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Letter dated 10 June 2026 from the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 2745 (2024) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 2745 (2024) have the honour to transmit herewith the final report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 2789 (2025).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024) on 12 May 2026 and was considered by the Committee on 5 June 2026.

The Panel of Experts would appreciate it if the present letter and the final report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)

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Summary

The reporting period was marked by efforts undertaken by the Government of the Central African Republic to implement the N'Djamena agreements of 19 April 2025 with *Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique* (UPC) and *Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation* (3R), as well as to broaden the peace process to include the *Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique* (MPC), notably through the 19 November 2025 agreement, signed under Chadian auspices. These agreements effectively provided for the groups' return to the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and the Luanda process, and contributed to a temporary reduction in the activities of certain armed groups, as well as to the holding of elections in December 2025.

Implementation of the agreements has formally commenced. Progress was most visible in the disarmament and demobilization of UPC and 3R elements, with approximately 1,300 total combatants, including 31 women, disarmed and demobilized as at the time of writing. The Panel reviewed a total of 1,025 firearms collected through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, the majority of which were functional. Nevertheless, key issues remain to be addressed, particularly with regard to integration and reintegration modalities, including the number of ex-combatants to be incorporated into the defence and security forces, ranks to be granted, funding for socioeconomic reintegration and the timing of the formal dissolution of the armed groups. Elements and networks affiliated with 3R, UPC and MPC remained active to varying degrees.

The south-east remained a key armed-conflict hotspot. Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) was the most visible non-State armed actor in open clashes in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture. The security situation deteriorated significantly around the December 2025 electoral period, with attacks on convoys, campaign teams, officials, positions of the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic (FACA), electoral materials and civilian infrastructure. The Panel found that the crisis in the south-east remains complex, characterized by the presence of AAKG, partially integrated or disarmed actors, local self-defence dynamics, cross-border linkages and a heavily militarized State response.

The humanitarian and human rights situation in the south-east remained deeply concerning. The Panel documented attacks on civilians, abductions, hostage-taking, destruction of property, restrictions on humanitarian access and significant displacement. Muslim and Fulani communities remained particularly exposed to violent attacks and movement restrictions, while Azande civilians were caught up in the crossfire. The Panel also received information that weapons continued to reach the south-east from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, and from within the Central African Republic.

In the north-east, the Panel found continued convergence among local armed groups activity, transnational supply networks and spillover from the conflict in the Sudan. Vakaga and Haute-Kotto Prefectures remained key areas of concern. Elements linked to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), including networks associated with "General" Djazouli, remained active, while the *Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique* (FPRC), the *Parti pour le rassemblement de la nation centrafricaine* (PRNC) and remnants of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), along with Sudanese armed elements, local self-defence groups and elements referred to as "Wagner Noirs", contributed to a complex and volatile security environment.

The north-east remained a key node for arms circulation. The Panel reviewed evidence of armed elements linked to RSF operating in the tri-border area. The Panel also documented the seizure, in October 2025 near Sam Ouandja, of heavy weapons and ammunition from an LRA-linked position. Civilians in Vakaga continued to face killings, house burnings, abductions, torture, displacement and predation around mining sites and road corridors, while the Sudan conflict exerted significant demographic and economic pressure on Birao and the broader north-east.

The Government of the Central African Republic pursued multiple regional and international cooperation frameworks during the reporting period. Chad played a key role as both a facilitator of armed group agreements and a security partner through the joint force of Chad and the Central African Republic to secure the common border.

Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)

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* Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Background

A. Introduction

1. The present report, provided to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 1 of its resolution [2789 \(2025\)](#), covers the period from the submission of the Panel's progress update in August 2025 until 15 April 2026.
2. On 29 July 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution [2789 \(2025\)](#), by which it extended the measures as set out or extended in paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#), including an arms embargo on armed and associated groups in the Central African Republic, travel ban and asset freeze. By resolution [2789 \(2025\)](#), the Council also extended, until 31 August 2026, the mandate of the Panel of Experts as set forth in paragraph 6 of resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#) and reaffirmed paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 through 12 of that resolution. The Panel was tasked with discharging its mandate in accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution [2789 \(2025\)](#).
3. Following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution [2789 \(2025\)](#) in July 2025, the Secretary-General appointed, on 25 February 2026, three individuals with expertise in armed groups, arms and humanitarian affairs to serve on the Panel. Two experts commenced their functions on 2 March 2026, while the third expert began work on 6 April 2026. The Panel does not yet have a finance and natural resources expert, but expects one to be appointed shortly, while the regional expert position was recently abolished.
4. In its resolution [2789 \(2025\)](#), the Security Council requested the Panel of experts to provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, a midterm and a final report no later than 31 January and 15 June 2026, respectively. Given the limited time frame, the Panel pursued several lines of investigation and included in the present report only those findings that could be assessed and verified, in accordance with established standards of work, within the time available.

B. Field visits, and cooperation with other stakeholders and institutions

5. Between March and April 2026, the Panel conducted one field visit to the Central African Republic, during which it visited Bangui, and Zemio and Obo in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture (south-east of the Central African Republic), as well as Birao in Vakaga Prefecture (north-east of the Central African Republic). The Panel had envisaged conducting a visit to Chad in April 2026; however, the visit could not take place during the reporting period. The Panel remains hopeful that such a visit may be undertaken in the near future.
6. The Panel had exchanges with other United Nations panels and groups of experts established by the Security Council, in particular the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the panels of experts on the Sudan and South Sudan.
7. The Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#) expresses its gratitude to the Government of the Central African Republic and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) for their continued support and cooperation.

C. Methodology

8. In conducting its investigations, the Panel complied with the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see [S/2006/997](#)). The Panel maintained the highest achievable standard of proof.

9. The Panel relied on corroborated evidence and adhered to its standards in respect of the opportunity to reply. Further details on methodology can be found in annex 1. The Panel has maintained transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence in its investigations.

II. Implementation of the peace agreement between the Government of the Central African Republic and Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique; Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation; and Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique

A. Overall assessment of the implementation of the 2025 peace agreements

The 2025 peace agreements and the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic

10. On 19 April 2025, following months of talks, the Government of the Central African Republic and leaders of two prominent armed groups belonging to the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC),¹ namely Ali Darassa (CFi.015) of Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) and Sembé Bobbo of Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation (3R), signed peace agreements under the auspices of the Government of Chad in N'Djamena (see annex 2).

11. On 10 July 2025, a symbolic ceremony was held in Bangui, attended by national authorities and representatives of armed groups, including Mr. Darassa and Mr. Bobbo, marking the effective beginning of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process for UPC and 3R elements.²

12. On 19 November 2025, the Government of the Central African Republic also signed a peace agreement with the leader of the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC), Mahamat Al-Khatim, in N'Djamena, where he had been in exile since 2021. The Panel is still seeking to obtain a copy of the document (see annex 3).

13. The 19 April and 19 November 2025 peace agreements effectively meant the return of UPC, 3R and MPC to the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, following the groups' exit in 2021 with the formation of CPC and their joining of the rebel coalition.

14. The N'Djamena agreements of 19 April 2025 are framed as instruments for the re-entry of armed groups into the peace process rather than constituting a stand-alone peace framework.³ These agreements expressly provide that armed groups will "reintegrate the [Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation] and the Luanda process" and reproduce several core principles of the Political Agreement, including the cessation

¹ See [S/2021/569](#), para. 10.

² Public reporting and news sources, July 2025.

³ The Panel has seen copies of the 19 April 2025 peace agreements between the Government of the Central African Republic and 3R and UPC. Accordingly, the analysis of the contents is focused on these two agreements.

of hostilities, the renunciation of armed violence, the surrender of arms and war material within the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, the dissolution of armed group structures, and a return to political engagement through institutional channels. In that respect, the N'Djamena agreements align with the core logic of the Political Agreement, which required armed groups to renounce violence, participate fully in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, cease all obstruction of State authority, respect humanitarian access and engage in the peace process in good faith.

15. Moreover, the N'Djamena agreements are narrower and more transactional. They provide for the participation of 3R and UPC in senior Government positions within national institutions and the Administration, as well as appointments within the military chain of command and the defence and security forces, based on competence criteria and consultation with the leadership of the respective armed groups. This approach goes beyond the general inclusion language of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and creates potential ambiguity around the nature, scope and number of positions to be granted.

16. The agreements envisage the cantonment and registration of armed group elements, disarmament following registration, the training of eligible combatants following disarmament, integration into the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic (FACA) and other defence and security forces at the end of training, and the demobilization of ineligible combatants in line with the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation. While this sequencing is more detailed than that outlined in the Agreement, it may also create expectations of integration that exceed existing capacity, notably in terms of resources.

17. Both agreements are broadly consistent with the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in their stated objectives of facilitating the re-entry of armed groups into the peace process. However, they introduce more explicit and operational commitments on political and administrative appointments and security sector integration, while creating a tripartite follow-up mechanism led by Chad which differs from the Agreement monitoring framework. The primary risks are therefore not formal contradiction but implementation ambiguity. Challenges include the sequencing and funding of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; the number of combatants to be integrated into the defence and security forces and their military rank, and the required resources; the options available to ineligible combatants; the funding of socioeconomic reintegration; and the allocation of political appointments.

18. For example, there appears to be a misalignment in the understanding of the sequencing. The dissolution of armed groups is said to have already taken place, whereas the armed groups consider that the dissolution will be effective only at the very end of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, once all combatants have been disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated with appropriate military ranks and all political appointments have been made.⁴

19. On the political front, the armed groups have had several individuals appointed in key adviser roles in the executive and legislative branches in Bangui, and other senior-level appointments are expected in the forthcoming government.⁵

20. In the Panel's assessment, the implementation of the 2025 peace agreements between the Government and the leaders of UPC, 3R and MPC remained uneven across the groups, with the agreement with MPC yet to be officially launched. Interlocutors met by the Panel described 2025 as a decisive year in which the

⁴ Ibid.; and public and news reports in 2025 and 2026.

⁵ Interviews in Bangui, March–April 2026.

Government invested heavily in the peace process, and noted that armed group activities had slowed in early 2025 while negotiations were under way and immediately after the signing.⁶ At the same time, those interlocutors emphasized the gap between commitments made in 2025, certain provisions of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and practical implementation on the ground.⁷

Implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration components of the 2025 peace agreements

21. The most visible area of progress has been the disarmament and demobilization component involving 3R and UPC. According to information gathered by the Panel during its field visit in March and April 2026, progress in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process was most tangible between July and December 2025. Interlocutors from the political and peace process architecture referred to there having been approximately 1,300 combatants, including 31 women, disarmed and demobilized.⁸ The groups cited as participating in the broader process were predominantly UPC and 3R, along with a few MPC combatants, with additional participation of factions linked to the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC)/Séléka rénovée pour la paix et la justice, and some anti-balaka elements. As of mid-April 2026, progress in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration continued to be presented as one of the main pillars of implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and the 2025 peace agreements.

22. As a central element of the implementation of the peace agreements, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process is attempting to deliver peace dividends while also having significant implications for the national security sector. Several interlocutors expressed concerns about a perceived lack of clarity on exactly how ex-combatants are to be absorbed within the defence and security forces of the Central African Republic, including the National Police and the Gendarmerie.⁹ One interlocutor in particular referred to the “necessity to avoid watering the seeds of continued insecurity and instability by now building a professional army of the people”.¹⁰

23. Nevertheless, information gathered by the Panel also points to shortcomings in the implementation architecture. The Panel was repeatedly informed of the limited visibility into the reintegration phase and inadequate clarity regarding the integration process. Interlocutors reported that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process was paused on 13 December 2025 in the run-up to the electoral period, initially for a period that was expected to last three weeks, but that activities resumed from the beginning of March 2026 and are expected to accelerate following the April 2026 voting round.¹¹ Several interlocutors also highlighted technical challenges, including insufficient resources and limited capacity, which remain key obstacles, and that the issue of integration and reintegration requires urgent attention to prevent a rollback of the progress to date.

24. The Panel also received repeated indications that the integration component was marked by uncertainty over the number of ex-combatants to be absorbed, the ranks to be granted and the institutional actors responsible for the process.¹² According to various sources, senior military officials were not aligned on the number of elements

⁶ Ibid.; and public and news reports in 2025 and 2026.

⁷ Interviews in Bangui, March–April 2026.

⁸ Interviews in Bangui with a wide range of stakeholders, March–April 2026.

⁹ Interviews in the Central African Republic, March–April 2026.

¹⁰ Confidential source in the Central African Republic, March–April 2026.

¹¹ Interviews in Bangui with a wide range of stakeholders, March–April 2026.

¹² Interviews in Bangui, March–April 2026.

to be integrated or on the treatment of their prior ranks.¹³ The question of military ranking allocation (*harmonisation des grades*) of the ex-combatants could be a stumbling block for the peace process if not addressed cautiously.¹⁴ Some interlocutors expressed concern that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration funding may be insufficient, given the difficult financial environment and also because the total number of combatants to be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated is unclear. At the same time, many ex-combatants continued to equate disarmament, demobilization and reintegration with access to the uniformed services, while other options remained vague or underfunded.¹⁵

25. The Panel further understands that the 2025 peace agreements have not yet resulted in the dismantling of the operational structures of the armed groups concerned, which remains a core contradiction, as these structures continue to be relied upon for the orderly implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The structures of the armed groups were described as having remained largely intact. Several interlocutors noted that cantonment had been reintroduced in the April 2025 peace agreements, despite not being part of the official disarmament, demobilization and reintegration dispensation, and had a significant cost implication. The issue of waiting periods at cantonment sites has been consistently cited as contributing to frustration, remobilization and renewed abuses.¹⁶

26. 3R appears to have moved substantially in formal disarmament, but has not yet completely ceased its armed activities, and the number of combatants yet to be disarmed remains unclear. Interlocutors told the Panel that 3R had disarmed to almost a similar extent as UPC, yet the security reporting reviewed by the Panel indicates that isolated or holdout 3R elements remained active in the west and north-west of the country.¹⁷ In the first week of April 2026, incident reports continued to refer to abuses by 3R, and also to the movement of 21 armed 3R elements carrying both weapons and gold detectors towards mining sites, as well as to illegal checkpoints.¹⁸ During the reporting period, information also indicated the involvement of 3R in sexual violence, kidnappings for ransom, cattle-related predation and coercive taxation, especially in Lim-Pendé and the wider Yade area.¹⁹ The Panel will continue to investigate the details of the sexual violence cases.

27. The implementation record with respect to UPC elements also remains a work in progress. According to interlocutors met by the Panel, it is not clear how many UPC elements remain to be disarmed. Similarly, other interlocutors indicated that some children associated with UPC remain in places such as Pombolo. At the operational level, activities during the reporting period show that UPC remained active in several areas despite the peace agreement.²⁰

28. The vulnerability of the implementation process was illustrated by incidents on 15 and 16 October 2025, when 22 UPC elements travelling on the Zemio axis towards Mboki to participate in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations were attacked by the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) near Kere, 25 km from Mboki. The clashes reportedly resulted in the deaths of six AAKG members and one UPC member.²¹ Subsequent reporting reviewed by the Panel confirmed that UPC elements

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ [S/2025/384](#), para. 13.

¹⁵ Interviews in Bangui, March–April 2026.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Confidential security reporting.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Interviews in Bangui, March–April 2026.

²⁰ Interviews in Bangui and Zemio, March–April 2026.

²¹ Confidential security reports.

continued to operate in the north-east and south-east and around mining corridors, including in Vakaga and Mbomou Prefectures.²²

29. According to information obtained by the Panel, since the signing of the 19 November 2025 peace agreement, implementation arrangements have not yet been formally agreed between the Government of the Central African Republic and MPC (see para. 36).²³ The group was also less visible in direct incident reporting inside the Central African Republic during the reporting period. Some interlocutors indicated that MPC had released children associated with its ranks after committing to do so.²⁴

30. MPC negotiations regarding the November 2025 peace agreement had been ongoing since 2024. The Panel's 2025 findings show that, during the course of those negotiations, after his release from detention in N'Djamena in March 2025, Mahamat Al-Khatim simultaneously resumed political outreach and sought access to arms and ammunition networks linked to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).²⁵ This dual track underscores the fragility of MPC commitments made under the current peace process.

31. The Panel's observations are that the 2025 peace agreements helped revive a political framework, contributed to a reduction in some armed group activities and supported the conduct of elections in the country in December 2025. There are indications of goodwill on the side of both the Government and the armed groups, as well as real gains on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. However, to deliver on the key objectives of the 2025 peace agreements, the implementation of those agreements will need to resolve the core structural issues that continue to undermine peace, security and stability, including the complete dismantling of armed groups' command structures, achieving greater clarity over integration and reintegration processes, tackling the persistence of transnational supply networks and addressing violations committed by signatory armed groups. These challenges are especially visible in the continued activities of 3R in the west and north-west, the continued operational presence of UPC and the ambiguity surrounding MPC re-engagement.

B. Review of arms and ammunition collected through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration following the 2025 peace agreements

32. The Panel conducted a review of arms and ammunition collected through the formal national disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation programme in the Central African Republic. This review draws upon a verified data set comprising 1,025 individual weapons records collected between July 2025 and March 2026, containing detailed information on the location of collection, weapon type, calibre, number, provenance and functionality (see annex 4). The data set further identifies the armed group associated with each collected item, thereby providing insight into the relative participation of various factions in disarmament initiatives.

33. As at the date of writing, among the 1,025 firearms collected, 976 weapons (95.2%) were assessed as functional at the time of handover, 46 weapons (4.5%) were classified as non-functional, obsolete or requiring repair, and 3 weapons were recorded as "undetermined" (see annex 5). This high proportion of functional weapons aligns with standard disarmament, demobilization and reintegration protocols whereby only functional weapons are meant to qualify for the process.

²² Ibid.

²³ Interviews in Bangui, March–April 2026.

²⁴ Interviews in the Central African Republic, March–April 2026.

²⁵ See S/2025/385, para. 49.

Assault rifles of the AK-pattern continued to dominate collections, confirming the trend documented in the Panel's previous reports for 2025.²⁶ Weapons of the Type 56 series (451 units) represented the largest single category, followed by AK-47 variants (193 units), RPG-7 launchers (74 units), AKM rifles (56 units), Galil rifles (31 units) and PKM machine guns (28 units) (see annex 6). The predominance of the AK-pattern weapons is explained, in part, by the fact that they are relatively low-maintenance and can be sustained through established illicit supply networks, including for ammunition.

34. Analysis of the data set indicates that UPC and 3R collectively accounted for 79.1% of collected weapons (811 units), which aligns with expectations following the peace agreements. The remaining 20.9% of weapons (214 units) were collected mainly from FPRC and two anti-balaka wings (Mokom and Ngaïssona), as signatories of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, even though they did not participate in this recent peace process. The Panel notes a discrepancy between the number of weapons collected (1,025) and the number of combatants registered under the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, estimated at 1,331 as at the time of writing. This is partly explained by the fact that fighters can present only ammunition and do not need to present a weapon to participate in the process. The Panel is further examining this discrepancy.

35. At the time of writing, UPC accounted for 505 weapons collected, representing the largest share among participating armed groups (see annex 7). This figure corresponds to nearly half of the total firearms collected, thereby indicating the notable participation of UPC thus far.

36. MPC recorded only eight weapons returned to date. This limited participation reflects several intersecting factors, including the fragmentation of MPC into numerous groupings and the seeming inability of its leader, Mahamat Al-Khatim, to exert effective authority over the group's elements.²⁷ This has affected the internal coordination of MPC and its ability to organize structured participation in disarmament activities. Some MPC-affiliated fighters have gravitated towards other signatory groups with stronger operational structures, including UPC, while elements of the MPC command structure and leaders of some smaller groupings have been stalling, pending greater clarity on the internal allocation of benefits resulting from the peace agreement and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

37. The data set also shows that MAS-36 rifles (7.5×54 mm) collected during the reporting period were predominantly associated with the anti-balaka Mokom and Anti-balaka Ngaïssona wings. With 20 weapons recorded, the MAS-36 represented the largest single weapon type collected from these factions during this period. This relatively low number is consistent with historical disarmament trends, as the Panel has previously documented that a substantial proportion of MAS-36 rifles had already been recovered through prior security operations and collection exercises.²⁸ Furthermore, the limited availability of 7.5×54 mm ammunition to armed groups significantly affects the operational utility of the MAS-36. The Panel assesses that the surrender of these rifles is likely to reflect a decision to dispose of weapons that are difficult to maintain or are operationally outdated.

38. Conversely, the continued presence of 7.62×39 mm intermediate cartridges reflects their cross-platform interoperability. Their widespread availability significantly influences the acquisition and retention decisions of armed groups with

²⁶ See [S/2025/384](#), para. 58.

²⁷ Interviews in Bangui, March–April 2026.

²⁸ See [S/2025/384](#), para. 59.

regard to the AK-pattern rifles, which are the most widely used across armed groups in the region.

39. Collection sites recorded in the database correspond to the known areas of presence of each armed group, with patterns broadly consistent with their historical areas of operation, rather than reflecting arbitrary geographical dispersion (see annex 8).

III. Situation in the south-east of the Central African Republic

A. Security and armed group dynamics

40. The south-east of the Central African Republic remained a key armed conflict hotspot during the reporting period. Incident reporting from September 2025 to March 2026 shows a clear concentration of armed confrontations in Haut-Mbomou and adjacent areas, with Zemio, Mboki, Bambouti, Obo, Djema and Dembia featuring repeatedly.²⁹ The period was characterized above all by the operational prominence of AAKG, which became the most visible non-State armed actor in open clashes. The material reviewed by the Panel suggests that the south-east experienced a marked militarization during the electoral period and in its immediate aftermath.

41. Field interlocutors described AAKG as having been weakened in comparison with its earlier configuration, while remaining active across several red zones in Haut-Mbomou. Bambouti, Mboki, Djema, areas around Zemio and the Guénékoumba area were all cited as continued centres of AAKG presence.³⁰ Several interlocutors also emphasized that Bambouti appeared to operate with a distinct dynamic of its own. At the same time, some AAKG members were said to be interested in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, while others sought to remain in the bush for fear of reprisals.³¹

42. The Panel heard from various sources, including some AAKG members, about the group's different demands, of which three were consistent requests, namely: the departure from Haut-Mbomou of Russian instructors as a condition for AAKG disarmament; confirmation of the whereabouts of two arrested AAKG leaders, Célestin Bakayogo-Leman and Elie Gomengue (aka Elie Pasteur); and a request for a dialogue process with the authorities.³² The Panel observed that the Government sent a delegation to Haut-Mbomou in early April 2026 to prepare the ground for a potential dialogue.³³

43. Information gathered by the Panel during its field visit in Haut-Mbomou indicates that the continued resilience of AAKG is linked to several factors. First, the group benefits from being deeply embedded in the community. Interlocutors in Zemio and Obo told the Panel that AAKG elements belonged to the local community and were therefore well informed about population movements along key axes and within the towns and surrounding areas.³⁴ Second, the group appears able to exploit cross-border community networks with the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan. Third, State authority remains in its infancy outside a limited number of rural centres. Multiple interlocutors stressed that the extension of State authority and services in Haut-Mbomou remained very limited, particularly in remote areas along

²⁹ Various incident reports.

³⁰ Interviews in Zemio and Obo, March–April 2026.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Field visits in Zemio and Obo, March–April 2026.

³⁴ Interviews in Zemio and Obo, March–April 2026.

the different axes, and that the Government response to insecurity in the area had remained predominantly militarized.³⁵

44. Interlocutors stated that Fulani communities continued to be targeted by AAKG in the area.³⁶ The enquiry by the Panel further identified repeated references to the presence or influence of South Sudanese and Congolese elements within the border region, and to the use of ethnic Azande networks across the three countries. Some local interlocutors described AAKG actions as being driven, in part, by a cross-border agenda to assert territorial control over the south-east of the Central African Republic, with the aim of establishing an Azande kingdom.³⁷

45. The violence in the south-east was not limited to AAKG. The Panel was told that UPC remained active in parts of Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou, notwithstanding the 2025 peace agreements and earlier rounds of disarmament.³⁸

46. From mid-December 2025 onward, the south-east entered a sharper phase of militarization linked to the electoral period. On 16 December, a fuel convoy for humanitarian actors was attacked 40 km west of Zemio. The broader incident material reviewed by the Panel indicates that such attacks contributed not only to insecurity along the axis but also to killings, abductions and the burning of trucks (see para. 60).

47. The pattern intensified in the days immediately preceding and following the 28 December vote. On 28 December, AAKG attacked Bambouti, overran FACA positions, burned electoral materials and abducted local officials and election workers (see para. 63). On the same date, AAKG fired a rocket-propelled grenade at a FACA checkpoint near Zemio.³⁹

48. Between 1 and 7 January 2026, fighting spread further across Zemio and Bambouti. Incident reporting reviewed by the Panel described attacks on the positions of FACA and Russian instructors, including attacks on the aerodrome, the Gendarmerie and the hospital in Zemio.⁴⁰ Interlocutors met by the Panel in the field described the 4 January coordinated attack on the Gendarmerie and the hospital as marking a significant deterioration in local security conditions.⁴¹

49. The south-east remained unstable after the immediate electoral period, with growing evidence of military engagement involving AAKG. On 3 February 2026, AAKG attacked a FACA position at Dembia, east of Rafai. The following day, FACA and Russian instructors carried out a joint air and ground operation near Bambouti against armed elements allegedly involved in illegal resource exploitation and other criminal activities. According to the incident report, the operation resulted in the dismantling of camps, the seizure of arms, ammunition and communications equipment, and the expulsion of a large number of purported foreigners. On 10 March 2026, AAKG ambushed a patrol of FACA and Russian instructors on the Obo axis and also clashed with FACA and Russian instructors near Mboki. In the same incident, a Peuhl interpreter serving with FACA was killed, further heightening communal tensions.⁴²

50. The latest security information available to the Panel indicates that the situation remained acute in mid-April 2026. During the first two weeks of April, several AAKG movements were reported near Obo, on the Obo-Bambouti axis, at Ligoua and on the

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Interviews in Zemio, March–April 2026. See [S/2025/385](#), para. 127.

³⁷ Interviews in Zemio and Obo, March–April 2026.

³⁸ Interviews in Bangui, Zemio and Obo, March–April 2026.

³⁹ Various incident reports, 2025.

⁴⁰ Various incident reports; and interviews in Zemio, March–April 2026.

⁴¹ Interviews in Zemio, March–April 2026.

⁴² Various incident reports, 2026.

Obo-Mboki axis. The same reporting referred to plans or intentions to disrupt the 26 April electoral process, as well as continued exactions against civilians, including armed robbery in the Sikotara quarter in Obo and the intimidation of farmers, hunters and fishers in Batimbilika and Makembé.⁴³ On 10 April 2026, a convoy of FACA and Russian instructors was attacked on the Zemio-Dembia axis, and two AAKG armed elements were apprehended during the incident.⁴⁴

51. In the Panel's assessment, the security situation in the south-east is no longer reducible to a simple confrontation between AAKG and UPC. It now reflects a broader fragmentation of the security landscape in which partially integrated or partially disarmed elements, local self-defence dynamics, cross-border solidarities operating through deeply embedded networks, long-standing grievances and unresolved communal tensions intersect with a heavily militarized State response. This has produced a highly unstable environment in which armed actors remain mobile on the axes, civilian populations continue to be trapped between rival coercive structures and the political process remains vulnerable to disruption.

B. Arms situation

52. The south-east remained exposed to significant flows and use of weapons and related material. Incident reporting documents the use of a rocket-propelled grenade by AAKG on 28 December 2025 near Zemio, and field interlocutors linked the January 2026 attacks in Zemio to the use of rockets, DKM-type weapons and AK-pattern rifles.⁴⁵

53. The Panel was repeatedly informed during its mission that arms and ammunition continued to reach the south-east from South Sudan and from across the Mbomou River from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and from other parts of the Central African Republic. Interlocutors stressed the difficulty of controlling border crossings at Zapai and other riverine or bush routes.⁴⁶ The Panel also heard from different sources that some of the weapons available to AAKG had been taken by the group from UPC during years of fighting. The same sources mentioned that AAKG had access to some of the UPC weapons cache.⁴⁷

54. Further information reviewed by the Panel confirms that weapons associated with the December 2025 events continued to circulate in the south-east. On 5 March 2026 in Bambouti, a civilian voluntarily surrendered a Simonov self-loading carbine (SKS) rifle with five rounds after stating that he had joined armed elements during the 28 December 2025 incident and subsequently fled to South Sudan and then returned.⁴⁸

55. On 14 March 2026 in Bangassou, shotgun ammunition was seized from a trader travelling towards a mining area.⁴⁹ Together with the 4 February 2026 operation near Bambouti, these incidents point to an environment in which weapons remain widely dispersed among civilians, ex-combatants and armed elements, while insecurity around mining and border zones continues to facilitate their circulation.

⁴³ Various security sources in Bangui, April 2026.

⁴⁴ Confidential security reporting, 2026.

⁴⁵ Various incident reports, 2025–2026.

⁴⁶ Interviews in Zemio, March–April 2026.

⁴⁷ Interviews in Obo and Bangui, March–April 2026.

⁴⁸ Confidential security sources, 2025–2026.

⁴⁹ Various incident reports, 2026.

C. Humanitarian and human rights situation

56. The humanitarian and human rights situation in the south-east remained deeply concerning. Documentation and investigation by the Panel point to repeated attacks on civilians, including abductions, hostage-taking, destruction of civilian property, attacks affecting civilian infrastructure and severe restrictions on humanitarian access.

57. The Panel has received from multiple credible sources photographic evidence showing the impact of the AAKG attacks on FACA soldiers and on civilians. The Panel notes that the images depict disturbing scenes of mutilation (see confidential annex C).

Targeting of civilians and ethnic- or religious-based attacks

58. Field interlocutors consistently described a climate of fear among Muslim communities in and around Zemio. They reported that Muslims not involved in hostilities were unable to circulate safely along the axes, access their fields or obtain schooling and healthcare, and, in some cases, they have expressed the wish to be relocated out of the prefecture, as also reported previously by the Panel.⁵⁰ Several interlocutors stated that the roads had become unusable from a security perspective for commerce and that farming and trading livelihoods requiring usage of the roads in any way had been severely disrupted.⁵¹

59. These concerns are consistent with the broader pattern identified by the Panel in the south-east since 2024, including previous findings of grave human rights violations and the impact of ongoing humanitarian constraints. Muslim civilians had been repeatedly targeted on the basis of purported affiliation with UPC.⁵²

60. The current field material suggests that these earlier patterns of communal targeting continued in 2025 and 2026. On 30 November 2025, AAKG elements reportedly killed five Fulani civilians near Mboki, and contributed to heightened intercommunal violence.⁵³ On 16 December 2025, on the Zemio-Dembia axis near Tabane village, AAKG members attacked, robbed and set fire to a convoy of two lorries carrying fuel and other commercial merchandise. Between approximately 10 and 20 civilians travelling in the trucks were abducted and held for weeks. A number of field interlocutors confirmed at the end of March 2026 that the hostages had been killed, although the Panel was not able, on the basis of the material reviewed for the present report, to independently verify when they were killed and the exact number.⁵⁴

61. The Panel was also informed about the challenges of official attempts to identify AAKG combatants among the Azande community. For example, while community members described scarification as a general cultural practice, security actors are said to be using scarification as evidence of AAKG affiliation and consider it a part of their initiation rituals.⁵⁵ This exposes civilians and non-combatants to suspicion and potential targeting.

Abduction and kidnapping around elections

62. The insecurity around the election period noted above also saw a spike in politically motivated abductions and kidnappings, which represents an expansion of

⁵⁰ Interviews in Zemio, March–April 2026. See [S/2025/385](#), annex 28.

⁵¹ Interviews in Zemio, March–April 2026.

⁵² See [S/2025/385](#), para. 125 and annex 28.

⁵³ Public reporting, February 2026.

⁵⁴ Interviews in Zemio, March–April 2026; and various incident reports.

⁵⁵ Interviews in Zemio and Obo, March–April 2026.

the targeting of civilians by AAKG. Human rights monitors reported that, between 17 and 23 December 2025, AAKG members abducted at least 14 people, 13 of whom were electoral candidates or members of campaign teams. All were subsequently released after being held for between one and three days.⁵⁶

63. On 28 December 2025, during the election day attack in Bambouti, AAKG kidnapped four officials, including the sub-prefect of Bambouti.⁵⁷ Interlocutors described a telephone exchange with the four hostages in February 2026 as confirmation that they were still alive.⁵⁸ The Panel gathered reports of demands made by AAKG for their release, including a financial ransom and either the release of, or proof of life for, AAKG leaders arrested in Bangui in January 2025.⁵⁹

Attacks against humanitarian personnel, and humanitarian access

64. Attacks against humanitarian and health personnel impeded humanitarian access and the effective delivery of assistance to populations. United Nations monitoring recorded 20 incidents affecting humanitarian workers in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, out of 61 such incidents countrywide.⁶⁰

65. The intensity of violence in December 2025 was also reflected in incidents affecting health personnel. On 4 December 2025, along the Zemio–Djema axis, a health worker and two motorcycle taxi drivers were reported missing after having been intercepted by armed elements who confiscated vaccines and ordered them to return to Zemio.⁶¹ On the same day, in Ngouyo (80 km from Zemio), three additional health workers were abducted by unidentified armed men. On the next day, 5 December 2025, in Guibéré (30 km from Zemio), suspected AAKG members abducted two additional health workers.⁶²

66. On 5 January 2026, AAKG elements attempted to storm the Zemio hospital with the intent to kill patients inside, namely a couple of FACA soldiers wounded in the previous day's clashes. They fired shots at the hospital and attempted to gain access, but were blocked by MINUSCA peacekeepers.⁶³ The Panel also received information from multiple sources indicating that health posts in villages in and around Zemio were attacked and destroyed during operations against AAKG.⁶⁴

67. Humanitarian access was already constrained by the physical inaccessibility of Haut-Mbomou by road: in normal times, a road trip from Bangui to Obo can take up to three weeks.⁶⁵ The insecurity has further exacerbated these constraints. The heightened insecurity in December 2025 led to a suspension of humanitarian activities by most actors, with renewed needs assessment activity evident in late March 2026. Access to vulnerable populations has been further complicated by displacement away from towns, villages and farms, as populations seek safety in the bush.

Displacement

68. The violence during the reporting period had an immediate humanitarian and demographic impact. Armed clashes between AAKG and government forces resulted in significant displacement of civilians from Haut-Mbomou to the Democratic

⁵⁶ Public reporting, December 2025.

⁵⁷ Public reporting and incident reports, December 2025 and January 2026.

⁵⁸ Confidential sources in the Central African Republic, March–April 2026.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ United Nations monitoring data, September 2025–March 2026.

⁶¹ Interviews in Zemio, March–April 2026; and public reporting, December 2025.

⁶² Public reporting, December 2025.

⁶³ Community and security sources in the Central African Republic, March–April 2026.

⁶⁴ Interviews in Zemio, March–April 2026.

⁶⁵ Interviews in the Central African Republic, March–April 2026.

Republic of Congo and South Sudan. Attacks in late December and early January led to approximately 3,000 people fleeing Bambouti to South Sudan; interlocutors estimate that only a few hundred have since returned.⁶⁶

69. The Panel received information indicating that populations fled Zemio and surrounding localities during the late December and early January attacks, including towards Zapai and across the river into the Democratic Republic of Congo. Estimates of displacement from Zemio vary, with some sources indicating 45,000 to 50,000 people, while other estimates put the number at 60,000 to 65,000 people (see annex 9).⁶⁷ Some returns reportedly began in February 2026, but field interlocutors stressed that the returns remained partial and fragile, with many houses burned or damaged and some returnees staying with relatives rather than reoccupying their homes. Field interlocutors also note that returnees are subject to unofficial fees collected at river border crossings imposed by armed actors, further complicating returns.⁶⁸ As one interlocutor said: “They left with empty hands and return with even less.”⁶⁹

70. The evidence indicates that unresolved disappearances, the burning and looting of homes and the continued inability of civilians to move safely beyond a short radius around Zemio have combined to worsen a prolonged humanitarian crisis. Even where returns have begun, several interlocutors told the Panel that assistance remained insufficient compared to needs, water access was highly constrained and mobile medical support was needed.⁷⁰

IV. Situation in the north-east of the Central African Republic

A. Security and armed group dynamics

71. In the north-east, the information reviewed by the Panel confirms a continued convergence of local armed group activity, transnational supply networks and spillover from the conflict in the Sudan. The geographical core of concern remains Vakaga and Haute-Kotto Prefectures, with direct relevance also for adjacent areas of Bamingui-Bangoran. The Panel’s earlier reporting had already identified Am Dafok as a key logistical and recruitment hub linked to RSF and other armed actors.⁷¹ Events during the current review period show that these structural vulnerabilities persisted through 2025 and early 2026.

72. The Panel’s field visit underscored a deteriorating security environment in the north-east. Several interlocutors indicated that RSF remains one of the main actors in the area and warned that the emergence of self-defence groups could evolve into longer-term ethnic or community-based tensions, similar to dynamics observed elsewhere, including in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture.⁷²

73. The Panel observed that there are essentially two groupings of actors involved in violent and deadly clashes.⁷³ The first grouping is composed of State and State-allied forces: FACA, Russian instructors, armed actors referred to by several interlocutors as “Wagner Noirs” and local self-defence militias. The term “Wagner

⁶⁶ Community and security sources in the Central African Republic, March–April 2026.

⁶⁷ Interviews in Zemio, March–April 2026; and public reporting, 2026.

⁶⁸ Interviews in Zemio, March–April 2026.

⁶⁹ Interviews in Obo, March–April 2026.

⁷⁰ Community and security sources in the Central African Republic, March–April 2026.

⁷¹ [S/2024/444](#), para. 16.

⁷² Interviews in Birao, April 2026.

⁷³ Interviews in the Central African Republic, March–April 2026.

Noirs” was repeatedly mentioned to the Panel by several interlocutors, including in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, where the term was used interchangeably with “Wagner Peulhs”, both seeming to refer to ex-combatants who, after being disarmed and demobilized, had now turned into units working alongside Russian instructors.⁷⁴ At the same time, the local self-defence militias had emerged in most of the major towns in Vakaga Prefecture, made up of young people from the community who initially were focused on defending their areas against incursions by RSF and armed elements but later were also mobilized to assist in offensive military operations in their areas. Some interlocutors stated that members of the self-defence militias were offered opportunities for further training in Bangui.⁷⁵ With this first grouping of actors, particularly the non-regular forces, the absence of clarity on the command-and-control structure raises concerns regarding accountability and the protection of civilians.

74. The second grouping, composed of non-State armed actors operating across the greater Fertit region, including Vakaga, Haute-Kotto and Bamingui-Bangoran Prefectures, remains opaque. The presence of RSF and affiliated elements continues to constitute an important feature of the landscape, with reports indicating the continued presence of FPRC and Parti pour le rassemblement de la nation centrafricaine (PRNC) elements and remnants of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)(CFE.002). Reports also refer to the circulation of “loose” armed individuals referred to as “Sudanese” armed elements and/or armed “bandits”.⁷⁶ The Panel has noted the fluidity of some of these labels and observed that, at times, when FPRC or RSF presence or involvement is reported, it cannot be excluded that the group referred to is a mix of two or all three of FPRC, PRNC and RSF elements.⁷⁷ The Panel had previously reported on the presence of groups of armed elements referred to as “Sudanese Arabs” or “Sudanese armed elements”, which the Panel understands to be a mixture of RSF and Central African Republic armed group elements that are active mainly in Vakaga Prefecture.⁷⁸ The Panel has received information from multiple sources, which it has corroborated, indicating that the RSF commander in the area, Mohamed Al-Hessein Mohamed Atahir, widely referred to as “General” Djazouli and mentioned in previous Panel reports,⁷⁹ has been recruiting young men, particularly in and around Birao, offering them motorcycles and other forms of compensation to join his ranks.⁸⁰

75. This complex actor landscape is reflected in a series of operations carried out by FACA and Russian instructors against armed actors in the north-east at the beginning of the reporting period. On 5 September 2025, FACA and Russian instructors attacked armed elements near Ndélé, recovering two AK rifles and one PKM machine gun. On the same date, Russian instructors launched an operation against PRNC elements in the Sam Ouandja area.⁸¹ On 12 October 2025, FACA and Russian instructors conducted an operation against an LRA-linked position near Sam Ouandja and reportedly dismantled an arms trafficking point (see para. 83), while a separate operation the same day targeted foreign armed elements in a village east of Sam Ouandja. On 31 October 2025, a patrol comprised of FACA elements and

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.; and confidential security reporting.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ August 2025 progress update.

⁷⁹ See [S/2019/930](#), para. 75, and [S/2025/385](#), para. 28.

⁸⁰ Confidential security sources in the Central African Republic, 2025–2026.

⁸¹ Security sources in the Central African Republic, March–April 2026.

Russian instructors near Birao was ambushed by presumed elements of FPRC and the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement Fondamentale (CPC-F).⁸²

76. The north-east also experienced a marked increase in activity during the electoral period. On 1 December 2025, FACA and Russian instructors carried out an operation in the Aouk area against presumed UPC, CPC-F and FPRC elements. On 17 December, Russian instructors clashed with armed Sudanese fighters east of Sam Ouandja. Other reports refer to another confrontation in late December in the Aouk area between Russian instructors, supported by an air asset, and presumed FPRC elements. On 25 December, clashes between State security forces and unidentified armed elements in Hadajlit and Sarahevo villages led to civilian casualties and the complete burning of the Hadajlit market.⁸³ These incidents indicate that the electoral period was not only tense in the south-east, but also marked by continuing pressure in the Vakaga-Haute-Kotto theatre.

77. The involvement of local self-defence actors became more visible in early January 2026. On 3 January, Russian instructors, reportedly accompanied by locally recruited young people from Birao and Am Dafok, attacked a temporary RSF base near Karkar, 30 km north west of Am Dafok.⁸⁴ The information reviewed by the Panel indicates that this action resulted in fatalities on the RSF side and generated fears of retaliatory action against nearby localities such as Boura (25 km north of Birao) and Boromata (95 km south west of Birao).⁸⁵ This incident is significant, as it highlights both the operational footprint of RSF-linked elements in the territory of the Central African Republic and the increasing involvement of locally mobilized self-defence actors in cross-border security dynamics.

78. The north-east remained unstable after January 2026. On the night of 21 to 22 January, Russian instructors attacked an alleged PRNC base near Sam Ouandja. Interlocutors also reported continued activity by smaller LRA remnants in the broader eastern space, although these were described as less numerous and less strategically significant than in earlier years.⁸⁶ At the same time, insecurity around mining sites and along key road corridors persisted. Incident reporting reviewed by the Panel highlights repeated UPC incursions or armed robberies at mining sites in Vakaga and Haute-Kotto, including at Keye (65 km south of Birao) and Boutabaye, as well as robberies of miners on the Sam Ouandja axis.⁸⁷

79. The most recent reporting available to the Panel confirms that the north-east remained volatile ahead of the 26 April poll. In the Fertit region, including Birao and Ndélé, persistent infiltrations by RSF-affiliated elements and other unidentified armed actors were reported. On 11 April, four farmers were killed on the Bili-Bili–Am Dafok axis. On 13 April, three traders were robbed on the Ndélé–Krakoma axis. On 15 April, three individuals identified as RSF elements reportedly confiscated five donkeys from six women after the women refused to disclose the location of their husbands. This incident reportedly prompted a response from self-defence groups. In that same week, there were also reports of extortion by elements referred to as “Wagner Noirs” at the weekly market in Boura and Birao, including the imposition of taxes and laissez-passer fees on Sudanese herders.⁸⁸

⁸² Confidential security reporting, 2025–2026.

⁸³ Interviews in the Central African Republic, March–April 2026; and public reporting, December 2025.

⁸⁴ Confidential security reporting, 2026.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Confidential security reporting, 2025–2026.

⁸⁸ Confidential security reporting, 2026.

80. Overall, the security dynamics in the north-east continued to be shaped by a combination of internal and external factors, including the continuation of spillover from the Sudan into Vakaga and Haute-Kotto, the continued presence of armed groups exploiting border areas and mining sites for mobility and financing, persistent constraints on access to those areas, and the instrumentalization of local self-defence actors whose emergence further fragments the security landscape. While the local peace agreement concluded in October 2025 between the communities of Am Dafok in the Central African Republic and Umm Dafog in the Sudan appears to have contributed to a degree of intercommunal stabilization, broader armed and cross-border threats affecting the area remain a serious concern.⁸⁹

B. Arms situation

81. The north-east remained a key node for the circulation of arms and related material. The Panel's previous findings had identified Am Dafok, Sam Ouandja, the Ndah mining area and, more broadly Haute-Kotto as a recruitment and supply corridor connected to RSF networks operating through Nyala, Sudan. The Panel had also established connections between these networks and Central African Republic armed actors, including individuals associated with UPC and FPRC/CPC and involved in recruitment and movement along these corridors.⁹⁰ The Panel's findings for the current reporting period suggest that these linkages remained active into 2026.

82. The Panel received a video recording, dated early March 2026 and lasting three minutes and 48 seconds, depicting approximately 60 armed combatants on new motorcycles. Statements captured in the footage indicate affiliation with RSF commander Djazouli, and his armed elements conducting coordinated movement in the tri-border area between the Central African Republic, Chad and the Sudan.⁹¹ The group stated its intention to advance towards Am Dafok with the objective of securing the border and enforcing its closure. Most combatants were observed carrying AK-pattern assault rifles, while a limited number were equipped with PKM machine guns and 7.62 mm ammunition (see annex 10). The Panel continues to analyse the footage to verify the precise geographical location of the incident and to confirm the identity of the individuals present.

83. On 12 October 2025, FACA, supported by Russian instructors, conducted a security operation along the axis linking Kotto 3 in the Central African Republic to Umm Dafog in the Sudan, in the Sam Ouandja area (Haute-Kotto Prefecture), targeting positions allegedly held by LRA.⁹² According to the incident report, nine armed combatants were killed. Three encampments established at sites of illegal construction, as well as one location identified as a weapons trafficking hub, were dismantled. Government forces also seized a significant cache of weapons, including six assault rifles, five machine guns, one grenade launcher, 58 grenades and approximately 5,000 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition and 4,570 rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition (see annex 11). These findings indicate that the armed groups remain active and that associated weapons supply networks continue to operate. The Panel will continue to investigate further.

84. Similarly, over the preceding 12 months, Sam Ouandja was among the localities most frequently associated with cases involving seized, discovered or voluntarily surrendered arms and ammunition. At the national level, in March 2026 alone, 10 war

⁸⁹ Interviews in Birao, April 2026; and public reporting, 2026.

⁹⁰ See S/2024/444, paras. 16–20.

⁹¹ Confidential security sources, 2026.

⁹² Public security reporting, 2025.

weapons, 9 magazines, 3 grenades and 1,188 rounds were recovered, pointing to a renewed increase in arms circulation.⁹³

85. Information gathered by the Panel during its field mission further indicates that the arms environment in the north-east is not limited to structured armed groups. A review of security incidents in Vakaga during the reporting period points to the presence of armed men near Birao carrying AK-pattern rifles, as well as broader indications of military-grade weapons circulating outside formal force structures, including among self-defence groups.⁹⁴

86. The Panel confirmed from multiple sources that weapons are widely available in the area, largely as a result of spillover from the conflict in the Sudan. At the same time, civilians reported carrying weapons for self-protection.⁹⁵ Taken together, these factors point to a permissive weapons environment in which border insecurity, informal recruitment, mining-site protection rackets, banditry and opportunistic armed mobilization intersect.

C. Humanitarian situation

87. The humanitarian and human rights situation in the north-east remained concerning throughout the reporting period. Since 2024, the Panel has documented how the conflict in the Sudan has driven refugee flows into the Central African Republic, strained relations between refugees and host communities in Vakaga Prefecture and complicated food security and humanitarian delivery.⁹⁶ Interlocutors met by the Panel in April 2026 stated that the population of the Korsi neighbourhood of Birao had grown considerably, outnumbering the local population. According to official figures, since 2023 more than 35,000 Sudanese refugees have fled to the Central African Republic, with approximately 22,000 residing in Korsi. In addition, over 6,900 former Central African refugees have returned from the Sudan.⁹⁷ These trends underscore the sustained demographic and humanitarian pressure created by the conflict in the Sudan.⁹⁸

88. Information available to the Panel indicates that civilians in Vakaga and adjacent border areas continued to face grave abuses at the hands of RSF or other Sudanese armed elements, including killings, the burning of houses, displacement, abduction and torture.⁹⁹ Civilians continued to be directly exposed to cross-border violence, as illustrated by the killing of farmers on the Bili-Bili–Am Dafok axis and reported reprisals against women on 15 April 2026 (see para. 79 above).

89. Civilians in the north-east were also affected by insecurity around mining sites and along key road corridors. Information collected by the Panel consistently highlights the impact on civilians of armed incursions, robberies and predatory activities at or near mining sites in Vakaga and Haute-Kotto, as well as attacks on traders and travellers moving between localities such as Ndélé, Krakoma, Sam Ouandja and Ouanda-Djallé.¹⁰⁰ The Panel also continues to investigate reports of children working at the Cinq Kilo/Manou mine, located 5 km from Gordil, Vakaga Prefecture, undertaking tasks such as crushing rocks, washing, transporting water and

⁹³ Various security reports, 2025–2026.

⁹⁴ Interviews in Birao, April 2026; and security reporting, 2025–2026.

⁹⁵ Various community and security sources in the Central African Republic, March–April 2026.

⁹⁶ See S/2024/444, paras. 23–28.

⁹⁷ Public reporting, April 2026.

⁹⁸ Interviews with various stakeholders in the Central African Republic, March–April 2026.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Security reporting, 2025–2026.

handling chemicals.¹⁰¹ These patterns suggest that arms flows, mining-related predation and civilian insecurity remain closely interconnected.

90. Civilians in Vakaga were caught up in and significantly affected by the fighting. In mid-September 2025, interlocutors described an operation conducted by FACA, supported by Russian instructors, against suspected RSF elements which resulted in two individuals killed, two captured and the burning of several homes. RSF elements reportedly retaliated against another village, also setting homes on fire. As retaliations intensified, RSF elements were observed entering the Central African Republic on approximately 40 motorcycles, causing widespread panic among the local population. An estimated 11,000 people fled their villages and sought refuge near the MINUSCA temporary base in Am Dafok.¹⁰² The Panel notes that communities often appear to be subjected to collective punishment, with villages and homes burned down indiscriminately.

91. In addition to large-scale displacement, civilians were targeted on suspicion of acting as informers, or subjected to violence to extract information. One reported case concerns a 53-year old man who arrived at the Am Dafok camp for internally displaced persons on 26 September 2025 and reported that he had been abducted from the Central African Republic and taken to the Sudan and tortured for four days by RSF elements, who had accused him of sharing information about them with Russian instructors. Another case describes how five young women were assaulted, threatened and questioned outside Am Dafok on 22 January 2026 regarding the identity and whereabouts of the young men involved in the killing of a Sudanese national the previous year.¹⁰³

92. Humanitarian needs in Birao continue to increase and remain acute. Economic pressures linked to population growth, the loss of access to markets in the Sudan, the poor condition of the road to Bangui and increased banditry along the axes have all contributed to rising prices. For example, food items previously sold for 150 CFA francs are now reported to cost 500 CFA francs. Community concerns that limited humanitarian assistance is being redirected towards the refugees, combined with the increased insecurity caused by the presence of RSF elements, are contributing to growing tensions and resentment towards the refugees.¹⁰⁴ The Panel will continue to monitor the situation.

V. Regional and international cooperation in support of peace, security and stability

93. The Government of the Central African Republic continued to pursue bilateral, regional and international cooperation aimed at addressing cross-border insecurity, armed group activity and arms trafficking, and creating security conditions conducive to the peace process and the electoral period. These efforts built on cooperation frameworks documented in previous reports of the Panel, including the revitalization of the High-level Joint Commission on Cooperation between the Central African Republic and Chad in October 2024, the January 2025 bilateral military cooperation agreement between the two countries and broader initiatives by the Government to strengthen border management and regional security cooperation.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Interviews in Birao, April 2026.

¹⁰² Ibid.; and security and public reporting, 2025–2026.

¹⁰³ Confidential security reporting, 2025–2026.

¹⁰⁴ Interviews in Birao, April 2026.

¹⁰⁵ See S/2025/385, para. 21.

A. Regional cooperation

Central African Republic and Cameroon

94. Cooperation with Cameroon also advanced. On 4 September 2025, the Governments of Cameroon and the Central African Republic signed a defence partnership agreement in Yaoundé.¹⁰⁶ The agreement was signed by the Minister Delegate at the Presidency in charge of Defence of Cameroon, Joseph Beti Assomo, and the Minister of National Defence and Army Reconstruction of the Central African Republic, Claude Rameaux Bireau. According to the Ministry of Defence of Cameroon, the ceremony took place at the Ministry in Yaoundé and was attended by senior civilian and military officials from both countries.

95. The agreement is of significance, as the Cameroon-Central African Republic corridor remains the latter country's principal commercial lifeline. Previous Panel reporting noted that more than 80% of goods imported into the Central African Republic transit through the Douala–Garoua–Boulaï–Cantonner–Beloko corridor, and that military escorts for cargo vehicles have remained a routine measure since the 2020–2021 crisis.¹⁰⁷

96. On 5 September 2025, the National Shippers' Council of Cameroon inaugurated a logistics and service centre at Garoua-Boulaï, near the border with the Central African Republic.¹⁰⁸ The facility provides parking for trucks, accommodation and services for transporters operating along the Douala/Kribi–Bangui corridor. Although primarily an economic and logistics initiative, the infrastructure is also relevant to peace and security, as it supports the functioning and safety of a corridor critical to the economic stability of the Central African Republic.

97. On 29 and 30 January 2026, Douala hosted an interministerial workshop on cross-border transhumance between Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Chad, organized under the Support Project for the Regulation of Cross-Border Transhumance in Central Africa.¹⁰⁹ According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the meeting was intended to validate a common strategy for managing cross-border pastoral movements. Transhumance corridors have repeatedly intersected with armed group taxation, community tensions and broader patterns of cross-border insecurity in the Central African Republic.

Central African Republic and Chad

98. The most significant development during the reporting period was the establishment and deployment of the joint border security force between the Central African Republic and Chad. On 26 September 2025, the Chief of Staff of FACA, travelled to Sarh, Moyen-Chari Province, Chad, in preparation for the installation of the force, the headquarters of which were to be based in Sarh (see annex 12).

99. On 27 September 2025, the joint force of Chad and the Central African Republic to secure the common border was officially established in Sarh. Its stated objective is to secure the common border against armed infiltration and illicit trafficking.¹¹⁰

100. The border between the Central African Republic and Chad has repeatedly been identified as a corridor affected by armed group mobility, transhumance-related

¹⁰⁶ Public reporting and news sources, 2025–2026.

¹⁰⁷ See [S/2025/385](#), para. 16.

¹⁰⁸ Public reporting and news sources, 2025–2026.

¹⁰⁹ Public reporting and news sources. The project is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in partnership with the Governments of Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Chad.

¹¹⁰ Public reporting and news sources.

insecurity and illicit supply networks. Previous Panel reporting also highlighted the presence of 3R and MPC elements along seasonal transhumance routes and underscored the continued importance of bilateral cooperation with Chad in addressing cross-border threats.¹¹¹

101. The joint force became operationally active during the reporting period, conducting operations along the border. From 24 March to 12 April 2026, it carried out an operation referred to as “Al-Hamamia” across several border localities between Chad and the Central African Republic, including Ngarba and Yamanié in the Central African Republic, and Boussa, Ngolongosso and Gaskaï in Chad. According to several sources, the operation was aimed at recovering illegally held weapons, combating arms trafficking and securing border areas. On 14 April 2026, several AK-pattern rifles and locally manufactured weapons seized during Operation Al-Hamamia were presented to administrative authorities and local media in Sarh.

102. On 4 and 5 April 2026, as part of the same operation, a joint delegation visited Ngondéï, in Lac-Iro Department, and Boussa, near the border with the Central African Republic.¹¹² The delegation met with local authorities, traders and community representatives. Discussions focused on local security, freedom of movement, economic activity and the need for community reporting of suspicious activities.

103. Chad also remained central to the political track with armed group leaders. On 19 November 2025, it hosted the signing of a peace agreement between the Government of the Central African Republic and MPC in N’Djamena as part of the peace process (see para. 12 and annex 3).¹¹³

B. Subregional frameworks

104. On 9 and 10 September 2025, Bangui hosted the sixteenth ordinary session of the Conference of Heads of State of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). The meeting brought together Heads of State from the States members of CEMAC, including Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Discussions focused on regional integration, economic cooperation, freedom of movement and strengthened security cooperation.¹¹⁴

105. The cooperation of the Central African Republic with CEMAC and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) should be viewed in the context of persistent cross-border threats. Previous Panel reporting noted that ECCAS had been requested to support the Central African Republic–Chad joint border security initiative through regional stability initiatives.¹¹⁵ The Panel will continue to assess whether such subregional support translates into operational coordination, information-sharing, border management capacity and sustained financial and technical assistance.

¹¹¹ Over the years, the Panel of experts has documented transhumance-related challenges and highlighted the need for regional cooperation.

¹¹² Public reporting and news sources.

¹¹³ Ibid.; and interviews, April 2026.

¹¹⁴ Public reporting and news sources.

¹¹⁵ See [S/2025/385](#), para. 23.

C. Bilateral cooperation

Central African Republic and France

106. France resumed high-level political engagement with the Central African Republic during the reporting period. On 12 and 13 March 2026, the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, Jean-Noël Barrot, conducted an official visit to Bangui. According to a joint statement issued on 16 March 2026 by Mr. Barrot and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, la Francophonie and Central Africans Abroad of the Central African Republic, Sylvie Valérie Notefe Ndoute née Baïpo Témon, discussions covered bilateral relations and major regional and international issues of mutual interest. The two ministers reaffirmed their commitment to bilateral cooperation under the road map endorsed by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, and the President of the Central African Republic, Faustin Archange Touadéra, in 2024.¹¹⁶

Central African Republic and the Russian Federation

107. The Russian Federation remained a key security and political partner of the Central African Republic during the reporting period. On 5 March 2026, President Touadéra met the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, in Moscow. According to reporting on the meeting, the two leaders discussed security cooperation as well as energy, agriculture, infrastructure and broader bilateral relations. President Touadéra expressed appreciation for security support provided by the Russian Federation, while President Putin referred to prospects for expanding cooperation in energy, agriculture and infrastructure.¹¹⁷

Central African Republic and Rwanda

108. Rwanda remained an important security partner of the Central African Republic. On 23 November 2025, President Touadéra travelled to Kigali for a two-day official visit, during which he met the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame. According to reporting, discussions focused on bilateral cooperation, including Rwandan security support provided to the Central African Republic through Rwanda Defence Force personnel deployed under both bilateral arrangements and MINUSCA.¹¹⁸

Central African Republic and the United States of America

109. From 2 to 6 February 2026, a delegation from the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), led by its Inspector General, United States Air Force Colonel Roy Rhinehart, conducted a military-to-military engagement in Bangui. According to AFRICOM, the delegation met with the Minister of Defence of the Central African Republic, Claude Rameaux Bireau; the Inspector General of FACA, General Léopold Bruno Izamo; and officials from the Security Sector Reform Service of MINUSCA. The engagement focused on inspection methodology, governance, accountability and professional standards within FACA.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ Public reporting and news sources, 2025–2026.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

Cooperation with the European Union

110. European security cooperation continued during the reporting period through the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic¹²⁰ and the European Union Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic.¹²¹ On 4 September 2025, the Training Mission reported that senior FACA leadership, institutional partners, international advisers and members of the Training Mission advisory group had met in Bangui to support the drafting of the Military Programming Law for 2026–2030.¹²² The discussions were guided by the Inspector General of FACA and focused on longer-term planning.

111. From 9 to 13 February 2026, a high-level delegation from the European External Action Service and the Civilian Operations Headquarters visited Bangui in the context of the strategic review of the European Union Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic. The delegation held consultations with national authorities on mandate implementation, security sector reform priorities, national ownership, coordination and the evolving security context.¹²³

112. On 17 March 2026, the European Union Advisory Mission, represented by its head of mission, Gail Van Hoever, participated in the high-level meeting of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff in Bangui. The meeting brought together FACA, the National Police, the Gendarmerie, MINUSCA, the European Union Military Training Mission and other security actors. Discussions focused on lessons learned from security arrangements during the 28 December 2025 elections, the adaptation of the MINUSCA operational posture and the coordination of joint efforts to strengthen security along the border between the Central African Republic and Chad.

D. Analysis

113. Events during the reporting period confirm a trend previously identified by the Panel of the Government of the Central African Republic making efforts to address security challenges through multiple and overlapping cooperation frameworks. Chad occupied a central role in this architecture, acting as both a facilitator of agreements with armed group leaders and a security partner through the joint force of Chad and the Central African Republic to secure the common border.

114. Cameroon remained critical to border security and to the principal commercial corridor of the Central African Republic. Rwanda and the Russian Federation continued to play important security roles.

115. At the regional level, CEMAC, ECCAS and the African Union provided broader frameworks for coordination. International partners, including the European Union, the United States and France remained engaged primarily on security sector reform, military governance, advisory support, political engagement and coordination with MINUSCA.

116. These initiatives are significant but coexist with persistent risks. The joint force of Chad and the Central African Republic may strengthen border control and disrupt illicit arms circulation, as indicated by Operation Al-Hamamia. However, the same border areas remain affected by armed group mobility, transhumance-related insecurity and trafficking networks. Similarly, cooperation with Cameroon may

¹²⁰ A non-executive training mission established in April 2016 and based in Bangui.

¹²¹ A non-executive civilian Common Security and Defence Policy mission established in October 2021 and based in Bangui.

¹²² Public reporting and news sources, 2025–2026.

¹²³ Ibid.

improve the security and reliability of the commercial corridor, while illicit mining, smuggling and armed group activity continue to affect border areas.

117. The Panel will continue to assess whether these cooperation mechanisms translate into improved protection of civilians and more effective implementation of sanctions measures.

VI. Update on designated individuals and entities

Travel ban

118. As part of the peace process in the Central African Republic, UPC leader Ali Darassa (CFi.015) travelled from N'Djamena to Bangui on 10 July 2025 for the official ceremony marking the launch of the 19 April 2025 peace agreement between the Government of the Central African Republic and UPC. He subsequently returned to N'Djamena approximately two weeks later, and then proceeded to Sarh, Chad, according to interlocutors met by the Panel.¹²⁴ The Panel is not aware of any request for a travel exemption; the Panel continues to follow up.

Legal process updates

119. On 21 January 2026 in Bangui, the Trial Chamber of the Special Criminal Court was formally seized of the “Bossembélé” case. Two of the four defendants are designated individuals: François Bozizé (CFi.001) and Eugène Barret Ngaïkosset (CFi.008). They were referred to the Trial Chamber for charges, including crimes against humanity, namely murder, torture, enforced disappearance of persons, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law, and other inhumane acts. All accused in the Bossembélé case are currently in pretrial detention, with the exception of François Bozizé, who has been in exile in Guinea-Bissau since March 2023 and is subject to an international arrest warrant issued by the investigating judges of the Special Criminal Court on 27 February 2024 (see annex 13).

120. On 24 July 2025, Trial Chamber V of the International Criminal Court issued its verdict in the case of *The Prosecutor v. Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona*, finding them both guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Bangui and the west of the Central African Republic between September 2013 and at least February 2014. Mr. Yekatom (CFi.004) was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment and remains in custody at the Court's detention centre. On 26 September 2025, the Defence for Mr. Ngaïssona and Mr. Yekatom, as well as the Office of the Prosecutor, filed notices of appeal against the judgment in the case.

121. See confidential annex B for latest updates on all designated individuals and entities.

VII. Recommendations

122. The Panel of Experts makes the following recommendations:

To the Government of the Central African Republic:

(a) Pursue efforts to align the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process under the 2025 peace agreements with Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique; Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation; and Mouvement

¹²⁴ Various confidential sources, March–April 2026.

Patriotique pour la Centrafrique, with ongoing security sector reform efforts, in particular by clarifying the criteria, numbers, ranks, vetting requirements and institutional responsibilities governing the absorption of ex-combatants into the defence and security forces, including the Central African Armed Forces, the National Police and the Gendarmerie;

(b) Pursue efforts to strengthen civilian protection in areas affected by armed group activity and military operations, including by investigating and ensuring accountability for international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses committed by all armed actors, including armed group elements, self-defence groups and members of the defence and security forces;

To the African Union:

(c) In its capacity as guarantor of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, work closely with Chad, as guarantor of the 2025 peace agreements, to harmonize the implementation and monitoring frameworks of the Agreement and the 2025 agreements, including with regard to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sequencing, dissolution of armed groups, political commitments and follow-up mechanisms;

To the African Union and the Economic Community of Central African States:

(d) Encourage and support the Government of the Central African Republic and neighbouring States to strengthen cross-border security cooperation, with particular focus on armed group mobility, arms and ammunition trafficking, illicit taxation, mining-related predation and transhumance-linked insecurity;

To the Security Council:

(e) Encourage and support the Government of the Central African Republic to ensure that the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration under the 2025 peace agreements is coordinated with security sector reform;

(f) Encourage the African Union, Chad and relevant regional organizations to harmonize the follow-up mechanisms of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and the 2025 peace agreements, so that implementation benchmarks, monitoring responsibilities and reporting channels are clear and mutually reinforcing;

(g) Call upon Member States in the region to strengthen cooperation to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material to armed groups and associated individuals operating in the Central African Republic, in accordance with the measures set out in resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#) and extended in resolution [2789 \(2025\)](#);

To the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#):

(h) See confidential annex A.

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Annex 1: Methodology

1. The Panel ensured compliance with the methodological standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions ([S/2006/997](#)). These standards call for reliance on verified, genuine documents and concrete evidence and on-site observations by the experts, including taking photographs, wherever possible. When physical inspection is not possible, the Panel will seek to corroborate information using multiple, independent sources to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard, placing a higher value on statements by principal actors and first-hand witnesses to events.
2. The Panel uses satellite imagery of CAR procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations, as well as open-source imagery, where relevant. Commercial databases recording aviation and maritime data will be referenced as required. Public statements by officials and armed group representatives issued as press releases (communiqués), audio clips or media appearances were verified by the Panel. Any mobile phone records, where relevant, from service providers are also accepted as factual. While the Panel wishes to be as transparent as possible, in situations where identifying sources would risk exposing them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel has not included identifying information in the Panel report but has placed the relevant evidence in United Nations secure archives.
3. The Panel reviewed and included reference to social media posts, where relevant to its investigations. However, evidence and information gleaned from social media was only used in Panel report where it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to meet the appropriate evidentiary standard.
4. The spelling of toponyms within the Central African Republic and broader region often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in reports. All major locations in CAR and other regional countries are spelled or referenced as per the UN Geographical Information System (GIS) map.
5. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of four out of the five members including the coordinator. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
6. The Panel is committed to impartiality in investigating incidents of non-compliance by any party.
7. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and will endeavor to provide the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in the majority of incidents that are currently in investigation. Their response will be taken into consideration in the Panel's findings for the final report.

Annex 2: Peace agreements with 3R and UPC



**ACCORD DE PAIX
ENTRE
LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA RCA
ET
LE GROUPE ARME 3R
SOUS LA MEDIATION DU TCHAD**

Le Gouvernement de la République centrafricaine d'une part et le Groupe Armé Retour-Réclamation-Réhabilitation (3R) d'autre part, ci-dessous désignés « les Parties »

Considérant les multiples crises que la République centrafricaine a connues et leurs impacts sur la population civile ;

Considérant que la persistance du conflit armé qui affecte les efforts de développement auquel le peuple centrafricain aspire et que la prospérité ne saurait se réaliser dans un contexte d'instabilité ;

Considérant que la Paix est une valeur commune et partagée par toutes les Parties comme condition sine qua non et socle de la construction de la Nation centrafricaine ;

Saluant la volonté politique et la main tendue du Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat au groupe armé 3R dans le cadre des efforts renouvelés pour pacifier l'ensemble du territoire national ;

Ayant accepté l'initiative du Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat en vue d'une Paix définitive et durable en République centrafricaine ;

Animées par un élan patriotique et soucieuses de la cohésion nationale et du vivre-ensemble en harmonie entre tous les fils et filles de la République centrafricaine ;

Convaincues de l'engagement sincère de toutes les Parties à prendre un nouveau départ pour garantir une paix durable ;

Rassurées par l'engagement du Maréchal du Tchad, Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat, Garant de cet Accord de paix ;

Convenons de ce qui suit :

I. DES PRINCIPES

Article 1^{er} : Dans le cadre de cet Accord, les Parties fondent leurs engagements sur :

- a. La sincérité ;
- b. La confiance ;
- c. Le respect des engagements.

II. DES ENGAGEMENTS COMMUNS

Article 2 : le gouvernement et les 3R s'engagent à :

- a. La cessation immédiate des hostilités par un cessez-le-feu dès la signature de cet Accord ;

b. Les Forces Armées centrafricaines (FACA) ainsi que leurs alliés d'une part et les unités des 3R d'autre part s'abstiennent de toute action militaire pouvant compromettre le cessez-le-feu ;

c. La promotion de l'unité nationale, le respect des valeurs républicaines, la cohésion nationale, la cohabitation pacifique et la tolérance religieuse.

Article 3 : Les deux parties réitèrent leur ferme volonté à respecter le présent Accord et à contribuer de bonne foi à l'atteinte des objectifs en éliminant tout type d'obstruction.

III. DES ENGAGEMENTS DES 3R

Article 4 : Le groupe armé 3R s'engage dans le cadre du présent Accord à :

- a. Renoncer définitivement au recours aux armes et à la violence comme mode de conquête du pouvoir ou moyens d'expression des revendications ;
- b. Remettre au gouvernement dans le cadre du processus DDRR les armes et matériels de guerre ;
- c. Réintégrer l'APPR et le Processus de Luanda ;
- d. Procéder dans le cadre des arrangements sécuritaires prévus dans le présent Accord, à la dissolution des 3R en tant que groupe armé.

IV. DES ENGAGEMENTS DU GOUVERNEMENT

Article 5 : le gouvernement de la RCA s'engage dans le présent Accord à :

- a. Garantir la participation des 3R au Gouvernement mais la détermination du département reste à la discrétion du Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat ;
- b. Nommer à des postes de responsabilités dans les Grandes institutions de la République et dans l'Administration générale ;
- c. Garantir la nomination dans le commandement militaire et à des responsabilités dans les différents corps des FDS les cadres militaires et civils des 3R en fonction des critères de compétence de concert avec la présidence des 3R ;

V. DES ARRANGEMENTS SECURITAIRES

Article 7 : Les parties s'engagent à :

- a. Cantonner et procéder à l'enregistrement dans des sites désignés à cet effet dans un délai de trois (03) mois ;
- b. Procéder au désarmement dans les quinze (15) jours suivant l'enregistrement ;
- c. Commencer la formation des combattants aptes dans les quinze (15) jours suivant le désarmement ;
- d. Assurer l'intégration au sein des FACA et autres corps des FDS à la fin de formation ;

- e. Mettre en œuvre la démobilisation des combattants inaptes suivant le processus prévu dans l'APPR ;
- f. Réactiver dans un délai de trois mois l'Unité Spéciale Mixte de Surveillance (USMS) conformément à l'APPR ;
- g. Cette Unité est constituée des FACA et des éléments des 3R intégrés au sein des FDS.

VI. ROLE DE GARANT

Article 8 : les deux Parties s'accordent à :

- a. Faire du Tchad le médiateur et Garant de cet Accord. A ce titre, le Tchad veille à la mise en œuvre effective de l'Accord ;
- b. Le Garant veille par le plaidoyer pour le respect des engagements pris par les Parties.

VII. COMITE TRIPARTITE DE SUIVI ET EVALUATION DE LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE L'ACCORD ENTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT ET LES 3R

Article 9 : Il sera mis en place un Comité Tripartite de Suivi et Evaluation comme suit :

- a. Le comité sera composé des Parties et du Tchad ;
- b. Il est présidé par le Tchad en sa qualité de Garant de l'Accord ;
- c. Le comité se réunit alternativement sur une base mensuelle lors des trois premiers mois à N'Djaména ou à Bangui puis par trimestre pour la suite. Il peut organiser des réunions extraordinaires en cas de nécessité ;
- d. Le Comité peut être appelé à organiser des missions sur le terrain pour constater l'évolution de la mise en œuvre.

VIII. REGLEMENT DES DIFFERENDS

Article 10 : En cas de désaccords entre les Parties, l'une ou l'autre peut saisir sans délai le Garant afin de contribuer au règlement du point de désaccord.

Il est chargé de veiller à la mise en œuvre de l'Accord et au règlement d'éventuels différends d'interprétation.

IX. DISPOSITIONS FINALES

Article 11 : Cet Accord peut être complété en cas de nécessité par des Annexes pour traiter des points particuliers ; ces annexes feront partie intégrante de l'Accord.

Cet Accord et les éventuelles annexes peuvent être modifiés avec le consentement exprès des deux (02) Parties sous la médiation du Garant.

Article 12 : le présent Accord entre en vigueur dès sa signature.

Signé à N'Djaména, République du Tchad, en trois (3) copies originales en Français ;

Le 19 Avril 2025

Les Parties

Gouvernement de la
République centrafricaine



Général d'Armée
WANZET LINGUISSARA Henri

Retour-Réclamation-
Réhabilitation (3R)



Président de 3R
Oumar ABDELKADER

Pour
La République du Tchad



Général de Corps d'Armée
IDRISS SOULEYMANE LONY



ACCORD DE PAIX
ENTRE
LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA RCA
ET
LE GROUPE ARME UPC
SOUS LA MEDIATION DU TCHAD

Le Gouvernement de la République centrafricaine d'une part et le Groupe Armé Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC) d'autre part, ci-dessous désignés « les Parties »

Considérant les multiples crises que la République centrafricaine a connues et leurs impacts sur la population civile ;

Considérant que la persistance du conflit armé affecte les efforts de développement auquel le peuple centrafricain aspire et que la prospérité ne saurait se réaliser dans un contexte d'instabilité ;

Considérant que la Paix est une valeur commune et partagée par toutes les Parties comme condition sine qua non et socle de la construction de la Nation centrafricaine ;

Saluant la volonté politique et la main tendue du Pr Faustin-Archange TOUADERA, Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat au groupe armé UPC dans le cadre des efforts renouvelés pour pacifier l'ensemble du territoire national ;

Ayant accepté l'initiative du Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat en vue d'une Paix définitive et durable en République centrafricaine ;

Animés par un élan patriotique et soucieux de la cohésion nationale et du vivre-ensemble en harmonie entre tous les fils et filles de la République centrafricaine ;

Convaincus de l'engagement sincère de toutes les Parties à prendre un nouveau départ pour garantir une paix durable ;

Rassurés par l'engagement du Maréchal du Tchad MAHAMAT IDRIS DEBY ITNO Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat, Garant de cet Accord de paix ;

Convenons de ce qui suit :

I. DES PRINCIPES


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- a. La sincérité ;
- b. La confiance ;
- c. Le respect des engagements.

II. DES ENGAGEMENTS COMMUNS

Article 2 : le gouvernement et l'UPC s'engagent à :

- a. La cessation immédiate des hostilités par un cessez-le-feu dès la signature de cet Accord ;



- b. Les Forces Armées centrafricaines (FACA) ainsi que leurs alliés d'une part et les unités de l'UPC d'autre part s'abstiennent de toute action militaire pouvant compromettre le cessez-le-feu ;
- c. La promotion de l'unité nationale, le respect des valeurs républicaines, la cohésion nationale, la cohabitation pacifique et la tolérance religieuse.

Article 3 : Les deux parties réitèrent leur ferme volonté à respecter le présent Accord et à contribuer de bonne foi à l'atteinte des objectifs en éliminant tout type d'obstruction.

III. DES ENGAGEMENTS DE L'UPC

Article 4 : Le groupe armé UPC s'engage dans le cadre du présent Accord à :

- a. Renoncer définitivement au recours aux armes et à la violence comme mode de conquête du pouvoir ou moyens d'expression des revendications ;
- b. Remettre au gouvernement dans le cadre du processus DDRR les armes et matériels de guerre ;
- c. Réintégrer l'APPR et le Processus de Luanda ;
- d. Procéder dans le cadre des arrangements sécuritaires prévus dans le présent Accord, à la dissolution de l'UPC en tant que groupe armé ;

IV. DES ENGAGEMENTS DU GOUVERNEMENT

Article 5 : le gouvernement de la RCA s'engage dans le présent Accord à :

- a. Garantir la participation de l'UPC au Gouvernement mais la détermination du département reste à la discrétion du Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat ;
- b. Nommer à des postes de responsabilités dans les Institutions de la République, dans l'administration générale ou territoriale ;
- c. Garantir la nomination dans le commandement militaire, les différents corps des Forces de de Défense et Sécurité et de l'administration générale, les cadres militaires et civils de l'UPC en fonction des critères de compétence et de concert avec la présidence de l'UPC ;

V. DES ARRANGEMENTS SECURITAIRES

Article 7 : Les parties s'engagent à :

- a. Cantonner et procéder à l'enregistrement dans des sites désignés à cet effet dans un délai de trois (03) mois ;
- b. Procéder au désarmement dans les quinze (15) jours suivant l'enregistrement ;
- c. Commencer la formation des combattants aptes dans les quinze (15) jours suivant le désarmement ;

- d. Assurer l'intégration au sein des FACA et autres corps des FDS à la fin de formation ;
- e. Mettre en œuvre la démobilisation des combattants inaptes suivant le processus prévu dans l'APPR ;
- f. Mettre en place dans un délai de trois mois une Unité des FDS au Nord-est et Centre-est du pays conformément à l'APPR ;

VI. ROLE DE GARANT

Article 8 : les deux Parties s'accordent à :

- a. Faire du Tchad le médiateur et Garant de cet Accord. A ce titre, le Tchad veille à la mise en œuvre effective de l'Accord ;
- b. Le garant veille par le plaidoyer pour le respect des engagements pris par les Parties.

VII. COMITE TRIPARTITE DE SUIVI ET EVALUATION DE LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE L'ACCORD ENTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT ET L'UPC

Article 9 : Il sera mis en place un Comité Tripartite de Suivi et Evaluation comme suit :

- a. Le comité sera composé des Parties et du Tchad ;
- b. Il est présidé par le Tchad en sa qualité de Garant de l'Accord ;
- c. Le comité se réunit alternativement sur une base mensuelle lors des trois premiers mois à N'Djaména ou à Bangui puis par trimestre pour la suite. Il peut organiser des réunions extraordinaires en cas de nécessité ;
- d. Le Comité peut être appelé à organiser des missions sur le terrain pour constater l'évolution de la mise en œuvre.

VIII. REGLEMENT DES DIFFERENDS

Article 10 : En cas de désaccords entre les Parties, l'une ou l'autre peut saisir sans délai le Garant afin de contribuer au règlement du point de désaccord.

Il est chargé de veiller à la mise en œuvre de l'Accord et au règlement d'éventuels différends d'interprétation.

IX. DISPOSITIONS FINALES

Article 11 :

- a. Cet Accord peut être complété en cas de nécessité par des Annexes pour traiter des points particuliers ; ces annexes feront partie intégrante de l'Accord ;
- b. Cet Accord et les éventuelles annexes peuvent être modifiés avec le consentement exprès des deux (02) Parties sous la médiation du Garant ;
- c.

d. Les Parties s'engagent à ne pas divulguer tout ou partie de l'Accord ou ses Annexes.


Article 12 : le présent Accord entre en vigueur dès sa signature.

Signé à N'Djaména, République du Tchad, en trois (3) copies originales en Français ;

Le 19 Avril 2025

Les Parties

Pour
La République centrafricaine




Général d'Armée
WANZET LINGUISSARA Henri

Pour l'Unité pour la Paix en
Centrafrique (UPC)



Président de l'UPC
Ali DARRASSA MAHAMAT

Pour
La République du Tchad



Général de Corps d'Armée
ISMAEL SOULEYMANE LONY

Annex 3: Photographs of MPC-CAR Government Signing Ceremony


Social media posts showing signing ceremony between the Government of the Central African Republic and the MPC under Chadian mediation, on 19 November 2025 in N'Djamena, Chad



Source: Image sourced from social media.

Annex 4: Photographs of Weapons & Ammunition Collected in DDR Process


Weapons and ammunition collected in Bangui during DDR operations



Source: photographs by 2745 Panel of Experts, Bangui, March 2026

Annex 5: Overview of weapons collected through DDR process, by functionality


Comparison of status or functionality of arms collected during DDR operations



Source: Data received April 2026, and analysed by the 2745 Panel of Experts

Annex 6: Overview of weapons collected through DDR process, by type


Arms collected during DDR operations, by type



Source: Data received April 2026, and analysed by the 2745 Panel of Experts

Annex 7: Overview of weapons collected through DDR process, by armed group


Comparison of total number of arms collected from different armed groups through DDR operations



Source: Data received April 2026, and analysed by the 2745 Panel of Experts


Annex 8: DRR analysis maps

Figure 8.1: Number of Weapons Collected per Location from UPC in the Central African Republic, July 2025–March 2026




Number of Weapons Collected Per Location - UPC									
Bambari	Bangui-UEPNDDR	Bossangoa	Kabo	Ketté Sido	Koui	Maloum	Mboki	Pombolo	Sam-Ouandja
16	113	2	41	52	1	237	8	14	21

Figure 8.2: Number of Weapons Collected per Location from 3R in the Central African Republic, July 2025-March 2026




Number of Weapons Collected Per Location – 3R					
Bangui-UEPNDDRR	Bouar	Kabo	Koui	Noufou	Sanguéré-Lim
3	1	2	136	77	87

Figure 8.3: Number of Weapons Collected per Location from FPRC in the Central African Republic, July 2025–March 2026




Number of Weapons Collected By Location - FPRC		
Ndélé	Sam-Ouandja,	Sikikédé
1	12	74

Figure 8.4: Number of weapons collected per Location from UPC, 3R and FPRC, July 2025–March 2026



Annex 9: Snapshot of CAR refugees and asylum-seekers in DRC



Source: Data sourced from public reports, UNHCR

Annex 10: Djazouli video screen shot



Source: Video received by the 2745 Panel of Experts in mid-March 2026 from multiple confidential sources.

Annex 11: Weapons recovered during operations against LRA, 12 October 2025






**MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE
NATIONALE ET DE
LA RECONSTRUCTION DE L'ARMÉE**


FLASH INFO

Après plusieurs mois de travail de service de renseignement, un réseau de trafic d'armes et plusieurs sites miniers illicites liés à la LRA de Joseph Kony ont été identifiés sur le territoire centrafricain, dans la zone de Sam-Ouandja, près de la frontière avec le Soudan du Sud.

**Bilan de l'opération des FACA et des forces alliés
de 12 Octobre 2025 :**
 9 malfrats éliminés

**3 campements sur les chantiers illégaux détruits ,
 1 site important de trafic d'armes détruit,**
Armes et munitions saisies :

Fusils d'assaut - 6	Mitrailleuses - 5
Lance-grenades - 1	Munitions 7.62 - 5000
Munitions 5.56 - 4570	Grenades - 58

Une enquête est ouverte pour retracer la provenance de ces armes.

Les FACA poursuivent leur mission : défendre le territoire et garantir la paix.



ZONE D'OPERATION

Source: Photos sources from official social media accounts.

Annex 12: Establishment of the CAR-Chad force mixte, 27 September 2025





Source: Photos sources from official social media accounts.

Annex 13: Press release from Special Criminal Court



COUR PENALE SPECIALE
Communiqué de presse CPS n°280126



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité - Dignité - Travail

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE DE LA COUR PENALE SPECIALE

Le mercredi 21 janvier 2026, la Chambre d'assises de la Cour pénale spéciale (« CPS ») a été saisie d'un nouveau dossier. Il s'agit de l'affaire dite « Bossembélé » opposant le Parquet spécial et les Parties civiles aux Accusés François BOZIZÉ YANGOUVONDA, Eugène Barret NGAÏKOSSET, Vianney SEMNDIRO et Firmin Junior DANBOY.

L'Ordonnance de renvoi du 9 septembre 2024, telle que partiellement confirmée par l'Arrêt de renvoi de la Chambre d'accusation spéciale de la CPS du 29 décembre 2025, a renvoyé les Accusés devant la Chambre d'assises pour les crimes contre l'humanité suivants :

- L'Accusé François BOZIZÉ YANGOUVONDA, en sa qualité d'ancien président de la République centrafricaine, pour des faits allégués de meurtre, d'emprisonnement ou autres formes de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des règles fondamentales du droit international, de torture et actes inhumains, de disparitions forcées de personnes, et d'autres actes inhumains de caractère analogue causant intentionnellement de grandes souffrances ou des atteintes graves à l'intégrité physique ou à la santé physique ou mentale, commis sur le territoire centrafricain notamment à Bangui, Bouar et Bossembélé, y compris au Centre d'instruction militaire et à la maison d'arrêt, entre février 2009 et le 23 mars 2013,
- L'accusé Eugène Barret NGAÏKOSSET pour des faits allégués de meurtre, d'emprisonnement ou autres formes de privation grave de liberté, de torture et actes inhumains, et de disparitions forcées de personnes, commis sur le territoire centrafricain notamment à Bangui et Bossembélé, et au Centre d'instruction militaire, entre février 2009 et le 23 mars 2013,
- L'Accusé Vianney SEMNDIRO pour des faits allégués de meurtre, d'emprisonnement ou autres formes de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des règles fondamentales du droit international, de torture et actes inhumains, de disparitions forcées de personnes, et d'autres actes inhumains de caractère analogue causant intentionnellement de grandes souffrances ou des atteintes graves à l'intégrité physique ou à la santé physique ou mentale, commis sur le territoire centrafricain notamment à Bangui et Bossembélé, notamment au Centre d'instruction militaire et à la maison d'arrêt, entre le 4 mai 2009 et mars 2011,

Pour toutes informations complémentaires veuillez contacter Unité communication et sensibilisation de la Cour pénale spéciale (CPS) au téléphone : +23676110707 ou ucs@cpsrca.cf.

- L'Accusé Firmin Junior DANBOY pour des faits allégués de meurtre, d'emprisonnement ou autres formes de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des règles fondamentales du droit international, et de torture et actes inhumains, commis sur le territoire centrafricain notamment à Bangui et Bossembélé, notamment au Centre d'instruction militaire et la maison d'arrêt, entre le 28 juillet 2011 et le 23 mars 2013.

L'Accusé François BOZIZÉ YANGOUVONDA est visé par un mandat d'arrêt international.

La Section de la Chambre d'assises appelée à connaître de cette affaire entamera prochainement la phase des conférences de mise en état, préparatoire aux débats.

Il convient de rappeler qu'à ce stade de la procédure, tous les Accusés sont présumés innocents.

Fait à Bangui, le 28 janvier 2026

Unité d'information et de communication de la CPS

La Cour pénale spéciale (CPS) est une cour hybride au sein du système judiciaire centrafricain et créée par la loi organique n°15.003 du 3 juin 2015. Elle a pour mandat d'enquêter et de poursuivre les crimes de droit international commis en République Centrafricaine depuis 2003. Elle est située rue Martin Luther King à Bangui, en République Centrafricaine.

Pour toutes informations complémentaires veuillez contacter Unité communication et sensibilisation de la Cour pénale spéciale (CPS) au téléphone : +23676110707 ou ucs@cpsrca.cf.