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Letter dated 21 April 2026 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution [2781 \(2025\)](#), have the honour to transmit herewith the final report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 18 of resolution [2781 \(2025\)](#).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) on 16 March 2026 and was considered by the Committee on 27 March 2026.

The Panel would appreciate if the present letter and the final report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2781 (2025)

Summary

The history of South Sudan is marked by a succession of ceasefires and peace agreements. Another is now at risk of collapse.

First Vice-President Riek Machar, the leader of the main opposition group, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), remains in detention while on trial for a range of serious charges, including treason. He is joined in detention by several opposition figures, as well as by a growing number of former officials from the party of the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, which has suffered its own divisions.

Officials in Juba, however, insist that the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan was never between individuals. It therefore remains intact, they argue, as a faction of the SPLM/A-IO has remained in Juba after a number of the party's more prominent figures fled the capital and pronounced the collapse of the Agreement and the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity. This remaining Juba-faction has allowed the President to claim a veneer of support for his efforts to amend the peace agreement and allow elections to take place in December 2026, without the prior completion of a permanent constitution or national census.

These developments have flowed from a profound loss of confidence in the peace agreement and its mechanisms after years of halting and incomplete implementation.

Government officials feel opposition groups have seized upon the exacting language of the agreement to impede any meaningful progress towards the elections that would bring an end to the power-sharing provisions from which they benefit.

Opposition leaders, in turn, believe President Kiir and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) were never truly committed to power-sharing, nor to the unification of the country's security forces, while key regional guarantors have failed in their promise of neutrality. They cannot countenance, they argue, elections under conditions that are stacked against both them and their natural constituents.

In this context, elements of the country's leadership have argued that the current political processes in South Sudan will not allow the country to move forward without a military intervention that more decisively alters the balance of power in their favour. "Sometimes you have to make war to make peace," a security forces officer told the Panel.

Armed confrontations between the signatories to the peace agreement, as well as their affiliated militias, have continued in almost all parts of the country where opposition forces retain a meaningful presence, with the focus of the most intense hostilities shifting to northern parts of Jonglei State in late 2025 and early 2026. Both South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) and Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) forces have initiated attacks in these areas.

Despite widespread disaffection with the peace process, however, leaders in South Sudan have found few enthusiasts for war among those expected to fight it. The failure to pay and feed soldiers over many years has eroded morale and left SSPDF reliant on loosely integrated or affiliated ethnic militia forces. Long-standing tribal

grievances and fears have, therefore, increasingly been exploited by military leaders leading, inevitably, to a wave of atrocities against civilians, including in Jonglei State.

The SSPDF military campaigns also continue to be aided by an armed deployment of Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces in South Sudan, as well as by helicopters and surveillance aircraft that have facilitated extensive bombardments of opposition-held areas. Subsequent ground offensives have made substantial use of armoured personnel carriers previously procured in violation of the arms embargo first implemented under resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#). The Panel also believes the SSPDF procured additional small arms in early 2025 in support of its ongoing military operations.

The humanitarian impact of renewed fighting has been catastrophic. Recent fighting has displaced more than 320,000 individuals since January 2025, further compounding the humanitarian impact of the ongoing conflict in the Sudan and flooding. Widespread armed confrontations have also seriously impeded humanitarian access, particularly in Jonglei State and the greater Equatoria region. Several humanitarian operators have been forced to suspend their operations following armed attacks and bombardments on both their staff and facilities in these areas. Several humanitarian staff also told the Panel that they believed humanitarian access and resources were being instrumentalized by all parties, but by the South Sudan People's Defence Forces in particular, as a means of war.

The humanitarian challenges have been further exacerbated by the economic crisis in South Sudan. Soon after successful efforts to restore oil exports from Upper Nile State, fighting around Heglig, in the Sudan, significantly reduced oil exports from Unity State for several months. The Panel has also documented the continued diversion of oil revenues, including to opaque private accounts and to large non-competitive contracts awarded to companies tied to political and security elites. Increased pressure on oil revenues has fuelled predation on non-oil revenues, including the humanitarian sector, which has faced escalating financial and bureaucratic impediments to their work, as well as waves of looting.

As many South Sudanese have lost faith in their own domestic political mechanisms, many have called for greater support and intervention from regional institutions and the broader international community. Both the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development have taken an active mediation role, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the release of the First Vice-President Riek Machar and meaningful investment in key electoral institutions. Regional bodies and States have also taken important steps towards consolidating existing mediation initiatives, which have grown increasingly diffuse as opposition groups have fragmented.

"You can't solve the problems in Jonglei without first solving the problem in Juba," a long-time observer of the peace process told the Panel. Sustained regional and international support is now needed to prevent a further addition to the history of failed peace agreements in South Sudan.

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I. Background

A. Mandate and travel

1. By its resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council imposed a sanctions regime targeting individuals and entities contributing to the conflict in South Sudan and established a sanctions committee (the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan). The Committee designated six individuals for targeted sanctions on 1 July 2015. With the adoption of its resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), the Council imposed an arms embargo on the territory of South Sudan and added two individuals to the list of designated individuals. On 30 May 2025, with the adoption of resolution [2781 \(2025\)](#), the Council renewed the sanctions regime until 31 May 2026.

2. By its resolution [2781 \(2025\)](#), the Security Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan until 1 July 2026 so that it might provide information and analysis in support of the work of the Committee, including as relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities that might be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 7 of resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) and in paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution [2521 \(2020\)](#), as renewed by resolution [2781 \(2025\)](#).

3. On 1 July 2025, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, appointed four members of the Panel ([S/2025/452](#)). The appointment of a humanitarian affairs expert remains pending.

4. During the mandate period, the Panel travelled to South Sudan on two occasions, visiting Juba, in Central Equatoria State; Bentiu, Leer and Adok, all in Unity State; and Pariang in the Ruweng Administrative Area. The Panel also travelled twice to Kenya and Uganda.

B. Cooperation with international organizations and other stakeholders

5. While the Panel operates independently of United Nations agencies and institutions, it wishes to express its gratitude to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and other United Nations staff, including in New York.

6. The Panel is grateful for the cooperation of the Government of South Sudan during the mandate period, including for the opportunity to meet with a range of government officials, including representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; State Governors and Chief Administrators; county commissioners representing both the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO); representatives of the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF), military intelligence, the National Security Service (NSS), and the National Police Service; Members of the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly representing all parties; and the National Elections Commission. The Panel also met with senior leaders within both factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO); representatives of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism; representatives of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission; representatives of several parties to the Tumaini Initiative; and representatives of humanitarian organizations; as well as representatives of South Sudan youth groups, women's groups, religious groups and other civil society organizations. The Panel also met with a number of diplomatic representations in Juba, as well as with representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya, in Nairobi.

7. In paragraph 17 of its resolution 2781 (2025), the Security Council emphasized the importance of the Panel consulting with concerned Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations and UNMISS. The Panel was able to consult extensively with United Nations bodies and agencies in South Sudan and elsewhere.

8. The Panel sent 37 letters to the Government of South Sudan, Member States and other individuals and entities. The Panel has also sent a letter to the Government of South Sudan setting out an overview of the key findings of the present report and has included its response as an annex to the present report.¹

C. Methodology

9. The present report was prepared in March 2026, on the basis of the Panel's own independent research and investigations. The Panel conducted numerous interviews to gather a body of credible information, obtained from a wide range of sources. The Panel has made a conscious effort to ensure that its reporting is informed by the full range of perspectives on the peace process in South Sudan. The Panel also drew upon its earlier work, including previous reports to the Security Council and the Committee, both public and confidential.

10. The Panel followed the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 (S/2006/997). The Panel has corroborated the information contained in the present report using multiple independent sources to meet the appropriate evidentiary standards.

11. The Panel conducted its research with the greatest transparency possible, while giving priority to confidentiality where necessary. A source, document or location is described as confidential when its disclosure could compromise the safety of the source.

II. Erosion of the peace process

12. The halting and incomplete implementation of the peace agreement over more than seven years has ultimately done little to rebuild trust between communities whose humanitarian hardships have only worsened, nor to develop security and governance institutions that are perceived as genuinely shared and neutral.

13. "South Sudan is ruled by fear," a religious leader told the Panel.² "What will be my future if my opponent takes power?" As a result, he stressed, it is easy for leaders to persuade their communities that the struggle for power, both locally and nationally, is "a matter of life and death." While local political and security dynamics remain crucial, therefore, individuals from across the political spectrum repeatedly stressed that the erosion of the peace process is ultimately a result of the decisions and failures of their country's most senior leadership in Juba.

14. These fears have been evident throughout the mandate period. The fragile power-sharing provisions of the peace agreement are collapsing, and its principal signatories have been drawn back into direct military confrontations in several parts of the country. Furthermore, as opposition groups have fragmented, fears and divisions have also emerged within the party of President Kiir, SPLM, further complicating efforts to revive a constructive political dialogue.

¹ See annex 47.

² Interview with a South Sudanese religious leader, February 2026.

A. Political divisions

15. First Vice-President Riek Machar, the leader of the main opposition group, SPLM/A-IO, has been on trial in Juba since 23 September 2025, following his detention in March 2025. Along with seven other defendants, he faces a range of serious criminal charges, including murder, conspiracy, terrorism and treason.³

16. As noted in the Panel's interim report ([S/2025/768](#)), the First Vice-President's detention and trial have split the main opposition party. Nathaniel Oyet, who served as deputy to Mr. Machar prior to his arrest, has fled to Nairobi, and declared that the 2018 peace agreement and accompanying Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity had collapsed.⁴ This faction retains the strongest ties to armed opposition forces in South Sudan, though these also retain a degree of independence within a complex and much-eroded chain of command.

17. In Juba, meanwhile, President Kiir and SPLM have sought to reframe the peace agreement not as a deal struck with Mr. Machar, nor with any other individual, but as an agreement between two political movements.

18. Soon after Mr. Machar's arrest, a second group of less prominent opposition officials appointed the Minister of Peacebuilding, Stephen Par Kuol, as the Interim Chairperson of SPLM/A-IO and announced that they would remain in Juba and continue to engage with the peace process.⁵ This faction, however, appears to retain little legitimacy and influence with opposition communities and forces outside of Juba.⁶

19. In recent months, however, President Kiir and SPLM have continued their efforts to marginalize Mr. Oyet's faction of SPLM/A-IO by removing his supporters and perceived sympathisers from all levels of government, replacing them either with representatives of the rival faction led by Mr. Par Kuol, or with members of SPLM.

20. On 7 January 2026, for example, President Kiir issued a Presidential Decree⁷ dismissing three SPLM-IO-nominated Ministers. These were all subsequently replaced by representatives of the SPLM-IO faction led by Stephen Par Kuol. On the same day, a separate decree replaced 11 SPLM-IO members of Parliament with new members nominated by Mr. Par Kuol's faction.

21. On 19 January 2026, another decree dismissed Angelina Teny as Minister of Interior. Angelina Teny, who is the wife of First Vice-President Riek Machar, was the last remaining Minister appointed by the SPLM-IO faction led by Mr. Machar. She was replaced as Minister of Interior by Aleu Ayieny Aleu, who represents the party of President Kiir, SPLM, in contravention of the power-sharing provisions of the peace agreement.⁸ Similar dismissals were also made within State-level political institutions; the opposition faction led by Mr. Oyet now consider themselves largely unrepresented in the country's political institutions.⁹

³ See [S/2025/768](#). Also on trial are the Minister of Petroleum, Puot Kang Chol; the former SSPDF Deputy Chief of Staff, Gabriel Duop Lam; and Mam Pal Dhuor, Gatwech Lam Puoch, Camilo Gatmai Kel, Mading Yak Riek and Dominic Gatgok Riek.

⁴ See annex 2.

⁵ See [S/2025/768](#) and [S/2025/767](#).

⁶ Interviews with opposition officials and commanders and South Sudan civilians, July 2025 to February 2026.

⁷ Presidential decrees are all read on the South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation.

⁸ As Governor of Warrap State, Mr. Aleu presided over a series of extrajudicial executions aimed at restoring stability in the state following a period of sustained sub-national violence. See [S/2022/359](#).

⁹ Interview with SPLM/A-IO leadership, February 2026.

22. In parallel to the marginalization of opposition groups, however, the party of President Kiir, SPLM has faced its own internal divisions.

23. On 14 October 2025, Nhial Deng Nhial, a prominent and influential veteran of the party, announced the launch of a new political movement. In an 18-page document he outlined his intention to challenge the current SPLM leadership in future elections, while raising a series of concerns about the current state of the country.¹⁰ Several SPLM members told the Panel that Mr. Nhial's concerns resonated with many within the party and that his departure had shocked many of its members.¹¹ Soon after, President Kiir convened a meeting of senior SPLM leaders to consolidate party unity.¹² This was followed, on 3 November 2025, by a series of decrees with which President Kiir once again dramatically reconfigured the senior ranks of the Government of South Sudan, reversing many of the appointments that had been made earlier in 2025.¹³

24. Tut Gatluak Manime was reappointed as the Presidential Advisor on Security Affairs, having been removed from this position in January 2025 after many years as one of the President's most prominent and influential advisors. Additional changes were made within the Office of the President, the Ministry of Petroleum and the Ministry of Finance and Planning.

25. These changes were followed, on 12 November 2025, by the dismissal of Benjamin Bol Mel from his positions as Vice-President in charge of the Economic Cluster and as First Deputy Chairman of SPLM. He was also demoted to the rank of Private, then discharged from the National Security Service.¹⁴ In his place, President Salva Kiir reinstated James Wani Igga, who had been replaced by Bol Mel, in both positions, in May 2025. Several of Bol Mel's perceived allies were also dismissed from their positions.

26. Bol Mel's rapid accumulation of positions of power had led many to consider him a possible successor to President Kiir.¹⁵ He was, however, also considered a divisive figure who had benefited, disproportionately, from large road construction contracts awarded to companies with which he is affiliated.¹⁶

27. Bol Mel was also increasingly viewed, in South Sudan, as a political rival to President Kiir's daughter, Adut Salva Kiir.¹⁷ Earlier, in August 2025, President Kiir appointed his daughter as the Presidential Envoy for Special Programmes, a position that was previously held by Benjamin Bol Mel.

¹⁰ Document on file with the Panel.

¹¹ Interview with four members of SPLM, November 2025.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ See [S/2025/768](#).

¹⁴ See annex 3.

¹⁵ Interviews with individuals in the security sector, former government officials, commercial actors, South Sudan journalists and civil society and international observers, March to November 2025.

¹⁶ See [S/2020/1141](#), [S/2021/365](#), [S/2022/359](#), [S/2022/884](#), [S/2023/294](#), [S/2023/922](#) and [S/2024/343](#). See also the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, "Plundering a nation: how rampant corruption unleashed a human rights crisis in South Sudan", 16 September 2025.

¹⁷ Interviews with individuals in the security sector, government officials, South Sudan journalists and civil society and international observers, March to November 2025.

B. Contentious elections

28. Despite political upheaval and escalating insecurity, officials, including President Kiir, have repeatedly emphasized the Government's commitment to holding elections in December 2026.¹⁸ Elections would formally end the transitional period established by the 2018 peace agreement, which had been extended by two years on two separate occasions. In a recent survey of 4,582 individuals in the 10 states of South Sudan, 63 per cent of respondents wanted elections to be held in December 2026.¹⁹

29. During a meeting of signatories to the peace agreement held in Juba in December 2025, however, participants agreed that "the continued adherence to all outstanding prerequisites" outlined in the peace agreement would present "insurmountable obstacles" to holding elections in December 2026.²⁰ Participants agreed, therefore, to amend the peace agreement in order to allow elections to be held without the prior completion of a new permanent constitution or a new national census.²¹

30. Only three of the five parties to the peace agreement formally endorsed these amendments, with the leadership of the South Sudan Opposition Alliance and SPLM-Former Detainees both absent.²² Moreover, Johnson Mayiik Akol, who signed on behalf of SPLM/A-IO, was described to the Panel as "a ghost element" by several members of the opposition group.²³

31. No representatives of the faction of SPLM-IO led by Nathaniel Oyet participated in the process, and Mr. Oyet later described the amendments as "null and void" and as a violation of the peace agreement.²⁴ He also stressed that elections risked becoming deeply divisive in the current political and security environment, and that it meant that the permanent constitution of South Sudan would be drafted by the victors of a contentious election rather than under the power-sharing provisions of the peace agreement.²⁵

32. Opposition groups that are not signatories to the peace agreement also stated that "this decision confirms that the [peace agreement] has been systematically dismantled and stripped of its substance. With this act, the agreement has, in effect, been finally abrogated."²⁶

33. Interviews with SPLM officials indicate that the decision to press ahead with elections is, in part, the result of deep frustration with opposition leaders.²⁷ Several officials felt opposition groups had instrumentalised the exacting demands of the peace agreement to stall any meaningful progress towards elections and so preserve

¹⁸ Interviews with government officials, February 2026.

¹⁹ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, "Trends in civic space and elections in South Sudan", September 2025. The international non-governmental organization has polled more than 22,000 people in South Sudan since 2021.

²⁰ Video of the subsequent press conference on file with the Panel and available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3zr5VI4dLM>.

²¹ See annex 4. The amendments also remove articles 8.2 and 8.3 of the peace agreement, which incorporate the agreement into the Transitional Constitution and establish the supremacy of the peace agreement over pre-existing legislation.

²² Document on file with the Panel.

²³ Interviews with sources associated with both factions of SPLM/A-IO, December 2025.

²⁴ See annex 5.

²⁵ Interviews with leadership of SPLM/A-IO, February 2026.

²⁶ See annex 6.

²⁷ Interviews with SPLM officials, international observers and the diplomatic community in Juba, February 2026.

their positions within the power-sharing provisions of the agreement. Several SPLM officials have also, however, in the past, opposed elections for similar reasons.

34. Opposition leaders told the Panel that they do not oppose elections, but only once the protections required by the peace agreement have been fully implemented.²⁸

35. Soon after the proposed amendments were agreed, however, the National Elections Commission announced that the elections will be conducted on the basis of the census conducted in 2010 and the resulting 102 constituencies.²⁹ Many South Sudanese, including community leaders in Unity State, told the Panel that nearly two-decade-old demographic data from before the independence of South Sudan does not credibly reflect current realities.³⁰

36. The National Elections Commission has also reported that it has established offices in 9 out of 10 States in South Sudan, with the exception of Upper Nile State, and that it anticipates that voter registration will begin in April 2026, subject to the availability of financial and logistical resources.³¹ In January 2026, Kenya confirmed its readiness to provide technical and institutional assistance for the elections in South Sudan.³²

C. Armed hostilities between parties to the peace agreement

37. As the peace process in Juba has faltered, armed confrontations between the principal signatories to the peace agreement and their affiliated militia groups, have continued in most parts of the country where opposition forces maintain a presence. In February 2026, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism tasked with monitoring the ceasefire and peace agreements in South Sudan noted “near-daily reports on armed confrontations between SSPDF and SPLM/A-IO and their affiliated forces,” recording 407 separate violations of the ceasefire between August 2025 and January 2026.³³

38. While the political contest between President Kiir and First Vice-President Riek Machar ultimately underpins the increase in hostilities since December 2024, the conflict dynamics vary considerably across States.

39. Increasingly, SSPDF has relied on a patchwork of local militias, defectors and forced recruits³⁴ to carry out much of its fighting. Low morale remains pervasive as a result of years of sporadic pay and insufficient food. Local tribal and ethnic dynamics have, therefore, increasingly been used by military leaders to motivate this patchwork of fighters.

40. Furthermore, as the Panel noted in its interim report, appetite for sustained conflict also appears to remain limited at the local level. As commanders and fighters have lost confidence in the political process and face significant humanitarian hardship, many are primarily focused on protecting their own local communities and resources, including checkpoints and river ports. As a result, many are reluctant to

²⁸ Interviews with leadership of SPLM/A-IO, February 2026.

²⁹ See annex 7.

³⁰ Interviews with community leaders in Unity State, February 2026.

³¹ Interview with members of the National Elections Commission, February 2026.

³² Eye Radio, “Ruto says stability key to prosperity, pledges support for South Sudan elections”, 29 January 2026.

³³ Opening statement by Maj. Gen. Teshome Anagawe Ayana, Chairperson of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, on the occasion of its 53rd board meeting, 26 February 2026.

³⁴ See [S/2025/768](#).

disrupt local arrangements and risk larger military confrontations in the areas they control.

41. This has, at times, created friction between national and local leaders, including within SPLM/A-IO. Its senior leadership has continued to stress, however, that “our ability to keep fighting, despite our Commander-in-Chief’s detention and with limited logistical capacity, shows that we still have an operational structure.”³⁵

Fighting in the Greater Upper Nile region

42. In Upper Nile State, SSPDF has primarily sought to maintain territorial control and repel SPLA-IO attacks after a period of intense fighting in early 2025.³⁶ In August 2025, however, SSPDF and allied militia seized the strategic port town of Tonga, in Panyikang County, where lucrative port fees are levied.³⁷ SPLA-IO forces retreated to Wunkur, in the Ruweng Administrative Area, before being displaced again by a subsequent SSPDF attack on Wunkur, which aimed to disrupt opposition supply routes through the nearby border with the Sudan.³⁸ By September 2025, clashes had also been reported in Mathiang, Bukteng, Jikmir, Mandeng and the Burebiey area near the Ethiopia border.³⁹

43. In late 2025 and early 2026, however, the focus of the most intense hostilities shifted from Upper Nile State to northern areas of Jonglei State, and particularly to the predominantly Nuer Counties of Uror, Nyirol and Ayod. These are among the nine Counties described by the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, Martin Elia Lomuro, as “hostile” in April 2025.⁴⁰

44. Throughout August and September 2025, SSPDF and its allied forces continued aerial strikes and shelling of opposition-controlled areas in Pigi and Ayod Counties.⁴¹ SSPDF also continued attacks on SPLA-IO-controlled areas in November 2025, including in Bhol, Goagoak and Pieri payams, all in Uror County.⁴² In December 2025, SSPDF carried out an aerial bombardment in Normanyang, in Ayod County, followed by further air strikes in Lankien in Nyirol County and in Pieri in Uror County.⁴³

45. In late December 2025, SPLA-IO and allied armed groups launched an offensive, capturing several SSPDF positions, including in Waat. Shortly after, in early January, SPLA-IO forces captured the SSPDF position in Yuai in Uror County,

³⁵ Interview with an SPLA-IO commander, February 2026.

³⁶ Interviews with SSPDF and SPLA-IO officers, December 2025 and January and February 2026.

³⁷ Interviews with South Sudan civil society representatives and international observers, September 2025.

³⁸ Interviews with security forces and local sources, September 2025. See also Radio Tamazuj, “SSPDF announces capture of strategic Wunkur area”, 7 September 2025.

³⁹ See Eye Radio, “Burebiey clashes kill 48 on Saturday, Upper Nile governor says”, 21 September 2025; Radio Tamazuj, “Dozens killed in Nasir border clashes security official says”, 21 September 2025; Radio Tamazuj, “Officials: 20 killed in clashes in Longechuk County”, 2 September 2025; No. 1 Citizen, “SSPDF Captures top rebel commanders”, 3 September 2025; and The Juba Monitor, “SSPDF repels SPLM-IO-White-Army attack on Mathiang barracks killed 21”, 2 September 2025.

⁴⁰ Eye Radio, “Nuer leaders call for resignation of Dr. Lomuro over ‘ethnic profiling’ remarks”, 29 April 2025.

⁴¹ Interviews with security forces and other local sources, September 2025. Additional videos and photographs are on file with the Panel. See also [S/2025/768](#).

⁴² Interviews with SPLA-IO officers and international observers, December 2025.

⁴³ Interviews with community leaders, international observers and SPLM/A-IO members, December 2025. See also Radio Tamazuj, “SSPDF carries out airstrikes in Jonglei Ayod and Uror Counties”, 3 December 2025.

which is a significant SSPDF garrison in the State.⁴⁴ These attacks marked a setback for SSPDF, while also allowing opposition forces to capture a significant quantity of weapons and ammunition.

46. Government officials cited to the Panel that these attacks as clear cases of SPLA-IO aggression, necessitating a military response.⁴⁵ Opposition leaders told the Panel, in turn, that these were pre-emptive attacks initiated after military build-ups and other provocations by SSPDF.⁴⁶

47. As hostilities intensified, SSPDF ordered the evacuation of civilians from SPLA-IO-held areas in Nyirol, Uror and Akobo Counties and launched air strikes and heavy ground attacks in Lankien in Nyirol County.

48. In January 2026, in response to opposition advances, SSPDF initiated “Operation Enduring Peace,” a large-scale counteroffensive in northern Jonglei State. Shilluk Agwelek forces under the command of Johnson Olony were reinforced with forces from Juba, Division 3 from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State, Division 11 from Warrap State, and Division 12 from Lakes State, as well as forces from the national police, military intelligence and national security service.⁴⁷

49. Several of these forces appear to have had little understanding of their deployment. One soldier told the Panel that he was part of a group that was transported at night. “I only realized that something was under way when we reached Pajut.”⁴⁸ Several soldiers also told the Panel that tribal and ethnic grievances were cited to them as reasons to fight, with some telling the Panel that they were told that if SPLA-IO were to capture Juba, Dinka civilians in the capital would all be killed.⁴⁹

50. On 20 January 2026, SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces, Paul Nang Majok, who personally travelled to Bor to lead “Operation Enduring Peace”, gave his forces a seven-day ultimatum to end the insurgency in Jonglei State and protect the town of Bor from opposition forces.⁵⁰ In so doing, he invoked the notorious 1991 Bor Massacre, during which predominantly Nuer forces killed thousands of predominantly Dinka individuals in and around the town of Bor.

51. A video of Johnson Olony addressing forces under his command in Poktap, in Duk County,⁵¹ was also widely circulated in South Sudan. Johnson Olony is the leader of the predominantly Shilluk Agwelek forces that have been loosely integrated into SSPDF following his defection from SPLM/A-IO in 2021. This defection resulted in a sustained period of violence in Upper Nile and Jonglei States in 2021 and 2022, during which local civilian communities were repeatedly targeted.⁵² Olony was appointed as an SSPDF Deputy Chief of Defence Forces in 2025.⁵³

⁴⁴ Interviews with international observers, members of the local community and SPLA-IO commanders, January and February 2026.

⁴⁵ Interviews with government officials, February 2026.

⁴⁶ Interviews with the SPLM/A-IO leadership, February 2026.

⁴⁷ Interviews with officers of SSPDF, police, military intelligence and air force, January and February 2026.

⁴⁸ Interviews with members of SSPDF, January 2026.

⁴⁹ Interviews with three SSPDF members deployed under “Operation Enduring Peace”, January and February 2026.

⁵⁰ Sudans Post, “South Sudan army chief orders forces to ‘end’ rebellion in seven days”, 21 January 2026; and Radio Tamazuj, “SPLA-IO: We act in self-defence”, 28 January 2026.

⁵¹ See annex 8.

⁵² See [S/2022/359](#), [S/2022/884](#), and [S/2023/294](#).

⁵³ See [S/2024/442](#).

52. In his address in January 2026, Olony told his forces that “when we arrive there [Jonglei State], don’t spare an elderly [person], don’t spare a chicken, don’t spare a house.”⁵⁴

53. These remarks drew strong reactions⁵⁵ from the African Union, religious groups, civil society organizations, opposition groups, UNMISS⁵⁶ and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan.⁵⁷

54. On 27 January 2026, a Government spokesperson, Ateny Wek Ateny, stated that “The Government would like to clarify that the recent statement attributed to Lt. Gen. Johnson Olony Thabo does not represent the policy or the position of the Republic of South Sudan.”⁵⁸ Olony, however, continued to command his forces during a military campaign that resulted in several well-documented atrocities against civilians.

55. In late January 2026, SSPDF forces started advancing northward, engaging SPLA-IO positions in Ayod County. Operations subsequently extended into Urur County, where air strikes were reported in Yuai as SSPDF units also advanced towards opposition-held positions in Panyok and Pathai. On 3 February 2026, SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces, Paul Nang Majok, declared victory in the first phase of the military operation in northern Jonglei State,⁵⁹ after SSPDF announced it had captured the strategically significant town of Pieri in Urur County, as well as Walgak in Akobo County and other territories.⁶⁰

56. Much of the territory in Jonglei State remains contested, however, with opposition forces stressing that they have engaged only in “tactical withdrawals.”⁶¹ A series of alleged atrocities, carried out in the context of the fighting, have also further undermined intercommunal relationships, which had already suffered cycles of violence and retaliation over many years. Both sides, for example, accused each other of executing prisoners and beheading civilians.⁶²

57. On 21 February 2026, in Pankor in Ayod County in Jonglei State, around 25 civilians were killed by elements of SSPDF, including at least eight children and five women.⁶³ The Panel has reviewed photographs of six victims, several of whom appeared to have been killed with their hands tied behind their backs.⁶⁴ According to several independent reports,⁶⁵ the victims had previously been displaced by fighting in the area, but were urged to return in order to receive food aid. Instead of registering

⁵⁴ Unofficial translation from extensive press reporting of these remarks. Video on file with the Panel. See also Radio Tamazuj, “‘Spare no lives’: UN warns South Sudan at risk of mass killings”, 25 January 2026.

⁵⁵ See annexes 9 to 12.

⁵⁶ UNMISS, “UNMISS condemns threats of indiscriminate violence against civilians in South Sudan”, 25 January 2026.

⁵⁷ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, South Sudan: UN Commission warns incitement and command failures risk mass atrocities, ethnic mobilization and further unravelling of peace agreement, 26 January 2026.

⁵⁸ Eye Radio, “Govt rejects Gen Olony’s remarks, reaffirms duty to protect civilians in Jonglei”, 26 January 2026.

⁵⁹ Radio Tamazuj, “SSPDF declares ‘defeat’ of SPLA-IO in northern Jonglei”, 3 February 2026.

⁶⁰ Interviews with international observers, security agents and other local sources, February 2026.

⁶¹ Interviews with SPLM/A-IO leadership and commanders, January and February 2026.

⁶² Interviews with government officials, SSPDF commanders and SPLM/A-IO leadership, January and February 2026; see also annex 13.

⁶³ The Panel interviewed two survivors of the incident, several opposition leaders and commanders, government and SSPDF officials, journalists and international observers, February 2026.

⁶⁴ Photographs on file with the Panel.

⁶⁵ Associated Press, “South Sudan villagers killed after being lured from homes with promise of aid, witnesses say”, 23 February 2026; and Radio Tamazuj, “Villagers massacred in Ayod food aid trap”, 26 February 2026.

them for food as promised, however, soldiers in SSPDF uniforms reportedly opened fire. Local residents told the Panel that the soldiers had travelled from a nearby SSPDF position in Palith. Several reports implicate Agwelek forces within SSPDF, in the killings, allegedly in retaliation for past attacks. An SSPDF spokesperson stated that several soldiers have been arrested and promised accountability.⁶⁶

58. A 36-year-old woman who lost two of her children to the killings told the Panel that “when we received information ... about food distribution, we all headed to the meeting centre”.⁶⁷ “I arrived at the meeting point late. I got there just as men in SSPDF uniforms began shooting at people who were tied up. In a panic, I ran with my six-month-old child in my arms. When I turned around, I realized I couldn’t find my other children. Later, I learnt that they had been shot by the SSPDF while trying to run”.

Use of armoured vehicles procured in violation of the arms embargo

59. The extended military campaigns in Upper Nile and Jonglei States have made extensive use of armoured vehicles, including armoured personnel carriers, that have been procured by SSPDF and the National Police Service since around 2021. The Panel has noted the import of these vehicles, in violation of the arms embargo first implemented by resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), in several of its reports.⁶⁸ The armoured vehicles include the “Titan-S” and “Tygra” identified by the Panel in 2022,⁶⁹ which have been repeatedly observed during SSPDF operations in Jonglei State. SSPDF and opposition commanders confirmed that SSPDF often employs armoured vehicles to perform rapid attacks in the relatively flat terrain of Jonglei and Upper Nile States.⁷⁰

60. SSPDF Agwelek forces have also paraded a number of additional heavy weapons systems in Jonglei State, including vehicle-mounted ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns; a 122mm howitzer; and a range of different sized mortar systems.⁷¹ Sources interviewed by the Panel indicated that these weapons have played a key role in SSPDF ground operations in the region, often aided by the surveillance aircraft described below.⁷²

Escalating tensions in Unity State

61. Government officials in Unity State, including the State Governor, County Commissioners and security representatives, told the Panel that relations between the parties to the peace agreement had been relatively stable in the State, with commanders on both sides reluctant to disrupt the fragile but stable allocation of positions and resources.⁷³ Escalating tensions between the parties in early 2026, however, illustrate how fragile such arrangements can be and how fragmented chains of command and competing local interests can result in escalating confrontations.

62. Between October and December 2025, multiple groups of SPLA-IO forces, including from Garia and Abyei, moved towards the SPLA-IO base in Kaljaak.⁷⁴

⁶⁶ Eye Radio, “SSPDF regrets civilian killings in Ayod, vows to punish perpetrators”, 4 March 2026.

⁶⁷ Interviews with two survivors of the incident, February 2026.

⁶⁸ See [S/2024/343](#), [S/2023/294](#) and [S/2022/359](#); see annex 14.

⁶⁹ See [S/2022/359](#).

⁷⁰ Interviews with opposition commanders, February 2026.

⁷¹ See annex 15.

⁷² Interviews with SSPDF officers, February 2026.

⁷³ Interviews with the Governor of Unity State, County Commissioners and local security forces, February 2026.

⁷⁴ Interviews with SPLA-IO commanders, local officials and international observers, November 2025 and February 2026.

These movements, and the concentration of opposition forces, raised suspicions among local SSPDF forces, leading to an attack on Kaljaak and other SPLA-IO positions in Jamus Bridge, Dingding and Tong.⁷⁵ In response, SPLA-IO launched attacks on SSPDF positions in Guit, Tor Abieth and Budang.⁷⁶ Government officials told the Panel that SSPDF troops were operating defensively and to protect civilians.⁷⁷

63. Armed confrontations between SSPDF and SPLA-IO also resulted in tensions within the internally displaced persons camp near Bentiu. On 5 January 2026, armed individuals believed to be members of SPLA-IO fired at the SSPDF/SPLM contingent of the joint police force stationed at the gate of the camp.⁷⁸ SSPDF members subsequently harassed camp residents and established checkpoints along the road to the camp.⁷⁹ Soon after, on 10 February 2026, Panel members witnessed further hostilities near the camp and later found evidence of gunfire and a rocket-propelled grenade round inside the camp.⁸⁰ SPLA-IO acknowledged their involvement in the incident and expressed grievances regarding the composition of the security force stationed at the camp.⁸¹

64. Further armed confrontations between SSPDF and SPLA-IO were also reported in Kuer Latjor in Guit County. According to these reports, a joint Government force advanced towards the SPLA-IO position in Kuer Latjor in an effort to dislodge them in retaliation for the incidents at the Bentiu internally displaced persons camp.⁸² During this engagement, however, SPLA-IO forces reportedly ambushed some of the advancing SSPDF troops.⁸³

65. Unity State has also continued to suffer cycles of violent and retaliatory intercommunal raiding. On 1 March 2026, unidentified armed youth carried out an attack in Abiemnon County in the Ruweng Administrative Area.⁸⁴ The attackers reportedly killed more than 160 civilians, as well as local government officials and members of the security forces. More than 1,000 civilians sought temporary shelter at the local UNMISS base. Armed youth and cattle guards, including Bul Nuer from neighbouring Mayom County, have been engaged in extensive cycles of retaliatory raiding and attacks in recent years. On 4 March 2026, the Governor of Unity State ordered further disarmament efforts in the State.⁸⁵

Fighting in the greater Equatoria region

66. Violence has also continued in the greater Equatoria region, though attacks by opposition groups typically take the form of ambushes, often aimed at SSPDF patrols, supply routes and outposts.

67. In Western Equatoria State, for example, the SPLA-IO has continued its attacks in Yambio and Nzara Counties, aiming primarily to disrupt SSPDF checkpoints along

⁷⁵ Interviews with international observers, local security forces, SPLM officials, SPLA-IO commanders and community leaders, February 2026.

⁷⁶ Interviews with SSPDF soldiers, SPLA-IO soldiers, international observers, youth and community leaders, February 2026.

⁷⁷ Interview with State government officials, February 2026.

⁷⁸ Interviews with international observers, February 2026.

⁷⁹ Interviews with youth and community leaders, February 2026.

⁸⁰ See annex 16.

⁸¹ Interviews with SPLM/A-IO commanders and senior leadership, February 2026.

⁸² Interviews with SSPDF soldier, local officials and international observers, February 2026.

⁸³ Interviews with SPLA-IO forces, February 2026.

⁸⁴ Interviews with local officials, March 2026; see also: UNMISS, "UNMISS alarmed by rising violence in Abiemnom, calls for urgent restoration of calm", 1 March 2026; and Sudans Post, "Death toll from Abiemnom attack rises to 176 as wounded succumb to injuries", 5 March 2026.

⁸⁵ Statement on file with the Panel.

the Yambio-Maridi and Yambio-Sue roads.⁸⁶ In February 2026, SPLA-IO forces also sought to retake positions along the Sue River, including the crossing near Li Rangu, which provides access to their base in Nadiangere, as well as to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁸⁷

68. In response, SSPDF has continued to target suspected opposition sympathizers in the area. In February 2026, for example, the National Security Service reportedly conducted a search operation in Yambio, resulting in the arrest of civilians allegedly linked to SPLA-IO. Previously, in September 2025, SSPDF also raided the Ayat Internally Displaced Persons camp in Tambura County⁸⁸ after SPLA-IO forces attacked an SSPDF base near the camp.⁸⁹

69. In Central Equatoria State, fighting has focused on SPLM/A-IO held areas around Panyume, which also provide strategic access to the Uganda border. In May 2025, SPLA-IO overran the SSPDF garrison in Panyume, following attacks on SSPDF positions in Kendila, Mongalla and Lujulo.⁹⁰ Fighting in Panyume intensified again in January 2026, when SPLA-IO forces again attacked SSPDF positions in and around the town.⁹¹

70. Violence in the region has also featured opportunistic attacks and kidnappings by armed and criminal groups, several of which operate semi-independently. Such attacks have routinely targeted aid workers and humanitarian organizations, substantially disrupting the delivery of humanitarian aid and services in the area.⁹² In August 2025, Médecins Sans Frontières suspended its operations in Yei River and Morobo Counties in Central Equatoria State, following the abduction of one of its staff.⁹³

71. In Eastern Equatoria State, elements of SPLA-IO continue to operate in alliance with the National Salvation Front (NAS).⁹⁴ In November 2025, their joint forces attacked several government positions, including the SSPDF Division 7 headquarters and checkpoints near Torit, as well as SSPDF positions in Magwi County.⁹⁵ In response, the SSPDF attacked the Irube cantonment site, which forced SPLA-IO and NAS forces to retreat.⁹⁶ On 1 January 2026, SPLA-IO also launched an attack on the Nadapal border checkpoint in Kapoeta East County, resulting in the reported deaths of several SSPDF soldiers.⁹⁷

⁸⁶ Interviews with a local government representative, international observers and a member of the security forces, February 2026.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Interviews with local community leaders and international observers, September 2025.

⁸⁹ Interviews with SSPDF sources and international observers, September 2025.

⁹⁰ Interviews with local sources, SPLA-IO commanders and international observers, January and February 2026.

⁹¹ Interviews with SSPDF and SPLA-IO forces, January and February 2026.

⁹² Interviews with SSPDF and SPLA-IO forces, local civilians, and international observers, January and February 2026.

⁹³ Médecins Sans Frontières, "MSF suspends activities in southern South Sudan following abductions", 20 January 2026.

⁹⁴ See annex 17.

⁹⁵ Interviews with SPLA-IO and NAS fighters in Eastern Equatoria State, February 2026.

⁹⁶ Interviews with local sources, SSPDF and representatives of SPLA-IO/NAS, November 2025.

⁹⁷ Interviews with local sources and SPLA-IO forces, February 2026.

III. Arms

A. Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces presence in South Sudan⁹⁸

72. In its interim report, the Panel noted the presence of the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF) in South Sudan. These forces arrived in South Sudan on 10 March 2025 in support of SSPDF military operations, upon the invitation of President Kiir, pursuant to a 2014 defence agreement between the two countries.⁹⁹

73. The armed UPDF presence in South Sudan has continued throughout the current mandate period. UPDF are primarily based in Bilnyang, approximately 5 kilometres to the east of Juba. In November 2025, the Government of Uganda also confirmed, to the Panel, the presence of UPDF in Malakal, Paloich and other locations in Upper Nile State.¹⁰⁰

74. Analysis conducted by the Panel indicates that the primary UPDF camp in Bilnyang remains large, but has not been altered significantly since the publication of the Panel's interim report.¹⁰¹ Analysis by the Panel also indicates that the two battle tanks and four armoured fighting vehicles, as confirmed by the Government of Uganda in November 2025, remain deployed as at March 2026.¹⁰²

75. UPDF have engaged in community outreach activities in the areas in which they operate, most recently in February 2026, when two days of medical services were reportedly provided to around 1,500 residents in Mangalla payam in Central Equatoria State.¹⁰³

B. Use of aerial assets

76. In its interim report, the Panel documented the presence of several armed Bell 412 helicopters in South Sudan. The Government of Uganda confirmed to the Panel that these are operated by UPDF, but leased from the private company Bar Aviation in Uganda.¹⁰⁴ Panel analysis indicates that, as of March 2026, at least two Bell 412 helicopters remain in South Sudan, operating primarily from the Paloich airfield in Upper Nile State.¹⁰⁵ This airfield is strategically proximate to areas of conflict, as well as to oil facilities.

77. In addition, a white helicopter corresponding in size to an Mi-8/17 model has been observed operating alongside the Bell helicopters in Paloich and several additional locations in South Sudan.¹⁰⁶ It has transported senior SSPDF personnel, including the Chief of Defence Forces.¹⁰⁷ This helicopter appears to be designated with an "AF" tail number (possibly AF-111). The Panel has previously observed the

⁹⁸ See annex 46 for a response from the Government of Uganda to the findings in this section and the following section.

⁹⁹ See S/2025/768. See also: UPDF, "Uganda's mission in South Sudan is legitimate and has saved lives", 10 March 2026: <https://www.updf.go.ug/press-release/ugandas-mission-in-south-sudan-is-legitimate-and-has-saved-lives/>.

¹⁰⁰ See S/2025/768, annex 17.

¹⁰¹ See annex 18.

¹⁰² See S/2025/768, annex 17.

¹⁰³ UPDF, "UPDF marks 45th Tarehe Sita anniversary with community outreach in South Sudan", 25 February 2026: <https://www.updf.go.ug/tarehe-sita/updf-marks-45th-tarehe-sita-anniversary-with-community-outreach-in-south-sudan/>.

¹⁰⁴ See S/2025/768, annex 17.

¹⁰⁵ See annex 19.

¹⁰⁶ See annex 20.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

“AF” designation being used by Bell helicopters operating in South Sudan.¹⁰⁸ The UPDF has also used the “AF” designation for other aerial assets it operates.

78. Images and videos reviewed by the Panel indicate that the Mi-8/17 helicopter has been piloted and crewed by armed individuals who are Caucasian and, by appearance, unlikely to be enlisted with either UPDF or SSPDF.¹⁰⁹ Armed crew with a similar appearance have also been seen operating Bell 412 helicopters in South Sudan on previous occasions.¹¹⁰

79. The use of third-party contractors to provide technical support to military operations in South Sudan, in particular to the operation of armed helicopters, could constitute a violation of the arms embargo imposed under resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#) and renewed by resolution [2781 \(2025\)](#).

80. Since March 2025, when the most recent UPDF deployment to South Sudan started, the Panel has also recorded the presence of two Cessna Caravan-style aircraft operating from airfields in Juba and Paloich.

81. One aircraft, N208PM/SF166, was seen operating over Wunaliet, a short time after a bombardment targeted an SPLA-IO cantonment location in March 2025.¹¹¹ Flight data show the aircraft performing tight concentric circles over Wunaliet around the time of the attack, consistent with either a surveillance or battle damage assessment. The Government of Uganda has confirmed that the aircraft N208PM was operated by UPDF.¹¹² In a since-deleted social media post, the UPDF Chief of Defence Forces also stated that the bombardment was carried out by UPDF.¹¹³ Around 2 May 2025, however, this aircraft departed South Sudan.

82. The Panel has since observed the presence of at least one additional green/grey Caravan aircraft in Juba and Paloich. A green/grey Caravan aircraft observed in Juba has an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance dome mounted under the central cabin. It also appears to have mountings under the wings making it capable of carrying munitions.¹¹⁴ Sources in South Sudan have confirmed that this aircraft is operated by UPDF; also, an “AF” designation appears visible in some photographs.¹¹⁵ In November 2025, the Government of Uganda confirmed that it is operating a Cessna Caravan-style aircraft in support of the UPDF contingent in South Sudan.¹¹⁶

83. Sources in South Sudan have told the Panel that the primary role of the green/grey Caravan aircraft is to assist with target selection.¹¹⁷ These targets are then attacked by “gunships,”¹¹⁸ and followed up with additional strikes from aircraft or shelling by SSPDF artillery or rocket systems, in advance of ground assaults.

84. Planes have also been seen performing strafing runs with heavy machine guns. The Panel has observed a green/grey aircraft, in video footage, circling over Pieri, in

¹⁰⁸ One helicopter, for example, changed its designation from 5X-NBR to AF-579 when it entered South Sudan on 18 March 2025; flight records on file with the Panel.

¹⁰⁹ See annex 20.

¹¹⁰ Photographs and video on file with the Panel.

¹¹¹ Flight records on file with the Panel.

¹¹² Correspondence with the Panel.

¹¹³ See annex 21.

¹¹⁴ See annex 22.

¹¹⁵ See annex 22.

¹¹⁶ See [S/2025/768](#), annex 17.

¹¹⁷ Interview with confidential source, February 2026.

¹¹⁸ Aircraft terminology varies in South Sudan. “Antonov” often refers to all fixed wing aircraft regardless of type, while “gunship” is often used interchangeably for both fixed-wing and rotary aircraft. See annex 23.

Jonglei State, with what appears to be machine gunfire emanating from the rear access door.¹¹⁹

C. Supply of small arms to the South Sudan People's Defence Forces

85. In advance of extended military operations in Upper Nile and Jonglei States, SSPDF, and its Agwelek forces in particular, also appear to have received a significant transfer of new weapons, ammunition and other military equipment.¹²⁰ In early 2025, the Panel observed what appeared to be new Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles in the possession of SSPDF forces in Upper Nile and Jonglei States. These included rifles with both folding and fixed buttstocks, uniform in colour and design, which suggests they originate from a single source. The Panel has reviewed a large number of images featuring military units with identical rifles, as well as of weapons still in their protective wrapping.

86. Individuals within the security sector, as well as opposition groups, have also confirmed that SSPDF obtained new rifles in 2025.¹²¹ The Panel has also obtained images of weapons captured from SSPDF forces in Upper Nile State in 2025.¹²² These have markings that indicate that they were manufactured in 2024, further corroborating their likely transfer to South Sudan in 2025. The Panel has not been able to identify the source of these weapons, which were likely imported in violation of the arms embargo implemented under resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#) and renewed by resolution [2781 \(2025\)](#).

IV. Impact of conflict in the Sudan

87. The political, economic and security landscape of South Sudan remains deeply affected by the ongoing conflict in the Sudan, particularly as its front lines move closer to the South Sudanese border.

88. The Government of South Sudan has continued to insist it is neutral with respect to the parties to the conflict;¹²³ a position that remains essential to managing the complex economic and security relationships that still bind the two States. Persistent allegations of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) activity within South Sudan, as well as the Government's relationships with Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates continue to complicate this position,¹²⁴ however, necessitating sustained engagement with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Government of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

89. From 13 to 16 December 2025, for example, the recently reappointed National Security Advisor, Tut Gatluak, led a delegation to Port Sudan, in the Sudan, where the parties agreed to establish a supreme high economic committee, coordinate diplomatic positions in international forums and facilitate South Sudanese trade through the port.¹²⁵ Soon after, in January 2026, Malik Agar, the Deputy Chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council of the Sudan, travelled to Juba to meet with

¹¹⁹ See annexes 22 and 23.

¹²⁰ See annex 24.

¹²¹ Interviews with members of the security forces and SPLM/A-IO leadership, February 2026.

¹²² Photographs on file with the Panel.

¹²³ Interviews with government officials and the international diplomatic community in Juba, February 2026.

¹²⁴ Interviews with officials affiliated with SAF, diplomatic representatives in Juba and international and South Sudanese non-governmental organizations, February and March 2026.

¹²⁵ Radio Tamazuj, "Kiir's advisor in Sudan for talks after Heglig oilfield deal", 14 December 2025.

President Kiir to discuss oil-related issues, intelligence and security coordination, and ongoing peace initiatives.¹²⁶

90. The importance of maintaining relationships with both SAF and RSF was particularly evident in Heglig, in December 2025.

A. Securing oil facilities in Heglig

91. Heglig is a strategically significant town in West Kordofan State in the Sudan, located only around 15 kilometres from the border with Unity State and Ruweng Administrative Area in South Sudan. On 8 December 2025, RSF seized control of Heglig.

92. The oilfields and facilities in Heglig are critical to the export of the Nile blend crude oil produced by the Greater Pioneer Operating Company and the Sudd Petroleum Operating Company in Unity State and the Ruweng Administrative Area. This production accounts for around 42 per cent of total oil exports of South Sudan.¹²⁷

93. The pipeline that carries this Nile blend crude oil to Port Sudan, in the Sudan, for export, passes through Heglig, and facilities in Heglig are also critical to processing production from Sudd Petroleum Operating Company.¹²⁸ Furthermore, the physical characteristics of the crude oil produced by both companies make it unsuitable for pumping through the pipeline without first being blended with production from oilfields in the Sudan located near Heglig. Should production cease in those fields, it could jeopardize production by both companies in South Sudan.

94. On 10 December 2025, however, the SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces, Paul Nang Majok, announced that separate agreements had been reached between SSPDF and SAF, and between SSPDF and RSF, to allow SSPDF to enter and take primary responsibility for protecting oil installations in Heglig. These arrangements were, reportedly, agreed to prevent an armed confrontation between RSF and SAF near vital oil infrastructure.¹²⁹

95. On 17 December 2025, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for South Sudan, Semaya Kumba, announced that an agreement had also been reached with the Government of the Sudan to resume operations at the oilfields around Heglig.¹³⁰

B. Transfer of Sudanese Armed Forces weapons from Heglig

96. As part of the same agreements, a large contingent of SAF soldiers that had been stationed in Heglig withdrew into South Sudan territory, bringing with them a significant quantity of weapons and ammunition.

¹²⁶ Official statement, on file with the Panel.

¹²⁷ Draft budget for the 2025/26 financial year, prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Planning.

¹²⁸ Interviews with individuals with knowledge of the oil industry in South Sudan from both the Government and private sector, December 2025. Corroborated by oil marketing reports produced by the Ministry of Petroleum of South Sudan.

¹²⁹ Eye Radio, "Over 1,700 SAF troops flee to South Sudan after Heglig fall – Ateny", 11 December 2025. South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation broadcast also available from: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1167392241742048>.

¹³⁰ Sudan Tribune, "South Sudan, Sudan agree to resume production at Heglig, Bamboo oilfields", 17 December 2025.

97. The weapons and ammunition included small arms and light weapons, including what one source estimated to be around 2,000 AK-47 rifles.¹³¹ Photographs and videos reviewed by the Panel also confirm the transfer of mortars, light machine guns and rocket propelled grenades, as well as towed artillery and vehicle-mounted weapons, including a ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft cannon, T-72 tanks, 122mm field artillery, ZPU-4 anti-aircraft guns, at least one 122mm rocket launcher, and several armoured personnel carriers.¹³²

98. The weapons transferred from Heglig were received in Panakuac by the SSPDF Deputy Chief of Defence Forces, Johnson Olony who, as detailed above, has played a central role in recent military campaigns in Jonglei and Upper Nile States.

99. A number of sources have told the Panel that most of the weapons and ammunition have been kept by SSPDF forces “for safe keeping,” with additional unarmed Toyota Landcruiser vehicles transferred to Juba and “shared among the Generals.”¹³³ SAF troops have returned to the Sudan, according to the same government officials.¹³⁴

V. Impediments to humanitarian operations

100. The conflict in the Sudan has also placed additional pressure on the humanitarian situation in South Sudan. While population flows have slowed, South Sudan continues, commendably, to welcome several hundred returnees and refugees daily. Since April 2023, more than 1.3 million people have been documented as arriving in South Sudan, with the true number likely higher.¹³⁵ While South Sudanese returnees account for the majority of the total, Sudanese refugees now make up almost a third of all registered arrivals.

101. The humanitarian challenges in South Sudan are, however, the consequence of multiple compounding factors. These include other external factors, such as persistent climate-induced flooding,¹³⁶ but remain driven primarily by domestic factors, and most notably by renewed fighting and insecurity.

A. Food insecurity

102. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification is a standardized system for classifying hunger. It has five phases. At phase 3, families typically eat just one meal a day and show signs of malnourishment or are forestalling this only through short-term coping mechanisms that will harm their longer-term food security, such as slaughtering livestock, selling productive assets, or borrowing money.

¹³¹ Interview with a member of the security forces, February 2026.

¹³² See annex 25.

¹³³ Interview with confidential source, February 2026.

¹³⁴ Interview with representatives of the government and security forces, February 2026.

¹³⁵ International Organization for Migration, Arrivals from Sudan to South Sudan, <https://dtm.iom.int/online-interactive-resources/arrivals-from-sudan-to-south-sudan> (last accessed 5 March 2026).

¹³⁶ An estimated 1.35 million persons in South Sudan have been affected by severe and recurrent floods in 2025. See: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudan floods snapshot, November 2025. Flooding has also been tied to a serious cholera outbreak in South Sudan, with almost 100,000 cases recorded and over 1,600 cholera-related deaths since February 2024, making it among the deadliest in the world. See: South Sudan Cholera Outbreak Situation Report No. 64, 16 February 2026.

103. By April 2026, more than 7.5 million people in South Sudan – around half of the population – are projected to face phase 3 of food insecurity, or worse.¹³⁷ Of these, more than 2.2 million people are facing emergency (phase 4) levels of food insecurity, while South Sudan is one of just a handful of countries in which pockets of “catastrophic” famine levels (phase 5) of hunger are projected. As a result, more than 2.1 million children under five are estimated to suffer from acute malnutrition with around 1.15 million pregnant and breastfeeding women also expected to be malnourished.¹³⁸ More than 10 million people, around two thirds of the population of South Sudan, require some form of humanitarian assistance, with 9 out of 10 people living in poverty.¹³⁹

104. “South Sudan is suffering,” a senior religious leader of South Sudan told the Panel, noting that “life is getting harder and harder every year” and that many of his congregation increasingly rely on wild fruits and greens for survival.¹⁴⁰ A Juba resident told the Panel that more and more of the capital’s residents are resorting to scavenge for food at one of the city’s many informal rubbish dumps, with crowds forming, and fights occasionally breaking out, when new trucks arrive.¹⁴¹

B. Access constraints and attacks on humanitarian operators

105. The humanitarian crisis in South Sudan is driven, primarily, by domestic pressures. More than 320,000 individuals have been displaced by renewed fighting since January 2025, with around 225,000 displaced by recent fighting in Jonglei State alone.¹⁴² By September 2025, UNMISS recorded 1,854 deaths, 1,693 injuries, 423 abductions and 169 cases of sexual violence since January, representing a 59 per cent increase from the same period the year before.¹⁴³

106. Renewed fighting has also seriously affected humanitarian access, including in many of the areas of greatest humanitarian need. The Panel spoke to a range of experienced humanitarian actors. They acknowledged that access has always been challenging in South Sudan. Most reported, however, that over the past year, they have faced a dramatic increase in attacks on their independence, as well as in bureaucratic and security constraints.¹⁴⁴ Several also described efforts by parties to the conflict to instrumentalise aid and humanitarian service delivery.

107. As detailed above, northern Jonglei State has been a focus for renewed military confrontations. Several humanitarian workers described serious access constraints in the State during this period. They noted that while they were not formally denied access, security considerations were frequently cited by SSPDF as grounds for

¹³⁷ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), “South Sudan: acute food insecurity situation for September–November 2025 and projections for December 2025–March 2026 and for April–July 2026”, 4 November 2025.

¹³⁸ IPC, “South Sudan: acute food insecurity and malnutrition snapshot, September 2025 to July 2026”, 4 November 2025.

¹³⁹ World Bank, “A narrow path to recovery: the key role of restoring public finances”, January 2026.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with a South Sudanese religious leader, February 2026.

¹⁴¹ Interview with a Juba resident, February 2026.

¹⁴² Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot, January 2026”.

¹⁴³ UNMISS Human Rights Division, Brief on violence affecting civilians, April to June 2025. See also, “Türk alarmed by deteriorating human rights situation amid rising violence”, 26 September 2025.

¹⁴⁴ Interviews with humanitarian workers from multiple organizations and agencies, February 2026.

preventing the delivery of humanitarian goods and services to opposition-controlled areas.¹⁴⁵

108. On 25 January 2026, for example, SSPDF ordered all non-governmental organizations and United Nations staff to vacate the Counties of Nyirol, Uror and Akobo, all in Jonglei State, within 48 hours.¹⁴⁶ On 30 December 2025, a similar order directed all civilians to evacuate areas controlled by SPLA-IO in three Counties.¹⁴⁷

109. On 23 February, following a meeting with the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, President Kiir committed to ensuring that humanitarian agencies have unhindered access to all conflict-affected areas in the country.¹⁴⁸ On 6 March 2026, however, SSPDF ordered UNMISS and non-governmental organizations to withdraw from their operating base in Akobo, and all civilians in and around Akobo town to evacuate opposition-controlled areas within 72 hours, as part of the second phase of their military operation in Jonglei State.¹⁴⁹

110. A flight ban covering much of Jonglei State was also implemented between December 2025 and February 2026. This significantly limited the ability of many humanitarian organizations to evacuate wounded civilians, rotate their staff and resupply their facilities.¹⁵⁰ Several humanitarian staff also reported parallel pressure to relocate humanitarian services from inaccessible opposition held areas, to government-controlled towns in northern Jonglei State. “It is a means of war,” an employee of one humanitarian organization told the Panel.¹⁵¹ On 30 January 2026, another international organization publicly “denounced the restrictions on humanitarian access the Government of South Sudan has imposed exclusively in parts of opposition-held areas of Jonglei state.”¹⁵²

111. In December 2025, SPLA-IO also ordered civilians to vacate areas close to SSPDF positions in northern Jonglei State. Humanitarian workers stressed, however, that the SPLM/A-IO lack the territorial control, resources and incentives to restrict humanitarian access on the same scale as SSPDF.

112. Humanitarian workers have also reported an alarming increase in attacks on their facilities and staff. On 3 February 2026, for example, Médecins Sans Frontières reported that its hospital in Lankien, in Jonglei State, had been bombed by the Government, injuring several staff and destroying its main warehouse and its supplies.¹⁵³ Earlier on the same day, its facility in Pieri was attacked and looted as SSPDF took control of the town, though it is unclear whether advancing SSPDF or retreating SPLA-IO were responsible. In March 2026, the organization stated that 26 of its staff in Lankien and Pieri remained unaccounted for.¹⁵⁴

113. In total, Médecins Sans Frontières reported a total eight targeted attacks on its facilities in 2025, forcing the closure of two hospitals in Greater Upper Nile State and the suspension of general healthcare activities in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Central

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ See annex 26.

¹⁴⁷ See annex 27.

¹⁴⁸ Statement by the Office of the President, on file with the Panel.

¹⁴⁹ See annex 28.

¹⁵⁰ Interviews with humanitarian workers, February 2026.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), “South Sudan Government blocks opposition-held areas from humanitarian access”, 30 January 2026.

¹⁵³ MSF, “South Sudan: Government forces bombarded MSF hospital in Lankien, Jonglei state”, 4 February 2026.

¹⁵⁴ Associated Press, “26 Doctors without Borders workers remain unaccounted for in South Sudan a month after attacks”, 3 March 2026.

Equatoria States.¹⁵⁵ In February 2026, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that 16 health facilities had been damaged or looted in the past year, with 13 in located in Jonglei State.¹⁵⁶

114. The Government stressed to the Panel that these incidents were being investigated, but that any air strikes on healthcare facilities were accidental and not targeted.¹⁵⁷ The Government also stressed that it did not deny humanitarian workers access to opposition areas, citing several opposition areas where access was permitted, but stressed that security measures were sometimes necessary to protect humanitarian workers.

115. Looting of humanitarian assets has also increased, by both sides, in the context of ongoing insecurity. “Wherever there is fighting,” one humanitarian worker told the Panel, “there will be no food, medicine, or vehicles left,” adding that “everyone is looting.”¹⁵⁸ Photos from Lankien, for example, show healthcare facilities that have been looted and burned, with humanitarian vehicles stripped of almost all of their parts, including wheels and engines.¹⁵⁹

116. In its interim report, the Panel noted that pockets of catastrophic food insecurity were present in Nasir County, in Upper Nile State, following fighting between SSPDF and SPLA-IO in 2025. In January 2026, a twelve-boat World Food Programme convoy was sent, by river, from Malakal to supply food to Nasir County, which has a large Nuer population. While passing through Government-controlled Baliet County, however, the convoy was repeatedly attacked by armed youth across multiple locations. Over 1,500 metric tons of food and other non-food items were looted across several days, before the largely empty convoy was escorted back to Malakal.¹⁶⁰ The World Food Programme subsequently suspended all food operations in Baliet County.¹⁶¹

117. The Government denied responsibility for the attacks but has promised an investigation. It also dismissed the local County Commissioner.¹⁶² The World Food Programme reported that “despite receiving security assurances and guarantees from authorities for safe humanitarian movement, the looting occurred overnight without security intervention by the County authority.”¹⁶³

118. In January 2026, an SPLA-IO commander in Jonglei State ordered humanitarian organizations to surrender their vehicles to opposition forces.¹⁶⁴ Another opposition officer confirmed this to the Panel, noting that the order was intended to consolidate SPLA-IO territorial gains following several successful attacks on SSPDF positions.¹⁶⁵ While some of these vehicles were returned further to intervention from the senior SPLM/A-IO leaders, who had not endorsed the order, photographs reviewed by the

¹⁵⁵ MSF, “South Sudan: Government forces bombarded MSF hospital in Lankien”, Jonglei state, 4 February 2026.

¹⁵⁶ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan: conflict in Jonglei State”, Flash update No. 8, 17 February 2026.

¹⁵⁷ Interviews with government officials, February 2026.

¹⁵⁸ Interviews with humanitarian workers, February 2026.

¹⁵⁹ Photographs on file with the Panel.

¹⁶⁰ World Food Programme (WFP), “WFP suspends activities in Baliet County and urgently calls for protection of humanitarian space in South Sudan”, 4 February 2026.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Interviews with government officials, February 2026.

¹⁶³ WFP, “WFP suspends activities in Baliet County and urgently calls for protection of humanitarian space in South Sudan”, 4 February 2026.

¹⁶⁴ See annex 29.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with an SPLA-IO officer, February 2026.

Panel indicate that at least some of these vehicles appear to have been involved in fighting.

119. Attacks on humanitarian assets will likely also have a longer-term impact on food security. During the rainy season in South Sudan, access for humanitarian operations becomes challenging due to poor road networks. Pre-positioning food, closer to likely hunger hotspots, is therefore critical towards the end of the dry season.¹⁶⁶ As a result of repeated attacks and looting, however, major operators have paused or suspended the pre-positioning of aid.¹⁶⁷ This significantly increases the cost and challenges of humanitarian service delivery at a time when budgets are under severe strain. In October 2025, WFP reported that it would cut its food rations in South Sudan by 30 to 50 per cent.¹⁶⁸ As at February 2026, the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for South Sudan of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, for which \$1.4 billion is sought, is only 17.4 per cent funded, with the Plan for 2025 having received less than half of its required funding.¹⁶⁹

VI. Economic crisis

120. In February 2026, President Kiir appointed Salvatore Garang Mabiordit as Minister of Finance and Planning. He is the fourth person to hold the position in 12 months, and his appointment marked the ninth change in the position since 2018.¹⁷⁰

A. Disruption to oil revenues

121. Government revenues in South Sudan have recovered significantly since April 2025, when the pipeline that carries oil from Upper Nile State in South Sudan to Port Sudan, in the Sudan, was successfully repaired.¹⁷¹ The draft budget for the current 2025/26 financial year projects daily oil production of 156,000 barrels per day.¹⁷² Of this, the Government projects it will retain¹⁷³ around 19.34 million barrels, almost double its entitlement from the previous financial year. As a result, the Government's projected oil revenues are South Sudan pound (SSP) 5.219 trillion (\$1.1 billion),¹⁷⁴ which account for around 75 per cent of the Government's total projected revenues of SSP 7.007 trillion (\$1.5 billion).

122. Despite successful negotiations to avoid military confrontations around the critical oil facilities in Heglig, as detailed above, the production and export of the South Sudan Nile blend in January and February 2026 was disrupted.¹⁷⁵ A cargo of Nile blend is, however, scheduled for delivery in March 2026.¹⁷⁶

¹⁶⁶ Interviews with humanitarian workers, February 2026.

¹⁶⁷ WFP, "WFP calls for safe humanitarian access as conflict escalates in South Sudan's Jonglei State", 30 January 2026.

¹⁶⁸ WFP, "WFP warns that six critical operations are facing significant food aid pipeline breaks by yearend", 15 October 2025.

¹⁶⁹ Data from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

¹⁷⁰ See annex 30.

¹⁷¹ See [S/2025/768](#).

¹⁷² The draft budget was not presented until January 2026 and is yet to make its way through Parliament and the final stages of ratification.

¹⁷³ See annex 31.

¹⁷⁴ Based on the official exchange rate of SSP 4,600 to the dollar, as at 6 March 2026.

¹⁷⁵ Interviews with market participants, January to March 2026.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

123. South Sudan pays fees to the Sudan for the use of its oil infrastructure.¹⁷⁷ It is, however, currently unclear how these are being paid and allocated across the parties to the conflict in the Sudan. Transfers of SSP 846 billion are included in the draft budget for the current financial year, though South Sudan has also, according to its records, accumulated a substantial credit following a period of overpayment.¹⁷⁸ Panel interviews also indicate that South Sudan has continued to allocate some oil to the power plant in Kosti in the Sudan, as well as occasional cargoes to authorities in Port Sudan, including in June 2025.¹⁷⁹

124. Oil revenues in South Sudan are also increasingly vulnerable to other forms of disruption. The Government has continued the practice of selling its oil several months in advance of delivery.¹⁸⁰ Between January and September 2025, the Panel confirmed the sale of 22 cargoes (600,000 barrels) of crude oil by the Government, worth in excess of \$731 million.¹⁸¹ All were sold through short-term advances.

125. This practice has created uncertainty around the Government's oil sales, which have been further compounded by export disruptions caused by the conflict in the Sudan. These pressures, combined with domestic demand for oil revenues, have led the Government to promise the same future cargo of oil to more than one buyer.

126. On 18 November 2025, BB Energy (Gulf) DMCC successfully secured an injunction, in commercial courts in the United Kingdom, preventing the Government of South Sudan from selling a cargo of crude oil scheduled for delivery on 27 November 2025 to other oil traders.¹⁸² The company argued, successfully, that it had made a pre-payment of \$100 million in February 2025 for five cargoes of oil.¹⁸³ These cargoes, however, had not been delivered as promised. Instead, when BB Energy declined to provide an additional advance payment of \$25 million, the Government instead sold more than 20 cargoes to other traders. As such, the company sought to prevent the sale of additional cargoes until the Government's debt to BB Energy had been repaid.¹⁸⁴ At least four additional legal cases have, since 2024, sought repayment for oil backed debts owed by the Government of South Sudan.¹⁸⁵

127. A few weeks later, however, on 27 November 2025, the injunction was allowed to lapse after two other traders, Euro American International Energy and Meridian Energy, successfully demonstrated that they had also paid, in advance, for the enjoined cargo and were also owed millions further to advance payments. In February 2026, BB Energy announced that it had agreed a new repayment plan with the Government.¹⁸⁶ Neither debt is listed in the debt summary included in the draft budget for the current financial year.

128. Traders active in South Sudan noted that such developments were concerning, and confirmed that they would be reluctant to lift a cargo that was subject to an active injunction.¹⁸⁷ Commodity traders rely heavily on shipping, insurance and financing

¹⁷⁷ See annex 32.

¹⁷⁸ See [S/2023/922](#) and [S/2024/343](#).

¹⁷⁹ Interviews with market participants, January and February 2026, corroborated by a document on file with the Panel.

¹⁸⁰ See annex 33.

¹⁸¹ See annex 35.

¹⁸² Court documents, on file with the Panel, corroborated by interviews with individuals and companies with knowledge of the oil sector in South Sudan, November 2025.

¹⁸³ Claim form, BB Energy (Gulf) DMCC v. Republic of South Sudan and Nile Petroleum Corporation, CL-2025-000514, 13 November 2025.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ See [S/2025/768](#).

¹⁸⁶ BB Energy, "BB Energy secures first South Sudan cargo and advances repayment agreement", 14 February 2026.

¹⁸⁷ Interviews with oil traders active in South Sudan, November 2025 and March 2026.

secured in European financial markets, including in the United Kingdom, where the judgment was made.¹⁸⁸ They also noted that insecurity in South Sudan, the ongoing conflict in the Sudan, unpaid commercial debts and increasing legal insecurity would lead them to seek higher discounts on all pre-payments made for South Sudan oil.

B. Diversion of public resources

129. South Sudan law and the peace agreement require all oil revenues to be deposited in a single government oil revenue account. Since around May 2025, the Government of South Sudan has designated an account with the First Abu Dhabi Bank in the United Arab Emirates as its primary oil revenue account. The Panel has identified, however, several cases in which payments have been made directly to third parties, bypassing Government accounts. At least one advance payment worth around \$30 million was, for example, paid directly to the account of a company named “Al Wafra Najam Goods Wholesalers”, registered in the United Arab Emirates.¹⁸⁹ According to company records, the company is a “One person company with limited liability”.

130. Documents reviewed by the Panel also indicate that several private South Sudan companies have been allocated cargoes of Government crude oil as payment in part, or in full, for goods and services.¹⁹⁰ These companies are invited to sell these cargoes into the market in order to secure their payment.

131. The Panel’s interim report, for example, identified a contract worth more than \$600 million for the supply of food to SSPDF. The contract was awarded without competitive tender and significantly exceeded the approved budget of SSPDF. The recipient of the contract, Galda, is a private South Sudan company linked to a Brigadier General in the National Security Service. The company continued to deliver food to SSPDF in late 2025 and early 2026, including to soldiers engaged in military operations in Jonglei State. In official statements, including in February 2026, the food was described as a gift from the Office of the President.¹⁹¹ Documents reviewed by the Panel indicate that Galda was allocated at least two cargoes of oil as part payment for this contract.¹⁹²

132. Other private South Sudan companies have also been allocated cargoes of oil as payment for unspecified goods and services. Officials are under immense pressure, said one official, “to satisfy those who brought them [to their positions],” and to “pay those with huge claims on the Government.” Similarly, on 4 March 2026, shortly after taking office, the new Minister of Finance and Planning told Parliament that “the budget is put in one basket, and some strong people get the whole basket, take it all, and spend it.”¹⁹³

133. This is particularly evident in accounting for the 2024/25 financial year, when the Government reports a total spending of SSP 5.3 trillion.¹⁹⁴ Almost half of all Government expenditure, SSP 2.47 trillion, is recorded only as “goods and services” expenditure by just two offices: the Ministry of Finance and Planning and the Ministry of Presidential Affairs, with the latter spending almost 60 times its approved

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Interviews with confidential sources, October 2025 to February 2026.

¹⁹⁰ Interviews with market participants, July 2025 to March 2026, corroborated by documents on file with the Panel.

¹⁹¹ Video of statements by SSPDF, on file with the Panel.

¹⁹² Documents on file with the Panel.

¹⁹³ Eye Radio, “‘Strong people’ seizing national budget, Finance Minister tells Parliament”, 25 February 2026.

¹⁹⁴ Draft budget for the 2025/26 financial year, on file with the Panel. See also annex 36.

budget.¹⁹⁵ By contrast, the Ministry of Health received just 40 per cent of its SSP 52 billion budget, while social and humanitarian affairs sector received just 9 per cent of its SSP 185 billion budget.¹⁹⁶

134. In its accounts, the Ministry of Finance and Planning acknowledged several inconsistencies, including the failure to track revenue and debt in real time; payments being made without being recorded; and expenditure recorded without actually having been paid.¹⁹⁷

135. This system is aided by the continued reliance on cash. From the Government's primary revenue accounts, funds are transferred to regional commercial banks, including in Kenya. From there, some suppliers are paid directly, while large amounts of cash are also withdrawn and flown to Juba, where additional payments are made in cash.¹⁹⁸ The Panel has confirmed that individuals linked to private companies that have been awarded large Government contracts are permitted to withdraw cash directly from the central bank.¹⁹⁹

136. As competition and disruption to oil revenues in South Sudan has increased, political and security elites have also sought to control other revenue streams.

137. In recent years, for example, South Sudan has worked successfully with a private company from the United Arab Emirates to collect so-called overflight fees from commercial airlines operating in South Sudanese airspace. These fees, which total between \$3 million to \$5 million per month, were used to pay and maintain the facilities, controllers and equipment necessary for international accreditation.²⁰⁰ In December 2025, however, the contract with this company was terminated and all airlines were instead instructed to make payments to Capital Pay Trust, the payment processing subsidiary of Crawford Capital, a company with close ties to several government officials.²⁰¹

C. Illicit taxation of humanitarian operations

138. The mismanagement of public resources in South Sudan has also led to increased efforts by officials and security forces to tax commercial and humanitarian operators.

139. Humanitarian operations are largely exempt from government taxes in South Sudan. While humanitarian goods and services are largely administered by international organizations, however, transport and logistics are often contracted to commercial companies. Officials and security forces often attempt to tax commercial vehicles or drivers delivering humanitarian goods.

140. Many such taxes and fees are levied at the point of import, but also at the checkpoints that populate almost all of the roads and waterways in South Sudan's, partly as a consequence of the failure to pay soldiers and civil servants. Checkpoint fees typically range from a few thousand SSP to millions of SSP, depending on the size of the vehicle and its contents. In Mayom County, for example, the largest trucks

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Confidential presentation by the Ministry of Finance and Planning on file with the Panel.

¹⁹⁸ Interviews with current and former government officials, February 2026.

¹⁹⁹ Interviews with current and former government officials and another confidential source, February 2026.

²⁰⁰ Interviews with individuals familiar with these operations, February 2026, corroborated by documents on file with the Panel.

²⁰¹ Ibid. See also, Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, "Plundering a nation: how rampant corruption unleashed a human rights crisis in South Sudan", 16 September 2025.

paid in excess of SSP 2 million, with payments distributed across nine different actors, including local security forces and political offices, with small cars charged SSP 5,000.²⁰²

141. At the same time, companies owned by the security services of South Sudan have been given large tax-exempt imports. In May 2025, for example, the National Security Service-owned “Frontier GeoConsultants” was given an exemption to import fuel worth more than \$3 million.²⁰³

142. As checkpoints have attracted political attention, river ports have also become centres of illicit taxation. Here illicit taxes can more easily be described as port fees. Port fees range from SSP 200,000 to SSP 1 million depending on the location and type of vessel.²⁰⁴ At the port of Adok, local government officials and SPLA-IO forces had, until recently, reached an agreement to share revenues, with 60 per cent going to the SPLM/A-IO and 40 per cent going to SPLM officials and SSPDF. Following renewed fighting, however, SPLA-IO forces have recently reverted to retaining all of the revenues collected.²⁰⁵

143. In December 2025, 12 boats carrying humanitarian items were stranded at Malakal Port “for weeks due to multiple and inflated taxation demands.”²⁰⁶ One humanitarian worker described the fee structure at the port in Malakal as “out of control.”

D. Illegal logging

144. Illegal logging and charcoal production remain widespread in the forests of South Sudan, particularly in Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria States. These provide income streams for armed groups, as well as soldiers and local officials who go largely without pay.

145. According to individuals familiar with the industry, local chiefs and communities control access to forests in exchange for payment. Local security forces provide protection, tax key transport routes, and are in some cases also involved in the transport and sale of charcoal. In opposition-controlled areas, including around Panyume, SPLA-IO forces play a similar role.²⁰⁷

146. Despite a series of national and local bans, the Panel has reviewed a significant number of documents that indicate an active and ongoing cross-border trade in charcoal and logs.²⁰⁸ Despite a strong charcoal market in South Sudan, many traders reportedly favour selling their charcoal in Uganda, where they are paid in dollars or Ugandan shillings, and they can then purchase commodities in Uganda for export back to South Sudan.²⁰⁹

147. The Panel has reviewed dozens of documents from 2025 and 2026 in which local officials authorize the passage of Ugandan trucks, each carrying 300 sacks of

²⁰² See annex 38.

²⁰³ See annex 39.

²⁰⁴ Interviews with humanitarian workers, February 2026.

²⁰⁵ Interviews, SPLM/A-IO representatives, February 2026.

²⁰⁶ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan: humanitarian access snapshot”, January 2026.

²⁰⁷ Interviews with civilians and current and former government officials, July 2025 to February 2026, corroborated by documents on file with the Panel.

²⁰⁸ See annex 40.

²⁰⁹ Interviews with civilians and current and former government officials, July 2025 to February 2026, corroborated by documents on file with the Panel.

charcoal, across the border to Uganda, against payment of SSP 600,000 to SSP 1,200,000.²¹⁰

E. Trade in looted copper

148. Since the onset of the conflict in the Sudan, a significant trade in looted copper has been carried out through South Sudan. Panel interviews indicate that copper looted in Khartoum and other Sudanese cities is sold in Abyei, as well as in other trading posts near the border with South Sudan. From here it is transported through Wau and Juba, typically to the port of Mombasa in Kenya.²¹¹ Shipping documents reviewed by the Panel indicate that the copper is then shipped on to buyers in India.

149. In June 2025, for example, the National Security Service issued a letter to an Indian company, granting four trucks, each carrying 50 tons of copper, passage through South Sudan to Kampala.²¹² The letter copies the SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces and requests that all security organs facilitate the safety of the vehicles.

150. The Panel has reviewed several other documents that show trucks loaded with 100 to 600 kgs of “scrap copper” transiting through numerous checkpoints in South Sudan, often against payment of around SSP 80,000 to SSP 100,000 to security forces and State authorities, before being given clearance to enter either Uganda or Kenya.²¹³ In May 2025, for example, several trucks, each loaded with 40 tons of scrap copper, were given clearance by the National Security Service to transit from Juba to Mombasa, in Kenya.²¹⁴

151. In some cases, however, payments or permissions appear to have been inadequate to secure safe passage. In April 2025, for example, authorities in Juba seized a truck which they claimed contained copper illegally looted in the Sudan, as well as from the oil industry in South Sudan.²¹⁵ In January 2026, several National Security Service officers were ordered to appear before a Court in Juba, charged with confiscating and selling a large amount of copper seized from nine South Sudanese traders. In January 2025, authorities in Kenya seized a truck loaded with scrap copper travelling from Juba to Kenya, claiming the shipment was smuggled and illegal.²¹⁶

VII. Regional efforts to mediate crisis in South Sudan

A. Consolidation of regional mediation efforts

152. In numerous interviews conducted by the Panel, South Sudanese citizens and opposition figures shared a profound loss of faith in the ability of the existing political mechanisms in South Sudan to resolve the current political and security crisis. There was a consistent call for greater regional and international engagement in South Sudan, including from the region. Senior SPLM/A-IO leaders, in particular, stressed

²¹⁰ See annex 40.

²¹¹ Interviews with international observers and Sudanese civilians, May to August 2025 and February 2026. See also National Public Radio, “A city opens a hopeful new chapter after 2 brutal years of fighting”, 16 May 2025; and Reuters, “Sudan war shatters infrastructure, costly rebuild needed”, 28 May 2025.

²¹² See annexes 41 and 42. Additional confidential documents on file with the Panel.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ See annex 41.

²¹⁶ TV47 news segment available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UxePtIawR-M>

that any viable mediation efforts will require broad regional and international support beyond that of past peace agreements.

153. The African Union has engaged extensively in South Sudan since the escalation of violence in January 2025. A number of high-profile delegations have travelled to Juba, including on 14 and 15 January 2026,²¹⁷ but have not been permitted to meet with First Vice-President Riek Machar.

154. From 13 to 16 February 2026, President Salva Kiir also attended the Assembly of the African Union in Addis Ababa.²¹⁸ On the sidelines of this event, President Kiir attended a meeting of the High-level Ad Hoc Committee on South Sudan, chaired by the President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa. In its final declaration, the Committee reiterated the Union's calls for the release of all political detainees, including First Vice-President Riek Machar.²¹⁹ The Committee also urged the Government of South Sudan to provide immediate funding to key electoral institutions, while stressing the importance of an inclusive national dialogue.²²⁰ A decision was also taken to consolidate existing regional mediation initiatives concerning South Sudan.²²¹

155. In this context, the Kenya-led Tumaini Initiative, which aims to engage opposition groups that have not yet signed the 2018 peace agreement, had largely stalled. In early 2026, however, efforts have been made to revive the Initiative and integrate it into other regional efforts. On 21 February 2026, the Initiative's Deputy Chief Mediator, Mohamed Ali Guyo, stated that the upcoming dialogue between the parties would be led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, with Kenya continuing to provide technical support. The parties and mediators are developing a new "National Consensus Charter" in the hope that this can form the basis for future negotiations.²²²

156. The United People's Alliance²²³ has supported the resumption of dialogue and negotiations, while also expressing serious concerns about the current political and security context in South Sudan.²²⁴ In a separate letter, however, Thomas Cirillo, the leader of NAS, largely rejected the approach of the National Consensus Charter, as well as any efforts to "resuscitate" the 2018 peace agreement, of which he is not a signatory.²²⁵ SPLM/A-IO has also stated that it will not participate unless First Vice-President Riek Machar is released and permitted to participate.²²⁶ Talks scheduled for 9 February 2026 were postponed in order to allow for further consultations.

²¹⁷ South African Government, "Minister Ronald Lamola leads African Union C5 visit to South Sudan", 14 January 2026.

²¹⁸ Sudans Post, "Kiir returns from AU summit, reaffirms commitment to December elections", 16 February 2026.

²¹⁹ See annex 43.

²²⁰ Radio Tamazuj, "Ramaphosa outlines key outcomes of South Sudan crisis talks", 16 February 2026.

²²¹ Statement on file with the Panel.

²²² Radio Tamazuj, "Opinion: Evaluating the success and significance of the Tumaini Initiative", 31 January 2025.

²²³ Includes Real-SPLM, South Sudan United Front/Army (SSUF/A), South Sudan People's Movement/Army (SSPM/A) and National Salvation Front – Revolutionary Command Council (NAS-RCC). See annex 44.

²²⁴ Africa-Press, "South Sudan opposition bets on new Tumaini talks", 1 October 2025.

²²⁵ See annex 45.

²²⁶ Amjambo Africa, "South Sudan opposition party lays down new demands over peace talks", 12 February 2026.

B. Bilateral relations

157. Regional mediation efforts are also affected by the bilateral relations of South Sudan with regional Member States.

158. As noted above, Uganda remains a critical regional security partner to President Kiir, though opposition leaders stressed to the Panel that UPDF deployment in South Sudan has eroded their confidence in Uganda as a neutral guarantor of the peace agreement. Uganda also continues to host a large number of South Sudanese refugees, including as a consequence of increased instability in the greater Equatoria region, while also remaining a critical trading partner to South Sudan. Recent diplomatic engagements have also focused on improving connectivity and border efficiency, including in the context of a regional road network that will link the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Uganda.²²⁷

159. Relations between the two countries are also tested periodically by several unresolved border disputes. Lethal clashes between SSPDF and UPDF were recorded on 28 July 2025 in the West Nile/Kajo-Keji area, as well as on 30 July 2025.²²⁸ De-escalation efforts followed on 9 August 2025, when President Kiir met UPDF Chief of Defence Forces, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, in Juba.²²⁹

160. Diplomatic engagements between Ethiopia and South Sudan also intensified in 2025 and 2026. On 9 September 2025, President Kiir attended the inauguration ceremony of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia, meeting also bilaterally with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed.²³⁰ The two leaders met again, on 15 February 2026, on the margins of the African Union Summit.²³¹ On 1 February 2026, a meeting between the countries' respective foreign ministers in Addis Ababa also reaffirmed bilateral ties, with discussions focused on border management, counter-smuggling measures and regional stabilization initiatives in the context of the ongoing conflict in the Sudan. An Ethiopian delegation also attended Nile Day events in Juba, in February 2026, where South Sudan officials discouraged the politicization of Nile River water issues.²³²

161. On 15 February 2026 an agreement to link South Sudan to the Port of Djibouti though Ethiopia was also announced, with the initiative aiming to reduce transit costs and improve maritime access for South Sudan.²³³

162. Diplomatic engagement with Kenya has also centred on trade and economic integration. In early 2026, officials discussed the reduction of trade barriers, as well as improved customs coordination with respect to the Ports of Mombasa and Lamu, both of which are critical to South Sudan imports.²³⁴ At a ministerial meeting held in

²²⁷ The Radio Community, "Uganda, South Sudan and CAR to build 1,800 km linking road", 26 May 2025.

²²⁸ The East African, "Six South Sudan soldiers killed in border clashes with Uganda", 30 July 2025.

²²⁹ The East African, "Muhoozi meets Kiir as border clashes test ties", 10 August 2025.

²³⁰ Statement by the Office of the President on file with the Panel.

²³¹ Ethiopian News Agency, "Ethiopia, South Sudan strengthen push for regional peace", 15 February 2026.

²³² Reuters Connect, "South Sudan hosts Nile Day for the first time in Juba", 22 February 2026.

²³³ Capital Ethiopia, "Historic signing establishes DESSU corridor authority to boost regional trade", 17 February 2026.

²³⁴ Parliament of Kenya, "Lamu leaders push for speedy LAPSET implementation", 21 January 2026.

Nairobi on 18 and 19 February 2026, a joint trade commission was formed to streamline cargo movement and address trade obstacles.²³⁵

163. Engagements by South Sudan with the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have also focused on border stabilization in the context of increased cross-border movements by non-State armed groups from both countries. In September 2025, for example, consultations were initiated on the demarcation of a contested border between South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, culminating in a prisoner exchange between the two States as part of broader confidence-building measures.²³⁶

VIII. Conclusions

164. In a recent large survey conducted in South Sudan, less than half the respondents agreed that their country is currently at peace.²³⁷ The international community's concern for the rapidly deteriorating situation in South Sudan should, however, not be contingent on the terms we use to describe it. Whether or not South Sudan is said to have returned to war is of little consequence to those already suffering from the collapse of the political and security structures that sought to end the cycles of violence that have plagued the country since before its independence. The people of South Sudan are in urgent need of regional and international support to prevent further violence, restore unhindered humanitarian access and ensure the country's leaders recommit to peace.

IX. Recommendations

165. The Panel of Experts recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan:

(a) Consider sending a delegation of its members to South Sudan in 2026 to assess the current political and security situation and operating environment for humanitarian organizations and agencies in the country;

(b) Issue a press release stating that the deployment of armed forces, including armed private contractors, armed aircraft and armed vehicles, without an exemption further to the provisions of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), as renewed by resolution [2781 \(2025\)](#), is a violation of the terms of the arms embargo first implemented by resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#);

(c) With support from the Panel of Experts, review the list of individuals and entities currently subject to targeted sanctions as listed in resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) and consider additional listings, particularly in instances where there is substantial credible evidence linking individuals to attacks on humanitarian operators further to paragraph 7(c) of resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), or encouraging attacks on civilians by the use of ethnic or tribal hate speech;

(d) Write a letter to the Government of South Sudan requesting an update on all investigations announced in 2025 and 2026 into the looting of humanitarian

²³⁵ AllAfrica, "Kenya and South Sudan explore joint trade commission to boost cross-border commerce", 18 February 2026.

²³⁶ HumAngle, "DRC, South Sudan exchange prisoners to boost security cooperation", 21 January 2026.

²³⁷ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, "Trends in civic space and elections in South Sudan", September 2025. See footnote 18.

resources, attacks on humanitarian personnel and/or assets, and atrocities committed against civilians;

(e) Write a letter to customs authorities in India, Kenya, Uganda, and Viet Nam, encouraging enhanced scrutiny of copper, gold, charcoal and timber originating from Kenya, South Sudan, the Sudan or Uganda, in the context of the active illicit trade in South Sudan;

(f) Issue a press release calling upon the Parties to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan to immediately cease all hostilities, restore the permanent ceasefire, and engage in inclusive and genuine dialogue under the provisions of the agreement;

(g) With support from the Panel of Experts, develop an implementation assistance notice for the benefit of Member States and companies trading in crude oil originating in South Sudan, identifying relevant provisions of the law of South Sudan, the peace agreement and highlighting risks associated with the diversion and misapplication of public resources in South Sudan.

166. The Panel of Experts recommends that the Security Council:

(a) Consider explicitly including surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance equipment intended to support the use of lethal military equipment within the scope of the arms embargo first implemented by resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#);

(b) In coordination with the African Union Peace and Security Council and the African Union High-level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan, deploy appropriate mediation support to assist the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity in facilitating a political resolution of the current political and security crisis in South Sudan, including the status of the First Vice-President and all political detainees, and an agreed basis for free and fair elections.

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Annex 1: List of abbreviations

AU	The African Union
IGAD	The Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
NAS	National Salvation Front/Army
NSS	National Security Service
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (referring to its armed wing)
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (referring to both its armed wing and political party)
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (referring to its political party)
SSP	South Sudan Pound
SSPDF	South Sudan People's Defence Forces
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces

Annex 2: SPLM-IO statement on charges against First Vice President Riek Machar and additional co-defendants, 15 September 2025



Article. 1.16; on Responsibilities Sharing at States and Local Government levels;

2. The suspension of the First Vice President from the Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGNU) is a grave violation which effectively brings the implementation of the Political and Security provisions of the R-ARCSS to a complete stop. In light of this unfortunate development the SPLM/SPLA-IO further resolves;
 - a. The government that was formed pursuant to R-ARCSS has collapsed; its structure, mandate has been destroyed, and the legitimacy has ended.
 - b. The current regime in the Republic of South Sudan is not based on the R-ARCSS, it is a setup of dictatorship, peace spoilers and state capture that is holding power illegally and by violence, and as such, the SPLM/SPLA-IO shall work to effect in the Republic of South Sudan a regime change and a new political dispensation of peace, justice, equality, democracy, rule of law and development.

The Charges against the First Vice President, other Political Detainees and Members of SPLM/SPLA-IO

1. Condemns and rejects all charges against the members of SPLM/SPLA-IO as these charges are violations of R-ARCSS, politically motivated, denials of Political Space, and witch-hunt against Dr. Riek MacharTeny and the SPLM/SPLA-IO Party as such the SPLM/SPLA-IO;
 - a. Does not recognize the court process, and shall not take part in the politically motivated trials nor file any legal defense against members who are illegally arrested and detained in contravention of the Peace Agreement.

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


- b. Welcomes, on the account of abuse of power by SPLM-IG, efforts by legal professionals and activists to challenge the illegal arrest, detention and trials of the First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan and other Political Detainees.
- c. Legal Defense or representation in the illegal political and incompetent court of the SPLM-IG shall proceed on account of individual Human Rights and freedom of the Political Detainees.
- d. Reiterates calls for immediate and unconditional release of the First Vice President and all Political Detainees from illegal detention, failure to do so, the SPLM/SPLA-IO shall use all means to demand the release of the First Vice President and other Political Detainees.

Call for National Service and Mobilization


In light of the political trials, abrogation of the R-ARCSS and ongoing military campaign by the regime's forces, the SPLM/SPLA-IO hereby calls upon all its supporters, members in the political and military wings, the citizens of the Republic of South Sudan to report for National Service in defense of the citizens and the Country and use all means available to regain their Country and Sovereignty.

Signed:




Rt. Hon. Gen. Oyet Nathaniel Pierino
Acting Chairman and Commander-in-Chief,
First Deputy Speaker,
TNLA, RSS

Annex 3: Presidential Decrees concerning former Vice President Benjamin Bol Mel





REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
The President


RSS/RD/3/403/2025

12th November 2025

**DEMOTION OF A GENERAL TO THE RANK OF PRIVATE AND
SUBSEQUENT DISMISSAL FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY
SERVICE (NSS)**

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 51(4) of the National Security Service Act, 2014 (as amended), I, Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan and the Supreme Commander of All Regular Forces, do hereby **Demote Gen. Dr. Benjamin Bol Mel to the Rank of Private and is hereby Dismissed from the National Security Service (NSS).**

Issued under my Hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Sudan in Juba, this Twelfth Day of the Month of November in the Year 2025.



Salva Kiir Mayardit,
President,
Supreme Commander of All the Regular Forces,
Republic of South Sudan,
Juba.

Annex 4: Proposed amendments to the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan

AMENDMENT OF THE REVITALIZED AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN, 2018

The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) generally mandates that elections shall be held in accordance with the Provisions of the Permanent Constitution. Since the Permanent Constitution will not be attainable before the end of the current transitional period, then there is need to delink the processes of conducting the National Population and Housing Census and holding of elections from the adoption of the Permanent Constitution. To proceed with elections under the current Transitional Constitution, necessity requires that the Parties Signatory to the Agreement agree to amend the following provisions of the R-ARCSS.

Preamble

We the Parties and Stakeholders signatory to the R-ARCSS, reaffirm our unwavering commitment to conduct peaceful and democratic elections by the end of the Transitional Period as enshrined in the R-ARCSS and its extended roadmap.

Cognizant of Article 8.4 of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, 2018, which authorizes the Parties to amend the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, 2018;

Aware that the Parties signatory to the Agreement recognize the need to delink National Elections from the Permanent Constitution and thereby conduct National Elections in accordance with the provisions of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 (as amended);

Mindful of the fact that the R-ARCSS has been facing serious challenges and most of its provisions are either ongoing or pending;

Aware that, progress has been made in the implementation of the R-ARCSS, while some critical tasks are either ongoing or pending due to lack of resources and other related challenges;

Committed to advance the social welfare of our people by ensuring that, resources are spent in services delivery and development of public infrastructure;

J.M.A

Page 1 of 3

mml W.L.S.

Conscious of the demand of our people for the conduct of elections in December 2026, as per the extended R-ARCSS roadmaps.

We the undersigned Parties hereby collectively resolved to amend the following provisions of the R-ARCSS: -

1. Article 1.2.5 of the Revitalized Agreement is hereby amended by deleting and substituting it to read as follows:

Oversee and ensure that the amendment of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 (as amended) is successfully carried out in order to delink it from the permanent Constitution.

2. Article 1.2.14. of the Revitalized Agreement, is hereby amended by deleting and substituting it to read as follows:

Conduct a national population and Housing Census after the elections.

3. Article 1.20.5. of the Revitalized Agreement, is hereby amended by deleting and substituting it to read as follows:

Sixty (60) days prior to the end of the Transitional Period, the National Elections Commission (NEC) shall organize elections *in accordance with the provisions of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 (as amended)* and shall ensure that the outcome is broadly reflective of the will of the electorates.

4. Article 1.20.6. of the Revitalized Agreement, is hereby amended by deleting and substituting it to read as follows:

Within two (2) months, the National Elections Act, 2012 (as amended), shall be amended to conform with the Provisions of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 (as amended).

5. Article 1.20.10. of the Revitalized Agreement, is amended by deleting the period of publication and substituting it to read as follows:




The Voters register shall be published three (3) months prior to the holding of elections.

J. M. A

Page 2 of 3

mmj K/L/S,

6. Article 6.4 of the Revitalized Agreement is hereby repealed.
7. Article 8.2 of the Revitalized Agreement is hereby repealed.
8. Article 8.3 of the Revitalized Agreement is hereby repealed.
9. Delete the title of Chapter VIII and rename it, to read as follows: Procedures for Amendment of the Agreement. Articles 8.2 and 8.3 are hereby deleted.
10. Annexure D, of Revitalized Agreement is hereby amended by deleting item No. 42 on the reference of Article 1.19.5. and substituting it as follows:
 - (a) Article 1.20.5. and deleting the phrase "terms of Permanent Constitution" and substituting it with "*The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 (as amended)*".
 - (b) On the time frame *within "two (2) months"*.
11. Deleting Reference 1.19.9 replacing it with Article 1.20.10.
12. On the time frame six (6) months is deleted and substitute with three (3) months.

S/No.	Name	Party	Signature
1.	Hon. Justice Michael Makuei Lueth	SPLM-ITGONU	
2.	Adv. Johnson Mayiik Akol	SPLM/A-IO	
3.	Hon. Wilson Lodiong Sebit	OPP	

Annex 5: SPLM-IO statement on amendments to the peace agreement, 18 December 2025



SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (IO)
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS



Ref: SPLM/SPLA-IO/RJMEC/006/2025

Thu, 18 December 2025

H.E. Maj. Gen George Aggrey Owino (Rtd)
Chairperson, RJMEC
RSS, Juba

Dear Excellency,

REPORT OF THE UNILATERAL AMENDMENT OF THE REVITALIZED AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN (R-ARCSS)

I am writing to report to you and the guarantors the unilateral decision by the SPLM-IG/ITGNU to amend the R-ARCSS following the systematic violations that have not been addressed.

On 10th December 2025, the Parties to the R-ARCSS met in the Presidency without the First Vice President, H.E. Dr. Riek Machar Teny. The meeting was attended by the President (SPLM-IG), Vice president for Economic Cluster (SPLM-IG), Vice President for Infrastructure Cluster (SPLM-IG) and the Vice President for Gender, Sport and Youth Cluster (FD/SPLM-IG), as H.E. Rebecca Nyandeng De Mabior is a member of Political Bureau of the SPLM-IG. Meanwhile, the Vice Presidents for Service Cluster (SSOA), have always been handpicked by President Salva Kiir Mayardit during appointments.

The decision to amend the R-ARCSS therefore was a unilateral decision of the SPLM-IG aimed at completely dismantling the Agreement and unravel the peace process in South Sudan.

We would like to further point out that the procedure for amending the R-ARCSS is provided in Articles 7.13, 7.14 and Article 8.4, as follows; *"The Revitalised Agreement may be amended by the Parties, with at least two-thirds of the members of the Council of Ministers of the RTGoNU, and, at least two-thirds of the voting members of the Revitalised Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission consenting to the amendment, followed by ratification by the Transitional National Legislature, according to the constitutional amendment procedures set out in the*



TCRSS, 2011 (as amended), **(Article 8.4)**. The decision to amend the Agreement must be approved by the voting members of RJMEC who shall comprise; the forty-three (43) representatives of the Parties, other South Sudanese stakeholders, regional and international guarantors and partners of South Sudan, as stipulated in Chapter VII, Articles 7.2.1 - 7.2.4. **(Article 7.13)**.

In light of the foregoing provisions, any amendment not conforming to Article 7.13, 7.14 and Article 8.4, and without participation of SPLM/SPLA-IO and resolving the systematic violations of the Agreement shall be a further violation, null and void, and will **not** be accepted.


Moreover, systematic violations of the Agreement have made the amendment of R-ARCSS legally impossible since in the Presidency, the First Vice President, who represents the SPLM/SPLA-IO has been arrested and detained by the SPLM-IG; in the Council of Ministers, out of nine ministers, representing the SPLM/SPLA-IO, seven (7) have been unilaterally removed or imprisoned. In the Legislature, President Salva Kiir Mayardit has unilaterally removed the Speaker of the National Council of States, the First Deputy Speaker of the Reconstituted Transitional National Assembly and dozens of Members representing the SPLM/SPLA-IO.

The SPLM/SPLA-IO rejects and condemns in the strongest term possible the decision to amend the Agreement without SPLM/SPLA-IO and would like to point out that this is a dangerous escalation by the SPLM-IG and refusal to address the Root Causes of the conflict in South Sudan.

In conclusion, due to persistent attacks on Cantonments, Training Centers and the forces of the SPLA-IO, we would like to report the collapse of the Permanent Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) and call upon RJMEC and the Guarantors to break the long standing deadlock and resolve the conflict in South Sudan. **(Article 7.11)**

Your Excellency, please accepts the assurances of my highest regards and consideration.

Yours sincerely,



Rt. Hon. Oyeth Nathaniel Pierino
Acting Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, SPLM/SPLA-IO
First Deputy Speaker, TNLA, RSS



Annex 6: PCCA statement on amendments to the peace agreement, 17 December 2025



The People's Coalition for Civil Action

Juba, South Sudan
Email: thecivilactionssd@gmail.com

17th December 2025

The PCCA Questions Elections Without Peace and Permanent Constitution

For Immediate Release

The People's Coalition for Civil Action (PCCA) issues this press statement in response to the resolutions adopted at the meeting of the so-called "Expanded Presidency" held in Juba on 10 December 2025. Given the far-reaching implications of these resolutions for the future of the country, the PCCA sets out its response as follows:

First, the PCCA contends that the entity called the "Expanded Presidency," is illegitimate as it is not provided for neither in the Transitional Constitution nor in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Any decisions purportedly taken by a non-existent institution are therefore null and void. The Transitional Constitution of South Sudan recognizes only the Presidency and the Council of Ministers. The creation of *ad hoc* bodies lacking constitutional mandate represents a systematic attempt by the regime in Juba to exercise power outside the rule of law. The PCCA condemns this desperate legitimization of backdoor usurpation of constitutional authority.

Second, even if the meeting were assumed to have been legally constituted, the absence of legitimate representation from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO)—the largest opposition signatory to the R-ARCSS—constitutes a direct violation of both the Transitional Constitution and the Agreement itself, which together form the legal basis of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU). Consequently, any decision taken under such circumstances carries no force of law and is null and void. This decision merely confirms what the PCCA has long maintained: that the R-ARCSS has been systematically dismantled and stripped of its substance. With this act, the Agreement has, in effect, been finally abrogated.

Third, the Tumaini Initiative collapsed early this year because the government delegation insisted on annexing its outcomes to the R-ARCSS. At the time, we urged the parties to prioritize inclusive political dialogue, security arrangements, constitution-making, and the conduct of elections, while deferring other matters to a post-election government. The government delegation rejected this approach, remaining adamant that the Agreement had to be implemented in full. What has unfolded since makes the situation clear: the RTGoNU is playing unhealthy political games with the lives and future of the people of South Sudan. If the government has now accepted the logic of our position,

its delegation must return to Nairobi to conclude the talks, resolve outstanding conflicts, and fully commit to a viable democratic transition. Attempts to pursue shortcuts or backdoor strategies to deceive the people of South Sudan into endorsing dictatorship will neither succeed nor be accepted.

Fourth, while we acknowledge the stated desire of the parties not to further extend the transition, we question any attempt to conduct elections in the absence of inclusive political dialogue, a permanent constitution, and sustainable peace. These are not optional conditions; they are the minimum requirements for a credible, legitimate, and democratic transition. Moreover, the authority to determine when elections should be held and under what conditions does not rest with the RTGoNU. That mandate belongs to the people of South Sudan. This is precisely why an inclusive political dialogue must precede constitution-making and why both must come before any elections are conducted.

Lastly, it must be stated plainly that the kleptocrats and autocrats in Juba have exhausted all political options. Pushing for constitutional amendments that usurp power from the people is not a legitimate democratic act; it is a self-serving strategy designed to prolong illegitimate rule. The coalition of entities currently governing the country lacks confidence in its ability to win free and genuine democratic elections and is therefore seeking alternative routes to secure authority without legal constraint, effectively short-changing the people of South Sudan.

In conclusion, the PCCA reaffirms that South Sudan's path to peace, stability, and legitimate governance cannot be forged through constitutional shortcuts, exclusionary decision-making, or the manufacture of unlawful institutions. A genuine democratic transition must be rooted in the will of the people, anchored in an inclusive political dialogue, secured through a permanent constitution, and conducted under conditions of peace and the rule of law. Any attempt to bypass these fundamentals will only deepen the crisis and further erode the legitimacy of those in power. The PCCA therefore calls on all responsible actors: national, regional, and international, to stand with the people of South Sudan in defending constitutionalism, democratic principles, and the urgent necessity of a truly inclusive and lawful transition.

The People Shall Prevail

Annex 7: South Sudanese constituencies as outlined by the NEC in December 2025

Republic of South Sudan
National Elections Commission

Ref: _____ Office of the Chairperson _____ Date: _____

Press Statement of the Chairperson of the National Elections Commission of the
Republic of South Sudan.

On 22nd December 2025 at the National Elections Commission HQs Office -Juba

On the Declaration of the National Geographical Constituencies for the December
2026 General Elections in the Republic of South Sudan.


Prof. Abednego Akok Kacuol,
Chairperson
National Elections Commission (NEC)

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
NATIONAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRPERSON
JUBA



Date: _____

In reference to the decision **made by the parties** to the Agreement (**R-ARCS**) on 10th December 2025 to delink the conduct of a new population Census and Constitution-making process as a pre-conditions for the conduct of General Elections in December 2026 and in accordance with the National Elections Act 2012 (Amendment) Act, 2023, section 41(1)(e) &(f) that gave the NEC powers to revert the country to use the constituencies of the 2010 General Elections for the upcoming December 2026 elections in the Republic of South Sudan.

Henceforth, the National Elections Commission hereby declares the 102 constituencies in accordance to the ten (10) States and the Three Administrative Areas as summarized follows:

1. Central Equatoria State (CES) has fourteenth (14) National constituencies.
2. Eastern Equatoria State has eleven (11) National Constituencies.
3. Western Equatoria State has eight (8) National Constituencies.
4. Jonglei State has seventeenth (17) National Constituencies including Greater Pibor Administrative Area.
5. Unity State has seven (7) National Constituencies including Ruweng Administrative Area.
6. Upper Nile State has twelve (12) National Constituencies
7. Lakes State has eight (8) National Constituencies.
8. Northern Barh El Ghazal State has nine (9) National Constituencies.
9. Western Barh El Ghazal State has four (4) National Constituencies.
10. Warrap State has twelve (12) National Constituencies including Abyei Administrative Area.


Thereafter, as per the section 41(1)(g) the public shall have the names and other details of their constituencies on the official Website of the National Elections Commission and in the print media.

We thank all the media houses for coming to make the coverage of this press conference on the electoral process.

God bless the Republic of South Sudan.


Annex 8: Johnson Olony's speech to troops in Poktap, Jonglei State

Johnson Olony's speech was widely circulated on South Sudanese social media pages and widely reported in the press. A full video is available from multiple sources, including: <https://www.facebook.com/reel/3125630607608975> (images below are taken from video)



Satellite image source: Google Earth, Airbus © 2025. Satellite image capture date 11 November 2023.

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Satellite images source: Google Earth, Airbus © 2025. Satellite image capture date 11 November 2023.

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Annex 9: African Union Statement on situation in South Sudan, 27 January 2026



INFORMATION & COMMUNICATION DIRECTORATE

Press Release No: ____/2026

Date: 27 January 2026

Venue: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission Calls for De-escalation and Respect for the Revitalized Peace Agreement in South Sudan

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, **H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf**, expresses deep concern over the deteriorating security situation in parts of the Republic of South Sudan, particularly reports of escalating tensions and violence in Jonglei State, which have led to the displacement of large numbers of civilians.

The Chairperson is gravely alarmed by reports of inflammatory rhetoric and actions that risk inciting further violence and placing civilian populations, including women and children, at heightened risk. Such developments run counter to the letter and spirit of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

H.E. Mr. Youssouf strongly condemns any calls for, or acts of, violence against civilians and reiterates that the protection of civilians remains a fundamental responsibility of all parties to the conflict.

While noting the continued public commitments by South Sudanese leaders to the peace process, the Chairperson expresses serious concern over ongoing violations of the Permanent Ceasefire and their adverse humanitarian impact.

The Chairperson calls upon all parties to exercise maximum restraint, immediately de-escalate tensions, and fully comply with their obligations under the R-ARCSS. This includes strict adherence to ceasefire arrangements, respect for agreed power-sharing mechanisms, and a return to inclusive, consensus-based decision-making.

The Chairperson further urges South Sudanese stakeholders to place the interests of the people of South Sudan above all other considerations and to resolve outstanding differences through dialogue and peaceful means, with a view to ensuring the successful completion of the Transitional Period.

The African Union reaffirms its unwavering commitment to supporting the people and Government of South Sudan in their pursuit of lasting peace, stability, and national reconciliation, and will continue to work closely with IGAD, the United Nations and international partners toward this objective.

For media inquiries, please contact:

Mr. Nuur Mohamud Sheekh | Spokesperson of the Chairperson | African Union Commission | Email: SheekhN@AfricanUnion.org | Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Information and Communication Directorate, African Union Commission | E-mail: DIC@africanunion.org
Web: www.au.int | Addis Ababa, Ethiopia | Follow Us: [Facebook](#) | [Twitter](#) | [Instagram](#) | [YouTube](#)

Annex 10: Sudan and South Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference, Communique dated 27 January 2026

Sudan and South Sudan Catholic
Bishops' Conference (SSSCBC)



مؤتمر المطارنة الكاثوليك
بالسودان وجنوب السودان

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Communique of the Catholic Bishops of South Sudan Ecclesiastical Province to the Government of National Unity and Opposition Groups in our Beloved Country

27th January 2026

"Let us pursue what leads to peace and to building one another up" (Romans 14:19)

To the Government of National Unity and Opposition Groups in South Sudan.

We the Catholic Bishops of South Sudan Ecclesiastical Province, in response to the deteriorating political, Security and humanitarian situation in our country, condemn in the strongest term the renewed fighting between the government forces, SPLA-IO and other armed opposition groups, particularly in in Jongle and Eastern Equatoria States. Last year 2025, we raised concerns twice on behalf of the suffering people of South Sudan to the political leaders. We are coming again with urgency to reiterate our appeal for dialogue, unity, peace and reconciliation in the Republic of South Sudan.

Again in July 2025, we called on all the political leaders not to ignore dialogue and we said "all these (conflicts in the country) are happening because genuine dialogue is being sidelined intentionally, while military action is wrongly embraced as a solution to addressing political and social differences. Thus, we asked our government and opposition leaders: "do you have this country and its people in your hearts or are you only concerned and obsessed with pursuit of power and wealth?"

During our annual plenary meeting in the Catholic Diocese of Malakal last November we urged all the parties to the peace agreement to work for the good of the suffering people in South Sudan when: "we call for the full implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) by all the parties to create confidence in the people and engage in sincere dialogue."

As Shepherds and leaders in this country, we are alarmed and surprised by the total disregard to the full implementation of the revitalized peace agreement. The growing discord within the Unity Government, attacks and counter attacks between the warring parties in many parts of the country is spreading rapidly causing displacements, hunger, and many other inhuman conditions. There is alarming increase in armed robbery of motorists and the common people even in the city of Juba and other parts of the country.

We are equally concerned by the issuing of wild messages in the social media, which amplify hate speech, misinformation and disinformation. The worst part of this kind of communication in social media is the promotion of tribal sentiments and incitement.



1

P.O BOX 258 - Juba Town Street- Juba South Sudan

جنوب السودان- شارع جوبا- جوبا
Tel: +211 928 777 219 WhatsApp: +211 923 044 500 E-mail: ssscbsc@outlook.com E-mail: Sameyu2011@gmail.com

The Catholic Bishops of South Sudan condemn in particular, the alleged speech by Gen. Johnson Olony, the Deputy Chief of South Sudan Defense Forces (SSPDF) for Mobilization and Disarmament, calling for indiscriminate violence against civilians in Jonglei State. Directing forces to "spare no lives" is a direct call to genocide. We call on all the fighting forces not to heed to any directive that risks victimizing innocent civilians and pitting communities against each other.

We urge you all the leaders in the Unity Government and the non-signatories to the Revitalized Peace Agreement to stop war and embrace dialogue, listen to one another and to the people you claim to fight for their sake. The citizens are not properties, they are human beings and it will be good to know their pains, hunger for peace, and their desire to live in freedom. In the name of God we call out to you *"let us pursue what leads to peace and to building one another up"* (Romans 14:19). We shall not be tired of quoting the words of His Holiness Pope Francis who from heaven still tell you as the leaders of the people in South Sudan *"no more war, no more bloodshed, no more conflicts, no more violence and mutual recriminations about who is responsible for it, no more leaving your people a thirst for peace. No more destruction: It is time to build! Leave the time of war behind and let a time of peace dawn"* (Message of Pope Francis to the people of South Sudan 2023)

We call on all peace loving people not to lose hope in God *"a hope which will not let us down, because the love of God has been poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit which has been given to us"*. Let us hold to prayers for this country. This country is more than any human desire, it's a home for a thousand of generations to come. Let us care for it and protect ourselves as long as God gives us a new day. We do not have other South Sudan to migrate to, so let's work for what unites us.

To all our partners, regional bodies and international community, the people of South Sudan are aware of your valuable contribution. You are our friends in deed and we urge you on behalf of the suffering people of our country not to grow tired of doing what is right for them.

We call upon our clergy, religious men and women and all people of good will to dedicate this time for special prayer for peace in our country. May Mary our Mother and Queen of Peace intercede for us.

On behalf of the Catholic Bishops of South Sudan.



H. E. Stephen Ameyu Martin Card. Mulla.

The Metropolitan Archbishop of Juba &

President of the Sudan and South Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference (SSSCBC)



Annex 11: Civil society statement on escalating violence, 26 January 2026

**JOINT STATEMENT**

**THE RAGING SECURITY SITUATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON CIVILIAN
WELLBEING IN THE STATES, GREATER PIBOR AND RUWENG
ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS**

January 26th, 2026

Conscious of a possible relapse to an all-out violence, the Civil Society Networks from the ten (10) States and Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA), held a virtual meeting on the 21st of January, 2026, assessed the growing security threats across the country and deliberated upon a possibility of joint efforts among the sub-national Civil Society Actors.

Alarmed by apparently increasing military and communal confrontations across the country and in particular:

The military hostilities between the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) and South Sudan Peoples Defense Force (SSPDF) in Jonglei, Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Unity, and Upper Nile States. These confrontations have exacerbated recruitment of civilians into the armed forces, as observed in Northern Bahr Elgazal State, Jonglei State, Upper Nile and Western Equatoria State. Equally, it has resulted in the loss of lives, properties, livelihoods and displaced approximately 1,050,000 (1.5million) civilians in the last one month, hence, inflicting enormous suffering, panic and immense uncertainties among the populace.

Communal violence and threatening presence of Ambororo nomads: communal violence is rising in Lake State, Warrap State, Northern Bahr Elgazal State, Western Equatoria State, Eastern Equatoria State, Unity State, and Central Equatoria state, and with the provoking presence of Ambororo, the foreign nomads that are currently posing a growing threat, especially among the host communities in Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria and Northern Bahr Elgazal States, our communities are likely to be adversely affected.

Eastern Equatoria State





Most importantly, moved by the deep outcry and suffering of our people in the States and Administrative Areas, we:

- 1) Humbly appeal to the President of South Sudan and the Presidency to order an immediate pause of hostilities, and unconditional release of the suspended First Vice President. This would prevent the chance of committing crimes against humanity and genocide in Jonglei State and the Greater Upper Nile Region in general. Cessation of hostilities would end the ongoing coercive mass recruitment of civilians, especially in Northern Bahr El gazal, Jonglei and Upper Nile States and also allow the displaced South Sudanese to access humanitarian assistance, a conducive environment necessary for dialogue and peaceful implementation of R-ARCSS including the resumption of Tumaini Initiative.
- 2) Strongly condemn the dangerous rhetoric made by both political and military leaders that can enable mass killing of civilians and potential genocide in Jonglei State.
- 3) Strongly urge the communities of Jonglei State to, in the midst of the hostilities between the SSPDF and SPLA-IO, reject the ethnic and tribal notion that is being championed by some military, political and community leaders.
- 4) Are calling upon the national Ministry of Peace Building to, in collaboration with the State Governments, address the inter-communal, intra-communal and age-set conflicts in Northern Bahr El gazal, Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria States and GPAA including the tension brought about by Ambororo.
- 5) Appreciate the relentless assistance accorded to the displaced populace across the country by the Humanitarian Actors. With the increasing humanitarian demands, we are appealing for continued support to the vulnerable people affected by the renewed conflicts.

Issued jointly by the Civil Society Networks from the 10 States Greater Pibor and Ruweng Administrative Area.



Annex 12: Statements by opposition groups on escalating violence



**SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY
SPLM/SPLA (IO)
NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATION**

PRESS STATEMENT

Date: January 25, 2026
For Immediate Release

**SPLM-IO CONDEMNS SSPDF DIRECTIVE ORDERING MASS CIVILIAN
DISPLACEMENT AND THREATENING CIVILIANS IN NYIROL, UROR, AND
AKOBO**

The National Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement—in Opposition (SPLM-IO) strongly condemns the press release issued on **25 January 2026** by the Office of the SSPDF Spokesperson, which orders civilians in **Nyirol, Uror, and Akobo** to vacate their homes and threatens them with military targeting.

This directive confirms earlier orders issued by **Lt. Gen. Johnson Olony Thebo**, who simultaneously serves as **Deputy Chief of Defence Forces for Mobilization and Disarmament** and as a **commander of the Agwelek militia**. Lt. Gen. Olony publicly ordered forces under his command not to spare any life—including women, children, elderly or livestock and chickens—in **Nyirol, Uror, Akobo, Fangak, and Ayod**. The SSPDF spokesperson's statement therefore constitutes a direct endorsement of these criminal threats.

The directive represents a **grave violation of international humanitarian law (IHL)** and poses an immediate and serious danger to civilian populations. Specifically, it:

1. Orders the **collective and forced displacement** of civilians from their habitual residences without lawful justification or provision of protection, shelter, or humanitarian assistance;
2. Effectively declares civilians **legitimate military targets** based on vague and arbitrary criteria, including mere proximity to opposition-controlled areas;
3. Orders the withdrawal of **NGOs and UNMISS personnel**, deliberately stripping civilians of protection and independent monitoring.

These actions violate the **Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols**, the **Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court**, and the **Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS)**.

The SPLM-IO warns that this directive constitutes an **early indicator of genocidal intent**, including forced displacement, extrajudicial killings, and collective punishment against civilian populations.

The SPLM-IO reiterates its unwavering commitment to the protection of civilians and calls on the **United Nations, African Union, IGAD, and the international community** to take urgent action and ensure **accountability for all violations of international law**.

Yours truly,

Reath Tang

Hon. Reath Muoch Tang,
Acting Chairperson, National Committee on Foreign Relations, and former Member of
the Transitional National Legislative Assembly, SPLM-IO
Email: reathtang@gmail.com
Cell: +211929909555
WhatsApp: +12029139977

CC:

- Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC)
- Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
- UNMISS
- African Union Peace and Security Council
- IGAD Secretariat
- IGAD-Plus
- Troika (United States, United Kingdom, Norway)
- United Nations Security Council
- Diplomatic Missions
- International and Regional Media

Annex 13: SSPDF allegations of prisoner executions, 7 February 2026





REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES
 Directorate of Media & Press
 Office of SSPDF Spokesperson
 For Immediate Release

7/2/2026



Press Release

SSPDF demand for full explanation and accountability from MSF

In December 2025 and January 2026, SPLA-IO rebels launched unprovoked and unjustified attacks on SSPDF's bases that resulted in the fall of Waat, Yuai and Pajut in Nyirol, Uror and Duk Counties respectively. Following those attacks, a sizeable number of servicemen and women were captured and taken as Prisoners of War (POWs).

In line with MSF's mandate of providing treatment and care, some of the POWs were taken to Pieri, Uror County. However, following the start of "Operation Enduring Peace" which enabled capture and recapture of lost bases, SSPDF command was utterly shocked and dismayed at the discovery of thirteen (13) corpses of former POWs executed in MSF's container in Walgak, Akobo County. On a positive note, four survived and rejoined SSPDF while ten (10) including four (4) servicewomen remained in captivity with SPLA-IO rebels on retreat.

In light of aforementioned unfortunate developments, SSPDF command hereby demand for full explanation and accountability from MSF on the exact circumstances under which own personnel were executed in their container.

Signed  

Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang Psc (ET)
 Director of Media & Press and SSPDF Spokesperson,

Annex 14: APCs deployed as part of SSPDF operations

Titan-S style armoured vehicles (identified in S/2023/294) in Ulang County



Tygra armoured vehicles (identified in S/2022/359) in Jonglei State, February 2026



Source: Both images posted to social media websites by members of the SSPDF

Tygra armoured vehicles in Upper Nile State, 2025



Source: Image posted to social media websites by member of the SSPDF

Annex 15: Heavy weapons used by SSPDF Agwelek forces

Mortars and 122mm Howitzer




Vehicle-mounted ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft cannons



Source: Both images posted to social media websites by members of the SSPDF

Annex 16: Evidence of attacks on Bentiu IDP camp



Source: confidential source

Satellite image source: Planet Labs Inc. Satellite image captured on 1 March 2026.

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Annex 17: SPLA-IO / NAS Memorandum of Understanding, March 2026



**MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
(MOU)**

BETWEEN

SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ ARMY – IN
OPPOSITION (SPLM/A – IO)

AND

NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT/ARMY (NAS)

6/03/2026

This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is entered into this 06/03/2026 subsequent to the consultative meeting between the representatives of Sudan People's Liberation Movement / Army – In Opposition (SPLM/A–IO); and National Salvation Front/Army (NAS/A), hereinafter referred to as the Parties.

PREAMBLE

WHEREAS, the Parties enter into this MOU with an aim towards the resolution of the Root Causes of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan in light of the ongoing political situation in the country;

COGNIZANT of the Parties shared political objectives and principles namely; federal system of governance, rule of law, democracy, peace, liberty, stability for South Sudan, as enshrined in their respective Manifesto and Vision for an Inclusive Modern South Sudan;

ACKNOWLEDGING the need to work in cooperation to usher in a new era of rights, freedom, dignity and rule of law;

EXPRESSING and REAFFIRMING the Parties' willingness for cooperation in order to achieve durable and sustainable peace and stability in the Republic of South Sudan;

CONCERNED of the political, security and dire humanitarian situation in South Sudan;

DETERMINED to salvage the country from disintegration and collapse due to the oppressive policies of President Salva Kiir and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Government (SPLM-IG);

COMMITTED to enter into a cooperation to restore power and dignity to the people and usher South Sudan into sustainable peace and prosperity; and that

WE, the Parties, recognize that this cooperation requires agreement of procedures and processes that shall guide its operation.

THEREFORE, the Parties agree as follows:

ARTICLE I: POLITICAL/MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES

1. To end the current oppressive system of government in South Sudan and usher in a Federal Democratic Governance based on the will of the people;
2. To work towards sustainable peace in South Sudan through a comprehensive and inclusive new peace plan;
3. To install a new inclusive transitional government;
4. To work for a people's based permanent constitution whose processes shall be led and owned by the people;
5. To cease political and military hostilities between forces of the Parties and resolve to work together; and expedite military cooperation;
6. To promote and strengthen the unity of the opposition in South Sudan;
7. Affirmation of South Sudan as an independent and sovereign state where sovereignty is vested in the people and is exercised by the state in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution;
8. Uphold citizenship, human rights and duties without discrimination on the basis of race, tribe, religion, gender, sex, origin or region;

9. That inclusivity in governance is paramount for promoting unity, security and stability in the country;

ARTICLE II: INTER-PARTY COOPERATION

1. Maintain and promote friendly relations and cooperation in areas of mutual interest at all levels;
2. Develop/coordinate unified political messages and positions in forums such as peace talks or engagement;
3. Render mutual support to advance shared political objectives;
4. Form a joint High-Level Committee for the purpose of developing framework for long-term cooperation and resolution of disputes;
5. Develop a comprehensive and common peace plan for South Sudan;
6. Continuous consultations on matters related to peace, stability, and security in South Sudan;
7. Engage the international community to support South Sudanese stakeholders in the resolution of the Root Causes of the Conflict;
8. Engage with other genuine political forces and civil societies in and outside the country in search for peace and stability.

ARTICLE III: DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM

1. The Parties shall use the joint High-Level Committee to resolve, in good faith, any dispute that may arise in the course of the execution of the MOU. In the event the Committee fails to resolve

a dispute, the matter shall be referred to the leadership of the respective parties.

ARTICLE IV: AMENDMENT AND PROCEDURE FOR TERMINATION

1. This MOU may only be amended or terminated by a prior written notice signed by the Party concerned within two weeks (14 days).
2. Notwithstanding the provision of sub article (1) above, in the event of termination, the Parties, through the High-Level Committee, agree to settle within one month, all outstanding matters such as shared assets, logistics, or liabilities related to the execution of the MOU or Cooperation.

SIGNATURES OF THE PARTIES:

The representatives of the Parties have hereunto set their signatures on this 06/03/2026.

**NATIONAL SALVATION
FRONT/ARMY**




Compatriot Nasike Teko Allan,
Secretary General




Lt. Gen. Samuel Lankiri Lado,
Deputy Chief of General Staff for
Administration and Finance

**SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION
MOVEMENT/ ARMY – IN
OPPOSITION**




Cde. Hon. Regina Joseph Kapa,
Secretary General



**Cdr. Lt. Gen. Wesley Welebe
Samson,**
Deputy Chief of General Staff for
Operations and Training

Annex 18: UPDF camp in Bilnyang, near Juba



Annex 19: Bell 412 helicopters at Paloich airfield



Possible use of the hangar by Bell 412. 13 December 2025



Source: Planet Inc. Source: Planet Labs Inc. Satellite image captured on 13 December 2025.

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Annex 20: Mi8/17 helicopter

Source: Planet Labs Inc. Satellite image captured on 25 April 2025.

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Mi8/17 Helicopter, Kajo-Keji County, Central Equatoria State, 8 July 2025



Video posted to social media websites on 2 October 2025. “Maj. Gen. Deng Akeen, head of security personnel, has visited Bor, Jonglei State”



Source: images posted to social media websites by local politicians and security sector actors



Source: video broadcast on South Sudan Broadcasting corporation



Source: image posted to social media websites by local politicians and security sector actors



Source: video broadcast on South Sudan Broadcasting corporation



Source: confidential source

Identical livery and location of tail number to AF-111




Source: video broadcast on South Sudan Broadcasting corporation



Source: image posted to social media websites by local politician


Annex 21: Attack on Wunaliet, March 2025

Social Media posts by the Chief of Defence Forces of Uganda in relation to the bombing at Wunaliet



Source: X.com (since deleted)

Departure SF166/N208PM from military section of Juba International Airport 24 March 2025.




Source: Flight Radar24



Approximate location of SF166/N208PM on 24 March

Source: Planet Inc

Flight pattern consistent with surveillance and battle damage assessment role over Wunaliet.



Source: Flight Radar24

N208PM/SF166 Flight Data showing when it left South Sudan

Arrival of N208PM/SF166 in South Sudan on 14 March 2025


On arrival the aircraft adopted an SF166 flight number indicating it was part of the UPDF deployment. It reverted to N208PM when it left Juba. (Source: FlightRadar24)

08 May 2025	Yola (YOL)	Abuja (ABJ)	(N208PM)	3:06	18:16	15:10	18:16	Landed 18:16	KML	CSV	Play
02 May 2025	Juba (JUB)	—	SP166	-	16:36	16:35	—	Unknown	KML	CSV	Play
02 May 2025	Juba (JUB)	Juba (JUB)	SP166	3:19	09:39	06:20	09:39	Landed 09:39	KML	CSV	Play
30 Apr 2025	—	Juba (JUB)	SP166	-	—	—	16:48	Landed 16:48	KML	CSV	Play

20 Mar 2025	—	—	(SF166)	-	—	—	—	Unknown	KML	CSV	Play
17 Mar 2025	—	—	SF166	-	—	—	—	Landed 12:28	KML	CSV	Play
14 Mar 2025	Juba (JUB)	—	(N208PM)	-	13:51	13:51	—	Unknown	KML	CSV	Play
14 Mar 2025	Entebbe (EBB)	Juba (JUB)	(N208PM)	2:11	12:35	10:23	11:35	Landed 11:35	KML	CSV	Play
13 Mar 2025	—	Entebbe (EBB)	(N208PM)	5:22	—	—	20:03	Landed 20:03	KML	CSV	Play
12 Mar 2025	Mogadishu (MOG)	—	SF166	-	12:44	12:43	—	Unknown	KML	CSV	Play
12 Mar 2025	Mogadishu (MOG)	Mogadishu (MOG)	SF166	5:11	10:33	05:22	10:33	Landed 10:33	KML	CSV	Play

Annex 22: Grey “Caravan” fixed wing aircraft

Paloich, 8 May 2025



Source: Planet Labs Inc. Satellite image captured on 8 May 2025.

Disclaimer: The designations employed, including geographical names, and the presentation of the materials in the present annex do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations concerning the names and legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries and do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Grey Caravan in Juba. Attachments are visible under the wings near each wing-strut




Source: confidential source, video on file with the Panel



Source: confidential source, video on file with the Panel

Grey Caravan aircraft with ISR pod at Juba Airport





Source: confidential source

Annex 23: Munitions from aerial bombardments

57mm rocket, Mandeng, 26 April 2025



Source: images posted to multiple social media websites and shared with the Panel by South Sudanese civilians.

Projectiles found after an attack on an MSF facility, Pieri, 3rd December 2025



A bullet hole in an MSF healthcare facility in Pieri, Jonglei state, South Sudan, December 2025.

Source: Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF healthcare facility hit during an airstrike in South Sudan, 4 December 2025: <https://www.msf.org/msf-healthcare-facility-hit-airstrike-south-sudan>

Video of grey aircraft over Pieri on 3rd December 2025.

A video taken of a grey aircraft circling over Pieri, appears to show small arms fire being directed from inside the aircraft towards the ground. Flashes emanating from that area where the rear hatch is located occur in a random sequence, suggesting that they are not part of an integral fitting to the plane, such as a light. The audio accompanying the video contains the sound of multiple controlled bursts of machine gun fire of a similar length, which suggests an operator with military training.

Dark square, suggesting the rear hatch is open**Flashes emanating from the approximate position of the rear hatch.**

Source: confidential source

Annex 24: New rifles allocated to the SSPDF

Source: all photos posted to social media websites by SSPDF soldiers







Annex 25: SAF weapons transferred to the SSPDF in South Sudanese territory

Automatic rifles, **light** machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, mortars and small arms ammunition.



Mortars



Heavy Weapons**37mm twin-barreled anti-Aircraft (AA) gun systems.****ZPU-4 Quad model 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns**

122mm Howitzer



Mounted ZU-23-2 model anti-aircraft auto-cannon



73mm recoilless rifle



122mm, rocket launcher.



(4) T-72 tanks



Armoured Personnel Carriers



Source: Eye Radio, Sudanese Army Troops surrender their weapons to the SSPDF in South Sudan territory, 9 December 2025: <https://www.eyeradio.org/sudanese-soldiers-hand-over-weapons-to-sspdf-after-heglig-fall-gen-olony> and <https://www.facebook.com/61567132254234/videos/gen-johnson-olony-speaking-at-panakuach-in-pariang-after-disarming-the-sudanese-/1655235828784499/>

Annex 26: SSPDF evacuation order, 25 January 2026





REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES

Directorate of Media & Press

Office of SSPDF Spokesperson

25/1/2026

For immediate release

Press Release

Ref: Press release on precautions and safety of civilians in SPLA-IO controlled areas

1. With imminent commencement of "Operation Enduring Peace" all civil population in SPLA-IO controlled areas of Nyirol, Uror and Akobo are directed to immediately evacuate for safety to government- controlled areas as soon as possible,
2. Armed civilians not interested in fighting with government forces must immediately handover their rifles to the nearest SSPDF's garrison without further unnecessary delays,
3. Youth that are not part and parcel of the white army should move their families and livestock to the nearest government- controlled areas,
4. Armed civilians found loitering in and around SPLA-IO barracks, assembly areas and rally grounds would be considered as legitimate military targets and finally
5. All NGOs and UNMISS personnel operating and working in Nyirol, Uror and Akobo counties are given 48 hours to leave.

Signed

Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang Psc (ET)

Director for Media & Press and SSPDF Spokesperson,

SSPDF GHQs-Bilpam






SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S
DEFENCE FORCES

25 JAN 2026

SSPDF SPOKESPERSON

Annex 27: SSPDF evacuation order, 30 December 2025



Annex 28: SSPDF evacuation order, 6 March 2026





REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES
 Directorate of Media & Press
 Office of SSPDF Spokesperson

6/3/2026

For immediate release

Press Release


Subject: SSPDF Orders for closure and withdrawal of UNMISS force from Temporary Operating Base in Akobo

With successful completion of 1st Phase of "Operation Enduring Peace", Akobo town and surrounding areas are the next targets for 2nd phase of offensive military operations.

In light of looming shift in the theatre of operations, SSPDF Chief Defense Forces, hereby:

1. Orders for closure and immediate withdrawal of UNMISS forces from their Temporary Operating Base in Akobo town within 72 hours.
2. UN agencies, NGOs and their staff are ordered to leave within the same window of opportunity.
3. All civilians living in Akobo town and surrounding villages are hereby ordered to either relocate to the nearest SSPDF controlled areas or leave for areas they deem safer.
4. Finally, the above are orders are being issued in advance in order to avoid unnecessary collateral damage.


Signed 



Maj. Gen. PSC (ET) Lul Ruai Koang,
 Director for Media & Press and SSPDF Spokesperson,
 SPDF GHQs-Bilpam

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Annex 29: SPLM.A-IO order for confiscation of humanitarian vehicles



Annex 30: Ministers and Undersecretaries in major financial Ministries and institutions since independence

South Sudan's Ministries and institutions do not maintain detailed public records of officeholders. This list is therefore compiled by the Panel, based on a range of sources, including official announcements, government documents, media articles, and interviews. The list may therefore contain unintentional errors or inaccuracies.

Ministry of Petroleum		Nilepet	Ministry of Finance	Central Bank
Minister	Undersecretary	MD	Minister	Governor
Stephen Dhieu Dau (Aug-11 to Apr-16)	Macar Achiek Ader (Aug-11 to 2015)	Mangok Khalil Mangok (Jul-11 to 2012)	David Deng Athorbei (Jul-11 to Aug-11)	Elijah Matok Aleng (Jul-11 to Aug-11)
Dak Diop Bichok (Apr-16 to Aug-16)	Mohamed Lino Benjamin (2016 to Mar-18)	Adong Bith Deng (2012 to May-15)	Kosti Manibe Ngai (Aug-11 to Jul-13)	Kornelio Koriom Mayiek (Aug-11 to Jan-17)
Ezekiel Lot Gatkuoth (Aug-16 to Jun-19)	Mayen Wol Jong (Mar-18 to 2020)	Joseph Cleto Deng (May-15 to Nov-15)	Aggrey Tisa Sabuni (Jul-13 to Jan-15)	Othom Rago Ajak (Jan-17 to May-18)
Awow Daniel Chuang (Jun-19 to Mar-20)	Awow Daniel Chuang (2020 to Jul-22)	Machar Achiek Ader (Nov-15 to Feb-17)	David Deng Athorbei (Jan-15 to Apr-16)	Dier Tong Ngor (May-18 to Jan-20)
Puot Kang Chol (Mar-20 to Sep-25)	Mayen Wol Jong (Jul-22 to Dec-23)	Thelweng Mathiang Rok (Feb-17 to Sep-17)	Stephen Dhieu Dau (Apr-16 to Mar-18)	Gamal Abdalla Wani (Jan-20 to Nov-20)
	William Anyak (Dec-23 to Jul-24)	Chol Deng Thon Abel (Sep-17 to Jan-23)	Salvatore Garang Mabiordit (Mar-18 to Sep-20)	Dier Tong Ngor (Nov-20 to Jan-22)
	Chol Deng Thon Abel (Jul-24 to Nov-24)	Bol Ring Muorwel (Sep-20 to Oct-21)	Athian Ding Athian (Sep-20 to Nov-21)	Moses Makur Deng (Jan-22 to Aug-22)
	Deng Luar Wol (Nov-24 to Nov-25)	Chol Deng Thon Abel (Oct-21 to Jan-23)	Agak Achuit Luar (Nov-21 to Aug-22)	Johnny Ohisa (Aug-22 to Oct-23)
	Chol Deng Thon Abel (Nov-25 to Nov-25)	Bernard Amuor (Jan-23 to Jul-24)	Dier Tong Ngor (Aug-22 to Aug-23)	James Alic Garang (Oct-23 to Dec-24)
	Deng Luar Wol (Nov-25 to Nov-25)	Mohamed Lino Benjamin (Jul-24 to Oct-24)	Barnaba Bak Chol (Aug-23 to Mar-24)	Johnny Ohisa (Dec-24 to Jun-25)
	Chol Deng Thon Abel (Nov-25 to present)	Ayuel Ngor Kacgor (Oct-24 to Nov-25)	Daniel Daniel Chuong (Mar-24 to Jul-24)	Addis Ababa Othow (Jun-25 to Nov-25)
		Emmanuel Athiel Ayual (Nov-25 to present)	Marial Dongrin Ater (Jul-24 to Aug-25)	Yeni Samuel Costa (Nov-25 to Jan 26)
			Athian Ding Athian (Aug-25 to Nov-25)	Johnny Ohisa (Jan 26 to present)
			Barnaba Bak Chol (Nov-25 to Feb 26)	
			Salvatore Garang Mabiordit (Feb 26 to present)	

Annex 31: Allocation of oil produced in South Sudan

All of South Sudan's oil is produced by three joint-venture oil production companies. These are:

The **Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC)**, which produces Dar blend crude oil in Upper Nile State:

- China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC): 41%
- Petronas: 40%
- Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet): 8%
- SINOPEC: 6%
- TRI-OCEAN: 5%

The **Greater Pioneer Operating Company (GPOC)**, which produces Nile blend crude oil in Unity State and the Ruweng Administrative Area:

- CNPC: 40%
- Petronas: 30%
- ONGC Videsh: 25%
- Nilepet: 5%

The **Sudd Petroleum Operating Company (SPOC)**, which produces Nile blend crude oil in Unity State and the Ruweng Administrative Area:

- Petronas: 67.8%
- ONGC Videsh: 24.2%
- Nilepet: 8%

In August 2024, Petronas announced its departure from South Sudan's oil industry. Its shareholding in the three joint venture production companies is subject to an ongoing dispute. See the Panel's report S/2025/442.

Each of these companies recoup both their costs and profits through an allocation of the oil that is produced. The remaining oil is allocated to the Government of South Sudan. These allocations are based on Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements and depend on the fields in which the oil is produced and current production levels.

Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC)		
Development Block 3D		
Operating Expenses	Recovered in year incurred	
Exploration Expenditures	25% per financial year	
Development Expenditures	25% per financial year	
Cost Oil Maximum	50%	
Excess Cost Oil	Shared as per Profit Oil	
Profit Oil	50%	
Profit Oil Sharing	RSS	Contractor
< 10,000 bbls / day	64%	36%
> 10,000 bbls / day; < 15,000 bbl / day	67%	33%
> 15,000 bbls / day; < 20,000 bbl / day	77%	23%
> 20,000 bbls / day	80%	20%

Exploration Blocks 3E		
Operating Expenses	Recovered in year incurred	
Exploration Expenditures	25% per financial year	
Development Expenditures	25% per financial year	
Cost Oil Maximum	45%	
Excess Cost Oil	Shared as per Profit Oil	
Profit Oil	55%	
Profit Oil Sharing	RSS	Contractor
< 25,000 bbls / day	70%	30%
> 25,000 bbls / day; < 50,000 bbl / day	72%	28%
> 50,000 bbls / day; < 75,000 bbl / day	74%	26%
> 75,000 bbls / day	80%	20%

Development Block 7E		
Operating Expenses	Recovered in year incurred	
Exploration Expenditures	25% per financial year	
Development Expenditures	25% per financial year	
Cost Oil Maximum	45%	
Excess Cost Oil	Shared as per Profit Oil	
Profit Oil	55%	
Profit Oil Sharing	RSS	Contractor
< 25,000 bbls / day	70%	30%
> 25,000 bbls / day; < 50,000 bbl / day	72%	28%
> 50,000 bbls / day; < 75,000 bbl / day	74%	26%
> 75,000 bbls / day	80%	20%

Greater Pioneer Operating Company (GPOC)		
Development Block 1b and 2b		
Operating Costs	Recovered in year incurred	
Capital Costs	Recovered over four years	
Cost Oil Maximum	40%	
Excess Cost Oil	RSS 100%	
Profit Oil	60%	
Profit Oil Sharing	RSS	Contractor
< 25,000 bbls / day	61.5%	38.5%
> 25,000 bbls / day; < 50,000 bbl / day	71.0%	29.0%
> 50,000 bbls / day	80.0%	20.0%

Exploration Blocks 2a, 2a and 4		
Operating Costs	Recovered in year incurred	
Capital Costs	Recovered over four years	
Cost Oil Maximum	45%	
Excess Cost Oil	RSS 100%	
Profit Oil	55%	
Profit Oil Sharing	RSS	Contractor
< 25,000 bbls / day	60%	40%
> 25,000 bbls / day; < 50,000 bbl / day	70%	30%
> 50,000 bbls / day	80%	20%

SUDD Petroleum Operating Company Limited (SPOC)		
Block 5A		
Operating Expenses	Recovered in year incurred	
Exploration Expenditures	20% per financial year	
Development Expenditures	20% per financial year	
Cost Oil Maximum	40%	
Excess Cost Oil	Shared as per Profit Oil	
Profit Oil	60%	
Profit Oil Sharing	RSS	Contractor
< 25,000 bbls / day	71.5%	28.5%
> 25,000 bbls / day; < 50,000 bbl / day	72.5%	27.5%
> 50,000 bbls / day; < 100,000 bbl / day	76.25%	23.75%
> 100,000 bbls / day	81.25%	18.75%

Annex 32: Fee payments to Sudan

The joint venture production partners and the Government of South Sudan sell their oil separately. With the exception of any oil that remains in Sudan, all of the oil produced by DPOC, GPOC, and SPOC in South Sudan (see preceding annex) is exported through Port Sudan, in Sudan. One pipeline transports oil from Unity State to Port Sudan, another transports oil from Unity State and the Ruweng Administrative Area to Port Sudan. See the Panel's report S/2023/922.

Further to a series of agreements, the Government of South Sudan pay the Government fees for the use of this infrastructure. The most recent agreement specifies fees as follows:

Fees		
<i>Oil transported from Upper Nile fields</i>		
Transport Fee	6.5	\$/bbl
Processing Fee	1.6	\$/bbl
Transit Fee	1	\$/bbl
Total	9.1	\$/bbl
<i>Oil transported from Unity fields</i>		
Transport Fee	8.4	\$/bbl
Processing Fee	1.6	\$/bbl
Transit Fee	1	\$/bbl
Total	11	\$/bbl

In 2012, South Sudan also agreed to pay an additional \$15 per barrel towards a \$3.028 billion Transitional Financial Agreement (TFA) agreed upon independence. Following a period of low oil prices, however, this was renegotiated in 2016. Rather than a fixed \$15 per barrel fee, contributions towards the TFA were tied to the international oil price, with higher contributions when oil prices are high, according to the following schedule.

Payment towards TFA settlement	
Oil price	TFA payment
\$20-\$30 / bbl	6 \$/bbl
\$30-\$40 / bbl	9 \$/bbl
\$40-\$50 / bbl	10.5 \$/bbl
above \$50 /bbl	15 \$/bbl

Also in 2016, however, South Sudan started paying both fees and TFA contributions through in-kind transfers of crude oil. These transfers were allocated to both the Khartoum Refinery and the Kosti Power Plant. The government of South Sudan maintains the TFA was paid off, in full, around March 2022. See the Panel's report S/2023/922.

As South Sudan has been paying Sudan through an in-kind allocation of oil, the dollar value of its largely fixed transfers to Sudan have varied with the prevailing oil price. As such, a precise accounting for its payments and obligations to Sudan require a reconciliation that is agreed by both parties.

Annex 33: Process for the advance sale of oil by the Government of South Sudan

The Government of South Sudan primarily sells its share of the oil produced in South Sudan (see annex 31) to international commodity traders. The government typically sells its cargos (600,000 barrels +/- 5%) three to nine months before they are scheduled to be delivered, against an advance payment from such a trader. This system of short-term advance payments can be distinguished from the longer-term loans the government has also obtained from commodity traders, banks, and oil production companies. Such longer-term loans can have a horizon of several years and are often not secured against the delivery of any specific or dated future cargos of oil.

Under the current system of shorter-term advance payments, commodity traders are typically contacted by a representative of the government of South Sudan and offered a specific cargo of crude oil that is due to be delivered within three to nine months. The trader is offered to secure the allocation of the cargo, in advance, in exchange for an advance payment to the government. As noted in the following annex, during 2025, these advance payments were typically in the range of \$20 to \$30 million, but vary with the prevailing oil price.

In exchange for the advance payment, the trader will negotiate a discount on the value of the cargo of crude oil that is eventually delivered. This discount is expressed in terms of a discount on the price of each barrel of oil that is delivered. This price is, in turn, determined by an auction that is held closer to the time of delivery.

In exchange for making payment in advance, however, the buyer will typically require a larger discount than if payment was made closer to the time of delivery, as advance payment carries additional costs and risks for the trader. First, the trader either has to borrow the sum that is paid in advance, in which case there will be financing costs; or the trader will have to forgo other possible returns on the funds. Second, making a payment several months in advance also increases the risk that pipeline disruption, conflict, legal disputes, or other developments will prevent or delay the delivery of the promised cargo. Traders either have to insure these risks, at a cost, or require payment for bearing them.

The discount negotiated in exchange for advance payments is, therefore, typically substantially higher than the discount that would be negotiated if the cargo was sold closer to the time of delivery. As such, the advance payment mechanism is one that reduces the amount of revenue the Government of South Sudan generates from the sale of its oil.

An advance payment agreement might therefore, as an example, specify that the trader will provide an advance payment of \$25,000,000 for a cargo (600,000 barrels +/- 5%) of Nile blend crude oil scheduled for delivery in September of the current year, with a discount of \$7 per barrel, applied against the winning bid when the cargo is auctioned.

Closer to the time of the scheduled delivery of the cargo, all registered parties will be invited to bid on the cargo. Their bids are also expressed as a discount against an agreed oil price benchmark, such as Dated Brent Crude, on the day of delivery. The best bid may, for example, be expressed as Dated Brent Crude on the day of delivery minus a discount of \$2 per barrel.

Even when not sold in advance, both South Sudan's Dar and Nile blends of crude oil have, historically, traded at a small discount against the most commonly used international oil price benchmarks. This is ultimately determined by market demand for crude oil with varying physical characteristics. In South Sudan's case, the agreed discount also covers additional costs imposed on the buyer by the Government of South Sudan. The e-Crude Accreditation

Permit, for example, charges buyers a fee equivalent to 0.3 percent of the value of the cargo, and is payable to Crawford Capital Ltd., a company with ties to senior political elites.²³⁸

In a case where the cargo has already been sold in advance to another buyer, however, the auction is used solely to set the price. The trader offering the best price is not awarded the cargo, as the cargo has already been awarded, several months prior, to the buyer that was willing to offer payment in advance. Instead, as in the case of the example above, this winning bid will be used to set a discount of \$2 per barrel, to which the additional negotiated discount of \$7 per barrel will be added, for a total discount of \$9 per barrel. The final value of the cargo will then be expressed as, for example:

$(620,000 \text{ barrels delivered}) \times (\text{Dated Brent Crude oil benchmark price} - \$9) = \text{total value of cargo}$

If this amount exceeds the value of the advance payment, the trader will pay the difference. Or, if the value of the advance payment exceeds the value of the cargo, the trader is owed money by the Government of South Sudan.

²³⁸ See following annex 34. See also the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, *Plundering a Nation: how rampant corruption unleashed a human rights crisis in South Sudan*, 16 September 2025

Annex 34: e-Crude accreditation permit



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM

RSS/MOP/J/O/U/23/139 **21st February 2023**

TO JOINT OPERATING COMPANIES

SUBJECT: MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM E-CRUDE ACCREDITATION PERMIT POLICY AMID OF THE E-GOVERNMENT

Dear Partners,

Reference is hereby made to our previous meeting in regard to the subject matter. The Government of the Republic of South Sudan through the Ministry of Petroleum has established a policy for the e-Crude Oil Accreditation Permit amid Council of Minister's. resolution No.20/30 for the implementation of e-Government. The permit is applicable to all crude oil ship vessels at Port Sudan made mandatory before any South Sudanese origin crude oil.

The said e-Crude Oil Accreditation Permit certificate is a new requirement by the Ministry of Petroleum and shall be evidenced by an e-crude oil accreditation permit certificate for each shipment of crude oil vessel exported at Port Sudan, liable to a charge of 0.03% of the shipment vessel value, benchmarked and calculated against the international crude oil brent price on the day of application, to be issued digitally through the Ministry of Petroleum's Portal (www.mop.eservices.gov.ss), effective as from 1st March 2022.

The 0.03% against each shipment of the crude shall be paid by the lifter of the crude.

"Example for e-crude oil accreditation permit fee:

Today's Brent Price \$81.30 x 600,000 barrels x 0.03% = \$146,349" All invoices generated through the Ministry of Petroleum portal(www.mop.eservices.gov.ss) must be paid at any commercial bank integrated with the e-Government system domiciled in the Republic of South Sudan, in which the generated INVOICE MUST BE SETTLED WITHIN 48 HOURS AFTER CRUDE OIL AWARD LETTER FROM THE MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM.


The Undersecretary

PO Box 376, Opp. Presidential Palace (J/I), Juba - South Sudan
General Line : +211 915 177 770 | E-mail : undersecretary@mop.gov.ss | www.mop.gov.ss

Furthermore, any crude oil exported from Port Sudan without the certified e-Grude Oil accreditation permit, shall be rendered as illegal export.

This office hereby requests your esteemed office to disseminate the above policy information to the companies that are exporting crude oil at Port Sudan.

Please accept the assurances of my highest regards and consideration.



Mayen Wol Jong
Undersecretary,
Ministry of Petroleum



CC : Hon. Minister of Petroleum, Ministry of Petroleum
: Director General, National Security Services, Internal Security Bureau
: Chairperson, e-Government Board of Directors
: Legal Advisor, Ministry of Petroleum
: Marketing Committee, Ministry of Petroleum
: File.

Annex 35: Oil cargos sold for advance payment in 2025

The government of South Sudan has not published any recent oil marketing reports. See the Panel's interim report S/2025/768. These figures are based on the Panel's own research, drawing on documents produced by the Ministry of Petroleum, Ministry of Finance and Planning, and interviews during the mandate period.

2025							
Lifting	Award	Blend	FOB	Value	Advance	Balance	
Jan 28-30	Euro-American	Nile	62.11	39,016,446.13	25,000,000.00	14,016,446.00	
Feb 28-30	Euro-American	Nile	59.84	36,962,988.48	30,000,000.00	6,962,988.48	
Mar 28-30	Euro-American	Nile	55.09	33,102,148.66	30,000,000.00	3,102,148.66	
Apr 28-30	EPDESA	Nile	54.27	32,632,062.57	30,000,000.00	2,632,062.57	
May 1-2	Euro-American	Dar	48.93	30,329,162.64	30,000,000.00	329,162.64	
May 17-18	Euro-American	Dar	52.73	33,193,060.43	25,000,000.00	7,693,060.43	
May 27-29	Euro-American	Nile	51.41	30,875,714.98	25,500,000.00	5,375,714.98	
May 30-31	Euro-American	Dar	59.14	35,462,768.74	20,000,000.00	15,462,768.74	
Jun 25-26	Euro-American	Dar	52.69	33,119,511.37	25,500,000.00	7,619,511.37	
Jun 27-29	Euro-American	Nile	52.64	31,622,690.40	25,500,000.00	6,122,690.40	
Jun 27-29	BGN	Dar	53.87	33,879,112.35	25,000,000.00	7,941,179.68	
Jul 26-28	Euro-American	Nile	55.93	33,565,942.06	30,000,000.00	3,565,942.06	
Jul 30-31	BGN	Dar	57.12	35,924,367.36	30,608,881.00	5,315,486.36	
Aug 12-13	BGN	Dar	56.67	34,007,837.01	30,958,542.40	3,049,294.61	
Aug 24-26	Euro-American	Nile	56.39	32,203,144.81	30,600,000.00	1,603,144.81	
Aug 28-30	Euro-American	Nile	56.88	34,161,786.72	25,500,000.00	8,661,786.72	
Aug 30-31	EPDESA	Dar	59.19	35,517,492.21	25,000,000.00	10,517,492.21	
Sep 27-29	Chiangwei	Nile	51.75	31,717,109.25	35,000,000.00	-3,282,890.75	
Sep 29-30	BGN	Dar	54.12	34,032,983.16	31,110,303.50	2,922,679.66	
Oct 13-14	BGN	Dar	51.09	29,600,881.83	31,000,000.00	-1,399,118.17	
Oct 28-30	Chiangwei	Nile	64.75	28,949,595.48	30,000,000.00	-1,050,404.52	
Oct 30-31	EPDESA	Dar	62.68	31,240,246.86	30,000,000.00	1,240,246.86	
Total				731,117,053.50	621,277,726.90	108,401,393.80	

Annex 36: 2024/25 expenditure report

The following expenditure tables are drafted by the Panel on the basis of public and non-public information developed by the Ministry of Finance and Planning.

General overview of government expenditure for the 2024/25 financial year (1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025):

Expenditure report for 24/25 FY (July 2024 to June 2025)						
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Avg for year
Quarterly average exchange rate		2,356	3,442	4,332	4,492	3,656
	2024-25 Budget	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Total
Total Revenue	2,257,638,729,531	546,678,471,220	564,537,488,018	2,892,953,572,670	1,630,517,164,452	5,634,686,696,359
Estimated US\$ value		232,036,703	164,014,378	667,810,151	362,982,450	1,426,843,681
Oil revenue	1,138,434,318,441	379,017,149,660	297,447,116,160	1,569,988,186,669	791,012,502,603	3,037,464,955,092
Estimated US\$ value		160,873,154	86,416,943	362,416,479	176,093,611	785,800,186
Non-oil revenue	1,119,204,411,089	170,953,707,422	285,870,507,699	1,331,468,309,689	839,504,661,849	2,627,797,186,659
Personal Income Tax (private)	380,549,916,782	-	7,316,914,250	505,317,196,892	111,818,862,247	624,452,973,389
Personal Income Tax (public)	4,764,653,058	49,620,806	790,847,253	361,140,657	240,120,199	1,441,728,914
Grants		-	-	-	-	-
Total Expenditure	4,172,220,712,946	684,854,646,299	623,566,671,097	2,174,151,547,263	1,837,667,974,220	5,320,240,838,879
MDA recurrent expenditure	1,533,734,788,111	650,736,350,374	615,308,878,805	2,024,998,575,799	1,741,141,273,492	5,032,185,078,470
Wages and Salaries	717,672,291,714	76,045,284,317	129,009,656,045	172,294,499,285	229,062,420,843	606,411,860,490
Operating expenses	396,644,711,449	531,934,646,270	429,632,816,770	1,717,529,347,298	1,402,614,630,405	4,081,711,440,743
Transfers and Grants	417,159,767,236	42,756,419,787	56,666,405,990	135,174,729,215	109,464,222,244	344,061,777,236
Other expenses	2,258,017,712	-	-	-	-	-
Mandatory Recurrent expenditure	2,142,164,694,740	28,001,168,813	8,257,792,292	44,826,047,378	880,026,120	81,965,034,603
Transfer to Sudan	157,035,230,468	-	-	-	-	-
Transfer to Oil Prod. States (2%)	22,768,686,369	8,551,805,958	1,381,872,320	6,816,697,340	880,026,120	17,630,401,738
Transfer to Oil Prod. Comm. (3%)	34,153,029,553	9,724,681,428	3,437,959,986	19,004,675,019	-	32,167,316,433
Transfer to MOP (3%)	34,153,029,553	9,724,681,428	3,437,959,986	19,004,675,019	-	32,167,316,433
Interest payments	286,642,748,700	-	-	-	-	-
10% NRA Gross Non-oil revenue	54,957,368,080	-	-	-	-	-
Other Mandatory Expenditures	1,552,454,602,017	-	-	-	-	-
Capital expenditure	496,321,230,095	6,117,127,112	-	104,326,924,086	95,646,674,608	206,090,725,806
Capital expenditure	496,321,230,095	6,117,127,112	-	104,326,924,086	95,646,674,608	206,090,725,806
Cash surplus / Cash deficit ()	-1,914,581,983,415	-138,176,175,080	-59,029,183,079	718,802,025,407	-207,150,809,768	314,445,857,481

More detailed breakdown by spending Ministry/Agency:

Agencies by Sectors	Approved Budget FY 2024/25	Wages & Salaries	Use of Goods & Services	Capital Expenditure	Mandatory Expenditure	Transfers and Grants	Total
A. ACCOUNTABILITY	5,193,696,384	525,421,655	3,702,570,227	-	-	2,187,206	4,230,179,088
Audit Chamber	3,673,762,563	199,530,796	3,142,712,286	-	-	-	3,342,243,083
National Bureau of Statistics	407,135,799	227,038,545	214,833,695	-	-	-	441,872,240
Anti-Corruption Commission	671,704,452	58,006,010	283,877,099	-	-	-	341,883,109
SS Reconstruction & Dev't Fund	141,721,846	17,339,918	61,147,146	-	-	-	78,487,065
SSFFAMC	299,371,724	23,506,386	-	-	-	2,187,206	25,693,591
B. ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS	2,365,932,017,610	53,227,630,714	1,271,583,146,238	151,732,862	81,965,034,604	183,036,980,487	1,589,964,524,905
Ministry of Finance and Planning	2,207,031,554,253	29,504,561,224	1,108,497,011,419	151,732,862	51,623,289,715	183,036,980,487	1,372,813,575,706
Ministry of Petroleum	837,562,724	380,500,839	151,870,628,217	-	30,341,744,889	-	182,592,873,946
Ministry of Mining	104,187,100,896	100,083,605	3,862,623,531	-	-	-	3,962,707,135
Ministry of Trade, Industry	1,965,353,107	1,060,367,250	3,689,731,158	-	-	-	4,750,098,408
Ministry of Land, Housing & Urban Dev't	1,709,830,564	105,393,211	742,293,361	-	-	-	847,686,572
Ministry of Investment	714,968,187	100,398,496	330,213,794	-	-	-	430,612,290
Ministry of Water & Irri	3,156,178,145	327,628,200	1,359,632,031	-	-	-	1,687,260,231
National Revenue Authority	42,839,146,248	20,537,189,374	-	-	-	-	20,537,189,374
Petroleum and Gas Commission	389,138,310	26,524,142	-	-	-	-	26,524,142
National Bureau of Standards	817,619,983	362,092,936	126,814,660	-	-	-	488,907,595
Electricity Corporation	1,386,662,599	392,172,829	799,604,479	-	-	-	1,191,777,308
South Sudan Urban Water Corporation	896,902,593	330,718,609	304,593,588	-	-	-	635,312,198
C. EDUCATION	224,135,744,981	55,852,474,761	53,182,033,829	2,388,591,915	-	57,120,132,620	168,543,233,125
Ministry of General Education	109,757,210,950	9,206,104,569	9,511,316,965	2,388,591,915	-	53,814,341,596	74,920,355,044
Ministry of Higher Education	94,786,281,502	46,496,127,305	28,407,979,654	-	-	3,305,791,025	78,209,897,983
SS National Examination Council	8,875,237,679	150,242,888	14,031,024,356	-	-	-	14,181,267,244
Research & Development Center	2,143,402,970	-	1,231,712,853	-	-	-	1,231,712,853
Student Support Funds	8,573,611,880	-	-	-	-	-	-
D. HEALTH	52,255,922,636	4,851,885,289	14,871,663,443	1,563,504,180	-	557,194,112	21,844,247,023
Ministry of Health	50,761,360,511	4,703,547,891	14,491,129,338	1,563,504,180	-	557,194,112	21,315,375,521
HIV/Aids Commission	710,964,358	118,781,117	186,579,156	-	-	-	305,360,272
Drugs & Food Control Authority	112,062,629	29,556,281	166,867,714	-	-	-	196,423,995
National Public Health Institutes	309,321,592	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Sudan Medical Council	362,213,545	-	27,087,235	-	-	-	27,087,235
E. INFRASTRUCTURE	12,336,454,811	1,324,312,114	9,932,792,198	201,986,896,850	-	-	213,244,001,162
Ministry of Energy & Dams	2,896,071,523	65,736,230	561,525,284	-	-	-	627,261,514
Ministry of Transport	3,088,352,890	195,614,937	349,902,966	-	-	-	545,517,903
Ministry of Roads & Bridges	2,528,285,439	118,850,457	1,534,143,042	201,986,896,850	-	-	203,639,890,349
South Sudan Roads Authority	2,435,309,704	303,065,697	6,345,673,780	-	-	-	6,648,739,477
South Sudan Civil Aviation Authority	1,388,435,254	641,044,793	1,141,547,127	-	-	-	1,782,591,919
F. NATURAL RESOURCES	350,319,645,718	24,755,045,842	18,608,080,569	-	-	16,287,230,698	59,650,357,109
Ministry of Agriculture & Food Security	79,091,189,153	509,430,876	14,798,925,205	-	-	-	15,308,356,081
Agriculture Sectoral projects	225,763,872,953	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry of Livestock & Fisheries	4,238,003,630	221,244,929	629,188,155	-	-	34,204,456	884,637,540
Ministry of Environment & Forestry	1,218,676,395	336,495,404	251,802,220	-	-	-	588,297,624
Wildlife Conservation & Tourism	39,855,709,786	23,620,650,379	2,859,501,954	-	-	16,253,026,242	42,733,178,574
South Sudan Land Commission	152,193,800	67,224,254	68,663,036	-	-	-	135,887,290
Environment Management Authority	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

G. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	230,950,109,737	28,974,961,680	1,686,320,795,194	-	-	-	1,715,295,756,674
Ministry of Presidential Affairs	23,381,834,620	11,131,910,792	1,362,074,470,145	-	-	-	1,373,206,380,937
Ministry of Cabinet Affairs	16,773,997,323	915,428,429	4,113,906,101	-	-	-	5,029,334,530
Ministry of Foreign Affairs & IC	5,452,966,316	482,991,498	242,922,206,835	-	-	-	243,405,198,332
Ministry of Peace Building	2,989,798,592	49,692,067	1,120,969,988	-	-	-	1,170,662,055
Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs	3,306,032,243	78,898,445	2,803,751,217	-	-	-	2,882,649,661
Ministry of Federal Affairs	7,646,467,856	64,436,162	2,996,625,868	-	-	-	3,061,062,031
Ministry of Information	5,869,225,503	648,764,910	2,756,203,699	-	-	-	3,404,968,609
Telecommunication and Postal	526,684,950	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry of East African Affairs	418,300,919	33,013,464	162,738,805	-	-	-	195,752,269
TNLA	114,571,166,718	7,556,220,043	43,087,734,241	-	-	-	50,643,954,283
South Sudan Local Government Board	166,874,630	33,824,570	62,695,702	-	-	-	96,520,271
National Election Commission	382,101,731	105,083,438	76,552,321	-	-	-	181,635,759
Council of States	38,371,858,427	5,387,948,777	18,126,065,788	-	-	-	23,514,014,565
National Constitution Review Commission	271,449,240	110,171,724	77,732,677	-	-	-	187,904,401
Northern Corridor Implementation Authority	85,906,399	12,647,487	37,204,914	-	-	-	49,852,400
Political Parties Affairs	800,281,504	530,860,262	61,035,684	-	-	-	591,895,945
Peace Commission	319,948,248	63,721,845	1,866,895,044	-	-	-	1,930,616,889
National Communication Authority	278,294,371	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation	1,053,684,591	409,129,658	2,251,559,077	-	-	-	2,660,688,735
Ministry of Public Service & Human Resource Development	4,251,796,311	677,366,215	660,736,403	-	-	-	1,338,102,618
Ministry of Labour	615,953,386	314,298,196	113,106,785	-	-	-	427,404,981
South Sudan Employees Justice Chamber	161,691,371	19,662,611	45,811,416	-	-	-	65,474,028
South Sudan Grievances Chamber	143,055,896	17,749,329	-	-	-	-	17,749,329
Access for Information Commission	294,117,357	-	46,070,937	-	-	-	46,070,937
Universal Services Access Fund	36,437,850	-	-	-	-	-	-
Media Authority	1,340,151,700	-	524,400,004	-	-	-	524,400,004
South Sudan Civil Service Commission	153,471,691	24,244,598	46,506,767	-	-	-	70,751,365
Parliamentary Service Commission	1,086,559,995	306,897,158	285,814,779	-	-	-	592,711,937
Salaries and Remuneration Commission	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
H. RULE OF LAW	303,011,098,212	123,165,889,295	150,668,376,673	-	-	84,917,560,599	358,751,826,766
Justice & Constitutional Affairs	6,800,517,950	1,536,391,100	11,374,984,922	-	-	-	12,911,376,022
Ministry of Interior	13,584,947,017	5,546,048,142	32,928,558,381	-	-	-	38,474,606,523
Police	158,507,540,170	92,835,289,970	25,852,190,030	-	-	41,469,214,148	160,156,694,148
Prisons	58,154,316,846	11,951,991,378	71,938,175,365	-	-	29,943,293,548	113,833,460,292
Fire Brigade	34,920,847,754	7,772,273,705	889,725,344	-	-	13,505,052,902	22,167,051,951
Judiciary of South Sudan	30,152,405,744	3,311,907,417	7,281,178,073	-	-	-	10,593,085,490
Judicial Service Commission	12,251,436	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Sudan Law Review Commission	271,154,862	30,343,753	245,844,094	-	-	-	276,187,846
Small Arms Control	177,845,866	34,999,388	90,831,346	-	-	-	125,830,734
South Sudan Human Rights Commission	167,296,618	29,789,304	33,673,160	-	-	-	63,462,464
Commission for Refugee Affairs	261,973,949	116,855,138	33,216,159	-	-	-	150,071,297
I. SECURITY	439,623,440,146	312,742,847,671	855,740,859,488	-	-	2,140,491,514	1,170,624,198,673
Defense	288,412,061,028	246,802,257,903	179,552,899,655	-	-	2,140,491,514	428,495,649,073
Veteran Affairs	91,524,383,526	22,672,063,950	915,524,741	-	-	-	23,587,588,691
National Security Service	58,737,678,439	7,500,140,061	675,085,742,365	-	-	-	682,585,882,426
National Mine Action Authority	102,608,331	123,328,922	116,660,994	-	-	-	239,989,916
DDRC	137,590,968	139,616,683	16,688,894	-	-	-	156,305,577
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)	709,117,855	35,505,440,152	53,342,838	-	-	-	35,558,782,990
J. SOCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN	185,899,777,711	991,391,470	18,470,301,341	-	-	-	19,461,632,811
Ministry of Gender, Child & Social Welfare	2,116,822,862	137,606,036	244,393,293	-	-	-	381,999,328
Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs & DM	1,869,722,077	70,139,502	8,930,277,484	-	-	-	9,000,416,986
Ministry of Culture, Museum & NH	2,631,678,116	150,857,616	8,406,183,442	-	-	-	8,557,041,057
Ministry of Youth & Support	3,120,870,892	124,567,757	800,207,116	-	-	-	924,774,872
SS RRC	2,077,328,273	460,045,598	43,268,884	-	-	-	503,314,482
War Disabled	423,355,491	48,174,962	45,971,124	-	-	-	94,146,085
Humanitarian and Emergency Fund	173,660,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
	4,169,657,907,947	606,411,860,490	4,083,080,619,401	206,090,725,806	81,965,034,604	344,061,777,236	5,321,610,017,537

Annex 37: Draft resource envelope for the 2025/26 financial year

Draft resource envelope for the 2025/26 financial year (1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025), developed by the Ministry of Finance and Planning. Available from: <https://mofp.gov.ss/document-category/documents/> and https://mofp.gov.ss/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Budget-Books_Draft-5_Inner.pdf

Resource Envelope FY 2025-2026			
	FY 2024-25 Budget	2024-2025 Outturn	2025-26 Proposed Budget
Total Revenues and Grants	2,257,638,729,531	3,968,452,436,960	7,007,468,393,945
Oil Revenues	1,138,434,318,441	2,984,083,925,372	5,219,273,715,158
DPOC	-	-	3,088,327,642,105
GPOC	943,610,579,883	2,476,789,658,059	1,666,071,491,136
SPOC	194,823,738,558	507,294,267,313	464,874,581,917
Non-Oil Revenues	1,119,204,411,090	984,368,511,587	1,788,194,678,787
Personal Income Tax (Private & Public)	385,314,569,840	403,399,033,388	707,593,629,897
Business Profits Tax	9,046,233,910	48,252,687,992	118,910,088,235
Excise Tax (Domestic & Customs)	18,122,836,610	21,375,687,470	99,485,715,397
Sales (Domestic & Customs)	18,913,758,266	16,549,130,672	38,427,129,414
Advance Income Tax	85,357,312,355	1,312,296,850	1,596,022,029
Customs Duties/Fees	552,284,081,279	374,736,583,326	543,035,685,633
Other non-tax revenue	50,165,618,830	118,743,091,890	279,146,408,182
Grants from Donors	-	-	-
Total Payments (incl. loan repayments)	4,172,220,712,962	5,432,905,904,467	8,580,058,502,527
Ministry Recurrent expenditure	2,973,335,866,325	5,033,554,257,127	3,852,985,784,774
Wages and Salaries	1,512,179,527,385	606,411,860,490	1,901,287,268,262
Operating expenses	603,874,029,888	4,083,080,619,401	1,036,349,588,932
Transfers and Grants	731,461,902,112	344,061,777,236	788,827,112,801
Subsidies and Benefits	125,820,406,940	-	126,521,814,779
Mandatory Recurrent expenditure	589,710,092,723	193,260,921,534	2,265,135,877,207
Transfer to Sudan (Tariff, Transportation & Process)	157,035,230,468	-	846,673,150,261
Transfer to Oil Prod. States (2%)	22,768,686,369	13,591,111,780	104,385,474,303
Transfer to Oil Prod. Comm. (3%)	34,153,029,553	35,551,329,284	156,578,211,455
Transfer to MOP (3%)	34,153,029,553	35,551,329,284	156,578,211,455
Debt Principal Repayment	229,314,198,960	-	802,229,545,000
Debt Interest Payment	57,328,549,740	21,482,634,139	40,167,140,000
NRA Retention and Commission (14.5%)	54,957,368,080	87,084,517,047	158,524,144,733
Capital expenditure	609,174,753,914	206,090,725,806	2,461,936,840,547
Oil for Infrastructure Projects	-	-	1,168,000,000,000
Other Projects (Capital)	609,174,753,914	206,090,725,806	1,293,936,840,547
Fiscal balance	(1,914,581,983,431)	(1,464,453,467,507)	(1,572,590,108,583)
Financing (net cash inflows) (1)	-	-	-
Investments (net payments to investment accou)	-	-	-
Payment Future G Fund (10% of net gross revenue)	-	-	-
Oil Revenue Stabilization Fund (ORSA)	-	-	-
Loans (net cash inflows from loans)	-	-	-
Disbursements	-	-	-
IMF Food Shock Window	-	-	-
Treasury bills	-	-	-
Internal borrowing	-	-	-
External borrowing (Commercial)	-	-	-
Financing Requirement (2)	(1,914,581,983,431)	(1,464,453,467,507)	(1,572,590,108,583)
Memorandum items:			
Nominal GDP (estimated)	-	0%	20,672,972,000,000
Financing requirement as % of GDP	0.0%	0.0%	0.1
Financing requirement as % of Revenue	-84.8%	-36.9%	-22.4%
Financing requirement as % of Expenditure	-45.9%	-27.0%	-18.3%
Explanatory notes & assumptions:			
1) A negative number denotes a net cash outflow			
2) A negative number denotes the amount of additional financing required. A positive amount denotes the increase in cash res			

Annex 38: Checkpoint fees for Thil-Gai (Ariel) checkpoint in Mayom County

1. Revenue's Collection Guideline for Thil-Gai (Ariel) Checkpoint: 2025 -2026

No	Particular Unit/ Department	Commercial Biggest Truck (Jerare) & Double Container	Commercial Single Container & Medium Truck (ZS)	Commercial Tipper Truck (Gileap) & Fuel Tanker	H. Vehicle	Small Commercial Car	Empty Vehicle
1.	Gate (Rope) Fees	SSP 20,000	SSP 20,000	SSP 20,000	SSP 10,000	SSP 5,000	SSP 5,000
2.	Finance	SSP 800,000	SSP 700,000	SSP 500,000	SSP 200,000	SSP 60,000	-
3.	Security Agencies (MI/NSS/CJ/CID/PSU)	SSP 250,000	SSP 200,000	SSP 150,000	SSP 75,000	SSP 20,000	-
4.	Army Admin (Bde 11)	SSP 150,000	SSP 100,000	SSP 80,000	SSP 40,000	SSP 15,000	-
5.	Police Admin	SSP 100,000	SSP 60,000	SSP 40,000	SSP 20,000	SSP 10,000	-
6.	Protection Unit	SSP 200,000	SSP 150,000	SSP 100,000	SSP 50,000	SSP 15,000	-
7.	Secretariat	SSP 200,000	SSP 150,000	SSP 150,000	SSP 75,000	SSP 15,000	-
8.	OCS	SSP 200,000	SSP 150,000	SSP 150,000	SSP 60,000	SSP 15,000	-
9.	Road & Bridge	SSP 150,000	SSP 100,000	SSP 70,000	SSP 30,000	SSP 10,000	-
	Grand Total	SSP 2,070,000	SSP 1,630,000	SSP 1,260,000	SSP 560,000	SSP 165,000	SSP 5,000

N.B: All amounts must be paid to finance officer at the particular checkpoint and distributed at the end of the day except gate fees.

23 NOV 2025

Sign:  21/11/2025

Hon. Maj. Gen. James Lily Kuol Diew
Commissioner of Mayom County.

Cc: Executive Director for Mayom County
Cc: Director of Accounts for Mayom County
Cc: All Checkpoints' Authorities
Cc: All Security Agencies
Cc: File

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L.B

Annex 39: NSS-owned Frontier GeoConsultants Ltd fuel exemption

(9)

Hon. Undersecretary
Ministry of Trade and Industry,
Republic of South Sudan
Juba, South Sudan

12th May, 2025

TV DG - External trade
Approved to process all
need documents.

Dear Honorable Undersecretary,

Subject: Request for the approval of tax exemption

The Frontier GeoConsultants Ltd presents its compliments and distinct pleasure to your esteemed office in regard to the above-mentioned subject.

The company is the General Intelligence Bureau (GIB) NSS, owned institution for its investment and special projects.

We are requesting your approval for exemption of tax and custom duties for the importation of 4,120,000 liters of petroleum products for the operations and emergency reserve for the institution.

Order Number	Items Description	Quantity in Liters	Value Price in USD
1	Supply of Fuel	4,120,000	3,270,000

This is to respectfully request your esteemed authority to approve the issuance of tax and custom duty exemptions for the aforementioned item.

The Frontier Geoconsultants Ltd wishes to convey its appreciation for the assistance you will be providing in regard to this and the future similar requests.

Regards,

Joseph Kuer Dau
General Manager,



Approved to process all
need documents.
12-5-25
WTS-MDT

Annex 40: Sample permits for export of charcoal to Uganda


 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
 CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE
 KAJOKEJI COUNTY
 OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER


Ref: KKC/CES/59/A07/2025 Date: Aug 5th, 2025

Subject: Release of Truck Number UAV239W
Belonging to Kaddi Adam

Through the resolution of the security meeting held on Friday July 25th, 2025, it was resolved that the above mentioned subject be released after examining that it was loaded with old 300 bags of charcoal with clearance of only 600,000 UGX.

Therefore, all security forces along the border are directed to render necessary assistance and give it safe passage.

Accept the assurance of my highest regards:


 Hon. Wani Jackson Mule
 Commissioner
 Kajo-Keji County

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
 ★ 06 AUG 2025 ★
 OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
 KAJO - KEJI COUNTY, CES


 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
 CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE
 KAJOKEJI COUNTY
 OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

Ref: KKC/CES/59/A07/2025 Date: July 30th, 2025

Subject: Release of Truck Number UBM630E
Belonging to Kalisa James

Through the resolution of the security meeting held on Friday July 25th, 2025, it was resolved that the above mentioned subject be released after examining that it was loaded with old 300 bags of charcoal with clearance of only 550,000 UGX.

Therefore, all security forces along the border are directed to render necessary assistance and give it safe passage.

Accept the assurance of my highest regards:


 Hon. Wani Jackson Mule
 Commissioner
 Kajo-Keji County

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
 ★ 31 JUL 2025 ★
 OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
 KAJO - KEJI COUNTY, CES


 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
 CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE
 KAJOKEJI COUNTY
 OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

Ref: KKC/CES/59/A07/2025 Date: Aug 5th, 2025

Subject: Release of Truck Number UBE878J
Belonging to Magret Luyiga

Through the resolution of the security meeting held on Friday July 25th, 2025, it was resolved that the above mentioned subject be released after examining that it was loaded with old 300 bags of charcoal with clearance of only 600,000 UGX.

Therefore, all security forces along the border are directed to render necessary assistance and give it safe passage.

Accept the assurance of my highest regards:


 Hon. Wani Jackson Mule
 Commissioner
 Kajo-Keji County

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
 ★ 06 AUG 2025 ★
 OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
 KAJO - KEJI COUNTY, CES


 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
 CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE
 KAJOKEJI COUNTY
 OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

Ref: KKC/CES/59/A07/2025 Date: July 30th, 2025

Subject: Release of Truck Number UAU374A and UAS035N
Belonging to BATUNGIRI OZIBAT

Through the resolution of the security meeting held on Friday July 25th, 2025, it was resolved that the above mentioned subject be released after examining that it was loaded with old 300 bags of charcoal with clearance of only 550,000 UGX.


Therefore, all security forces along the border are directed to render necessary assistance and give it safe passage.

Accept the assurance of my highest regards:


 Hon. Wani Jackson Mule
 Commissioner
 Kajo-Keji County

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
 ★ 31 JUL 2025 ★
 OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
 KAJO - KEJI COUNTY, CES

Annex 41: Seizure of copper by NSS



Annex 42: Sample permits for the transport of scrap copper through South Sudan


NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE
Internal Security Bureau
Deputy Director General for Administration & Finance

Ref: RSS/MNS/DDG-A&F/ISB/J/June./01056/025 Date: 30/06/2025

TO WHOM IT BE MAY CONCERNED


Subject: Approval for the Transportation of 50 Tons of Copper to Kampala - Uganda

1. This note serves to inform whoever it may concerned that, the Security Clearance is granted for the [REDACTED] to Transport the above mentioned Copper to Kampala – Uganda by road.

S/No.	Items name	Vehicle Number	Remarks
1	Copper 50 Tons	SSD 454 AE / SSD 406 F	
2	Copper 50 Tons	T 855 DC / T 406 AFN	

2. All the security organs are therefore asked to accord with the bearer of this letter and give him the necessary assistance for the safety delivery of this Copper to the last destination.

3. This is passed to your comradeship esteemed office for cooperation.

Thanks  **Gen. Chol Agoth Den:**
D/DG. For Admin. & Finance
Internal Security Bureau
(ISB)-NSS

Cc: Chief of Defense Forces/SSPDF
Cc: DG –ISB
Cc: Inspector General of Police/SSNPS
Cc: Chief of Petroleum and Mining Security/NSS –ISB
Cc: Chief of States Security Division/NSS –ISB
Cc: Chief of Economic Intelligence/NSS –ISB
Cc: File



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
NATIONAL REVENUE AUTHORITY
CUSTOMS DIVISION**

IN/OUT WARD CARGO MANIFEST

NRA C.D. Form 10 SN^o 00090149

Name of Importer / Exporter: [REDACTED]

Clearing Agent: [REDACTED] Station: Wau

Destination: Juba Vehicle N^o: SSB 349 D Date: 22/12/2021

MARKS	DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	PACKAGES			DECLARATION /RECEIPT NUMBER
		QUANTITY	WEIGHT	NUMBER	
<u>Groundnut</u>	<u>Bags of groundnut</u>	<u>260</u>	<u>1X100 Kgs</u>		
	<u>Bags Copper</u>	<u>400</u>	<u>1X100 Kgs</u>		

I/we confirm that the goods received/exported are in good condition

Owner of Goods Name: _____

Signature: _____ Date: ____/____/20____

Driver's Name: John

Signature of customs officer: _____

Station: Wau

SOUTH SUDAN CUSTOMS SERVICE
WAW STATION
22 DEC 2021
ADMINISTRATION OFFICE

Annex 43: Final Declaration of the C5 at the AU, 15 February 2026

Page 1 of 4

DECLARATION

WE, the Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU) High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5), under the chairship of H.E. Cyril Ramaphosa, President of the Republic of South Africa, the Chairperson of the Committee, gathered on the margins of the thirty-ninth (39th) Ordinary Session of the Assembly in Addis Ababa on 15 February 2026.

TAKING NOTE of the Introductory Statements by H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission and presentations by H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan and other Members of the C5 and other invited guests.

REITERATING the AU's respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan.

REAFFIRMING the solidarity of the AU with the people and the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) in their legitimate aspirations to restore durable peace, security, stability and development not only in their country, but also for regional stability in line with our collective aspirations to 'Silencing the Guns' on the African Continent as a whole.

WELCOMING the confidence demonstrated by the President of the Republic of South Sudan in the AU, and in particular the C5, in supporting the peace processes in the country and **COMMENDING** all AU Member States supporting the peace efforts in South Sudan in the spirit of pan-africanism, collective responsibility and commitment.

ACKNOWLEDGING the critical role played by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) since its establishment in 2011, particularly its contributions to supporting the peace process, preventing conflict, protecting civilians, and facilitating humanitarian access and **URGES** continued cooperation of the RTGoNU in ensuring UNMISS effective mandate implementation.

Hereby declare the following:

1. **EXPRESS DEEP CONCERN** over the deteriorating and increasingly tense political and security situation in South Sudan and the potential of a full-scale civil war, in violation of the Ceasefire Agreement and which is worsening the humanitarian situation;
2. **DEMAND** for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire and cessation of hostilities towards a permanent ceasefire; and **CALL** for the expedition of the unification of forces;
3. **TAKE NOTE** of the progress made on the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement for Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and **STRESS** that the Revitalized Agreement for Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) remains the paramount instrument for the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan and **CALL** for its full implementation;
4. **URGE** the parties to the conflict to prioritise dialogue as the most constructive and effective means of resolving outstanding issues particularly those related to the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement; in this regard **REQUEST** the RTGoNU to resume the national

dialogue which is meaningful, thorough, inclusive and transparent and **ENSURE** that all stakeholders concerned participate in the dialogue without pre conditions with a view to building trust for the stability of the country;

5. **CALL** on the leaders of the Revitalized Government and all its stakeholders to prioritise the organization of elections by December 2026 in order to meet the aspiration of the South Sudanese people in ending the extended transitional period by February 2027 and **APPEAL** to all parties to engage in this electoral process; **URGENTLY** Calls on **the Government of South Sudan to provide** the requisite substantive and financial support to the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), the National Elections Commission (NEC) and the Political Parties Council which are essential for ensuring free, fair and credible elections scheduled for December 2026; **EMPHASIZE** that there should not be any other extension of the transition;
6. **DIRECT** the AU Commission to coordinate and collaborate with the relevant institutions of RTGoNU to develop a clear roadmap for elections and to provide technical and financial support to create conducive environment for the organization of the free, credible and inclusive elections in December 2026 inclusive of all citizens eligible to participate in the elections;
7. **CALL UPON** international partners, donor agencies, and humanitarian actors to continue mobilising resources to meet the pressing needs of affected populations and address the worsening humanitarian situation;
8. **REQUEST** Member States, particularly the C5 to scale up support to South Sudan, including deployment of technical experts on Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration, and on Security Sector Reform, as well as provide financial and logistical support to the Government and related institutions to support the Government's efforts to facilitate the holding of inclusive, peaceful, free, fair and credible elections as scheduled;
9. **CALL UPON** regional and international partners to provide technical resources and predictable funding mechanisms to facilitate the successful conclusion of the peace process;
10. **CALL ON** the RTGoNU to take urgent steps towards consolidating the progress achieved and to lay the groundwork for a successful organization of the elections including the consideration of releasing all political detainees, especially Dr. Riek Machar, 1st Vice President, in the spirit of national cohesion and reconciliation;
11. **REITERATE** the call for the immediate appointment of an AU High Representative/Special Envoy for South Sudan, at the level of a former Head of State/Government, in order to provide strategic support towards durable peace and stability in South Sudan; The AU Special Envoy will work with IGAD appointees and the C5, and will have an oversight role to monitor and support the implementation of this process in South Sudan

12. **CALL** for coordination and harmonization of the efforts of all actors in South Sudan, in particular AU, IGAD, UN and the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3); in this regard, **AGREE** to harmonise the efforts of the C5 and the Tumaini Initiative, and to work closely with IGAD to assist South Sudan in successfully concluding its political transition, reaffirming the R-ARCSS as the viable mechanism for durable peace and security in the country; **ENCOURAGE** regular engagement between the C5, IGAD and the AUC on the implementation of the peace process in South Sudan.

Annex 44: Response of United People's Alliance to Tumaini Initiative, 13 February 2026



UNITED PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE (UPA)

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRPERSON

Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo
Chief Facilitator, Tumaini II Initiative

Subject: Formal Response to the Proposed Framework of Dialogue.

Dear General Sumbeiywo,


On behalf of the United Peoples' Alliance (UPA), I wish to formally acknowledge receipt of the Framework for Dialogue provided under the Tumaini II Initiative. We commend H.E. President William S. Ruto and the Government of Kenya for the steadfast support to the people of South Sudan in mediating a peaceful resolution of the conflict in South Sudan and for facilitating this initiative for an inclusive, South Sudanese-led process, and for the continued commitment to promoting stability, democratic governance, and accountability in South Sudan. We also extend our sincere appreciation for the extensive effort your team has invested in developing a structured and inclusive platform aimed at advancing the South Sudan National Consensus Charter for Peace and Democracy.

The UPA is fully prepared to engage actively and constructively with all the South Sudanese stakeholders to build and reach a national consensus to rescue South Sudan from the imminent danger of disintegration and prevent a looming genocide. We have reviewed and officially accepted the proposed modality of dialogue, which prioritizes inclusivity and equal participation. Furthermore, we endorse the problem-solving approach as the essential foundation for our upcoming deliberations.

UPA remains committed to participating in this dialogue with pragmatism, patriotism, and goodwill. We stand ready to address the urgent issues facing our nation, including cessation of hostilities, civilian protection, stabilization of the country, unhindered humanitarian access, and transitional arrangements that chart a clear and irreversible path toward sustainable peace, good governance, and national renewal. In this regard, we consider the immediate release of all political prisoners a necessary prerequisite for the creation of a conducive environment for dialogue, confidence-building, and meaningful participation by all stakeholders.

The UPA looks forward to working collaboratively under your facilitation to ensure this dialogue yields tangible and concrete outcomes in terms of peace, freedoms, and justice for the people of South Sudan.

Sincerely,


Pagan Amum Okiech 13/2/2026
United People's Alliance (UPA)

Annex 45: Thomas Cirollo response to Tumaini Initiative, 13 February 2026

General Lazarus Sumbeliwo,
Chief Facilitator, Tumaini Peace Initiative (TPI),
Government of the Republic of Kenya,
Nairobi – Kenya,

13th February, 2026

RE: POSITION OF SSOMA ON "THE SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL CONSENSUS CHARTER DIALOGUE"

Your Excellency,

The Leadership of South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) extends its compliments to the Government and people of Kenya and seizes this opportunity to confirm receipt of the proposed framework for the Tumaini Initiative.

SSOMA remains committed to achieving a just and sustainable peace through an inclusive process that addresses the root causes of the conflict in South Sudan and enables sustainable peace, ensures justice, dignity, security and sovereignty of the people of South Sudan.

SSOMA takes note of the Tumaini Initiative's circulated document: *"Proposed Framework for the Tumaini Initiative – Towards South Sudan National Consensus Charter for Peace and Democracy"*; and makes reference to this document as well as to the virtual meeting between the Leadership of SSOMA and the Tumaini Initiative Mediation Leadership held on 4th February 2026. Consequently, SSOMA Leadership presents its position on this Initiative, the proposed framework document and the National Consensus Charter Dialogue.

The Tumaini Peace Initiative & Framework for Dialogue on the South Sudan National Consensus Charter

In early 2024, SSOMA engaged with your leadership in the pre-mediation consultative talks in Rome, Italy, with a desire to clearly understand the Tumaini Peace Initiative under the auspices of the Government of the Republic of Kenya and clarify its participation in the process. Based on the meetings conducted, it was apparent that the Tumaini Initiative was intended to find better mechanisms of implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS, 2018) rather than addressing the Root Causes of the conflict in order to achieve sustainable peace. SSOMA members are not signatory to the R-ARCSS and therefore could not participate in its resuscitation process.

SSOMA acknowledges receipt of both *The Framework for Dialogue on the South Sudan National Consensus Charter* and the *Tumaini Press Statement*, dated 31 January 2026, released by Your Excellency. SSOMA, as a matter of principle, appreciates the stated intention that the peace process for South Sudan be owned by South Sudanese themselves. However, after careful review of the Framework, fundamental concerns regarding both the process and substance of the Framework were identified.

First, the Framework was developed and presented without prior structured consultations with South Sudanese stakeholders. This approach contradicts the core principle emphasized by the Tumaini Initiative itself — that peace-making process must be owned by South Sudanese.

Second, the Framework appears to predetermine the agenda, process, and outcome, particularly through the proposal of a Peace Charter. In SSOMA's view, such an approach limits genuine dialogue and constrains South Sudanese parties to negotiate within externally pre-set parameters rather than shaping the process collectively and freely.

Third, the Framework does not allow room for negotiations but rather adopts a pre-determined problem-solving approach. This caveat will not only disallow stakeholders from frankly addressing the Root Causes of the conflict but can lead to a recurrence of the vicious cycle of violence that has gripped South Sudan for over a decade.

Fourth, the Framework prioritizes elections as the primary pathway out of the current crisis, while deliberately avoiding addressing the Root Causes of the conflict. SSOMA believes that elections, conducted under the current conditions of war, displacements, humanitarian crisis, and collapsed national institutions as well as the broken and fragmented social fabric of the nation, will not produce peace. Instead, it leads to legitimizing the status quo, leading to the disintegration of the fragile South Sudanese nation-state.

SSOMA is of the conviction that South Sudan needs credible and inclusive negotiations that will lead to a comprehensive peace agreement that will guarantee sustainable peace.

SSOMA RECOMMENDATIONS

SSOMA respectfully submits the following recommendations for a credible and effective peace process:

1. Preliminary Consultation

The mediation must begin with inclusive consultations involving South Sudanese stakeholders: political movements, civil society organizations, faith-based institutions, women, youth, traditional leaders, academia, professionals and displaced communities.

2. Stakeholder-Informed Framework

Based on the consultations conducted, the mediators should develop a first draft peace framework that reflects the views of the stakeholders.

3. Validation of the Draft Framework for Dialogue

The draft framework for dialogue developed should be shared with all stakeholders for review, input, and validation before finalization - so that all stakeholders thereafter agree on the agenda, modalities, methodology, venue, and principles for peace talks.

4. Inclusive Roundtable Conference

SSOMA proposes the convening of an Inclusive Roundtable Conference as a basis for peace negotiations to address the Root Causes of the conflicts in South Sudan and chart the path to achieve sustainable peace.

5. Primary Focus on the Root Causes of the Conflict

Agenda of the peace talks must prioritize addressing Root Causes of the conflict, including - among others - governance failure, ethnicized security sector, justice and rule of law, mismanagement of resources, land occupation and grabbing, impunity and ethnic polarization.

6. Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The peace negotiations process should culminate in a comprehensive peace agreement, negotiated and signed by South Sudanese parties, with clear implementation mechanisms, modalities, guarantees, and regional and international guarantors for clear consequences of violations of any clause/s of the agreement.

7. Conducive Environment and Requisites for Elections

Elections should be the outcome of peace, not a substitute for it. They must only take place after the enactment of a permanent constitution through an agreed process, security stabilization, repatriation and resettlement of displaced populations, formation of an inclusive transitional government, conduct of population census and creation of a conducive political environment for free, fair and credible elections.

8. Immediate and Unconditional Release of all political Detainees

All political detainees under the outgoing South Sudan regime's security apparatus should unconditionally be released to show the political will for peace. The top political detainee is South Sudan's First Vice President, & Chairman / Commander-in-Chief of the SPLM-IO, Dr. Riek Macher Teny, and all his political and military colleagues as well as other detainees.

9. Broad-Based Mediation

The conflict in South Sudan is so complex that its resolution demands a broad-based mediation involving different stakeholders in refining and shaping the posture of the parties to the conflict and all other secondary issues. An appropriate mediation team to achieve peace in South Sudan should include: IGAD, AU, Community of Sant' Egidio, TROIKA, EU, UN and others.

10. Neutral Venue Acceptable to all Parties to the Conflict

All parties should agree on a neutral venue - as a pre-requisite for any meaningful negotiation and to ensure safety as a fundamental right of any participating group. Such a venue would be conducive for free negotiations without coercion, pressure, intimidation, personal insecurity. Such a venue must also be open for all members of the mediation team as well as guarantors.

Annex 46: Response from the Government of the Republic of Uganda to the Panel's final report, 18 March 2026

1. Could you please provide an update on the current size (number of troops, vehicles and aircraft) of the UPDF deployment in South Sudan, including as part of Operation Mlinzi wa Kimya?

Answer

As previously communicated, The UPDF deployed a sizeable number of troops in South Sudan to support the implementation, oversight and ensure adherence to the tenets of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan of 12th September 2018.

This deployment forms part of ongoing regional efforts to promote stability, prevent further escalation, and support the maintenance of peace in South Sudan.

We also previously communicated that the UPDF currently has the following assets deployed in South Sudan:

- Two (02) battle tanks
- Four (04) armoured fighting vehicles
- Three (03) Bell 412 helicopters
- One (01) Caravan aircraft

The status of deployment of UPDF personnel and assets has not changed since our last communication. The deployed UPDF personnel form part of the Operation Mlinzi wa Kimya troops.

2. Could you kindly confirm whether the Government of South Sudan is contributing financially to the UPDF deployment in South Sudan?

Answer

As previously communicated, the UPDF presence in South Sudan is fully funded by the Government of the Republic of Uganda.

3. Is AF-111 operated in South Sudan by the UPDF or Ugandan Government and, if so, is it also “dry leased” from Bar Aviation as previously confirmed with respect to other UPDF aerial assets deployed to South Sudan in your letter (UN-NY/TECH 38), dated 4 November 2025?

Answer

Aircraft AF-111 is not on dry lease from Bar Aviation.

The aircraft is on call and only tasked on a case-by-case basis to support the UPDF operations in South Sudan.

4. With respect to these air assets, are any pilots, crew members or ground support staff provided by an external private company such as Bar Aviation, Kampala Executive Aviation or another company? If so, could you please confirm the name(s) of the relevant private operators and the nature of the services rendered?

Answer

All aircrafts are operated exclusively by members of the UPDF.

5. An additional green military helicopter is also currently operating at the Paloich airfield, alongside the two Bell 412 helicopters previously confirmed as dry leased, by the UPDF, from Bar Aviation. Could you kindly confirm whether this helicopter is being operated by the UPDF and, if so, the make, model and tail number of the helicopter?

Answer

The Government of Uganda is not aware of an additional green military helicopter currently operating at the Paloich airfield alongside the two Bell 412 helicopters.

6. In your letter (UN-NY/TECH 38), dated 4 November 2025, you also kindly confirmed that the UPDF has deployed a Caravan aircraft in support of UPDF and SSPDF operations in South Sudan. Could you please confirm whether this is the grey Caravan aircraft depicted in the annex to this letter, and whether this aircraft carries external hardpoints for the delivery of munitions?

Answer

The UPDF-deployed Caravan aircraft is equipped with electro-optical surveillance capabilities and limited defensive armament strictly for force protection purposes, as well as for observation and transportation support to UPDF personnel.

The UPDF's role in South Sudan remains limited to supporting the protection of vital national assets and infrastructure, particularly in Upper Nile, under conditions of imminent and potential hostile threats.

Its actions are conducted in a controlled and disciplined manner, and any use of force is strictly limited to self-defence, in furtherance of regional stability, the prevention of escalation, and the maintenance of peace.

7. Several sources have also told the Panel that this grey Caravan aircraft has been used as a firing platform, with small arms fire from the aircraft used to disperse or warn individuals on the ground. A video taken on 29 December 2025, for example, appears to show small arms fire being directed from a circling Caravan aircraft towards the ground in Jonglei State. Can you kindly confirm whether any UPDF operated aircraft have been used to direct fire, or any other ordinance, including for the purposes of warning or dispersal?

Answer

We can confirm that the UPDF has not engaged and is not aware in the activities referred to herein.

8. The Panel has also documented a second Caravan aircraft that operated in South Sudan in 2025, with the designation SF166/N208PM. This aircraft appeared to fly a pattern indicating that it was undertaking target and aerial surveillance functions. Has the UPDF used this, and/or the Caravan described in questions 6 and 7 above, for surveillance, target acquisition and/or battle damage assessment in support of SSPDF or UPDF operations in South Sudan?

Answer

We can confirm that the UPDF has not engaged and is not aware in the activities referred to herein.

Annex 47: Response from the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to the Panel's final report, 16 April 2026



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
HEADQUARTERS

**Response of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to the
 Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, 2026
 Date: 16th April 2026**

1. Introduction

The Government of the Republic of South Sudan, reaffirms its full commitment to realisation and maintenance of peace, security and stability in the country. To achieve these objectives, the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU), despite challenges, is implementing the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), 2018 in letter and spirit.

2. Allegations that the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan is now threatening to collapse:

(a) Detention of the First Vice President:

The detention of the First Vice President, Dr. Riek Machar, came as a result of his involvement in the Nasir incident. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), and its supporters, the armed civilian youth, known as the White Army, violated the Peace Agreement and overran in a joint surprise attack, the South Sudan people's Defence Forces (SSPDF) Garrison in Nasir on 4th March 2025, killing more than two hundred and fifty officers and soldiers, including the Garrison Commander Maj.Gen. David Majur Dak, and one crew member of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan's helicopter (UNMISS) sent to the area on the 7th March the same year to airlift the surviving officers and soldiers. For involvement in that incident, Dr. Riek Machar was put under house arrest on 26th March 2025, investigated and put on fair trial which is ongoing. The court is

Page 1- 13

K.A

JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN

publicly accessible and all legal rights have been availed to the accused. The Government will adhere to the Court verdict.

(b) Split in the SPLM/A-IO and Marginalization of the Oyet's Faction:

The split in the SPLM/A-IO that is reported by the Panel, is an internal issue in which the Government has no hand. Concerning the Panel's report that a series of Presidential Decrees have marginalized the political representation of the more prominent faction of the SPLM/A-IO led by Nathaniel Oyet, who has pronounced the Peace Agreement as having collapsed. The Government would like to clarify that the SPLM/A-IO faction led by Nathaniel Oyet, was marginalized by the desire and acts of its members not by a series of Presidential Decrees as alleged by the Panel. Mr. Oyet and some other elements from the SPLM/A-IO voluntarily forsook their posts in the Government, left South Sudan for abroad, took arms, and waged war against the country.

The Peace Agreement exists, and the claim by Oyet's faction and the Panel of Experts, that it has collapsed is a wishful thinking, which does not match with the realities on the ground.

The abandonment of the Agreement by some members of the SPLM/A-IO including Oyet after Nasir incident, has not prevented the parties from proceeding with the implementation of the Agreement, and the transitional period will end with the conduct of free, fair and credible elections in December 2026.

To enable the Government, conduct the elections, the parties to the R-ARCSS agreed to amend some provisions in the Agreement. This includes delinking the Population Census and the Permanent Constitution Making Process. These issues and other things will be the post-election matters that will be implemented by the elected Government. The parties have also agreed to hold Inter-party dialogue, which shall commence soon.

3. Violations of both the 2017 Ceasefire and 2018 Peace Agreements:

On the report that significant violations of both the 2017 ceasefire and 2018 peace agreements took place since January 2025. The Government would like to state that the Panel is fully aware of the party which

violated these agreements, but opted to make a blanket accusation without indicating clearly the violator. Such general statements/accusations are not acceptable as they are not helpful and encourage commission of crimes by those being covered up.

The violation of the agreements in Nasir in Upper Nile State in March 2025, was made by the SPLM/A-IO as explained in paragraph 2 (a) above. Encouraged by the silence and inaction of the international community to condemn and take measures against it, the SPLM/ A-IO again violated the agreements in Northern Jonglei State at the end of last year and the beginning of this year by overrunning Waat in surprise military attacks on 24th December 2025, Yuai on 2nd January 2026, and Pajut on 16th January 2026, using tanks, APCs, ammunition, fuel of UNMISS and that of the UN Specialized Agencies, and NGO's vehicles.

The occupation of those towns, emboldened the SPLM/A-IO and the White Army (rebels) to make advances towards the capital, Juba, ignoring the repeated appeals by the Government to halt the attacks and vacate the occupied towns.

Left with no option, the South Sudan people's Defence Forces (SSPDF) launched in self-defense and fulfilment of its constitutional mandate, "Operation Enduring Peace" on 18th January 2026, to counter rebels advancing to Juba. As a result, the SSPDF recaptured the occupied towns and reclaimed its military equipment, two armored personnel carriers (APCs) and two main battle tanks that were taken by the SPLM/A-IO from UNMISS. Also, five vehicles taken by the SPLM/A-IO/ the White Army from organizations were recaptured and returned to their rightful humanitarian agencies.

After the recapturing of those towns, law and order was restored and most of inhabitants, who fled during the fight, voluntarily returned and resumed normal lives in their areas.

On the remarks by Lt. Gen. Johnson Olony that have been characterized by some circles as hate speech. The Government would like to state that the public statement made by Lt. Gen. Olony was not intended to harm any ethnicity, rather, it was a response to the inflammatory speeches attributed to the SPLM/A-IO/ White Army.

As the remarks, were taken out of their context, Lt. Gen. Olony apologized publicly for his wording, and emphasized adherence to professional codes of conduct.

K-A

4. Civilian Casualties and accountability (Pankor incident):

On this incident, the Government would like to clarify that unintended collateral damage occurs at the time of military operations by the army of any state. However, this non - target damage/accidental damage, does not represent policy of the army in question.

During operations in Pankor, some civilians were accidentally killed by elements of the South Sudan people's Defence Forces (SSPDF). As the act does not march with the policy and the doctrine of the SSPDF, the commanding officer and the personnel involved in the incident, were immediately arrested and put into custody. They will be investigated and tried by the General Court Martial.

5. Killing of Civilians in Abiemnhom:

On the killing of civilians in Abiemnhom in the Ruweng Administrative Area in March 2026. The Government would like to state that, it was not involved in this carnage, which was carried out by the SPLM/A-IO, the White Army, and other supporters. The killing of the innocent civilians by the SPLM/A-IO includes, the Commissioner of Awarpiny County, Hon. Paulino Wal Muonykok, and the Executive Director of Abiemnhom County, as well as other Government officials, and the SSPDF personnel.

Besides this, the Government would like to highlight the following:

(a) Refusal of the Panel to indicate perpetrators:

Though, it is a known fact to the international community, including the Security Council, that this heinous crime was committed by the SPLM/A-IO, the Panel of Experts made a blanket accusation, and treats the incident as if it is unaware of the perpetrators. Refusal to pinpoint to the perpetrators is unacceptable, and poses the following questions:

Are the maintainers of the international peace and security,

genuine in their claim that they are in South Sudan to protect civilians?

Will general accusation not contribute to the continuation of the conflict?

How will the perpetrators desist from commission of such crimes, if they are not clearly mentioned in the obvious situations like this?

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(b) Inaction by UNMISS forces to rescue the situation during commission of atrocities:

While the massacre took place in presence of the UNMISS forces in the area, the Mission failed to save lives of the victims and their properties. Failure of the UNMISS forces to take immediate action and rescue the situation, raises questions about fulfillment of the Mission's mandate as this is not the first time where an incident occurred in the presence of UNMISS, and the organisation stood aloof.

When the SPLM/A-IO forces committed atrocities in Malakal, Bentiu and Bor in 2014, the organisation forces in those cities did not intervene to protect the civilians. The questions which pose themselves are:

If civilians are not protected when facing imminent dangers, why did the Security Council incorporate protection of civilians in the mandate of the Mission in South Sudan, and deployed more than ten thousand troops in the country?

If such vivid cases like this are not properly addressed, will presence of UNMISS in South Sudan bring peace to the country, or will the fate of the State be like that of other countries that have been hosting UN Missions since early sixties and no peace nor progress and development to date?

Why does the international community always claim that it is concerned with the maintenance of peace and security as well as human rights in the country?

6. Allegations of new weapon consignments:

The claim that the SSPDF has acquired new weapon consignments in violation of the arms embargo, is baseless. The Panel of Experts, was supposed to produce pieces of evidence supporting this allegation, including end user certificate, ports of entry, vendor states and waybill. Failure to do so, the allegation will be deemed as a preparation of the ground for the renewal of the arms embargo.

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7. Air assets and the arms embargo:

With regard to this issue, the Government would like to state that the SSPDF strictly adhere to the terms of the arms embargo and has not acquired new air assets in contravention of the embargo. The limited aviation capability currently in service was acquired long time ago, under a bilateral defence agreement signed before the arms embargo with a friendly state for logistical and transport purposes only. The SSPDF reiterates compliance with the terms of international obligations and will provide documentation regarding any future bilateral transfers upon request by competent UN or oversight mechanism.

8. Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) withdrawal from Hegilig and disarmament on entry:

The withdrawal of SAF elements from Hegilig was conducted under a negotiated tripartite agreement among Sudan, South Sudan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

In accordance with international practice governing cross-border military movement and the terms of tripartite arrangement, the SSPDF disarmed the SAF elements upon their arrival in South Sudan territory and escorted them to safer places as required by the international law. These measures were taken to maintain security and uphold the obligations and arrangements agreed in the tripartite framework.

9. Claim of access denials:

On the report that a range of humanitarian operators reported being prevented from accessing opposition control areas of Jonglei State on security grounds between December 2025 and March 2026. The Government would like to point out that this claim is unsubstantiated. During the mentioned period, the Government issued to humanitarian agencies and UNMISS, several approvals for flight and land safety assurances. These approvals facilitated travel and visits of the UN bodies and humanitarian agencies to various parts of the country. Though the Panel reported the issue of access denials for the whole country,

the Government shall focus its response indicated hereunder on Jonglei State as an area mainly highlighted in the report:

(a) Approvals issued by the Joint Border Verification Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) to humanitarian agencies to operate in Jonglei State from December 2025-March 2026:

(1) The World Food Programme (WFP):

- i. Approval for flight safety assurance was issued by the JBVMM to WFP for 5th February 2026. The purpose of the request by WFP was to deliver the remaining of the humanitarian critical supplies from Juba to Akobo by air on 5th February 2026.
- ii. Approval for flight safety assurance was issued by the JBVMM to WFP from 9th-12th February 2026. The purpose of the request by WFP, was to transport passengers and deliver the remaining of the humanitarian critical supply from Juba to Akobo by air.

(2) International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC):

Approval for flight safety assurance was issued by the JBVMM to ICRC from 1 February to 30th April 2026. The purpose of the request by the ICRC was to respond to the humanitarian needs of the affected population in many areas of Jonglei State, including, Bor, Panyagor, Payuel, Duk Padiet, Poktap Pagaak, Ayod, Waat, Lankien, Walgak, Akobo, Yuai, Motot, Pathai, Pieri, among others.

(3) OCHA:

Approval for safety assurance was issued by the JBVMM to OCHA from 1st November 2025 to 31st January 2026. The purpose of the request by OCHA was to assess and respond to the humanitarian needs and deliver lifesaving humanitarian aid by road from Juba to areas of Bor, Jalle, Kongor, Duk Padiet, Ayod, Yuai, Motot, Lankien, Nyirol, Gadiang, Pajut Walgak and Akobo in Jonglei State. The approval has been renewed for

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the period from 1st February to 30th April 2026 and shall cover the areas mentioned above.

(b) Approvals issued by the JBVMM for UNMISS from December 2025 to March 2026:

(i) By air:

- (a) Approval for flight safety assurance was issued by the Joint Border Verification Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) to UNMISS to patrol its field offices by air from 1st-15th January 2026. The purpose of the patrol by UNMISS, was to show presence in the areas, assess security and humanitarian situation, and monitor human rights issues.

Other approvals for flight safety assurances were issued by the JBVMM as follows:

- (b) Bor-Akobo-Bor from 19th-22nd February 2026. The purpose of the request by UNMISS, was to support and facilitate the Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Relief Coordinator's field mission in Akobo on 21st February 2026.
- (c) Bor-Akobo-Bor from 22nd – 24th February 2026. The purpose of the request by UNMISS, was to rotate troops in Akobo Temporary Operation Base (TOB).
- (d) Bor-Yuai (Uror)-Bor for 25th February 2026. The purpose of the request by UNMISS, was to engage with the local authorities, community and to assess the overall humanitarian situation in the area.
- (e) Bor-Akobo-Bor from 25th – 27th February 2026. The purpose of the request by UNMISS, was to rotate troops in Akobo Temporary Operation Base (TOB).
- (f) Bor-Ayod-Bor from 27th February to 2nd March 2026. The purpose of the request by UNMISS, was to conduct a LDP to Ayod to investigate human rights violation.
- (g) Bor-Akobo-Bor from 28th February to 3rd March 2026. The purpose of the request by UNMISS, was to conduct rotation and supply of troops in Akobo Temporary Operation Base (TOB).

- (h) Bor-Akobo-Bor from 3rd-5th March 2026. The purpose of the request by UNMISS, was to conduct troops rotation and resupply of troops in Akobo (TOB).
- (i) Bor-Akobo-Bor from 6th-8th March 2026. The purpose of the request by UNMISS, was to conduct rotation and resupply of troops in Akobo TOB.
- (j) Bor-Akobo-Bor from 9th-11th March 2026. The purpose of the request by UNMISS, was to conduct rotation and resupply of troops in Akobo TOB.
- (k) Bor-Akobo-Bor from 18th-19th March 2026. The purpose of the request by UNMISS, was to conduct rotation and resupply of troops in Akobo Temporary Operation Base (TOB).

(l) By land:

Approvals for safety assurances were issued by the JBVMM for UNMISS to conduct patrols by land.

- (a) Bor-Panyagor-Poktap-Bor from 9th-13th February 2026. The purpose of the request by UNMISS, was for the Mission to continue the Dinka-Nuer dialogue recently facilitated in Bor and aims to defuse potential tensions with ethnic dimension to promote peaceful coexistence between the host community (Dinka) and internally displaced persons (Nuer) in the above-mentioned areas.
- (b) Bor-Duk Padiet-Bor from 17th-19th February 2026. The purpose of the request by UNMISS, was to facilitate the visit of A/SRSG and Minister of humanitarian Affairs (GoSS) as they assess the humanitarian situation in Duk County.
- (c) Bor-Panyagor-Poktap-Duk-Fagak-DukPadiet-Panyagor-Bor from 11th-14th February 2026. The purpose of the request by UNMISS, was to amend the route of SN SOI-LDP as UNOCHA plans to join the LDP to conduct an interagency rapid needs assessment (IRNA) for conflict affected and displaced population in Duk County.
- (d) Approval for safety assurance was issued by the JBVMM to UNMISS to conduct patrols in some areas in Northern Jonglei State by road from 16th to 31st December 2025. The purpose of the

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request by UNMISS, was to show UNMISS presence in the areas, assess security and humanitarian situation, and monitor human rights issues.

10. Case Open against Government and Transfer of Money to Private Account in the UAE:

Concerning the case open in London against the Government, and transfer of money to a private account in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Government would make the following clarifications:

(a) Case in London against the Government:

BB Energy company made a bid to buy crude oil from South Sudan and was awarded the contract. The company did not receive the cargo, due to the fact that the crude oil did not reach the marine terminal, because of the interruption in the pipeline. As the lifting did not take place, the company lodged a case in London against the Government.

There are no justifiable grounds for the company to open the case against the Government for the following:

1. The oil to be lifted did not flow to the Sea Port in time, due to the war in the Sudan, and war is considered worldwide as force majeure, for which, either side of the contract is exempt from liability.
2. The Government is working to resolve that issue by providing another cargo to the company, and for that it requested the company several times to settle the dispute outside the court of law.

(b) Deposit of a large advance payment for crude oil into the bank account of a private company in the United Arab Emirates:

Regarding deposit of a large advance payment for crude oil into the bank account of a private company in the United Arab Emirates, rather than into the Government's oil revenue account. The Government would like to state that the transfer of the advance payment to the bank account of a private company in the UAE, was

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made on its directives. Since the Government is the beneficiary and not the private company, the accusation is a flaw for the following:

Euro American International Energy, applied to purchase crude oil and was awarded the contract. The two parties agreed that the payment shall be in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) currency, Emirati Dirham (AED). While the parties were preparing the contract, the Government requested the company to make advance payment to address some urgent issues. The request was approved by the company. As the Government has no bank account in the UAE currency, it directed the company to remit the advance payment into the bank account of a private company in the United Arab Emirates. That advance payment after receipt, was spent on the areas of need.

11. Increase in illicit taxation:

On the issue of illicit taxation. The Government would like to inform that this accusation is baseless for the following: -

- a. There is no Government policy in place to levy illegal taxes.
- b. The Republic of South Sudan is abided by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946, and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN Specialized Agencies 1947, as well as the Host Country Agreements signed with the UN Specialized Agencies and humanitarian bodies.
- c. The 7th Governors' Forum that took place in Juba from 28 November to 3 December 2023 adopted a resolution on the removal of all illegal road blocks in the country, and thereafter a committee was formed to implement the resolution. Based on the above, anyone found in contravention of the law is brought to book.

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12. Increase in the Looting of Humanitarian Goods:

On the increase in the looting of humanitarian goods, including a 12 boat World Food Programme convoy passing through Bailiet County in Upper Nile State in January 2026. The Government affirms that it was not involved in the looting of the World Food Programme convoy in Bailiet County in January 2026. Apart from the involvement in this incident, the Government has taken some measures to prevent occurrence of similar incidents. These measures, include, relief of Baliet County' Commissioner from his post, formation of a committee to investigate into this incident, among others.

13. Attacks on humanitarian bodies and their assets:

Regarding the claim of Attacks on humanitarian agencies, the Government would like to reiterate that it is unaware of the attacks launched on the humanitarian agencies. However, if there are assaults, that maybe be in places, which were previously under the control of the SPLM/A-IO.

What justifies lack of involvement of the Government in such allegations, is that the humanitarian bodies are operating in the Republic of South Sudan on permission of the Government. If there was no interest in the organizations, the Government, could have rejected their applications for operation in the country and also expels the licensed ones. Since it has not done so, there are no grounds for this claim.

In conclusion the Government would like to make the following:

- (a) The Government reaffirms its commitment to the UN principles and policies enshrined in the United Nations Charter and international law concerning respect for human rights, maintenance of peace and security. It shall also continue full cooperation and support for the UN family.
- (b) The violations attributed in the report to the SSPDF personnel are committed on personal grounds. Therefore, are subject to immediate disciplinary and judicial actions, as they are contrary to the policies of the army, the South Sudan laws, rules of engagement and the four Geneva Protocols of 1949.

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(c) The methodology/ means of reporting adopted by the United Nations Security Council and the UN Specialized Agencies, as well as the humanitarian organizations, and being used by the UN officials in preparing reports, will not bring peace to the Republic of South Sudan. The reporters gather information from unreliable sources or those irrelevant to the situations on the ground. They also share information, including unsubstantiated data. The wrong information gathered mislead the decision makers whether on the Security Council or other organizations. Furthermore, reports are also prepared in line with the interests of the mandated officials.

(d) The report contains deceptive, false and unsubstantiated information, particularly the issues of access denials, transfer of oil proceeds to the bank account of a private company in The UAE instead of Government account, Also Most of the contents of the report do not match with the realities on the ground.



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