



Lebanon

Syrian Refugee Return: Snap Return Intentions, Perceptions and a Qualitative Analysis

Executive Summary

Since December 2024, over **655,000 Syrian refugees have returned home to Syria**¹ - most returning spontaneously to their areas of origin in Syria settling in with relatives or in rented properties in Syria. Return intentions amongst Syrian refugees in Lebanon continue to be highly individualized and non-homogenous, shifting regularly with a change in individual and external circumstances. While **return intentions alone do not predict return behaviour** and do not always translate into actual movements, understanding the factors which drive refugees' decision-making on returns is key to ensure voluntary, safe and dignified return. Return intentions need to be considered together with actual return movements and trends and be guided by refugees' voices, taking into consideration the continuously evolving circumstances in both Lebanon and Syria.

This report aims to better understand current and shifts in return intentions since the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon in March 2026, with an added focus on age, gender and diversity considerations. The report presents quantitative and qualitative findings collected between 1 and 12 June 2026, drawing on Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), representative-sample intentions surveys and key informant interviews (KII), providing a comprehensive understanding of the drivers, barriers, and existing capacities currently influencing refugees' decision-making on return to Syria.

In January 2026², refugees highlighted practical considerations such as the end of the school year and weather conditions as relevant factors for return decision-making. In March 2026, this evolved to many feeling compelled to return due to the hostilities in Lebanon. During the initial weeks of the conflict, movement of Syrians from Lebanon to Syria across official border points tripled from an estimated 2,500 individuals per day to nearly 8,000 individuals per day, with many citing the hostilities in Lebanon as their primary motivator for return. UNHCR adapted its programming to reflect these changing dynamics through support with return of more than 17,000 refugees³, highlighting that while returns under such adverse conditions would not be considered voluntary, limited **support to returns due to *force majeure*** conditions would help mitigate harm and reduce risks during the return travel to Syria. By May 2026, movements from Lebanon to Syria stabilized, to 3,500 individuals per day.

The surveys and discussions conducted with refugees in June 2026 found that while the hostilities in Lebanon impacted return decision-making during the initial weeks of the hostilities, **96% of refugees now indicate the conflict has no or little impact** on their return decision-making. Compared to December 2025, where 15% of Syrian refugees indicated an intention to return to Syria⁴, the June 2026 return intentions survey found only **7% of Syrians remaining in Lebanon intend to return to Syria within 12 months**, with lack of shelter (38%) and lack of livelihoods (32%) in Syria highlighted as the primary deterrents to return. Qualitative discussions with refugees similarly found that conditions in Syria shape current return decision-making more than conditions in Lebanon, across different age, gender and diversity groups and among those secondarily displaced by the conflict in Lebanon. While the majority of refugees still express an intention to return to Syria eventually, shelter, livelihoods and access to services in Syria, are currently the most predominant determinants of return.

¹ Document - UNHCR Facilitated Return of Syrian Refugees - Lebanon, 30 June 2026

² UNHCR, Lebanon: Between Hope and Reality– Syrian Refugee Return Decisions from Lebanon: A Qualitative Analysis, December 2025

³ Document - UNHCR Facilitated Return of Syrian Refugees - Lebanon, 30 June 2026

⁴ Regional Enhanced Return Perceptions and Intentions Survey, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/114221>

Methodology and Sources

This report includes findings from a mixed-method approach, combining quantitative data collected through representative surveys with Syrians refugees as well as qualitative insights from refugees and key informants. Data was collected largely between **1 and 12 June 2026** across all governorates in Lebanon, including a variety of age, gender and diversity profiles and conflict-affected refugees. It is intended to provide a robust understanding of return perceptions and dynamics, with an added focus on capacities and barriers to return. The following data sources were compiled and analysed for the report:

Protection and Border Monitoring

- Protection Monitoring interviews with over 2,800 households and 110 key informant interviews.
- Over **700 interviews** conducted with respondents during **60 border monitoring missions** at official border crossing points, including Masnaa, Qaa, Arida, Boqayaa, since mid-March 2026.

UNHCR's facilitated return programmes

- Over **100,000 Syrians** provided with information and counselling on return to Syria since 1 July 2025.
- **60,793** Syrians processed for voluntary return, including voluntariness assessments since 1 July 2025.
- **17,292** Syrian refugees processed for return due to *force majeure* since 1 April 2026.

Intentions Surveys (4 to 12 June 2026)

- Targeted snap survey with **795 Syrian refugees**, a representative sample of the remaining population.
- Targeted snap survey conducted by INTERSOS with **799 Syrian refugees**, a representative sample of refugees who previously expressed interest in return but subsequently changed their minds.

Focus Group Discussions (4 to 12 June 2026)

- **16** Focus Group Discussions conducted with **149 Syrian refugees** residing in Nabatieh/Tyre, Saida, Mount Lebanon, Beirut, Baalbek/El-Hermel, Zahle, Barelias, West Bekaa, Akkar and North.
- Interviews with community representatives and service providers.

Returnees from Lebanon: Patterns and Profiles

Since January 2025, over 630,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon returned home to Syria - 89% opting to return spontaneously while 11% availed of UNHCR's support to return. The vast majority of refugees were observed to have returned in the summer of 2025, coinciding with the launch of the UNHCR-facilitated return programme and the implementation of the General Security Office's waiver of administrative facilitation measures at official border crossing points, ensuring safe routes for return.

- **Return over intention:** While 24% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon surveyed in January 2025 indicated an intention to return to Syria in 2025⁵, over 501,603 Syrian refugees or 33% were identified as actually having returned by the end of 2025⁶. Further, 76% of those who had previously indicated no intention to return to Syria in June 2025, were confirmed to have returned by December 2025⁷ – highlighting that **return intentions do not necessarily predict actual return** behaviour. Overall, more Syrian refugees actually returned to Syria in 2025 than those who expressed the intention to do so.

⁵ [UNHCR, Flash Regional Survey on Syrian Refugees' Perceptions and Intentions on Return to Syria, February 2025](#)

⁶ [UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation Dashboard, December 2025](#). Note figures includes both facilitated returns and spontaneous returns. Spontaneous returns are verified through information provided by the Lebanese GSO, UNHCR Syria and refugee family members; and presumed returns as a result of prolonged absence and failure to participate in UNHCR's presence verification exercise over an extended period of time. Some of those who are recorded as spontaneously departed as of end of 2025, actually departed in 2024 but were only verified as remained in Syria during the 2025 verification exercise.

⁷ [UNHCR, Enhanced Regional Return Perceptions and Intentions Survey, February 2026](#)

- **Those who can return, have returned:** FGD participants highlighted that returnees who already returned to Syria in 2025 are those who have homes or property to return to and/or who have savings or livelihood opportunities to reintegrate in Syria; while those remaining in Lebanon do not. This is generally supported by statistics from UNHCR's return programme, whereby most refugees in 2025 returned to their area of origin (84%) where family or community support is available; and to adequate accommodation in their own homes, with relatives or rented properties in Syria (81%). This is also reflected in Protection Monitoring reports from UNHCR Syria noting that 94% of all Syrian returnees either owned property, rented property or were hosted by family and friends⁸.
- **More complete families return under force majeure:** Between 1 January and 30 June 2026, over 154,000 Syrian refugees are verified or presumed to have returned to Syria. Among these, an estimated 19% (29,054) have been identified as returning after 2 March 2026⁹ under *force majeure* conditions. Further, of the 17,292 Syrian refugees supported by UNHCR to return, 96% returned in complete families and only 71% returned to their area of origin in Syria (compared to 84% under voluntary return). This supports the claim that returns under *force majeure* occur with urgency, where families are compelled to flee Lebanon with the entire family to seek safety in Syria.

Remaining Syrians: Return Intentions

In December 2025, 15% of the remaining Syrian refugee population in Lebanon (an estimated 1.12 million Syrians) indicated an intention to return to Syria within 2026¹⁰. Discussions with the community held in January 2026 indicated a projected increase in return intention during the summer of 2026, highlighting the end of the school year and improved weather conditions as preferable conditions for return¹¹. However, according to the June 2026 return intentions survey, 62% indicated no intention to return within the next 12 months, 31% were undecided and only 7% intend to return to Syria within 12 months.

- **Conditions in Syria are predominant in return decision-making:** Current conditions in Syria, including availability of shelter, viability of livelihood and access to services, are predominant factors for return decision-making. Among the 62% of refugees not intending to return, 99% noted conditions in Syria as the **primary deterrent**, including non-availability of shelter and housing (31%), economic challenges in Syria (23%), lack of livelihood opportunities (19%), and perceived challenges with personal safety and security (19%). Similar findings were collected during the FGDs, with men and youth particularly highlighting concerns with available livelihood opportunities, noting low wages incompatible with the high living costs. Women and youth also raised concerns with the lack of rule of law, citing fears of kidnapping for ransom and criminality.
- **Focus on return preparedness:** Refugees emphasize the importance of return preparedness, noting that a premature return could be a costly and irreversible decision. Several refugees highlighted that refugees who remain in Lebanon do not have homes or family and community networks to support their return, and are either more integrated in Lebanese society or require additional preparation before they can be ready to return. Refugees also shared stories from returnees who came back to Lebanon and spoke of poor living conditions in Syria, which has further deterred returns. Return is perceived as a high-stakes decision, with refugees fearing losing both humanitarian and host community support in Lebanon by returning prematurely to Syria.

⁸ UNHCR Syria, Protection Monitoring, December 2025

⁹ UNHCR, [Facilitated Return of Syrian Refugees – Lebanon, 31 May 2026](#). Percentage known to UNHCR who crossed after 2 March 2026 confirmed through lists shared by the General Security Office of persons who crossed between 2 March and mid-April 2026; with further verification ongoing.

¹⁰ UNHCR, [Enhanced Regional Return Perceptions and Intentions Survey, February 2026](#)

¹¹ UNHCR, Lebanon: Between Hope and Reality – Syrian Refugee Return Decisions from Lebanon: A Qualitative Analysis, December 2025

- **Gradual and phased return strategies:** Due largely to information received from relatives, friends and recent returnees in Syria, refugees are adopting a cautious and incremental strategy to navigate the uncertainty around return, including engaging in temporary visits and split-family arrangements. Most refugee families have engaged in some form of “go-and-see” visit with at least one member of the family having returned to Syria temporarily to assess conditions for return. Several families also highlighted split-family dynamics, with part of the household, often the women and children, returning to Syria to start establishing themselves while the main breadwinners, often men, remain in Lebanon to maintain more stable income. UNHCR’s voluntary return programme supports this, noting that among the 16% with a family member remaining in Lebanon, 74% were men staying behind for livelihood purposes. The strategies adopted reflect caution and risk mitigation in return, highlighting the criticality of economic sustainability for reintegration.

Impact of Hostilities

Since 1 April 2026, over **17,292 refugees also benefitted from support from UNHCR to return due to force majeure**, seeing no other viable alternative to seek safety. Of these, 40% were residing in Bekaa and Baalbek/Hermel; 33% in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, South and Nabatieh; and 27% in North and Akkar, further highlighting the hostilities in Lebanon were not a main driver for return. However, towards the end of April, movements to Syria largely stabilized, with refugees currently highlighting that **the conflict has little or no impact on their decision-making on return**. Through community engagement, evidence suggests that despite the difficult situation in Lebanon, remaining refugees regard the conditions in Lebanon as more predictable and therefore more favourable than the unknown situation in Syria.

- **Conflict as a trigger, not as a driver for return:** While exposure to hostilities temporarily increased considerations for return, it is no longer seen as a decisive driver for return. The majority (94%) of respondents in the June 2026 intentions survey indicated that the security situation in Lebanon had **no or low impact on their decision-making towards return**. Even among those who indicated being directly affected by hostilities, 87% still indicated the security situation had no or low impact on their decision-making. However, among the 9% of the general population who said they were more willing to return compared to 12 months ago, more than half quoted the security situation as a reason, showing that the security situation remains a consideration in return decisions, albeit a secondary one.
- **Displacement increases vulnerability, not return intentions:** UNHCR estimates that 172,000 refugees have been directly impacted by the hostilities¹². Among these, 136,000 were forcibly displaced in Lebanon of which 78,000 refugees remain displaced. Secondary displacement heightens vulnerabilities of refugee families but does not increase the intention to return to Syria. The June 2026 return intention survey found that while displaced refugees were the only group to highlight security in Lebanon as one of their top considerations for decision-making on return, conditions in Syria were still more determinative of return. Displacement reinforces the need for stability and adequate pre-conditions before seriously considering return, with affected persons focused primarily on short-term survival in Lebanon.
- **Perceptions from the South:** Refugee families directly affected by hostilities or displaced from South Lebanon highlighted that while they were more compelled to consider return due to the adverse circumstances, they did not perceive return to Syria as a safe or sustainable alternative. Notably, 7% of refugees who have been living in the South and Mount Lebanon indicated an intention to return to Syria within 12 months, proportionate to the overall refugee population in Lebanon. However, a higher 16% of refugees from El Nabatieh indicated an intention to return within 12 months due to the ongoing security incidents in the region.

¹² Based on triangulation of recorded areas of residence in Lebanon of Syrian refugees known to UNHCR with areas impacted by the hostilities.

Barriers to Return

- **Adequate shelter as a minimum requirement:** Housing in Syria was repeatedly identified as a minimum condition for return, noting that **families without property or secure accommodation in Syria are less likely to return**. Among Syrian refugees surveyed in June 2026 who had previously expressed interest in return but subsequently changed their minds, 34% cited lack of available shelter and adequate accommodation in Syria as their main reason for postponement; highlighting that even for those willing to return, significant barriers still remain. Concerns were also raised about land, inheritance and property disputes in Syria.
- **Access to livelihoods as a determinant factor across profiles:** Access to livelihoods remains a decisive factor shaping return intentions, both in Lebanon and in Syria. Across age, gender and diversity profiles and area-based data collection, access to livelihoods was consistently identified as one of the most important considerations, both in terms of deciding to remain in Lebanon to earn an income; or in deciding to return to Syria to seek livelihoods. Syrian refugees surveyed who had previously expressed interest in return but subsequently changed their minds, noted available livelihood opportunities (33%) and general economic challenges (25%) in Syria as main reasons for the postponement. Refugees did however note that job availability differs depending on the intended return destination in Syria, with better job opportunities identified in Damascus and Aleppo, while regions such as Ar-Raqqa and Hassakeh lack any viable job prospects.
- **Perceptions of personal safety and security:** Concern for personal safety and security was raised across refugee profiles, especially among women and youth. Refugees raised fears of return due to accounts of kidnapping for ransom, revenge killing, general criminality and gender-based protection risks, in tandem with a lack of trust in law enforcement and the rule of law. Refugees highlighted that these concerns while particularly prevalent in only some parts of Syria, were a concern particularly for women and children, and for members of ethnic and religious minority groups (Kurdish, Alawite, Druze).
- **Financial assistance needed to support return:** Overall, refugees highlighted that barriers to return are largely inside Syria. While only 2% of surveyed refugees who identified barriers in Lebanon, including lack of financial resources to return, the Post-Distribution Monitoring survey conducted in February 2026 indicated that 30% of beneficiaries of the return cash grant used personal funds to supplement their return, with half spending an additional USD200¹³. In June, some refugees further highlighted the inability to clear accumulated private debt as a barrier, stating that identity documents had been confiscated by private individuals as leverage. Others highlighted an inability to afford the increased cost of transportation back to Syria, including for persons with specific needs requiring specialized arrangements for return, noting the USD 100 return cash grant provided by UNHCR as insufficient to cover the needs.

Age, Gender & Diversity

- **Women and female-headed households:** Women are overall more reticent about return than men, with 73% expressing no intention to return within 12 months, compared to 55% among men. Only **3% indicated an intention to return within 12 months**. While general factors for return decision-making remain the same as men - with livelihoods and shelter as principal considerations - women and female-headed households raised concerns with personal safety, limited income and support, housing insecurity, reduced autonomy and social reintegration challenges exacerbating protection risks. Women frequently highlighted concerns with regard to personal safety and security in Syria, due to the absence of effective rule of law, linked also to fears of restricted freedom of movement and need to rely on male relatives. Women also expressed concern for

¹³ UNHCR, PDM and post-return feedback <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/121045>, February 2026

children and their wellbeing, including their safety and their access to education under a different curriculum (and language, in some cases). Female-headed households perceived stronger community support in Lebanon, and heightened gender-based protection risks to return, compounded by limited income-earning opportunities and increased caregiving responsibilities.

- **Men:** Men were generally more open to return with **10% indicating an intention to return within 12 months**. Men's decision-making around return is strongly shaped by economic responsibilities and livelihoods. Consistent with overall trends, livelihood opportunities remain central, with men frequently emphasizing the lack of stable income and employment prospects in Syria as key deterrents. Men were particularly influenced by accounts shared by other returnees regarding income generation and cost of living in Syria, with many prioritizing limited but more stable earnings in Lebanon over uncertain prospects upon return. While 55% of men indicated no intention to return to Syria within 12 months, 11% of surveyed men indicated they were more willing to return to Syria compared to 12 months ago (compared to only 4% among women).
- **Youth:** Youth are overall the most reluctant and hesitant group to return, with only **4% indicating an intention to return within 12 months** driven by a strong attachment to Lebanon and concerns around the lack of opportunities in Syria. Syrian youth in Lebanon express a strong sense of belonging in Lebanon, and worry about being perceived as outsiders and facing harassment and discrimination in Syria as a result. Economic factors remain central, especially the availability of livelihoods, and youth frame their concerns in terms of long-term possibilities in building a stable future. Concerns around limited job opportunities and low wages are often cited, as well as challenges related to education, including curriculum differences and recognition of qualifications. However, some did mention that their TVET training from Lebanon could be useful in Syria if conditions stabilized one day; and interest in starting their own business if microfinancing is provided. While some mention encouragement from older relatives to return, some noted limited influence in family-decision making, not always feeling fully heard.
- **Elderly and persons with disability:** The elderly and persons with disability are the most constrained in their ability to return, with **only 4% indicating an intention to return**. While elderly refugees may generally express a stronger emotional attachment to Syria and in some cases a greater willingness to return, this willingness is often constrained by practical concerns, notably access to healthcare, medication, services and family support, as is also the case for persons with disabilities. Both the elderly and persons with disabilities raise concerns regarding the need for specialized arrangements for return, the weak healthcare system in Syria, and dependency on family and community support structures. Even when there is a desire to return, these groups often require a higher threshold of preparedness to ensure their return in safety and dignity.
- **Refugees secondarily displaced:** While surveyed refugee families affected by the hostilities in Lebanon were more likely to consider return to Syria, this was compelled by the security situation in Lebanon rather than a genuine desire to return home. Among those who identified as being secondarily displaced in Lebanon, **6% indicated an intention to return to Syria within 12 months**. Despite having experienced secondary displacement in Lebanon, displaced refugees maintained a preference to remain in Lebanon due to available livelihood opportunities. Those displaced from Southern Lebanon, highlighted better wages in the agricultural sector in the South and their intention to return to the South once conditions allow.

Area-based Nuances

Overall, the drivers and barriers to return cited by refugees remained consistent across different areas of residence in Lebanon. However, the percentage of families indicating an intention to return varied depending on area of residence, with higher intentions to return noted from those residing in the South, Beirut and the North, while lower intentions to return were noted by those residing in Mount Lebanon, Bekaa and Baalbek regions.

- **Beirut & Mount Lebanon:** 15% of refugees residing in Beirut indicated an intention to return within 12 months, while only 6% of those residing in Mount Lebanon indicated intention to return. Key informant interviews confirm that while many refugees have expressed a desire to return to Syria eventually, they continue to face economic and security-related barriers to return in Syria. According to the June 2026 survey, refugees living in Beirut and Mount Lebanon highlight security as the key consideration for return decision-making, followed by livelihoods and shelter. However, FGDs confirm that economic conditions in Syria still dominate decisions over conditions in Lebanon.
- **Bekaa/Baalbek-El Hermel:** Only 2% of refugees residing in the Bekaa region indicate an intention to return to Syria within 12 months, with a further 6% of refugees in Baalbek-Hermel region indicating an intention to return. Key informants also highlight that most refugees in the area who had intended to return had already done so, and those remaining in Lebanon have adequate shelter and work, anchoring them in Lebanon. Given the proximity to the Syrian border, pendular movement (return to Syria and back to Lebanon) was also commonly reported. FGD participants indicated high costs of return (USD 1000-1200 USD per family), debt accumulation in Lebanon, livelihood collapse in Syria, and housing destruction or unavailability as deterrents to return. Baalbek-El Hermel had the highest rate of respondents (18%) citing seasonal factors that could influence their decision to return, with half citing the school calendar and half citing the agricultural season as determinants for return. While these populations do show intention to return eventually, they are quite economically constrained and sceptical about the feasibility of return.
- **North/Akkar:** 9% of refugees residing in the North and 5% from Akkar indicated an intention to return, with a lesser proportion (53% and 61% respectively) indicating no intention to return compared to other regions. A further 38% from the North were undecided about return compared to 34% undecided from Akkar. Overall, refugees in North and Akkar are comparatively more open to return. Of note, the closure of the Arida official border crossing point in January 2026 impacts the feasibility of return for many in the North. While the reopening of Arida and Boqaaya for pedestrian-only crossing in April and May 2026 is welcomed, it does not facilitate permanent movement to transport goods and belongings, and encourages undesirable cross-border movements through unofficial routes.
- **South/Nabatieh:** Only 7% of refugees residing in the South indicated an intention to return compared to 16% of refugees in El Nabatieh - the highest rate across governorates in the country. Both South and Nabatieh respondents said they had become more willing to return compared to a year ago, with all or most citing security factors in Lebanon as a reason for the change. In the South, refugees highlighted that the hostilities resulted in a temporary increase in return intentions, which eventually stabilized. Key informants highlighted the high number of spontaneous returns compared to UNHCR-facilitated programmes as a result of urgent circumstances requiring rapid return.

Information Needs

- **Information from returnees who come back to Lebanon heavily influences perceptions:** Information shared by Syrian returnees who have come back to Lebanon has a significant influence in shaping perceptions of conditions in Syria and delaying return. Findings from both intention surveys and FGDs indicate that returnees share stories of economic hardship, poor infrastructure and limited livelihoods in Syria which are widely disseminated within the refugee community. Across FGDs, refugees highlight they trust these informal information channels through relatives, friends, communities and returnees over information shared on media and social media, which were at times described as incomplete or misleading. These testimonies reinforce caution amongst those considering return and often lead to a re-evaluation of initial intentions. Among those who had changed their mind regarding return, 36% indicated this was due to information received about poor living conditions in Syria. Participants expressed a need for clearer, more practical, and area-specific information on conditions in Syria including availability of assistance and services.

- **Perception of UNHCR programme:** Overall, refugees had good knowledge of UNHCR's facilitated return programmes noting it is helpful for those who were ready to return. Refugees highlighted that the facilitated return programme does not influence return decisions, as the financial assistance provided is perceived to be insufficient. While the return assistance does contribute to return costs, it does not account for the increase in transport and fuel prices; and is insufficient to support initial reintegration in Syria. Nonetheless, refugees generally highlighted that when they are ready to return to Syria, they would prefer to avail of the UNHCR-facilitated programme which is perceived as safer than returning without UNHCR's support, while some expressed concern regarding loss of assistance if they were to proceed with the UNHCR programme.

Final Reflections and Recommendations

- **Refugees who were able to return, have returned.** Refugees still remaining in Lebanon have additional barriers to return or are more deeply attached to Lebanese society. Return movements will likely be phased and gradual for the remainder of the year, with a slight increase in the summer.
- **Refugees with vulnerabilities have additional financial needs to return.** Refugees with heightened needs may want to return but are not able to do so. Provision of additional financial assistance, specialized arrangements for return and referral to services in Syria can help alleviate costs associated with their specific needs and facilitate a safe and dignified return.
- **Strengthen information provision on conditions in areas of return in Syria.** Further dissemination of information on humanitarian and government services available in priority return areas, including through the [Syria is Home](#) platform.
- **Review transfer value of the return cash grant.** Align the return cash grant transfer value accounting for inflation and the rising costs of basic needs and fuel, including the market price for passenger and household goods transport to Syria.
- **Support safe and dignified routes for return.** Prioritize advocacy and support for reopening the Abboudiyeh official border crossing point, to support safe return through the Northern border.
- **Prioritize shelter support in Syria.** Investment in small-scale home repair, rental subsidies and basic services restoration in priority areas of return in Syria, with a particular focus on access to shelter as a decisive factor for sustainable return.
- **Strengthen cross-border coordination on skills and job matching.** In cooperation and partnership with relevant humanitarian, development and private-sector partners, explore cross-border opportunities for referral of Syrian refugees participating in TVET and accessing specific labour markets in Lebanon to TVET programmes and job-matching opportunities inside Syria.

“Everyone hopes to return to Syria one day, but the biggest obstacles are housing, livelihoods, and the cost of starting all over again.”
– Syrian refugee in the North

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