechanisms, disruption to internet and telecommunication networks, fear of retaliation, and mistrust and non-functioning of the justice system.[12]

12. Documented forms of sexual violence include rape, gang rape, attempted rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage, forced prostitution, sexual torture, forced nudity, sexual assault, trafficking for the purpose of sexual violence, and incidents involving combinations of multiple forms. An analysis of prevalence over three years of the conflict illustrates how reports of sexual violence have accompanied the geographic spread of the conflict and patterns of displacement. OHCHR has documented the coordinated use of sexual violence in the context of conflict, and recurrent and systematic patterns of its use as a weapon of war.[13] Sexual violence has been perpetrated as retaliatory attacks targeting victims based on perceived affiliation with specific parties to the conflict.[14] OHCHR has also documented numerous incidents of ethnically motivated targeting of victims based on perceived identity, frequently

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8 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 19.

9 Customary IHL Rules 93, 156; Rome Statute, Art. 8 2 (c)(ii) and (e)(vi).

10 Rome Statute, Art. 7 1(g). By virtue of Security Council resolution 1593 (2005), in which the Council referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court, the Rome Statute has corresponding application.

11 These reports include those that have not met the required evidentiary threshold in accordance with OHCHR's standard of proof, or have been assessed as not yet sufficiently linked to the armed conflict. Broader acts of gender-based violence that do not have a link to the current armed conflict are beyond the scope of this report.

12 In some documented cases, family members blamed victims, tried to hide the incident, or refused victims access to medical services. In another case, the whole family felt ostracized from their community due to the incident.

13 See, for example, OHCHR Sudan reports, *"They were shooting us like animals": RSF final offensive and capture of besieged El Fasher* (February 2026); and *"Three days of terror with no safe refuge": RSF offensive on Zamzam IDP camp, El Fasher* (December 2025). See also Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights Council on the situation of human rights in Sudan, A/HRC/58/29, 20 January 2025.

14 Ibid, OHCHR Sudan reports on RSF offensives on El Fasher and Zamzam camp, North Darfur.

accompanied by hateful and derogatory language.[15] Sexual violence has been used consistently as part of apparent tactics to terrorize and traumatize civilian populations as targets of attacks. There has also been a diversification of perpetrators over three years, which span all parties and armed actors involved in the conflict. The majority of verified incidents were attributed to men in Rapid Support Forces (RSF) uniforms, its affiliates and Arab militias in RSF controlled areas (around 87 per cent); verified incidents have also been attributed to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), affiliated security actors, Joint Forces, other armed movements and armed militias (around four per cent).

A. Trends over time

1. 2023: Spread of CRSV with the hostilities – from Khartoum to Darfur

13. From 15 April 2023, CRSV escalated rapidly after the outbreak of hostilities, particularly during urban warfare in cities. In 2023,[16] the highest number of incidents were documented in West Darfur (59) and Khartoum (54) states, followed by South Darfur (14) and North Darfur (12). The geographic concentration of incidents aligns with the outbreak of the conflict in Khartoum and subsequent spread of hostilities to the Darfur region, in particular West Darfur. Trends of CRSV reflect early patterns of systematic attacks on the civilian population, mass displacement, and the collapse of protection mechanisms.

14. In West Darfur, CRSV was perpetrated on a widespread and organized scale, particularly during RSF offensives on El Geneina (June 2023) and Ardamata (November 2023). Violations were closely linked to mass displacement, abduction, and prolonged captivity, including sexual slavery. Sexual violence was frequently ethnically motivated and accompanied by insults and derogatory language directed against women and girls perceived as belonging to the Masalit community. Many victims of sexual violence interviewed by OHCHR were asked before being raped which tribe they belonged to. One of them replied "Masalit" and the perpetrators said they would kill her. Another was told "if you are Masalit, we will slaughter you today" before being subjected to gang rape.[17] Others were told, "You will be our wives," "You slave," "You are our women," and "This year, all of you Masalit girls deliver our children".[18] Sexual violence frequently occurred in the context of evacuation and mass displacement, house-to-house attacks, and detention-like situations, including in neighbourhoods heavily affected by hostilities in El Geneina. The intensity of attacks against civilians was particularly pronounced in the Al Madares and Al Jamarik neighbourhoods of El Geneina in June 2023. OHCHR received testimonies indicating that during an attack on the Al Madares neighbourhood on 16 June 2023, at least 500 residents fled, while RSF fighters reportedly pursued women and girls specifically and abducted more than 30 of them. During an OHCHR monitoring mission to Chad in March 2025, women who had finally escaped from captivity recounted how women related to members of armed movements or military personnel had been targeted with sexual violence by RSF fighters.

15. In Khartoum state, approximately half of the documented incidents occurred within the first two months of the conflict (April to May 2023), coinciding with

[15] See also OHCHR Sudan reports on monitoring missions to the Chadian border with Sudan in June-July 2023 (El Geneina, West Darfur) and in February-March 2024 (Ardamata, West Darfur).

[16] In 2023, at least 155 incidents involving at least 318 victims (253 women, 58 girls, five men and two boys) were verified, based on OHCHR monitoring and reporting.

[17] Above n. 15, see OHCHR Sudan report on monitoring mission to the Chadian border with Sudan in February-March 2024 (Ardamata, West Darfur).

[18] Above n. 15, see OHCHR Sudan reports for findings on gross human rights abuses and serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in El Geneina and Ardamata by the RSF and allied Arab militias against members of the Masalit community.

intense urban fighting and widespread incursions into private residences.[19] Sexual violence was predominantly committed by men in RSF uniforms and affiliated fighters, often in the context of group operations involving intrusion, looting, and gang rape. Among incidents involving intrusion into private homes, the majority were committed in the context of looting; at least one involved an organized raid targeting the residence of a SAF member. Seven incidents involved abductions, two of which involved transportation to the Darfur region. OHCHR also received 14 separate reports alleging the movement of women for trafficking purposes from Khartoum to South, North, Central and West Darfur, with situations of alleged captivity reported between July and October 2023.[20]

2. 2024: "Normalization" – geographical spread and diversification of perpetrator profiles

16. In 2024, OHCHR documented a significant increase in incidents of CRSV in South Darfur (80), followed by North Darfur (61), Al Jazirah (29), and West Darfur (18).[21] Incidents were also reported in Khartoum, West Kordofan, North Kordofan, Gedaref, Sennar, Kassala, River Nile and White Nile states – indicating the broader geographic spread of sexual violence.[22] This escalation occurred amid sustained clashes between the SAF and RSF and large-scale displacement. By early January 2024, South Darfur accounted for the highest number of internally displaced persons,[23] and many documented victims of CRSV were internally displaced women and girls.

17. Following the RSF's consolidation of territorial control in South Darfur in October 2023, reports of sexual violence expanded beyond Nyala into rural and peri-urban localities. While 11 of 14 incidents documented in South Darfur in 2023 occurred in Nyala, the capital of the state, 46 of 80 incidents in 2024 were reported in localities such as Mershing, Al Wahida, Beliel and Gereida. Several of these areas lie along strategic supply, displacement, and cross-border routes, including routes connecting Nyala to El Fasher and South Sudan, and hosted large numbers of displaced persons. OHCHR observed a marked increase in reported incidents between July and October 2024, coinciding with the rain-fed agricultural season, when women and girls were more exposed while engaged in agricultural livelihoods activities.

18. In North Darfur, from April 2024, the escalation of fighting and the siege of El Fasher were accompanied by a sharp rise in sexual violence. Reliable sources reported a significant increase in survivors seeking services in El Fasher from May 2024, with service providers receiving 20 to 40 cases per month.[24] Most documented incidents occurred in areas surrounding El Fasher, as well as in Kutum and Kabkabiya, including during displacement from El Fasher; such incidents were mostly attributed to the RSF. Incidents were also reported within the city and in areas near El Fasher market, at times under the control of the Joint Forces allied with SAF, illustrating the complexity of the presence of different perpetrators within specific

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[19] See also OHCHR Sudan report on a monitoring mission to the Ethiopian border with Sudan in July 2023 for details of sexual violence after raids into private homes in Khartoum State, especially paras. 78-81.

[20] However, these cases could not be independently verified due to challenges associated with cross-state operations; thus it cannot be confirmed if sexual violence was committed, or if the purpose was a commission of sexual violence.

[21] In 2024, at least 214 incidents involving at least 253 victims (125 women, 125 girls, two men and one boy) were verified, based on OHCHR monitoring and reporting.

[22] Above n. 13, see also Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 20 January 2025, A/HRC/58/29, especially para. 50, for reports of sexual violence that follow a geographical pattern as the fighting spread across the country.

[23] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Sudan Humanitarian Update, 14 January 2024.

[24] See OHCHR Sudan report, *Under siege: the situation of human rights in El Fasher, North Darfur, since May 2024*, para. 40.

geographic locations. Food insecurity, loss of livelihoods, and prolonged siege conditions further heightened risks of sexual exploitation and abuse.

19. In Al Jazirah state, documented incidents increased sharply from two in 2023 to 29 in 2024, following the RSF's extension of control over the state. Approximately half of the incidents occurred after 20 October 2024, following the SAF's announcement of the defection of a senior RSF commander, Abu Aqla Keikel,[25] and were reported amid apparent retaliatory attacks by the RSF. Incidents were concentrated in Tamboul, Al Hilaliya, Rufaa, Brankaw (Sharq Al Jazirah locality), where the commander's ethnic group mainly resides, and Al Kamlin locality.

20. In West Darfur, most incidents in 2024 were documented in Kulbus locality between mid-October and mid-November, in the context of continued operations by the RSF and allied Arab militia, following earlier attacks and consolidation of control of the state in 2023.

21. OHCHR also documented sexual violence in places of detention operated by the RSF in Khartoum, and South, West and North Darfur, including in settings where large numbers of civilians were held. In parallel, in Khartoum and Al Jazirah, reports emerged in RSF-controlled urban areas of organized sexual violence committed by armed men in civilian clothing ("Shafshafa"), reflecting a broader collapse of law and order and proliferation of armed actors. While some medical facilities continued to operate in RSF-controlled areas, several sources reported fear of seeking care due to the presence of personnel affiliated with armed actors in health facilities, contributing to delayed treatment and medical complications.

22. As the conflict entered its second and third years, an increasing range of actors – including the SAF, affiliated security forces, Joint Forces, armed movements and armed militias – were implicated in sexual violence across at least eight states.[26] This diversification of perpetrator profiles, involving actors with distinct and fragmented central command structures, has posed challenges to civilian protection and preventive measures.

3. 2025 and early 2026: Continued pursuit of territorial control – retaliatory violence and attacks based on ethnic identity and perceived affiliation

23. From late 2024 to the first half of 2025, as the SAF regained control over parts of Al Jazirah and Khartoum states, OHCHR documented incidents of sexual violence attributed to the SAF and allied militias. At least three victims in separate incidents were targeted for having been accused of affiliation, collaboration, or association with the RSF, at the time the violence occurred.

24. The majority of incidents in 2025[27] (112 of 177) were reported from North Darfur, largely in the context of the RSF's sustained military presence around El Fasher. Between January and February, all recorded incidents occurred in areas surrounding the city. Sexual violence was used as apparent tactics to terrorize the civilian population and aimed at weakening opposing forces, in particular Joint Forces, in attacks on Zamzam IDP camp and in the lead-up to the final offensive on El Fasher in October 2025.

25. In April 2025, sexual violence escalated sharply during the RSF offensive on Zamzam IDP camp.[28] OHCHR documented incidents in which civilians attempting to flee Zamzam IDP camp were intercepted and raped after being accused of

[25] Official Facebook page of the SAF (20 October 2024), https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Cu4HCRZR2/.

[26] As the reported number is small, specific names of the states are not disclosed for reasons of protection of victims.

[27] In 2025, 177 incidents involving at least 267 victims (161 women, 101 girls, one man and four boys) were verified, based on OHCHR monitoring and reporting.

[28] Above n. 13, see OHCHR Sudan report on RSF offensive on Zamzam IDP camp, 11-13 April 2025.

"collaboration" or "conspiracy" and forcibly returned to the camp. RSF attacks also targeted villages south of Zamzam IDP camp where Joint Forces were present, with sexual violence committed against civilians fleeing the attacks, including girls accused of "staying with the Joint Forces." Abduction often accompanied these assaults.

26. OHCHR verified incidents involving 114 victims (84 women, 27 girls and three boys) – many from the Zaghawa tribe – who were subjected to rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, attempted rape and sexual assault between mid-April and mid-May 2025, in the context of RSF offensive in and around Zamzam IDP camp, and along exit routes. At least two women and one girl died following rape committed during the offensive, including in captivity. Sexual violence appears to have been used to inflict terror among the community, and was often accompanied by forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, such as flogging. Women perceived to be family members of the SAF or Joint Forces leaders (referred to as Nissaa Al Quiadat, or women of the commanders) were reportedly targeted for sexual violence.[29] OHCHR gathered information that victims were asked, "Is your father SAF?", "Where are your men? Where are the Joint Forces?" and "Your husband is Falangay[30]". At least 13 victims were abducted in a group and taken to Nyala; at least one woman reported to OHCHR that she had been sexually enslaved for three weeks and subjected to forced domestic servitude by the RSF. Many incidents of sexual violence occurred along escape routes; OHCHR recorded at least one case of a woman who was subjected to sexual violence in two separate incidents along exit routes. Many victims recounted being raped in front of family members. One woman saw her mother shot and killed because she had begged the perpetrator not to rape her daughter; the daughter was subsequently gang raped. Another girl saw her younger sister gang raped and found dead afterward due to injuries sustained. Sexual violence against pregnant women was documented both inside Zamzam camp and along exit routes towards Tawila.

27. In October 2025, widespread incidents of sexual violence were reported during the RSF offensive to capture the city of El Fasher, where people had sought refuge from the prior offensive on Zamzam IDP camp and attacks on Abu Shouk IDP camp. Consistent patterns of sexual violence were repeated, including of rape, gang rape, abductions for ransom using sexual violence, and sexual assault during searches.[31] Women and girls from Zaghawa and other non-Arab communities accused of family links or affiliation with the SAF or Joint Forces were particularly targeted. In some cases, perpetrators invoked retaliation for the past killing of RSF commanders or troops during commission of sexual violence. Incidents of sexual violence occurred within the city – including in displacement shelters, homes and in Daraja Oula and Abu Shouk neighbourhoods – and during mass displacement along exit routes. The majority of documented incidents occurred along exit routes from El Fasher to Tawila through Garni, with others reported on routes to Tura, Kutum and Mellit. Victims also reported abduction for ransom using sexual violence and a pattern of invasive body searches during RSF enforcement of strict movement controls around El Fasher and along exit routes. Witnesses also reported being subjected to verbal abuse by RSF fighters during these invasive searches, using racially derogatory and dehumanizing language. OHCHR also gathered information that women and girls became pregnant as a result of rape, and suffer from stigma, discrimination and exclusion. Details and illustrative examples are included in the OHCHR report on the final offensive on El Fasher..[32]

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[29] For details, see above n. 13, OHCHR Sudan report on RSF offensive on Zamzam IDP camp, 11-13 April 2025.

[30] Derogatory term referring to enslaved persons.

[31] For details, see above n.13, OHCHR Sudan report on RSF final offensive on El Fasher, 24-30 October 2025.

[32] Above n. 13, paras. 60-67.

B. Patterns in the commission of CRSV

1. General modus operandi

28. Since the outbreak of the conflict on 15 April 2023, OHCHR has observed that sexual violence has been perpetrated in conjunction with systematic attacks on civilians as a tactic of war.[33] These acts were often carried out through planned and coordinated operations, with perpetrators arriving in groups, frequently equipped with weapons and combat vehicles. Roles were commonly divided: some secured buildings or guarded entrances, while others perpetrated sexual violence, often successively.

29. Notably, more than one quarter of the incidents documented by OHCHR involved gang rape, with multiple perpetrators – reaching ten or more in at least one incident - acting together against a single victim. In several cases of gang rape, individuals perceived to hold higher ranks reportedly asserted priority in committing rape; in other instances, higher-ranking combatants reportedly deterred the commission of such abuses. Sexual violence was frequently committed during violent intrusions into private homes, often accompanied by looting and searches for money, weapons, or individuals perceived as adversaries. Buildings sheltering internally displaced persons were also targeted. OHCHR documented cases in which family members attempting to intervene were shot and killed, and incidents in which sexual violence was inflicted in the presence of family members.

30. OHCHR further documented the use of sexual violence as a means of controlling civilian movement, including to prevent escape from conflict-affected areas or to forcibly return civilians who had fled. Perpetrators intercepted public transport and established checkpoints, where women were subjected to invasive body searches under the pretext of security screening. Practices also involved the separation of men and women, frequently followed by sexual violence against the latter. Abduction was a recurrent precursor to sexual violence, with victims taken individually or in groups and transported to locations where abuses were committed, often in groups.

31. Perpetrators also targeted women and girls while they were seeking basic necessities and livelihoods such as water, food, or agricultural produce, particularly where humanitarian access was limited. Women and girls with disabilities have also been subjected to sexual violence.

2. Abduction and CRSV

32. Patterns of abduction linked to sexual violence have been consistently documented. Over the three-year period, OHCHR documented 42 incidents of abduction, representing over 17 per cent of the total number of victims, affecting at least 143 victims (126 women, 16 girls, and one man). In addition, 29 women were confirmed to have been abducted in West and North Darfur states. While OHCHR was unable to verify whether sexual violence subsequently occurred in all such cases, there is a reasonable suspicion that such violations may have taken place. Abductions were frequently carried out in groups, particularly during the first year of the conflict, and in some instances involved the transportation of victims across state lines. Of the documented incidents, 21 involved sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced marriage, and trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Abductions occurred in Khartoum, Al Jazirah, North Darfur, West Darfur, South Darfur, and West

[33] Above n. 13, see OHCHR Sudan report on RSF offensive on El Fasher which describes the use of sexual violence as part of apparent tactics to terrorize or traumatize the population, and also OHCHR Sudan report on RSF offensive on Zamzam camp which describes the use of rape and other forms of sexual violence as "a weapon of war". See also Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence, 21 April 2026, S/2026/321, which refers to the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war in Sudan.

Kordofan states, and took place during intrusions into homes or displacement sites, as well as along evacuation routes. Alleged perpetrators included men in RSF uniforms and their affiliates, armed Arab militias, elements associated with the Al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade affiliated with the SAF, and other armed actors. Following abduction, victims were reportedly taken to various locations, including empty houses, detention facilities, military camps, and, in some cases, returned to areas they had just been able to flee. In 2025, during RSF offensives on the Zamzam IDP camp and El Fasher, abductions were reported in connection with attacks targeting individuals based on perceived tribal identity or affiliation with opposing parties, including the Joint Forces or the SAF.[34] Abduction was also systematically linked to financial exploitation, with sexual violence used as a means of coercion to extract ransom from family members of the victims.[35]

3. Sexual slavery

33. Sexual slavery has also been widely documented over the three-year period, affecting at least 85 victims (78 women and seven girls), or ten per cent of the total number of victims, with the act predominantly reported in the first year of the conflict. Incidents were perpetrated predominantly by the RSF in contexts marked by retaliation against women perceived as affiliated with the opposing party, collective punishment of communities, and sexual exploitation. Sexual slavery was also used to generate income and to compel victims to perform domestic and other forms of servitude in support of the daily activities of fighters. These violations were frequently committed collectively and in conjunction with other violations. Victims were held in coercive environments and deprived of their liberty through a combination of physical restraint, intimidation, and threats of violence. OHCHR documented cases in which victims were chained, blindfolded, or otherwise confined, with their movement strictly controlled under the threat of weapons. Such conditions effectively prevented escape and entrenched situations of prolonged captivity, during which victims were subjected to repeated acts of sexual violence amounting to sexual slavery. Prolonged captivity resulted in unwanted pregnancies, severe psychological trauma, and additional serious medical complications for victims who were often raped multiple times, by multiple perpetrators.

34. In 2023, OHCHR documented cases of sexual slavery perpetrated against women and girls by the RSF across in Khartoum state from the very first day of the conflict, beginning on 15 April 2023. During periods of intense hostilities – marked by ground fighting, artillery shelling and air raids affecting densely populated urban areas - victims were held in captivity either following abduction or violent intrusions into their homes. In some cases, victims were forcibly transported out of Khartoum state to locations in North and Central Darfur States, more than 1,000 kilometres away. These operations were often well organized and deliberately executed, with victims kept in captivity for the purpose of repeated sexual violence. Victims were subjected to regular rape, often combined with forced labour, including cooking, cleaning and washing clothes for fighters. In several instances, perpetrators also occupied victims' homes and used them for strategic military purposes. Reports further indicate that some victims were allegedly sold for "investment gains", while others were forced into sex work to generate income for perpetrators. Escape occurred only when intensifying hostilities disrupted control of victims at the places of captivity. In other cases, family members secured victims' release after paying large sums of money under duress. OHCHR received information indicating that some individuals who had been held in captivity by the RSF in Khartoum state were "released" following the SAF's reassertion of control over the city in early 2025. However, access to victims has remained limited, constraining a comprehensive assessment of the full scope and operational structure of sexual slavery in the capital.

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[34] Above n. 13, OHCHR Sudan reports on the RSF offensives on Zamzam camp and El Fasher.
[35] Ibid.

35. Sexual slavery by RSF and armed Arab militias in West Darfur began in June 2023, notably in El Geneina, during large-scale attacks directed against African tribes, mainly against the Masalit. Further incidents were reported in November 2023 in Ardamata, which experienced another major offensive by the RSF against civilian population. Women and girls were abducted either from homes or while fleeing along evacuation routes between El Geneina and Ardamata. Victims were taken individually, or in groups ranging from seven to 20 persons. Consistent with patterns documented in Khartoum state, victims in West Darfur were subjected to sexual slavery and compelled to perform domestic labour for fighters, including cooking, cleaning, and washing clothes. Women and girls were reportedly identified by perpetrators as 'women of enemy fighters'. In one documented case, a perpetrator reportedly told a victim, "You are comrade. [36] You will be our wife now." Other victims were subjected to racially derogatory and dehumanizing language during captivity.

36. In 2024 and 2025, OHCHR received further reports of sexual slavery in Al Jazirah and North Darfur states, all allegedly perpetrated by members of the RSF. In at least two documented incidents, victims were transported from Khartoum to South Darfur, following RSF's consolidation of territorial control in the region since October 2023. The reported motivation for these violations included retaliation, with perpetrators allegedly citing perceived support by victims' family members for the SAF. In one case, a victim was abducted, chained, and held in captivity for approximately ten days, during which she was repeatedly raped. Forced marriage to fighters and forced labour were also documented as integral components of sexual slavery.

37. In North Darfur in 2025, reports of sexual slavery emerged in the context of RSF military operations targeting Zamzam IDP camp and surrounding areas, reportedly due to the presence of Joint Forces fighting alongside the SAF. These operations formed part of a broader military objective by the RSF to seize control of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, which was besieged from May 2024 until its capture in late October 2025. Victims reported being labelled as "spies", or subjected to racially abusive language, including being called "black slaves", similar to derogatory remarks made against victims in West Darfur.

38. OHCHR documented cases in which victims were held in collective captivity sites, including houses in which up to 20 people were confined, from which a group of RSF fighters would take one victim to rape every night. In one incident, a group of civilians who had initially escaped an attack on Zamzam IDP camp were intercepted, forcibly returned to the camp, and subjected to repeated gang rape on a daily basis. In another instance, a group of civilians hiding from an attack was initially lined up for execution by the RSF; after one combatant reportedly intervened, the group was instead transported to an area near Nyala, where they were held in captivity for three weeks. At least one woman was gang raped during this period and later discovered she was pregnant as a result. Women and girls may still continue to be held in situations of sexual slavery in parts of the Darfur region, as only a few victims confirmed being able to escape.

4. Sexual violence in detention, including as a means of torture

39. OHCHR documented incidents of sexual violence in detention, including when used as a method of torture, in Khartoum, West Darfur, North Darfur, North Kordofan, South Darfur, Al Jazirah and South Kordofan states.[37] Alleged perpetrators included RSF, armed Arab militias operating in RSF-controlled areas, SAF, Military Intelligence, General Intelligence Service and prison guards. Compared to other

[36] A term used by the perpetrators to refer to Masalit fighters.

[37] See also OHCHR Sudan report, *"Don't ask about him": Detention facilities and practices in Khartoum State in the context of the conflict in the Sudan*, (March 2025), especially para. 39, in which the report describes sexual violence against female detainees.

patterns of sexual violence, the proportion of male victims was notably higher, comprising approximately 20 per cent of documented victims; one girl was also among the victims. Victims were frequently arbitrarily detained without explanation and frequently accused of collaboration or affiliation with an opposing party without legal basis. In several cases, sexual violence was committed during detention against individuals accused of such affiliation, including as a means to extract confessions, as such amounting torture. OHCHR documented cases in which victims were detained solely based on perceived tribal affiliation, appearance, participation in peaceful demonstrations calling for humanitarian assistance, or other discriminatory grounds. Victims detained in these contexts frequently witnessed sexual violence and other forms of severe abuse against other detainees, including in facilities where large numbers of detainees – up to 45 individuals – were held together. OHCHR also documented cases in which sexual violence in detention was inflicted in a discriminatory manner based on the origin or ethnicity of the person.[38] Persons with pre-existing mental health conditions were also subjected to sexual violence and severe abuse while in detention. Sexual violence in detention also had fatal consequences. In October 2023, a man from the Masalit community was taken by RSF in El Geneina, West Darfur, accused of affiliation with armed movements aligned with the SAF, and subjected to severe torture, including sexual violence, while in detention. He later died in April 2025 as a result of untreated injuries and compounded psychological harm. In another case, a woman with a pre-existing mental health condition was detained by RSF from the streets of Khartoum, tortured, and raped for approximately one week before being released in critical condition; she died several weeks later due to her injuries.

C. Human rights impacts of CRSV

1. Sexual violence resulting in death

40. Since 15 April 2023, OHCHR has documented the deaths of at least six girls, five women, and two men following incidents of sexual violence in 2023, 2024 and 2025. The youngest victim was nine years old. In addition, at least one woman died by suicide following rape, and another woman attempted suicide. These figures reflect only cases documented by OHCHR and therefore do not represent the actual scale of the harm. OHCHR's findings indicate that at least five of the identified victims might have survived if they had timely access to adequate medical care, and psychological support had been made available. In some cases, survivors initially survived the rape but were unable to seek or continue treatment due to severe trauma, stigma, fear or the collapse of health services, and subsequently died. In one case, the family of a victim refused appropriate medical treatment for her vaginal bleeding and instead sent the victim to a general practitioner. The victim passed away one month after the rape.

41. Most documented immediate deaths occurred following brutal gang rape, including against girls. Several victims died also while held in captivity, during which they were subjected to repeated sexual violence amounting to sexual slavery. At least two documented incidents involved detention settings, where sexual violence was inflicted as a method of torture. The violence further stripped victims and families of dignity even in death. In one case, family members were unable to retrieve or bury the body of the loved one due to ongoing shelling that forced their immediate displacement. In another incident, relatives were reportedly prevented by perpetrators from burying a victim near her home because of her religious identity. In another instance, a woman resisted an attempted rape while her daughter fled to seek help. When the daughter returned with assistance, she found that her mother had been shot and killed by the perpetrator. The brutality of these deaths leaves enduring scars on

[38] Ibid, para. 12.

families and communities and deepens the long-term harm and hatred caused by sexual violence in conflict.

2. Medical complications resulting from sexual violence

42. The majority of victims of sexual violence documented by OHCHR—including several of those who later died—were unable to access adequate medical services within the critical 72 to 120-hour window required for post-exposure prophylaxis, emergency contraception, and other life-saving interventions. This was due to the non-functioning or absence of health facilities, insecurity and movement restrictions, and fear of disclosing sexual violence in medical settings perceived to be under the influence or control of perpetrators, among other factors.

43. Among the cases documented by OHCHR, severe medical complications most frequently occurred following gang rape. Victims suffered extensive physical injuries, including serious damage to reproductive organs, such as vaginal tears, genital trauma, and rectal injuries. Several victims experienced heavy vaginal bleeding, were unable to stand, walk, or urinate, and required urgent medical intervention was often unavailable or delayed.

44. OHCHR documented cases in which the extreme violence associated with rape resulted in additional physical injuries, including fractures to the shoulders and vertebrae, indicating the use of significant blunt force during the assault. In several instances, victims lost consciousness for prolonged periods, in one case lasting up to six days, further delaying access to medical care and increasing the risk of permanent injury or death.

45. Sexually transmitted infections were also confirmed in several cases, although diagnoses were often made only after victims reached locations of displacement and eventually accessed limited health services. Even where survivors were able to reach hospitals in displacement settings, these facilities frequently lacked the capacity to perform complex surgical procedures or provide comprehensive trauma-informed care, leaving many survivors with untreated injuries and long-term health consequences.

3. Pregnancy resulting from sexual violence and children born of rape

46. OHCHR documented at least 59 victims of rape (30 women and 29 girls) who became pregnant as a result.[39] Among them, ten victims had been subjected to sexual slavery or forced into marriage with combatants and fighters. Of the documented pregnancies, at least 15 victims accessed abortion services, primarily through legal procedures. However, at least two victims underwent unsafe abortions, reflecting the absence of accessible, timely, and victim-centred reproductive health services. Where legal abortion was obtained, victims were largely supported by women-led civil society organizations, which facilitated access to medical services and the necessary legal documentation. In many other cases, victims were unable to access legal abortion due to insecurity, lack of service availability, fear of disclosure, or because they exceeded the statutory 90-day gestational limit for the procedure. The actual prevalence of pregnancies resulting from rape is undoubtedly significantly higher. For example, in the months following the RSF offensive on El Fasher in late October 2025, numerous reports of pregnancies as a result of rape committed during the offensive and along exit routes were received from different sources, including victims.

47. At least seven children were born following pregnancies resulting from rape. Pregnancy and childbirth following sexual violence had profound social consequences for victims and their families. While efforts were made in some cases

[39] See also Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 20 January 2025, A/HRC/58/29, especially para. 53, describing increasing reports of pregnancy and children born as a result of rape.

to arrange alternative care or adoption, when necessary, OHCHR documented instances in which children born as a result of rape were rejected by family members. In one case, relatives refused to accept the child, describing the child as "offspring of enemy." In another case, a victim was ostracized by her family, threatened with violence, and ultimately forced to leave her home. Conversely, OHCHR also documented cases in which families provided assurances of support to victims and their children, illustrating the uneven and deeply contextual nature of community responses.

D. Access to justice and accountability

48. The administration of justice has been severely compromised throughout the current conflict, also affecting rights of victims of sexual violence to access justice. In areas under the control of SAF, OHCHR observed that criminal charges have, in some instances, been used to target individuals based on perceived affiliation with opposing parties to the conflict. Conversely, in areas under RSF control, there is no functioning formal justice system.

49. The already-entrenched climate of impunity for sexual violence has been further exacerbated, including as a result of the granting of amnesty. In Al Jazirah state, following the defection of a senior RSF commander[40] to SAF in October 2024, the Commander-in-Chief of the SAF, Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan, reportedly reiterated on 20 October 2024 a previously announced amnesty granted to RSF defectors who joined the SAF. The granting or reiteration of amnesty to defectors, without clear exclusions for sexual violence crimes, undermines accountability for CRSV and risks shielding perpetrators from prosecution. Support for amnesty significantly undermines victims' rights to justice and accountability and erodes the legitimacy of State justice institutions.

50. Against this backdrop, reporting of CRSV to police posts has remained very limited compared to the number of cases documented by the OHCHR. Of 546 verified incidents, only 48 were reported to police posts or prosecution offices, with at least two cases proceeding to investigation and prosecution.[41] While reporting has increased modestly over time – five in 2023, 11 in 2024, and 32 in 2025 – victims and their families consistently cited the absence or non-functioning of justice institutions, insecurity, fear of retaliation, stigma, lack of protection measures, and a profound mistrust in authorities as primary reasons for not reporting violations, especially in areas under the control of armed actors. In one incident, a victim could not report the incident because the local police post was reportedly closed due to threats from affiliates of the perpetrators. In other incidents, police reportedly refused to investigate or make arrests, explicitly citing that perpetrators were heavily armed and more powerful than law enforcement actors. OHCHR also documented instances in which suspects were briefly detained and subsequently released, including a case resolved through informal or traditional mechanisms, as well as cases in which victims and their families were humiliated or actively discouraged from pursuing complaints, effectively silencing a victim of sexual violence, instead of providing access to justice.

51. Deep polarization within the justice system in the context of ongoing hostilities has further impeded access to justice. OHCHR received multiple reports in which

[40] This former RSF commander had exercised command authority during RSF ground operations in the state, during which serious violations, including sexual violence, were reported.

[41] This figure includes reports made to police posts operating in RSF-controlled areas. These posts were reportedly staffed by former police officers and individuals stationed following the RSF's effective control of the area. OHCHR was not able to verify the legal status, independence, or institutional capacity of these police posts.

both SAF and RSF representatives denied, directly to victims, that members of their respective forces had committed sexual violence. In some instances, cases were recorded but not investigated, or investigative processes were deliberatively stalled or obstructed where the alleged perpetrators belonged to the force controlling the area. In 2024, women who had been held by the RSF and subjected to sexual violence under coercive conditions were subsequently arrested by the Joint Security Cell, mainly composed of Sudanese Police Force, the General Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence, and charged with collaboration with the RSF. According to OHCHR documentation, at least one woman was reportedly sentenced to death on such charges. Such practices have further discouraged victims from reporting sexual violence.

52. The existence of women-led civil society actors has supported access to justice for victims; in cases that were reported, victims were often assisted by these civil society actors and/or reported incidents through police desks operating within medical facilities providing services to victims of violence.

53. Some positive progress in terms of addressing access to justice for victims of CRSV has been observed. In March 2024, an oral announcement by the Attorney-General instructed public prosecution offices to receive complaints of sexual violence irrespective of territorial jurisdiction. The same announcement reportedly reiterated victims' legal right to access abortion in accordance with relevant provisions of the Criminal Act.[42] From early 2024, OHCHR observed that access to legal abortion in cases of rape was, in some instances, processed through expedited procedures that departed from previously required judicial authorization processes, within 90 days of pregnancy. According to OHCHR monitoring, these expedited arrangements were observed in cases where rape was attributed to the RSF. In some cases, victims were able to report cases after reaching safer areas, and police accepted complaints although the incidents had occurred outside their territorial jurisdiction. In exceptions to the prevailing climate of impunity, OHCHR documented two separate incidents that occurred in 2024 and 2025 respectively, in which immunity was lifted for members of security forces – one from the SAF and one from the police – and first instance courts in the relevant states convicted the perpetrators for acts of rape.

54. In April 2025, Sudan signed with the United Nations a Framework of Cooperation to address sexual violence in conflict, including commitments to address access to justice and accountability.[43] According to Sudan, the National Committee for the Investigation of Crimes and Violations of National and International Humanitarian Law registered 120,594 individual cases by June 2025,[44] including sexual violence cases. It is not clear if investigation and prosecution for sexual violence cases were undertaken, or if any, based on international standards, or any reparation has been processed for victims.[45]

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[42] Article 135 and 136 of the Sudanese Criminal Act of 1991 prohibit abortion and criminalize those who operate abortion. It also stipulates exceptions for the prohibition

[43] Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Framework of Cooperation between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Nations on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Violence in Conflict, https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/frameworks-doc/auto-draft/FRAMEW1-1.pdf.

[44] Statement by Sudan, 59th session of the Human Rights Council, 17 June 2025.

[45] Sudan's "National plan for the protection of civilians in time of war and during the peacebuilding phase," an *Annex to the letter dated 23 January 2025 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council*, states Sudan enhance capacity of the National Committee for Investigating Crimes and Violations of National Law and International Humanitarian Law, in order to "ensure that victims are rehabilitated and receive the necessary compensation and reparations." (S/2025/49)

V. Conclusions and recommendations

55. Since the outbreak of the conflict in Sudan on 15 April 2023, OHCHR's findings demonstrate consistent and recurring patterns of the use of CRSV as a weapon of war involving serious violations of IHL and gross violations and abuses of IHRL by parties to the conflict, including the widespread use of rape, gang rape, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence. The patterns documented by OHCHR indicate that these acts have been committed during attacks on villages and towns, in and around IDP camps, during house-to-house searches, at checkpoints and along displacement routes, often in conjunction with killings, torture and other ill-treatment and arbitrary detention. OHCHR's findings indicate that sexual violence was used as an apparent tactic to terrorize and humiliate the civilian population, and was often directed based on ethnicity and perceived affiliation, targeting members of non-Arab communities in Darfur, and was frequently accompanied by racially derogatory and dehumanizing language.

56. OHCHR monitoring suggests that such acts, committed in the context of the current armed conflict, amount to war crimes. Specifically, in Darfur, OHCHR has reasonable grounds to believe that RSF and its allied Arab militias committed acts amounting to war crimes of sexual violence, in particular rape and sexual slavery, violence to life and person, including cruel treatment and torture, and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment. The scale, repetition, geographic spread and coordinated nature of the violations and abuses by the RSF and allied Arab militias documented by OHCHR in several contexts, including in El Geneina and Ardamata in West Darfur, and Zamzam IDP camp and El Fasher in North Darfur, further indicate that these were committed in the context of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population.[46] OHCHR has therefore reasonable grounds to believe that certain acts documented may also amount to crimes against humanity in form of rape, sexual slavery, other forms of sexual violence, torture, and other inhumane acts.

57. While all conflict-related violations raise grave concerns, sexual violence is distinct in its enduring and silencing impact. By its nature – and often by design – it suppresses the voices of victims and families long after the violence itself, stripping victims of dignity, inflicting profound psychological and physical harm, and imposing lasting stigma that communities frequently fail or refuse to address. Victims who survive live bearing the weight of trauma while the lack of consequences for perpetrators – including those exercising command responsibility –allows sexual violence to be repeated and normalized. Persistent impunity deepens harm and reinforces cycles of violations and abuses; accountability is essential to breaking these cycles, and ensuring access to justice, including remedies and reparation, for victims. Unless the patterns and impacts of CRSV are addressed through justice, victim-centred responses and efforts to tackle stigma and discrimination, peace and social cohesion in Sudan risk being undermined for years to come. Peace that is constructed without confronting the realities and wide-ranging impacts of CRSV risks being fragmented. Sustainable peace cannot take root in the absence of justice and where profound harm remains unaddressed.

OHCHR calls upon parties to the conflict to:

(a) To fully comply with their obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law and to take specific measures for

[46] Above n. 13, OHCHR Sudan report on RSF final offensive on El Fasher, 24-30 October 2025, para. 114.

the protection of civilians in line with their commitments, including by issuing and enforcing strict command orders to end sexual violence in conflict.

(b) Pursue timely, independent, and impartial investigations into sexual violence in line with international human rights standards, and ensure accountability for all perpetrators, including those exercising command or superior responsibility, and lifting immunity where necessary.

(c) Take concrete and verifiable measures to prevent sexual violence within their ranks, including through issuance, dissemination and enforcement of command orders prohibiting such acts, oversight mechanisms, and effective disciplinary measures for violations.

(d) Ensure that survivors of sexual violence have timely access to essential services, including medical care, sexual and reproductive health services and psychosocial support.

OHCHR calls upon Sudanese authorities to:

(a) Ensure independent and effective justice and accountability processes, including reparations.

To pursue investigations and ensure accountability for violations of international law, in line with international human rights standards, as a matter of priority, and ensure there are no amnesty provisions for sexual violence or other conduct amounting to international crimes. Consider urgent interim reparations for *all* eligible victims, until a comprehensive, victim-led, rights-based reparation process can be established including as a part of a future transitional justice process.

(b) Ensure access to victim-centred and trauma-informed services

Ensure all victims of sexual violence have unimpeded access to comprehensive medical and sexual and reproductive health services, including psychosocial and trauma-informed rehabilitation services, and safe and legal abortion based on free and informed choices without discrimination or procedural barriers.

OHCHR calls upon the international community to:

(a) Promote centrality of accountability in mediation efforts

Continue to support coordinated efforts to reach a cessation of hostilities and a unified road map for the resolution of the conflict, ensuring the centrality of accountability for serious violations of international law, in particular CRSV. Ensure there are no amnesty provisions for sexual violence or other conduct amounting to international crimes.


(b) Promote inclusion and protection of children born of sexual violence

Promote measures to ensure the social inclusion and protection of women who gave birth as a result of rape and other sexual violence and of children so born, including their access to civil documentation, education, health care, and community support.

(c) Support efforts to address stigma and discrimination related to sexual violence

Support initiatives by civil society and community leaders aimed at challenging stigma, promoting respect for victims' rights, and reinforcing that responsibility for sexual violence rests solely with perpetrators.

VI. Annex: Geographic spread, victims & impacts of CRSV




Geographic Reach and Concentration of Documented Incidents

- Conflict-related sexual violence has affected nearly the entire country, with verified incidents documented in 89% of Sudan's states (16 of 18 states).
- More than three-quarters of documented incidents were concentrated in five states, reflecting the close relationship between conflict dynamics, displacement patterns, and the prevalence of conflict-related sexual violence.

Who Was Most Affected?

Profile of documented victims




Victim Profile

- Women: 64%
- Girls: 34%
- Men and Boys: 2%

Forms of CRSV

Percentage of victims affected by specific documented patterns:



CRSV: Interconnected and Intergenerational Impacts

