



# Security Council

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## Forty-third semi-annual report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)

### I. Background

1. The present report is the forty-third semi-annual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). It provides a review and an assessment of the implementation of the resolution since the issuance of the previous report on the subject, on 7 October 2025 (S/2025/625), and covers developments until 31 March 2026.

### II. Implementation of resolution 1559 (2004)

2. The reporting period was marked by the escalation of hostilities between Israel and Hizbullah following the 2 March rocket attack by Hizbullah on Israel and the large-scale attacks launched by Israel in response across Lebanon, in the context of the military escalation in the Middle East. Israel extended its military presence in the South and conducted air and artillery strikes across the country, including against key infrastructure, that resulted in significant casualties, including a large number of fatalities, widespread destruction and mass displacement in Lebanon. Attacks by Hizbullah resulted in additional casualties and damage in northern Israel. The recent escalation reversed the progress that had been observed earlier in the reporting period, including the decision of the Government of Lebanon to progressively extend State authority over the country and the statement by the Lebanese Armed Forces in January that it had established operational control south of the Litani River.

#### A. Sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon

3. Through the adoption of resolution 1559 (2004), the Security Council sought to help strengthen the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout the country, in accordance with the Taif Accords of 1989, to which all the political parties in Lebanon had committed themselves. That objective has remained the priority of United Nations efforts in Lebanon.

4. Before the 2 March escalation of hostilities, efforts to address security issues between Lebanon and Israel, including through the Cessation of Hostilities



Monitoring Mechanism (see [S/2024/870](#)) continued. The Mechanism held meetings on 29 October, 12 November and 3 and 19 December 2025, and on 7 January and 25 February 2026. The Israel Defense Forces, the Lebanese Armed Forces, the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon participated in those meetings, which were chaired by the United States, with the support of France, and hosted by United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Discussions centred on the implementation of the plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces to establish exclusive State control over weapons and strengthen the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River. Civilian representatives of the parties participated in the meetings that were held in December. In a speech delivered on 5 December, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Naim Qassem, denounced the decision to include Lebanese civilians in the Mechanism as an “illegal move, an additional misstep for the Government and a free concession to Israel”, which he argued “will only increase the pressure on Lebanon”. In addition, no further progress was made after February 2025 with respect to the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Lebanese territory pursuant to the 27 November 2024 cessation of hostilities agreement. The Israel Defense Forces continued to maintain five positions and two “buffer zones” north of the Blue Line. The Lebanese authorities repeatedly denounced the violations committed by Israel of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. In identical letters dated 25 November 2025 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([A/80/546-S/2025/767](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations called upon the Security Council to compel Israel “to withdraw immediately south of the Blue Line from all areas in Lebanon ..., including the five border posts; not to establish so-called buffer zones in Lebanese territory; and to allow Lebanese civilians to return to their villages on the border”. Israel also continued to occupy the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line, in violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon and resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#) and [1701 \(2006\)](#).

5. In addition, Israel Defense Forces uncrewed aerial vehicles and fixed-wing aircraft, including fighter jets, continued daily overflights of Lebanon during the reporting period, violating Lebanese sovereignty and resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#) and [1701 \(2006\)](#). The Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations, in the aforementioned identical letters, stated: “Israel continues to violate the sovereignty of Lebanon. There have been 4,229 such violations from the time that the cessation of hostilities was announced to 13 November 2025”.

6. In the early hours of 2 March, Hizbullah announced that, “in retribution for the [killing] of ... Ayatollah Imam Sayyed Ali al-Husseini Khamenei [by Israel]; and in defence of Lebanon and its people; and within the framework of responding to repeated Israeli aggressions: the Islamic resistance targeted ... the Mishmar HaCarmel missile defence site [of the Israel Defense Forces], south ... of Haifa, with a salvo of specialized missiles and a swarm of drones”. The Israel Defense Forces responded with overnight air strikes on 2 March against alleged Hizbullah assets in southern Lebanon and reported that it had struck senior Hizbullah officials in the southern suburbs of Beirut. The Minister of Defence of Israel, Israel Katz, announced that “Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and I have instructed the [Israel Defense Forces] to act with force against Hezbollah”. The Lebanese State adopted a series of significant decisions to curtail the role and activities of Hizbullah in the aftermath of the projectile launches, as detailed in section C of the present report.

7. Since 2 March, Hizbullah has increased the scope, range and frequency of its attacks, using rockets, missiles and drones against northern and central Israel, including Tel Aviv, as well as the occupied Syrian Golan, and engaging Israel Defense Forces positions and soldiers inside Lebanon. Hizbullah stated that it had targeted civilian population centres, including Haifa and cities in central Israel, and industrial

and military sites. Its deepest attack inside Israel was against a “satellite communications station ... in the Ella Valley, [Israel], 160 km from the Lebanese border”. On 24 March, a woman was killed, hundreds of persons were reportedly injured and significant damage was caused to civilian infrastructure and residential areas inside Israel as a result of the attacks by Hizbullah.

8. Since 2 March, the Israel Defense Forces has carried out intensified large-scale and continuous strikes in southern Lebanon, the southern suburbs of Beirut and the Bīqa’ Valley, as well as numerous attacks in central Beirut and some Palestine refugee camps. In addition, Israel launched expanded ground operations as part of what it has called a “forward defence”. On 7 March, the Israel Defense Forces carried out its first attack in central of Beirut since 2 March, causing four fatalities in the Rawshah area. The Israel Defense Forces said that it had targeted “key commanders in the Lebanese Corps of the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force, who were operating in Beirut”. The attack followed Israeli warnings on 3 March to “representatives of the Iranian terrorist regime who remain in Lebanon of the necessity to leave immediately before they are targeted”. In a letter dated 10 March 2026 addressed to the Secretary-General ([A/80/669-S/2026/153](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated that “the targeted killing of four Iranian diplomats while they were serving as official representatives of a sovereign Member State on the territory of another sovereign State constitutes a grave terrorist act” and called upon the Secretary-General and the members of the Security Council to condemn the attack on Iranian diplomats and ensure that those responsible are held accountable. In a letter dated 17 March 2026 addressed to the Secretary-General ([A/80/677-S/2026/194](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General and the members of the Security Council of the “assassination of two additional Iranian diplomats ... as a result of terrorist attacks carried out by the Israeli regime in Beirut on 8 and 13 March 2026”, reiterating his calls upon the Secretary-General and the members of the Security Council to condemn the attack on Iranian diplomats and ensure that those responsible are held accountable.

9. On 11 March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, for the first time, publicly claimed “a joint and integrated operation” with the “Lebanese resistance” using “missiles launched by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, alongside intensive drone and missile attacks by the Lebanese Hezbollah, targeting over 50 sites” in Israel. In response, the Israel Defense Forces conducted extensive strikes on the southern suburbs of Beirut. That same day, the Israel Defense Forces also carried out air strikes in the Ramlat al-Bayda’ neighbourhood of Beirut, killing 12 persons and injuring 28 others, according to the Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon. On 13 March, in response to the claims made by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of Lebanon, Youssef Raggi, acting on instructions from the Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, summoned the Chargé d’affaires of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Lebanon, Tawfiq Samadi, and formally expressed his country’s “rejection of any foreign interference in its domestic affairs”. On 14 March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed that it had carried out a second operation “in coordination with Hizbullah”. On 17 March, Hizbullah announced a new, large-scale offensive consisting of simultaneous barrages of rockets directed towards towns and villages in northern Israel, as well as several Israel Defense Forces bases and positions. In response, the Israel Defense Forces conducted air strikes in Beirut and its southern suburbs that resulted in at least 10 fatalities, according to the Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon. On 23 March, the Israel Defense Forces struck an apartment building in the Hazimiyah area south-east of Beirut and stated that it had killed a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a result of that strike. Israel separately struck several neighbourhoods of Beirut at various dates during the heightened hostilities. In addition to its claimed

strikes against Hizbullah and representatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Israel claimed strikes against members of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Jama'ah al-Islamiyah.

10. On 14 March, 12 medical workers were killed and several others wounded in an Israeli air strike on the Islamic Health Authority centre in Bint Jubayl District, according to the Ministry of Public Health, while two paramedics were killed as the result of a separate strike. The Israel Defense Forces stated that Hizbullah was allegedly using ambulances and medical facilities for military purposes. The Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations, in identical letters dated 17 March 2026 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([A/80/674-S/2026/191](#)), transmitted a letter from the Lebanese Red Cross Society in which the group reported that “two paramedics from its team were targeted and injured in the town of Arnun al-Shaqif on 7 March” and that another incident, “on 9 March of this year, occurred in the town of Majdal Zun, Tyre District, resulting in serious injuries to two paramedics from the Society’s team while they were performing their humanitarian duties. One of them, paramedic Youssef Assaf, died of his injuries soon after ...”.

11. On 13 March, the Israel Defense Forces destroyed the bridge over the Litani River in Zarariyah, which it said served as a main crossing for Hizbullah. Following the announcement by Israel of its intent to destroy the bridges in southern Lebanon, the President of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, condemned the “systematic destruction of infrastructure, civilian facilities and residential areas” as indicative of a “policy of collective punishment”. The Israel Defense Forces stated that the destruction of civilian infrastructure was intended as a message to the Lebanese State, and that it “will attack every piece of infrastructure” used by Hizbullah. All other bridges over the Litani River were subsequently struck and destroyed by the Israel Defense Forces. On 20 March, Électricité du Liban, the public electricity company, announced that Israeli strikes had “targeted its main transmission network”, taking out the “main [power] substation in Sultaniyeh, Bint Jbeil district ...”.

12. Israel’s continued ground presence inside Lebanon has significantly expanded, with confirmed operations by units of multiple divisions inside Lebanese territory several kilometres north of the Blue Line, including advances on multiple axes into villages across Tyre, Bint Jubayl, Marji’yun and Hasbaya Districts. The Israel Defense Forces reported that, between 20 and 29 March, multiple divisions, units and brigades had conducted raids, “focused ground activities” and operations in southern Lebanon, including on 29 March “for the first time in cross-border activity from the Syrian Hermon to South Lebanon”. On 25 March, the Israel Defense Forces stated that, in the context of its operations in southern Lebanon, it had arrested a “cell leader” of the “Lebanese Saraya ... funded by ... Hizbullah and directly linked to it” and had “transferred” him to Israel. At the time of writing, 10 soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces had been “killed in battle in southern Lebanon”. Several other soldiers have reportedly been wounded in the hostilities.

13. Since the escalation of hostilities, Israel has repeatedly stated its intention to establish a “security zone” in southern Lebanon, possibly extending up to the Litani River. On 23 March, the Minister of Finance of Israel, Bezalel Smotrich, stated that “I say here definitively ... in every room and in every discussion, too: the new Israeli border must be the Litani”. In identical letters dated 25 March 2026 addressed to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General ([S/2026/225](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations transmitted a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Gideon Sa’ar, in which the latter said, “Given the proximity of Hezbollah entrenchment in southern Lebanon to Israeli civilian communities, and in light of Hezbollah’s public threats to raid these communities, as

well as its ongoing missile and drone attacks, the presence of forward defensive forces is critical. The [Israel Defense Forces] troops are operating at key locations in southern Lebanon to prevent a ground incursion and limit Hezbollah's ability to target Israeli communities directly ...". On 25 March, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, said: "We have created a real security buffer that prevents a ground invasion into the Galilee, across the northern border. We are expanding this security buffer to push the anti-tank missile threat away from our communities. We are simply creating a larger buffer zone. ... We are determined to fundamentally change the situation in Lebanon". On 31 March, Mr. Katz stated that, "[at] the end of the operation, the [Israel Defense Forces] will be positioned in a security area inside Lebanon – in a defensive line against anti-tank missiles – and will have security control over the entire area up to the Litani River, including the remaining bridges". He added: "The return of over 600,000 residents of the area south of the Litani River will be completely prohibited until the safety and security of residents of the north is ensured, similar to the model of Rafah and Beit Hanoun in the Gaza Strip. We will eliminate Radwan's forces that have infiltrated the area and destroy all weapons located there".

14. In identical letters dated 30 March 2026 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([A/80/690-S/2026/253](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations, referencing the statements made by Messrs. Katz and Smotrich, said: "The Government of Lebanon expresses its strong condemnation and deep disapproval of those statements and actions; it considers them to constitute a clear and serious threat to [the] sovereignty and territorial unity of Lebanon". He also added that "the point where the Litani River meets the Mediterranean Sea lies 30 km north of the Israel-Lebanon border".

15. On 28 March, an Israeli strike hit a vehicle carrying three journalists in southern Lebanon, killing all three. The Minister of Information of Lebanon, Paul Morcos, denounced the killing by Israel of the three journalists, one of whom was a woman. Mr. Morcos identified the journalists as "correspondent Fatima Ftouni, cameraman Mohammad Ftouni and correspondent Ali Shuaib". On 29 March, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had killed "Ali Shuaib, who worked as a terrorist in the Radwan Force affiliated with Hezbollah and moved for years disguised as a journalist". The killing of those journalists was widely condemned by Lebanese senior officials, including Mr. Aoun, who called it "a blatant crime that violates all norms and treaties under which journalists are granted international protection during armed conflicts".

16. As at 31 March, 1,268 people had been killed and 3,750 had been wounded in Lebanon, according to the country's Ministry of Public Health. The World Health Organization reported that 58 on-duty healthcare workers had been killed and 91 had been injured in at least 64 attacks on healthcare workers and facilities in the period from 2 to 23 March. Successive evacuation orders issued by Israel had driven repeated population movements, displacing more than 1.2 million people, more than half of whom were women and girls. Of the 1.2 million internally displaced people, 134,100 have taken refuge in 648 collective shelters amid growing shelter shortages and protection risks. A total of \$308.3 million is being sought under the Lebanon flash appeal, which was launched on 13 March, to provide life-saving assistance and protection to up to 1 million people between March and May 2026. As at 31 March, contributions amounting to \$63.4 million, representing 20.6 per cent of the overall requirement, had been recorded by the Financial Tracking Service of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

17. Against a backdrop of hostilities that had been escalating since 2 March, Mr. Aoun presented a four-point initiative on 9 March. According to Mr. Aoun, the objectives of the initiative are "[e]stablishing a complete ceasefire, with a halt to all

Israeli land, air and sea aggressions against Lebanon; accelerating the provision of the necessary logistical support to the Lebanese Armed Forces; these forces immediately take control of the recent tension areas, confiscate all weapons from them and disarm Hezbollah and its depots and warehouses ...; and, simultaneously, Lebanon and Israel begin direct negotiations under international sponsorship, to reach the implementation of all the details of the foregoing". That same day, Mr. Salam expressed his openness to "any agenda, format [and] location" to ensure the success of the process.

18. Lebanese-Syrian governmental relations improved throughout the reporting period. On 10 October, the Lebanese authorities were formally notified that the Syrian Arab Republic had suspended the Lebanese-Syrian Higher Council, which had been effectively in charge of bilateral relations under the former Government, and that all bilateral affairs would now be handled strictly through official diplomatic channels. That same day, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic, Asaad al-Shaibani, held talks with Lebanese officials in Beirut, marking his first ministerial visit to Lebanon since the formation of the new Syrian Government. Security issues of mutual concern, including the transfer of Syrian detainees in Lebanese prisons, the demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian border and enhanced cooperation to strengthen border control, as well as the repatriation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, reportedly featured in the discussions. Mr. Al-Shaibani, following his meeting with Mr. Aoun, heralded the visit as a "historic opportunity to develop bilateral ties and explore avenues for political, economic and security cooperation, by moving beyond past grievances and obstacles". Mr. Aoun, meanwhile, called for "building bilateral ties on the basis of mutual respect and non-interference in domestic affairs".

19. In a 6 March telephone call with the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, the President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Ahmad al-Sharaa, said that "the defensive reinforcements Syria has deployed along the Syrian-Lebanese border fall within the framework of border protection and preventing attempts to smuggle weapons or undermine stability, emphasizing the importance of supporting Syrian territorial unity and sovereignty". On 9 March, the Syrian authorities stated that "artillery shells landed on Syrian territory near the [town of] Serghaya, west of Damascus, [that were] fired from Lebanese territory. [Hizbullah] launched the shells targeting Syrian army positions near Serghaya". Hizbullah said that it had detected Israeli helicopters infiltrating from Syria and that the presence of "an infantry force in the Serghaya plain" had led to confrontations between Hizbullah and that force. Mr. Al-Sharaa, in a 10 March telephone call with Mr. Aoun, expressed his "support for the Lebanese President's efforts to disarm Hizbullah and spare the region the repercussions of the current conflict". Both men reaffirmed their intent "to confront attempts to sow discord and undermine stability". On 19 March, Mr. Raggi met with his Syrian counterpart, Mr. Al-Shaibani, who reportedly informed him that "Syria has no intention of entering Lebanon or interfering in its internal affairs in any way".

20. There was no progress in relation to the issue of the Shab'a Farms area. Furthermore, neither the Syrian Arab Republic nor Israel has responded to the provisional definition of the area contained in the report of the Secretary-General of on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) 30 October 2007 ([S/2007/641](#)).

## **B. Extension of control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory**

21. The Government of Lebanon continued its efforts to extend the authority of the State over all Lebanese territory, as called for in the Taif Accords and in resolution

1559 (2004). On 8 January, the Lebanese Armed Forces announced that its “plan to restrict weapons has entered an advanced stage following the ... achievement of the objectives of the first phase, [which was] focused on expanding the Army’s operational presence, securing vital areas and extending operational control over the territories that have come under its authority in the South Litani sector, with the exception of lands and sites that remain under Israeli occupation”, in an apparent reference to the five positions and the two “buffer zones” that Israel maintains north of the Blue Line. The Lebanese Armed Forces added that its operations were ongoing, “in order to consolidate control and prevent armed groups from irreversibly rebuilding their capabilities”.

22. In identical letters dated 26 January 2026 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General (A/80/599-S/2026/42), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations said that the “Lebanese army has succeeded in extending full State authority over the area south of the Litani River – with the exception of the positions still occupied by Israel”. He added that the next phases of the plan to extend Government authority would cover the area between the Litani River and the Awali River, and then Beirut and Mount Lebanon, followed by the Bīqā‘, before ultimately being applied nationwide. On 16 February, the Cabinet took note of the “plan for the area north of the Litani”, which it had tasked the Lebanese Armed Forces with developing.

23. On 1 March, the Office of the President of Lebanon and the Office of the President of France jointly announced that the International Conference in Support of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the internal security forces had been postponed from its scheduled date on 5 March to an unspecified date in April, citing “unfavourable conditions” in the region. The announcement was made following a telephone call between Messrs. Aoun and Macron, who agreed on “the need to reinforce Lebanon’s stability, support its State institutions and guarantee the full restoration of its sovereignty”.

24. On 4 March, in line with the Cabinet decision of 2 March (see para. 31), the Lebanese Armed Forces announced that “army checkpoints arrested 26 Lebanese and 1 Palestinian in several areas for illegally possessing weapons and ammunition. These units have also strengthened their deployment on the eastern border in coordination with the relevant Syrian authorities”.

25. On 7 March, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that its units had detected four Israeli helicopters over the Khuraybah-Baalbek border area, two of which had delivered troops amid intense aerial bombardment, followed by an “exchange of gunfire between the enemy force and local residents after the force moved from the landing site towards Nabi Chit”. The statement added that “three soldiers and a number of civilians were killed as a result of the intense hostile bombardment ...”. Hezbollah, meanwhile, stated that, on 6 March, it had “detected the infiltration of four helicopters belonging to [Israel] from the Syrian direction”, and that it had subsequently engaged with that infantry force in Nabi Shit, supported by “residents of neighbouring villages” amid heavy Israeli air strikes. The Israel Defense Forces stated that, “as part of the defense forces’ activities in Lebanon, special forces from the defense forces operated last night in an attempt to find evidence related to the missing air navigator Ron Arad”. The Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon said at least 41 people had been killed and another 40 had been wounded as a result of the operation.

26. According to the Lebanese Armed Forces, on 16 March, Israeli air strikes resulted in the death of four personnel from the Lebanese Armed Forces and the injury of four others in the areas of Zibdin, Qa‘qa‘iyat al-Jisr and Duwayr (Nabatiyah). The Israel Defense Forces stated that the “incident is currently under investigation. We

affirm that the Defense Army operates against [...] Hizbullah and not against the Lebanese army or Lebanese citizens”. Mr. Aoun said that he “strongly condemned the targeting of the soldiers”, adding that it “blatantly contradicts the calls ... to enable the army to extend the State’s authority over all Lebanese territories and to confine arms to the hands of legitimate armed forces”. As at 31 March, a total of 12 Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers had been killed and several others had been wounded.

27. In its resolution [1680 \(2006\)](#), the Security Council strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request made by the Government of Lebanon to delineate their common border. This remains critical to enabling proper border control and management, including the movement of people and the potential movement of arms.

28. The delineation and demarcation of the boundaries of Lebanon also remain elements that essential to guaranteeing national sovereignty and territorial integrity. While border delineation is a bilateral matter, progress on the issue remains an obligation for Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, in accordance with resolution [1680 \(2006\)](#).

### **C. Disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias**

29. In its resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#), the Security Council called for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, a key provision of the resolution that has yet to be implemented. The provision reflects and reaffirms a decision to which all Lebanese committed themselves in the Taif Accords.

30. While several groups across the political spectrum in Lebanon possess weapons outside government control, Hizbullah is the most heavily armed militia in the country. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups continued to pose a serious challenge to the State’s ability to exercise full sovereignty and sole and exclusive authority over all its territory.

31. In identical letters dated 2 March 2026 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([A/80/660-S/2026/113](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations said that the Cabinet, “following its rejection and condemnation of the rocket-launching operation claimed by Hizbullah ...”, had decided the following:

“First: The Lebanese State declares its absolute rejection, in a manner that admits of no ambiguity or misinterpretation, of any military or security actions launched from Lebanese territory outside the framework of its legitimate institutions, and affirms that the decision of war and peace rests exclusively with the State. This requires the immediate prohibition of all Hezbollah security and military activities, as they are unlawful, and requires it to surrender its weapons to the Lebanese State and to confine its activity to the political sphere within constitutional and legal frameworks, in a manner that enshrines the State’s exclusive right to bear arms and strengthens its full sovereignty throughout its territory. The Government requests all military and security agencies to take immediate measures to implement the foregoing, to prevent any military operation or the launch of any rockets or drones from Lebanese territory, and to apprehend violators in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations;

“Second: To request that the Army Command immediately and decisively implement the plan it presented at the Council of Ministers session held on [16 February 2026], insofar as it concerns the confinement of weapons north of the Litani River, using all necessary means to ensure its implementation;

“Third: In line with its unwavering commitment to prevent Lebanon from being drawn into any conflict amid heightened regional tensions, the Council calls on the guarantor states of the Declaration on the Cessation of Hostilities to secure a clear and final commitment from the Israeli side to cease all attacks across all Lebanese territory ...;

“Fourth: To request the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants to intensify diplomatic contacts to halt the Israeli aggression”.

32. On 5 March, Mr. Salam “requested that the necessary measures be taken to prevent any military or security activity by members of the [Islamic] Revolutionary Guard [Corps] in Lebanon, in preparation for their deportation”. In a televised interview on 22 March, Mr. Salam said, “We will not back down [from placing the] decisions of war and peace ... in [the State’s] hands”. He also said that “the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ... is present and unfortunately managing the military operations in Lebanon, [as evidenced by the statement issued] by the official Iranian agency about a joint operation between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah”, and he noted that “they hold forged passports and have entered illegally into the country. It is difficult to uncover them. But when they are, they will be arrested and deported”.

33. In identical letters dated 24 March 2026 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([A/80/684-S/2026/223](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that, “in light of increasing reports that members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are present on Lebanese territory and engaging in military and security activities, ... the Cabinet adopted Decision No. 10 dated 5 March 2026 ... calling on the military and security agencies to ascertain if members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are present in Lebanon; intervene decisively and immediately to prevent any security or military activity or operation they might launch from Lebanese territory, regardless of their status or the cover under which they operate; and detain them ... until they can be deported”.

34. On 24 March, Mr. Raggi said: “I instructed today the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants to summon the Iranian Chargé d’affaires in Lebanon to inform him of the decision to withdraw the *agrément* for the designated Iranian Ambassador, Mohammad Reza Shibani, declare him persona non grata and request that he leave Lebanese territory no later than 29 March 2026”. Hezbollah and Amal ministers boycotted the Cabinet session of 26 March in protest against that decision. On 30 March, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Esmail Baghaei, said, “Our embassy in Lebanon is operating. Our Ambassador, given the discussions that were raised by the relevant Lebanese authorities and the conclusions reached, will continue his work as Iran’s Ambassador in Beirut and will remain there”.

35. Since 2 March, Israel has reiterated its concern over the security threat posed by Hezbollah and the Israel Defense Forces has stated on several occasions that it would continue its military operations until that threat has been removed. In identical letters dated 11 March 2026 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2026/162](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations transmitted a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, in which the latter deplored the fact that “Iran’s ... network of terrorist organizations, most prominently Hezbollah (acting directly against the express will of the State of Lebanon, as noted in its letter to the Council dated 2 March 2026), continue to attack Israel and destabilize the region”.

36. Following the 11 March attack that was jointly claimed by Hizbullah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (see para. 8), Mr. Katz reportedly stated on 12 March that he had “warned the Lebanese President that if the Lebanese Government does not know how to control the territory and prevent Hizbullah from threatening the northern communities and firing at Israel – we will take the territory and do it ourselves”. On 14 March, Mr. Katz said that “the Lebanese Government deceived and failed to honour its commitment to disarm Hizbullah, and it will therefore pay the price with territorial losses and infrastructure damage until the central commitment of disarming Hizbullah is fulfilled”. On 15 March, Mr. Sa’ar reportedly stated that “Lebanon hadn’t really done what it should have done in order to dismantle Hizbullah, and we see now the results. And we also expect to take some serious steps from their side to stop the shootings on Israel. ... We are all for peace and normalization in the future, including with Lebanon. ... We have some minor border disputes that can be solved quite easily. But the problem is Hizbullah”.

37. In identical letters dated 25 March 2026 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2026/225](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations transmitted a letter from Mr. Sa’ar, in which the latter stated that, since 2 March, “Hizbullah has initiated and carried out coordinated indiscriminate attacks against Israel’s civilian population, acting at the request and behest of its patrons in Tehran. To date, Hizbullah has launched more than 3,500 rockets, missiles, and [uncrewed aerial vehicles] at Israel, including from areas south of the Litani River, endangering millions of Israeli residents and forcing them into bomb shelters. Only yesterday 27-year-old Nuriel Dubin, was murdered by a Hizbullah missile strike.” Mr. Sa’ar added that “Hizbullah’s attacks from both north and south of the Litani River demonstrate that it has not been disarmed and that Security Council resolutions [1701 \(2006\)](#) and [1559 \(2004\)](#), as well as the 2024 Understandings have not been implemented”. He also stated that, “although Lebanon has claimed in January it had gained ‘operational control’ south of the Litani River, a significant portion of the attacks against Israel originated from that area, underscoring the gap between rhetoric and reality. ... [T]he initial barrage of rockets launched on March 2, 2026, originated from a location that had been repeatedly reported to the [Lebanese Armed Forces] but was not addressed. This represents a clear failure by Lebanon to prevent attacks from its territory.” He asked the Security Council to condemn Hizbullah, ensure compliance with resolutions [1701 \(2006\)](#) and [1559 \(2004\)](#) by the Lebanese authorities and hold the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable for the transfer of funds and weapons to Hizbullah.

38. Hizbullah, meanwhile, continued to denounce the failure of the Government of Lebanon to prevent Israeli violations. On 13 March, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Mr. Qassem, stated that “diplomatic activity in Lebanon has failed miserably. ... There is no solution in this situation except resistance; otherwise, Lebanon is headed towards disappearance.” He added that Hizbullah would “not retreat, because this concerns our very existence. This is an existential battle”. He asked the Government to stop offering “free concessions [to Israel]”.

39. In a televised interview on 23 March, a senior official Hizbullah, Wafic Safa, said that there were two main reasons why Hizbullah had not responded to Israeli violations during the 15 months since the cessation of hostilities: “The first was to give Lebanese diplomacy a chance; ... the second is to give a chance to the [brothers in arms] to restore the military capability ...; truthfully, during these 15 months, ... Hizbullah and the Islamic resistance were working to consolidate their capabilities: firstly, its missile capabilities, in quantity and quality, ... secondly, its drones, in quantity and quality, ... and thirdly, its ground forces in all forms, whether the Radwan Forces or others”. The maintenance by Hizbullah of a military arsenal outside a legal framework, combined with such statements, continued to be denounced by a

number of voices in Lebanon, who consider those issues to be destabilizing factors in the country and ones that undermine democracy. Mr. Qassem, in a speech on 25 March, said that “national unity means reversing the decision to criminalize resistance work and resistance fighters”.

40. The handover of weapons to the Lebanese Armed Forces from inside Palestine refugee camps continued throughout 2025. On 30 December, the Lebanese Armed Forces announced that it had received a shipment of weapons from the Ein El Hilweh Palestine refugee camp as part of the ongoing handover process. At the time of writing, only factions aligned with the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization have handed over weapons. On 22 December, the Chair of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee in the Office of the Prime Minister issued a statement in which he expressed “surprise at the lack of response from some Palestinian factions to the State’s plan to confine weapons south of the Litani River to the State’s control before the end of this year”. The United Nations continued to support the Government in developing a national plan for governance inside the Palestine refugee camps.

### III. Observations

41. I welcome the 17 April announcement of a 10-day ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon and commend the role of the United States of America in facilitating the ceasefire. I reaffirm the support of the United Nations for all efforts to end hostilities and alleviate the suffering of communities on both sides of the Blue Line. I call on the parties to extend this ceasefire, in order for it to pave the way for negotiations and the full implementation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) towards a long-term solution to the conflict. The meeting on 15 April between Lebanon and Israel, convened by the United States, constitutes an important first step toward ending the hostilities and breaking the recurrent rounds of violence that have caused considerable suffering on both sides for too long.

42. I reiterate my condemnation of all attacks affecting civilians and civilian objects on both sides of the Blue Line. The 2 March attack and subsequent attacks by Hizbullah across the Blue Line, the large-scale Israeli attacks across Lebanon and Israel’s deeper incursion in the South are deplorable and have resulted in dramatic consequences for civilians on both sides of the Blue Line. During the reporting period, Israeli air and artillery attacks have had a staggering human cost, including casualties, fatalities and mass displacement of the civilian population, and have caused considerable destruction, including to key civilian infrastructure across Lebanon. I urge all actors to fully respect the ceasefire and comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, at all times.

43. The continued possession of weapons outside the authority of the State is a blatant violation of resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#) and [1701 \(2006\)](#). The continued refusal of Hizbullah to comply with the efforts of the Government of Lebanon to assert State authority throughout the country and its stated justification for the attack on 2 March are in direct contradiction to the decision adopted by the Cabinet on 5 August 2025 to establish exclusive State control over weapons, as well as to the Government’s repeated affirmation of the State’s sole authority over questions of “war and peace”.

44. The continued presence and the expansion and ongoing operations of the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line, coupled with its continued extensive military activities in southern Lebanon, hinder the efforts of the Government of Lebanon to extend its authority and impede the return of residents to their homes. I reiterate my strong condemnation of all violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. I urge the Israeli authorities to fulfil their obligations under resolutions [1701](#)

(2006) and 1559 (2004) to withdraw from all areas north of the Blue Line and to cease violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. In that connection, I renew my call on Israel to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions, withdraw from the northern part of Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line and immediately cease its overflights of Lebanese airspace. Of particular concern, in this regard, are the statements made by Israeli officials indicating that Israel intends to establish a “security zone” in southern Lebanon, which would be a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon and in flagrant breach of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and relevant Security Council resolutions. I also urge the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab‘a Farms contained in my report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) dated 30 October 2007 (S/2007/641, annex).

45. During my solidarity visit to Lebanon from 13 to 15 March, I met Messrs. Aoun and Salam and the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, with whom I discussed de-escalation efforts and to whom I emphasized the importance of an immediate ceasefire and the full implementation of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006) and reiterated my support for all efforts that would ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon and the State’s monopoly on the use of force. I expressed my hope to see a Lebanon in which peace prevailed, where the State has a monopoly of the use of force and the territorial integrity of which is fully re-established and respected.

46. The escalation of hostilities demonstrated anew the very tangible risks presented by the continued activities of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias that resolution 1559 (2004) was intended to prevent. I reiterate my call upon all parties concerned not to engage in any military activity inside or outside Lebanon, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Accords and resolution 1559 (2004). The Accords must be preserved and implemented by all in order to avoid the spectre of a renewed confrontation among Lebanese citizens and to strengthen the institutions of the State. All parties concerned must contribute to efforts to reinforce the institutions of the Lebanese State. Countries in the region that maintain close ties with Hizbullah should encourage its disarmament and its transformation into a solely civilian political party, in accordance with the requirements of the Taif Accords, resolution 1559 (2004) and recent Cabinet decisions, and in the best interests of Lebanon and of regional peace and security. The decisions adopted by the Cabinet reaffirming the State’s exclusive authority over all arms and military activity in Lebanon constitute a critical development towards the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) and must be fully respected. The Government’s efforts to implement those decisions must be fully supported.

47. The Lebanese Armed Forces has a pivotal role in asserting and extending State authority. I urge donors to enhance support to the Lebanese Armed Forces and other security institutions, so that they can effectively fulfil their security responsibilities. The extension of State authority must encompass not only the security sector, but also broader governance, institutional and socioeconomic dimensions. A whole-of-government approach is needed to address the entrenched reality of non-State arms and heal long-standing grievances of marginalized communities. Sustainable security cannot be achieved through military pressure; it requires meaningful dialogue. For such dialogue to take place, space is needed to address the root causes of the conflict, in particular those identified in resolution 1559 (2004), including the disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia and the cessation of Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty. I welcome international efforts to advance diplomatic approaches.

48. The renewed escalation of hostilities has set back the progress achieved in Lebanon since the previous reporting period. Beyond the dramatic impact on the

people of Lebanon, the current crisis has halted progress on reforms and disrupted the normal functioning of parliament. Humanitarian needs are massive, with 20 per cent of the Lebanese population displaced and nearly 15 per cent of Lebanon's territory subject to an evacuation order by the Israel Defense Forces. I urge donors to contribute without delay to the Lebanon flash appeal.

49. It is vital that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East receive adequate and predictable funding to meet the protection needs of Palestine refugees. The indispensable role of the Agency in maintaining stability in the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon remains critical.

50. I count on the continued commitment of the Government of Lebanon to its international obligations and call upon all parties and actors to fully abide by resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#), [1680 \(2006\)](#) and [1701 \(2006\)](#). The United Nations will continue its efforts towards the full implementation of those and all other resolutions pertaining to Lebanon.

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