

13 March 2026

English only

Human Rights Council
Sixty-first session

Consolidated findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran*

Summary

The present conference room paper complements the contemporaneous report submitted to the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/61/60) pursuant to resolution 58/21, and contains detailed findings, analysis and recommendations of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran in relation to recent and ongoing serious human rights violations, including the repression that followed during and after the June 2025 hostilities, the sharp rise in executions pursuant to death sentences recorded in 2025, persistent impunity, and structural discrimination, particularly against women, girls, and minorities. It also includes the Mission's preliminary observations into credible allegations that gross human rights violations and crimes under international law may have occurred in the context of the protests that began on 28 December 2025.

The present paper was completed before a new wave of U.S.-Israel airstrikes began on 28 February 2026 on the Islamic Republic of Iran, and covers investigations carried out between March 2025 and 18 February 2026.

* The information contained in the present document should be read in conjunction with the official report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (A/HRC/61/60), submitted to the Human Rights Council at its sixty-first session, pursuant to Council Resolution 58/21.

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I. Introduction

1. The present conference room paper complements the contemporaneous report (A/HRC/61/60) submitted to the Human Rights Council (“the Council”) pursuant to its 58/21 in which “the Council” extended the mandate of the Independent International Fact-finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (“the Mission”) for a period of one year, until April 2026. The Council asked the Mission to thoroughly and independently investigate allegations of recent and ongoing serious human rights violations, to establish the facts, circumstances and structural causes of such violations, including discrimination on grounds of gender, ethnicity, religion or belief and political views; and to collect, consolidate, analyze, record and preserve evidence of such violations for use in any independent legal proceedings.¹

2. In its first report to the Council in March 2024, the Mission concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that gross human rights violations and crimes under international law, including the crime against humanity of gender persecution, were committed by State authorities in the context of the 2022-2023 protests, and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement.²

3. In its second report to the Council in March 2025, the Mission found that such State persecutory conduct had persisted after the large-scale protests subsided, including through continued arbitrary arrests and detentions, the issuance of death sentences and executions following grossly unfair trials, and judicial and physical harassment, threats, and intimidation. The Mission further found that this persecutory conduct on gender grounds had continued through the recurrent repression, both of women and girls who defied mandatory *hijab* laws, and protesters and their families and other groups advocating for accountability, including truth, justice, and reparations. The Mission also found that ethnic and religious minorities, in particular Kurds and Baluch, as well as LGBTQ+ persons, were victims of crimes against humanity and affected as separate persecuted groups.³

4. On 23 January 2026, the Council convened a special session on the deteriorating situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In its resolution S-39/1 the Council extended the Mission’s mandate for a further period of two years, as set out in Council resolution 58/21 of 3 April 2025, effective from the end of the sixty-first session of the Council. It further requested the Mission to continue to fulfil its mandate in line with Council resolution 58/21, and to conduct an urgent investigation into allegations of recent and ongoing serious human rights violations and abuses and crimes perpetrated in relation to the protests that began on 28 December 2025, including for potential future legal proceedings in line with its mandate.⁴

5. In this and earlier resolutions S-35/1, 55/19, and 58/21, the Council has consistently called on the Government of Iran to cooperate fully with the Mission, including by granting it unhindered access to the country, and providing necessary information. The Mission deeply regrets that the Government has not granted access to the country since the start of its mandate. To date, the Mission has sent 44 letters with information requests to the Government.⁵ While acknowledging responses to 12 of these letters, the Mission regrets that the rest remained unanswered and that, in the responses received, the Government did not provide the underlying information requested. Such information requested includes on comprehensive, disaggregated data on civilians killed and injured during the June 2025

¹ In April 2025, the Council extended the Fact-Finding Mission's mandate for one additional year through resolution A/HRC/58/21.

² On 22 November 2022, the Human Rights Council convened a special session and adopted Resolution S-35/1 on the deteriorating situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially with respect to women and children, and established the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran. In its resolution, the Human Rights Council expressed concerns about the violent crackdown on peaceful protests by security forces in Iran, following the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini, a young woman arrested for allegedly violating the country’s mandatory *hijab* laws. In March 2024, the Mission submitted its first report (A/HRC/55/67) and the accompanying conference room paper (A/HRC/55/CRP.1), which contained its detailed findings, analysis and recommendations.

³ See A/HRC/58/63. The Mission also submitted an accompanying conference room paper (A/HRC/55/CRP.1), which contained its detailed findings, analysis and recommendations.

⁴ See A/HRC/RES/S-39/1.

⁵ See Annex I in this document. See also A/HRC/58/CRP1 Annex I

hostilities, death certificates, medical reports, testimonies, and/or other relevant information, as well as specific measures taken to ensure protection of detainees before, during and after the airstrikes on Evin prison compound, including the steps taken to ensure that detainees were not subjected to torture or enforced disappearance; the methodology of the investigations conducted; details on the arrests, detention, legal proceedings, and use of force during and following the June 2025 hostilities and, in relation to the protests that began on 28 December 2025, details of the incidents cited, alleged perpetrators, and any investigations or other measures undertaken by the State.

6. While the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations (UN) in Geneva has not responded to the Mission's requests for meetings, it did provide two briefings to the Mission, one on the events in the country since 28 December 2025, and a second briefing following the airstrikes by Israel and the United States of America (U.S.) which began on 28 February 2026. During the first briefing, the Mission reiterated its concern regarding a written threat by the Government of Iran against the Mission's members (see Annex I). The Permanent Mission explained the threat as a difference in cultural perceptions and stated that it had nothing against the Mission's experts personally and respected them professionally.

7. The Mission has reviewed 29 reports submitted by the Government of Iran, since December 2025, reflecting their content herein, where relevant.

8. On 24 October 2025, the Mission sent a request for information to the Government of Israel in relation to airstrikes by Iran on the territory of Israel, and airstrikes by Israel on the territory of Iran, but has not received a response to date.

9. The Mission faced a UN-wide hiring freeze during the current mandate, which caused its Secretariat to work with a variable staffing rate that did not exceed 60 per cent. The Mission spent several months operating with a staffing rate of around 20 per cent and only one staff member was continuously employed throughout the mandate. The Mission lacked an English-Persian interpreter for five months, and a second interpreter for the entire mandate.

10. Given various operational constraints, the Mission prioritized investigations based on gravity, scale, access to information, impact on victims and their families, and the wider landscape of accountability efforts, including justice, truth, and reparations pursued by victims and their families.

11. The Mission took note in particular of the astonishing escalation in executions in 2025, in many cases following grossly unfair trials and due process violations, including credible reports of torture-tainted evidence used to convict individuals. The Judiciary's continued failure to meaningfully prosecute or remedy past and on-going violations and crimes further underscores the persistent, systemic impunity in Iran.

12. The Mission continued to build on its previous work examining patterns and root causes of human rights violations through the lens of institutionalized discrimination against women and girls, including the violent enforcement of the mandatory *hijab* laws and regulations, as well as femicide, and the application of the death penalty against women, including activists and human rights defenders.

13. Under the expanded mandate, and within the constraints of available resources, the Mission also began investigations into Israeli airstrikes on civilians and civilian objects in Iran as well as Iran's domestic response to the airstrikes in June 2025. The Mission has highlighted the need for further investigations into areas where it could not find sufficient information to reach a conclusion under its standard of proof. The Mission requires additional resources, as well as unhindered access to relevant sites and people of interest to complete these investigations.

14. On 28 February 2026, Israel and the U.S. began a new wave of airstrikes on Iran, and by 3 March, the armed conflict had already expanded to involve over 10 countries. Some senior Iranian officials, including *inter alia* Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader and Mohammad Pakpour, Commander of the IRGC, have been killed by U.S.-Israeli

airstrikes. Iran has also conducted airstrikes in countries in the region that have killed civilians and caused damage to civilian infrastructure.⁶

15. Reports of civilian casualties as well as damage and destruction of critical civilian infrastructure, hospitals and schools in Iran are rapidly emerging. As of 14 March, according to UN agencies, around 1,300 people have been killed in Iran, including 200 children under 12 years, and 9,000 people injured as a result of the airstrikes. In Israel, authorities reported 15 deaths and 2142 injuries.⁷

16. On 28 February, airstrikes hit a school in Minab, Hormozgan province, reportedly killing over 165 people, the vast majority of whom appear to have been schoolgirls.⁸ The Government shut down the Internet on 28 February 2026, as it did during the June 2025 hostilities and the protests that began on 28 December (see Section III, below), again preventing people from accessing vital updates on the hostilities, safe escape routes, and cutting off communication with loved ones inside and outside the country.⁹

17. The current security situation must not be used to justify new large-scale arrests, broader restrictions to freedom of expression, and renewed violence against those who dare to express dissent, as documented here in relation to the State response during and after the armed conflict between Iran and Israel in June 2025 (see Section IV and V, below). Concerns about the fate and whereabouts of detainees, including in the Evin prison compound, are markedly increasing, especially for those reportedly detained in unofficial detention facilities. This includes tens of thousands of people detained in relation to the protests that began on 28 December 2025, as well as activists and human rights defenders, many of whom are being held arbitrarily, in prisons across Iran. Some detainees are reportedly facing expedited death penalty proceedings in violation of international fair trial and due process rights, and the right to life. A durable peace, rooted in full respect for international law, including the UN Charter and international human rights law, offers the only sustainable way to safeguard the rights of the people in Iran, and international security.

18. The Mission expresses its gratitude to victims and witnesses who came forward with their experiences despite constant security risks posed to them and their families, including well-founded fears of reprisals for cooperating with the Mission. It also expresses gratitude to civil society organizations providing information to the Mission.

II. Methodology and standard of proof

19. The Mission was guided by the methodologies and best practices of UN entities and bodies, ensuring a victim-centered approach, with specific attention paid to the gender dimensions of the violations documented, and to intersectional factors shaping survivors' experiences. In line with the general practice of UN investigative bodies, the Mission applied the "reasonable grounds to believe" standard of proof.¹⁰

20. The Mission continued to ensure strict adherence to the principles of "do no harm," independence, impartiality, objectivity, transparency, and integrity, in accordance with the standard investigation methodology of the OHCHR.¹¹

21. Due to security concerns, the Mission withheld or redacted certain details in the present conference room paper, such as names, dates, or locations, to protect the identities of individuals and prevent further harm to victims and/or their families, including reprisals.¹²

⁶ "Urgent call to protect civilians and respect international law amid escalating regional conflict following US and Israeli attacks on Iran", Amnesty International, 3 March 2026.

⁷ "Conflict deepens health crisis across Middle East, WHO says", WHO, 11 March 2026; Child casualties rise amidst deepening Middle East conflict, UNICEF, 11 March 2026.

⁸ "Search operations for the Minab martyrs have concluded; 165 students were killed", VISTA, 2 March 2026.

⁹ <https://radar.cloudflare.com/ir?dateStart=2026-02-28&dateEnd=2026-03-11>.

¹⁰ For the Mission's detailed methodology, see A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 30-43.

¹¹ See Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian law, Guidance and Practice, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Chapter II. The Terms of Reference for the 2025 mandate are available in English and Persian.

¹² A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 38-41.

22. The Mission conducted over 400 interviews with victims, witnesses, and others providing information whether remotely or in person, both outside and inside the country, and gathered official information, including that made available by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran directly to the Mission, to the UN Secretary General, UN human rights mechanisms, and on official websites and State or state-affiliated media outlets.¹³ The Mission also obtained information from human rights organizations which the Mission deemed credible (hereafter “credible information”), satellite imagery, military, forensic and weapons analysis and open-source material,¹⁴ and secondary source information to corroborate and contextualize the information gathered.¹⁵

23. The Mission’s investigations are ongoing and it remains open to the Islamic Republic of Iran to assist the Mission, including by facilitating a country visit, so that a full accounting of the evidence can be reflected in its future reports.

III. The protests that began on 28 December 2025, and Government response

24. On 28 December 2025, three months before the end of the Mission’s current mandate, protests erupted in Iran and quickly spread to all 31 provinces.¹⁶ Initially sparked by an economic crisis and deteriorating living conditions, protesters’ demands rapidly evolved into broader calls for rights and change in national leadership. While the Government initially adopted a conciliatory tone, its response quickly degenerated into increasing and unprecedented levels of violence.

25. On 29 December, President Masoud Pezeshkian published a post on social media noting the need to listen to the protesters’ demands, and for the Interior Minister to engage in dialogue with their representatives.¹⁷ On 31 December, the then Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, appointed Ahmad Vahidi,¹⁸ former Minister of Interior, as deputy commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”). Later, in March 2026, Mr. Vahidi was appointed as the head of the IRGC after his predecessor, Mohammad Pakpour, was killed in the U.S.-Israeli airstrikes that began again on 28 February 2026. The Mission has previously found reasonable grounds to believe that, in accordance with Iran’s obligations under international law, in the light of his role and authorities, Mr. Vahidi bore responsibility for violations and crimes under international law established by the Mission.¹⁹

¹³ The Mission availed itself of official translations where they were available. In all other instances, translations are unofficial translations.

¹⁴ See Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/OHCHR_BerkeleyProtocol.pdf. The Mission has reviewed hundreds of pieces of video footage and verified them to the extent that was possible. Where it has relied on audio-visual material to make findings, it has accepted that the material is credible and authentic, in line with its standard of proof. The Mission notes that its use and preservation of digital open-source information, the Mission is guided by United Nations rules, regulations and policies in general and the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open-Source Investigations in particular. Due to repeated Internet shutdowns in Iran in June 2025, January 2026 and from the beginning of March until the date of publication of this document, the Mission has only had intermittent access to digital open-source information on Iranian websites. Despite this obstacle, the Mission was able to preserve the vast majority of the digital open-source material it relied upon.

¹⁵ See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 30-43.

¹⁶ “What happened at the protests in Iran?”, Amnesty International, 26 January 2026. See also, “Bloody 17th of Dey in Iran; the number of slain protesters has reached 45”, Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), 8 January 2026.

¹⁷ See https://x.com/drpezeshkian/status/2005738625926152403?s=46&t=MaFBaW_f8rsCZqG4J88OnQ.

¹⁸ “Strategic Appointment Founder of Quds Force Becomes Deputy Commander of the IRGC”, Mehr News, 31 December 2025.

¹⁹ In the light of their roles and authorities within the entities listed above, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the former Minister of Interior and current head of the IRGC, Ahmad Vahidi; Minister of Intelligence, Esmail Khatib; Head of the Judiciary, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei; IRGC Commander in Chief, Major General Hossein Salami; and the FARAJA Commanders-in-Chief, Hossein Ashtari (former) and Ahmad Reza Radan bear responsibility in accordance with Iran’s obligations under international law. See A/HRC/58/CRP.1, para. 687.

26. On 3 January 2026, the then Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei announced that “a protest is justified [but] a riot is different” and urged that “rioters be put in their place.”²⁰ Later that day, the IRGC’s provincial corps in Lorestan declared that “the period of appeasement” towards protesters was over.²¹ On that date, at least 11 protesters had reportedly been killed, according to a credible human rights organization.²²

27. According to Iranian media, on 8 January 2026, a closed-door session of parliament was held to review economic issues, in the presence of senior security officials, including the head of FARAJA. Reportedly, discussions focused on the scale of the protests, the State response, and on casualty figures recorded by then. A member of parliament was quoted as stating that “the use of weapons” had been limited to cases involving “harm to the country,” and that while officials “understand legitimate demands,” they “will nevertheless confront “insecurities.”²³

28. On 5 January, President Pezeshkian instructed the Minister of Interior, Eskandar Momeni, to carry out a comprehensive, transparent investigation into incidents in Ilam.²⁴ On 6 January, the Interior Minister tasked the Deputy Minister of Security and Law Enforcement, Ali Akbar Pour Jamshidian, with conducting this investigation.²⁵

29. On the evening of 8 January, the Government imposed a total Internet, mobile and landline communications shutdown. People inside Iran were cut off from the world, unaware of the scale of violations unfolding elsewhere in the country, and unable to contact loved ones inside Iran and abroad. Credible reports indicated that a marked escalation in violence and deaths began shortly thereafter, as millions of people took to the streets.²⁶ The shutdown concealed this shift and the increasingly violent repression that followed. On 9 January, Iran’s National Security Council reportedly issued a statement ordering security forces to “decisively” crack down on protesters, “without any restraint” and to “bring the protests to an end.”²⁷

30. On 17 January, the then Supreme Leader acknowledged that “thousands of people” had been killed²⁸ and yet called for the authorities to “break the backs of the secessionists.”²⁹ On 21 January, the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans³⁰ announced that 3,117 individuals had been killed, including an unknown number of members of the security forces, and 690 “rioters.”³¹ At the time of writing, a credible human rights organization estimated that over 7,000 people, including up to 6,500 protesters, and at least 219 children, and at least 200 security forces had been killed.³²

²⁰ “Meeting of the families of martyrs with the Leader of the Revolution on the birthday of Amir Al Momenin” Khamenei.ir, 3 January 2026.

²¹ “The period of leniency toward those involved in the recent unrest has come to an end”, Vista, 5 January 2026.

²² “Authorities renewed cycle of protest bloodshed”, Human Rights Watch, 8 January 2026.

²³ “Iran Parliament, the number of killed security forces was announced as four times the number of deceased protesters”, Radio Free Europe, 8 January 2026. See also “Death toll of the unrest”, Hammihan, 8 January 2026.

²⁴ See “Important order from Pezeshkian to the Minister of Interior to comprehensively investigate the Ilam incidents”, Donya-e- Eqtesad, 5 January 2026.

²⁵ The Government of Iran confirmed these instructions to investigate incidents in Ilam in a report dated 9 January 2026. See also “A special delegation from the Ministry of Interior left for Ilam”, Mehr News, 6 January 2026.

²⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008410 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008409 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008414 (FFMI Interview).

²⁷ “Security forces and the Judiciary will not tolerate the saboteurs under any circumstances.”, IRIB Telegram Channel, 9 January 2026.

²⁸ “Meeting of various groups of people with the Leader of the Revolution on the anniversary of the Prophet’s Mabaas”, Khameni.ir, 17 January 2026.

²⁹ “Meeting of various groups of people with the Leader of the Revolution on the anniversary of the Prophet’s Mabaas”, Khameni.ir, 17 January 2026.

³⁰ The Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans is an official state body whose head is appointed by Iran’s Supreme Leader. It operates exclusively under his authority and is not affiliated with any Ministry.

³¹ “The number of martyrs and casualties in recent terrorist incidents has been announced”, Tasnim, 21 January 2026.

³² “The Crimson Winter: A 50 Day Record of Iran’s 2025–2026 Nationwide Protests”, HRANA, 23 February 2026.

31. Despite severe communication restrictions imposed by the Government, the Mission collected information on credible allegations that gross human rights violations and crimes under international law may have occurred in the context of the protests that began on 28 December 2025.

A. Use of force resulting in deaths and injuries

“You should thank God that your brother wasn’t part of the protests. Last night, I was crying while amputating a teenager’s leg below the knee.”

Statement obtained by the Mission³³

1. 28 December – 7 January

32. Reports received indicated that protesters were shot and killed on or around 31 December in some provinces such as Ilam, Fars and Lorestan.³⁴ A credible human rights organization reported that at least 28 protesters and bystanders, including children, were killed between 31 December 2025 and 3 January 2026 by security forces in Lorestan, Ilam, Fars, Kermanshah, Isfahan, Hamedan, Qom, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari provinces, some of which are minority dominated areas.³⁵

2. 8 and 10 January

33. On the night of 8 January, according to credible information, the presence of security forces increased³⁶ in several provinces with uniformed armed Basij,³⁷ plainclothes agents,³⁸ Iran’s law enforcement agency (FARAJA) special forces,³⁹ and the IRGC⁴⁰ deploying to protest sites.

34. On 25 January, the commander of Iran’s special forces, Mehdi Sharif Kazemi, stated that the “police did not use any firearms against the protestors” and had instead used “non-lethal means such as water cannons, paintball guns, and flashbang instruments to handle the situation.”⁴¹

35. The Mission has learned, however, that protesters, including women,⁴² older persons,⁴³ and children,⁴⁴ were reportedly killed between 8 and 10 January across at least nine

³³ FFM-IRAN-D-008535 (FFMI Submission).

³⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008462 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008444 (FFMI Interview).

³⁵ “Iran: Authorities’ Renewed Cycle of Protest Bloodshed”, Human Rights Watch, 8 January 2026.

³⁶ “In Parliament, the number of killed security forces was announced as four times the number of deceased protesters”, Radio Free Europe, 8 January 2026.

³⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008444 (FFMI Interview).

³⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008410 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008411 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008414 (FFMI Interview).

³⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008484 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008411 (FFMI Interview).

⁴⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008411 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008410 (FFMI Interview).

⁴¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008411 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008409 (FFMI Interview).

⁴² “Commander of FARAJA’s Special Units: The police did not use live firearms during the recent unrest”, Vista, 27 January 2026. See also “The police did not use live firearms during the recent unrest”, Mehr News, 25 January 2025.

⁴³ FFM-IRAN-D-008889 (FFMI Interview).

⁴⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008414 (FFMI Interview).

⁴⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008476 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008729 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008411 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008719 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008444 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008469 (FFMI Interview).

provinces including Alborz,⁴⁵ Tehran,⁴⁶ Ilam,⁴⁷ Mazandaran,⁴⁸ Lorestan,⁴⁹ Kermanshah,⁵⁰ Kurdistan,⁵¹ Isfahan, and Gilan.⁵² In Tehran, Karaj and Isfahan, witnesses saw traces of blood and dead bodies scattered on the streets.⁵³ Security forces allegedly shot at the bodies of injured protesters in Karaj.⁵⁴

36. In Tehran,⁵⁵ Fardis,⁵⁶ and Karaj⁵⁷ witnesses saw security forces shooting at crowds with shotguns loaded with lethal ammunition,⁵⁸ DShK heavy machine guns,⁵⁹ and rifles,⁶⁰ injuring⁶¹ and killing protesters.⁶²

37. Credible information also indicates that, between 8 and 9 January, protesters appear to have been killed in Alborz, Tehran, Mazandaran, Isfahan and Lorestan, with their bodies bearing visible gunshot wounds to the back,⁶³ face,⁶⁴ head,⁶⁵ and chest.⁶⁶ On 10 January, in Fardis (Karaj), a protester saw fellow protesters falling to the ground after security forces chased the crowd into an alley and fired lethal ammunition at them.⁶⁷ Reports and open-source information also indicated that snipers shot at protesters.⁶⁸

38. Video footage verified by credible human rights organizations shows security forces, including some on motorcycles, beating, chasing and shooting at crowds and fleeing protesters in Hamedan, Karaj, Fardis, Tehran, and Mashhad cities.⁶⁹ In some videos, people can be seen carrying bodies covered in blood.⁷⁰ In one video from Mashhad, the person recording states: “Look, they shot a girl. They are using weapons of war.”⁷¹ Video footage published in January also showed individuals covered in blood lying motionless on the street,⁷² on hospital floors⁷³ in Tehran and Arak,⁷⁴ and near a hospital entrance in Tehran

⁴⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008411 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008463 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008469 (FFMI Interview).

⁴⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008406 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008476 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008729 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008463 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008410 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008888 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008788 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁴⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008462 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008473 (FFMI Interview).

⁴⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008406 (FFMI Interview).

⁴⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008413 (FFMI Interview).

⁵⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008412 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008466 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008719 (FFMI Submission).

⁵¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008719 (FFMI Submission).

⁵² FFM-IRAN-D-008794 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁵³ FFM-IRAN-D-008410 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008411 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008414 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008406 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008406 (FFMI Interview).

⁵⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008411 (FFMI Interview).

⁵⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008410 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008469 (FFMI Interview).

⁵⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008469 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008411 (FFMI Interview).

⁵⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008411 (FFMI Interview).

⁵⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008410 (FFMI Interview).

⁵⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008469 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008414 (FFMI Interview).

⁶⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008414 (FFMI Interview).

⁶¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008410 (FFMI Interview).

⁶² FFM-IRAN-D-008411 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008469 (FFMI Interview).

⁶³ FFM-IRAN-D-008406 (FFMI Interview).

⁶⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008415 (FFMI Interview).

⁶⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008416 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008406 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008889 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008411 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008412 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008469 (FFMI Interview).

⁶⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008409 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008469 (FFMI Interview).

⁶⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008469 (FFMI Interview).

⁶⁸ Material on file with the Mission. FFM-IRAN-D-008409 (FFMI Interview). See also “How Iran Crushed a Citizen Uprising With Lethal Force”, New York Times, 20 February 2026.

⁶⁹ Material on file with the Mission.

⁷⁰ Material on file with the Mission.

⁷¹ Material on file with the Mission.

⁷² Material on file with the Mission.

⁷³ Material on file with the Mission.

⁷⁴ Material on file with the Mission.

city.⁷⁵ Witnesses provided the Mission with pictures of ammunition indicating that security forces may have fired at protesters with 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition associated with Kalashnikov pattern assault rifles and solid plastic .50 caliber pepper balls.⁷⁶

39. Witness interviews, photos, and video footage revealed injuries to protesters from pellet ammunition, including to their faces, eyes, torso and genitals.⁷⁷ This is consistent with patterns the Mission previously established concerning use of force by State authorities during the 2022-23 protests. In one instance, the Mission reviewed footage of a boy who was blinded in one eye after being shot at close range with metal pellets during a protest. The child had pellet wounds to the upper half of his face and the back of his left forearm, indicating that he likely adopted a defensive posture before being shot.

40. On 25 January 2026, State media broadcast an interview with a doctor who stated that around 1,000 individuals with eye injuries from pellets had been reportedly admitted to Farabi hospital in Tehran on 10 January alone.⁷⁸

41. Credible information and video footage indicates that individuals, apparently protesters, committed acts of violence during protests, such as burning vehicles,⁷⁹ including motorcycles.⁸⁰ Video footage also showed individuals storming and vandalizing the Abuzar Mosque in Tehran, causing significant damage. Images reviewed by the Mission showed damage to other buildings, including a bank.⁸¹ A video, published on 10 January, showed an individual throwing what was described by the person posting it as a Molotov cocktail into a government building, reportedly in Tehran.⁸² In reports sent to the Mission on 15 and 19 January 2026, the Government of Iran stated that “public” vehicles, mosques, banks, residential homes, government centers or institutions, medical facilities and ambulances, healthcare centers, including hospitals, clinics, and emergency/Red Crescent bases were damaged or burnt, as well as relief infrastructure and warehouses in different provinces, including Razavi Khorasan.⁸³

42. The Mission analyzed video footage published on social media between 15 and 17 January 2026,⁸⁴ which was verified by a credible human rights organization,⁸⁵ along with a separate video published on social media on 16 January. It was not possible to verify the location of this last video.⁸⁶ The videos between 15 and 17 January show units of security forces, heavily armed with lethal firearms, deployed in Mashhad, Borujerd, Tonekabon, and Karaj, patrolling on foot and in vehicles, including armoured vehicles.⁸⁷ The Mission analyzed another video published on 20 January, which showed security forces armed with Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles patrolling residential streets with their faces covered, moving in pick-up trucks mounted with heavy machine guns. They repeatedly ordered residents to “go inside” while chanting slogans praising the Supreme Leader.⁸⁸

3. Families of victims

43. State authorities appear to be concealing the truth about the protesters, including children, who were killed, while silencing their families in their effort to demand justice, or even mourn their loved ones, reflecting patterns previously established by the Mission. Credible information indicated that, after 10 January, bereaved families have been prohibited

⁷⁵ Material on file with the Mission.

⁷⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008953 (FFMI Analytical report).

⁷⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008729 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008476 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008414 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008409 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008953 (FFMI Analytical report); Material on file with the Mission.

⁷⁸ Material on file with the Mission.

⁷⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008410 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁰ Material on file with the Mission.

⁸¹ Material on file with the Mission.

⁸² Material on file with the Mission.

⁸³ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran dated 26 January 2026.

⁸⁴ Material on file with the Mission.

⁸⁵ “Iran: Authorities unleash heavily militarized clampdown to hide protest massacres”, Amnesty International, 23 January 2026.

⁸⁶ Material on file with the Mission.

⁸⁷ Material on file with the Mission.

⁸⁸ Material on file with the Mission.

from organizing funerals,⁸⁹ subjected to severe funeral-related restrictions,⁹⁰ and coerced to pay large sums of money to receive the bodies of their loved ones.⁹¹

44. According to a witness, State authorities have threatened to bury victims in unknown locations, unless their bereaved families agree to maintain silence on the cause of death, and to declare that their loved ones were “martyrs” who had been “killed by terrorists.” Another witness stated that security forces reportedly attempted to force families to falsely claim that their killed loved ones, had been plainclothes Basij members.⁹² To retrieve bodies, some families were forced to pay for alleged property damage attributed to their killed loved ones, who had been accused by the authorities of being “rioters.”⁹³ One family informed the Mission that they attempted to bury their loved one in the yard of their home, instead of a graveyard, fearing that the security forces would otherwise take the body away.⁹⁴

45. In another case, a two-year-old girl was reportedly shot in the head and killed on 9 January during protests in Razavi Khorasan province. State media then broadcast an interview with the child’s father, where an off-camera voice can be heard telling him to claim that the child had been killed by “terrorists.”⁹⁵

B. Hospitals and morgues

“[NAME], Baba, where are you?”

Father desperately looking for his son amongst the bodies at the Kahrizak morgue,

January 2026

46. Hospitals became quickly overwhelmed, with one hospital in Isfahan reportedly admitting between 450 to 500 protesters with eye injuries from metal pellets, and one doctor describing that they had to surgically remove the eyeballs of some 450 protesters due to the severity of their injuries.⁹⁶ In Tehran, some 700 others with similar injuries were admitted between 8 and 10 January.⁹⁷

47. According to medical staff, as of 8 January, increasing numbers of protesters, some disfigured, were admitted to hospitals in Tehran and Isfahan with injuries caused by lethal ammunition. In one hospital, over 200 injured people reportedly arrived during just one hour in the evening of 8 January.⁹⁸ In another hospital, a witness saw, on 10 January, many wounded protesters whose hands had been tied to hospital beds, and bodies of dead protesters placed in the hospital corridor, because of lack of space.⁹⁹

48. Hospitals were also attacked by security forces. On 4 January, security officers reportedly raided the Imam Khomeini hospital in Ilam, beat injured protesters and medical staff there, and used tear gas inside the medical facility.¹⁰⁰

Forensic Diagnostic and Laboratory Center in Kahrizak (the “Kahrizak morgue”), south of Tehran city

49. The scale of casualties related to the protests, and the recent nature of the events, including the Internet blackout, and Iran’s refusal to provide access, have made it difficult for the Mission to arrive at precise estimates of people killed and injured. Nevertheless, the Mission’s preliminary investigations indicate that people were killed and injured during the protests on a staggering scale. Credible information received concerning the Kahrizak

⁸⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008413 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008416 (FFMI Interview).

⁹⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008409 (FFMI Interview).

⁹¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008411 (FFMI Interview).

⁹² FFM-IRAN-D-008406 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008466 (FFMI Interview).

⁹³ FFM-IRAN-D-008885 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁹⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008409 (FFMI Interview).

⁹⁵ “Nishapur’s spring was scattered in the winter” IRIB Telegram channel, 15 January 2026.

⁹⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008414 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008409 (FFMI Interview).

⁹⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008414 (FFMI Interview).

⁹⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008409 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008414 (FFMI Interview).

⁹⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008947 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008919 (FFMI Interview)

¹⁰⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008462 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008473 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008476 (FFMI Investigation note).

morgue has informed the Mission's ongoing effort to determine the extent of casualties nationwide.

50. On 11 January, video footage and images emerged on social media showing grieving families searching for their loved ones among what appeared to be hundreds of body bags, at the Kahrizak morgue.¹⁰¹ State media broadcast videos showing large commercial trucks and mortuary vehicles transporting bodies,¹⁰² while a forensic doctor explained that over 900 bodies had been transferred to Kahrizak between 8 and 11 January.¹⁰³ On 16 January, a journalist stated on State media that the Kahrizak morgue had reached its capacity, resulting in bodies being placed outside.¹⁰⁴

51. Videos showed victims in body bags scattered across various areas, including on a warehouse floor, in the morgue's courtyard, laid out on a sidewalk, and near a parking lot. Grieving families were shown searching frantically for their loved ones as medical staff in white lab coats appeared documenting injuries on the bodies.¹⁰⁵ Some bodies appeared covered with blood, with many bearing open wounds, including gunshot wounds. The Mission observed the spray pattern of metal pellets fired from shotguns on several bodies.¹⁰⁶

52. Videos showed people gathered in front of a monitor (likely inside the Kahrizak Forensic Center) displaying photographs of deceased individuals, as they sought to identify loved ones among what appeared to be more than 200 images of men's upper torsos and heads.¹⁰⁷

53. Beyond the Kahrizak morgue, reportedly families have been told to seek their loved ones in other locations where additional bodies were allegedly held, including hospitals, and the Behesht Zahra Cemetery in Tehran province.¹⁰⁸ Witnesses in hospitals in Tehran and Isfahan saw multiple dead bodies in hospital corridors, including some very young people who appeared to have been shot at close range. In a hospital in Isfahan, on or around 10 January, bodies were allegedly being transferred from that same hospital in body bags to a local morgue.¹⁰⁹

C. Arrests, detention, and emerging reports of death sentences

54. On 26 January 2026, the IRGC's Intelligence Organization indicated that at least 11,000 people had been summoned by intelligence and security forces as of that date.¹¹⁰ Later, on 17 February, the Judiciary's spokesperson stated that 10,538 individuals had been referred for prosecution and over 8,800 indictments had been issued.¹¹¹ A credible human rights organization estimated that, by the end of February, over 50,000 people had been arrested,

¹⁰¹ Material on file with the Mission.

¹⁰² "Disturbing images from Tehran's forensic medicine department and the account of the incident from eyewitnesses.", IRIB Telegram, 11 January 2026.

¹⁰³ "Material on file with the Mission. See also "950 dead identified in Kahrizak alone", Factnameh, 20 January 2026.

¹⁰⁴ "Why were the bodies left lying on the floor at the forensic center?!", IRIB Telegram, 16 January 2026.

¹⁰⁵ Material on file with the Mission.

¹⁰⁶ Material on file with the Mission. See also "How Iran Crushed a Citizen Uprising With Lethal Force", NY Times, 26 January 2026.

¹⁰⁷ Material on file with the Mission. See also "950 dead identified in Kahrizak alone", Factnameh, 20 January 2026.

¹⁰⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008889 (FFMI Interview); FFM-00718 (FFMI Evidence); FFM-IRAN-D-008919 (FFMI Interview). See also "Iran: Massacre of protesters demands global diplomatic action to signal an end to impunity", Amnesty International, 14 January 2026.

¹⁰⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008889 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008919 (FFMI Interview).

¹¹⁰ "IRGC Information: 735 individuals linked to anti-security networks have been arrested." Asr-e-Iran, 26 January 2026.

¹¹¹ "Judiciary Spokesperson: The European Parliament's anti-Iran resolution has no legal value / Latest status of the judicial cases of suspects in the recent terrorist acts / Announcement of the extent of damages to public places during the Dey unrest." Mizan News, 17 February 2026.

including women, university students, schoolchildren, human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, and minorities.¹¹²

55. At the time of writing, several reports have emerged on social media platforms indicating that security forces had arrested and detained significant numbers of medical personnel for providing treatment to injured protesters,¹¹³ reflecting a pattern previously established by the Mission in the context of the 2022-23 protests.¹¹⁴

56. Allegations of torture against protesters have likewise emerged,¹¹⁵ and of gender-based violence by security forces against protesters, including children.¹¹⁶ Reportedly, some protesters were forced to take unknown medications in detention.¹¹⁷

57. Courts were reportedly crowded with families searching for information about their loved ones,¹¹⁸ raising serious concerns about enforced disappearances. Similar concerns include families who could not locate their loved ones in morgues, hospitals or elsewhere, and others who were unable to pay to retrieve their loved ones' bodies, raising questions as to whether these bodies were disposed of without informing their respective families.

Death penalty

58. On 10 January, Iran's Prosecutor General declared that all protesters have committed the offence of "enmity against God," (*moharebeh*), that incurs the death penalty under Iran's Penal Code (see Section VI., below).¹¹⁹ On 11 January, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, Head of the Judiciary, stated that "we must [act] quickly," and show "no mercy" and "no leniency this time" towards those deemed responsible for the protests.¹²⁰ Read together, these statements raise serious concerns that detained protesters may be at risk of possible execution or other ill-treatment.

59. At the time of writing, there are at least two individuals on death row in relation to the protests. On 31 January, Branch 1 of the Criminal Court in Qom sentenced one man to death for the alleged killing of a member of the security forces during a protest on 8 January in Qom.¹²¹ In another case, a 19-year-old man was sentenced to death on charges of "*moharabeh*" by Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court in Tehran. According to credible information, the young man was not allowed a lawyer of his choice during this trial despite several requests from his family.¹²²

60. The State had broadcast numerous "confessions"¹²³ by detained protesters, including a 16-year-old girl, admitting to having led "riots."¹²⁴ In one such video a young man is heard crying and being told that he has been charged with "*moharabeh*" and sentenced to death.¹²⁵ Such conduct is consistent with previously established patterns whereby State media aired

¹¹² "Iran: Authorities unleash heavily militarized clampdown to hide protest massacres", Amnesty International, 23 January 2026.

¹¹³ Information on file with the Mission. "Suppression of medical staff and volunteer rescuers in Iran", Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), 25 January 2026. See also "Physicians for Human Rights Call for Protection of Health Care Workers in Iran", Physicians for Human Rights, 29 January 2026. See also <https://x.com/DrTedros/status/2016929148430917919>.

¹¹⁴ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 627.

¹¹⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008919 (FFMI Interview).

¹¹⁶ "Hundreds detained, including children, amid continuing nationwide protests", Kurdistan Human Rights Network, 6 January 2026.

¹¹⁷ FFM-00739 (FFMI Submission).

¹¹⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008956 (FFMI Investigation note).

¹¹⁹ "The Attorney General: Prosecutors must promptly prepare the necessary steps for prosecuting the rioters.", Young Journalists Club, 10 January 2026.

¹²⁰ "Mohseni-Ejei: There will be no Mercy toward disruptive elements", ISNA, 11 January 2026.

¹²¹ FFM-00751 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008992 (FFMI Interview).

¹²² FFM-IRAN-D-008950 (FFMI Investigation note); "In a conversation with Emtedad, the lawyer of Mohammad Amin Biglari, a 19-year-old sentenced to death", Emtedad Telegram Channel, 18 February 2026.

¹²³ Material on file with the Mission. "The Crimson Winter: A 50 Day Record of Iran's 2025-2026 Nationwide Prot" HRANA, 23 February 2026.

¹²⁴ "Arrest of the leader of the unrest in Isfahan" Tasnim, 3 January 2026.

¹²⁵ Material on file with the Mission.

videotaped forced “confessions” by persons accused in connection with the 2022-23 protests, immediately after they were arrested and subsequently sentenced to death.

IV. Iran-Israel conflict (13 to 25 June 2025)

A. Brief overview of the conflict

61. Starting on 13 June 2025, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) carried out hundreds of airstrikes¹²⁶ on Iranian territory as part of a 12-day military campaign that ended on 25 June 2025. The initial airstrikes targeted both military and nuclear sites in Iran. Between 12 and 13 June, Israel struck the Natanz nuclear enrichment complex near Natanz city, Isfahan province, followed by airstrikes on other nuclear facilities in Isfahan, Qom, and Fordow cities. Major IRGC installations were also targeted, including the Artesh Second Tactical Airbase in Tabriz City and the IRGC Headquarters in Tehran City, among others.¹²⁷ Several senior IRGC commanders were killed in the airstrikes, including Hossein Salami, Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, and Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. According to the Government of Iran, at least 15 nuclear scientists were killed between 13 and 24 June 2025, including Mohammad Mehdi Tehrani, Fereydoun Abbasi, Abdolhamid Minouchehr, Ahmad Reza Zolfaghari Dariani, Amir Hossein Feqhi, and Akbar Motallebizadeh. The spouses and children of at least four of them were also killed.¹²⁸

62. From 15 June onwards, according to the Government of Iran,¹²⁹ Israeli airstrikes expanded to include energy and other critical infrastructure, including water plants and oil depots. Israeli airstrikes also caused collateral damage to medical facilities, including the Shahid Motarhari Hospital, the Shahid Labafinejad Hospital, and the Hakim Children’s clinic in Tehran city.¹³⁰ According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, between 13 and 22 June, five male staff and volunteers of the Iranian Red Crescent Society were killed by the Israeli airstrikes in Tehran, East Azerbaijan, and Hamedan provinces.¹³¹

63. The Mission investigated the Israeli airstrikes that struck Evin prison compound on 23 June, which killed around 80 prisoners, their family members, and prison staff, including one child and eight women, according to the Government of Iran (see sub-section B, below).

64. The Mission has also identified several incidents whereby Israeli airstrikes reportedly struck or impacted civilian objects, including especially protected objects, that merit further investigation. This includes but is not limited to the Farabi hospital in Kermanshah (16 June) and, in Tehran city, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) headquarters (16 June), and the Chamran complex building (14 June) (see Section XI, below).

65. According to the Government of Iran, a total of 1,100 people were killed during the airstrikes, including 102 women and “dozens of children and adolescents,” and over 5,600

¹²⁶ “Israel has so far carried out five waves of strikes in Iran, military officials say”, Times of Israel, 13 June 2025. See also “Looking back at Israel and Iran’s ‘12-day war’: Direct conflict breaks out between arch-enemies” France24, 28 December 2025.

¹²⁷ Critical Threats, Israeli Strikes on Iran, Evening Edition, 14 June 2025.

¹²⁸ “Brazen Attack on International Law by the Israeli Regime and the United States Vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic of Iran Through their Acts of Aggression of 13-24 June 2025, Updated Report By the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, June 2025. See also “Iran’s IRGC chief Salami, army head Bagheri, commanders, scientists killed in IAF strikes”, The Times of Israel, 13 June 2025. See also “Who were the Iranian commanders killed in Israel’s attack?” BBC, 13 June 2025. See also “Martyrdom of 6 nuclear scientists in Israel’s attack on Iran/Who were assassinated?”, Shargh daily, 13 June 2025.

¹²⁹ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 10 October 2025.

¹³⁰ Report the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 10 October 2025. See also “Twelve Days Under Fire: A Comprehensive Report on the Iran–Israel War.”, HRANA, 28 June 2025.

¹³¹ “IFRC mourns the killing of five Iranian Red Crescent colleagues,” Statement by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), 4 July 2025.

people were injured.¹³² Officials later reported different civilian death tolls, ranging from 276 to 700.¹³³ Credible information estimated that between 1,082 and 1,190 individuals were killed, including 182 to 436 civilians, among them 45 to 65 children and 49 to 69 women.¹³⁴

66. Iran responded on 13 June by launching missile and drone strikes toward Israel following Israeli airstrikes, marking a significant escalation in the regional cycle of hostilities. The missile and drone strikes carried out by Iran against Israel reportedly struck military sites,¹³⁵ critical infrastructure including a power station and oil depots, as well as residential areas, homes, a religious school, and medical facilities.¹³⁶ On or around 16 June, the IRGC called on residents in Tel Aviv to evacuate the respective areas as soon as possible.¹³⁷

67. On 26 June, Israeli authorities announced that 32 people had been killed because of the Iranian strikes in Israel, of whom 31 were civilians, including four children. Over 3,400 people were also injured inside Israel, including 346 children.¹³⁸

68. The Mission was unable independently to verify overall casualty figures in Iran or Israel but was able to independently verify certain individual casualties and incidents (see below, on Evin prison).

69. On 19 June 2025, Iranian airstrikes hit the Soroka Medical center in Beerbesha city, which reportedly served as one of the largest hospitals in the Negev region, southern Israel.¹³⁹

70. On 20 June 2025, Iranian forces reportedly used cluster munitions in Beerbesha, where a submunition reportedly struck a basketball court of Gevim School, and in Rishon LeZion, south of Tel Aviv, on 21 June 2025.¹⁴⁰

71. By 20 June, Israel stated that it had conducted more than 720 strikes on Iranian territory.¹⁴¹ On 22 June, the USA launched an airstrike on Natanz and Isfahan nuclear facilities in Iran.¹⁴² Iran launched a missile strike at a US Al Udeid airbase in Qatar on 23 June.¹⁴³

72. On 24 June, a U.S.-brokered ceasefire was announced between Iran¹⁴⁴ and Israel¹⁴⁵ with both governments pledging to uphold it conditionally, contingent on the other's restraint.

¹³² Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 10 October 2025.

¹³³ "How many civilians were killed in the 12-day war? Government spokesperson explains" Shargh Daily, 22 July 2025. See "Direct Israeli attack on 7 hospitals, 700 civilians martyred, and over 5,000 injured", IRNA, 9 July 2025.

¹³⁴ "Twelve Days Under Fire: A Comprehensive Report on the Iran–Israel War." HRANA, 28 June 2025.

¹³⁵ "Israeli military official says Iran hit some military sites last month", Reuters, 8 July 2025. See also "Iranian missiles directly hit 5 Israeli military bases during 12-day war, radar data shows, Anadolu Agency, 6 July 2025.

¹³⁶ "Mapping the most significant strikes on Israel", Al Jazeera, 18 June 2025. See also "Israel's Haifa-based Bazan group says all refinery facilities shut down after Iranian attack", Reuters, 16 June 2025.

¹³⁷ "Iran warns Israeli settlers to evacuate from Tel Aviv", Maher news, 16 June 2025. See also "Iran's Revolutionary Guards call on Tel Aviv residents to evacuate" The Times of Israel, 16 June 2025.

¹³⁸ "Operation Rising Lion – update: Over 550 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 UAVs were launched at Israel from Iran during Operation Rising Lion. The attacks resulted in 32 Israeli fatalities, of whom 31 were civilians", Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 June 2025. See also "Looking back at Israel and Iran's '12-day war': Direct conflict breaks out between arch-enemies", France24, 28 December 2025.

¹³⁹ "Israeli hospital had taken patients underground hours before missile hit", Reuters, 20 June 2025.

¹⁴⁰ "Iran/Israel: Iranian forces' use of cluster munitions in '12 Day War' violated international humanitarian law", Amnesty International, 24 July 2025.

¹⁴¹ "Twelve Days Under Fire: A Comprehensive Report on the Iran–Israel War." HRANA, 28 June 2025.

¹⁴² Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 10 October 2025.

¹⁴³ "What we know about Iran's attack on US base in Qatar", BBC, 24 June 2025.

¹⁴⁴ "Iran says it will stop attacks if Israel does", BBC, 24 June 2025. See also: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZWXVRjETjY>.

¹⁴⁵ https://x.com/Israel_katz/status/1937573779892269509.

73. The Mission sent requests for information to the Government of Iran on 4 July and on 19 November 2025. On 10 October, the Mission received a response from Iran's High Council for Human Rights ("the HCHR" or "High Council"), references to which are provided in the subsections below, where applicable.

74. The Mission also sent a request for information to the Government of Israel on 24 October 2025 in relation to airstrikes by Iran on the territory of Israel, and airstrikes from Israel on the territory of Iran, but has not received a response to date.

B. Airstrikes on Evin prison compound, Tehran City, 23 June 2025

1. Conduct of hostilities

75. Concerning the airstrikes on Evin prison compound in Tehran city on 23 June 2025, the Mission collected victim and witness accounts, as well as credible information obtained by human rights organizations and other secondary sources. It further analyzed satellite imagery from before and after the airstrikes, reports and media articles from Iranian State and state-affiliated media, as well as Israeli official media, and statements by Israeli officials. The Mission also obtained photographs and video footage and reviewed and analyzed material published by Iranian media outlets and on social media.¹⁴⁶

76. On this basis, the Mission established that, on 23 June, between 11:20 a.m. and 12 p.m., the IDF launched targeted airstrikes on Evin prison compound, causing significant damage to several buildings within the facility. The airstrikes took place during visitation hours when family members of prisoners were expected to be on the prison grounds. The Government of Iran stated that between 79¹⁴⁷ and 80¹⁴⁸ individuals were killed, including prisoners, their family members, and prison staff. They included eight women, of whom one woman perished while posting bail for her spouse, and a five-year-old boy.¹⁴⁹ Despite the Mission's request, the Government has not made public, nor shared with the Mission comprehensive and disaggregated data on the number of persons killed and injured during the airstrikes on Evin prison (see Annex I, below).

77. On 23 June, at 11:51 a.m., during ongoing strikes on the prison compound, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on X (formerly Twitter) that "In accordance with the directive of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and myself, the IDF is now striking with unprecedented force targets of the regime and governmental suppression bodies in the heart of Tehran, including among them [...] Evin Prison for political prisoners and regime opponents."¹⁵⁰ Minutes later, Gideon Sa'ar, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, posted on X (formerly Twitter) that the airstrikes on Evin prison were in retaliation for Iranian airstrikes "targeting" civilians. The post was accompanied by a photograph of Evin prison's entrance gate, and a short video,¹⁵¹ purportedly showing an explosion at the gate. The video was later assessed by a credible human rights organization as likely to have been manipulated.¹⁵²

78. Later that day, at a press briefing, Brigadier General Ephraim "Effie" Defrin, IDF Spokesperson, confirmed that "we [the IDF] [also] carried out a targeted strike on the notorious Evin prison," which he described as a "symbol of repression for the Iranian

¹⁴⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-006144 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006150 (FFMI Investigation Note); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006149 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006064 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006081 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006083 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006061 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006111 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008338 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008366 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006610 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008580 (FFMI Analytical report); FFM-IRAN-D-008854 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-00663 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁴⁷ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 10 October 2025.

¹⁴⁸ "A wounded soldier from Evin Prison was martyred / The number of martyrs has increased to 80", Young Journalists Club, 9 July 2025.

¹⁴⁹ "Evin prison worker martyred with her 5-year-old son in Israeli attack", Shargh daily, 26 June 2025.

¹⁵⁰ https://x.com/israel_katz/status/1937086162415321107.

¹⁵¹ <https://x.com/gidonsaar/status/1937083300373541216>.

¹⁵² "Iran: Deliberate Israeli attack on Tehran's Evin prison must be investigated as a war crime" Amnesty International, 22 July 2025.

people.” He also noted, without providing further information, that “in this prison complex, intelligence operations, including counter espionage, against the State of Israel, were carried out” and that the “strike was carried out in a precise manner to mitigate harm to civilians imprisoned within the prison to the greatest extent possible.” He then stated that “individuals defined as enemies of the regime were held in the prison,” including “many subjected to severe torture.”¹⁵³

Evin prison compound

79. Iran’s HCHR responded to a letter from the Mission on 10 October 2025 and described Evin prison as a “civilian detention facility,” and “not a military target” and stated that it did “not represent a real or imminent security or military threat.”¹⁵⁴

80. Over the course of its three successive mandates, the Mission has collected numerous statements from primary and secondary sources, including from former detainees, their families, and lawyers, who have been held in, or have visited Evin prison multiple times, including during the airstrikes on 23 June 2025. On this basis, the Mission has previously established that many protesters, human rights defenders, including women opposing the mandatory *hijab* laws, journalists, lawyers, activists, foreign nationals, and others have been held in Evin prison for their support towards the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement. The Mission previously found that detainees were routinely denied legal counsel and familial visits, forced to confess, and subjected to prolonged interrogation sessions, as well as beaten, intimidated, subjected to sexual and gender-based violence, and harassed by guards, including by threats of harming family members. Victims and witnesses have also reported severe overcrowding, inadequate access to food and sanitary, in addition to denial of or delays in providing medical care.¹⁵⁵

81. Many of those detained at Evin were held in solitary confinement for prolonged periods, in security section Wards 209, 240, and 325 (also known as “2-A”).¹⁵⁶ In this context, evidence collected and preserved by the Mission demonstrated that IRGC intelligence operates its own separate network of detention facilities outside the authority of Iran’s Prisons Organization, which includes Ward 325 known as 2-A within Evin prison. Separately, the Ministry of Intelligence administers Wards 209 and 240 in Evin Prison.¹⁵⁷ According to credible information, security officers guarding Wards 240 and 325 (known as 2-A) were typically dressed in civilian clothing and often wore masks. The prison staff under the Prisons Organization wore official uniforms and were reportedly only deployed to ordinary wards.¹⁵⁸

82. Throughout its investigation, the Mission found no information indicating that IRGC intelligence or Ministry of Intelligence personnel were present in the Evin prison compound during the attack and directly participating in the hostilities, or that security forces at Evin prison were deployed for military purposes during the attack, or that Iranian military personnel, arms, or weapons were present or stored on the prison premises, including during the airstrikes on 23 June.¹⁵⁹

Damage and/or destruction of sections within the Evin prison compound and surrounding residential areas

83. The Evin prison compound is located near the Alborz Mountain range in a crowded, residential area in Tehran city. It is a large compound, estimated at around 40 hectares,¹⁶⁰ or 0.4 square kilometers. Over 1,500 inmates, including women and transgender persons, were believed to have been held in the prison at the time of the airstrikes.¹⁶¹ In its response to the Mission, Iran’s HCHR stated that several sections of the prison were hit by airstrikes, including the visitation hall, administrative section, public inquiry office, a medical center,

¹⁵³ Press Briefing by IDF Spokesperson, BG Effie Defrin, 23 June 2025.

¹⁵⁴ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 October 2025.

¹⁵⁵ A/HRC/51/CRP.1, paras. 246, 247, 641, 689, 717, 740, 745, 756, 757, 1268, among others.

¹⁵⁶ A/HRC/51/CRP.1, paras. 246, 247, 641, 689, 717, 740, 745, 756, 757, 1268, among others.

¹⁵⁷ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 1808.

¹⁵⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁵⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008366 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006046 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008580 (FFMI Analytical report); FFM-IRAN-D-008584 (FFMI Analytical report).

¹⁶⁰ “The ambiguous status of the transformation of Evin prison”, Mashregh news, 15 July 2025.

¹⁶¹ “Iran: Israeli Attack on Evin Prison an Apparent War Crime”, Human Rights Watch, 14 August 2025.

and Evin Ward 8, where individuals convicted of financial crimes were typically being held.¹⁶²

84. Victim and witness accounts, satellite imagery, video footage, and photographs confirmed large-scale structural destruction particularly in the southern and central parts of the prison compound.¹⁶³ The extent of the damage suggested that the facility was struck by multiple munitions, with at least six direct impact points on buildings inside the prison compound.¹⁶⁴

85. For example, buildings located in the southern, central, and northeast section, namely the medical clinic,¹⁶⁵ Evin's administrative building, the Prosecutor's office, and the visitation hall were damaged or completely destroyed, with roofs collapsed, walls blown out, and large amounts of debris visible across the courtyards.¹⁶⁶ A likely impact site has been identified immediately adjacent to the medical clinic with a ground floor wall collapsing, while the clinic itself sustained moderate damage with limited structural impact.¹⁶⁷ The prison's northern and southern entrances were destroyed,¹⁶⁸ while Ward 4 (general ward), and Ward 8 (where detainees convicted for financial crimes were being held) sustained blast damage.¹⁶⁹ The reception area of the prison (commonly known as the "quarantine section"), where detainees were typically received and booked, and the nearby cell where transgender prisoners were held, were also damaged.¹⁷⁰

86. The impact pattern and effects of the explosion(s) indicated that significantly higher payload munitions were used on the administrative building, and low-yield munition on the Prosecutor's office. Penetrating munitions with delayed fuses were used to reach a certain level of the administrative building before detonation.¹⁷¹

Ward 209 (under the effective control of the Ministry of Intelligence) and Ward 325 (or 2-A) (under the effective control of the IRGC)

87. Consistent with satellite imagery, witness testimonies confirmed that Ward 209 was not directly hit by the airstrikes. The administrative building of Ward 209, located directly adjacent to the ward, was hit instead.¹⁷² This building was typically used by guards for rest, administrative duties and, on occasion, for prisoners to meet their legal representatives.¹⁷³

¹⁶² Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 October 2025.

¹⁶³ FFM-IRAN-D-008366 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006113 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁶⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008584 (FFMI Analytical report).

¹⁶⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008366 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006113 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006610 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008580 (FFMI Analytical report); FFM-IRAN-D-008584 (FFMI Analytical report).

¹⁶⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-006046 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008366 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁶⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008584 (FFMI Analytical report).

¹⁶⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-006113 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008580 (FFMI Analytical report); FFM-IRAN-D-008584 (FFMI Analytical report). See also "Iran: Israeli Attack on Evin Prison an Apparent War Crime", Human Rights Watch, 14 August 2025.

¹⁶⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008366 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006113 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008580 (FFMI Analytical report); FFM-IRAN-D-008584 (FFMI Analytical report). See also "Iran: Israeli Attack on Evin Prison an Apparent War Crime", Human Rights Watch, 14 August 2025.

¹⁷⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-006060 (FFMI Investigation note). See also "Iran: Israeli Attack on Evin Prison an Apparent War Crime", Human Rights Watch, 14 August 2025.

¹⁷¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008584 (FFMI Analytical report); FFM-IRAN-D-008580 (FFMI Analytical report); FFM-IRAN-D-006610 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁷² FFM-IRAN-D-008366 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008580 (FFMI Analytical report); FFM-IRAN-D-008584 (FFMI Analytical report); FFM-IRAN-D-006046 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁷³ FFM-IRAN-D-008366 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008923 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-006046 (FFMI Interview).

88. A prison storage facility, located opposite Ward 209, and where, according to former detainees, food and hygienic supplies had been stored, was also impacted.¹⁷⁴ The roof of the women's section of Ward 209 was further damaged from the impact.¹⁷⁵

89. Consistent with satellite imagery, one witness indicated that Ward 325, which is under the control of the IRGC, did not sustain damage from the airstrikes.¹⁷⁶

Weapons used

90. According to an official Israeli statement, 50 Israeli Air Force fighter jets¹⁷⁷ used over 100 munitions in strikes on Tehran city on 23 June alone.¹⁷⁸ Beyond Evin Prison, other locations struck by Israeli airstrikes on 23 June included *inter alia* the Basij headquarters and the IRGC's "Sayyed al-Shuhada" Headquarters, as well as the "Israel Destruction" clock in Palestine Square.¹⁷⁹

91. The Mission did not find any footage or pictures of material or unexploded ordnance, which would have allowed it to assess the munitions used. Based on the extent of the damage, however, the Mission finds it highly likely that several guided munitions of varying types and payload were used on Evin prison compound.¹⁸⁰

92. On 24 June, a FARAJA spokesperson announced that its bomb squad had successfully "neutralized and disposed" of two undetonated "missiles" from the prison premises.¹⁸¹ No further details were provided publicly, or to the Mission upon request to the Government, regarding the type of munitions found or the exact location in which they were recovered.

Casualties within the compound and adjacent residential areas

93. As noted above, according to the Government of Iran, between 79 to 80 individuals were killed, including prisoners, their family members, and prison staff, including one child and eight women.¹⁸² According to Iranian media, and official and semi-official media, at least 21 persons were injured, including a doctor, a lawyer, and one child.¹⁸³

94. A credible organization focused on documenting civilian casualties, independently confirmed the death of 73 civilians on the prison compound. This organization further estimated, but was unable to confirm, that another seven civilians were killed, totaling 80 deaths.¹⁸⁴

Breakdown of civilian casualties

95. Iran's Prisons Organization and state media published the names and photos of 41 prison staff who were killed, including administrative staff, five female social workers,¹⁸⁵ a worker's five-year-old son,¹⁸⁶ and 13 young men who were performing mandatory national

¹⁷⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008580 (FFMI Analytical report); FFM-IRAN-D-008584 (FFMI Analytical report); FFM-IRAN-D-006046 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006113 (FFMI Investigation note).

¹⁷⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-006046 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006514 (FFMI Interview).

¹⁷⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008366 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008580 (FFMI Analytical report); FFM-IRAN-D-008584 (FFMI Analytical report).

¹⁷⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-006144 (FFMI Interview).

¹⁷⁸ See Press Briefing by IDF Spokesperson, BG Effie Defrin, 23 June 2025. See Interview with IDF spokesperson on Al-Mashhad, dated 23 June 2025, available here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=65E2uM0QRHo>. See also "Over 50 fighter jets participated in wave of strikes targeting Iranian military infrastructure", The Times of Israel, 23 June 2025.

¹⁷⁹ See Press Briefing by IDF Spokesperson, BG Effie Defrin, 23 June 2025.

¹⁸⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008580 (FFMI Analytical report); FFM-IRAN-D-008584 (FFMI Analytical report).

¹⁸¹ "Two unexploded missiles neutralized near Evin prison", IRNA, 24 June 2025.

¹⁸² Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 10 October 2025.

¹⁸³ FFM-IRAN-D-008857 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-FFMI-00663 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁸⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008857 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁸⁵ "Names and pictures of martyred soldiers and administrative staff of Evin published", ISNA, 9 July 2025.

¹⁸⁶ "Evin prison worker martyred with her 5-year-old son in Israeli attack", Shargh daily, 26 June 2025.

service.¹⁸⁷ The Mission notes that those personnel performing mandatory national service in prisons, including Evin prison, fall under the authority of Iran's Prisons' Organization and the national police force. Their duties consist of guarding the premises, transferring prisoners, and performing administrative tasks, and they cannot, as such, be considered combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities.¹⁸⁸

96. According to official media and witness interviews, the Evin Chief Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutor of Tehran, the Director of Evin's medical clinic, another prison doctor, and the Directors of Wards 4 and 8, were also amongst those killed.¹⁸⁹

97. At the visitation hall, at least two people were killed, including one woman who reportedly perished while posting bail for her spouse.¹⁹⁰ According to the Judiciary's Spokesperson, five men prisoners sentenced for "financial crimes" were also killed. Their names, however, have not been published to date.¹⁹¹ Reportedly, two imprisoned clerics and some of their family members were also killed.¹⁹²

98. According to witnesses and credible information, in the administrative section of Ward 209, some detainees saw the bodies of prison staff, as well as the bodies of several men who wore no identifiable insignia. Witnesses understood these men to be security guards in Ward 209, as they were typically in civilian clothing.¹⁹³ According to credible information, one witness saw the dead bodies of two women dressed in prison uniforms, as well as the bodies of several male prison staff, and the body of an officer of the Ministry of Intelligence, which he recognized on the basis of the victim's identification card.¹⁹⁴ According to a witness and credible information, prisoners in Ward 209 removed dead bodies from under the rubble.¹⁹⁵

Outside the Evin compound

99. Israeli airstrikes also damaged buildings and vehicles outside the Evin prison compound, killing and injuring civilians.¹⁹⁶ For example, one passerby was killed on the east side of the prison where the Evin visitation hall is located.¹⁹⁷ Iranian media reported that a 69-year-old businessman was also killed while on his way to the Kachoui Prosecutor's office in the northeastern corner of the Evin prison compound.¹⁹⁸

100. Another witness saw dead bodies scattered on Kachoui Street, near the Evin prison compound, and a boy who was crying over his father's dead body.¹⁹⁹

2. Iran's response in the aftermath of the Israeli airstrikes

101. In a letter to the Government of Iran in November, the Mission requested additional details on the number of prisoners in Evin at the time of the airstrikes, those transferred to

¹⁸⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-006144 (FFMI Interview). See also "A wounded soldier from Evin Prison was martyred / The number of martyrs has increased to 80", Young Journalists Club, 9 July 2025.

¹⁸⁸ "Executive Regulations of the Prisons Organization and the Country's Security and Educational Measure+ reforms", Mizan News, 24 December 2023.

¹⁸⁹ "Names and pictures of martyred soldiers and administrative staff of Evin published", ISNA, 9 July 2025.

¹⁹⁰ On file with the Mission. "The nameless victims of Evin attack, those who were passing by and those who were posting bail", Asriran, 1 July 2025.

¹⁹¹ "Five prisoners convicted of financial crimes were martyred during the Israeli attack on Evin", Mashregh news, 12 July 2025.

¹⁹² FFM-IRAN-D-006514 (FFMI Interview).

¹⁹³ FFM-IRAN-D-008366 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006111 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview).

¹⁹⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-006514 (FFMI Interview).

¹⁹⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008923 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008366 (FFMI Interview).

¹⁹⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-006081 (FFMI Interview); See "Narrating what happened to people during the 12 days of Israel's attack", Aparat, 14 July 2025. See also "My father was martyred in the most defenseless state a human being can be in." Shargh News, 9 July 2025 also "Painter Mehrangiz Aymanpour killed in Israeli attack on Evin Prison", Khabar Online, 25 June 2025.

¹⁹⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-006081 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006080 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁹⁸ "My father was martyred in the most defenseless state a human being can be in." Shargh News, 9 July 2025.

¹⁹⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-006149 (FFMI Interview).

other facilities after the airstrikes, and those later returned. It also sought information on the criteria for the transfers to Qarchak and the Grand Prison of Tehran, whether families and lawyers were notified of the transfers, or if they had been killed; and whether prisoners were able to communicate with their families regarding their whereabouts prior to, or after their transfers to an official prison. It further requested additional information regarding detention conditions during and after transfers, including safeguards against ill-treatment, access to medical and psychological care, overcrowding, and transport conditions. It requested details on measures taken to ensure adequate conditions at Tehran Central Prison, commonly known as Fashafoyeh prison, and Qarchak Prison, including access to medical care and investigations into reported deaths of women prisoners in custody (see Section VII; see also Annex I).²⁰⁰

102. The Mission further asked for clarification on a special directive issued by the Head of the Judiciary to grant leave to eligible prisoners,²⁰¹ noting that, on 25 June 2025, the Judiciary had announced conditions attached to such releases, including that plaintiffs (or victims) were required to withdraw complaints lodged against individuals imprisoned as a result to qualify for such releases (see Annex I).²⁰² The Mission has not received a response to this letter to date.

Lack of protection prior to the airstrikes

103. One victim told the Mission that they had heard munitions impact near Evin prison compound on the night of 22 June, leading some prisoners to fear that an airstrike on the prison was imminent.²⁰³

104. Detainees asked judicial, prosecutorial, and prison authorities to take measures to temporarily or conditionally release prisoners prior to the airstrikes on Evin prison compound. However, state authorities did not do so.²⁰⁴

105. According to a credible human rights organization, prior to the strikes, a journalist detained in Evin Ward 8 of Evin Prison had sent a message to media outlets urging the Judiciary to implement a 1986 Resolution by the Supreme Judicial Council²⁰⁵ that allowed for the conditional release or release on bail of prisoners during wartime emergencies. The journalist said that Evin Ward 8 was an old five-story building without emergency stairs or even fire extinguishers.²⁰⁶

Lack of protection during and after the airstrikes

106. Some women and men prisoners, including those held in solitary confinement in Ward 209, remained inside their cells as the strikes were ongoing,²⁰⁷ with one interviewee reporting that they heard fellow detainees screaming for help as the walls shook.²⁰⁸ At the women's section, Evin prison guards reportedly locked women inside their cells during the strikes – when the women prisoners asked to be released, a woman guard reportedly told them that

²⁰⁰ “Head of Judiciary visits injured in Israeli attack on Evin Prison”, Ilna, 24 June 2025.

²⁰¹ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 10 October 2025.

²⁰² “Head of Judiciary visits injured in Israeli attack on Evin Prison”, Ilna, 24 June 2025.

²⁰³ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview).

²⁰⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006111 (FFMI Investigation Note). See “Iran: Detainees Ill-Treated and Disappeared After Israeli Evin Prison Attack”, Human Rights Watch, 14 August 2025. See also “Reza Khandan’s report on the attack on Evin and the violent transfer of prisoners”, IranWire, 2 July 2025.

²⁰⁵ “Necessary measures regarding the protection of prisoners’ lives in war zones during a state of emergency.” Parliament Research Center, 15 January 1987.

²⁰⁶ “Iran: Detainees Ill-Treated and Disappeared After Israeli Evin Prison Attack”, Human Rights Watch, 14 August 2025.

²⁰⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-006514 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006111 (FFMI Investigation Note); FFM-IRAN-D-006149 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006797 (FFMI Submission).

²⁰⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-006514 (FFMI Interview).

they did not have “permission to do so.”²⁰⁹ Prisoners held in Ward 8 were reportedly also locked inside their cells during the strikes.²¹⁰

107. At approximately 12:30 p.m., after the airstrikes had stopped, women and men prisoners held in Ward 209 were taken out of their cells and brought to the prison courtyard.²¹¹ Chaos ensued, with one witness reporting that many of the men prisoners bore visible marks of beatings, and appeared in distress as they were being taken outside.²¹² One victim described his shock upon seeing the impact of the strikes on the prison compound, noting that the storage and supply room facing Ward 209 (above) was on fire.²¹³ Another victim recalled how fighter-jets were flying in the sky above them as they stood outside,²¹⁴ and armed prison guards were positioned along the perimeter walls of the courtyard.²¹⁵ Despite requesting permission to contact their families, detainees were not allowed to do so by the security forces guarding them.²¹⁶

108. Some prisoners were subsequently returned to their damaged cells, although these lacked electricity and water, while prisoners from Ward 209 were reportedly moved to Ward 240.²¹⁷ Many were left fearing the possibility of further airstrikes.²¹⁸ In Ward 8, upon return, some prisoners were reportedly locked inside their cells.²¹⁹

109. At around 1 p.m., witnesses saw the IRGC, armed plainclothes agents, and security officers in dark green uniforms arriving and surrounding the prison compound. Rescue teams, including firefighters and the Red Crescent, arrived around one hour later, at approximately 2 p.m., to assist the victims.²²⁰ According to one witness, security forces initially prevented the rescue teams from retrieving bodies from under the rubble, only allowing them to begin extinguishing the fire and removing victims approximately 20 minutes after their arrival.²²¹

110. According to open-source material, four members of security forces on motorbikes, two on each, went to the street outside Evin prison, and began shooting at prisoners who were standing outside, after the strikes had subsided. Two of the shooters were in plain clothes, and two in uniform. The plainclothes shooters were reportedly carrying submachine guns, while the uniformed officers had AK-47s, forcing the prisoners to return to the prison.²²²

Transfers

111. In its response dated 10 October 2025 to the Mission, Iran’s HCHR stated that, “from the very first hours” of the airstrikes, prisoners were allowed to contact their families.²²³ It noted that, following the airstrikes, prisoners were transferred to a safe location “while

²⁰⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-006149 (FFMI Interview).

²¹⁰ “Narrating what happened to people during the 12 days of Israel’s attack”, Aparat, 14 July 2025

²¹¹ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission).

²¹² FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview).

²¹³ FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission).

²¹⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission).

²¹⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission). See “Narrating what happened to people during the 12 days of Israel’s attack”, Aparat, 14 July 2025

²¹⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006797 (FFMI Submissions); FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission).

²¹⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-006797 (FFMI Submission).

²¹⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006113 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-006117 (FFMI Investigation note); See “Narrating what happened to people during the 12 days of Israel’s attack”, Aparat, 14 July 2025.

²¹⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-006117 (FFMI Investigation note); See “Narrating what happened to people during the 12 days of Israel’s attack”, Aparat, 14 July 2025.

²²⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-006062 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006111 (FFMI Investigation Note); FFM-IRAN-D-006117 (FFMI Investigation note); See “Narrating what happened to people during the 12 days of Israel’s attack”, Aparat, 14 July 2025.

²²¹ FFM-IRAN-D-006062 (FFMI Interview).

²²² “Narrating what happened to people during the 12 days of Israel’s attack”, Aparat, 14 July 2025.

²²³ “Explanation from the Judiciary Spokesperson on the Zionist regime’s purpose for attacking Evin Prison”, Khabar Online, 12 July 2025.

adhering to safety, health and legal standards to protect their lives against recurring threats,” and that “no reports of “torture or inhumane treatment have been recorded or confirmed.”²²⁴

112. However, the Mission’s investigations demonstrated that, after the airstrikes, prisoners were rushed out of their cells, threatened by security forces to collect their belongings from their cells and to prepare within 10 minutes for transfer to another undisclosed location, otherwise they would be shot.²²⁵ Witnesses recalled that detainees from Wards 2 and 4 were transferred in the late afternoon, while men prisoners from Ward 209 were transferred later that evening.²²⁶ According to credible information, prison guards, special forces, and the Ministry of Intelligence organized the transfers.²²⁷

113. Prisoners were then taken outside their cells at gunpoint, handcuffed in pairs and forced to walk through the rubble before being loaded onto buses.²²⁸ One former detainee recalled that the prison appeared to have sustained such extensive damage that officials had to use trucks to clear the debris.²²⁹ According to credible information, one prisoner saw several covered bodies along the side of the road as prisoners were being ushered past. The same source indicated that no medical care was immediately provided to injured prisoners.²³⁰ The security forces did not provide information regarding their destination to prisoners at any point during the transfers.

Enforced disappearances

114. Following the airstrikes, Evin’s prisoners were transferred to two main official detention facilities in Tehran province: for women, Shahr-e Rey Penitentiary in Qarchak County, also known as Qarchak prison – a former poultry farm – and for men, the Great Tehran Central Penitentiary, also known as Fashafouyeh prison (or Grand Tehran Prison).²³¹ Some men were also reportedly transferred to a prison in Qom.²³²

115. According to credible information, some prisoners were transferred from Evin without their families being informed either about whether they had survived the airstrikes, or of their whereabouts after the transfer.²³³

116. In some cases, State authorities did not promptly disclose information about the fate and whereabouts of detainees held by security and intelligence bodies, including human rights defenders and activists, and dual and foreign nationals. Families and lawyers were left with no information about their loved ones or clients for days, weeks, and sometimes months, after their transfers - a delay that caused relatives significant anguish and distress.²³⁴ When contact was eventually allowed, most were permitted to speak with their loved ones for only a few minutes, with some prohibited from disclosing their location by the security officers

²²⁴ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 10 October 2025.

²²⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-006111 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-006117 (FFMI Investigation note). See “Narrating what happened to people during the 12 days of Israel’s attack”, Aparat, 14 July 2025.

²²⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-006111 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-006117 (FFMI Investigation note).

²²⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission). See “Firsthand Account from Evin Prisoners: Trapped Between Israel’s Unlawful Attacks and Iranian Authorities’ Shocking Abuses”, Center for Human Rights in Iran, 7 July 2025, 28 June 2025.

²²⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-006111 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview).

²²⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-006111 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview).

²³⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission).

²³¹ “Iran’s Qarchak Prison: A Place of Death That Must Be Closed”, Center for Human Rights in Iran, 7 October 2025.

²³² FFM-IRAN-D-006514 (FFMI Interview).

²³³ FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission); See “The families of two French prisoners in Evin doubt that they are alive”, Iran Wire, 16 July 2025. See also “Threats and interrogations of families of those killed in Evin”, Iran Wire, 15 July 2025.

²³⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-006150 (FFMI Investigation Note); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008923 (FFMI Interview).

guarding them.²³⁵ When asked by family members about at least two prisoners after their transfer, authorities denied having any knowledge about their fate and whereabouts.²³⁶

117. Some prisoners were taken from the official prison to which they had been transferred, and brought to undisclosed detention facilities, including “safe houses.”²³⁷ One witness described being forcibly taken out of their cell from one of the two main official detention facilities in Tehran province and transferred to a secret facility reportedly operated by the Ministry of Intelligence. The victim was not allowed to contact their family, held in solitary confinement, and in a windowless room, with a ceiling light that remained on at all times.²³⁸

*Dr. Ahmadreza Djalali*²³⁹

118. The Mission sent two requests for information to the Government of Iran, one in June 2025, inquiring about the case of Dr. Ahmadreza Djalali, and later, in July 2025, inquiring about his fate and whereabouts, following his transfer from Evin prison on 23 June 2025. In its response to the Mission, Iran’s HCHR confirmed that, after the airstrikes on Evin prison, Mr. Djalali had been transferred to another location, where he has allegedly had “unrestricted access to essential services in a satisfactory condition.”²⁴⁰

119. Dr. Ahmadreza Djalali was among the prisoners assembled for transfer on the evening of the airstrikes on Evin Prison compound. Security officers reportedly attempted to separate several men on death row, including Dr. Djalali, from the general male prison population. Allegedly, some prisoners protested the attempted separation, and security forces beat them with batons.²⁴¹ Although Dr. Djalali remained with the rest of the prisoners until their transfer to the Greater Tehran Prison, he was ultimately separated from the others, allegedly by officials of the Ministry of Intelligence. He was taken to an unknown location, where he remained until the end of September 2025. During that time, when asked, authorities refused to disclose any information regarding his fate or whereabouts.²⁴²

Detention conditions at prison facilities to which prisoners were transferred

120. In Fashafouyeh, victim accounts and credible information indicated that men detainees were held in overcrowded cells, exacerbated by the influx of new prisoners, unsanitary and filthy rooms, poor-quality and insufficient food and bad quality water, and a shortage of beds forcing many to sleep on the floor.

²³⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview). See also “Mass prison transfers and crackdown on dissidents following airstrikes on Evin”, OMCT; See also “Firsthand Account from Evin Prisoners: Trapped Between Israel’s Unlawful Attacks and Iranian Authorities’ Shocking Abuses”, Center for Human Rights in Iran, 7 July 2025; “Political Prisoners’ Lives Are in Danger’: Families Left in the Dark After Israeli Strike on Evin Prison”, Iran Wire, 11 July 2025; “Political Prisoner Transferred from Iranian Prison to Unknown Location”, Iran Wire, 17 July 2025.

²³⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006064 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006061 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview).

²³⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008923 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006144 (FFMI Interview). See also “Political Prisoner Transferred from Iranian Prison to Unknown Location”, Iran Wire, 17 July 2025.

²³⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview).

²³⁹ The Mission has sent two requests for information to the Government of Iran, in May and in June 2025, in relation to the case of Dr. Jalali, a medical doctor, lecturer, and researcher who was arrested in April 2016 while visiting Iran to attend an academic workshop. He was charged with espionage, convicted and sentenced to death. The sentence was based on a confession that was reportedly extracted under torture and following a trial that allegedly failed to meet international standards. His detention was previously determined to be arbitrary. See United Nations Special Procedure Mandate Holders, “Detention taking its toll on hostage Ahmadreza Djalali: UN experts call on Iran to release him without delay”, 5 June 2025.

²⁴⁰ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 10 October 2025.

²⁴¹ FFM-IRAN-D-006150 (FFMI Investigation Note); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview).

²⁴² FFM-IRAN-D-006064 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006061 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006110 (FFMI Interview).

121. Likewise, women prisoners, including foreigners, who were initially held at the women's section in Evin's Ward 209 were evacuated to Qarchak prison²⁴³ in Tehran province, where conditions have long been documented as poor and inhumane due to *inter alia* poor ventilation, filthy and overcrowded rooms, with many prisoners forced to sleep on the floor; as well as lacking in access to clean, potable water and adequate facilities to maintain personal hygiene.²⁴⁴ Once there, the women were placed in a separate building within the Qarchak prison compound, in a cell that they described as infected with lice and bedbugs. One woman who had been transferred from Evin to Qarchak in the aftermath of the airstrikes died in custody in late September 2025, reportedly due to denial of medical care (see Section VII, below).

122. Women prisoners from the Evin women's section were transferred to Qarchak Prison the following day, on 24 June. According to a witness, the women protested their transfer on the evening of 23 June, fearing that they might be subjected to enforced disappearance given a general and shared lack of confidence that the transfers were being carried out by the authorities in good faith.²⁴⁵

C. Overall impact of the Israeli airstrikes on the Iranian civilian population

1. Ineffective, partial evacuation warnings by the Government of Israel

123. On 15 June 2025, the Israeli army issued a warning in Persian, urging people across the country to "immediately evacuate areas [housing] facilities manufacturing military weapons and their support institutions."²⁴⁶ Given that the public generally lacked knowledge of the location of such installations, the warning appeared largely ineffective and instead created fear and confusion among residents.²⁴⁷

124. The following day, on 16 June, the Israeli Military Spokesperson released a video message in Persian,²⁴⁸ in which he urged individuals to evacuate Tehran District 3, an area of 30 square kilometers and home to some 330,000 residents.²⁴⁹ The video showed a map with purported danger zones without giving any timeframe or clarifying the specific locations or the extent of areas at risk from munition blast or fragmentation, leaving residents uncertain about which areas to avoid.

2. Lack of information from the Government of Iran

125. Interviewees described the lack of information on developments in the hostilities, airstrikes and their impact, casualties, damage to residential areas and civilian infrastructure, or places to which to evacuate.²⁵⁰ One witness told the Mission that the Government had warned people against following international news outlets, urging them instead to rely solely on official Government statements, though these often lacked any relevant information leaving people in panic and fear. According to another witness, State authorities warned civilians via text messages not to evacuate in response to warnings issued by foreign media outlets.²⁵¹ These announcements were allegedly sent to residents of specific districts and were also broadcast on local television and radio.²⁵²

²⁴³ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006798 (FFMI Submission).

²⁴⁴ "Female political prisoners transferred to Qarchak prison have nothing", Radio Zamanah, 26 July 2025. See also "Humanitarian crisis following Israeli missile attack on Evin prison: Forgotten women", Radio Zamanah, 7 July 2025. See "Iran: Israeli attack on Evin prison an apparent war crime", Human Rights Watch, 14 August 2025.

²⁴⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-006149 (FFMI Interview).

²⁴⁶ <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/1934142367017075081>

²⁴⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-006144 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008526 (FFMI Meeting Note).

²⁴⁸ <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/1934605406455677379>.

²⁴⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-006144 (FFMI Interview). See also "Urgent need to protect civilians amid unprecedented escalation in hostilities between Israel and Iran", Amnesty International, 18 June 2025; "Thousands flee Tehran as conflict with Israel continues to escalate", Euronews, 17 June 2025.

²⁵⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-006144 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006057 (FFMI Interview).

²⁵¹ FFM-IRAN-D-006144 (FFMI Interview).

²⁵² FFM-IRAN-D-006144 (FFMI Interview).

3. Internet shutdown²⁵³

126. On 13 June 2025, the Minister of Communication, Sattar Hashemi, issued a statement noting the “temporary restricti[on] to the Internet” due to the “special situation” in the country.²⁵⁴ On 16 June 2025, the Government officially acknowledged the disruptions, and justified the intentional reduction of internet speed, attributing it to efforts to counter “cyberattacks.”²⁵⁵

127. According to credible information, by 13 June, many Internet users in Iran began experiencing connectivity issues with messaging applications and access to VPN. Data released by Cloudflare Radar also confirmed a sudden and significant drop in international internet traffic on the same day.²⁵⁶ Connectivity data analyzed by the Mission indicated that between 14 and 18 June, the Government of Iran continued throttling the internet, during which several provinces, including Tehran, Ilam, Qom, East Azerbaijan, and Hamedan, experienced severe disruptions in international data exchange. The Detecting Internet Outrages Worldwide in Real-Time (IODA) organization also confirmed a drop in Internet connectivity during the same timeframe.²⁵⁷ Additionally, according to mobile internet monitoring domains in Iran, on 17 June, Hamrah-e Aval and Irancell mobile operators were almost cut off, with limited connectivity only being restored around 9 p.m. Iranian time.²⁵⁸ These disruptions continued until 19 June, when a total Internet shutdown was imposed. From 22 June, Internet service began to be gradually restored.²⁵⁹

127. Mobile phone services were heavily disrupted, making communication extremely difficult, in addition to preventing people from accessing real-time information on the impact on airstrikes and potential evacuation routes.²⁶⁰

128. Google Maps and GPS were also disrupted, which caused navigation problems, leaving people lost while attempting to evacuate cities.²⁶¹

129. The Internet shutdown likewise impacted the banking system, with payment networks at major banks reportedly failing and halting transactions. Small online businesses, a key income source for many, were reportedly forced to close, due to their dependency on internet access to survive.²⁶²

4. Displacement, disruption of access to essential services

130. Following the Israeli warnings of imminent airstrikes on 15 and 16 June 2025 (above), thousands of people began fleeing Tehran city. Many were forced to return, however, as supply roads were closed, and gas stations were overcrowded or unable to meet the demand for petrol.²⁶³ Satellite-based and navigation systems, such as Google maps and GPS, as noted above, were equally not functioning, leaving people without reliable guidance to navigate the

²⁵³ Over the past 15 years, Iran has increasingly tightened control over Internet access and simultaneously developed and deployed more sophisticated methods of restricting online information flows. The Mission previously established a consistent pattern in which periods of political tension or protest movements coincide with targeted Internet disruptions and/or complete Internet shutdowns. Since the 2009 Green Movement, when social media first became central to mobilization, Iranian authorities have significantly expanded their technical capacity for censorship, surveillance, and disruption, as also demonstrated by the Mission’s findings in the context of the September 2022 protests. See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 1136-1140.

²⁵⁴ “Ministry of Communications: The internet will be temporarily restricted”, ISNA, 13 June 2025.

²⁵⁵ “Government’s Spokesperson Internet Speed Reduction is to Prevent Cyber Attacks”, Shargh Daily, 16 June 2025.

²⁵⁶ See <https://radar.cloudflare.com/traffic/ir?dateStart=2025-06-12&dateEnd=2025-06-14>

²⁵⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-006047 (FFMI Submission). See also IODA | Internet Outages for Iran (Islamic Republic Of).

²⁵⁸ “The state of internet communication between Iran and the world”, Arvan Cloud, 17 June 2025.

²⁵⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-006047 (FFMI Submission); Cloudflare Radar, IODA.

²⁶⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-006047 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-006057 (FFMI Interview). See also “Tehran is in shock - and we have fled with heavy hearts”, Al Jazeera, 21 June 2024.

²⁶¹ FFM-IRAN-D-006413 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006351 (FFMI Interview). See also “GPS is broken, locator is messed up; people are frustrated”, Fararu, 13 July 2025.

²⁶² “A comprehensive report on the Iran-Israel war” June 2025, Human Rights Activists in Iran.

²⁶³ FFM-IRAN-D-006413 (FFMI Interview). See also “Tehran residents flee Israeli bombings: ‘Innocents are killed and it’s going to get worse’”, Le Monde, 17 June 2025.

roads, as they desperately searched for safety.²⁶⁴ In Tehran city, authorities opened metro stations to use as public shelters. However, access to them was reportedly only available until 11 p.m., despite airstrikes occurring mostly at night. Residents who sought shelter during later hours were reportedly turned away by metro stations personnel.²⁶⁵

131. Education and essential services were likewise heavily affected. On 15 June, the Ministry of Education reportedly announced the nationwide closure of all educational institutions in Iran, until further notice.²⁶⁶ Public transport was also disrupted after Israeli airstrikes impacted rail and road infrastructure, and supply roads were closed, reportedly leading to long bread lines, rationing of oil, infant formula, and sanitary items, and soaring food prices.²⁶⁷

5. Damage to civilian homes due to Israeli airstrikes

132. The Mission collected and preserved evidence in relation to the damage and/or destruction of civilian homes and residential areas caused by the Israeli airstrikes in Tehran city.

133. According to witness interviews and credible information, Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, have reportedly located some of their offices in, or near, residential areas.²⁶⁸ Residents were largely unaware of their potential locations, thereby increasing the risk they already faced due to the Government's location of potential military targets in civilian areas.²⁶⁹ In the aftermath of airstrikes on residential areas, one witness noted that, in several residential areas they had visited, emergency response staff appeared to prioritize the protection of injured IRGC personnel over the evacuation of the civilian population. The witness saw security forces, including plainclothes agents, arriving within minutes to the affected areas they had visited to close it off, assist IRGC officers, and prevent access to the sites.²⁷⁰

134. The Mission found that, in some cases, residential buildings in populated areas of Tehran city sustained severe damage from blast waves as airstrikes hit nearby buildings.²⁷¹ In one such example, a woman was injured by a blast wave after an Israeli airstrike hit a nearby building allegedly housing a senior IRGC intelligence official. Her house, located in a busy residential area of Tehran city, was almost destroyed and rendered uninhabitable.²⁷²

6. Harassment, threats, and intimidation of family members of civilians killed in the airstrikes

135. Families of victims learned about the deaths of their loved ones in airstrikes only after they failed to reach them by phone or found that they were not at home. In the cases investigated by the Mission, relatives were not promptly provided with official information

²⁶⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-006413 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006351 (FFMI Interview).

²⁶⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-006144 (FFMI Interview). See also "Tehran is in shock – and we have fled with heavy hearts", Al Jazeera, 21 June 2024.

²⁶⁶ "Israel, Iran Close Schools Amid Rising Tensions", MENAFN, 16 June 2025.

²⁶⁷ "A comprehensive report on the Iran-Israel war", June 2025, Human Rights Activists in Iran. See also, "Thousands flee Tehran as conflict with Israel continues to escalate", Euronews, 17 June 2025.

²⁶⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-006144 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008526 (FFMI Meeting Note).

²⁶⁹ The Mission has previously documented the presence of unofficial secret detention facilities—referred to as "black sites" or "safe houses" (*khanehay-e amn*); these are often houses or apartment buildings located within residential areas used by the Ministry of Intelligence or the IRGC Intelligence Organization to hold individuals in their custody. Some were subjected to torture and rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence while detained in such "safe houses". See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 657, 1810.

²⁷⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-006144 (FFMI Interview).

²⁷¹ FFM-IRAN-D-006414 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006144 (FFMI Interview).

²⁷² FFM-IRAN-D-006414 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006415 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006416 FFM-IRAN-D-006417 (FFMI Image); FFM-IRAN-D-006418 (FFMI Image); FFM-IRAN-D-006419 (FFMI Image).

by the authorities on what happened to their loved ones, and some had to search for their family members for days across different hospitals throughout Tehran city.²⁷³

136. According to witnesses, some family members were later harassed, intimidated, and threatened to prevent them from speaking to domestic or foreign media about the circumstances of the death of their loved ones during the airstrikes.²⁷⁴ Reportedly, security officers were present at the funerals of some victims and threatened grieving families to refrain from speaking up of their deceased relatives. In one case, family members were told that “silence” was a condition for obtaining permission to bury their loved one. At least one family was forced to sign a pledge committing them to remain silent. The family was also compelled to bury their loved one in a designated section of a specific cemetery reserved for those killed during the war, as a prerequisite for receiving the compensation allocated to “martyrs.”²⁷⁵

V. Intensification of repressive measures during and in the aftermath of the June 2025 airstrikes

“What are you talking about? Evidence? Documentation? You are nothing in this [judicial] process.”

Prosecutorial staff to a detainee’s family member²⁷⁶

137. During and after the June 2025 strikes, State authorities took coordinated action to suppress dissent and silence individuals critical of or perceived as having criticized State-sanctioned ideologies and rules. This included large-scale arbitrary arrests and detention by security forces; undue calls by the Judiciary, including the head of the Judiciary, to expedite trials and prosecutions; and undue digital restrictions, including a total Internet shutdown for over several days. Incidents of unlawful use of lethal force were also documented at security checkpoints established shortly after the airstrikes began. Against this backdrop, credible human rights organizations recorded an alarming increase in the use of the death penalty, following grossly unfair trials in violation of the right to life (see Section VI, below).

138. Such repressive measures did not emerge in isolation. As noted in Section IX, below, the absence of adequate domestic legal protections to express dissent, reinforced by a judiciary that lacks independence and a security sector that operates with impunity, perpetuates cycles of repression that enable the recurrence of gross human rights violations in Iran. This can be seen during successive waves of protests, including the 2019 “Aban” protests, the 2022-23 protests and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement,²⁷⁷ and the protests that began on 28 December 2025 (see Section III, above). Although the contexts of those protests and the June 2025 hostilities markedly differ, the State employed similar repressive measures to silence individuals, as examined below. That such cycles of violence recur, indicates that the repression in Iran functions as a governing strategy to suppress dissent, and the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly, rather than as isolated responses to situations of crisis.

139. On 18 November 2025, in the context of its investigations and in response to Iran’s HCHR letter, the Mission sent a follow-up request for information to the Government of Iran. The Mission requested additional information on the allegations of human rights violations under investigation, including information pertaining to events that occurred since 13 June 2025 (see Annex I). To date, the Mission has not received a response to this letter.

²⁷³ FFM-IRAN-D-006081 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006062 (FFMI Interview); Social media post on file with the Mission. See also “Threats and interrogations of families of those killed in Evin”, Iran Wire, 15 July 2025.

²⁷⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-006414 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006415 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006416 (FFMI Image); FFM-IRAN-D-006417 (FFMI Image); FFM-IRAN-D-006418 (FFMI Image); FFM-IRAN-D-006419 (FFMI Image).

²⁷⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-006062 (FFMI Interview).

²⁷⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008923 (FFMI Interview).

²⁷⁷ For the Mission’s investigations into the protests that began on 16 September 2022, and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, see generally A/HRC/55/CRP.1, and A/HRC/58/CRP.1.

A. Arrests, detention and criminal prosecution

“Would I get into trouble for to this? It’s true that they [security forces] let me go, but they took photos of and filmed every line and every part of my mobile content.”

Statement provided by a credible organization to the Mission²⁷⁸

1. Challenges to investigations

140. The Mission was unable to exhaustively investigate arrests and detention premised on national security grounds during and in the aftermath of the June 2025 airstrikes for a variety of reasons, including lack of access to Iran, fear of reprisals by the authorities if victims and/or their families spoke up, and limited staffing and operational capacity of the Mission’s Secretariat (see Section I above, Introduction).

141. According to credible information, many victims of arbitrary arrests and detention have been pressured by prosecutorial authorities to forgo legal representation of their choice and instead to accept State-appointed lawyers,²⁷⁹ in exchange for promises of reduced or suspended sentences.²⁸⁰ Such pressure reportedly had a chilling effect on victims’ willingness to speak publicly of their plight because they feared receiving harsher or conditional sentences as punishments for speaking up, including to the Mission. The Mission has identified this conduct as an established government strategy for deterring victims from sharing their circumstances and engaging in any form of dissent.²⁸¹ In Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces, pressure and threats by security forces against detainees and their families have reportedly made information about the fate of many detainees difficult to obtain. Families of victims reportedly avoided speaking up due to fear of reprisals.²⁸²

142. The following section is therefore based primarily on open-source material, as well as interviews with victims and witnesses, and court documents. It is also based on victim statements obtained from credible civil society organizations, and statements by Iranian officials on state and state-affiliated media.

2. Scope and scale of arrests

143. Beginning as early as 14 June 2025, one day after the Israeli airstrikes commenced, official and semi-official media announced, almost daily, alarming numbers of arrests across the country of individuals detained purportedly on national security grounds for alleged “spying”, “spreading lies”, “propaganda” and “disturbing security and peace.”²⁸³

144. On 22 July, the Head of the Judiciary, Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, announced that 2,000 people had been arrested in the context of the hostilities.²⁸⁴ On 12 August, Saeed Montazer Al-Mahdi, FARAJA’s Spokesperson, announced that 21,000 “suspects” had been arrested including 2,774 foreign nationals; 261 “suspects” arrested for “espionage;” 172 persons accused of “unauthorized filming,” and 30 for security related “activities.”²⁸⁵ Others

²⁷⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008959 (FFMI Submission).

²⁷⁹ According to the Note of Article 48 of the 2015 Code of Criminal Procedure, individuals accused of “crimes against internal or external security” and “organized crimes” (punishable by death, life imprisonment, amputation, payment of one-half or more of a full person’s *diya* or “blood money”, and 19 years’ imprisonment or more) are allowed a selected legal counsel from a list of lawyers pre-approved by the Head of the Judiciary for the entire duration of the investigation phase.

²⁸⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008526 (FFMI Meeting Note). See also “Iran detains over 250, executes three, kills two in Kurdistan during, after Israel conflict”, Kurdistan Human Rights Network, 1 July 2025.

²⁸¹ The Mission previously found that State authorities maintain a constant threat of prosecution and imprisonment against individuals in an apparent effort to deter them from participating in the protests and/or other forms of expression of dissent. See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 889-891.

²⁸² FFM-IRAN-D-008991 (FFMI Investigation note). See also “Iran detains over 250, executes three, kills two in Kurdistan during, after Israel conflict”, Kurdistan Human Rights Network, 1 July 2025.

²⁸³ FFM-IRAN-D-008770 (FFMI Analytical report).

²⁸⁴ “Mohseni Ejei: About 2,000 people were arrested during and after the 12-day war”, IRNA, 22 July 2025.

²⁸⁵ “21,000 war suspects arrested, 127 political prisoners arrested while escaping Evin and 30 arrested on charges of supporting Israel”, Asriran, 12 August 2025.

arrested included Afghans, as well as members of minorities, including members of the Baluch, Kurds, Baha'i, Christian and Jewish communities (see also sub-section D below).

145. According to the Head of the Judiciary, while “many [were] released on bail,” others, he noted, “will face severe punishments, including *moharabeh* [death penalty] due to the severity of their crimes.”²⁸⁶ To date, the authorities have not disclosed the number of individuals who remain in detention, in detention, how many have been released, the charges brought against them, or the conditions under charges brought against them, or the conditions under which any releases occurred.

3. State action

146. Arrests were accompanied by public threats and calls for accelerated trials and harsh sentences by different State entities and officials, raising concerns about potential due process and fair trial rights violations. In parallel, FARAJA, the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence repeatedly urged the public to report “suspicious individuals” or “activities” people may deem “supportive of the Zionist regime.”²⁸⁷

4. Nature of arrests

147. Victims’ interviews, court documents, credible information, official statements, and open-source material indicated that security and intelligence forces, including the IRGC Intelligence, carried out large-scale arrests of individuals in multiple provinces including Tehran, Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Fars, Isfahan, Sistan and Baluchestan, North Khorasan, and Razavi Khorasan, among others.²⁸⁸

148. On this basis, the Mission established that arrests in the context of the June hostilities occurred at checkpoints, during house raids, on the street, or at people’s workplaces, with victims not informed of the reasons for their arrests, nor promptly informed of the charges. Victims reported that they were not provided with written summons, in violation of Iran’s own procedural law, which requires that a suspect be informed of the charges and grounds for arrest.²⁸⁹ Victims were primarily arrested by the intelligence forces,²⁹⁰ not provided with a lawyer, nor promptly brought before a judge. Some detainees were also held incommunicado and subjected to harassment and beatings during their arrests and in detention.²⁹¹

5. Arrests, intimidation and harassment at security checkpoints

149. Security forces also established an extensive network of checkpoints across the country,²⁹² with the head of the Basij organization announcing on official media, that around 3,000 checkpoints were operating at all times.²⁹³ A large number of arrests took place at

²⁸⁶ “Which groups of people were arrested during the 12-day-war”, SNN, 22 July 2025.

²⁸⁷ “Unprecedented public calls to 110 to identify Zionist regime spies”, Tasnim, 17 June 2025; “Mossad agent arrested in Parand, Tasnim, 22 June. “Ministry of Intelligence statement on the 12-Day War: Heavy blows to the Mossad network and infiltrators”, SNN, 25 June 2025.

²⁸⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-006514 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006476 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008310 (FFMI Interview); FFM-00611 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008543 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-00577 (FFMI Submission); FFM-00734 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008616 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008882 (FFMI Submission); FFM-00708 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008774 (FFMI Submission).

²⁸⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006476 (FFMI Interview).

²⁹⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008543 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006476 (FFMI Interview); FFM-00708 (FFMI Submission).

²⁹¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008543 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview).

²⁹² “Activation of popular mobilization checkpoints and night patrols in the country”, Fars News, 16 June 2025.

²⁹³ “Basij checkpoint patrols carried out by 3,000 battalions/ Basij organization chief apologizes to the public for “unwanted inconvenience caused by patrols and checkpoints”, Khabar Online, 17 June 2025.

security checkpoints, official media reported.²⁹⁴ On 25 June 2025, the head of FARAJA, Ali Moedi, announced that checkpoints would remain in place until further notice.²⁹⁵

6. Targeted individuals

“Warning! You have tried to become a member, to support and encourage the invasion of the Zionist regime on social media groups associated with terrorists; delete this content and leave those groups immediately; otherwise, you will be prosecuted for national security offenses.”

*Extract of a text message sent by the State [cyber] monitoring unit to social media users*²⁹⁶

150. During the June 2025 airstrikes and in their aftermath, and pursuant to established patterns, State authorities subjected human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, academics, artists, other members of Iran’s creative community and social media users to arrests, detention and criminal prosecution for protected conduct such as online expression and/or their broader activism. The recurrence of these practices reflects the State’s continued reliance on a well-established system of repression, including the use of the Judiciary as a tool of this repressive apparatus. The persistent lack of accountability and systemic impunity continues to allow for such violations to continue unabated.

Official statements

151. On 15 June 2025, the Supreme National Security Council stated that “any attempt to endorse Israel, undermine Iran’s legitimate defense, incite actions against national security, create social or ethnic divisions, disclose confidential documents, or spread false information benefiting Israel would fall under the 2020 espionage law (See Section VI, below), and would incur the maximum penalty.”²⁹⁷

152. Shortly thereafter, official media outlets began publishing information on arrests “in cyber [digital] space,” for “online activities,” and for “disturbing public opinions” in several provinces, including Ahwaz, North Khorasan, Robat Karim, Mazandaran, and Tehran.²⁹⁸ On 23 June, state media (Tasnim) reported that the IRGC arrested “a number of online activists with links to the Zionist regime’s media and online pages” in Mazandaran province.²⁹⁹

Social media users

153. The Mission collected witness interviews, court documents, and copies of text messages sent to victims indicating that Iranian authorities arrested and detained individuals for peaceful online expression.³⁰⁰

154. For example, one victim recalled how he was arrested in June 2025 by the IRGC Intelligence in Tehran, after they shared stories on social media containing pictures of the impact of the Israeli airstrikes in Iran. Reportedly, the victim was beaten by IRGC intelligence officers while in detention.³⁰¹

Human rights defenders

155. One victim recalled how they were arrested in June 2025 after voicing opposition to the ongoing hostilities and expressing views critical of the Government’s response. The

²⁹⁴ “The people are the sharp eyes of national security”, IRIB Telegram, 22 June 2025.

²⁹⁵ “Checkpoints remain in place in the country until further notice”, Mashregh news, 25 June 2025.

²⁹⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-00577 (FFMI Submission).

²⁹⁷ “Important statement from the Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council”, Khabar Online, 15 June 2025.

²⁹⁸ “Five Israeli-linked spies arrested in Suleiman Mosque”, Tasnim, 20 June 2025. See also “Mossad agent arrested in Parand, Tasnim, 22 June 2025; “Pro-Israeli cyber activists arrested in Mazandaran”, Tasnim, 23 June 2025; “24 Israeli spies arrested in western Tehran province”, Tasnim, 19 June 2025.

²⁹⁹ “Pro-Israeli cyber activists arrested in Mazandaran”, Tasnim, 23 June 2025. See also “Arrest of a number of activists of virtual pages linked to the Zionist regime in Mazandaran”, DefaPress.ir, 23 June 2025.

³⁰⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008543 (Investigation note); FFM-00577 (FFMI Submission).

³⁰¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008543 (Investigation note).

victim was arrested by multiple plainclothes intelligence officers who raided their home and presented a document that bore the logo of the Ministry of Interior, and which the agents claimed was an arrest warrant. As the family resisted their arrest, security forces beat the victim and another family member. The victim was then shoved into a vehicle, blindfolded, and subjected to sexualized threats, including of rape, before being placed in solitary confinement in Ward 209 at Evin Prison.³⁰² During interrogations, they were threatened with the arrest of their family members and subjected to gendered insults. Intelligence officers allegedly told them that they would receive a reduced sentence if they cooperated with them, which they refused.³⁰³

156. According to media sources, another human rights defender and blogger who had been arrested and detained earlier in 2022 for supporting the 2022-23 protests was arrested again on 25 June 2025. In July 2025, he was reportedly charged with “propaganda against the Islamic Republic in favour of Israel” with respect to his post on social media, calling for an end to the hostilities.³⁰⁴

Lawyers

157. According to one witness, authorities continued to summon and detain both families of victims from the 2022-23 protests, and lawyers involved in these cases, reportedly on charges including “propaganda against the State” and “insulting the Supreme Leader.”³⁰⁵

158. According to credible information, in early September 2025, between 10 to 14 lawyers were summoned and arrested in Rasht, Gilan province.³⁰⁶ According to a witness, at least six of these lawyers were placed in solitary confinement in Lakan prison (Rasht) for days following the arrest, with authorities providing no information on their fate or whereabouts. Security forces accessed the social media accounts of some of the lawyers and cited their critical posts against the Government as grounds for their arrest, detention and alleged charges namely “insulting the Supreme Leader” and “dissemination of false information” by Branch 2 of the Revolutionary Court in Rasht. Another lawyer from that group, a woman, who had also been arrested in early September 2025, was transferred to Lakan prison, allegedly on charges of “propaganda against the state.”³⁰⁷

159. On 17 July, another lawyer was allegedly summoned in late 2025³⁰⁸ by the Prosecutor’s Office in Arak city for “propaganda against the State.”³⁰⁹ The lawyer represented the family of a young man protester who had been reportedly killed in Arak in October 2022.³¹⁰

Khosrow Alikordi

160. On 6 December, the dead body of Khosrow Alikordi, a prominent Iranian lawyer, was found in his office in Tehran under reportedly suspicious circumstances.³¹¹ According to one witness, prior to his death, Mr. Alikordi had been receiving threats such as “If you continue doing this, you will end up badly.” Allegedly, when his body was found, he bore an injury to his head and his mouth was bleeding. Reportedly, his family was not allowed to see his body prior to the burial.³¹²

³⁰² FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview).

³⁰³ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview).

³⁰⁴ “PEN America Urges Iran to Stop Its Renewed Crackdown on Dissenting Voices After War”, 3 July 2025. See also “Hossein Ronaghi Near Collapse on Hunger Strike”, Iran Wire, 30 September 2025.

³⁰⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-006412 (FFMI Interview).

³⁰⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008408 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008925 (FFMI Interview).

³⁰⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008925 (FFMI Interview). See also “Iranian authorities hold lawyer Hesam Pourahmadi in solitary confinement in Lakan Prison”, HRANA, 3 September 2025; “Number of lawyers detained in Rasht reaches three; No information on Shadi Falahati's condition”, VOA News, September 2025; “A judicial case has been opened against Babak Eslami Farsani, an attorney at law, in the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office of Arak County”, HRANA, 3 November 2025.

³⁰⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008408 (FFMI Interview).

³⁰⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008408 (FFMI Interview); Information on file with the Mission.

³¹⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008408 (FFMI Interview).

³¹¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008493 (FFMI Investigation Note); See A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 335-373.

³¹² FFM-IRAN-D-008318 (FFMI Interview).

161. On 10 December 2025, 82 lawyers, all inside Iran, issued a public statement in which they called for full transparency regarding what they referred to as the lawyer's "suspicious death." Mr. Alikordi defended political activists as well as the families of killed protesters, including Abolfazl Adinezhadeh, a teenage boy who, according to credible information, was killed by security forces on 8 October 2022 in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi province.³¹³ Mr. Alikordi had been previously detained and charged for supporting the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement.³¹⁴

162. On 12 December, Javad Alikordi, brother of Khosrow Alikordi, also a lawyer, was arrested by security forces at his workplace, after speaking on social media about the arrests of several human rights defenders, including women, that took place at his brother's memorial in Mashhad (see Section VII, below). Reportedly, he had been briefly arrested on 10 December 2025 for criticizing the authorities following his brother's death.³¹⁵

163. In its letter to the Mission, dated 24 December 2025, Iran's HCHR noted that "based on visual evidence," the absence of a "criminal act" and a "history of cardiac medication", the "likelihood of an acute heart attack as the cause of death of Mr. Alikordi is strongly supported." The letter further noted that Mr. Alikordi had a "prior security-related conviction" adding that a report had been prepared by the Special Homicide Prosecutor and that investigations continued "in accordance with legal procedures."³¹⁶

Journalists

164. In their September 2025 response to the UN Special Procedures mandate holders the Government of Iran stated that there are "thousands of active journalists, media outlets, and even critics" operating legally in Iran, without interference or restrictions on "journalists' professional or trade-union freedoms"; and that media activities were "respected within the framework of domestic law," rendering any claims of restrictions or harassment "unsubstantiated and contrary to reality."³¹⁷

165. As noted below, on 28 July, Iranian media reported that between 13 and 24 June 2025, the Ministry of Intelligence, had summoned and detained 98 "citizen-journalists" in connection with the 2025 Iran-Israel armed conflict, allegedly affiliated with an "operational network" abroad. The Ministry did not provide evidence to support these claims, nor did it disclose the names, location, or legal status of those detained or summoned.³¹⁸ Earlier, on 16 June, one journalist was arrested after he visited the headquarters of IRIB TV broadcast in Tehran to report on the damage caused by Israeli airstrikes that day on said building (see Section XI, below).³¹⁹

Academics

166. On 3 November 2025, Iranian security forces reportedly arrested several leftist intellectuals in Tehran city, including sociologists, economists, writers and translators. While most of the detainees were released by the end of November 2025, there is no information relating to the charges or reasons for the arrests.³²⁰ As previously noted by the Mission, such crackdown against Iran's creative community should be viewed against the backdrop of pre-

³¹³ "82 lawyers called for full transparency regarding the cause of Khosrow Alikordi's death." Radio Zamaneh, 10 December 2025.

³¹⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008318 (FFMI Interview). See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 1565.

³¹⁵ "Arrest of Javad Alikordi in Mashhad by agents of the Intelligence Department." Iran Wire, 12 December 2025. see also, "The brother of Khosrow Alikordi, the deceased lawyer, was summoned by the Revolutionary Court of Mashhad.", Iran Wire, 10 December 2025.

³¹⁶ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 25 December 2025.

³¹⁷ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 18 September 2025.

³¹⁸ "Ministry of Intelligence, 98 operatives affiliated with the International Network were arrested and summoned inside the country", Entekhab, 28 July 2025. See also A/HRC/55/CRP.1 and A/HRC/58/CRP.2 on existing legal framework and practices that limit protected speech.

³¹⁹ "Ali Pakzad, journalist, was arrested" Khabar online, 17 June 2025.

³²⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008338 (FFMI Submission). See also "Nearly 900 Activists Condemn Arrests of Iranian Researchers, Demand Release", Iran Wire, 10 November 2025; "Shocking Arrests of Writers and Scholars in Iran Latest in Escalating Free Speech Crackdown", PEN America, 5 November 2025; "Two Sociologists Arrested by Security Forces", HRANA, 3 November 2025.

existing laws and policies restrictive of both freedom of expression and artistic freedom for decades.³²¹

167. On 10 November 2025, more than 800 Iranian and non-Iranian scholars and activists reportedly signed an open letter denouncing the above arrests because they were “opposed to the war,” calling their arrests “arbitrary and unlawful.”³²²

Writers, poets

168. Writers, poets, and other members of Iran’s creative community were also arrested and detained as part of this broader repression after the June airstrikes.³²³ According to credible information, in 2024, Iran imprisoned 43 writers, with 13 new arrests that year. While this marked a decline from the major crackdown on Iran’s creative community in 2022, the level of repression remains higher than the period prior to the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, according to credible information.³²⁴

169. In August 2025, two women writers from Rasht were each sentenced to one year imprisonment by Revolutionary Court Branch 3 in Rasht. Reportedly, the women had been sentenced on charges of “propaganda against the regime on social media.”³²⁵

Artists, singers

170. According to media reports, Iranian rapper Toomaj Salehi was briefly arrested on 19 June in Kisch island³²⁶ for posting social media posts reportedly criticizing the Government’s response to the war.³²⁷ A prominent musician, he was earlier sentenced to death in the context of the 2022-2023 protests, though his sentence was later overturned in June 2024 by Iran’s Supreme Court.³²⁸

171. Another rapper was reportedly arrested in June and, in July 2025, sentenced to eight months of imprisonment and internal exile by a Revolutionary Court in Tehran. He was reportedly sentenced for posting a critical post on social media and sharing images of the impact of the airstrikes with foreign media outlets.³²⁹

172. In July, a woman filmmaker was also reportedly arrested by intelligence officers in her home in Shiraz.³³⁰ In September, she was said to have been sentenced to two years imprisonment, banned from leaving the country and online activity; her sentence was later suspended, according to a credible human rights organization.³³¹

Criminal prosecution

173. Victim interviews, court documents, credible information and open-source material indicated that detainees were subjected to criminal prosecution and lengthy prison sentences, simply for expressing critical views of the Government or calling for an end to hostilities on social media.³³²

174. Court documents obtained by the Mission demonstrated that social media users had been summoned or brought before Revolutionary Courts in Tehran, Markazi, North Khorasan, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, and Isfahan provinces. Convictions were based on

³²¹ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 1477-1478.

³²² “Nearly 900 Activists Condemn Arrests of Iranian Researchers, Demand Release”, Iran Wire, 10 November 2025.

³²³ FFM-IRAN-D-008464 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008465 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008405 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008338 (FFMI Submission).

³²⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008464 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008465 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008405 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008338 (FFMI Submission).

³²⁵ “Writers Nina Golestani and Rozita Rajai sentenced to prison”, HRANA, 21 August 2025.

³²⁶ Social media post on file.

³²⁷ Social media post on file.

³²⁸ See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 1487-1492.

³²⁹ “Iranian singer sentenced to 8 months in prison for social media posts”, Iran Wire, 20 August 2025.

³³⁰ “Shiraz filmmaker Negin Aminzadeh arrested by Intelligence Forces”, Hengaw, 1 July 2025.

³³¹ “Negin Aminzadeh’s two-year prison sentence has been conditionally suspended”, HRANA, 7 September 2025.

³³² FFM-IRAN-D-006483 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006156 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008616 (FFMI Submission).

information contained on their private phones confiscated by security forces and on their social media posts in which they expressed criticism of the war or called for peace. Victims were then charged with “espionage,” “propaganda against the state,” “spreading false news,” and/or “disturbing the public mind.”³³³

175. Open-source information collected and analyzed by the Mission further indicated that some individuals were subjected to criminal prosecution and lengthy prison sentences, in relation to their online expressions in the context of the June hostilities.³³⁴ For example, in early August 2025, one man, a taxi driver, was reportedly sentenced to eight years imprisonment for “insulting the Supreme Leader” and “propaganda and strengthening the foundations of the Zionist regime.” He had reportedly posted a story on social media on 15 June 2025, expressing criticism over the increasing number of executions, as well as the poverty and unemployment in Iran.³³⁵

B. Unlawful use of lethal force at security checkpoints

176. Credible information and open-source material indicated that, in Tehran province, a dense network of security checkpoints functioned not merely as a security measure, but as a tool for harassment, intimidation, arrest, and repression of individuals for possessing digital photos of the impact of the Israeli airstrikes including of damaged buildings struck by Israel.³³⁶

177. The Mission, moreover, documented several incidents where force, including lethal force resulting in deaths and injuries, was used unlawfully at security checkpoints between June and November 2025, in several provinces including Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Isfahan, Kurdistan, Hamedan, Markazi, East Azerbaijan, and Kuhdasht.³³⁷ A credible human rights organization documented that at least 29 individuals, including 18 Baluch and four Kurds, as well as five women, two of whom were Baluch, and a four-year-old girl were killed between July and August 2025.³³⁸

178. The authorities have not published information indicating that the victims’ conduct was such that international human rights law would have permitted law enforcement officers to use lethal force. On 19 November 2025, the Mission requested the Government of Iran to provide detailed information on whether the threshold for using force, including lethal force, was met in cases where security forces had caused death or injury at checkpoints and during village raids (see Annex I). The Mission has not received a response to this letter to date.

179. The examples below are illustrative of the use of lethal force by security forces at checkpoints resulting in deaths and injuries during the period under review.

³³³ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006156 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Submission); FFM-00734 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008543 (Investigation note).

³³⁴ “Iranian Activist Sentenced to 9 Years for Alleged Support of Israel”, Iran Wire, 13 November 2025. See also “Ilam: Mohammad Younesi Sentenced to Over 4 Years in Prison”, HRANA, 29 August 2025; “Four citizens sentenced to prison by Dezful Revolutionary Court” HRANA, 6 October 2025; “Pejman Yousefi: Posted an anti-war story, sentenced to 8 years in prison”, Iran Wire, 28 August 2025.

³³⁵ “He Might Take His Own Life: Iranian Taxi Driver Sentenced to 8 Years for Instagram Story”, Iran Wire, 28 August 2025.

³³⁶ “The checkpoints have turned into places for harassing and torturing citizens.” Dadban, 9 July 2025. See also “Hengaw special report: Grave violations in Kurdistan amid Iran-Israel ceasefire”, Hengaw, 30 June 2025; “Qazvin: Arrest of a citizen on charges of providing provocative content for anti-regime media outlets”, HRANA, 26 July 2025.

³³⁷ “Iran: Authorities unleash wave of oppression after hostilities with Israel”, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International Joint Statement, 3 September 2025. See also “Basij Forces Kill Civilians at Checkpoints in Iran”, Iran Wire, 14 October 2025; “Hengaw special report on the 12-day war between Iran and Israel—casualties and human rights violations one month after the ceasefire”, Hengaw, 26 July 2025.

³³⁸ “Hengaw special report on the 12-day war between Iran and Israel—casualties and human rights violations one month after the ceasefire”, Hengaw, 26 July 2025.

1. 16 July 2025, Markazi province

180. On 17 July 2025, security forces in Khomein, Markazi province, shot and killed four members of a family traveling in two cars, including two women, and a four-year-old girl. According to Vahid Baratizadeh, the governor of Khomein city, the security forces had shot at two “suspicious” vehicles, which then led to the deaths.³³⁹ In another statement, on 12 August, a Government Spokesperson announced, without providing further information, that “several agents involved in the shooting” had been arrested, and that investigations were underway.³⁴⁰ No further information on the progress of this investigation has been published to date.

2. 1 July 2025, Hamedan province

181. In a similar incident on 1 July, security forces shot and killed two young men and injured another, reportedly because they fled a checkpoint in Tarik Darreh city, Hamedan province. Media reports named the victims as Mehdi Abaei and Alireza Karbasi.³⁴¹ On the following day, 2 July, Hemat Mohammadi, the head of the Judicial Organization of the Armed Forces of Hamedan province, stated that an investigation into the incident had been initiated, and noted that security forces had fired after the vehicle attempted to flee.³⁴²

182. Reportedly, on 1 November, a military court in Hamedan reduced the charges from “intentional killing” to less severe charges against the three IRGC officers – publicly named – who had been accused of killing the two men. According to media reports, security agencies have prohibited the victims’ families from speaking to the media, while official state media outlets have allegedly attempted to portray the victims as “agents of Israel.”³⁴³

C. Digital space

183. The Mission has previously documented the extensive use of digital space by the wider public and its critical function in Iran, enabling people to communicate, express their views, and seek truth and justice. Social media has played a crucial role in mobilizing and organizing dissenting voices in Iran, first becoming central during the 2009 protests, known as the “Green Movement.”³⁴⁴ It has since been a consistent feature in subsequent protests, including the 2022-23 protests and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement. Since the “Green Movement”, the technical capacity of the authorities to effect online restrictions has also markedly increased.³⁴⁵

184. During and in the aftermath of the June 2025 hostilities, State authorities continued to use digital tools to silence dissent, further expanding their control over digital space to restrict freedom of expression and association and shape public narratives, including with respect to causes or consequences of dissent. These measures, as detailed below, coincided with the targeted arrests of social media users and others for their online expression (see sub-section A, above), as well as with Internet shutdowns and the blocking of social media platforms, illustrating how digital restrictions and punitive measures were utilized in parallel to suppress dissent and communication.

³³⁹ “Checkpoints or shooting zone?”, Shargh News, 23 July 2025.

³⁴⁰ “Arrest of officers in accidental shooting incident in Khomein”, Asr Iran, 12 August 2025. See also “The killing spree continues; four people, including a child, were killed by government forces in Khomein, killing 8 civilians in less than a month”, Hengaw, 18 July 2025.

³⁴¹ “Iranian Activist Sentenced to 9 Years for Alleged Support of Israel”, Iran Wire, 13 November 2025.

³⁴² “Head of the Judiciary Organization of Hamedan Armed Forces: The accused in the shooting case were arrested in Tarikdara”, IRNA, 2 July 2025.

³⁴³ “The case of the killing of two young men from Hamedan by gunfire from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers; protest against the issuance of a decision not to prosecute for intentional murder”, BBC Persian, 31 October 2025. See also “Basij Forces Kill Civilians at Checkpoints in Iran”, Iran Wire, 14 October 2025.

³⁴⁴ The Government reportedly blocked networks and conducted communications surveillance of users on social media platforms. See “After the Green Movement: Internet controls in Iran, 2009-2012”, OpenNet, February 2013. See also “Iran: Election contested, repression compounded”, Amnesty International, 10 December 2009.

³⁴⁵ A/HRC/50/CRP.1, Section VII.

185. On 13 June, Iran's Attorney General's Office announced that individuals who "misuse cyberspace to undermine the psychological security of society [...] by publishing untrue content" would be dealt with "in accordance with the regulations." Four days later, on 17 June, the Judiciary reported that a special task force had been established within the Tehran Prosecutor's Office to monitor cyberspace, including online activities of social media users, official news agencies, and media outlets, in order to identify those deemed to have violated the Attorney General's directive and refer them to a "specialized unit" that "monitors cyberspace."³⁴⁶

186. Over the course of 2025, the Government continued applying policies to further tighten digital space for users in Iran. On 3 August 2025, the bill on "protecting digital borders" was announced before Parliament by the Iranian Supreme Council of Cyberspace.³⁴⁷ This bill was introduced after the Government withdrew another bill on combating the "spread of false content online," and is considered a continuation or reworking of earlier proposals related to broader restrictions of digital space.³⁴⁸ Although the full text has not been made public as of yet, based on credible information, the bill, if adopted, would require media platforms to monitor and remove social media content. The bill would also criminalize social media activities, according to credible information.³⁴⁹

187. In December 2025, Mohammad Ghalibaf, President of Parliament, stated that the above-mentioned bill included 32 Articles, and its main purpose would be to "control" digital space."³⁵⁰

1. Suspended SIM cards

188. Consistent with previously established patterns,³⁵¹ State authorities continued to deactivate the SIM cards of journalists, human rights defenders and media activists as part of the broader crackdown on civic space during and after the June hostilities.

189. In late June 2025, the SIM cards of several journalists and activists were suspended. The journalists were apparently targeted for expressing critical views of the Government's handling of the hostilities on their social media accounts including on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.³⁵² In one case, after an activist's SIM card was deactivated, they received a summons requiring them to visit the Prosecutor's office.³⁵³ Some victims were requested by prosecutorial staff to sign a pledge posting a specified number of posts on social media with pre-drafted texts that showed support for the Government's policy during the hostilities.³⁵⁴

190. Witnesses noted that their SIM cards were suspended without a clear legal basis, in the absence of a judicial order, or formal charges, resulting in suspension of their access to communication, banking, education, and other essential services, often without prior notice and without transparency, or the ability to challenge the decision. To have their SIM cards restored, victims were requested to delete posts, publish content supporting the Government, and/or take down their social media profiles.³⁵⁵

191. Open-source material further indicated that the SIM cards of other activists and journalists were deactivated, including of a woman human rights defender previously

³⁴⁶ "Judiciary: We are closely monitoring the media and cyberspace", Asr Iran, 17 June 2025.

³⁴⁷ "Six bills were announced in the parliament", IRNA, 3 August 2025.

³⁴⁸ "The cyberspace systematization plan was announced", Mehr News, 3 August 2025.

³⁴⁹ "The Government, Parliament, and Other Institutions: Dozens of Plans, Resolutions, and Bills Against Freedom of Expression", FilterWatch, 12 August 2025.

³⁵⁰ "Ghalibaf: A plan with 32 clauses was proposed in the Supreme Council of Cyberspace", Mehrnews' Telegram Channel, 2 December 2025.

³⁵¹ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, Section VII.B. See also "Punishment by blocking SIM cards", Shargh Daily, 19 September 2024.

³⁵² FFM-IRAN-D-006298 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006083 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006300 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006061 (FFMI Interview).

³⁵³ FFM-IRAN-D-006298 (FFMI Interview).

³⁵⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-006300 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006061 (FFMI Interview).

³⁵⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-006298 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006083 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006300 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006061 (FFMI Interview).

arrested and detained for posting a picture of herself without the mandatory *hijab* during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement.³⁵⁶

2. Repression in digital space by other means

192. According to credible information, in some cities, including Isfahan, Shiraz and Tehran, authorities intensified the use of surveillance to target women not complying with the mandatory *hijab* laws (see Section VII below).³⁵⁷

D. Impact on minorities

193. While the security measures imposed in the context of the June 2025 hostilities affected the wider population, minorities appear to have been disproportionately impacted. Witness interviews, court documents, credible information, and official statements indicated that some minorities saw their properties confiscated, and were subjected to hate speech, while also arrested, detained, and faced with criminal prosecution. Security forces also resorted to the use of lethal force during a raid of a Baluch-populated village in Sistan and Baluchestan province.

1. Ethnic minorities

Use of force

194. On 1 July 2025, security forces raided Gunich, a village located in Sistan and Baluchestan province where the marginalized Baluch ethnic minority predominantly resides. Security forces resorted to unlawful use of lethal force, killing at least one woman and injuring 11 other Baluch women. Reportedly, one of the injured women later died at a hospital.

195. On 2 July, State-affiliated media announced that, in the pursuit of “some individuals,” “a group of locals were injured” in Gunich village on 1 July, because they “did not pay attention to security warnings.” The pursued individuals reportedly escaped.³⁵⁸ No further information has been provided by the authorities to date.

196. According to evidence collected, at around 6 a.m. on 1 July, masked armed security officers stormed the village. When women in the village gathered outside their homes to confront them and prevent their entry, security forces ignored them and subjected some to sexualized insults. Most men from the village had reportedly left earlier that day and were not present at the time of the events.³⁵⁹

197. Evidence indicated that security forces threw stones at the women, who threw stones back in response. Soon afterwards, security forces opened fire with live ammunition, leading to the killing of at least one woman.³⁶⁰ According to a credible human rights organization, 11 Baluch women and girls were also injured, including a 17-year-old girl, and a pregnant woman who subsequently suffered a miscarriage. Reportedly, another Baluch woman later died at a hospital from her injuries.³⁶¹

198. To date, no information has been made public indicating that the authorities have taken steps to investigate the above incident and ensure accountability. There has been no official acknowledgment of harm or wrongdoing, nor any announcement of an investigation into the deaths of the women, or the injuries sustained by the other girls and women. Finally,

³⁵⁶ “Silent punishment of critics”, Iran Wire, 5 November 2025.

³⁵⁷ “A Battlefield Named Isfahan: Targeted Use of IMSI-Catchers and Surveillance Cameras to the Enforce Chastity and Hijab Law”, Filter Watch, 17 April 2025.

³⁵⁸ “IRGC operation against 5 Israeli spies in Khash”, Mashregh News, 2 July 2025.

³⁵⁹ Information on file with the Mission. See “Claim of arrest of 50 “Israeli spies” in Sistan and Baluchestan / Simultaneous with the bloody repression of Baluch women in the village of Gunich”, Haalvash, 10 July 2025. See also “Account of the Bloody Raid on Gunich village in Baluchestan”, Iran Human Rights, 8 July 2025.

³⁶⁰ Material on file with the Mission.

³⁶¹ Account of the Bloody Raid on Gunich village in Baluchestan”, Iran Human Rights, 8 July 2025. See also “Claim of arrest of 50 “Israeli spies” in Sistan and Baluchestan / Simultaneous with the bloody repression of Baluch women in the village of Gunich”, Haalvash, 10 July 2025.

the reference in official media to purported security warnings that had allegedly been ignored by the women, appears aimed at justifying the shooting under the pretext of national security and shielding the incident from scrutiny. Such conduct further undermines any potential prospects for justice, accountability and reparations for the victims and/or their families. The Mission notes that, in any event, ignoring warnings does not justify the use of lethal force under international human rights law.

199. As per previously documented patterns of systemic impunity and intimidation of families of victims, some witnesses were harassed, threatened, and forced to delete evidence they had collected of the shooting. Reportedly, the authorities coerced village elders to deny the killings, restricted holding of funerals, and pressured victims' families to remain silent and not to file a complaint.³⁶² The Mission's investigations into this incident are on-going.

Arrests, detention

200. As noted above, on 25 June 2025, State affiliated media reported that more than 700 people had been arrested for alleged "collaboration with Israel" in Kermanshah and Khuzestan provinces, predominantly populated by ethnic minorities including Kurdish and Ahvazi Arabs. According to this source, Kermanshah and Khuzestan were listed amongst the provinces with the largest numbers of arrests in the context of the June hostilities, compared to other provinces in Iran.³⁶³

Arabs

201. On 25 June 2025, the Chief Prosecutor of Khuzestan province (predominantly inhabited by Ahvazi Arabs) announced that indictments had been issued for 23 people accused of "spying for Israel".³⁶⁴ On 4 October 2025, six men of Arab ethnicity, arrested in 2019, were executed for allegedly "collaborating with Israel" (see Section VI, below).

202. According to credible information, an Arab activist, aged around 30 years, who had been previously arrested for his activism and critical views of the Government, was arrested and detained during a raid on his home in late 2025. Security forces allegedly beat the victim and his family and confiscated their mobile and electronic devices. On the day after the arrest, the family was reportedly informed by security forces that the victim had died in custody on the previous evening due to "cardiac arrest". Allegedly, the victim's body bore visible marks of beatings on the face, nose and chest. Reportedly, despite the family's attempts, they were unable to lodge a complaint because several lawyers declined to represent the family.³⁶⁵

Kurds

203. Credible information indicated that more than 250 Kurdish individuals have been arrested, with dozens of others summoned and interrogated.³⁶⁶ On 25 June, Hamidreza Karimi, the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Kermanshah (where the Kurdish minority predominantly resides) announced that 115 individuals had been arrested on national security charges, of whom 54 were released on bail.³⁶⁷

204. According to a credible human rights organization, arrests increased by the end of 2025; at least ten Kurdish men, all-activists, were detained between October and December 2025 in Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan and transferred to undisclosed locations.³⁶⁸

205. According to credible information, in late 2025, masked security officers raided the home of the family of one human rights defender. Security forces reportedly stormed and damaged the home, before pointing a gun at the family members who were inside during the incident. They then arrested a relative of the defender, without providing information on the

³⁶² Material on file with the Mission.

³⁶³ "700 people arrested in 12 days on charges of anti-security activities," Tabnak, 25 June 2025.

³⁶⁴ "Indictments issued for 23 people in Khuzestan for spying for Israel", Aftab News, 25 June 2025.

³⁶⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008377 (FFMI Interview).

³⁶⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008773 (FFMI Submission).

³⁶⁷ "115 people arrested in Kermanshah on charges of acting against", ISNA, 24 June 2025.

³⁶⁸ "Security forces arrest 10 Kurdish citizens, bringing week's total to 19", Kurdistan Human Rights Network, 8 December 2025.

reasons or grounds for the arrest. The victim was taken to an unofficial detention facility reportedly run by the Ministry of Intelligence.³⁶⁹

2. Religious minorities

Baha'i

206. The Bahá'í, Iran's largest non-Muslim religious minority with roughly 300,000 members, has long faced systematic human rights violations by the State.³⁷⁰ These violations include arbitrary arrests, denial of education and employment, confiscation of property, and other forms of discrimination rooted in their religious identity.³⁷¹ In the context of the 2022-23 protests, reports indicated that the authorities accused the Baha'i of initiating the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement, and that since the protests there had been a surge in arrests and detention, especially of Baha'i women,³⁷² property confiscation and an increase in hate speech against the Baha'i. Such trends are reportedly not new, as repression of the Baha'i has historically increased during times of protests.³⁷³

207. During the period under review, witness interviews, court documents, credible information, and official statements showed further instances in which hate speech was used against the Bahá'í, their property was confiscated and they were arbitrarily arrested, detained and subjected to criminal prosecution.³⁷⁴

Hate speech

208. The Mission collected official statements whereby State officials labelled the Baha'i as a threat to national security on the basis of their religious identity. To illustrate, the Ministry of Intelligence, in a statement issued on 28 July 2025, referred to the Baha'i faith as a "Zionist sect."³⁷⁵ Earlier, on 18 June, Raja news, reportedly affiliated with the IRGC, accused the Baha'is of being "proxies and spies of Israel."³⁷⁶ Such narratives may potentially increase their vulnerabilities to harassment, arbitrary arrest, and criminal prosecution, especially following the adoption of the 2025 "espionage" law in late 2025 (see Section VI, below).

Arrests and detention

³⁶⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008602 (FFMI Interview).

³⁷⁰ See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 1113-1117. See also "They have dehumanized us - Minority rights violations during the 'Woman, Life, Freedom' movement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", Independent International Fact-finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, 5 August 2024.

³⁷¹ Article 500 bis of the Islamic Penal Code criminalizes adherence to, practice, and promotion of religions and beliefs that fall outside the legally recognized religions by allowing prosecution of "any deviant educational or proselytizing activity that contradicts or interferes with the sacred law of Islam." This provision is reported to be disproportionately used against the Baha'i, considered as 'deviant sects' by the Iranian government. Followers of the Baha'i faith are prohibited from practicing their religion in public, including from opening houses of worship. The United Nations and human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed concerns over the denial of higher education to the Baha'i, who were either prevented from continuing their studies after passing university exams, or expelled from universities later, for refusing to formally deny or recant allegiance to their faith. The Baha'is are barred from entering employment in the public sector altogether and have faced restrictions on their engagement in the private sector, including closure of private businesses. State-sponsored media regularly publishes stigmatizing and defamatory content against ethnic and religious minorities, as well as, in some contexts, incitement to violence against them, including references to a 'perverse sect' to describe the Baha'i faith.

³⁷² FM-IRAN-D-001712 (FFMI Submission). See also "Iran: Experts alarmed at systematic targeting of Baha'i women", 23 December 2024.

³⁷³ See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 1113-1171.

³⁷⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008348 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008346 (FFMI Interview); FFM-00626 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-00627 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-006476 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006413 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008980 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008979 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008777 (FFMI Submission).

³⁷⁵ "The Silent Battle with Intelligence NATO in the 12-Day Imposed War", IRNA, 28 July 2025.

³⁷⁶ "Baha'is are Netanyahu's proxies and Israeli spies", Raja News, 18 June 2025.

209. According to victims, witnesses and credible information, the Baha'is were targeted for arrests during and in the aftermath of the June hostilities.³⁷⁷ In one case investigated by the Mission, in late June 2025, a Baha'i individual was arrested by security forces and detained in an unofficial detention facility. The victim was not informed of the reason nor grounds of their arrest. Although allowed to call their family twice, the victim was not permitted to tell them where they were being held. The family was not informed of the fate or whereabouts of the victim for more than one month. The victim was subsequently transferred by IRGC officials to an official prison in late summer, before being transferred again (by the IRGC) to an unofficial detention facility; the victim was released later in 2025.³⁷⁸

210. Credible information and open-source material reviewed by the Mission indicated that security and intelligence officers had made further arrests of Baha'i, without an arrest warrant, with charges unknown to victims or their families, without permission or any opportunity for them to access a lawyer, and on occasions, with their whereabouts unknown to family or lawyers, for prolonged periods of time.³⁷⁹

Property confiscation

211. Properties of some Baha'is were also confiscated. One victim reported that their family property had been confiscated pursuant to a court judgment rendered in October 2025, that was only conveyed verbally to their lawyer. According to the victim, the decision stated that the property was seized on the grounds of the owner's "adherence to the Baha'i faith" and their alleged "connection to the Zionist regime." The owner was further accused of "holding underground classes related to the Zionist regime."³⁸⁰

Christians

212. In a statement issued on 28 July, the Ministry of Intelligence accused segments of the Christian community of being "Mossad mercenaries" with alleged ties to Israel.³⁸¹ State-affiliated media reported that at least 53 Evangelical Christians had been arrested since 13 June 2025.³⁸²

213. A human rights organization, based outside Iran, reported that arrests and hate speech against Christians in Iran in the month since the ceasefire was announced had notably increased compared to the six months prior, with at least 54 documented arrests since 24 June, compared to 40 between 1 January and 24 June.³⁸³

Jews

214. According to a Telegram Channel of a Jewish member of parliament, Homayoun Sameyeh Najafabadi, members of Iran's Jewish community were arrested in three provinces, and several were tried before a Revolutionary Court in Tehran on unknown charges. The posts indicated that those arrested in Tehran had charges related to espionage but that those charges were dropped.³⁸⁴

³⁷⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008348 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008348 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008346 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006476 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006413 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008777 (FFMI Submission).

³⁷⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-006476 (FFMI Interview).

³⁷⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008777 (FFMI Submission). See also "Baha'i citizen Arman Nikaein arrested in Shiraz", HRANA, 25 June 2025. See also "More than two months in prison; a report on the arrest of Kayhan Maghsoudi, a Baha'i citizen", HRANA, 27 August 2025; "Shahram Fallah, Baha'i citizen, arrested in Kerman", HRANA, 20 August 2025.

³⁸⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008348 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-00627 (FFMI Investigation note).

³⁸¹ "The Silent Battle with Intelligence NATO in the 12-Day Imposed War", IRNA, 28 July 2025.

³⁸² "Fifty-three Christians arrested in Iran-Israel war", Tabnak, 21 August 2025.

³⁸³ "Increase in arrests and hate speech against Christians since war with Israel", Article 18, 24 July 2025.

³⁸⁴ "The representative of the Kilimian in the parliament explained the latest situation of the Kilimian detainees." Shargh Daily, 5 August 2025.

215. Additionally, according to a human rights organization, Iranian authorities summoned 35 Jewish individuals in Tehran and Shiraz cities. They were reportedly interrogated by security forces for maintaining contact with their relatives in Israel.³⁸⁵

VI. The use of the death penalty

216. Further to the repressive measures resorted to by State authorities as outlined in Section V above, this section highlights the pronounced increase in the use of the death penalty during the period under review. In 2025, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted at least 1,639 reported executions, surpassing the global total for known executions in 2024,³⁸⁶ and marking another peak in its ongoing surge in executions since 2021.³⁸⁷ Of those, at least 48 of those executed were women, a 55 per cent increase compared to 2024, when 31 women were executed (see also Section VII, below).³⁸⁸

217. While executions have also increased by 68 per cent compared to 2024 following convictions by criminal courts for murder based on *qisas* crimes (retributive-in-kind),³⁸⁹ this surge is driven by the fact that approximately 51 per cent of executions resulted from judgments rendered by Revolutionary Courts.³⁹⁰ This surge is especially evident in executions for drug-related and security-related offenses, both of which fall under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts.

216. Often, there is little or no public information available about capital punishment cases, as the State does not publish comprehensive data on death sentences and, in security-related cases, Revolutionary Courts often deny defendants, their lawyers and families access to court documents. Nevertheless, evidence shows that executions are frequent, geographically dispersed, and coordinated by several state entities, including the Judiciary, intelligence services, and FARAJA. In the cases investigated by the Mission, victims were denied fair trial rights and due process guarantees and, according to credible information, sentenced to death and executed based on “confessions” obtained under torture. Detainees were also denied the right to a meaningful appeal, with one man executed while his retrial petition was under review by the Supreme Court. Executions were often carried out in secret and without prior notice to families, lawyers and, on occasion, the victims themselves.

A. Introduction

217. In a letter dated 19 November 2025, the Mission requested the Government of Iran to provide comprehensive data on executions for the four-year period covering 2022, 2023, 2024, and the (then ongoing) year 2025 (see Annex I). To date, the Mission has not received a response to this letter. The Mission acknowledges, however, that the Government has provided information in relation to some of the individual death penalty cases³⁹¹ which the Mission had raised, though regrets that the underlying information, including court

³⁸⁵ “Interrogation of 35 Jewish Citizens in Tehran and Shiraz”, HRANA, 28 June 2025.

³⁸⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008967(FFMI Investigation note). See also A/HRC/60/47, para. 19.

³⁸⁷ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 131ff.

³⁸⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008967(FFMI Investigation note)

³⁸⁹ Under the Islamic Penal Code, crimes and punishments are divided into four categories: *Hudud*, *Qisas*, *Diyat*, and *Ta'zirat*. While crimes punishable by *hudud* (i.e. the limits, or the limits prescribed by God; singular: *hadd*) are those with fixed and severe punishments in Islamic sources, crimes punishable by *ta'zir* are less serious crimes for which punishment is not fixed and left to the discretion of a *Shari'a* judge. In principle, all forbidden or sinful acts that do not constitute *hadd* offences, homicide or bodily harm, are punishable under this category. See also A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 152-153.

³⁹⁰ “2025 Annual Report”, HRANA, 26 December 2025.

³⁹¹ This includes response received in March 2025 in relation to Mojahed Karkouri. It also includes another response received on 10 October 2025, in relation to Ismeal Fekri, Edris Ali, Azad Shojaei, Rasoul Ahmad Rasoul, Mohammad Amin Mahdavi Shayesteh and Majid Mosayebi. The Mission also notes the response received by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation on the Islamic Republic of Iran in December 2025 and January 2026, in which Iran’s HCHR addressed the capital trials of Ehsan Faridi and Zahra Shahbazi Tabari.

documents, forensic, medical records as well as other supporting documents that served the relevant courts to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and sentence to death or execute individuals, including for drug-related offenses, were not provided. Additionally, the responses provided consistently refuted allegations of torture made by the defendants, without indicating whether such claims had been investigated, and if they were, on which basis they were dismissed.

218. The Mission notes that the Government's failure to provide the requested information is part of a broader pattern of lack of transparency concerning death sentences and executions, as also noted by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran,³⁹² and one that persists despite repeated recommendations by UN bodies to publish comprehensive and disaggregated figures.³⁹³ Instead, data on death sentences appears to be published selectively, with credible human rights organizations reporting that the Government of Iran has only acknowledged 113 executions for 2025. This represents an estimated 6.8 per cent of the total number of 1,639 executions recorded by credible human rights organizations for the same period.³⁹⁴

219. Absent official comprehensive data, the Mission continued to rely on figures compiled by credible human rights organizations. This data showed an ongoing drastic increase in executions year on year, that commenced in 2021, with 333 known executions that year.³⁹⁵ Executions then increased to at least 579 in 2022,³⁹⁶ to at least 811 in 2023,³⁹⁷ to at least 972 in 2024³⁹⁸, and at least 1,639 in 2025.³⁹⁹

220. According to credible information, executions carried out pursuant to death sentences issued by Revolutionary Courts have significantly outpaced those based on judgments rendered by Iran's criminal courts. To illustrate, in 2020, an estimated 14 per cent of executions, or 38 cases in total, were based on death sentences issued by Revolutionary Courts. Since 2021, however, their share of the overall number of executions has increased sharply. By 2023, most executions (63 per cent of the total) stemmed from sentences rendered by Revolutionary Courts. In 2024, executions pursuant to death sentences issued by Revolutionary Courts rose to 534, accounting for 55 per cent of the total.⁴⁰⁰ As of December 2025, 852 individuals were executed for offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts.⁴⁰¹

B. Expansion of death penalty offenses under Iran's domestic laws

221. Iran's domestic laws allow for the use of the death penalty for conduct that does not amount to "the most serious crimes" under international human rights law, as required by Article 6 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Iran is a party. The Mission recalls that the term "the most serious crimes" must be read restrictively and appertain only to crimes of extreme gravity involving intentional killing.⁴⁰²

³⁹² A/HRC/58/62, para. 13-15.

³⁹³ A/RES/75/183, para. 7 (c). See also A/HRC/58/62, para. 15. See also Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/IRN/CO/4 (2023), para. 24 (d).

³⁹⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008967 (FFMI Investigation note).

³⁹⁵ "Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2024", Iran Human Rights and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM), 2025. See also "Reported Executions in Iran", Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, Newsletter, last seen: 16 February 2026.

³⁹⁶ "Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2024", Iran Human Rights and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM), 2025. See also "Reported Executions in Iran", Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, Newsletter, last seen: 16 February 2026.

³⁹⁷ "Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2024", Iran Human Rights and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM), 2025. See also "Reported Executions in Iran", Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, Newsletter, last seen: 16 February 2026.

³⁹⁸ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, para. 131.

³⁹⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008967 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁴⁰⁰ Annual Reports on the Death Penalty in Iran (2024), Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM), 2025.

⁴⁰¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008967 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁴⁰² A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 922- 927.

222. In 2020, Iran enacted the “Law for Counteracting Hostile Actions of the Zionist Regime Against Peace and Security.” According to this law, any intelligence cooperation or espionage in support of Israel amounts to “corruption on earth” (*efsad-e-fil-arz*) and “enmity against God” (*moharebeh*) and, accordingly, incurs the death penalty. The law does not provide a clear legal definition of what constitutes “espionage” or “intelligence cooperation.”⁴⁰³

223. On 17 June 2025, amidst the Israel-Iran armed conflict, and alarming calls for expedited trials and executions (below), Iran’s Parliament approved a motion to fast-track a bill on “Intensifying the Punishment for Espionage and Collaboration with the Zionist Regime and Hostile States Against National Security and Interests.” As a result, on 15 October 2025, Parliament enacted the Law on the “2025 espionage law”.⁴⁰⁴ The vaguely formulated and overly broad provisions in this new legislation on espionage further expanded the application of the death penalty, effectively criminalizing a broad range of protected conduct, including the right to freedom of expression and freedom of information and other human rights.

1. Human rights concerns associated with the “2025 espionage law”

224. The Mission notes that the text of the “2025 espionage law,” as promulgated on 15 October 2025,⁴⁰⁵ presents numerous areas of additional concern.⁴⁰⁶ Concretely, many provisions violate the principle of legality under Article 15 of the ICCPR, to which Iran is a party, by failing to set out clear and precise definitions of what constitutes criminal conduct that are reasonably foreseeable to allow individuals to regulate their conduct accordingly. Such vague provisions could be used to further criminalize online expression and information-sharing, in violation of the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to impart information and ideas of all kinds as guaranteed under Article 19 (2) ICCPR.

225. According to Article 1, “any operational action” or “intelligence or espionage activity,” including non-violent acts such as disrupting communication networks, information systems or national infrastructure, “shall entail “confiscation of all property [...] and the punishment of death,” if it is done “on behalf of Israel” or “other hostile governments, including the U.S., or “other hostile regimes or groups,” as designated by the Supreme National Security Council,⁴⁰⁷ and “contrary to the security of the country.” Note 3 to Article 1 defines “operational action” as the “actions capable of endangering the security of the country, including acts involving “an act that is capable of causing loss of life,” destruction of public or private property or facilities, creation of public fear and panic, or disruption of communication networks, information systems, or national infrastructure.” Note 4 specifies that “intelligence activity” refers to “any collection of information that could endanger the security of the country.”

225. Pursuant to Article 2, any “security, military, economic, financial, technological act, or any direct or indirect assistance that strengthens, consolidates, or legitimizes” Israel carries the death penalty. Such broad wording could extend to a range of conduct that is not violent and protected by international human rights law including the right to freedom of expression or economic, social and cultural rights. For instance, engagement with Israeli cultural or academic institutions or commercial dealings with Israeli companies could potentially be considered acts of indirect assistance that strengthen, consolidate or legitimize Israel.

226. Article 3 sets out different types of “cyberattacks and sabotage” as well as acts enabling sabotage, intelligence gathering or armed action that “shall result in confiscation of

⁴⁰³ “Law to Counteract the Zionist Regime's Hostile Actions Against Peace and Security”, Shenaname.ir, 21 May 2020.

⁴⁰⁴ “Promulgation of 2 laws regulating drones and intensifying the punishment for espionage”, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 15 October 2025.

⁴⁰⁵ “Promulgation of 2 laws regulating drones and intensifying the punishment for espionage”, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 15 October 2025. See also “Law to increase penalties for espionage and collaboration with the Zionist regime and hostile countries against security and National interests”, Majlis Research Center, 15 October 2025.

⁴⁰⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-006506 (FFMI Submission). See also “One More Excuse to Kill: Espionage Weaponized in Iran’s Unrelenting Assault on the Right to Life”, Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran, 24 September 2025.

⁴⁰⁷ Note 2 to Article 1.

all property and the punishment of death,” where such acts are carried out with the intent to “collaborate with Israel or another hostile government or group.” Article 3(c) refers in particular to “any cyberwarfare, cyberattacks, interference with communication networks, information systems, or critical national infrastructure, or sabotage of public or private facilities.” This provision is vaguely and broadly formulated. It could, for example, be applied to acts of vandalism during protests or the defacing of government websites if the authorities can establish that the accused acted with the intent to collaborate with a government or a group considered hostile by the State, even in the absence of evidence that the individual in fact collaborated with an actor actually engaged in hostile actions against the Government of Iran.⁴⁰⁸

227. Article 4 sets out new offenses further curtailing the right to freedom of expression and information based on vague notions by criminalizing “any act or cooperation in carrying out political, cultural, media, or propaganda activities; or producing or publishing false news or any content that generally causes public fear or is against national security.” This provision requires no link between the perpetrator and a hostile state or group. While the provision allows for lengthy imprisonment, it explicitly provides that, if such conduct amounts to “corruption on earth” it incurs the death penalty.

228. Article 4 criminalizes sending videos, images, or information to foreign media networks, “human media” agents, or hostile virtual [digital] pages, if contrary to national security. According to the Note to Article 4, the Ministry of Intelligence should specify and make public the networks, media outlets and websites it considers “hostile,” but has not yet done so. This offense also foresees long prison terms, in the absence of “more severe punishment.”⁴⁰⁹

229. Participation in “illegal” demonstrations or gatherings during “wartime” is criminalized under Article 4. This provides for imprisonment, thus raising serious concerns about further violations of the right to freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly. These concerns are heightened considering the restrictive legal framework governing assemblies in Iran, including a requirement to obtain prior authorization for public gatherings; failure to do so would render such assemblies “unlawful” (see also Section IX, below).⁴¹⁰

230. Article 4 sets out new offenses further curtailing the right to freedom of expression and information based on vague notions by criminalizing “any act or cooperation in carrying out political, cultural, media, or propaganda activities; creating or broadcasting artificial damage; or producing or publishing false news or any content that generally causes public fear or is against national security.” This provision requires no link between the perpetrator and a hostile state or group. While the provision allows for lengthy imprisonment, it explicitly provides that, if such conduct amounts to “corruption on earth,” it incurs the death penalty.

231. Article 5 criminalizes the “use, possession, purchase, sale, or importation of unlicensed electronic or satellite internet communication tools, such as Starlink, for personal use” as well as “production, distribution, installation, operation, or importation of such devices for distribution purposes.” While the default punishments are long prison terms, the death penalty may be imposed if the perpetrator “is considered an enemy agent,” a term not defined in the 2025 espionage law. When such conduct is found to have amounted to “corruption on earth,” it carries the death penalty.

232. According to Article 7, all cases under the 2025 espionage law shall be tried and expedited in special branches of the Revolutionary Court designated by the Head of the Judiciary. This raises serious concerns given that the Mission has found that the system of justice within the Revolutionary Courts demonstrates a pattern of non-adherence to

⁴⁰⁸ The Mission recalls that Iran’s High Council for Human Rights, which is led by the Head of the Judiciary, had referred to “acts of sabotage” in relation to what it described as “riots and vandalism” in the context of the 2022 protests while then Supreme Leader Khamenei described violence during those protests as based on “plans of USA and Israel” (see A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 635 and 1823).

⁴⁰⁹ The Mission has previously found that individuals have been subjected to arrest, detention and criminal prosecution based on national security offenses for social media posts showing defiance against the mandatory *hijab* or critical posts on social media. See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 1282; A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 128, 166, 176, 182, 331, 827. State officials have also described Persian-language media outlets based abroad as being “hostile” or “terrorist”. See also A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 636-640.

⁴¹⁰ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 433.

internationally recognized fair trial standards.⁴¹¹ Additional concerns arise regarding the right to have criminal charges determined by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, as guaranteed under Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR, as well as the requirement under Article 6 (2) of the ICCPR that the death penalty may be imposed only pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court. These concerns are particularly acute given that the Revolutionary Courts, where defendants are typically tried in closed proceedings before judges and without juries,⁴¹² are assigned jurisdiction over offences under Article 4 of the “2025 espionage law.” Although framed as national security offences, these provisions largely target conduct of a political or media/press-related nature, including “cooperation in political, cultural, media or propaganda activities,” “preparing or spreading false news,” or sharing information with media or social media outlets.

233. The Mission notes that Iranian jurists have likewise expressed serious concerns relating to the “2025 espionage law.” Notably, a public statement issued by 57 Iranian lawyers in July 2025 on the basis of an earlier draft version of the law expressed concern at the violation of multiple principles of the Constitution, established rules of Islamic law, and fundamental legal principles, including the principle of legality of crimes and punishments, the Islamic legal rule prohibiting punishment without prior legal notice, the Islamic rule of precaution in matters involving life, the principle of proportionality between crime and punishment, the principles of fair trial, and the principle of equality of punishments.”⁴¹³

C. Death sentences and executions of individuals on the basis of vaguely defined national security charges

234. According to credible information, a total of 57 persons were executed in 2025 on broadly worded and vaguely defined capital offenses such as “enmity against God”, “corruption on earth”, and “armed rebellion” all of which fall under the jurisdiction of Iran’s Revolutionary Courts.⁴¹⁴

235. The Mission has observed that the number of executions based on convictions for offenses defined under these three provisions during periods of perceived crisis including but not limited to nationwide protests. Spikes in such executions have coincided with explicit calls by Iranian senior officials, including the Head of the Judiciary, for harsher punishment. For example, as of December 2025, the number of reported executions for these three offenses more than doubled, increasing from 15 in 2022 to 39 in 2023, 31 in 2024, and 57 in 2025.⁴¹⁵ Reported executions for these three national security offenses further increased to 57 in 2025, with around 52 per cent (30 executions) occurring after Israel began airstrikes on Iran on 13 June 2025.⁴¹⁶

236. Although no woman had been executed in Iran for national security offenses for 12 years, from 2011 to December 2023 — the first such execution occurred one year after the start of the 2022 protests. Between December 2023 and 2024, the Government executed four women, three on charges of “espionage.” At least two of the women belonged to the Kurdish minority (see Section VII, below).⁴¹⁷

⁴¹¹ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 801.

⁴¹² A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 865 ff.

⁴¹³ “A Critical Statement by 57 Lawyers and Legal Scholars Regarding the Approval of the Bill to “Intensify Punishments for Espionage and Cooperation with the Zionist Regime”, Vokalapress, 3 July 2025.

⁴¹⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Submission).

⁴¹⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Submission); Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran (2024), Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM), 2025.

⁴¹⁶ See e.g. “Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2024”, Iran Human Right (IHRNGO), 2 February 2024. See also, “Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2023”, Iran Human Right (IHRNGO), 5 March 2024; “Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2022”, Iran Human Right (IHRNGO), 13 April 2023.

⁴¹⁷ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, para. 141.

1. In connection to the 2022-23 protests and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement

237. Between December 2022 and the time of writing, the Government of Iran executed 12 men in connection with the 2022-23 protests. Ten protesters were executed between December 2022 and August 2024, following gross fair trial violations and absent due process guarantees.⁴¹⁸ At the time of writing, at least five other individuals remain at risk of execution in connection with the 2022-23 protests, including two women.⁴¹⁹

238. Between April and September 2025, two protesters, Abbas (Mojahed) Kourkouri and Mehran Bahramian, were executed on charges of “enmity against God.”⁴²⁰

*Abbas (Mojahed) Kourkouri*⁴²¹

239. On 11 June 2025, the Judiciary announced the execution of Abbas (Mojahed) Kourkouri, aged 43 years, from Izeh, Khuzestan province.⁴²²

240. The Mission previously noted that the family of Kian Pirfalak, whom Mojahed Kourkouri was accused of killing, consistently denied the involvement of the defendant and insisted that their son was killed by a security officer. The Mission previously provided in-depth analysis of the violations and irregularities in his trial, including that confessions used to convict Mr. Kourkouri were reported to have been obtained under torture.⁴²³ Prior to his sentence, he was deprived of access to a lawyer of his choice. On 29 December 2024, the Ahvaz Revolutionary Court upheld his death sentence for a second time, after Iran’s Supreme Court had overturned his death sentence for lack of evidence and had sent the case for retrial.

Mehran Bahramian

241. On 6 September 2025, the Government executed Mehran Bahramian, aged 32 years, after he was sentenced to death on charges of “enmity against God” related to the killing of a member of the security forces in late December 2022. Mr. Bahramian was arrested on 16 January 2023.⁴²⁴ The officer was reported to have been killed during a protest commemorating the killing of other protesters in Semiron city, Isfahan province, on 16 November 2022.⁴²⁵ Following arrest, Bahramian was initially held in an IRGC intelligence detention center where he was subjected to torture, according to reports by a credible civil society organization.⁴²⁶

242. On 27 January 2024, Mr. Bahramian was sentenced to death by a Revolutionary Court in Isfahan, reportedly based on a “confession” obtained under torture.⁴²⁷ Iran’s Supreme

⁴¹⁸ A/HRC/55/67, para. 64. See also A/HRC/58/63, paras. 33-37.

⁴¹⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-004507 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-002939 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008370 (FFMI Interview). See also “Iran’s Supreme Court Upholds Death Sentence of Mehrab Abdollahzadeh”, HRANA, 22 December 2025; “Another detainee from the nationwide protests of 2022 was sentenced to death” HRANA, 16 November 2024; “Nationwide protests of 2022; Armin Nourmohammadi was sentenced to death.” HRANA, 22 January 2026. See also, https://x.com/AI_Sharifzadeh/status/2014353973331849512?s=20. See also, https://x.com/AI_Sharifzadeh/status/2014353973331849512?s=20https://x.com/AI_Sharifzadeh/status/2014353973331849512?s=20

⁴²⁰ “The death sentence of armed criminal Abbas Kourkouri was carried out”, Mizan News, 11 June 2025

⁴²¹ “The death sentence of armed criminal Abbas Kourkouri was carried out”, Mizan News, 11 June 2025. See also “Mehran Bahramian, one of the thugs of the first level of Semiron city and one of the agents of the martyrdom of Martyr Rezaei, was carried out”, Mizan News, 6 September 2025.

⁴²² “The death sentence of armed criminal Abbas Kourkouri was carried out”, Mizan News, 11 June 2025.

⁴²³ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 105, 163-165.

⁴²⁴ “Mehran Bahramian, one of the thugs of the first level of Semiron city and one of the agents of the martyrdom of Martyr Rezaei, was carried out”, Mizan News, 6 September 2025.

⁴²⁵ “Mehran Bahramian 12th “Woman, Life, Freedom” Protester Executed.” Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), 6 September 2025.

⁴²⁶ “Mehran Bahramian 12th “Woman, Life, Freedom” Protester Executed” Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), 6 September 2025.

⁴²⁷ “Mehran Bahramian 12th “Woman, Life, Freedom” Protester Executed” Iran Human Rights, 6 September 2025.

Court later overturned the ruling for investigative deficiencies and referred the case for a retrial in another court, which sentenced him to death once again.⁴²⁸ Prior to the execution, State affiliated media published excerpts of a “confession” video purportedly filmed at the scene of the crime, in which Mr. Bahramian was shown describing the alleged offence. An off-camera voice can be heard reprimanding and instructing him to correct details regarding his position, seemingly to align the “confession” with the official narrative.⁴²⁹

2. On allegations of “espionage”

243. During the June 2025 hostilities and in the aftermath, at least 19 persons were sentenced to death and executed for their alleged links to Israel.⁴³⁰ These executions took place amidst alarming calls by senior State officials, including the then Supreme Leader and the Head of the Judiciary, for expedited trials and executions.

244. For example, on 16 June 2025, the Head of the Judiciary, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, stated at a meeting of the Supreme Judicial Council that anyone who had contact with or cooperated with Israel “should be tried and punished very quickly, and their sentence should be carried out and announced without delay,” adding in particular that their execution should happen “rapidly.”⁴³¹ On 16 July, the then Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei noted that “the Judiciary must pursue the recent crimes [of Israel] seriously, with complete accuracy and vigilance.”⁴³² On 17 July, the Head of the Judiciary, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, indicated in a meeting with senior judges that cases relating to Israel should be expedited and “just sentences should be issued for those whose crimes are proven,” adding that some of these crimes may amount to “corruption on earth,” a capital offense, and “should hence be prioritized.”⁴³³

Ismail Fekri

245. On 16 June 2025, Mizan, Iran’s judiciary news agency, announced the execution of Ismail Fekri, aged 33 years, who had been arrested in December 2023, and convicted and sentenced to death for “corruption on earth” and “enmity against God” based on his alleged collaboration with the Government of Israel.⁴³⁴ In his trial before Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, Mr. Fekri was reportedly not represented by a lawyer of his choice, but instead was assigned a state-appointed lawyer.⁴³⁵ Evidence showed that Mr. Fekri’s trial lasted around 10 minutes, giving him no meaningful opportunity to defend himself. He had earlier stated that his interrogators had made a case against him based on what he described as “false accusations.”⁴³⁶

⁴²⁸ “Protester Arrested in 2022 Uprising, Mehran Bahramian, executed”, HRANA, 6 September 2025. See also “Mehran Bahramian, one of the thugs of the first level of Semiron city and one of the agents of the martyrdom of Martyr Rezaei, was carried out”, Mizan News, 6 September 2025.

⁴²⁹ “Isfahan News”, Fars News, 6 September 2025.

⁴³⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008967(FFMI Investigation note). See also, “6 separatist terrorists affiliated with the Zionist regime were executed in Khuzestan”, Mizan Online, 4 October 2025.

⁴³¹ “Ejei: Disturbers of public security should be tried and punished under wartime conditions”, Tasnim News, 16 June 2025.

⁴³² “The Supreme leader’s analysis of the 12-day war between Iran and the Zionist regime / Once news censorship is lifted, it will become clear what a major blow Iran has inflicted.” Tabnak, 16 July 2025.

⁴³³ “Ejei’s Emphasis on Determining the Assignment of Cases of Elements Accused of Having Ties to the Zionist Regime/ Let’s Start People’s Work Sooner and Preserve Their Dignity More”, Mashregh News, 17 July 2025. See also “Iran’s judiciary chief orders expedited trials for Israel-related cases”, Iran Wire, 17 July 2025.

⁴³⁴ “A Mossad spy was hanged / A major intelligence blow dealt to the Zionists’ espionage network inside the country.”, Mizan News, 16 June 2025. See also “The 10-Minute Trial: How Iran Executed a Man to Steal His Bitcoins” Iran Wire, 6 October 2025.

⁴³⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008802 (FFMI Submission); “Esmail Fekri was executed on charges of ‘spying for Israel” Iran Human Rights Center, 16 June 2025.

⁴³⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008796 (FFMI Investigation note). See also “The 10-Minute Trial: How Iran Executed a Man to Steal His Bitcoins”, Iran Wire, 6 October 2025.

Majid Mosibi

246. Less than a week later, on 22 June 2025, Majid Mosibi, was executed after he was sentenced to death on charges of “corruption on earth” and “enmity against God” based on his alleged collaboration with an Israeli intelligence agent; the sentence was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court.⁴³⁷ There is no information available publicly in relation to when and before which court he was tried, or when the Supreme Court upheld his death sentence.

Mohammad Amin Mahdavi Shayesteh

247. On the next day, 23 June 2025, a third man, Mohammad Amin Mahdavi Shayesteh, aged 26 years,⁴³⁸ was executed. He had been arrested on 4 December 2023 on allegations of “insulting Islamic sanctity and collaborating with Israel.”⁴³⁹ In September 2024, he was reportedly tried by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court and sentenced to death.⁴⁴⁰ According to Mizan, Iran’s judiciary news agency, he had engaged in social media and other online activities in support of Israeli intelligence through his alleged “close ties” with Iran International, a Persian-speaking media outlet based abroad (see Section VIII, below).⁴⁴¹ A credible human rights organization reported that he had been tortured to confess to collaborating with Israel.⁴⁴²

Idris Ali, Azad Shojaei, and Rasul Ahmad Rasul

248. On 25 June 2025, Idris Ali and Azad Shojaei, two Iranian Kurdish men, and Rasul Ahmad Rasul, a Kurdish man of Iraqi nationality, were executed in Urmia, West Azerbaijan province.⁴⁴³ According to credible organizations, their families and lawyers were neither notified prior to the execution, nor informed that the sentence had been upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court.⁴⁴⁴ After their respective arrests in 2022, all three were reportedly held incommunicado, two of them for several months. During their time in detention, all three were reportedly tortured.⁴⁴⁵ Their group trial was concluded in a single court session conducted on 22 September 2023 before Branch 2 of the Revolutionary Court of Urmia. On 24 October 2023, the Court sentenced all three men to death on charges of “enmity against God” and “corruption on earth,” through “cooperation with hostile foreign governments in favor of the Zionist regime.”⁴⁴⁶

249. On 4 June 2024, Branch 39 of the Supreme Court reportedly upheld the death sentence.⁴⁴⁷ The death sentences were rendered on the basis of allegations that he had smuggled unspecified equipment used in the 2020 assassination of a nuclear scientist on

⁴³⁷ “Majid Mosayebi was executed on charges of espionage for Israel / The convict had a meeting with a Mossad liaison in one of the Persian Gulf states.” Mizan News, 22 June 2025.

⁴³⁸ “Risk of execution of Mohammad-Amin Mahdavi Shayesteh, accused of insulting religious sanctities and cooperating with Israel”, Iran Human Rights Center, 13 December 2024.

⁴³⁹ “Execution of the death sentence of a Mossad spy.” Mizan News, 23 June 2025.

⁴⁴⁰ “Execution of the third person accused of ‘spying for Israel’ in Iran since the start of the war.”, Radio Free Europe, 23 July 2025.

⁴⁴¹ “Dismantling of a Mossad-linked cyber network / A virtual collaborator of Iran International and a liaison of the Zionist regime’s intelligence service in cyberspace was executed.” Mizan News, 23 June 2025.

⁴⁴² Mohammad Amin Mahdavi Shayeste has been executed”, HRANA, 23 June 2025.

⁴⁴³ FFM-IRAN-D-006116 (FFMI Submission). See also “Decisive actions by the Judiciary against Mossad spies continue / Three Mossad spies were executed in Urmia / The defendants were smuggling assassination equipment into the country.” Mizan News, 25 June 2025.

⁴⁴⁴ “One More Excuse to Kill: Espionage Weaponized in Iran’s Unrelenting Assault on the Right to Life.” Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, 24 September 2025. See also “Urmia: Three Kurdish prisoners accused of ‘cooperation and espionage for Israel’ were executed.” Kurdistan Human Rights Network, 25 June 2025.

⁴⁴⁵ “One More Excuse to Kill: Espionage Weaponized in Iran’s Unrelenting Assault on the Right to Life”, Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, 24 September 2025.

⁴⁴⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-006116 (FFMI Submission). See also “One More Excuse to Kill: Espionage Weaponized in Iran’s Unrelenting Assault on the Right to Life,” Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, 24 September 2025.

⁴⁴⁷ “Confirming the death sentence of Azad Shojaei in connection with the Fakhrizadeh assassination case.” Iran Wire, 4 June 2024.

behalf of the Israeli intelligence.⁴⁴⁸ Information obtained by the Mission indicated that the defendants may not have been aware of the contents of the package they transported.⁴⁴⁹ Information obtained by the Mission also indicated that at least two of the defendants have maintained that they were alcohol smugglers who had agreed to transport a package without knowing about the sender's alleged affiliation with an intelligence agency.⁴⁵⁰

Roozbeh Vadi

250. On 6 August 2025, official media announced the execution of a seventh man, Roozbeh Vadi, after publishing a "confession" video. Mr. Vadi, who reportedly worked at a nuclear facility, had been convicted and sentenced for alleged espionage for Israel.⁴⁵¹ In a media outlet, a family member stated that the "confession" on which his conviction was based, had been obtained under torture.⁴⁵² No further information has been published on his trial.

Babak Shahbazi

251. On 17 September 2025, Babak Shahbazi, 44 years old, was executed for alleged espionage for Israel on charges of "corruption on earth" and "enmity against God".⁴⁵³ According to credible information, both his family and Mr. Shahbazi himself were not notified of the impending execution.⁴⁵⁴ Mr. Shahbazi had been arrested on 7 January 2024 in Tehran city, on the basis of alleged links to same espionage network as in the case of Ismael Fekri, mentioned above.⁴⁵⁵ To force a confession, Mr. Shahbazi was reportedly held in solitary confinement for several months, tortured and threatened with the arrest of his minor child.⁴⁵⁶

252. According to a credible human rights organization, on 4 May 2025, Mr. Shahbazi was sentenced to death by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court. His death sentence was upheld by Branch 39 of the Supreme Court on 1 July 2025. The first appeal filed on 2 August was rejected, while the second appeal was rejected on 21 August, and the last appeal was reportedly rejected on 14 September 2025.⁴⁵⁷ While a "confession" of espionage by Mr. Shahbazi was published on IRGC-affiliated Fars News, he consistently rejected the charges against him, including in a letter that was published posthumously.⁴⁵⁸

253. Since June 2025, State authorities have announced further executions on allegations of espionage of several individuals namely Bahman Chobin, Javad Naimi, Aghil Keshavarz, and Ali Ardestani. The Mission's investigation into these cases continues.

⁴⁴⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-006116 (FFMI Submission).

⁴⁴⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-006159 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006116 (FFMI Submission). See also "Forgotten Behind Closed Doors: Iran Must Be Held to Account for the Mass Execution of Alleged Drug Offenders." Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights, 10 October 2025.

⁴⁵⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-006116 (FFMI Submission).

⁴⁵¹ "Shocking confessions of Mossad spy in nuclear industries who was executed today", Tabnak, 6 August. See also "The death sentence of a Mossad spy who had transferred information related to a martyred nuclear scientist to Mossad was carried out / Meetings of Roozbeh Vadi with Mossad officers in the capital of Austria", Mizan News, 6 August 2025. See also "Confessions of Roozbeh Vadi about how he cooperated with Mossad, who was executed yesterday; 'Roozbeh Vadi and Mehdi Asgharzadeh were executed on charges of 'spying for Israel' and 'collaborating with ISIS.'" Iran Human Rights, 6 August 2025.

⁴⁵² "Family member of Roozbeh Vadi: His confession to 'spying' was made with the threat of torturing his mother", Iran International, 12 December 2025.

⁴⁵³ "The death sentence of Babak Shahbazi, a Mossad spy, was carried out." Mizan News, 17 September 2025. See also "New details from the highly ambiguous case of Babak Shahbazi, a citizen sentenced to death.", Iran Wire, 8 August 2025.

⁴⁵⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008874 (FFMI Submission).

⁴⁵⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008981 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D -00750 (FFMI Submission).

⁴⁵⁶ "Babak Shahbazi 10th Israel Espionage Defendant Hanged in 5 Months", Iran Human Rights Center, 17 September 2025.

⁴⁵⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008874 (FFMI Submission); "Babak Shahbazi 10th Israel Espionage Defendant Hanged in 5 Months", Iran Human Rights Center, 17 September 2025.

⁴⁵⁸ "The story of Babak Shahbazi, the spy who sold his homeland for money!", Apparatus, 17 September 2025. See also "Publication of a handwritten note by Babak Shahbazi, an executed political prisoner.", Iran Wire, 20 September 2025.

Other cases of individuals on death row

254. On 12 February 2026, Branch 9 of Iran's Supreme Court upheld the death sentence on alleged espionage charges of Yaghoub Karimpour, of Yaresan Turk-Azerbaijani ethnic-religious background, and with mental and physical disabilities.⁴⁵⁹

255. Mr. Karimpour had been arrested on 16 June 2025 in Miandoab, West Azerbaijan province, after the June hostilities had begun. He was held in a detention facility operated by the Ministry of Intelligence for over two months before his transfer to Urmia official prison.⁴⁶⁰ In November 2025, Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court in Urmia sentenced him to death on charges of "corruption on earth" based on his alleged collaboration with the Government of Israel.⁴⁶¹ His trial was held via a video conference despite his requesting an in-person hearing. Additionally, a few days after his arrest, the authorities arrested his spouse and questioned her while he was being interrogated. He was forced to confess and agree to the charges to secure the release of his wife. During his interrogation, Mr. Karimpour was threatened with death several times. He was also denied access to a lawyer earlier at the time of his arrest.⁴⁶²

256. In November 2025, credible human rights organizations reported that another man was at risk of imminent execution following his reported transfer to Qezel Hesar Prison in Karaj, a facility where detainees are typically transferred to prior to execution. He was reportedly sentenced to death for espionage by Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court in Tehran, after he voluntarily returned to Iran from abroad to face the accusations made against him. Upon his return, he was reportedly arrested and held incommunicado in solitary confinement for five months. During his detention, he was reportedly threatened with having several assassinations falsely attributed to him and forced to read prewritten "confessional" statements that were videotaped. At trial, he was reportedly provided only with a state-appointed lawyer.⁴⁶³

3. Executions for membership in a political group including for alleged affiliation with the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)

257. According to credible information, in 2025, at least 16 individuals have been executed because of their alleged membership in a political group, and at least 16 other individuals, including at least two women, remained on death row (see Section VII, below).⁴⁶⁴

Mehdi Hassani and Behrouz Ehsani

258. On 27 July 2025, the Iranian government executed two men, 49-year-old Mehdi Hassani and 79-year-old Behrouz Ehsani on charges of "armed rebellion" and "corruption on earth" due to their alleged affiliation with the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) in Karaj, Alborz province.⁴⁶⁵ Mehdi Hassani was arrested by the intelligence forces on 10 September 2022 in Zanzan while travelling. Intelligence officers then took him to a detention facility operated by the intelligence in Zanzan city where he remained for two days, before being transferred to Ward 209 in Evin prison in Tehran city. There, he was kept in solitary confinement for almost two months. During interrogations, he was severely beaten which led to long-term injuries to his neck. He was sentenced to death on 10 September 2024.⁴⁶⁶ Mehdi Hassani was

⁴⁵⁹ "Confirmation of the death sentence of Yaghoub Karimpour, a Turkish Yarsani prisoner accused of "spying for Israel," by the Supreme Court", Kurdistan Human Rights Network, 12 February 2025.

⁴⁶⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008679 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008678 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁴⁶¹ "Confirmation of the death sentence of Yaghoub Karimpour, a Turkish Yarsani prisoner accused of "spying for Israel," by the Supreme Court", Kurdistan Human Rights Network, 12 February 2025.

⁴⁶² FFM-IRAN-D-008678 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁴⁶³ "Concern Over Fate of Death Row Espionage Defendants Ehsan Afrashteh and Mehdi Farid", Iran Human Rights Center, 22 November 2025. See also "Hengaw warns of imminent risk of execution for Ehsan Afrashteh and Mehdi Farid", Hengaw, 26 November 2025; "Report on the Latest Status of Death-Row Prisoner Ehsan Afrashteh", HRANA, 4 November 2025.

⁴⁶⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Submission).

⁴⁶⁵ "Two operational members of the terrorist group 'Monafeqin' were executed in Iran / The terrorists were targeting residential, service, educational, and other sites by building improvised handheld mortar launchers." Mizan News, 27 July 2025.

⁴⁶⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-006067 (FFMI Interview).

executed while his retrial petition was reportedly under review by Branch 20 of the Supreme Court. No prior notice of the pending execution was given to his lawyer or family.⁴⁶⁷

259. According to a letter published by Behrouz Ehsani on Radio Zamaneh news outlet, Ehsani had been arrested in November 2021 and kept in solidarity confinement for over three months. Ehsani had been sentenced to death in September 2024.⁴⁶⁸

Ali Mojdami, Mohammadreza Moghaddam, Moein Khenfari, Habib Deris, Adnan Ghobishavi, and Salem Mousavi

260. On 4 October 2025, Ali Mojdami, Mohammadreza Moghaddam, Moein Khenfari, Habib Deris, Adnan Ghobishavi, and Salem Mousavi, six men of Arab ethnicity, were executed in Sepidar Prison in Ahvaz city, Khuzestan province, without prior notice to their families or lawyers.⁴⁶⁹ In early 2023, a Revolutionary Court in Ahvaz had sentenced them to death in a group trial on the charge of “enmity against God” in relation to armed operations carried out by the Harakaz al-Nizal group that led to deaths among security forces.⁴⁷⁰ On the occasion of their execution, the Judiciary news agency (Mizan) announced that these six individuals “were in contact with Israel and were supported by hostile foreign actors,”⁴⁷¹ a claim not made public in relation to the original judgment.

261. According to credible civil society organizations, the men were initially denied the right to counsel of their own choosing. When finally granted one, judicial authorities barred both defendants and their lawyers from accessing their case files. “Confessions” reportedly obtained under torture were used as evidence to convict them. Habib Deris was reportedly subjected to sleep deprivation, waterboarding, electric shocks, and beatings, and was hung upside down while his head was submerged in water. Another defendant, Moein Khenfari, was reportedly subjected to electric shocks and was tied up, while being beaten and flogged. Ali Mojdami, another defendant, was reportedly given electric shocks to his ears, and his wife and child were arrested and detained to force him to “confess” on camera; the “confession” was later broadcast on State television before the trial.⁴⁷² Intelligence agents reportedly contacted the families by phone on the day of the execution to inform them of the death of their loved ones. Prior to these calls, the families had received no information regarding the scheduled execution. Reportedly, the families were further warned by intelligence officers that any communication with the media or international human rights organizations would result in punitive measures against them.⁴⁷³

Other cases

262. In February 2025, a man was sentenced to death by a Revolutionary Court in Rasht for “enmity against God” for allegedly placing two sound bombs in front of a judicial and an

⁴⁶⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-006067 (FFMI Interview). See also “Political Prisoners Mehdi Hassani and Behrouz Ehsani Secretly Hanged”, Iran Human Rights, 25 July 2025; “Iran: Horrifying secret executions amid mounting political repression”, Amnesty International, 28 July 2025.

⁴⁶⁸ “A message from Behrouz Ehsani from Evin Prison; this 70-year-old political prisoner, after 22 months in legal limbo, was sentenced to death on the second anniversary of ‘Woman, Life, Freedom.’” Radio Zamaneh, 21 September 2024.

⁴⁶⁹ “Six separatist terrorists affiliated with the Zionist regime were executed in Khuzestan”, Mizan News 04 October 2025. See also “Families of Six Executed Prisoners in Ahvaz Threatened Against Holding Mourning Ceremonies”, 7 October 2025, HRANA; Iran secretly executes six Arab political prisoners in Ahvaz, Hengaw, 4 October 2025; “7 Arab and Kurdish Prisoners of Conscience Executed in Ahvaz and Karaj.” Iran Human Rights, 4 October 2025.

⁴⁷⁰ “Those responsible for the killing (martyrdom) of civilians and security forces in Khuzestan Province were sentenced to death / The military branch of the terrorist group Harakat al-Nidal was dismantled in Iran.”, Mizan News, 6 March 2023. See also “Iran: Chilling execution spree with escalating use of death penalty against persecuted ethnic minorities,” Amnesty International, 2 March 2023.

⁴⁷¹ “Six separatist terrorists affiliated with the Zionist regime were executed in Khuzestan”, Mizan News, 04 October 2025.

⁴⁷² “Six Ahwazi Arabs at Grave Risk of Execution”, Amnesty International, 12 May 2023. See also “Iran secretly executes six Arab political prisoners in Ahvaz” Hengaw, 4 October 2025; “7 Arab and Kurdish Prisoners of Conscience Executed in Ahvaz and Karaj.” Iran Human Rights, 4 October 2025

⁴⁷³ “Families of Six Executed Prisoners in Ahvaz Threatened Against Holding Mourning Ceremonies”, HRANA, 7 October 2025. See also “Iran Executes Six Arab Political Prisoners, Bans Mourning Ceremonies” Iran Wire, 6 October 2025.

IRGC intelligence building in Rasht.⁴⁷⁴ In an interview on Iranian social media, his lawyer stated that the damage incurred by the sound bombs amounted to approximately 15 million toman, and that his client was sentenced to death because of minor damage to public property.⁴⁷⁵ In October 2025, the Supreme Court reportedly rejected an appeal against the death sentence.⁴⁷⁶ According to credible information, his sentence was overturned by the Supreme Court in February 2026.⁴⁷⁷

263. In another case, in October 2025, the Supreme Court upheld the death sentence of a man on charges of “enmity against God” and “corruption of earth.”⁴⁷⁸ He was initially arrested in March 2024 and released on bail after 10 days and arrested again in May 2024. The man had been charged with “corruption of earth” and “enmity against God” for his alleged support to the MEK.⁴⁷⁹ Reportedly, he had been arrested with a hand-made bomb, attempting to damage a public building.⁴⁸⁰ His lawyer, when interviewed by Iranian media on 22 October 2025, stated that, the police report noted no damage to any public property by the individual.⁴⁸¹ After the final hearing, the judge did not inform the family about the decision for several months.⁴⁸² Additionally, the Supreme Court rejected the death sentence several times. In one attempt, retrial requests were rejected within less than 24 hours.⁴⁸³

D. Death sentences and executions of individuals for drug-related offenses

264. In 2025, at least 795 individuals were executed following convictions for drug-related offenses. This is more than 31 times as many as in 2020, when 25 people were reportedly executed for such offenses, and more than 58 per cent more than 503 executions recorded in 2024.⁴⁸⁴ In its report, the UN Secretary-General noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran was responsible for the vast majority of confirmed executions for drug-related offenses in recent years, carrying out 98 per cent of all such executions globally in 2023, and 79 per cent in 2024.

1. Background: drug offenses portrayed as an anti-revolutionary threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran that merits the death penalty

265. Owing to its geographic location between Afghanistan and drug markets in the Middle East and Europe and its own history of opium cultivation, Iran has historically seen extensive drug smuggling as well as drug use within the country.⁴⁸⁵

a) Approach under the then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

266. As a matter of law and policy, the death penalty has remained a constant feature of Iran’s approach to drug control, despite fluctuations over the past several decades in the

⁴⁷⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008861 (FFMI Submission). See also “Manouchehr Fallah Faces Execution After Forced Confession in Iran”, Iran Wire, 12 February 2025; “Interview with the lawyer”, Emtedadnet Telegram channel, 23 October 2025. See also “Manouchehr Fallah Faces Execution After Forced Confession in Iran”, Iran Wire, 12 February 2025; “Manouchehr Fallah”, Iran Human Rights, 28 October 2025.

⁴⁷⁵ “Interview with Lawyer”, Emtedadnet Telegram channel, 23 October 2025.

⁴⁷⁶ “Manouchehr Fallah’s death sentence confirmed by the Supreme Court”, HRANA, 23 October 2025.

⁴⁷⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008968 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008969 (FFMI Submission).

⁴⁷⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008370 (FFMI Interview). See also “Death Sentence of Ehsan Faridi Upheld by Supreme Court”, HRANA, 10 October 2025.

⁴⁷⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008370 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008735 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁴⁸⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008370 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008735 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁴⁸¹ “Ehsan Faridi’s lawyer: We will appeal the death sentence issued against this student.”, Ensaf News, 22 October 2025.

⁴⁸² FFM-IRAN-D-008370 (FFMI Interview).

⁴⁸³ FFM-IRAN-D-008370 (FFMI Interview). See also “Ehsan Faridi’s lawyer: We will appeal the death sentence issued against this student.”, Ensaf News, 22 October 2025.

⁴⁸⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Submission). See also “Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran (2024)”, Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM), 2025.

⁴⁸⁵ “Maziyar Ghiabi, Drugs Politics: Managing Disorder in the Islamic Republic of Iran” (2019), pp. 33.

relative emphasis placed on punitive deterrence versus other measures, such as treatment for drug dependence and harm reduction.⁴⁸⁶

267. In 2006, the then Supreme Leader issued a set of general drug policies, urging to “strengthen, develop, equip and comprehensively use intelligence, military, law enforcement and judicial facilities to identify, pursue and destroy networks and confront the main domestic and international factors.”⁴⁸⁷ In a reported speech in 2008, he claimed that there were “organized plots” pushing Iranian youth towards drugs and characterized the fight against drugs in Iran as a “great jihad and a fundamental task.”⁴⁸⁸

b) The 2017 legal reform reducing the scope of drug-related death penalty offenses

268. In November 2017, under international pressure, Iran enacted an amendment to Article 45 of Iran’s anti-narcotic law, that restricted, but did not abolish, the application of the death penalty in relation to drug-related offenses. Reportedly, resistance from judicial and security officials prevented the adoption of more extensive restrictions being mandated.⁴⁸⁹

269. The 2017 legal reform increased the legal threshold for the imposition of the death penalty for non-violent offenses to cases involving over 50 kilograms of drugs, 2 kilograms for importing, producing or distributing potent drugs and 3 kilograms for purchasing, storing or transporting such drugs. For lesser amounts, the law foresees imprisonment for up to 30 years and additional financial penalties.

270. Despite this, however, the death penalty may still be imposed for lesser amounts, if the court finds the existence of aggravating factors such as (i) the offender or an accomplice having used or carried weapons with the intent to use them against law enforcement officers; (ii) children or persons with psychosocial disabilities having been involved in the commission of the crime; or (iii) the defendant acted as a leader or financier in drug trafficking, or was a repeat offender. The law specifies that perpetrators found to have committed any of these offenses are deemed to have committed the offense of “corruption on earth,” and therefore liable to the death penalty. The 2017 legal reform foresees the commutation of the death sentence to a long-term prison sentence.⁴⁹⁰

271. After the 2017 legal reform entered into force on 14 November 2017, drug-related executions radically decreased during the period from 2018 to 2020. Whereas 2017 still saw 231 reported drug-related executions, this figure dropped to 24 executions in 2018, 30 in 2019 and 25 in 2020.⁴⁹¹

272. According to credible information, this decrease corresponded in part to a temporary halt in the execution of drug offenders sentenced to death prior to the 2017 reform, as their cases were being reviewed under the amended law, as well as to the continued international pressure on Iran to reduce its use of the death penalty.⁴⁹² At the time, Iranian scholars cautioned that the 2017 amendment law was structured around rigid quantitative thresholds and broadly defined aggravating factors subject to interpretation.⁴⁹³

⁴⁸⁶ “S. Ali Shafiee1, Abou Ali Veadhir and Emran Razaghi, Ups and downs of addiction harm reduction in Iran: key insights and implications for harm reduction policy and policing”, *Harm Reduction Journal* (2023) 20:8. See also Bijan Nissaramanesh, Mike Trace and Marcus Roberts, *The Rise of Harm Reduction in the Islamic Republic of Iran* (2004).

⁴⁸⁷ “General Anti-Drug Policies” Khamenei.ir, 2 October 2006.

⁴⁸⁸ “Khamenei Warns of Western Evils, As Youth Give Views on Ayatollahs”, *Radio Free Europe*, 6 June 2008.

⁴⁸⁹ “Majlis Endorses Bill to Restrict Death Penalty for Drug Crimes”, *Financial Tribune*, 14 August 2017. See also “Stop the execution of drug offenders until the new parliament bill is finalized”, *Asre Nou*, 6 July 2017.

⁴⁹⁰ “Law on the Addition of an Article to the Anti-Narcotics Law”.

⁴⁹¹ See “Annual report on the death penalty in Iran 2024”, *Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM)*, 2025.

⁴⁹² FFM-IRAN-D-008385(FFMI Interview). See “Iran Execution Trends Six Months After the New Anti-Narcotics Law, *Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO)*, 29 May 2018. See also “Suspending executions of drug convicts by order of the head of the Judiciary,” *Tasnim*, 10 October 2017.

⁴⁹³ “An Analysis of the Legislature’s Criminal Policy in Article 45 Added to the Anti-Narcotics Law”, *Principles of Criminal Law*, Vol. 17/19, 2020; “Referring Article 45 (Added) of the Anti-Narcotics Law to Islamic Criminal Jurisprudence: Restricting or Expanding a Strict Penal Policy?” Vol. 13/27.

c) Return to a repressive approach since 2021

273. Over the last five years, following a change in the political and judicial leadership and notwithstanding the overall spirit of the 2017 legal reform, Iran has returned to implementing a repressive approach that heavily relies on the imposition of the death penalty against drug traffickers and dealers.

274. On 1 July 2021, following the election of then President of Iran Ebrahim Raisi, the then Supreme Leader appointed Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei as the new Head of the Judiciary. In their previous functions as senior justice sector officials, and in the context of the debate leading to the 2017 legislative reform, both the then President Raisi and the Head of the Judiciary had publicly criticized efforts to reduce or abolish the application of the death penalty in relation to drug offenses.⁴⁹⁴ The change in the political and judicial leadership was followed by an immediate and drastic rise in executions, especially for drug-related offenses. More than five times as many people were executed for drug-related offenses in 2021 compared to 2020 (126 compared to 25).⁴⁹⁵ Compared to 111 reported executions in the first six months of 2021, executions doubled to 222 between 1 July 2021 and the end of 2021.⁴⁹⁶

d) Official statements denouncing the 2017 legal reform

275. On 27 November 2021, the Judicial Deputy to the Attorney General, Saeed Omrani, stated that the 2017 legal reform “broke the backbone of the fight against drugs” and “benefits drug traffickers.”⁴⁹⁷ Two days later, the FARAJA Commander of Greater Tehran, Sardar Hossein Rahim, stated that “removing the death penalty from drug charges has made offenders more brazen.”⁴⁹⁸ On 6 July 2022, the Head of Branch 41 of the Supreme Court, Hossein Zebhi, which handles security and drug offences, stated publicly that the new legislation “broadened the field for drug traffickers by reducing penalties” and expressed the view that “the severe punishment of execution in the fight against drug trafficking is very effective and a deterrent.”⁴⁹⁹ On 12 January 2023, the Director of Legal Affairs at the Anti-Narcotics Headquarters, Mohammad Tarahomi, told lawmakers that the 2017 legal reform had “dealt a severe blow” to anti-narcotics penal policies.⁵⁰⁰

276. In April 2022, Tarahomi had already announced that new drug legislation was being prepared, emphasizing that this was in line with written instructions that the then Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, had issued in 2020 to update and amend the Anti-Narcotics Law in the Islamic Consultative Assembly.⁵⁰¹ In June 2022, the then President Raisi publicly called for new legislation to make efforts to combat drug trafficking, and urged Parliament to expedite its review of the draft bill on drugs.⁵⁰²

277. In December 2022, the Government introduced a new bill on drug offenses into Parliament.⁵⁰³ If that bill had been enacted as initially submitted, it would have expanded the limitations on use of the death penalty for drug-related offenses even further. In particular, this bill would have empowered the Council of Ministers to designate additional drugs that would carry the death penalty once certain quantity thresholds were met. Such designation would have been based on proposal(s) by the Government’s Anti-Narcotics Agency developed in cooperation with the Ministries of Health and Education and would not have

⁴⁹⁴ “Opponents of the execution of drug traffickers should say what will happen if the death penalty is abolished?”, Mizan News, 2 November 2016; “Raisi: We have no ceasefire in dealing with drug traffickers.” Mashreg news, 16 December 2015. See also “Now, if we eliminate the “execution” of smugglers, the country will lose”, ISNA, 25 February 2015.

⁴⁹⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-004369 (FFMI Submission).

⁴⁹⁶ “Annual report on the death penalty in Iran 2024”, Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM) 2021, 28 April 2022.

⁴⁹⁷ “Harsh criticisms of the drafting and implementation of Article 45 which was added to the Anti-Narcotics law”, Tabnak, 27 November 2021.

⁴⁹⁸ “Abolishing the death penalty has made drug traffickers more prolific”, ISNA, 29 November 2021.

⁴⁹⁹ “Hundred to zero in the fight against drugs in the country”, Mehr News, 6 July 2022.

⁵⁰⁰ “Incompatible legal frameworks in the fight against drugs”, IRNA, 12 January 2023. See also “Don’t let them kill us”, Amnesty International, 4 April 2024.

⁵⁰¹ “Sending the “Prevention and Combating of Drug Abuse” bill to the government; what are the new proposals in this bill?”, DCHQ News, 9 April 2022.

⁵⁰² “Drugs are the country’s most important social problem and harm”, ISNA, 3 November 2022.

⁵⁰³ “Don’t let them kill us: Iran’s relentless execution crisis since the 2022 uprising”, Amnesty International, 4 April 2024.

required parliamentary approval. Moreover, the bill, if enacted would not have permitted judges to consider case-specific mitigating circumstances, other than the cooperation of the convicted persons with the authorities.⁵⁰⁴

278. On 8 January 2024, the Parliamentary Judicial and Legal Commission reportedly approved the general principles of the initial bill in a first reading and referred it to further deliberation in Parliament.⁵⁰⁵ As far as the Mission could establish, Parliament has not progressed further on adopting the initial bill and efforts by some parliamentarians and other officials to moderate it appear to be ongoing.⁵⁰⁶ In October 2025, the spokesperson for Iran's Parliamentary Judicial and Legal Commission stated that the bill that it was considering then provided for reducing the scope of the death penalty for eight drug-related offenses, adding that removing executions and replacing them with alternative penalties can contribute to more effective crime prevention.⁵⁰⁷ In a statement, dated 10 June 2025, the Minister of Justice, Amin Hossein Rahimi, stated that the confiscation of property of drug traffickers, high conviction rates and rigorous implementation of prison sentences would be more effective in curbing drug offenses than the imposition of harsh punishments such as the death penalty.⁵⁰⁸ Pending such efforts to align the approach more closely with international legal standards, a hardline approach continues.

279. Senior justice and security officials have continued to express support for a repressive approach. On 2 August 2025, the Head of Narcotics Section in FARAJA, Sardar Nasrollah Barin, stated that “reducing punishments such as the death penalty for some crimes has emboldened gangs.”⁵⁰⁹ According to state-affiliated media, in a parliamentary meeting on 28 October 2025, the Deputy Attorney General for Combating Smuggling and Organized Crime, Ali Jamadi, emphasized that any amendments to the Law on Combatting Narcotic Drugs should design punishments based on a deterrence model, while Osman Salari, a member of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and Vice-Chairman of the Legal and Judicial Commission, expressed support for “the adoption of deterrent punishments to prevent the spread and occurrence of addiction and drug-related crimes.”⁵¹⁰ On 17 November 2025, according to state-affiliated media, FARAJA Commander-in-Chief, Sardar Ahmadreza Radan, opposed reducing the penalties for major drug traffickers, adding that such individuals did not deserve leniency as the cost “of their crimes” must be “high enough to serve as a deterrent.”⁵¹¹

e) Surge in drug-related executions

280. Though the 2017 legislative reforms remain in place, executions for drug offenses have continuously surged. According to credible information, between 2022 and 2024, the number of reported executions for drug offences almost doubled, rising from 256 to 503. By 30 December 2025, 795 people had reportedly been executed for drug-related offenses, surpassing the previous annual high of 638 executions, recorded in 2015 during the period 2010–2025 (thus before the 2017 reform was adopted).⁵¹² This increase occurred despite the ban on poppy cultivation in neighbouring Afghanistan imposed by the Taliban in early 2022 having led to a reported drastic drop in opium production.⁵¹³ According to Iran's Anti-Narcotics headquarters, the seizures of heroin and opium in Iran dropped by 41 per cent and 17 per cent respectively between 2022 and 2023, although the seizure of methamphetamine

⁵⁰⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-004369 (FFMI Submission); See Anti-Drug Law Amendment Bill, Articles 1 and 4. See also “What does the new ant-drug bill say?”, Sharghdaily, 2 December 2023. See also “Don't let them Kill us”, Amnesty International, 4 April 2024.

⁵⁰⁵ “The general principles of the bill to reform anti-narcotics laws were passed”, Mizan News, 8 January 2024.

⁵⁰⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008385 (FFMI Interview).

⁵⁰⁷ “Reducing the number of executions in the amendment to the Anti-Narcotics Law”, ANA News, 11 October 2025.

⁵⁰⁸ “Justice ‘Minister Calls for Amendment to Anti-Drug Law’”, Mehr News, 10 June 2025.

⁵⁰⁹ “The need for decisive action against drug traffickers”, Mehr News, 2 August 2025.

⁵¹⁰ “Review of corrective punishments in the Anti-Drug Law Bill”, Mehr news, 28 October 2025

⁵¹¹ “Radan emphasizes the necessity of fighting drugs on the ground”, Mehr News, 17 November 2025.

⁵¹² FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Interview).

⁵¹³ UNODC estimates that opium production decreased from 6200 tons in 2022 to 433 tons in 2024. UNODC, Afghanistan: Drug Insights, Vol. 2.

increased by 23 per cent during the same period, as drug production and trafficking patterns affecting Iran and the region reportedly shifted to synthetic drugs.⁵¹⁴

2. Executions of persons for drug-related offenses

“Political and security cases actually offer more room for defending the accused than drug-related cases.”

Lawyer working on drug-related cases

281. Credible information indicated that many of those executed on drug-related offenses had played relatively minor roles in committing the offense for which they were sentenced to death. This includes transporting or temporarily storing quantities of drugs above the legal threshold required for the imposition of the death penalty.⁵¹⁵ Witness interviews, and statements obtained from lawyers, former detainees and experts further indicated that judges rarely consider exculpatory evidence, and as long as the drug quantity meets the legal threshold quantity, they issue death sentences regardless.⁵¹⁶

282. Against the backdrop of an overall dire economic situation and increasing socio-economic disparities in Iran, persons from marginalized backgrounds, including minorities, are likely to be lured by drug traffickers with small sums of money, with some not even aware that they are transporting drugs, according to credible information.⁵¹⁷ According to a witness, a woman was arrested at the age of 17 years, along with her infant child, although her drug-trafficking spouse escaped, a Revolutionary Court sentenced her to death because she was left in possession of the drugs.⁵¹⁸

283. Moreover, according to civil society organizations and legal experts, judges at Revolutionary Courts have adopted overly broad interpretations of aggravating factors, such as an alleged leadership role of the defendant, or the presence of an armed accomplice, to sentence minor drug dealers to death, even when the amount of the drugs involved was below the legal threshold that would trigger the death penalty.⁵¹⁹

3. The situation of minorities

286. The Government of Iran does not publish census data on ethnicity and does not collect demographic data for “non-recognized” religions.⁵²⁰ It is particularly difficult to gather disaggregated data on executions of religious and ethnic minorities, also because of the lack of Government transparency in relation to the overall data on persons executed, or sentenced to death, along with the geographic spread of minorities beyond specific regions into major urban areas. According to State-affiliated media, Sistan and Baluchestan province recorded the highest number of executions per capita in 2025.⁵²¹

⁵¹⁴ Understanding the Changing Illicit Drug Trafficking Trends in West and Central Asia, UNDOC, 2024.

⁵¹⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008827 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008385 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008371 (FFMI Interview). See also “Proven with(out) certainty’: How Judges Sentence Defendants to Death for Drug Offences in Iran”, Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran/Monash University/ELEOS Justice, 2023; “Iran’s Mass Executions of Drug Offenders Are a Human Rights Emergency”, Center for Human Rights in Iran, 16 April 2025.

⁵¹⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008827 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008371 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008372 (FFMI Interview). See also “Proven with(out) certainty’: How Judges Sentence Defendants to Death for Drug Offences in Iran” Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran/Monash University, 2023. See also “Iran: Prisons turned into killing fields as drug-related executions almost triple this year”, Amnesty International, 2 June 2023.

⁵¹⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008827 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁵¹⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008372 (FFMI Interview).

⁵¹⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008385 (FFMI Interview). See also “Iran’s Mass Executions of Drug Offenders Are a Human Rights Emergency”, Center for Human Rights in Iran, 16 April 2025.

⁵²⁰ “Rights denied – Rouhani’s promise to Iran’s minorities proves empty, new report”, Minority Rights Group International, 13 March 2018.

⁵²¹ “The political and social consequences of the death penalty in Sistan and Baluchestan; this province has the highest execution rate.” Etemad Online, 6 October 2025.

287. According to a credible civil society organization, 108 Baluch and 83 Kurds were executed in 2024.⁵²² In addition, a rapid surge in execution of Afghan nationals was reported, with 80 executions recorded for 2024, compared to 25 in 2023.⁵²³ Another organization with a specific focus on human rights violations in Kurdish-populated provinces, reported that, in 2024, Iran executed 183 persons of Kurdish ethnicity, 121 of Turk ethnicity, 110 Baluch, 60 Lur, 12 Arabs, 6 Turkmen and 75 Afghan and Iraqi foreign nationals.⁵²⁴ For 2025, the same society organization reported that 82 Kurd, 149 ethnic Baluch, and 28 Arabs were executed, in addition to 84 Afghan nationals.⁵²⁵

288. The Baluch ethnic minority, which constitutes approximately 2 to 6 per cent of Iran's population, has long accounted for a disproportionately high number of executions, including for drug-related offences. Between 2021 and 2024, 519 Baluch were executed, which represented 19 per cent of the total number of executed individuals for that period.⁵²⁶ Between 2021 and 2024, 393 out of 1,356 reported victims of drug-related executions (29 per cent of the total) were members of the Baluch ethnic and religious minority.⁵²⁷

289. According to credible information, in 2021, a Revolutionary Court sentenced two Baluch individuals to death for carrying drugs in quantities that exceeded the legal threshold. Court documents analyzed by the Mission do not explicitly state whether one of the defendants had actually carried the threshold amount required for the imposition of the death penalty. According to credible information, the hearings were conducted via video conference, and the defendants were not afforded time to present a meaningful defense.⁵²⁸

290. In another reported case, a Baluch man was tried before Branch 1 of the Kerman Revolutionary Court in the absence of a lawyer. The judgment at first instance was reportedly overturned four times by the Supreme Court, only for the trial judge to reaffirm the sentence each time. On 8 January 2023, the man was secretly executed without his family being notified or even allowed a last visit.⁵²⁹

E. Treatment of persons facing the death penalty, and convicted to death

291. As noted above, witness interviews, credible information, and open-source material indicated that investigative and judicial processes in death penalty cases are regularly marred by gross violations of due process and the right to fair trial, including reported reliance on confessions obtained under torture.⁵³⁰ The accused in drug cases are even more vulnerable to such violations as many lack the financial means to access adequate defense; such cases also receive less scrutiny from civil society organizations and the media, according to credible sources.⁵³¹

⁵²² "Annual report on the death penalty in Iran 2024", Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM), 2025.

⁵²³ "Annual report on the death penalty in Iran 2024", Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM), 2025.

⁵²⁴ "Hengaw Statistical Report: 909 Executions in Iran in 2024", Hengaw, 16 February 2025.

⁵²⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Submission).

⁵²⁶ "Annual report on the death penalty in Iran 2024", Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM), 2025.

⁵²⁷ "Annual report on the death penalty in Iran 2024", Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM), 2025. See also "Don't Let them Kill Us': Iran's Relentless Execution Crisis since the 2022 Uprising," Amnesty International, 4 April 2024.

⁵²⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008835 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁵²⁹ "Execution of Two Prisoners in Kerman Prison", HRANA, 8 January 2023.

⁵³⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008385 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008371 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008827 (FFMI Investigation note). See also "Proven With(out) Certainty: How Judges Sentence Defendants to Death for Drug Offences in Iran", Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran and Eleos Justice, 17 April 2023; "Iran: Prisons turned into killing fields as drug-related executions almost triple this year" Amnesty International, 2 June 2023; "Annual report on the death penalty in Iran 2024", Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM), 2025.

⁵³¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008827 (FFMI Investigation note). See also "Iran: Prisons turned into killing fields as drug-related executions almost triple this year", Amnesty International, 2 June 2023.

1. Fair trial violations

292. According to credible reports, many persons prosecuted for drug-related offenses are arrested without a warrant during mass anti-drug police operations.⁵³² According to official media, in one such case in Tehran in September 2025, a total of “12,000 drug addicts and 5,670 drug dealers were arrested in public roads and places.” State affiliated media further noted that the operation, described by the FARAJA Anti-Narcotics Police as the 21st operation under its “Calm City Plan” led to the arrest of “253 traffickers, the dismantling of 41 small and large drug-trafficking networks, and the detention of 4,380 individuals involved in related activities such as possession, transport, and distribution.”⁵³³

293. Moreover, according to one witness, many individuals arrested in anti-drug police operations lacked the financial means to hire a lawyer of their choice and were therefore without legal representation during the investigative stage, when they were often subjected to lengthy pre-trial detention under the control of the Anti-Narcotics Agency.⁵³⁴ Two witnesses joined credible human rights organizations in stating that, even where defendants can afford to have a lawyer of their choice, judges do not take the time to fully consider the available incriminating and exculpatory evidence and the individual circumstances of the case.⁵³⁵

294. In the cases investigated by the Mission, trials were often summary in nature, with the defendants mainly participating via video conference, which further reduced their ability to effectively defend themselves or confer with their lawyer. According to one witness, in October 2025, during a trial held before a Revolutionary Court, more than a dozen defendants were indicted for drug offenses. The trial was concluded within one hour, with the defendants only joining via video conference. The lawyers representing the defendants were given ten minutes each to defend their individual clients.⁵³⁶ Some of the defendants were sentenced to death and others received long-term prison sentences.⁵³⁷ Another witness observed a trial against a woman accused of drug offenses before a Revolutionary Court in Tehran, which lasted a total of two to three minutes and in which the judge told the defendant “You know your sentence is death” without reviewing the evidence of the case.⁵³⁸

295. In some cases, executions were carried out while defendants were still awaiting retrial.⁵³⁹ According to a court document, one individual was executed reportedly after his case had been sent for review by the Supreme Court, and before a final decision was issued.⁵⁴⁰

⁵³² “Islamic Republic of Iran’s Compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran & Harm Reduction International, June 2020. See also “One Person’s Story: Sa’did Baluch,” Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran; “One Person’s Story: Mohsen Nasiri”, Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran.

⁵³³ “Discovery of 10 tons of various narcotics and arrest of more than 16,000 small-scale dealers”, SNN, 8 October 2025. See also 724 drug addicts and traffickers arrested in Gilan, ISNA, 14 December 2025; “81 drug dealers arrested and 25 kilograms of drugs discovered in Lorestan,” IRNA, 6 October 2024; “Implementation of the “City Peace Plan” and the discovery of 136 kilograms of various drugs / 182 drug dealers arrested”, Egthesad Online, 10 May 2025.

⁵³⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008371 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008372 (FFMI Interview). See also “One Person’s Story: Sa’did Baluch”, Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran. See also “One Person’s Story: Mohsen Nasiri,” Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran.

⁵³⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008585 (FFMI Investigation Note); FFM-IRAN-D-008372 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008385 (FFMI Interview). See also “Proven with(out) certainty: How Judges Sentence Defendants to Death for Drug Offences in Iran” Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran/Monash University (2023); “One Person’s Story: Mohsen Nasiri”, Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran.

⁵³⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008835 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008585 (FFMI Investigation Note); FFM-IRAN-D-008371 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-005288 (FFMI Meeting note); FFM-IRAN-D-008386 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-005288 (FFMI Meeting note). See also Joint Submission by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran & Harm Reduction International to the 129th Session of the Human Rights Committee by in relation to Iran’s compliance with the ICCPR, June 2020.

⁵³⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008585 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁵³⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008372 (FFMI Interview).

⁵³⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008380 (FFMI Interview).

⁵⁴⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008877 (FFMI Submission).

In another case, according to a credible organization, the sentence was carried out despite ambiguities in the case.⁵⁴¹

2. Ill-treatment, torture

296. The Mission previously established a pattern of systematic dismissal of torture complaints by Iran's Revolutionary Courts, and reliance on confessions obtained under torture to convict protesters and political opponents.⁵⁴² Such systemic practices are especially significant given that all cases investigated by the Mission were held before Revolutionary Courts. The lack of transparency and public scrutiny in the trial process and the judgments further compounds blatant violations of rights.

297. According to credible information, individuals on death row were subjected to beatings, waterboarding and electric shocks amounting to torture.⁵⁴³ Many were held in solitary confinement and prevented from contacting their families or a lawyer for prolonged periods of time, in acts amounting to incommunicado detention.⁵⁴⁴ In one case, two men arrested and detained for alleged membership of an opposition group were subjected to sleep deprivation, waterboarding, electric shocks, beating and flogging, prior to being sentenced to death. The spouse and child of one of the men were also detained in order to force him to "confess" on camera. His confession was broadcast on State television before his trial and subsequent execution.⁵⁴⁵

298. In another case, a witness informed the Mission of a defendant being tortured in police custody after his arrest on drug-related offenses. His trial was held in person but lasted only 15 minutes, and he was represented by a state-appointed lawyer. He was sentenced to death, even though the judge acknowledged that the defendant was not the owner of the drugs found in his possession.⁵⁴⁶

3. Modes of carrying out executions and impact on families

a) Public executions

⁵⁴¹ "Execution of a Baluch prisoner in Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad despite ambiguities in the case and the scheduling of a serious review hearing" Haalvash Telegram Channel, 8 August 2025.

⁵⁴² See A/HRC/55/67, para. 55.

⁵⁴³ FFM-IRAN-D-006067 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008370 (FFMI Interview). See also "Mohammad Amin Mahdavi Shayesteh at Imminent Risk of Execution in Iran for Blasphemy and Israel Collaboration", Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), 13 December 2024; "Mohammad Amin Mahdavi", HRANA, 22 December 2025; "One More Excuse to Kill: Espionage Weaponized in Iran's Unrelenting Assault on the Right to Life", Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, 24 September 2025; "Family member of Roozbeh Vady: His confession to 'spying' was made with the threat of torturing his mother" Iran International, 12 December 2025; "Babak Shahbazi 10th Israel Espionage Defendant Hanged in 5 Months", Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), 17 September 2025; "Prison Letter from Kurdish Political Prison Rezgar Beigzadeh Babamiri Describes Torture", Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), 24 April 2025.

⁵⁴⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-006067 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008370 (FFMI Interview); "Mohammad Amin Mahdavi Shayesteh at Imminent Risk of Execution in Iran for Blasphemy and Israel Collaboration", Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), 13 December 2024; "Mohammad Amin Mahdavi", HRANA, 22 December 2025; "One More Excuse to Kill: Espionage Weaponized in Iran's Unrelenting Assault on the Right to Life", Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, 24 September 2025; Family member of Roozbeh Vady: His confession to "spying" was made with the threat of torturing his mother, Iran International, 12 December 2025; "Babak Shahbazi 10th Israel Espionage Defendant Hanged in 5 Months", Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), 17 September 2025; "Prison Letter from Kurdish Political Prison Rezgar Beigzadeh Babamiri Describes Torture", Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), 24 April 2025.

⁵⁴⁵ "Six Ahwazi Arabs at Grave Risk of Execution", Amnesty International 12 May 2023. See also "Iran secretly executes six Arab political prisoners in Ahvaz, Hengaw, 4 October 2025; "7 Arab and Kurdish Prisoners of Conscience Executed in Ahvaz and Karaj", Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), 4 October 2025.

⁵⁴⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008380 (FFMI Interview).

299. While for certain offenses the law foresees specific types of public executions such as stoning or crucifixion in violation of international human rights standards,⁵⁴⁷ in practice, public executions are generally carried out by hanging.

300. According to a directive issued in 2008 by the then Head of the Judiciary, Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, public executions were limited to cases of “social need,” with each case requiring the approval of the Head of the Judiciary.⁵⁴⁸ After carrying out only one reported public execution in 2020 and reportedly none in 2021, Iran resumed public executions in 2022, when two men were executed publicly, followed by seven others in 2023, and four others in 2024.⁵⁴⁹ During 2025, public executions increased again, reaching a total of 11 by December 2025.⁵⁵⁰

301. In one case, on 12 July 2025, a man who had been sentenced to death for raping and murdering a child, was hanged publicly in Bukan city from a mobile construction crane. Children were reportedly among the spectators.⁵⁵¹ Many children were also reportedly present in the crowd during the public hanging of another man convicted of murder in Beyrom, Fars province, on 19 August 2025.⁵⁵²

b) Secret executions and denial of families’ right to mourn

*“People ask us if we are okay. I woke up at 6 a.m. to the news of my brother’s execution. I feel bad, very bad.”*⁵⁵³

*“Execute them without informing the families; these victims are nobody to anyone.”*⁵⁵⁴

Lawyer, 2025,

302. Iranian law requires that the victim’s next-of-kin and their legal representative must be informed by the judicial authority in charge of enforcement at least 48 hours before enforcing any sentence,⁵⁵⁵ including through executions. A credible human rights organization recorded, however, that, in 2022, at least 15 individuals were executed without prior notice to their families or lawyers; in 2023, this number reportedly doubled, with at least 30 such executions documented.⁵⁵⁶ According to the same source, in 2025, at least 23 individuals were executed without notifying their families and, in some cases, without prior notice to the victims themselves.⁵⁵⁷

303. Witness interviews and credible information further indicated that the execution of individuals was often scheduled and carried out without any prior notice to the families, the immediate victim or the victim’s lawyer.⁵⁵⁸ In one case, according to credible information, a victim was taken out of a prison for interrogation, only to be transferred to solitary confinement, and executed shortly thereafter, without informing the family.⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁴⁷ Article 225 and 282 of the Islamic Penal Code. See also A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 926.

⁵⁴⁸ “A circular was issued to halt the execution of the death sentence in public”, Hamshahri Online, 30 January 2008.

⁵⁴⁹ See Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2024”, Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM), 2025.

⁵⁵⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008877 (FFMI Submission).

⁵⁵¹ “Video: The moment of the execution of the sentence of retribution for the killer of “Nian, a 6-year-old child in Bukan”, Tabnak News, 12 July 2025. See also “2nd Public Hanging in a Week; Ilia Khalifehzadeh Executed for Rape”, Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), 12 July 2025; “Ilya Khalifazadeh’s death sentence was carried out in public”, Kurdistan Human Rights Network, 12 July 2025.

⁵⁵² “IHRNGO Condemns Sajad Molayi Hakani’s Public Hanging with Children Present”, Iran Human Rights, 19 August 2025. See also “The moment of the public execution of the murderer of the Larestani family and the reaction of the audience”, Eghtesad Online, 19 August 2025; “The moments of the brutal execution of the murderer of four members of a family” Tabnak, 19 August 2025.

⁵⁵³ FFM-IRAN-D-005042 (FFMI Interview).

⁵⁵⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008371 (FFMI Interview).

⁵⁵⁵ Article 7, Regulatory Code on Sentences of Qisas, Stoning, Crucifixion, Execution, and Flogging.

⁵⁵⁶ Iran Human Rights and ECPM, Annual Report 2023.

⁵⁵⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008967(FFMI Investigation note).

⁵⁵⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-005042 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-003703 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-003703 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-005042 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008874 (Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008875 (FFMI Submission).

⁵⁵⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008874 (Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008875 (FFMI Submission).

304. When families were notified or were able to informally learn about an imminent execution, they were denied a final visit to their loved one. Such practices left families in a constant state of fear and acute anguish, as they struggled to obtain information or were forced to interpret signs such as a transfer to solitary confinement or a sudden loss of telephone access.⁵⁶⁰

305. For example, according to a credible human rights organization, on 4 November 2023, two Baluch brothers were executed in Zahedan Central Prison without prior notice to their family, pursuant to a death sentence for drug possession issued by a Revolutionary Court.⁵⁶¹ On 28 January 2024, two other Baluch men, also brothers, were reportedly executed for drug-related offenses in Birjand central prison, without their family being informed of their execution, and without the opportunity of a last visit to their loved one.⁵⁶²

Intimidation, harassment of families of persons executed pursuant to a death penalty sentence

306. State authorities intimidated families to prevent them from speaking out about violations associated with the execution of their loved ones, and the underlying proceedings, or engaging in any other activism, as previously reported. The Mission also noted reports suggesting that some families did not receive the bodies of their loved ones and were therefore unable to bury them according to their religious or cultural rites or to hold funerals and mourning ceremonies.⁵⁶³ For example, the family of Ismeal Fekri (above) was reportedly under pressure by the authorities after his execution. The family was never allowed to have a funeral for him, and his body was buried outside Ghazvin city, which is hundreds of kilometers from Mr. Fekri's family's hometown.⁵⁶⁴

F. “No-executions” campaigns led by civil society organizations in Iran

307. In response to Iran's persistent use of the death penalty, many Iranians, human-rights defenders, and civil society organizations have organized themselves to resist executions, advocate for the abolition of the death penalty and make peaceful and rights-based efforts to bring Iran's criminal justice system into conformity with international human rights standards, in particular the right to life and related due process and fair trial rights.

308. Over the last two decades, several human rights initiatives have mobilized significant campaigns advocating for the abolition of the death penalty. In 2013, for instance, a group of human rights activists launched the “Campaign for Step-by-Step Abolition of the Death Penalty” (or “LEGAM”), leading a domestic movement aimed at ending the death penalty. LEGAM sought incremental reforms: advocating for legislative and judicial reforms, raising public awareness, and aligning Iran's laws with international human rights standards.⁵⁶⁵ Prominent human rights defenders, including Narges Mohammadi and Nasrin Sotoudeh,

⁵⁶⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-005042 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-003703 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-003703 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-005042 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008874 (Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008875 (FFMI Submission).

⁵⁶¹ FFM-IRAN-D-004369 (FFMI Submission). See “Undocumented Baluch Brothers Asef and Aref Eshaghzei Secretly Executed”, Iran Human Rights, 28 January 2024. See also “Execution of at least two Baluch prisoners in Zahedan prison without informing and meeting their families”, Halvaash, 4 November 2023; “Iran Stakeholder Report for the United Nations Universal Periodic Review: The Death Penalty, Advocates for Human Rights/Iran Human Rights/Impact Iran/ECPM/World Coalition Against the Death Penalty, 16 July 2024.

⁵⁶² “Undocumented Baluch Brothers Asef and Aref Eshaghzei Secretly Executed”, Iran Human Rights, 28 January 2024.

⁵⁶³ Hengaw report on the execution and enforced disappearance of six political prisoners by the Iranian Government on charges of espionage for Israel”, Hengaw, 27 May 2025; Body of Kurdish political prisoner not returned after secret execution; family threatened”, KHRN, 22 April 2025. See also “Don't Let them Kill Us: Iran's Relentless Execution Crisis since the 2022 Uprising,” Amnesty International, 4 April 2024.

⁵⁶⁴ “The 10-Minute Trial: How Iran Executed a Man to Steal His Bitcoins” Iran Wire, 6 October 2025.

⁵⁶⁵ “Iran's brave human rights defenders and their struggle against the death penalty”, Amnesty International, 12 October 2017. See also “Launching the ‘Step-by-Step Abolition of the Death Penalty’ campaign in Iran.”, Radio Free Europe, 27 November 2013; “Step-by-Step Abolition of the Death Penalty’ campaign in Iran.”, Radio Zamaneh, 26 November 2013.

were involved.⁵⁶⁶ However, the members of this campaign faced harassment and imprisonment by the Government because of their activities.⁵⁶⁷

309. In response to the increasing number of executions carried out after the 2022 protests, the “Tuesday against Execution” campaign emerged, which has become a grassroots human rights movement, also involving families of detainees on death row. The campaign started when death row prisoners in Ghezel Hesor prison started going on hunger strike every Tuesday, the day when prisoners on death row were typically transferred to solitary confinement in preparation of their execution.⁵⁶⁸ Two years into the campaign, detainees in dozens of prisons joined this campaign.⁵⁶⁹

310. As of December 2025, the campaign had continued for nearly two years, covering over 55 prisons across the country and involving hundreds of prisoners and supporters, including common prisoners.⁵⁷⁰ It has served both to raise awareness of recent individuals on death row and executions, including secret executions, and to keep alive a persistent public demand for abolition. Campaigners have reportedly been subjected to threats of arrest and loss of visitation rights, and some protesting prisoners have been reportedly transferred to solitary confinement as a punitive measure.⁵⁷¹

G. Death sentences overturned or commuted

311. Any death sentences, including those issued by the Revolutionary Courts, must be approved by the Supreme Court, which also has jurisdiction over the appeals. In addition, the Supreme Leader may issue pardons or commutation of death sentences based on the advice of the Head of the Judiciary.⁵⁷²

312. There is no accurate information on the number of overturned death sentences in 2025. During the reporting period, the Mission documented 15 death sentences of individuals including protesters and women activists and human rights defenders that were overturned or commuted (see also Section VII, below). In this regard, the Mission welcomes the suspension of the death sentence rendered against Ehsan Faridi for alleged membership in MEK.⁵⁷³ Notably, these developments were all preceded by advocacy by UN human rights mechanisms, including UN Special Procedure mandate holders, the Mission, as well as credible international human rights organizations, which highlights the importance of continued advocacy in relation to death penalty cases. It is important to note however that, in many cases, death sentences may be reinstated if they have not been overturned by final appeal.

*“Ekhabatan” trial*⁵⁷⁴

313. On 13 September 2025, the Supreme Court overturned the sentence of six men, Milad Armoun, Alireza Kafaei, Amir Mohammad Khosheghbal, Navid Najaran, Hossein Nemati, and Alireza Bamerzpournak reportedly due to “significant ambiguities” in the case.⁵⁷⁵ Convicted on 12 December 2024 in a group trial known as the “Ekhabatan trial,” they had been sentenced to death for *qisas* (“retribution”) by Branch 13 of the Criminal Court in

⁵⁶⁶ “Iran’s brave human rights defenders and their struggle against the death penalty”, Amnesty International, 12 October 2017.

⁵⁶⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-005032 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-002460 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-000743 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-000148 (Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-004271 (FFMI Interview). See also “Iran’s brave human rights defenders and their struggle against the death penalty”, Amnesty International, 12 October 2017.

⁵⁶⁸ Global Solidarity with “No Death Penalty Tuesdays” Abolitionist Movement Ahead of World Day Against the Death Penalty”, Iran Human Rights, 15 October 2024.

⁵⁶⁹ https://t.me/No_To_Execution_Tuesdays/177

⁵⁷⁰ https://t.me/No_To_Execution_Tuesdays/177.

⁵⁷¹ “Coordinated wave of propaganda against the prisoners’ strike in Qazl-e Hassar; government’s attempt to distort the voices of those opposed to the death penalty”, Hengaw, 16 October 2025.

⁵⁷² Article 110 of the Constitution.

⁵⁷³ Reports from the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran dated 30 December 2025.

⁵⁷⁴ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 157-162.

⁵⁷⁵ “Supreme Court Overturns Death Sentences in “Ekbatan Case”, Iran Wire, 15 September 2025.

Tehran. They had been convicted for their alleged role in the death of a Basij member based on a trial marred by gross violations of the right to a fair trial, including reports of confessions obtained under torture, and forcing defendants to incriminate themselves, including on camera.⁵⁷⁶

*Ali (Sorani) Ghasemi, Kaveh Salehi, Rezgar Beigzadeh Babamiri, Teyfur Salimi Babamiri and Pejman Soltani*⁵⁷⁷

314. On 25 October 2025, Branch 39 of the Supreme Court overturned the death sentences of five Kurdish men who had participated in the 2022 protests in Bukan and referred the case to the Revolutionary Court of Mahabad for retrial.⁵⁷⁸ Among the defendants was Pejman Soltani who had been sentenced in relation to his alleged role in the killing of a Basij member.⁵⁷⁹ The other four were reportedly convicted in July 2025 on charges of “armed rebellion” and “waging war against God” linked to charges of having imported Starlink devices to enable internet access during the protest-related internet shutdown.⁵⁸⁰

315. One of the five men, Rezgar Beigzadeh Babamiri, detailed in a public letter acts of torture to which he had been subjected to in detention including beatings, waterboarding, electric shocks and sleep deprivation in a detention facility in Urmia, West Azerbaijan province. This was ignored by the Revolutionary Court, despite complaints by the victim, and other detainees to the Court.⁵⁸¹

VII. Continuous discrimination against women and girls

A. Persistent persecutory conduct

316. The Mission previously found that women and girls in the Islamic Republic of Iran faced pervasive and institutionalized discrimination, in law and in practice, and that this discrimination was the “enabler,” and the root cause, of the gross human rights violations and crimes under international law committed during the 2022-23 protests and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement that followed.⁵⁸² On 16 December 2025, a group of women victims of the repression of the 2022 protests in Iran and the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center filed a criminal complaint in Argentina calling the judicial authorities to open a formal criminal investigation into 40 senior officials of Iran. The officials reportedly include senior members of intelligence services, military, police forces, the IRGC, and civilian government officials. The complaint alleges that these officials bear responsibility for a widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian population, involving acts amounting to the crimes against humanity of gender persecution, murder, torture, and other inhumane acts, notably through targeted blinding of protesters. The complaint is reported to draw on the Mission’s findings in its March 2024 report (A/HRC/55/67) and subsequent findings, and requests Argentina to exercise universal jurisdiction.⁵⁸³

⁵⁷⁶ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 157-162.

⁵⁷⁷ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 174-178.

⁵⁷⁸ “The Supreme Court has overturned the death sentences of five Kurdish citizens”, Kurdistan Human Rights Network, 25 October 2025.

⁵⁷⁹ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran in response to Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 27 May 2024. See A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 174-178.

⁵⁸⁰ See A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 174-178. See also “The Supreme Court has overturned the death sentences of five Kurdish citizens”, Kurdistan Human Rights Network, 25 October 2025.

⁵⁸¹ “Prison Letter from Kurdish Political Prison Rezgar Beigzadeh Babamiri Describes Torture”, Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), 24 April 2025.

⁵⁸² See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 285-315. See also A/HRC/58/CRP.1, para.12.

⁵⁸³ See “IHRDC files criminal complaint in Argentina for crimes against humanity committed in Iran during Woman, Life, Freedom protests”, Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 17 December 2025; “Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project supports landmark criminal complaint in Argentina seeking accountability for crimes against humanity during Iran’s “Woman, Life, Freedom” Protests, Atlantic Council, 22 December 2025. See also “Victims of Iran’s 2022 crackdown file criminal complaint against 40 officials, The Guardian, 16 December 2025.

317. Examined in connection with this institutionalized gender discrimination, violations of women and girls' right to life are not isolated, but a foreseeable outcome of a legal system that systematically denies them protection. Laws, policies and practices that penalize women for their activism or for refusing to comply with the mandatory *hijab* laws and policies both online and offline, render women and girls more vulnerable to arrest, detention, and criminal prosecution, and place them at heightened risk of violence in custody, including custodial death (see sub-sections B and C). The imposition of the death penalty further entrenches this pattern, as women are sentenced to death under discriminatory laws and procedures and following proceedings that disregard patterns of gender-based violence, including child marriage and/or domestic violence to which they may have been subjected (see sub-section D). Systemic structural inequalities are also reflected in the patterns of femicide (intentional killing with a gender-related motivation), as the State's persistent failure to prevent, investigate, or punish indicates tolerance for women's deaths (see sub-section E). The recurrence of these practices demonstrates the State's continued reliance on an established system of repression, including the use of the Judiciary as part of the repressive apparatus, sustained by the persistent lack of accountability that enables such violations to continue unabated.

1. Arrests of women human rights defenders and activists, conditions of detention, including death in detention

"After each wave of protests or movement-building, space closes further as activists are arrested or forced into exile, though organizing efforts slowly resume over time."

Woman human rights defender, 2025⁵⁸⁴

318. Women human rights defenders and activists continued to be threatened, arrested and detained for their advocacy, or for sharing photos, expressions or opinions online or offline, which were critical, or perceived as critical, of the State or State policies.⁵⁸⁵ Some were also subjected to digital threats and surveillance (see Section VIII, below).

319. For example, in 2025, a human rights defender recalled how they had been arrested after voicing opposition to the June 2025 hostilities and expressing views critical of the Government's response. The victim was then shoved into a vehicle, blindfolded, and subjected to sexualized threats, including of rape, before being placed in solitary confinement in a prison in Tehran.⁵⁸⁶ In another case, credible information indicated that a woman was arrested and sentenced to two years of imprisonment, with the evidence against her being a photo she had taken of the impact of the Israeli airstrikes in Tehran.⁵⁸⁷

320. More recently, in Mashhad, on 12 December 2025, during the memorial service of prominent Iranian lawyer Khosrow Alikordi, several women human rights defenders, were violently arrested, including Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Narges Mohammadi, Pouran Nazemei, and Aliye Motallebzadeh (see also Section V, above). During their arrest, plainclothes agents and IRGC Intelligence officers hit some with batons, punched and pushed others and used tear gas against them. The women were then transferred to a detention facility reportedly operated by the IRGC Intelligence and were not allowed to contact their families or lawyers until at least 15 December.⁵⁸⁸ In at least one case, repeated inquiries relating to the fate and whereabouts of the women to the IRGC and the Intelligence in Mashhad were ignored, and relatives received no information about them for several days. A total of 39

⁵⁸⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008381 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁵⁸⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006472 (FFMI Interview).
FFM-IRAN-D-008381 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁵⁸⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview).

⁵⁸⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-006472 (FFMI Interview).

⁵⁸⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008403 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008402 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008927 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008461 (FFMI Interview). See also "Grave Concerns Over Detainees' Safety Following Arrests at Slain Lawyer's Memorial, Center for Human Rights in Iran, 17 December 2025. See also "Calls for Immediate Release of Mashhad Civil Rights Activists," Iran Human Rights, 16 December 2025.

individuals had been arrested during the memorial service for chanting protest slogans, according to the Government.⁵⁸⁹

321. At least three of the women were released on bail between January and early February 2026.⁵⁹⁰ Ms. Mohammadi was sentenced in February 2026 to seven and a half years of imprisonment for “assembly and collusion against national security” and “propaganda against the state,” two years of internal exile and a two-year ban on travel, reportedly resulting in a total sentence of imprisonment of 44 years. Even though she has been taken to hospital at least twice since her arrest in December, her overall health continues to deteriorate.⁵⁹¹

2. Conditions of detention in Qarchak women’s prison, including denial of medical care

322. The Mission has previously reported instances of denial of medical care for both women and men arrested and detained in the context of the 2022-23 protests in detention facilities in Iran, including in Evin and Qarchak women’s prison.⁵⁹²

323. Credible human rights organizations have, over the years, consistently reported on the detention conditions in Qarchak, including overcrowding and unsanitary cells, with infestations, poor ventilation, extreme heat, inadequate access to clean water and food, and the authorities’ repeated denial of adequate medical care.⁵⁹³

324. As noted above, following the Israeli airstrikes on Evin prison compound on 23 June 2025, women prisoners were transferred from Evin to Qarchak prison. During the transfer, security forces handcuffed the women and instructed them to take all their belongings without informing them of their destination, before loading them onto buses (see section IV.B above).⁵⁹⁴ Once at Qarchak prison, the women were held in a building separate from the main prison structure, in a cell infested with insects, lice, ticks, and bedbugs. The women requested permission to contact their families but were denied any communication. When contact was eventually permitted, detainees were allowed only brief phone calls with their families.⁵⁹⁵ The women were returned to Evin prison in the week of 9 October 2025.⁵⁹⁶

Denial of medical care in Qarchak prison

325. Amongst those transferred was Somayeh Rashidi, arrested in April 2025 for writing protest slogans in Tehran, according to credible information. Her health had steadily declined since her arrest, and despite repeated requests for medical care raised by her family and fellow detainees, prison authorities did not provide adequate treatment.⁵⁹⁷ Reportedly, on 15

⁵⁸⁹ “39 people arrested in connection with “norm-breaking behavior” in Mashhad”, Mehr News Agency, 13 December 2025. See also Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Mission, dated 24 December 2025.

⁵⁹⁰ See “Aaliyeh Motalebzadeh, Iranian Photographer, Released on Bail from Detention”, Frontline Defenders, 14 January 2026; See also “Hasti Amiri released on bail” Shargh Daily, 23 January 2026. See also “Pouran Nazemi was released on bail” HRANA, 4 February 2026.

⁵⁹¹ “Narges Mohammadi Sentenced to Seven and a Half Years in Prison and Internal Exile”, Iran Wire, 9 February 2026.

⁵⁹² A/HRC/55/CRP.1, Section V. C. 4; A/HRC/58/CRP.1, para. 233.

⁵⁹³ “Iran: Three Prisoners Dead after Denied Medical Care” Human Rights Watch, 20 October 2025.” Qarchak Prison Report: Hell for Women and Children in Iran” Iran Human Rights 10 December 2024. Iran: Iran: Detained Activists Denied Medical Care Iran Human Rights Watch 13 December 2024; “Iran: In death’s waiting room: Deaths in custody following deliberate denial of medical care in Iran’s prisons”, Amnesty International, 2022. “Iran: Three Prisoners Dead after Denied Medical Care”, Human Rights Watch, 20 October 2025, “Iran: Detained Activists Denied Medical Care”, Human Rights Watch, 13 December 2024.

⁵⁹⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006149 (FFMI Interview). See also “While the World Watched the Sky, the Cells Went Dark!”, Campaign to Free Political Prisoners in Iran (CFPPI), 5 August 2025.

⁵⁹⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-006515 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006149 (FFMI Interview). See also “While the World Watched the Sky, the Cells Went Dark!”, Campaign to Free Political Prisoners in Iran (CFPPI), 5 August 2025.

⁵⁹⁶ “Mass transfer of female political prisoners from Qarchak Varamin Prison to Evin Prison”, HRANA, 9 October 2025. See also “Return of female prisoners for security crimes from Qarchak Prison to Evin”, ISNA, 13 October 2025.

⁵⁹⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008777 (FFMI Submission). See also “Somayah Rashidi Transferred to Evin Prison After Arrest and Beating by Security Forces”, HRANA, 1 May 2025.

September 2025, Ms. Rashidi suffered a seizure and was transferred to a hospital in a semi-conscious state, where doctors determined that the delay in her transfer to hospital had caused irreversible damage.⁵⁹⁸

326. Ms. Rashidi died in hospital on 25 September 2025. Later that day, the Judiciary's official news agency, Mizan, confirmed the death of a prisoner identified as "S.R.", who, it noted, had been "arrested for alleged association with MEK", adding that she had been "ill."⁵⁹⁹

327. Writing to protest Somayeh Rashidi's death in detention, 45 women political detainees in Qarchak prison issued a joint statement, calling on the authorities to release prisoners over 60 years old, as well as those whose health conditions are life-threatening. The statement noted that Ms. Rashidi repeatedly sought release on bail that had been set at an amount she was unable to pay. It added that despite "full knowledge" of her serious health condition, prison and judicial authorities did not release her for nearly five months, leading to her death. It further warned that other detainees faced similar risks, citing the "recent" deaths of two other prisoners in Qarchak, whose names were not made public by the State.⁶⁰⁰

328. Credible human rights organizations reported additional deaths in detention of women in Qarchak, reportedly linked to the denial of medical care. According to media reports, these include Soudabeh Asadi who reportedly died on 16 September 2025,⁶⁰¹ Jamileh Azizi who reportedly died on 19 Sept 2025,⁶⁰² and Farzaneh Bijanipour, who reportedly died on 12 January 2025.⁶⁰³ Denial of medical care and deaths in custody have also been reported in Fardis prison, Karaj. According to media reports, Maryam Shahraki died in this prison on 12 September 2025.⁶⁰⁴

State response

329. Despite increasing reports relating to women's deaths in detention being linked to denial or delay of medical care by state authorities in Qarchak Prison, there is no indication that any official investigation has been initiated to date.

330. In a letter addressed to the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran's HCHR confirmed that, following the Israeli airstrikes on the Evin prison compound on 23 June, women prisoners were transferred to Qarchak prison, stating that they benefited from "appropriate sanitary conditions and adequate health care and sanitation." The letter also acknowledged the deaths of three other women prisoners, whom it did not name, stating that "necessary medical care was provided," but that the Legal Medicine Forensic Organization has not announced the causes of death.⁶⁰⁵

3. Violent enforcement of the mandatory *hijab*

331. Though the "Hijab and Chastity" law remains unimplemented, the underlying discriminatory legal framework that allows for arrest, detention and criminal prosecution of women who refuse to wear the mandatory *hijab*, together with the state's demonstrated willingness to enforce compliance of the law, continue to produce the same gendered harms (see A/HRC/55/CRP.1, Section V).

332. Many women and girls across Iran continue to challenge the mandatory *hijab* laws and regulations by refusing to wear the *hijab* in public, keeping the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement alive. As evidenced in this document, women and girls' persistent demands for

⁵⁹⁸ Somayah Rashidi dies after delay in sending her to hospital, HRANA, 25 September 2025.

⁵⁹⁹ "Judiciary explains the death of female prisoner in prison; S.R. was already ill." Etemad Online, 25 September 2025. See also "Somayah Rashidi, a member of MEK, died in hospital", EghtesadOnline, 25 September 2025.

⁶⁰⁰ On file with the Mission.

⁶⁰¹ Iran: Death of prisoner Soudabeh Asadi in Qarchak Varamin marks third case of medical neglect in September", Hengaw, 26 September 2025.

⁶⁰² "Jamileh Azizi becomes third woman to die in Qarchak Varamin Prison in 9 months", Hengaw, 20 September 2025.

⁶⁰³ "Prisoner Dies in Iran After Denied Medical Care" Iran Wire, 13 January 2025.

⁶⁰⁴ "Kachouei Prison, Karaj: woman prisoner Maryam Shahraki dies due to medical negligence", Hengaw, 13 September 2025.

⁶⁰⁵ Report, Iran's High Council for Human Rights, 2 February 2026.

equality and non-discrimination remain largely unmet, and they are instead continuously punished for refusing to comply with laws and policies that are in and of themselves discriminatory. Gendered harms already perpetrated under the existing discriminatory legal framework, including mandatory *hijab* laws and regulations, risk being further exacerbated if the “Hijab and Chastity” law officially enters into force (see below).

333. The Mission notes that, on 3 February, the Government of Iran formally allowed women to obtain licenses to ride a motorcycle. Although, the law had not explicitly prohibited women from riding motorbikes, reportedly, in practice authorities did not issue licenses for doing so to women. The Government signed a resolution that mandates traffic police to “provide practical training to female applicants, organize an examination under the direct supervision of the police, and issue motorcycle driver’s licenses to women,” according to State affiliated media.⁶⁰⁶

a) Official statements and policies adopted in 2025

“If someone with an unconventional appearance refers to an office, they should not easily receive services, and necessary warnings must be given.”

Mohammad Hatamikia, the prosecutor for Ardestan (Isfahan), at a meeting of the city’s “chastity and hijab working group”⁶⁰⁷

334. On 4 March 2025, several members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly signed and placed a petition in front of the rostrum of the Parliament, demanding that the Speaker of the Assembly promulgate the “Hijab and Chastity” law.⁶⁰⁸

335. Consistent with previously documented patterns, the State continued to rely on state-sponsored vigilantism to enforce compliance with the mandatory *hijab* in public.⁶⁰⁹ For example, on 17 October 2025, Rouhollah Momeni-Nasab, head of Tehran’s Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, outlined plans for a “volunteer squad of *hijab* enforcers” by activating 80,000 “trained personnel,” in coordination with the prosecutor’s office and Iran’s cyber police.⁶¹⁰ Likewise, in late August, the Secretary of the Headquarters for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in Qom province, Mohammad Karbasi, announced the launch of specialized “inspection teams” to monitor compliance with mandatory *hijab* within State institutions. He added that any reports of non-compliance would be investigated, and institutions held accountable for “failures to uphold *hijab*-related duties.”⁶¹¹ Video footage published in May 2025, also showed that the “morality police” were patrolling in Isfahan and harassing women there for failing to comply with mandatory *hijab* laws.⁶¹²

336. State officials have also characterized those opposing the mandatory *hijab* as “enemies”, in an apparent effort to frame non-compliance as a security threat, rather than an exercise of protected rights. For example, on 16 March 2025, the Assembly of Experts, a deliberative body empowered to appoint and dismiss Iran’s Supreme Leader,⁶¹³ issued a statement urging officials to stand against “the enemy’s conspiracy to cause moral deviations,

⁶⁰⁶ “Official Notification of the Resolution on Issuing Motorcycle Licenses for Women”, Tabnak, 3 February 2026.

⁶⁰⁷ “We have no legal regulations against women riding motorcycles. There is no mercy for those who violate the rules”, ISNA, 19 October 2025.

⁶⁰⁸ “A group of parliamentarians signed a petition supporting the chastity and hijab law”, IRNA, 4 March 2025.

⁶⁰⁹ The Mission previously noted the establishment and deployment by the IRGC of the so-called “ambassadors of kindness” described as a “trained group” whose members would support enhanced monitoring and compliance with the mandatory *hijab* laws in public spaces, including at markets, parks, and in public transport. See also A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 20-22.

⁶¹⁰ “Establishment of a “Chastity and Hijab Status Room”/Training 80,000 Moderators in Tehran”, Khabar Online, 17 October 2025.

⁶¹¹ “Examining the status of chastity and hijab in executive institutions and agencies”, Hawzah News, 24 August 2025.

⁶¹² Social media post on file with the Mission.

⁶¹³ The Assembly of Experts consists of 88 “virtuous and learned” *mojtahed* (an authoritative interpreter of Islamic law and jurisprudence) elected by the public for an eight-year term. It is the deliberative body empowered to appoint and dismiss the Supreme Leader. See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 138.

especially in the area of chastity and *hijab*.”⁶¹⁴ The statement called on the authorities to “redouble their efforts” to expand Islamic culture and lifestyle, to “confront cultural norm-breaking, particularly the abandonment of *hijab*” and “resist the enemy’s schemes for moral corruption, particularly in the field of chastity and *hijab*.” Later, on 19 May 2025, the Secretary of the Headquarters for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in Iran, Hojjatolislam Mohammad Hossein Taheri, stated that “the enemy uses the *hijab*” to “attack the family unit.”⁶¹⁵ On 12 November 2025, the Head of the Judiciary, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, instructed prosecutors to work with security forces and the police to identify what he referred to as “enemy groups linked to foreigners” involved in “social irregularities.”⁶¹⁶

337. State officials continued to frame non-compliance as a civic responsibility shared by the wider community. On 28 June 2025, the deputy head of the Headquarters for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, Ali Taghavi, warned that “unveiling” is not superficial but affects the economy, family, culture, and politics, and its promotion can “lead to the collapse of social foundations.” He further stressed that “immodesty and unveiling” are urgent issues with direct social and cultural consequences.⁶¹⁷

338. In December, the head of the Judiciary announced instructions for the police, intelligence bodies, and prosecutors to confront non-adherence to mandatory *hijab*.⁶¹⁸

Harassment, arrests, detention, criminal prosecution of women and girls for non-compliance with mandatory hijab

339. Video footage reviewed, analyzed and preserved by the Mission showed women and girls harassed by state officials and private individuals for not complying with the mandatory *hijab* laws in public, with some also beaten on the street for alleged non-compliance.

340. For example, video footage published on 4 August 2025, showed a man violently attacking a woman whose *hijab* had slipped from her head, kicking her from behind and knocking her to the ground.⁶¹⁹ On the same day, the FARAJA commander for Gachsaran, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad province, Arsalan Khademian, confirmed the man’s arrest but claimed he suffered from a “mental disorder” and that the incident had “no connection whatsoever to the issue of *hijab* compliance.”⁶²⁰

341. On 26 August 2025, the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Fars province announced the arrest of an individual who had filmed and circulated a video depicting a physical altercation between a woman wearing a *hijab* and two teenage girls described as wearing “inappropriate clothing.” The prosecutor stated that the woman had attempted to “promote virtue and prevent vice” but was insulted and assaulted by the girls, resulting in a public disturbance. Authorities launched an investigation to identify and arrest the person who recorded and shared the video, as well as those who allegedly “incited” the incident. Following the video’s publication, the police summoned and arrested the two girls, and the case was referred for further investigation. The prosecutor added that both girls expressed regret and that their prior “psychiatric hospitalization” was confirmed through medical records.⁶²¹ The Mission notes that State authorities, including the Judiciary, have previously sought to explain the refusal of women and girls to wear the mandatory *hijab* as being a symptom of a “mental disorder.”⁶²²

⁶¹⁴ “Enemies are attempting to create a culture of norm-breaking among women and girls.” ISNA, 16 March 2025.

⁶¹⁵ “Laying the foundations for the mission of good deeds is a move towards religious sovereignty”, Mehr News, 19 May 2025.

⁶¹⁶ “Anyone who knowingly puts pressure on people’s livelihoods is an agent of the enemy”, IRNA, 12 November 2025.

⁶¹⁷ “Enjoining good and forbidding evil is a neglected obligation that must be revived in society.”, Hawzah News, 10 September 2025.

⁶¹⁸ “Ejei: Unveiling must not continue”, Shargh Daily, 4 December 2025.

⁶¹⁹ Social media post on file with the Mission.

⁶²⁰ “Arrest of the assailant of a woman in Gachsaran.”, ISNA, 5 August 2025.

⁶²¹ “The individual responsible for producing and publishing the video clip of the altercation in front of a commercial center in Fasa was arrested.” ISNA, 27 August 2025.

⁶²² A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 1286-1289. See also A/HRC/58/CRP.1, para. 14.

342. The mandatory *hijab* laws and regulations impose undue restrictions on women athletes, with many choosing to forego the *hijab* despite State requirements to wear it when competing in public.⁶²³ For example, according to open source material, on 9 November 2025, a taekwondo athlete and gymnastic coach, was arrested by intelligence officers for performing in public without *hijab* in Tehran city. Allegedly, she had been taken to an undisclosed location and only allowed a brief call to her family.⁶²⁴ In December 2025, two organizers of a sports event on Kish Island, Hormozgan province, were reportedly arrested after images circulated online showing women participants competing without the mandatory *hijab*.⁶²⁵

Criminal prosecution

343. On 4 April 2025, the Secretary of the Headquarters of the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Headquarters in Isfahan province, Hojjatoleslam Mohsen Mozaheri reported that during Nowruz (Iran's New Year, March 2025) more than 97,500 public warnings were issued for non-compliance. He added that implementing these "cultural and value-based projects" during Nowruz is a step towards "strengthening religious and moral values in Iran."⁶²⁶

344. Credible information and open-source material indicated that during the reporting period, women not wearing the mandatory *hijab* continued to receive "warnings" in the form of text messages on their personal mobile phones. According to copies of text messages obtained by the Mission, women in Tehran, Gilan and Isfahan provinces have been photographed by unknown individuals and subsequently received "warnings," in the form of text messages on their mobile phones from the police, threatening them with legal action for non-compliance with the mandatory *hijab* laws.⁶²⁷

345. In August 2025, according to open-source material, a woman human rights defender, was sentenced to three years in prison and a fine of 3.3 million tomans for her activism against the death penalty, and for "appearing in public without a mandatory *hijab*."⁶²⁸

346. According to media reports, on 6 March 2025, a case was initiated against the organizers of the closing ceremony of the Third Journalism Awards in Tehran after several women attending the event appeared without the mandatory *hijab*. Authorities reported investigations against both the organizers and the women for non-complying with the mandatory *hijab* laws.⁶²⁹ Already on the next day 7 March, another case was initiated against the organizers of a public event in Tehran, after a picture of some women not wearing the mandatory *hijab* was published on the Internet.⁶³⁰

4. Other rights impacted

Denial of services

347. In March 2025, the Public Prosecutor of Isfahan directed State institutions providing services such as municipalities and cultural heritage organizations to deny access to tourist sites for women not wearing the mandatory *hijab*. He also ordered that warning signs regarding wearing the mandatory *hijab* be installed at the entrances to tourist locations.⁶³¹

⁶²³ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 266, 1476.

⁶²⁴ "Taekwondo athlete Hanieh Shariati Roudposhti arrested for performing without compulsory hijab", Hengaw, 10 November 2025. See also "Iran Arrests Gymnastics Coach Over Public Performance Without Headscarf", Iran Wire, 10 November 2025.

⁶²⁵ "Arrest of two main organizers of the Kish marathon", Mashregh News, 6 December 2025 See also "Iran arrests marathon organisers over women not wearing hijab" BBC, 6 December 2025.

⁶²⁶ From 97,000 warnings to awarding 400 gifts for observing Islamic codes of conduct during the Nowruz holidays.", Hawzeh News, 4 April 2025.

⁶²⁷ FFM-00577 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008874 (FFMI Submission).

⁶²⁸ "Hasti Amiri Sentenced to Prison, Fine, and Additional Punishments", HRANA, 18 August 2025.

⁶²⁹ "Judicial action against agents and norm-breakers present at the journalists' event", Mizan Online, 7 March 2025.

⁶³⁰ "Police dealing with violators of the 12th Interior Design Ceremony", Fars News, 7 March 2025.

⁶³¹ "Isfahan Prosecutor: Travel Bureau is the guarantor of protecting travelers' rights and a factor in the province's economic development", Mizan Online, 22 March 2025; FFM-IRAN-D-008784 (FFMI Submission).

348. Credible information, video footage and open-source material collected by the Mission indicated that State institutions continued to deny women services, including medical care, for not wearing the mandatory *hijab*. According to credible information, women detainees were denied family visits and access to a prison medical clinic because they refused to comply.⁶³²

349. Video footage collected by the Mission showed that women were denied postal and bank services between March and April 2025.⁶³³ According to a credible human rights organization, ten students were expelled from Sohanak Azad University in Tehran for posting critical remarks online, non-compliance with the mandatory *hijab* and not fasting during Ramadan.⁶³⁴

Closure of businesses

350. Consistent with previously established patterns, businesses continued to be closed for providing services to women who did not comply with the mandatory *hijab* laws.⁶³⁵

351. According to Iranian media, over 50 establishments, including cafes, restaurants, wedding halls, and clothing boutiques, were closed by the authorities between late June and early September 2025 under the pretext of serving women without the *hijab* in several cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, Dezful, Hamedan and Kashan.⁶³⁶ Closures of food courts and grocery stores in Teheran were also reported.⁶³⁷ On 11 June 2025, the head of the Public Places Supervision Department (*Amaken*) of Gilan Province, announced issuing closure warrants of 42 coffee shops and restaurants in Rasht due to violations of “social norms.”⁶³⁸

Vehicle confiscation

352. Credible information, video footage and open-source material obtained and analyzed by the Mission indicated that women had their vehicles confiscated for non-compliance with the mandatory *hijab* in 2025.⁶³⁹

353. According to credible information, in May 2025, the police sent a text message to a woman warning her that she had been identified without the mandatory *hijab* in public for the fifth time, and that she had 48 hours to arrange (via the police website) for her vehicle to be impounded for two weeks at a parking facility designated by the police. It further stated that failure to comply would result in the police seizing her vehicle.⁶⁴⁰

354. Likewise, video footage published on 19 May 2025 showed a woman filming as the police were, reportedly, about to impound her car. In the video, she is heard saying: “We don’t have gas, we don’t have anything, and they are taking away our car for *hijab* non-compliance.”⁶⁴¹

355. According to Iranian media, private individuals have been increasingly reporting on women not wearing the mandatory *hijab*. Reportedly, since March 2025, women in some larger cities received text messages warning them of having allegedly failed to comply with mandatory *hijab* laws in public.⁶⁴² Messages were also reported to have been sent to their male relatives, informing them that women “assigned” to them had been seen without a *hijab* on the street. The notifications did not note the time, location, or evidence, of the alleged

⁶³² FFM-IRAN-D-006021 (FFMI Submission).

⁶³³ Social media post on file with the Mission.

⁶³⁴ Social media post on file with the Mission.

⁶³⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008970 (FFMI Investigation note); “Iran’s New Tactics to Crush Mandatory Hijab Resistance: Business Raids and Surveillance”, Center for Human Rights in Iran, 15 October 2025.

⁶³⁶ “20 cafes and restaurants were sealed”, Eghtesad Online, 8 September 2025.

⁶³⁷ “Food court and several hypermarkets sealed due to lack of hijab (video)”, Asr Iran, 18 May 2025, “Several trade unions in Tehran were sealed off due to non-compliance with the hijab”, HRANA, 24 April 2025.

⁶³⁸ “Issuance of closure warnings for 42 non-compliant cafe-restaurants in Rasht.” Diyar Mirza, 11 June 2025.

⁶³⁹ See A/HRC/58/CRP.1 paras. 46-51.

⁶⁴⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-006135 (FFMI Submission).

⁶⁴¹ Social media post on file with the Mission.

⁶⁴² “Continued sending of “Hijab Discovery” text messages and one-week impoundment of vehicles”, Entekhab, 2 May 2025.

“offense”, and some women reported receiving messages while at home even though they had not been out in public.⁶⁴³

Electronic surveillance

356. The Mission previously documented the far-reaching use of technology by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to monitor women’s and girls’ compliance with the mandatory *hijab* laws. This included expanding the coverage of CCTV cameras, the use of mobile applications to monitor compliance in public, and the reported use of artificial intelligence to monitor and identify women not wearing the mandatory *hijab* on the street or in vehicles.

357. On 8 April 2025, the Head of the Tehran Municipality Traffic Control Company, Hamid Baradaran, announced that by the end of the [Persian] year (March 2026), 15,000 additional video surveillance cameras would be installed in Tehran as part of a broader plan to “make Tehran smart” and strengthen monitoring capacity.⁶⁴⁴

358. In October 2025, according to a credible organization, the “Nazer” smart phone application was updated and technically optimized to improve efficiency.⁶⁴⁵ As previously documented by the Mission, “Nazer” enables individuals vetted by the State to monitor and report on women’s compliance with the mandatory *hijab* on the street, in their vehicle, or in public transport.⁶⁴⁶ Once users report a “violation” into the system, the application generates a text message in real time to the registered owner of the vehicle, warning them that they had been found to be in violation of the mandatory *hijab* laws and that the vehicle would be impounded for ignoring the warning.⁶⁴⁷

359. On 1 May 2025, according to Iranian media, women pedestrians in Tehran and Mashhad reported receiving notifications saying they had been seen in public without “legal attire” urging them to comply with the mandatory *hijab* laws.⁶⁴⁸

360. Credible information further indicated the coordinated use of sophisticated tracking technology like IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) catchers,⁶⁴⁹ contactless card readers and surveillance cameras used by several law enforcement, security, judicial, and cultural institutions in Isfahan to identify and track women for non-compliance with the mandatory *hijab*.⁶⁵⁰

5. Continuous lack of domestic legal protection

361. As the Mission previously found, the Islamic Republic of Iran relies on a legal system and its enforcement that fundamentally discriminate on the grounds of gender, with far-reaching impact on women and girls’ rights to bodily autonomy freedom of expression, freedom of religion or belief, and a wide range of economic, social and cultural rights, including access to education and work.⁶⁵¹

362. The absence of comprehensive and effective legislation addressing violence against women and girls means that, survivors face ongoing barriers to protection and redress, and institutional responses remain insufficient, reinforcing patterns of impunity for violence against women and girls.

⁶⁴³ “Sending text messages to the father and husband of women who do not observe *hijab*”, Etelaat, 1 May 2025.

⁶⁴⁴ “15,000 video surveillance cameras to be added to Tehran by the end of the year”, ISNA, 9 April 2025.

⁶⁴⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008971 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁶⁴⁶ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 1183, 1184. See also A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 46-51.

⁶⁴⁷ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, para. 51.

⁶⁴⁸ “From Isfahan to Tehran: A report on the start of sending *hijab* SMS messages to women pedestrians in Tehran”, Hammihan Online, 1 May 2025.

⁶⁴⁹ IMSI is a device that mimics cell towers to intercept mobile signals and identify users in specific areas for tracking.

⁶⁵⁰ “A Battlefield Named Isfahan: Targeted Use of IMSI-Catchers and Surveillance Cameras to the Enforce Chastity and Hijab Law”, Filter Watch, 17 April 2025.

⁶⁵¹ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 276-284, 285-290. 312-314. 296-302. 303-311. 315-316.

Bill on “Safeguarding Women’s Dignity and Supporting Women and Families”

363. Iranian women’s rights activists have long called for legislation to protect women and girls from violence. The information below is based on interviews with witnesses and credible information received by a human rights organization.⁶⁵²

364. After various revisions over the years, in early 2017, a draft bill aimed at preventing domestic violence and criminalizing violence against women was sent to the Judiciary by the executive branch for review. More than two years later, a revised draft bill was submitted to the Government by the Judiciary on 16 September 2019. A total of 40 of the original 91 Articles had been removed by the Judiciary, and the title of the bill changed from “Bill for the Protection of Women against Violence” to “Bill for the Protection, Dignity and Security of Women against Violence.”⁶⁵³

365. After multiple subcommittee sessions and main committee sessions, the bill was approved by the cabinet on 3 January 2021 and sent to Parliament with “urgent” status. Parliament delayed acknowledging receipt for five months but finally did so on 19 May 2021 and referred it to the Judicial and Legal Committee.⁶⁵⁴

366. Since then, the bill has undergone several substantive revisions. As the spokesperson for the Women’s Faction reportedly announced in September 2020, during a session held with experts from Parliament’s Research Center, the Judiciary, and the Islamic Research Center in Qom, the strengths and weaknesses of the bill, its underlying approach, and the choice of terminology were examined. It was agreed that a joint commission would be formed to resolve the formal and substantive challenges of the bill so it could be presented to the open session of Parliament with minimal issues.⁶⁵⁵

367. The Mission examined the second draft of the bill titled “Protection, Dignity and Security of Women Against Violence” (2017) and its third and last draft retitled as the bill on “Prevention of Harm against Women and Increasing Women’s Security in the Face of Mistreatment” (2023). The text of the first draft of the bill (2012) appears to not have been made public, however, according to credible information, the provisions were aimed at providing support to women who were victims or at risk of violence and preventing violence against them.⁶⁵⁶

368. In 2017, a revised bill was submitted to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, where it underwent further substantial changes. Parliament removed provisions establishing shelters for survivors, eliminated specific penal provisions addressing rape, requiring such cases to be prosecuted under adultery (*zina*) laws instead, and replaced the concept of “violence” with the more limited term “harm.” The bill’s focus shifted significantly, portraying women primarily “as beings who are betrayed and vulnerable” rather than as rights-holders entitled to protection.⁶⁵⁷

369. The last version of the bill, dated 8 February 2023, omitted to define or even mention the term “violence.”⁶⁵⁸ Instead, it used *misconduct*, defined as any criminal act causing harm to women’s bodies, minds, dignity, or legal rights. A key clause required all protective measures to be centered on the family, aligned with Islamic ethics, and reinforcing women’s maternal roles.⁶⁵⁹ This bill focused not on all women experiencing violence but instead on “vulnerable” women and girls, including those who are orphaned. It removed portions of the progressive content contained in earlier drafts and introduced regressive provisions that

⁶⁵² FFM-IRAN-D-FFMI-00668 (FFMI Submission). See also “Supporting Women Against Violence: A Bill That Failed to Pass Under Five Administrations”, Femena, 9 March 2026.

⁶⁵³ FFM-IRAN-D-FFMI-00668 (FFMI Submission). See also AL IRN 25/2020, 3 November 2020.

⁶⁵⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-FFMI-00668 (FFMI Submission). See also “Supporting Women Against Violence: A Bill That Failed to Pass Under Five Administrations”, Femena, 9 March 2026.

⁶⁵⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-FFMI-00668 (FFMI Submission).

⁶⁵⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-FFMI-00668 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008318 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008907 (FFMI Investigation note)

⁶⁵⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-FFMI-00668 (FFMI Submission).

⁶⁵⁸ “The bill to enhance women’s security was revealed”, ISNA, 8 February 2023. See also A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 294.

⁶⁵⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-FFMI-00668 (FFMI Submission). See also “Iran: Adopt Draft Law to Protect Women: As Outrage Against Abuses Grows, Fix Bill’s Major Gaps and Pass It”, Human Rights Watch, 4 December 2020.

reinforced traditional gender stereotypical roles. These changes include mandating gender-differentiated education with a strong emphasis on religious and moral upbringing, requiring state affiliated media and the Ministry of Culture to promote women's roles within the family, and prioritizing vocational training for low-income men as a means of "reducing misconduct."⁶⁶⁰ The bill also restricted police and social workers from entering homes without permission, even in life-threatening situations, allowed courts to replace punishments with "supplementary measures" when the perpetrator is the woman's father, mother, or husband, and rendered some offenses "forgivable," if committed by male family members. The bill failed to adopt a broad definition covering economic, sexual, and coercive control, and did not extend protections to cover marital rape or include all forms of intimate or family relationships. The bill provides that in cases in which a father or husband is accused, the authorities should refer the case for mediation for a month, returning the case to the Judiciary if it is not resolved.⁶⁶¹

370. In around May or June 2025, Parliament removed additional provisions of the bill pertaining to establishing penalties for acts of coercive or dangerous violence against women, including violence by a spouse. Unlike the original bill, which sought to address forms of violence leading to injuries such as a torn lip or a broken tooth, the new text considered only those forms of assault and battery that resulted in the loss of a limb, as requiring punishment.⁶⁶²

371. In June 2025, the Pezeshkian administration withdrew the bill from Parliament. Zahra Behrouz-Azar, Vice President for Women and Family Affairs, described the reason for this decision as due to "fundamental changes to the spirit of the bill."⁶⁶³ In December 2025, a member of the "Women and Family Faction" of Parliament announced a special follow-up effort to complete and finalize the bill in Parliament.⁶⁶⁴

372. On 4 January 2026, however, Zahra Behroz, Vice President for Women and Family Affairs stated that, considering substantive alterations made to the bill the government has formally submitted a letter to Parliament requesting its withdrawal. She explained that, following consultations between the President and the Speaker of Parliament, it was agreed that the formal acknowledgment of receipt of this request would be temporarily deferred to allow additional time for further review and for the bill to be realigned with its original objectives and underlying considerations. She further noted that should the amendments proposed by the Government not be incorporated into the text, and should the bill fail to advance its intended purposes, the withdrawal request would be pursued definitively. She further stated: "The government's position is clear, and the principal objectives of the bill, namely, the establishment of a comprehensive mechanism for the prevention of violence and the promotion of women's security and dignity must be realized."⁶⁶⁵

Law on Protecting the Family through the Promotion of the Culture of Chastity and Hijab

373. The Mission has previously examined the Law on Protecting the Family through the Promotion of the Culture of Chastity and Hijab" (the "Hijab and Chastity" law).⁶⁶⁶

374. The Mission had expressed concerns with respect to this law regarding lack of legal certainty, criminalization of expression, discrimination, potential violations of due process and the right to life. The Mission further noted official statements indicating that the law was set to enter into force on 13 December 2024. At the time of writing, however, the "Hijab and Chastity" law had not yet been signed by the President.

375. On 13 May 2025, Deputy Prime Minister, Mohammad Reza Aref, announced that the Government is still revising the law, noting that any legislation on *hijab* must align with the

⁶⁶⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-FFMI-00668 (FFMI Submission).

⁶⁶¹ FFM-IRAN-D-FFMI-00668 (FFMI Submission).

⁶⁶² FFM-IRAN-D-FFMI-00668 (FFMI Submission).

⁶⁶³ "Pezeshkian send bill to parliament to protect women's dignity against violence", Mehr News, 1 June 2025.

⁶⁶⁴ "Latest status of the Women's Protection Bill", Shargh Daily, 14 December 2025.

⁶⁶⁵ "Final Withdrawal of the 'Women's Security Bill' to the Government in the Event of Failure to Amend Its Provisions in Parliament", ILNA, 4 January 2026.

⁶⁶⁶ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 57 ff.

“dignity and values” of Iran, the people, and the Constitution.⁶⁶⁷ On 25 May 2025, the Speaker of Iran’s Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, stated that the Supreme National Security Council had formally directed Parliament not to promulgate the “Hijab and Chastity law” at this time.⁶⁶⁸

B. Death penalty against women

376. The lack of comprehensive laws on violence against women, including on criminalization of marital rape, or protection for domestic violence, further compounds the risk of women receiving disproportionate sentences, including capital punishment, and further hinders women’s right to a fair trial within the Iranian judicial system. Other laws that may exacerbate disproportionately the impact on women in the context of trial proceedings resulting in the death penalty, include those on divorce, the lower age of criminal responsibility for girls, and inheritance.⁶⁶⁹

377. Two credible human rights organizations jointly recorded that at least 48 women were executed in Iran in 2025, including 32 for murder and 16 for drug-related offences.⁶⁷⁰

378. The data constitutes a significant increase from the data reported for 2024 and previous years in a public report by a credible human rights organization, when at least 31 executions were reported for 2024.⁶⁷¹ In a retrospective review of the application and imposition of the death penalty to women and girls in Iran from 2010 to 2024 conducted by a credible human rights organization recorded that at least 241 women were executed during these fourteen years.⁶⁷² The study found that, as in 2025, most women executed between 2010 and 2024 were executed for murder-related offences, with drug-related convictions a close second.⁶⁷³ In 2025, at least 48 women were executed, an increase compared to 2024 (when 31 women were executed).

1. Executions related to the *qisas* crime of murder

379. In murder cases, as in some other bodily injury cases, the State places the responsibility on the victim’s family to determine the appropriate response to the crime. Under the *Regulatory Code on Sentences of Qisas, Stoning, Crucifixion, Execution, and Flogging*, the victim’s family may demand execution (*qisas*), accept “blood money” (*diya*),

⁶⁶⁷ “Aref: The belief of the government and the president is to implement election slogans and promises”, Mizan Online, 13 May 2025.

⁶⁶⁸ “Qalibaf: The Supreme National Security Council has announced in writing that the hijab law will not be promulgated”, IRNA, 25 May 2025.

⁶⁶⁹ “Women and the Death Penalty in Iran: A Gendered Perspective”, Iran Human Rights, 2025. See also A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 285-295, ft 1343.

⁶⁷⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008826 (FFMI Communication); FFM-IRAN-D-008967 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁶⁷¹ “Iran Human Rights and ECPM Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2024”, Iran Human Rights, 2025.

⁶⁷² “Women and the Death Penalty in Iran: A Gendered Perspective”, Iran Human Rights, 2025.

⁶⁷³ In particular, 114 of the women that were executed had been sentenced to *qisas* (retribution-in-kind) for murder, 107 for drug-related offences, 4 for security-related charges of *moharebeh* (enmity against God) and *efsad-fil-arz* (corruption on earth), 9 were children forced into marriage; three of them were also child offenders. See “Iran Human Rights and ECPM Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2024”, Iran Human Rights, 2025.

or request that the defendant be granted a full pardon.⁶⁷⁴ The next-of-kin, most commonly the victim's father, may personally carry out the sentence or appoint a representative to do so.⁶⁷⁵

380. Where the family of a murder victim chooses *qisas* over *diya* or forgiveness, the death penalty is mandatory. The Penal Code provides for exemptions skewed in favour of men, including where the perpetrator is the victim's father or paternal grandfather, or where a man kills his spouse and another man with whom she engaged in an act of adultery.⁶⁷⁶ Conversely, given the absence of legal protection for domestic or other forms of gender-based violence in Iran as discussed above, a woman who murders her spouse in self-defence or after enduring sustained domestic violence, faces the death sentence, unless the victim's family chooses blood money or forgiveness, and there is no exemption available. The Head of Judiciary sets an annual indicative amount for *diya* based on inflation and other considerations, but the victim's family can choose their own amount. They can demand a lower or higher amount than the Judiciary's indicative number but crucially, no upper limit is set. The *diya* indicative amounts, which are determined every March, were set at 1.2 billion tomans (USD 12,000) for a Muslim man, and half of this amount for a Muslim woman, in March 2024, a 33 per cent increase compared to the previous year.⁶⁷⁷ The amount set by families is usually higher than the indicative amount and even the indicative amount is higher than what most families can afford.⁶⁷⁸ In 2024, at least eight people were executed because they could not afford to pay the "blood money." In 2025, the amount for *diya* increased to 1.6 billion tomans (USD 16,000).⁶⁷⁹

381. It is worth noting that a perpetrator may still be subject to execution if the victim's family does not request *qisas*, where the *diya* amount set by the family exceeds what the perpetrator is able to pay.⁶⁸⁰

382. For example, Goli Kouhkan, a 25-year-old Baluch woman, without a birth certificate, was set to be executed in December 2024. She had been forced into marriage at the age of 12 to her cousin and subjected to years of physical and psychological violence. At the age of 13, she gave birth at home without medical care. In May 2018, when Ms. Kouhkan was 18 years old, her husband beat both her and their five-year-old son. After a relative was called to help, a confrontation ensued which resulted in her husband's death. She was convicted of murder and sentenced to death because she had been unable to pay the 10 billion tomans (USD 100,000) *diya* set by his family.⁶⁸¹

383. In December 2025, UN special procedures mandate holders called for urgent intervention to halt her execution.⁶⁸² In late December, the death penalty of Ms. Kouhkan was revoked, and she was released.⁶⁸³

⁶⁷⁴ Article 2, Regulatory Code on Sentences of Qisas, Stoning, Crucifixion, Execution, and Flogging, adopted 19 September 1999. See also A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 285-290. Article 221 of the Islamic Penal Code criminalizes *zina*, which is defined as sexual intercourse of a man and a woman who are not married to each other, provided that the sexual intercourse is not done by mistake. Note 1 considers that sexual intercourse occurs when the sex organ (penis) of a man, up to the point of circumcision, enters into the vagina or anus of a woman. Article 224 of the Islamic Penal Code provides for the death penalty as a punishment for *zina* in cases of forbidden relations such as a relationship between a non-Muslim man with a Muslim woman, and death by stoning in cases of adultery.

⁶⁷⁵ Article 15, Regulatory Code on Sentences of Qisas, Stoning, Crucifixion, Execution, and Flogging, adopted 19 September 1999, Article 15.

⁶⁷⁶ Articles 301 and 302, Iran Penal Code.

⁶⁷⁷ "Diyah rate for 1403 announced", Mizan News, 16 March 2024. See also Article 550 from Iran's Penal Code.

⁶⁷⁸ "Iran Human Rights and ECPM Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2024", Iran Human Rights, 2025.

⁶⁷⁹ "Diyah rate for 1404 announced", Mizan News, 12 March 2025.

⁶⁸⁰ "Iran Human Rights and ECPM Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2024", Iran Human Rights, 2025.

⁶⁸¹ "Victim of Child Marriage Faces Execution in Iran," Center for Human Rights in Iran, 13 November 2025. See also "Child Bride on Death Row in Iran Appeals for Help to Avoid Execution", Iran Wire, 11 August 2025.

⁶⁸² Iran must halt execution of Goli Kouhkan domestic violence survivor: UN experts, 2 December 2025.

⁶⁸³ "Goli Kouhkan was forgiven + film", Mashregh News, 9 December 2025.

2. Security-related execution

384. The Mission has previously reported on the cases of women convicted and sentenced to death for security-related offenses, namely “armed rebellion” (*baghi*) in connection with their activism and/or support to the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement. The Mission previously found that the Government had escalated the use of the death penalty against women activists.⁶⁸⁴

385. These include the cases of Kurdish women’s rights activist Pakhshan Azizi;⁶⁸⁵ and of Varisheh Moradi,⁶⁸⁶ whose sentence was overturned by Iran’s Supreme Court on 10 December 2025 and her case sent for retrial;⁶⁸⁷ and labour rights activist Sharifeh Mohammadi,⁶⁸⁸ whose sentence was ultimately commuted to 30 years’ imprisonment in October 2025.⁶⁸⁹

386. In another case, according to credible sources, Zahra Shahbaz Tabari, a retired engineer from the Gilan Regional Electricity Company, was arrested in April 2025 in Rasht and sentenced to death at the end of October 2025 in a short video trial in which she was struggling to hear the judge. UN independent experts have noted that the case against her “involve[d] no intentional killing and contain numerous procedural violations” and thus “to execute Tabari under these circumstances would constitute arbitrary execution.”⁶⁹⁰ Ms. Tabari’s sentence was overturned by the Supreme Court in January 2026.⁶⁹¹

3. Executions on drug-related offences

387. As noted above, drug-related offences constitute the second most common category of executions and death sentences in Iran (see section VI), and in 2024, at least 12 women were reported to have been executed on such charges. According to credible information, drug-related cases involving women that result in the death penalty were marked by gross fair trial and due process violations, including denial of a lawyer of own choice, and in some instances trials that lasted only minutes.⁶⁹²

388. A witness, who spent five years between 2019 and 2024 in detention with other women who had been sentenced to death for drug-related offences, stated that some of those women had been sentenced to death for serving as a “cover” for men to transfer drugs, sometimes for their husbands or as a favour to a male family member.⁶⁹³ In some cases, women appear to have been sentenced to death despite having played less than a leading role, or no role at all, in the commission of the offence (see also Section VI, above).

389. For example, a Baluch widow, was executed on 15 November 2023. She had reportedly agreed to transport raw materials for cosmetics when she was arrested at a checkpoint for illegal drug possession.⁶⁹⁴ Another woman, a victim of child marriage, was executed on 11 April 2024. Reportedly, she had been arrested at the age of 19 years for drug-related offences with her husband in Zanjan. Reportedly, she was unaware that her husband was carrying drugs.⁶⁹⁵

⁶⁸⁴ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 139-142.

⁶⁸⁵ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 147-151.

⁶⁸⁶ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 152-156.

⁶⁸⁷ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 152-156. See also “Death Sentence of Varisheh Moradi Overturned”, HRANA, 10 December 2025. See also “The death sentence of Varisheh Moradi was overturned by the Supreme Court.” Kurdistan Human Rights Network, 10 December 2025.

⁶⁸⁸ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 143-146.

⁶⁸⁹ On file with the Mission.

⁶⁹⁰ “UN experts urge Iran to halt execution of a 67-year-old Iranian woman”, 23 December 2025.

⁶⁹¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008368 (FFMI Interview).

⁶⁹² FFM-IRAN-D-008372 (FFMI Interview). See also “Iran’s Mass Executions of Drug Offenders Are a Human Rights Emergency”, Centre for Human Rights in Iran, 16 April 2025.

⁶⁹³ FFM-IRAN-D-008372 (FFMI Interview).

⁶⁹⁴ “Women and the Death Penalty in Iran: A Gendered Perspective”, Iran Human Rights, 2025. See also “In a Forgotten Corner of Iran, a Baluchi Woman is Sentenced to Death”, Iran Wire, 31 March 2022.

⁶⁹⁵ “Women and the Death Penalty in Iran: A Gendered Perspective”, Iran Human Rights, 2025.

4. LGBTQ+ persons

390. As the Mission has previously reported, the Iran Penal Code provides for the death penalty for *lavat* (sodomy) and in certain cases *mosahegheh* (lesbian sex).⁶⁹⁶ As a credible source explained: “The criminalization of same sex relations has a significant chilling effect on the community in Iran, regardless of how frequently individuals are being investigated or prosecuted for such conduct; same sex conduct may still give rise to the death penalty. [...] LGBTQ+ persons are very fearful of the law and make them practically invisible.”⁶⁹⁷

5. Risk of death sentences for women human rights defenders and those opposing the mandatory *hijab*

391. Given the broad scope of national security offenses, which may incur the death penalty, there remains a serious risk that organized advocacy against the mandatory *hijab* could be prosecuted as a capital offence. This is because the vague formulation of national security offences leaves a wide margin of interpretation for judicial authorities. As noted above (See Section VI, above), Article 4 of the 2025 espionage law, criminalizes any act or cooperation in carrying out propaganda activities producing or publishing false news or any content that generally causes public fear or is against national security and provides that such conduct could amount to “corruption on earth”, giving rise to the death penalty. Such provisions may thus place women at risk for sending videos of themselves or others not wearing the mandatory *hijab* to media outlets and civil society organizations abroad, and thus be characterized as an act of espionage, invoking the death penalty (see Section VI, above).

392. When read together with the “Hijab and Chastity Law” which criminalizes the promotion or propagation of loosely defined acts such as “nudity”, “indecent”, “unveiling” or “bad dressing”, particularly where such conduct is alleged to involve collaboration with foreign media outlets or civil society organizations, this legislative framework enables morality-based conduct to be reframed as national security offences.⁶⁹⁸ Where such acts are further construed as threatening national security or as amounting to “corruption on earth” under Article 286 of the Islamic Penal Code, they may give rise to the imposition of the death penalty.

C. Femicide

393. Femicide, defined as “intentional killing with a gender-related motivation,”⁶⁹⁹ has been increasingly documented by UN entities and human rights organizations as a severe and systemic issue rooted in discriminatory laws, policies, practices, patriarchal norms on the grounds of gender, and structural gender inequality.⁷⁰⁰ In this context, femicide directly engages the State’s obligations under the right to life, including the duty to prevent killings, protect persons at risk, and ensure prompt, effective, and impartial investigations and accountability when such deaths occur.

394. Credible human rights organizations have documented an alarming increase in femicide in Iran since at least 2023.⁷⁰¹ These reports point to a continuous failure to prevent gender-based killings, or provide protection measures and effective legal remedies, contributing to an overall climate of impunity that prevails in Iran.

⁶⁹⁶ See A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 374-405.

⁶⁹⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008390 (FFMI Interview).

⁶⁹⁸ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 57-65.

⁶⁹⁹ The definition further distinguishes femicide (also referred to as feminicide in some contexts) from homicide, where gender may not be a factor. It is rooted in discrimination, unequal power relations, gender stereotypes, and harmful social norms. As the most extreme form of gender-based violence, femicide exists along a continuum of gender-based violence that occurs in private and public spaces, including intimate partner violence, sexual harassment, sexual violence, harmful practices, and trafficking. See “Five essential facts to know about femicide” UN WOMEN, 25 November 2024.

⁷⁰⁰ “Five essential facts to know about femicide”, UN WOMEN, 25 November 2024.

⁷⁰¹ Stop Femicide, Violence against women and girls, Annual report 2024. See also “Killed Because You Are a Woman—Violence Against Women in Iran Reaches New Heights”, Center for Human Rights in Iran, 6 January 2025.

1. Scope, scale and patterns of femicide cases

“While femicide has long been a problem, it has gained increased visibility over the past year due to civil society and media advocacy.”

Woman human rights defender⁷⁰²

Alarming increase of femicide cases

395. In her March 2025 report, the Special Rapporteur on Iran noted an apparent increase in femicide in Iran. She noted that at least 93 cases were reported in the first half of 2024, compared with 55 cases during the same period in 2023, and a total of at least 179 femicide cases were reported between January and December 2024.⁷⁰³

396. According to data by credible human rights organizations, at least 118 and up to 176 cases of femicide were documented in 2025.⁷⁰⁴ A credible organization recorded 28 such cases between 1 January and 16 November 2025 in Kurdistan province.⁷⁰⁵ By 5 December 2025, the number increased to at least 30 cases, including 16 killed in Kermanshah province, six in Ilam province, five in Kurdistan province, and three in West Azerbaijan province.⁷⁰⁶

397. The numbers are believed to be higher, however, as some deaths were believed to have gone unreported. This is because of lack of official data, combined with femicide cases being labeled by the media as “family disputes” instead of femicide.⁷⁰⁷ According to credible human rights organizations, common motives for femicide include “honour” crimes, rejection of marriage proposals, divorce proceedings, child marriage, and forced marriage. Such motives highlight how harmful social and gender norms along with legal frameworks intersect rendering women and girls particularly vulnerable to violence by men, including family members, sometimes with fatal consequences.⁷⁰⁸

Methods of killing

398. Based on credible information, the level of violence applied in femicide is often extreme. According to this information, in 2025, around 43 per cent of killings involved knives or blunt force, 29 per cent firearms, 12 per cent strangulation, 4 per cent burning, and 12 per cent mutilation or abandonment of the body. In more than half of the cases, extreme violence was used, suggesting punitive and demonstrative killings rather than spontaneous acts. Victims were predominantly young or middle-aged women: 14 percent were under 18, 36 percent were aged 18–30, and 32 percent were aged 30–45. Similar trends and methods of killing were reported in 2024. Geographically, cases were recorded across diverse provinces, indicating the widespread nature of gender-motivated killings.⁷⁰⁹

399. According to credible information, referring to femicides as “honour killings” obscures other underlying motives, such as preventing women from seeking greater independence, access to employment, or the right to divorce.⁷¹⁰ On the other hand, when a femicide is framed as an “honour killing,” Article 630 of Iran’s Penal Code may allow for the perpetrator to receive a reduced sentence. Moreover, “honour-based” narratives may also

⁷⁰² FFM-IRAN-D-008381 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁷⁰³ A/HRC/58/62, paras. 32.

⁷⁰⁴ See “176 femicides and systematic violations of women’s rights in Iran”, 2025 report, Hengaw, 25 November 2025. See also “Annual statistical report of the human rights conditions in Iran, HRANA, 26 December 2025.

⁷⁰⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008521 (FFMI Investigation note); “Annual report on violations against Kurdish women in Iran.” Kurdistan Human Rights Network, 5 December 2025.

⁷⁰⁶ “Annual report on violations against Kurdish women in Iran.”, Kurdistan Human Rights Network, 5 December 2025.

⁷⁰⁷ “176 femicides and systematic violations of women’s rights in Iran”, 2025 report, Hengaw, 25 November 2025.

⁷⁰⁸ “176 femicides and systematic violations of women’s rights in Iran”, 2025 report, Hengaw, 25 November 2025. See also “Killed Because You Are a Woman, Violence Against Women in Iran Reaches New Heights” Center for Human Rights in Iran, 5 January 2025.

⁷⁰⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008318 (FFMI Interview); “Stop Femicide, Violence against women and girls annual report” 2024.

⁷¹⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008521 (FFMI Investigation Note); FFM-IRAN-D-008318 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-00647 (FFMI Investigation note).

lead to societal approval of the perpetrator due to harmful societal gender norms. For example, according to credible information, the death of one woman was reported by her husband as an “honour killing”, even though she had reportedly experienced prolonged gender-based violence. Reportedly, her husband had forced her into prostitution, and when she refused, he killed her.⁷¹¹

Challenges and documentation

400. The Mission examined several cases of femicide based on open-source material. The cases below are illustrative of the gravity and scale of violence indicative of the gender-related motivation for the killing and also include cases of minority women. As illustrated below, the lack of meaningful investigations and accountability demonstrates a concerning degree of tolerance and leniency by the State in addressing femicide.

Fatemeh Soltani

401. In one such case reported in the media, on 16 April 2025, Fatemeh Soltani was stabbed 14 times and killed by her father in Eslamshahr, Tehran province. Family dispute dynamics involved Fatemeh’s attempts to gain financial independence, and to confront domestic violence.⁷¹² Reportedly, Mohammadreza Alizadeh, the commander of the Eslamshahr police, stated in remarks to the media that “this killing occurred as a result of the father’s anger over his daughter’s “independence”, adding that “the perpetrator turned himself in to the police after committing the crime.”⁷¹³ During initial interrogations, the father reportedly cited severe marital conflict and described the killing of his daughter as an act driven by revenge and a perceived sense of failure in his family life.⁷¹⁴

Elaheh Hosseinnejad

402. In another case reported in the media, on 25 May 2025, Elaheh Hosseinnejad, a 24-year-old woman from Eslamshahr, Tehran province, who reportedly participated in the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, disappeared after leaving her work place, and was found dead with multiple stab wounds on 4 June 2025.⁷¹⁵ The perpetrator allegedly attempted to rape the victim after offering her a ride and fatally stabbed her upon resistance. While authorities initially said the suspect killed the victim during a phone theft, recordings of interrogation videos suggested the perpetrator described the victim as “immoral” (shameless).⁷¹⁶ The Judiciary reportedly charged the perpetrator with murder, rape, abduction and “corruption on earth.”⁷¹⁷

Sogand Pakdel

403. Later, in June 2025, according to the media, Sogand Pakdel, a 25-year-old transgender woman and activist in Iran and a supporter of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, was shot and killed by her uncle at a family wedding in Fars province, in an alleged “honour killing”, as he, according to a credible human rights organization, viewed her gender identity and expression as a “disgrace.”⁷¹⁸ Despite prior threats from her family, Pakdel attended her

⁷¹¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008521 (FFMI Investigation Note); FFM-IRAN-D-00647 (FFMI Investigation note). “Killed Because You Are a Woman—Violence Against Women in Iran Reaches New Heights”, Center for Human Rights in Iran, 6 January 2025.

⁷¹² “My father slit my sister’s throat: the killing of Fatemeh Soltani as told by her brother,” Iran Wire, 22 April 2025.

⁷¹³ “Father Kills 18-Year-Old Daughter in Iranian Salon”, Iran Wire, 22 April 2025.

⁷¹⁴ “The killing of an 18-year-old girl by her father in Iran”, BBC Persian, 23 April 2025. “My father slit my sister’s throat: the killing of Fatemeh Soltani as told by her brother”, Iran Wire, 22 April 2025.

⁷¹⁵ “Iranian Woman Found Murdered After Suspicious Disappearance”, Iran Wire, 5 June 2025. See also “The body of Elaheh Hosseinnejad has been discovered and the killer has been arrested, Etemad Online, 5 June 2025.

⁷¹⁶ “Details of Elaheh Hosseinnejad murder announced/ Murder to steal a cell phone”, ISNA, 5 June 2025.

⁷¹⁷ “The murder of Elaheh Hosseinnejad: Contradictions, ambiguities, and public outcry” Hengaw, 8 June 2025.

⁷¹⁸ “Trans femicide in Fars province- Sognak Pakdel, young trans woman brutally killed by her uncle”, Hengaw, 23 July 2025.

cousin's wedding in her feminine appearance, where her uncle fatally shot her in the head. He later surrendered to the police and confessed to the crime. Pakdel had endured years of abuse by family members, including beatings, abduction, and death threats. She had been away after being threatened and ostracized by her family, while remaining active within Iran's transgender community.⁷¹⁹

Fatemeh Sheibani and Masoumeh Sheibani.

404. On 19 November 2025, according to the media, two Baluch sisters, Fatemeh Sheibani, 24-year-old, and Masoumeh Sheibani, 20-year-old, were fatally shot in the Noodzh district of Manoujan, Kerman province, by Fatemeh's husband ⁷²⁰ following a history of domestic violence and familial disputes. The husband reportedly shot Masoumeh in the head during an argument. Reportedly, the police issued a statement regarding the incident, but no investigations appear to have taken place since.⁷²¹

Kubra Rezaei

405. Reportedly, Kubra Rezaei, a 26-year-old Afghan woman in Iran disappeared in or around April 2025 in Tehran province. In June 2025, nearly 50 days after her disappearance, parts of her mutilated body were found in Tehran in a pile of trash. Authorities arrested two suspects in connection with the killing and reportedly blocked the funeral by withholding burial permits.⁷²² According to a public report, the perpetrator knew the victim.⁷²³ The police searched the home of the perpetrator and found the dismembered remains of her body, which had been dissolved in acid. The perpetrator initially denied the charge but later confessed, and stated he committed the crime after learning that the victim had been engaged.⁷²⁴

Maryam Eshaqi

406. According to media reports, on 5 June 2025, the body of Maryam Eshaqi, a 13-year-old Afghan girl, was found in a garden near Yekeh-Bagh village close to Qom. Although authorities reportedly officially ruled her death a suicide, her body is said to have shown multiple wounds and signs of strangulation, and eyewitnesses allegedly reported she was found hanging but with her feet touching the ground. Local sources alleged Maryam may have been sexually assaulted and that several workers were detained on suspicion, though no official investigation details have been released.

Farida Mohammadi

407. According to media reports, on 9 July 2025, Farida Mohammadi, a 15-year-old Afghan refugee disappeared on her way home. Her family reportedly declared her missing informing the police and the Afghan embassy in Tehran. There have been no official updates on her whereabouts.⁷²⁵

408. According to media reports, on 14 July 2025, a 25-year-old Afghan woman and her three young children were reportedly found murdered in their home in Tehran. Reportedly, the woman was stabbed with a sharp weapon, and her three children (two boys aged two and three and a five-year-old girl) were suffocated to death. Their bodies were discovered about

⁷¹⁹ Trans Woman Sogand Pakdel Killed by Uncle in Honor-Related Shooting, HRANA, 25 July 2025.

⁷²⁰ "Ongoing Femicide in Iran: Three Women Killed Within a Single Week", Radio Zamaneh, 30 November 2025. See also "A man in Kerman fatally shot his wife and her sister, HRANA, 30 November 2025.

⁷²¹ "Killing of Two Baluch Sisters in Noodzh: Fatemeh and Masoumeh Sheibani, Victims of Domestic Violence and Institutional Inaction" Stop Honor Killings, 25 November 2025.

⁷²² "Mutilated body of Afghan refugee woman, Kubra Rezaei, discovered in Tehran 50 days after disappearance," Hengaw, 9 June 2025.

⁷²³ "Ambiguity and 'silence' in the killing of Kobra Rezaei, an Afghan migrant girl in Tehran", BBC Persian, 12 June 2025.

⁷²⁴ "Brutal Murder of Kobra Rezaei: Remains Discovered in Iranian Man's Home" Hasht-E Subh Daily, 11 June 2025.

⁷²⁵ "Teen from Afghanistan reported missing in Tehran amid surge in migrant hostility", Kabul Now, 16 July 2025. See also "The disappearance of an Afghan teenage girl in Islamshahr", Radio Zamaneh, 15 July 2025.

10 days after the killings, when the neighbors alerted the police, alarmed by a foul smell and the family's prolonged absence.⁷²⁶

2. Lack of legal and institutional protection and state-enabled violence

*"The legal framework and its implementation create space for femicide."*⁷²⁷

Member of a civil society organization

409. Femicide as the most extreme form of gender-based violence in Iran must be understood against a backdrop of deeply entrenched and systemic discrimination on the grounds of gender, that shapes everyday life for women, girls, and LGBTQ+ persons.⁷²⁸

3. Legal framework

Iran's Penal Code

410. Iran's Penal Code creates conditions in which gender-based killings are enabled and go unpunished. Central to this is the unequal valuation of women's lives under the *qisas* system, whereby the legal consequences for killing a woman are substantially less than for killing a man. Under Article 367 of Iran's Penal Code, a male perpetrator of a female victim can avoid execution by paying half the required "blood money" to the victim's family. In contrast, a woman who kills a man may face execution without such prerequisites, revealing stark gender inequality in criminal responsibility and punishment.⁷²⁹

411. Other provisions of the Islamic Penal Code enable impunity for gender-based killings. Articles 302 and 303 exempt a perpetrator from punishment if the victim is deemed "deserving" of death, a provision historically used to justify the killing of women accused of offences such as prostitution.⁷³⁰ According to analysis by credible sources, Article 301 exempt fathers and paternal relatives who kill their children from *qisas*, limiting punishment to imprisonment or blood money; in practice, sentences of three to ten years are often reduced to the minimum, with "honour" treated as a mitigating factor. Additionally, Article 302(c) and Article 630 legitimize so-called "crimes of passion" by providing a defense for a husband to kill his wife and her alleged partner if he witnesses their sexual relations, thereby exempting perpetrators from punishment and effectively authorizing lethal violence against women. This framework incentivizes impunity for perpetrators of "honour killings" and murders within families.⁷³¹

Family law and lack of protection by the State for domestic violence survivors

412. As highlighted by the Mission, Iran's personal status family law embodies pervasive discrimination against women and girls.⁷³² According to credible information, Iran's family laws prioritize maintaining the family and reconciliation, even in cases when violence is involved.⁷³³

413. In 2014, according to a report by the State Welfare Organization of Iran, the Welfare Organization created 23 safe houses for victims of gender-based violence.⁷³⁴ These may not

⁷²⁶ "The killing of a young Afghan woman and her three small children in Tehran; ten days of silence about a migrant family", Stop Honor Killings, 5 August 2025. See also "An Afghan woman and her three children were killed in Tehran." Deutsche Welle Farsi, 27 July 2025.

⁷²⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008990 (FFMI Meeting note).

⁷²⁸ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 285-290.

⁷²⁹ Article 367, Islamic Penal Code. See also "Disposable Victims: Laws and Practices on Gender-related Killings of Women and Girls in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Submission to the UNODC Justice Section", Justice for Iran, February 2014.

⁷³⁰ Article 302 and 303, Islamic Penal Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

⁷³¹ Article 302 and Article 630, Islamic Penal Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran. "Disposable Victims: Laws and Practices on Gender-related Killings of Women and Girls in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Submission to the UNODC Justice Section", Justice for Iran, February 2014.

⁷³² A/HRC/58/CRP.1, para. 280.

⁷³³ FFM-IRAN-D-008908 (FFMI Interview); "They said their lives were in danger; the legal authorities did not take it seriously; they were killed.", Iran Wire, 15 May 2025.

⁷³⁴ "Report: Where Are Safe Houses for Iranian Women?", State Welfare Organization of Iran, 16 December 2020.

be accessible to all however, considering that, government-run women's shelters reportedly require a court order both to enter and to leave, and they do not meet basic standards.⁷³⁵

414. There is little information publicly available on shelters for women, but reports indicate that very few are operational, and they struggle to operate due to financial constraints. Most shelters rely on private funding and receive no government support. According to one witness, due to increased reports of femicide and gender-based violence, a shelter in West Azerbaijan reportedly continued working, while in Tehran, only few remain, after many of them were forced to close, with their permits revoked.⁷³⁶

Judicial bias

415. As previously noted by the Mission,⁷³⁷ in adjudicating gender-based violence cases, the absence of women within the Judiciary heightens gender bias in legal proceedings, including a presumption of victim's fault, such as in cases of femicide. In one case in 2017 involving the killing of a woman and her young child by the woman's husband, the court's initial questions reportedly focused on her alleged infidelity rather than the crime itself including asking the accused, "Were you suspicious of your wife? Did she betray you?"⁷³⁸

416. Likewise, according to credible information, in rape cases, the burden is placed on victims to prove resistance, and failure to do so can result in punishing the victim herself. A witness described a case in which a woman raped by multiple men was unable to meet evidentiary standards, became pregnant, fled her home, and was later punished with 100 lashes, after giving birth.⁷³⁹

4. Femicide and intersectionality

417. While femicide occurs throughout the country, under-reporting impacts the documentation of such cases.⁷⁴⁰

418. In 2024, a credible organization reported that a significant number of cases of femicide, 38 cases, accounting for 22 percent of all documented incidents, took place in western Iran, including the provinces of Fars, Ilam, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, and West Azerbaijan. In comparison, women in major urban centres such as Tehran reportedly generally have greater access to resources, including legal representation, which can influence both protection and reporting.⁷⁴¹

419. As the Mission previously found, for LGBTQ+ persons, femicide and other forms of lethal violence are even more severely underreported because of taboo and stigmatization, with cases frequently framed or recorded as so-called "honour" killings. Gender-based violence, including femicide, against LGBTQ+ persons in Iran is exacerbated by the criminalization of same-sex relations, which carries severe penalties ranging from corporal punishment to the death penalty, and creates a profound chilling effect on the community.⁷⁴²

420. This legal framework, combined with the absence of punishment for hate crimes against LGBTQ+ persons, renders the community largely invisible and fearful of seeking protection or justice. Deep-rooted social taboos and stigma, particularly acute in schools, universities, and within families, further expose LGBTQ+ persons to violence, exclusion, and forced marriage, as previously observed by the Mission.⁷⁴³

421. Credible sources reported on cases of "honour" killings of LGBTQ+ persons, including a recent incident in which a father killed his transgender daughter and then himself, with the circumstances and motives obscured. Transwomen are at particular risk of femicide due to the visibility of their gender identity and prevailing cultural hostility toward

⁷³⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008318 (FFMI Interview).

⁷³⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008908 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008907 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008318 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁷³⁷ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, para. 301.

⁷³⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008318 (FFMI Interview).

⁷³⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008318 (FFMI Interview).

⁷⁴⁰ Violence against Women and Girls, Stop Femicide, Annual Report, 2024.

⁷⁴¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008970 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁷⁴² A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 378-379.

⁷⁴³ See A/58/CRP.1, paras. 374-405.

transgender people with violence often perpetrated by male family members. Such killings are reportedly frequently misclassified as suicides, and the sexual orientation or gender identity of victims is omitted from reporting, contributing to a severe lack of reliable data and masking the true scale and gendered nature of violence against LGBTQ+ persons in Iran.⁷⁴⁴

D. Expulsions and deportations of Afghans from Iran and associated threats

1. Background

422. Most Afghan nationals residing in Iran remain in a precarious migration situation, even after decades of residence. Until March 2025, through different census and “headcount” programs introduced by the Government of Iran,⁷⁴⁵ several million Afghans were permitted to temporarily regularize their stay in Iran through the issuance of a “headcount” document (*bargeh-e sarshomari*). Holders of this document were able to access limited socio-economic services, including State healthcare, public education, work authorization, banking services, and the ability to enter into rental agreements. On 12 March 2025, however, Iran’s Centre for Foreign Nationals and Immigration Affairs, under the Ministry of Interior, announced that these “headcount” documents would automatically expire at the start of the Iranian year 1404, or 21 March 2025.⁷⁴⁶ In practice, authorities invalidated residence documents and reclassified many Afghans as “undocumented,”⁷⁴⁷ placing them, yet again, at serious risk of deportation.

423. Later in March, Iran’s Ministry of Interior issued a directive requiring “all illegal immigrants” to leave the country by 6 July 2025, or “face deportation.”⁷⁴⁸ Following this, on 25 March 2025, State affiliated media announced that a police plan to “gather and repatriate unauthorized immigrants” is being “pursued seriously.”⁷⁴⁹ Returns⁷⁵⁰ then began accelerating in April, continued through May and, as noted below, peaked in June during and after the Iran-Israel conflict.

2. Escalation during and after 2025 June hostilities

424. The highest monthly figures of returns of Afghans from Iran to Afghanistan in the past three years were recorded in July 2025, with a total of 373,000 individuals deported.⁷⁵¹ Already on 13 June, when the Israeli airstrikes began, daily returns raised to an average of more than 30,000, up sharply from around 2,000 per day earlier in the year.⁷⁵² A notable

⁷⁴⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008390 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008970 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁷⁴⁵ Announcement No. 1 regarding the registration scheme for Afghan nationals, UNHCR, 6 February 2017. See also UNHCR, Afghanistan Situation Response in Iran, as of 31 August 2022.

⁷⁴⁶ See IRAN-AFGHANISTAN Returns Emergency Response as of 25 June 2025.

⁷⁴⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008906 (FFMI Investigation note). See “Head of the Center for Foreign Nationals and Refugees Affairs of the Ministry of Interior: 717,000 Afghan citizens have left the country so far”, Mizan Online, 8 July 2025.

⁷⁴⁸ “How many Afghans have left Iran so far? | The plan to deport illegal nationals was not a one-time thing”, Hamshahri Online, 9 July 2025; “Head of the Center for Foreign Nationals and Refugees Affairs of the Ministry of Interior: 717,000 Afghan citizens have left the country so far”, Mizan News, 8 July 2025.

⁷⁴⁹ “The organization of unauthorized nationals is being pursued seriously.” IRNA, 25 March 2025.

⁷⁵⁰ OHCHR has stated that “return” should be understood as an umbrella term to refer to all the various forms, methods and processes by which migrants are returned or compelled to return to their country of origin or of habitual residence, or a third country. Returns may thus include deportation, expulsion, removal, rejection at the border, extradition, repatriation, handover, transfer or other types of return as defined in different national legal frameworks and practices. In practice, returns are often characterized as either “forced” or “voluntary”, though the reality is often less clear-cut. See UNCCT and OHCHR, *Human Rights at International Borders: A Trainer’s Guide*, 2021. See also Global Migration Group and OHCHR, *Recommended Principles and Guidelines on the Protection of the Human Rights of Migrants in Vulnerable Situations*, 2018.

⁷⁵¹ IRAN-AFGHANISTAN, Returns Emergency Response, as of 13 December 2025.

⁷⁵² Afghanistan Returnees Overview, UN OCHA, published on 26 October 2025.

increase was recorded on 26 June,⁷⁵³ when some 36,100 Afghans returned in just one day, followed by 4 July,⁷⁵⁴ when over 43,000 were registered in a single day.

425. Women and children represented a substantial portion of the people returned from Iran to Afghanistan, with UNHCR reporting (in June) that, 39 percent of the 500,000 deportations it registered between 20 March and 25 June, were female-headed households.⁷⁵⁵ By 2 July, UNHCR estimated that over 821,400 Afghans had been returned since 20 March 2025, with 70 per cent of those women and children. According to IOM, from 1 June to 24 June 2025, women and girls represented 30 per cent of all returnees from Iran.⁷⁵⁶

426. On 17 July 2025, Iran's Minister of Interior stated that approximately 800,000 Afghan migrants had returned to Afghanistan since the beginning of the Iranian New Year, or 21 March 2025, asserting that 80 per cent of them did so "willingly."⁷⁵⁷ However, IOM recorded that 70 per cent of the 714,572 Afghans registered to have returned from Iran between 1 January and 29 June 2025 to Afghanistan were "forcibly returned."⁷⁵⁸ As of December 2025, "headcount" slip holders made up 15 per cent of total returnees, with 13 per cent of total deportees being head-counted slip holders. Between 20 March and December 2025, approximately 51 per cent of total returnees and 48 per cent of total deportees were "headcount" slip holders.⁷⁵⁹ Many of the deportees from Iran to Afghanistan were people who had been born or had lived for years in Iran, women who travelled alone, unaccompanied children, former government officials, particularly from the police and security sectors, human rights defenders, journalists, LGBTQ+ persons and others who had opposed Taliban rule earlier and had left the country as a result.⁷⁶⁰

427. Following the Ministry of Interior's directive to deport Afghans from Iran, Brigadier General Ahmad-Ali Goudarzi, Commander of Iran's Border Guard, announced on 27 June that the rental contracts leased to "unauthorized" Afghans earlier, had been nullified.⁷⁶¹ On 28 June, Iran's Interior Minister, Eskandar Momeni, stated that "some Afghans who had entered Iran in recent years" came "with a specific intent to carry out sabotage operations" during the recent Iran-Israel conflict.⁷⁶²

3. Discrimination against Afghan women and girls, LGBTQ+ persons

428. Information shows that Afghan women, girls, and LGBTQ+ persons are doubly discriminated against based on gender and nationality. In particular, the enjoyment of the rights to freedom of expression, education and health are affected (see also sub-section C on femicide).

a. Mandatory *hijab* enforcement

429. For Afghan women, non-compliance with the mandatory *hijab* carries an additional risk of deportation, due to the precarious legal status of and discrimination towards Afghans in Iran more broadly, as also noted above. Related to this, in June 2023, the Director of Foreign Nationals Affairs of Qom province, Ali Akbar Zarei, warned that Afghan refugees who flout the mandatory *hijab* laws could be "denied services or deported."⁷⁶³

⁷⁵³ UNHCR sees sharp increase of Afghan returns in adverse circumstances from Iran to Afghanistan, 28 June 2025.

⁷⁵⁴ UNHCR: Needs intensify as 1.4 million people return to Afghanistan, UNCHR, 4 July 2025.

⁷⁵⁵ UNHCR, Iran Afghanistan Returns Emergency Response, June 2025.

⁷⁵⁶ UN IOM Migration, Flow Monitoring Dashboard, Afghanistan, available here: <https://dtm.iom.int/online-interactive-resources/afghanistan-flow-monitoring-2025>.

⁷⁵⁷ "Forced Deportation, Structural Discrimination: The Systemic Erasure of Afghan Lives in Iran", Femena, 31 July 2025.

⁷⁵⁸ "Record 256,000 Afghan Migrants Return from Iran as IOM Warns of Dire Funding Shortfall", UN IOM, 30 June 2025.

⁷⁵⁹ IRAN-AFGHANISTAN, Returns Emergency Response, as of 13 December 2025.

⁷⁶⁰ "No safe haven: Human rights risks faced by persons involuntarily returned to Afghanistan", UNAMA, July 2025.

⁷⁶¹ "Urgent order to expel illegal nationals from Iran/Property lease agreement for Afghans is invalid + Details", Eghtesad News, 27 June 2025.

⁷⁶² "Interior Minister's revelation about Afghans who came to Iran with purpose", Tabnak, 27 June 2025.

⁷⁶³ "Afghan migrants threatened with deportation if they fail to comply with mandatory hijab in Iran.", Radio Free Europe, 15 June 2023.

430. For example, according to media reports, in August 2024, an Afghan social researcher, who had lived in Iran since she was a child and was a valid holder of a residency permit, reportedly received a deportation order after she was found to have allegedly violated the mandatory *hijab* laws. She was reportedly summoned, detained by the police, and sent to a camp at the Iran-Afghanistan border within hours after her detention, without being able to contact her family. Friends and supporters, who argued that her deportation lacked a legal basis, launched a social media campaign calling for her to be brought back. She had been pursuing a master's degree at a university in Tehran and was known for her research and critique of the treatment of Afghan migrant women in Iran.⁷⁶⁴ Reportedly, she was ultimately allowed to remain in Iran.⁷⁶⁵

b. Education

431. Information likewise showed that access to education in Iran has long been limited for both Afghan girls and boys, and girls have been disproportionately affected. A witness explained that although Afghans have been permitted to establish their own schools under the supervision of the Ministry of Education of Iran, these largely operate only at elementary and middle-school levels.⁷⁶⁶

432. Since the Taliban's return, many Afghan families have reportedly sought refuge in Iran, in part because the *de-facto* authorities in Afghanistan have banned girls from attending school beyond sixth grade as of March 2022.⁷⁶⁷ However, once in Iran, Afghan girls face barriers to continuing their education due to documentation requirements and restrictive enrolment practices. Families report children being denied school places or classrooms because they lack valid residency papers or identification numbers.⁷⁶⁸

433. One witness noted that, in higher education, particularly at universities, Afghans were barred from fields such as medicine, science, engineering, and other technical disciplines, reportedly to prevent them from entering in-demand professions in Iran. At the school level, Afghan students could compete only up to the inter-city level and were excluded from international competitions. Some were assigned to schools on city outskirts, requiring long commutes of up to two hours, which led some families to withdraw their children from school altogether.⁷⁶⁹

434. According to a credible human rights organization, children from families lacking official residency documents have been excluded from public schools for years, and although the introduction of the so-called "education support form" has allowed some of them to enroll, access to this mechanism remains limited, and it is not guaranteed for all Afghan children. According to a credible civil society organization, many schools, particularly in provinces such as Qom, Razavi Khorasan, and Yazd, reportedly continue to formally or informally deny enrolment to Afghan students, reinforcing a widespread pattern of exclusion that undermines children's right to education and perpetuates long-term social and economic marginalization.⁷⁷⁰

⁷⁶⁴ "Afghan Social Researcher Deported From Iran Over Hijab Compliance", Afghanistan International, 2 August 2024.

⁷⁶⁵ "Former Mashhad City Council member: The risk of Kobra Gholami's deportation has been removed", Iran Wire, 4 August 2024.

⁷⁶⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008906 (FFMI Investigation note)

⁷⁶⁷ "One of the World's Largest Refugee Populations, Afghans Have Faced Increasing Restrictions in Iran, Migration Policy Institute, 7 January 2025.

⁷⁶⁸ While specific data linking individual decisions to flee because of the education ban is harder to find in single reports (because refugee motivations are multi-factorial, including threats to safety, rights, and economic opportunities), credible sources showed the large movement of Afghan families to Iran has been associated with the overall Taliban restrictions on rights and freedoms in addition to seeking economic opportunities. See "No documents, no education: Afghan girls in Iran", Zan Times, 6 January 2025.

⁷⁶⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008458 (FFMI Interview).

⁷⁷⁰ "Forced Deportation, Structural Discrimination: The Systemic Erasure of Afghan Lives in Iran," FEMENA, 31 July 2025.

4. Arrests, detention, threats of deportation against Afghan women human rights defenders in Iran

435. In one case, a woman human rights defender was arrested and briefly detained in Tehran for protesting the Taliban's return to power in August 2021 in Afghanistan. Reportedly, during interrogations, security forces expressed approval of the Taliban's return and threatened the witness and other protesting women with deportation to Afghanistan if the protests continued.⁷⁷¹

436. According to credible information, an Afghan woman human rights defender was detained and interrogated after applying for visa renewal. During that detention, security forces questioned her about her previous activism abroad. Although she was initially permitted to remain in Iran, she was ordered to leave the country within several days reportedly because she refused to collaborate with the authorities.⁷⁷²

437. In another case, on 6 July 2025, according to media reports, a sociology student was reportedly detained by Iranian authorities at the Ministry of Intelligence's detention facility in Mashhad after traveling to the eastern border to document the situation of Afghan refugees during mass deportation of Afghans from Iran.⁷⁷³ She was reportedly arrested without a warrant in Razavi Khorasan province, and held in solitary confinement for three weeks before being transferred to Torbat-e-Jam prison. Her family was reportedly not aware of her whereabouts for 10 days.⁷⁷⁴ She faced charges including "propaganda against the State" and filming in restricted areas reportedly because of her research focus on Afghanistan.⁷⁷⁵ Supporters launched a social media campaign to pressure authorities for information and her release. After more than two months in detention, she was temporarily released on bail of 500 million tomans (about USD10,000). A court in Taybad ultimately found insufficient evidence to continue prosecution, ruling her activities did not constitute a crime and issuing a formal decision to discontinue the case.⁷⁷⁶

5. Gender dimensions of the expulsions and deportations of Afghans from Iran to Afghanistan during the June hostilities

Prior to deportation

438. According to credible information, a trans woman, later deported to Afghanistan despite having legal documents, was arrested in Iran and beaten at a police station during a document check. The police reportedly insulted her based on gender and nationality, calling her "(افغانی ایرا خواهر)," a derogatory expression used in Iran toward men perceived as behaving like women; in this case accompanied by the term "Afghani" to denote the victim's nationality. She was then transferred to a camp, where she reportedly experienced violence both from Iranian police and from Afghan detainees because of her gender identity.⁷⁷⁷

439. Crossing the border reportedly poses significant challenges for LGBTQ+ persons, especially trans people who often face heightened risks and obstacles during their journey.⁷⁷⁸

⁷⁷¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008458 (FFMI Interview).

⁷⁷² Information on file with the Mission.

⁷⁷³ "Sara Gowhari (Gohari), an Afghan student residing in Tehran, has been detained for 12 days and remains in legal limbo at the Ministry of Intelligence's detention facility in Mashhad", HRANA, 17 July 2025.

⁷⁷⁴ "Iranian Intelligence Forces Arrest Afghan Sociology Student at Border", Iran Wire, 16 July 2025.

⁷⁷⁵ See "Latest status of the legal case of Sara Gohari; Afghan student at the University of Tehran", Rezashafakhah, 3 August 2025". See also "Taybad: Issuance of a Decision to Discontinue Prosecution for Sara Gohari, an Afghan Student, After Illegal Arrest and Security Charges", HENGAW, 4 October 2025.

⁷⁷⁶ "Taybad: Issuance of a Decision to Discontinue Prosecution for Sara Gohari, an Afghan Student, After Illegal Arrest and Security Charges", HENGAW, 4 October 2025.

⁷⁷⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008909 (FFMI Interview).

⁷⁷⁸ Report by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, A/80/432, paras. 50-52; FFM-IRAN-D-008917 (FFMI Investigation note)

6. Deported women, girls and LGBTQ+ persons from Iran to Afghanistan

440. On 8 July 2025, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “the Court”) issued, in the context of the Situation of Afghanistan, warrants of arrest for Mr. Haibatullah Akhundzada, *de-facto* Supreme Leader of the Taliban, and Mr. Abdul Hakim Haqqani, Chief Justice of the Taliban.

441. According to the arrest warrant, the Taliban have implemented a governmental policy that resulted in severe violations of fundamental rights and freedoms of the civilian population of Afghanistan, in connection with acts of murder, imprisonment, torture, rape and enforced disappearance. While the Taliban have imposed certain rules and prohibitions on the population as a whole, they have specifically targeted girls and women by reason of their gender, depriving them of fundamental rights and freedoms. In addition, other persons were targeted because certain expressions of sexuality and/or gender identity were regarded as inconsistent with the Taliban’s policy on gender.⁷⁷⁹

442. Additionally, in September 2025, UNHCHR issued a non-return advisory, urging States hosting Afghans not to forcefully return them to Afghanistan due to protection risks. This advisory, explicitly called on States to suspend “forcible returns,” noting that no return should occur unless safety and dignity conditions are met.⁷⁸⁰

443. Despite the gravity of the situation in Afghanistan, Iran continued to deport Afghans, including women, girls, and LGBTQ+ persons who face heightened and gender-specific risks. Witnesses interviewed by the Mission did not go through any screening processes to assess potential protection risks upon return to Afghanistan,⁷⁸¹ and others reported profound fear for their safety and security if they were returned to Afghanistan against their will.⁷⁸²

444. Some LGBTQ+ persons who previously held a temporary residence card had their documents reportedly annulled by Iranian authorities and were deported to Afghanistan without any valid identification. In Afghanistan, obtaining identity documents typically requires support from paternal relatives, which may create barriers for LGBTQ+ Afghans many of whom may be estranged from their families. As a result, they remain undocumented and unable to access evacuation programs, leaving many without viable options to pursue safety in a country where same-sex relationships are criminalized.⁷⁸³

VIII. Transnational repression

“One day they will find your corpse in the [REDACTED] River!”

Telegram message sent to a media activist residing abroad

January 2026⁷⁸⁴

445. The Mission has previously reported that following the 2022-23 protests, State authorities increased their repression beyond Iran’s borders. They targeted individuals in the territory of other States, including Iranian human rights defenders, journalists, and victims from protest movements, such as the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, who continued to call for truth, justice, equality, and accountability from abroad. Threats, arrests and other

⁷⁷⁹ Situation in Afghanistan: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II issues arrest warrants for Haibatullah Akhundzada and Abdul Hakim Haqqani, Press Release 8 July 2025.

⁷⁸⁰ UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation (UNHCR-Facilitated Return) – Afghan returnees, UNHCR Guidance Note on Afghanistan - Update II (as of September 2025).

⁷⁸¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008458 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008419 (FFMI Interview).

⁷⁸² FFM-IRAN-D-008459 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008419 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008458 (FFMI Interview).

⁷⁸³ FFM-IRAN-D-008909 (FFMI Interview).

⁷⁸⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008444 (FFMI Interview).

forms of repression were also directed against victims' family members who had remained inside Iran.⁷⁸⁵

446. The Mission collected 17 interviews with journalists, victims or witnesses from past protest movements in Iran, activists and human rights defenders, including some of minority backgrounds, who have faced physical threats, assassination, assassination attempts or plots, and other forms of repression, in at least 14 countries, reportedly by Iranian State agents or persons allegedly acting as their proxies, for advocating for, or reporting on, the human rights situation in Iran.⁷⁸⁶ It also requested information from 14 Member States claiming to have documented such repression within their territories. The Mission further analyzed, collected and preserved documents, statements by Iranian officials in state and state-affiliated media, statements by host governments, and analyzed credible information from civil society organizations, including witness statements, and open-and closed source digital material.

447. According to credible reporting, acts of transnational repression have increased in 2025,⁷⁸⁷ with threats against Iranian journalists abroad and their families in Iran becoming severe since the June 2025 hostilities.⁷⁸⁸ This mirrors the intensification of repressive measures aiming at silencing those expressing, or perceived to have expressed, critical views against the Government inside Iran during the same period (see Section V, above). As noted above, certain journalists continue to have their assets in Iran frozen by the Judiciary (since 2018), restricting access to their property, while others have been convicted by a court in Tehran and sentenced *in absentia* to imprisonment.

448. Acts of transnational repression in the digital space have also increased, according to credible information.⁷⁸⁹ Such acts included surveillance, smear, smear campaigns, cyber-attacks, and other digital attacks such as doxing, hacking, impersonation and other online attacks, including against women human rights defenders and journalists.⁷⁹⁰

449. On the basis of the information analyzed, the threats were often covert and victims and authorities in the host States found it difficult to identify possible perpetrators. Assessing the full extent of transnational repression is challenging.

450. The acts of transnational repression and the Government of Iran's deliberate publicizing of such acts through official statements create fear among those who have fled the country and those who remain and have had a chilling effect on members of Iranian communities abroad, including journalists and activists. Nevertheless, the reports below indicate that the repressive acts are not sporadic or uncoordinated, but a pattern of conduct directed by or with the knowledge of the Government and aimed at repressing those who criticize the Iranian State.

A. Information on the role of the Government of Iran in acts of transnational repression

1. Statements by Iranian officials

451. On 28 July 2025, the Ministry of Intelligence issued a statement saying that 98 citizens had been summoned or arrested due to their links with a Persian-language media outlet outside the country. The Ministry alleged that these individuals, described as "citizen-

⁷⁸⁵ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 634-665.

⁷⁸⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008425 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008431 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008432 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008949 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008334 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008373 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008602 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008908 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008389 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008388 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008387 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008401 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008746 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008546 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008444 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008392 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008472 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008660 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008689 (FFMI Submission).

⁷⁸⁷ "Iran: UN experts alarmed by escalating threats against Iran International media workers and their families", OHCHR, 21 August 2025.

⁷⁸⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008755 (FFMI Submission).

⁷⁸⁹ FFM-00738 (FFMI Submission).

⁷⁹⁰ FFM-00738 (FFMI Submission).

journalists,” were connected to Iran International, and “considered [by the State] part of an affiliated operational network” inside the country.⁷⁹¹

452. On 15 September 2025, Iran’s HCHR responded to a communication by UN Special Mandate holders on the “escalation since June 2025 of the targeting and harassment by the Islamic Republic of Iran of BBC News Persian staff outside Iran and their family members inside Iran, in some cases including death threats.”⁷⁹² In response, Iran’s HCHR described the reporting of “some foreign media organizations” as “examples of ‘media terrorism’ and ‘soft war’ [...] considered a serious threat to the country’s national security and public interests.”⁷⁹³ On 18 September 2025, in its response to a Communication by UN experts on the Iran International Persian language News service, the Government of Iran characterized Iran International as a “hostile and terrorist group” whose activities are “also punishable under international counter-terrorism laws.”⁷⁹⁴ State affiliated media reports reviewed by the Mission made similar claims.⁷⁹⁵

Reports by States on transnational threats allegedly posed by the Government of Iran

453. The Mission reviewed statements and reports issued in 2025 by Member States referring to the alleged involvement of the Government of Iran, including its intelligence entities, noting increasing transnational threats against individuals in their territories, such as human rights defenders and journalists.

454. On 31 July 2025, the governments of 14 States, namely Albania, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (USA), issued a joint statement condemning growing transnational repression by the intelligence services of Iran in their territories. According to the statement, the “attempts by the Iranian intelligence services to kill, kidnap, and harass people in Europe and North America [are] in clear violation of our sovereignty.” The statement alleged that these services were increasingly collaborating with international criminal organizations to target, *inter alia*, journalists and dissidents.⁷⁹⁶

455. In September 2025, members of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism⁷⁹⁷ issued a statement noting that “Iranian intelligence services have increasingly attempted to kill, kidnap, and harass political opponents abroad, following a disturbing and unacceptable pattern of transnational repression, and clearly undermining state sovereignty.” The statement also refers to operations to obtain and disclose the personal information of journalists.⁷⁹⁸

456. At the national level, in July 2025, the Intelligence and Security Committee of the Parliament of the United Kingdom noted the “persistent targeting of Iranian media organizations operating in the UK, primarily Iran International, BBC News Persian and

⁷⁹¹ “Arrest of 98 members of the International media outlet in Iran.”, Bartaran, 28 July 2025. The Mission recalls that, in late 2022, in response to their extensive coverage of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had designated four major international Persian-speaking media outlets, including BBC Persian, Iran International, Radio Zaman and Radio Farda as “terrorist organizations”. See A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 636-640.

⁷⁹² AL IRN 13/2025, United Nations Special Mandate Holders Communication dated 22 August 2025.

⁷⁹³ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 18 September 2025.

⁷⁹⁴ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 18 September 2025.

⁷⁹⁵ “Three facts about Iran International”, IRNA, 18 June 2025. See also “The media arm of the Zionist war room was exposed / From the “No to Iran International” campaign to the popular unity against the betrayal of the Persian-language media”, Mizan News, 19 June 2025. <https://t.me/mizanplus/180330>.

⁷⁹⁶ UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, “Statement on state threats from Iranian intelligence services: Joint statement of Albania, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US on state threats from Iranian intelligence services”, 31 July 2025.

⁷⁹⁷ Signatories include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden.

⁷⁹⁸ G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, “Statement on Iranian Transnational Repression and Other Malign Activities”, 12 September 2025.

Manoto TV – which are broadcast from the UK.”⁷⁹⁹ According to the September 2025 response of Government of the United Kingdom to that committee’s report, “direct action by the Iranian state against UK targets has substantially increased over recent years, particularly after the nationwide protests in Iran that followed the death of Jina Mahsa Amini in September 2022.”⁸⁰⁰ The Government further alleged that “[t]argeting dissidents is a high priority for the [Iranian] Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and the [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps].”⁸⁰¹

457. The alleged role of Iran in acts of transnational repression has been highlighted in other statements by States and reports by the Governments of Australia,⁸⁰² Canada,⁸⁰³ and the Netherlands,⁸⁰⁴ as well as the EU Parliament.⁸⁰⁵

Domestic criminal prosecutions alleging involvement by the Government of Iran

458. In March 2025 and January 2026, respectively, four men were convicted and sentenced for two separate plots to kill Masih Alinejad in the United States. According to the US Department of Justice, evidence showed that the men attempted to kill her on instructions from high-ranking members of the IRGC.⁸⁰⁶

459. In its 2024 Annual report, the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service noted that, in 2024, an assassination attempt was carried out on an Iranian citizen, and two suspects were arrested.⁸⁰⁷ In May 2025, according to the UK House of Commons report, dated 19 May 2025, three Iranian nationals were charged with offenses under the National Security Act 2023. The individuals were reportedly accused of engaging in conduct “likely to assist a foreign intelligence service.” Additional charges related to conduct including surveillance, reconnaissance, and open-source research, allegedly undertaken with the intent to commit acts of serious violence against a person in the United Kingdom. The report stated that the “foreign State to which these charges relate is Iran”, adding that these cases marked the first time Iranian nationals have been charged under the National Security Act.⁸⁰⁸

B. Individuals targeted in acts of transnational repression for conduct protected under international human rights law

460. Witness and victim interviews, and credible information indicated that Iranian, or dual nationals, human rights defenders and journalists advocating and reporting on human rights violations in Iran from abroad,⁸⁰⁹ as well as victims or witnesses from past protest movements, continued to be subjected to threats and intimidation, including assassination,

⁷⁹⁹ Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Iran, Presented to Parliament pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of the Justice and Security Act 2013, 10 July 2025.

⁸⁰⁰ UK Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Report IRAN, 4 September 2025.

⁸⁰¹ Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, IRAN, 10 July 2025.

⁸⁰² Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), “Director-General’s Annual Threat Assessment 2025”, 19 February 2025.

⁸⁰³ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Director’s Annual Speech”, 13 November 2025.

⁸⁰⁴ General Intelligence and Security Service (AVID), “Crossing borders State-sponsored interference in diaspora communities in the Netherlands”, 25 March 2025.

⁸⁰⁵ European Parliament, “MEPs warn of increasing repression of human rights activists across borders”, 31 November 2025.

⁸⁰⁶ “Brooklyn Man Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Murder-for-Hire Plot and Stalking a Journalist and Prominent Critic of the Iranian Government”, U.S. Department of Justice, 28 January 2026. See also “Two Russian Mob Leaders Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for Murder-For-Hire Targeting a Journalist on Behalf of the Iranian Government”, U.S. Department of Justice, 30 October 2025.

⁸⁰⁷ General Intelligence and Security Service (AVID), “Crossing borders State-sponsored interference in diaspora communities in the Netherlands”, 25 March 2025.

⁸⁰⁸ United Kingdom, House of Commons, Official Report, Parliamentary debates, Vol. 767, No. 140, 19 May 2025.

⁸⁰⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008444 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008401 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008658 (Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008669 (FFMI Submission); “Rostam Ejbari, an Iranian Baluch, was killed in Herat”, Radio Zamaneh, 11 October 2025.

assassination plots, after relocating to other countries.⁸¹⁰ Journalists and activists who reported on the protests that began on 28 December 2025, and their families reportedly faced threats of arrest and seizure of property, death threats and online smear campaigns.⁸¹¹

1. Activists and human rights defenders

461. Information received by the Mission reaffirms a previously identified pattern of transnational repression directed at Iranian activists and human rights defenders abroad, including some of minority backgrounds. According to one organization, nearly half of the threats and assassinations against Iranian nationals abroad documented by one credible human rights organization between 2019 and 2025 involved minorities, including Kurds and Baluch.⁸¹²

462. In one case, an Iranian activist reportedly with a strong social influence in the Baluch community in Iran, and who had allegedly provided support to victims of the 2022 “Bloody Friday” protests, was fatally shot on 8 October 2025 in Herat city, Afghanistan. He had relocated to Afghanistan reportedly after pressure by security forces on his family.⁸¹³ According to credible information, Iranian security forces have threatened the victim’s relatives several months before the shooting, and the victim had been advised to remain inside his home. Reportedly, the killing was carried out on behalf of the IRGC, alongside pressure on the victim to return to Iran, with implicit threats of further violence.⁸¹⁴

463. In another case, according to credible information, one activist of minority background was shot outside his home abroad in October 2025, after reportedly receiving threats. He had reportedly left Iran after being detained several times, including by an intelligence entity. According to credible reports, the victim had been forced to flee Iran and had repeatedly received threats, reportedly, from the Iranian intelligence entities prior to his assassination.⁸¹⁵

2. Iranian journalists reporting on Iran from abroad

464. The Mission interviewed six journalists, including dual nationals, reporting on Iran from abroad, who have been subjected to acts of transnational repression. These included journalists reporting for Persian language news services BBC News Persian and Iran International. It also reviewed open-source, digital material and submissions on threats against Iranian journalists in at least five other countries.⁸¹⁶

465. On this basis, the Mission found that these journalists were subjected to death threats and their family members inside Iran to harassment by authorities aimed at silencing independent media coverage from abroad. In this regard, according to credible information, 45 journalists abroad and their 315 family members inside Iran had been targeted in a span of six weeks between June and July 2025, in what was described as a “campaign of intimidation, according to credible information” (see also below).⁸¹⁷

BBC Persian News

466. According to witness interviews,⁸¹⁸ UK-based journalists working with BBC Persian News continued to face threats to their physical security, with credible information indicating

⁸¹⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008658 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008401(FFMI Interview).

⁸¹¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008444 (FFMI Interview). See also “BBC Persian journalists say Iran monitoring them and targeting their families”, The Guardian, 7 February 2026.

⁸¹² FFM-IRAN-D-008660 (FFMI Submission).

⁸¹³ FFM-IRAN-D-008472 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008658 (FFMI Submission).

⁸¹⁴ Information on file with the Mission; FFM-IRAN-D-008658 (FFMI Submission).

⁸¹⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008658 (FFMI Submission).

⁸¹⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008401(FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008387 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008388 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008389 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008426 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008384 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008755 (FFMI Submission).

⁸¹⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008611 (FFMI Submission).

⁸¹⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008387 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008388 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008389 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008426 (FFMI Interview). See also FFM-IRAN-D-008904 (Investigation note) .

that violence and threats aimed at some led them to abandon not only their work but also plans to return to their home and families in Iran.⁸¹⁹

467. In at least two cases, Iranian intelligence entities have reportedly labeled journalists *mohareb* (“enemy of God”) during calls or interrogations with family members.⁸²⁰ According to credible information, BBC journalists were also subjected to surveillance,⁸²¹ or defamation, or both, including women journalists.⁸²² In one case, a woman journalist received daily, graphic sexualized threats in the form of direct messages and posts on her social media. These included anonymous death and rape threats and were directed both at her and her women relatives, causing her great distress.⁸²³

468. According to credible information, legal measures have been taken in Iran against BBC Persian News journalists based abroad. These include criminal proceedings *in absentia* resulting in convicting them on the charges for “propaganda against the State”⁸²⁴ and an asset-freeze injunction.⁸²⁵ The victims in question only became aware of the proceedings through third-party sources.⁸²⁶

3. Update on 2017 mass criminal investigation and asset freeze

469. As previously reported, on 19 October 2022, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sanctioned BBC Persian Service and imposed asset freezes on their staff.⁸²⁷

470. According to credible information,⁸²⁸ the asset freeze accompanied a mass criminal investigation initiated in 2017 against 152 staff members, former staff members and contributors. “Those who join BBC Persian News have their names added to the list. This is a mass criminal investigation and asset freeze, affecting all BBC Persian News staff.”⁸²⁹ One BBC journalist whose assets had been frozen described its devastating financial impact on the family in Iran who had been prevented from selling and inheriting property in Iran.⁸³⁰ In at least one case, the case of a BBC staff was reportedly referred to the prosecutor’s office for decision on jurisdiction.⁸³¹

4. Reported convictions in absentia for BBC News Persian journalists

471. Credible information also indicated that, in February 2022, 10 current and former BBC Persian News journalists were reportedly tried *in absentia* by a court in Tehran city on charges of “propaganda against the Islamic Republic,” and each sentenced to one year of imprisonment.⁸³²

⁸¹⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008755 (FFMI Submission). See also “BBC Persian journalists say Iran monitoring them and targeting their families”, The Guardian, 7 February 2026.

⁸²⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008387 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008389 (FFMI Interview).

⁸²¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008389 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008755 (FFMI Submission).

⁸²² FFM-IRAN-D-008401 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008751 (FFMI Submission).

⁸²³ FFM-IRAN-D-008401 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008389 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008751 (FFMI Submission) FFM-IRAN-D-008769 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008611 (FFMI Submission).

⁸²⁴ Document submitted to the United Kingdom Parliamentary Committees entitled “WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY BBC WORLD SERVICE (TRUK0171)”, dated February 2025.

⁸²⁵ Document submitted to the United Kingdom Parliamentary Committees entitled “WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY BBC WORLD SERVICE (TRUK0171)”, dated February 2025.

⁸²⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008768 (FFMI Submission).

⁸²⁷ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 1470.

⁸²⁸ Document submitted to the United Kingdom Parliamentary Committees entitled “WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY BBC WORLD SERVICE (TRUK0171)”, dated February 2025.

⁸²⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008768 (FFMI Submission).

⁸³⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008387 (FFMI Interview).

⁸³¹ Document submitted to the United Kingdom Parliamentary Committees entitled “WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY BBC WORLD SERVICE (TRUK0171)”, dated February 2025.

⁸³² Document submitted to the United Kingdom Parliamentary Committees entitled “WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY BBC WORLD SERVICE (TRUK0171)”, dated February 2025. FFM-IRAN-D-008768 (FFMI Submission). See also “NUJ condemns as abhorrent Iran’s “convictions” of 44 journalists working on Persian-language media outlets”, National Union of Journalists, 22 February 2024.

5. State response

472. On 18 September 2025, in response to a letter by the UN Special Procedure Mandate Holders on BBC Persian News,⁸³³ the Government of Iran rejected claims of “kidnapping, torture, confiscation of property and harassment of citizens”, as “completely baseless and undocumented.” It further stated that it is, therefore, “completely incorrect and a generalization to draw a general conclusion of ‘harassment of BBC Persian News employees’ from “the legal action taken against a limited number of people and the prosecution of individuals who disrupt public order and security.”⁸³⁴

473. Credible information indicated that staff have not been formally notified by the state about this legal action and attempts to access information through seeking legal representation in Iran and making representations to the Judiciary have reportedly failed.⁸³⁵

Iran International journalists

474. On 18 September 2025, in response to a letter by the UN Special Procedure Mandate Holders regarding Iran International, the Government of Iran rejected claims as “unsubstantiated” and based on “false information and fabricated claims made by hostile and terrorism groups.”⁸³⁶

475. Earlier, on 7 July, however, Iranian State affiliated media announced that Iran International staff would be considered “spies” under the 2025 “espionage law” (see Section VI) because Iranian lawmakers claimed that Iran International was “working for Mossad.”⁸³⁷

476. According to public reporting and submissions, in July 2025, Iran International journalists were subjected to a coordinated hacking attack targeting their personal information by hackers reportedly linked to the IRGC. Shortly thereafter, Iranian state affiliated media launched a defamation campaign against the journalists.⁸³⁸ Some were given until the end of July 2025 by Iranian authorities to stop working for Iran International or they and named family members would face execution, according to credible information.⁸³⁹

477. Additionally, between July and August 2025, according to credible information, an Iran International journalist was placed under police protection following serious death threats reportedly made against them by Iranian officials.⁸⁴⁰ Another journalist reportedly relocated from the UK to another country.⁸⁴¹ Between June and August, two Iran International journalists in Canada also reportedly faced harassment and kidnapping threats by Iranian officials.⁸⁴²

⁸³³ AL IRN 13/2025, Communication by United Nations Special Mandate Holders, dated 22 August 2025.

⁸³⁴ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 18 September 2025.

⁸³⁵ Document submitted to the United Kingdom Parliamentary Committees entitled “WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY BBC WORLD SERVICE (TRUK0171)”, dated February 2025.

⁸³⁶ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 18 September 2025.

⁸³⁷ “Iran International in the grip of Hanzalah/ Mossad-affiliated terrorist network hacked/ The story of Mojtaba Pourmohsen's secret meeting with a Mossad officer + photos and videos”, Mashreq News, 8 July 2025.

⁸³⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008611 (FFMI Submission). See also “Iran International in the grip of Hanzalah/ Mossad-affiliated terrorist network hacked/ The story of Mojtaba Pourmohsen's secret meeting with a Mossad officer + photos and videos”, Mashreq News, 8 July 2025. See also “Iranian-linked hacker group targets Iran International journalists in cyberattack”, Committee to Protect Journalists, 9 July 2025.

⁸³⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008611 (FFMI Submission).

⁸⁴⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008611 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008373 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁴¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008389 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008399 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁸⁴² “Canadians among journalists threatened by Iranian authorities, Britain-based outlet says”, The Globe and Mail, 6 August 2025.

C. Journalists, human rights defenders, victims or witnesses of past and recent protest movements, and their families

478. Newly obtained evidence reaffirmed patterns of families of journalists, human rights defenders and victims or witnesses from past and recent protests, now abroad, being targeted and punished to intimidate or silence them, deter reporting, and suppress their calls for justice and accountability for violations suffered.⁸⁴³ The Mission notes that when establishing the facts in this area of its investigation it faced additional challenges, as some sources feared reprisals against their families in Iran.⁸⁴⁴

1. Family members of journalists

479. Interviews and other credible information indicated that family members of journalists were threatened, questioned, interrogated or detained reportedly by intelligence and security entities in Iran, including the Ministry of Intelligence and IRGC, with the circle of relatives and associates reportedly widening in some cases.⁸⁴⁵ This harassment in Iran appears to aim at intimidating Iranian journalists residing abroad, notably by forcing them to resign and thus stop reporting on the situation in Iran.

480. In the case of BBC Persian journalists, harassment and intimidation against family members escalated in the months following the June 2025 hostilities. According to witness interviews⁸⁴⁶ and other credible information,⁸⁴⁷ family members of the journalists endured job losses, were subjected to repeated interrogations, or were detained. During interrogations, security forces threatened some family members in Iran in an effort to intimidate them.⁸⁴⁸ Earlier, on 24 June, Voice of America Persian service reported that authorities in Iran had intimidated and detained relatives of its staff, warning that they will be “dealt with” unless they stopped VOA-related work.⁸⁴⁹ Likewise, on 21 June, Iran International reported that IRGC officials had detained relatives of one of its journalists (who was abroad) to put pressure on them to resign from their post.⁸⁵⁰

481. On 21 August, UN Special Procedures Mandate Holders issued a statement expressing concern over the escalating threats against Iran International media workers and their families in Iran, noting that families have been interrogated, placed under surveillance and threatened with arrest and even death.⁸⁵¹

2. Victims of past protest crackdowns and their families

482. Credible information indicated that the family members of victims and witnesses of recent and past protests were also threatened and intimidated reportedly by the Government

⁸⁴³ See “Iran escalating persecution of Persian staff and relatives, BBC says”, BBC, 2 June 2025.

⁸⁴⁴ Material on file with the Mission.

⁸⁴⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008426 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008387 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008401 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008389 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008388 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008611 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008755 (FFMI Submission).

⁸⁴⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008426 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008387 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008401 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008389 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008388 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008904 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁸⁴⁷ AL IRN 13/2025, Communication by United Nations Special Mandate Holders, dated 22 August 2025.

⁸⁴⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008948 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008949 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008388 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁴⁹ “Pressure on family members of a number of Voice of America colleagues by government institutions in Iran” VOA America, 24 July 2025.

⁸⁵⁰ Iran: UN experts alarmed by escalating threats against Iran International media workers and their families, 21 August 2025.

⁸⁵¹ “Iran accused of abducting journalist’s family in retaliation for war coverage”, AP News, 22 June 2025. See also “IRGC detains Iran International host’s family members to force him to resign”, Iran International, 21 June 2025.

of Iran,⁸⁵² consistent with patterns previously documented by the Mission in relation to families in Iran of protesters killed during the 2022-23 protests.⁸⁵³

483. For example, in late 2025, agents of the Ministry of Intelligence detained relatives of one victim from a past protest and interrogated them. The victim had previously received death threats.⁸⁵⁴

484. In early January 2026, according to credible information, IRGC Intelligence forces raided the family home (in Iran) of one media activist who managed a social media channel where they published news and video footage documenting recent protests. The agents confiscated electronic devices.⁸⁵⁵ After the raid, the activist, based abroad, also began receiving death threats on social media (see below).⁸⁵⁶

D. Transnational repression in digital space

485. The Mission obtained first-hand accounts from victims of digital transnational repression, including from minority backgrounds,⁸⁵⁷ and reviewed other credible information such as social media posts and direct messages received by human rights defenders and journalists residing in at least 10 countries.

486. It found that these victims, residing abroad, experienced cyber-attacks, disinformation, and online harassment, including hate speech and death threats. In some cases, such tactics compounded direct threats of physical violence and/or harassment of their family members in Iran.⁸⁵⁸ According to credible information, Iranian journalists living abroad were subject to digital threats,⁸⁵⁹ and women journalists and human rights defenders, as well as some of their women relatives, were disproportionately targeted in online attacks, including threats of rape to further intimidate them.⁸⁶⁰

1. Hacking and publication of personal data

Personal electronic devices

487. The Mission documented several cases of journalists whose phones, computers or email accounts were allegedly hacked.⁸⁶¹ In one case, in 2025, a journalist abroad stated that they faced attempts to hack the generic mailbox of the media outlet they worked for, placing confidential information about staff and external contacts at risk.⁸⁶² A BBC journalist reportedly received notifications from Google and Meta that his account had been subject to hacking attempts.⁸⁶³

⁸⁵² FFM-IRAN-D-008948 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008949 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008334 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁵³ See A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 1513-1543.

⁸⁵⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008334 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁵⁵ FFM-IRAN-FFMI-00670 (FFMI Submission).

⁸⁵⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008444 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁵⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008746 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008387 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008401 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008517 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008373 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008511 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008908 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008948 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008949 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008432 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008444 (FFMI Interview). See also FFM-IRAN-D-008399 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁸⁵⁸ Hacking, online surveillance, smear campaign, blocking websites, social media threats outside Iran.

⁸⁵⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008373 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008399 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008401 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008384 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008611 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008755 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008681 (FFMI Submission).

⁸⁶⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008401 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008681 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008611 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008755 (FFMI Submission).

⁸⁶¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008746 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008387 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008373 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008384 (FFMI Interview). See also FFM-IRAN-D-008399 (FFMI Investigation note).

⁸⁶² FFM-IRAN-D-008384 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁶³ FFM-IRAN-D-008387 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008755 (FFMI Submission).

Public websites

488. On 5 October 2025, the Narges Mohammadi Foundation reported that its official website managed from outside Iran, was targeted in a cyberattack.⁸⁶⁴ According to credible information, this attack relied on a hybrid infrastructure, meaning that it used global commercial hosting services for anonymity, and that the cyberattack was not the result of spontaneous bot activity.⁸⁶⁵ Public claims of responsibility for the attack were made by [specific actors] on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter).⁸⁶⁶

489. On 19 November 2025, Narges Mohammadi's personal Telegram account was reportedly taken over for 48 hours⁸⁶⁷ during which time messages were allegedly sent without her knowledge.⁸⁶⁸

2. Online harassment and threats

490. According to witness interviews and credible information, human rights defenders active online, including minorities, were regularly subject to online harassment. Others received threatening calls and messages via instant messaging services. The content of such messages suggested knowledge of their locations and activities, as well as details of family members.⁸⁶⁹

Doxxing

491. Earlier, in January 2025, Iran International announced that its public media website had come under a sustained cyberattack by malware-infected messages. This reportedly resulted in leaks of personal data contained in journalists' passports, other identity documents, residency permits, and photos along with the email addresses of numerous Iran International staff.⁸⁷⁰ This leaked personal data was then published by Iranian state affiliated media during the June 2025 hostilities, as part of a broader campaign against journalists reporting on the situation in Iran from abroad during that time (above).⁸⁷¹ According to media reporting, this resulted in one staff member in London receiving over 500 threats on an instant messaging platform and 100 anonymous telephone calls.⁸⁷²

Threats via social media messages

492. One woman human rights defender told the Mission that she had been asked by a student in Iran if she could "un-follow" her on social media because she had been summoned multiple times by an Iranian intelligence entity for following her.⁸⁷³ In another case, a UK-based journalist reportedly received frequent messages on Instagram threatening that people would come to his place of residence to take him back to Iran and "execute him." He was also told he would be poisoned at a certain location which he frequented.⁸⁷⁴

493. On 5 January 2026, a media activist, who administrated a media channel where they documented protests, received threatening messages from an individual with the username REDACTED who threatened them. The person referred to the victim with their full name (which was not public), their city of residence, and daily routine. The individual wrote: "*One day they will find your corpse in the [redacted] River.*" The message also referred to "Iranian [and other nationalities] people in [name of the town of residence of the victim] who are

⁸⁶⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008682 (FFMI Submission).

⁸⁶⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008682 (FFMI Submission).

⁸⁶⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008682 (FFMI Submission).

⁸⁶⁷ Social media post on file.

⁸⁶⁸ "Narges Mohammadi Reports Malicious Attempts to Access Her Telegram Account", Narges Mohammadi Foundation, 19 November 2025.

⁸⁶⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008602 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008948 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008949 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008648 (FFMI Submission).

⁸⁷⁰ "Leaked materials came from previously reported cyberattacks, Iran International confirms", Iran International, 8 July 2025.

⁸⁷¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008399 (FFMI Investigation note); FFM-IRAN-D-008373 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008611 (FFMI Submission).

⁸⁷² UA IRN 13/2025, United Nations Special Mandate Holders, communication dated 22 August 2025.

⁸⁷³ FFM-IRAN-D-008908 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁷⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008611 (FFMI Submission).

“ready to eliminate you for free.” The individual demanded that the victim shut down the media channel and that it would “be better for their future if the [victim] expressed regret.”⁸⁷⁵

E. Gender impact

494. Evidence and information reviewed by the Mission, including interviews, social media posts⁸⁷⁶ and data collected by one credible NGO, suggested that Iranian women rights activists and women journalists were disproportionately targeted by online attacks.⁸⁷⁷ In a joint communication, UN Special Procedures Mandate Holders, noted that “threats, including of death and sexual violence to women journalists, have been prolifically made on social media and instant messaging services against Iran International personnel.”⁸⁷⁸

495. Indeed, women journalists interviewed described severe online threats they and other women journalists had received, such as cyberbullying and email hacking, online sexual harassment, including being sent graphic images, insults about their women relatives, and threats of rape and death originating from unknown accounts.⁸⁷⁹

496. In one case, one woman journalist reported receiving death threats and threats of sexual violence and over 50 messages a day demanding sexual images.⁸⁸⁰ In February 2026, another woman journalist, who had written extensively about the protests that began on 28 December 2025, was subject to defamation, which placed her family at risk.⁸⁸¹

F. Impact

497. As a result of this continuous repression, many human rights defenders and journalists abroad were forced to cut contact with their families in Iran or have been unable to return home to Iran for fear for their safety.⁸⁸²

498. One victim described that they reduced their presence in social media because of the attacks to which they had been subjected online, reportedly by Iran’s “cyber army.”⁸⁸³ Another noted that the harassment was such that the father of one of the news presenters asked that presenter to resign, because of the pressure the father was put under.⁸⁸⁴ Others were warned by their employer not to travel to certain countries due to security related travel restrictions.⁸⁸⁵

499. Victims continued reporting severe anxiety, particularly after physical threats escalated between May and June 2025.⁸⁸⁶ For those living abroad, prolonged intimidation targeting their families in Iran also contributed to serious mental distress and guilt⁸⁸⁷ and fear for their children’s lives.⁸⁸⁸

500. One witness recalled how they constantly checked their home security footage. They stated that for their safety, they stayed in the house mostly and were cautious when they left home.⁸⁸⁹

⁸⁷⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008444 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁷⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008401(FFMI Interview).

⁸⁷⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008682 (FFMI Submission).

⁸⁷⁸ UA IRN 12/2025, United Nations Special Mandate Holders, Communication dated 13 August 2025.

⁸⁷⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008389 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008394 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁸⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008401(FFMI Interview).

⁸⁸¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008546 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁸² FFM-IRAN-D-008431 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008388 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008389 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008430 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁸³ FFM-IRAN-D-008432 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁸⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008511 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008373 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁸⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008388 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008389 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁸⁶ UA IRN 13/2025, United Nations Special Mandate Holders, communication dated 22 August 2025.

⁸⁸⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008387 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁸⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008432 (FFMI Interview).

⁸⁸⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008432 (FFMI Interview).

IX. Structural causes and patterns of repression during protests and situations of perceived crisis

501. In the context of its investigations into the 2022-2023 protests and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, the Mission established a pattern of impunity in relation to unlawful deaths, extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, torture and ill-treatment, and rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence.⁸⁹⁰ It found that Iran’s domestic legal framework, institutions, policies and practices are structured in a manner that prevents and obstructs victims and their families from obtaining remedies and reparations.⁸⁹¹

502. This lack of accountability is not confined to specific time periods or individual violations. Rather, many aspects of Iran’s domestic legal framework, institutions, policies and practices⁸⁹² not only fail to protect the rights of individuals in Iran’s jurisdiction but also constitute the structural causes that effectively enable the recurrence of serious human rights violations, and criminalize the rights to freedom of expression, and assembly, and shield perpetrators from responsibility.⁸⁹³ Recurrent violations of fair trial rights and access to justice contribute to maintaining this impunity, and further fuel violations, while accountability, justice, and reparations for victims and their families for past and on-going violations remain elusive, and persist.⁸⁹⁴

503. The absence of adequate domestic legal protections to express dissent, reinforced by a Judiciary that lacks independence, and security institutions that operate with impunity, perpetuates cycles of repression enabling gross human rights violations, as demonstrated during successive waves of protests, including the 2022-23 protests, the November 2009 “Aban” protests (see below), and the protests that began on 28 December 2025, but also in the State’s response following the June 2025 hostilities, as examined above.

504. Although the contexts of past and current protests in Iran and the June 2025 hostilities markedly differ, the State employed similar repressive measures in both situations aimed at silencing individuals critical of, or perceived as having criticized, State-sanctioned ideologies and rules. Enabled by the structural causes of violations that allow for suppressing of dissent, shortly after the Israeli airstrikes began, authorities resorted to arbitrary arrests and detention, fair trial and due process violations, while unduly limiting access to information through a complete Internet shutdown. Additionally, and as detailed in Section V above, incidents where security forces resorted to unnecessary use of force at security checkpoints in at least eight provinces were documented between July and October 2025, resulting in deaths and injuries, including a three-year-old girl (see subsection V.B, above).

505. The recurrence of these violations underscores the continuity and entrenchment of the State’s punitive approach to individuals critical of or perceived as having criticized Iran’s rules and State-sanctioned ideologies. This indicates that repression in Iran functions as a governing strategy rather than as an isolated response to protests or other situations that may be perceived as “crisis.”

⁸⁹⁰ See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 1620.

⁸⁹¹ See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 1851.

⁸⁹² The Mission previously found, that in the context of the 2022 protests, domestic law in and of itself falls short of international human rights standards, thereby failing to fully protect fundamental human rights as part of Iran’s commitments as State party to various human rights treaties. This includes the rights to life, not to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment, not to be subjected to rape and sexual violence, to liberty and security of person and to a fair trial and due process, as well as the right to privacy, to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly, equality and to non-discrimination, as well as the right to participate in public life, to bodily integrity and autonomy, to privacy, and to access to education and to health. The lack of full incorporation of human rights in domestic legislation denies victims of those rights and an effective remedy. See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 1832-1836.

⁸⁹³ FFM-IRAN-D-008542 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-000062 (FFMI Submission)

⁸⁹⁴ See A/HRC/50/19, para. 10, on continued pattern of excessive use of force in the context of the management of peaceful assemblies in relation to 2021 protests; see A/75/213, para. 5 in relation to “patterns of shooting at vital organs” in 2019 protests, and para. 28 on of “trends in the Islamic Republic of Iran of suppressing the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression and assembly”.

506. For three decades, various UN entities, including the UN Secretary General, have provided recommendations to the Iranian authorities which are yet to be implemented. The Mission has likewise provided concrete recommendations for structural reforms to cease current deprivations of rights and ensure gender equality, including legal reforms to amend laws, regulations, and policies which do not adhere to the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality, or lack legitimate grounds, and that have facilitated gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity in the context of the September 2022/2023 protests.⁸⁹⁵

507. Despite this, Iran's domestic laws and regulations continue to enable systemic impunity and the persecution of real or perceived dissenting individuals including protesters, while denying victims and their families their rights to truth, justice, and reparations. These laws, including due to their inherent discriminatory nature, as well as the institutions responsible for their application, including the Judiciary, deny basic fair-trial guarantees, independence, impartiality, and non-discrimination.

A. The role of law enforcement and the Judiciary in the suppression of dissent and repression of the population

508. The Mission previously examined root causes, or “enablers,” of serious human rights violations, including the absence of legal protections in Iran's domestic laws. It considered it necessary to expand this analysis, however, as the same flawed legal provisions that enabled violations during the 2022-2023 protests were employed to quell protests in 2019, to suppress dissent during and in the aftermath of the June 2025 hostilities (see also sub-section B, above), and to crack down on the protests that began on 28 December 2025 (see section III, above).

509. The lack of independence of the Judiciary and prosecutors, as detailed previously by the Mission, and the lack of transparency and accountability of the judicial system and interference with the independence of the Iranian Bar Association and members of the bar, create further impediments for victims of human rights violations to access justice. Judges deny victims' access to justice, including by ignoring torture allegations and denying them victim status because of supposed infractions. In light of their involvement in human rights violations as previously found by the Mission, including unlawful deaths, torture and arbitrary detention, the role of intelligence entities in judicial proceedings represents an effective bar for any victim of such violations to seek justice before the courts. Equally, defence lawyers from the approved list of the Head of the Judiciary, who do not provide effective assistance and/or disregarded torture allegations or even contribute to fair trial violations, can hardly be considered viable legal advocates for victims of these violations.

510. As outlined below, Iran's legal framework makes it virtually impossible for individuals or groups to obtain permits for assemblies, except in narrowly defined circumstances and only where the purpose of the assembly aligns with the Government of Iran's ideologies, beliefs, and policies, in violation of basic tenets of the right to freedom of expression and association. Assemblies held without authorization are deemed illegal, and laws allow police and security forces to use force, including lethal force with firearms, to suppress them.⁸⁹⁶ Laws governing assemblies, together with Iran's Penal Code, enable arbitrary deprivation of life, as well as arbitrary arrest and detention of both protesters and bystanders, including children.⁸⁹⁷ The legal framework therefore entrenches this structural impunity and suppresses dissent, including in the context of protests, with particularly severe impacts on women and ethnic and religious minorities, as also documented previously by the Mission.

1. Criminalization of assembly

511. Iran's Constitution does not guarantee the right to peaceful assembly in line with international law, as it subjects holding assemblies to vague and broad limitations. Article 27 allows assemblies only if they are not deemed contrary to the “fundamental principles of

⁸⁹⁵ For the Mission's detailed recommendations, see A/HRC/55/CRP.1, Section XIII and A/HRC/58/CRP.1, Section XII.

⁸⁹⁶ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 432-435.

⁸⁹⁷ A/HRC/58/CRP.1 Section VI.

Islam,” a term not defined in the Constitution.⁸⁹⁸ Accordingly, authorities equate these principles with the ideological foundations and laws of the Islamic Republic, effectively rendering other gatherings that allegedly depart from these principles as “illegal,” even if peaceful, and thus criminalizing expression, allowing security forces to lawfully disperse protesters,⁸⁹⁹ often through the use of force.

512. Although the Constitution does not require prior authorization for assemblies, the 2016 Law on the Operation of Political Groups and Parties (“Law on Political Parties”),⁹⁰⁰ requires that they receive prior permission to be held. Under this law, political parties that have been licensed to operate within the country have certain “rights and privileges,” including holding “demonstrations and assemblies” with the knowledge and/or permission of the Ministry of Interior and the Governor’s Office.⁹⁰¹

513. For example, Note 2 of Article 2 of the Law on Political Parties requires political parties’ statutes to ensure that their views, ideologies, and beliefs conform to Islamic principles. In addition, Article 4 requires members of a political party to have “demonstrated commitment to the Constitution and the principle of absolute guardianship of the Islamic jurist (*velayat-e-faqih*),” while Article 5 excludes, *inter alia*, individuals convicted of national security offences, those suspected of espionage by security and intelligence bodies prior to acquittal, and those deemed to “visibly commit vice.”

514. In practice, established patterns of convicting and sentencing human rights defenders, protesters, and others expressing opposing views of security-related charges, effectively excludes them from eligibility under these provisions, thereby foreclosing any possibility of their legally holding assemblies in Iran.⁹⁰² If such individuals do hold assemblies, such assemblies would be considered “illegal.”⁹⁰³

2. Use of force

515. The use of force in Iran is regulated by the 1995 “Law on the Use of Firearms by Armed Forces in Necessary Instances” (“Law on Firearms”).⁹⁰⁴ It is the only legislation in Iran that governs the use of force by law enforcement agents.

516. According to Article 1, the Law on Firearms applies to forces who carry weapons in the context of their duties to “secure order and security, prevent the flight of those accused or convicted of crimes [...] investigating and uncovering crimes, and enforcing judicial orders.” Note 1 states that the law applies to armed agents of the Ministry of Intelligence, while Article 11 extends provisions to “military and security forces collaborating with the police in assigned operations.”⁹⁰⁵ The Law does not provide additional details on these military and security forces.

517. According to Article 3, armed forces may use firearms in situations including but not limited to self-defense, protecting others at risk, arresting or preventing the escape of suspects or detainees, protecting borders, facilities, weapons, and high-security locations.⁹⁰⁶ In these

⁸⁹⁸ Article 27, 1979 Constitution.

⁸⁹⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008542 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-000062 (FFMI Submission).

⁹⁰⁰ Law on the Activities of Political Parties and Groups (Law on Parties).

⁹⁰¹ Law on the Activities of Political Parties and Groups (Law on Parties), Chapter II.

⁹⁰² FFM-IRAN-D-008542 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-000062 (FFMI Submission).

⁹⁰³ “We urge people not to participate in illegal gatherings”, ISNA, 30 December 2017.

⁹⁰⁴ Law on the Use of Firearms by Armed Forces in Necessary Incidents (the Law on Firearms)

⁹⁰⁵ Article 11 of the Law on Firearms.

⁹⁰⁶ The law allows for the use of firearms in the following circumstance 1. for defending themselves against an individual who attacks them with “warm or cold weapons”; 2. for defending themselves against one or several persons who launch an attack without resorting to arms but the circumstances are such that self-defense without the use of a firearm is not possible; 3. when law enforcement officials see that a person or several people have been attacked and their life is at risk; 4. for arresting a thief, a bandit, or a person who has committed an assassination or destruction or has used explosive and is fleeing; 5. in cases where a detainee or prisoner escapes the detention facility or prison or flees while being transferred and where other measures to stop and arrest them have been used to no avail; 6. for protecting buildings belonging to the police forces such as headquarters, police stations, weapons and armory storage and training grounds; 7. for protecting the weapons they carry for performing their missions; 8. for protecting high-security locations, referred to as “classified

circumstances, when the use of force is permitted, the Law on Firearms requires that advance warnings are given by armed forces and stipulates that firearms should be used only: (i) as a last resort; and (ii) “if the situation permits,” first shoot in the air, then at the individual’s lower body (waist down), and then shoot at the individual’s upper body.⁹⁰⁷ Therefore, the Law on Firearms does not align with international human rights law standards on the use of force with firearms, which state that potentially lethal force with a firearm is only permitted when strictly necessary to protect life or prevent serious injury from an imminent threat. These standards also clarify that intentionally lethal force may only be used if it is strictly necessary to protect life from an imminent threat.⁹⁰⁸ The Law on Firearms instead allows for the use of force against individuals without reference to these thresholds, including but not limited to situation of illegal border crossing.⁹⁰⁹

518. The Law on Firearms moreover provides for the use of firearms to control assemblies, while differentiating between “armed” and “unarmed” assemblies.⁹¹⁰

519. Article 4, applicable to “unarmed” assemblies,” provides that security and intelligence forces may resort to firearms to “control illegal assemblies,” and “quash riots, rebellion, and unrests” where “suppressing them” is deemed “impossible without the use of firearms.”⁹¹¹ In such circumstances, before using firearms, law enforcement must ensure that other means have been exhausted to no effect and that an “ultimatum” has been issued to the “rioters” and “agitators.”⁹¹² The Law on Firearms therefore allows armed forces to use firearms to block, disperse, or otherwise disrupt assemblies for which prior authorization was not obtained (otherwise referred to as “illegal assemblies”). Note 1 of Article 4 of the Law on Firearms stipulates that the responsibility for determining which assemblies warrant the use of firearms under Article 4, rests with the respective provincial or county provision council, namely the provincial governor or county governor.

520. According to Article 5, “military and police forces are allowed to use firearms for quashing “armed illegal assemblies, unrest and riots.”⁹¹³ It does not require issuing warnings or exhausting other means prior to resorting to the use of firearms, as is the case for “unarmed” assemblies under Article 4. It provides no definition of what constitutes being “armed,” nor does it set out any criteria for determining what qualifies as an “armed assembly.” It also fails to specify who is responsible for determining whether an assembly is considered “armed,” how to treat individuals who may be “armed” or “unarmed,” and what may constitute “armed illegal assemblies.”

Threats of criminal prosecution, including the death penalty, to incentivize security officers to use firearms⁹¹⁴

521. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure for Armed Forces, violations committed by the armed forces fall within the jurisdiction of military courts, which lack basic guarantees of independence and impartiality. This framework shields perpetrators from accountability and has serious consequences for the rights of victims of gross human rights violations.⁹¹⁵ According to Article 1, armed forces include the army and its affiliated organizations, the IRGC and its affiliated organizations, including the Basij, the Ministry of Defence and its affiliated organizations, and personnel covered under the Law on Police Forces. As also demonstrated in the Mission’s investigations,⁹¹⁶ these same forces are generally deployed to protest sites and have resorted to lethal force to “control assemblies” leading to killings and

locations”, in particular those prone to being invaded and attacked with the aim of committing an assassination, destruction, arson, theft of documents and valuables, hostage taking, or occupation; 9. for preventing and stopping people who intend to enter or exit from illegal borders and do not pay attention to the warnings of border guards; 10. for protecting police, military and security facilities, equipment, and buildings.

⁹⁰⁷ Note 1, Article 3 of the Law on Firearms.

⁹⁰⁸ Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36 (2019), para. 12.

⁹⁰⁹ *Idem*, pt. 9.

⁹¹⁰ Article 4 and Article 5 of The Law on Firearms.

⁹¹¹ Article 4 of the Law on Firearms.

⁹¹² Article 4 of the Law on Firearms.

⁹¹³ Article 5 of the Law of Firearms.

⁹¹⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008542 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-000062 (FFMI Submission).

⁹¹⁵ Article 1 of the Penal Code for Crimes Committed by Armed Forces.

⁹¹⁶ See *generally* A/HRC/55/CRP.1, Section V.A.

injuries. Military courts may therefore exercise jurisdiction over violations of human rights including of the right to life. In the context of the investigations into the 2022-23 protests, cases referred to military prosecutors or military courts were often terminated or stagnated for years.⁹¹⁷ The Mission has previously noted that military courts should not have jurisdiction over human rights violations and crimes under international law.⁹¹⁸

522. Article 633 prohibits the publication of information in relation to judgments rendered by military courts. While this provision allows the Head of the Judicial Organization of the Armed Forces to authorize publication “if necessary and where appropriate”, military court judgments are usually secret, shielded from public scrutiny, and as such, in violation of the principle of transparency.⁹¹⁹

523. It further imposes severe penalties, including the death penalty,⁹²⁰ on military and police personnel who hesitate or refuse to use force against “enemies” or “evil doers.”⁹²¹ These terms along with similar others such as “rioters” and “terrorists” have been routinely used in official statements including by senior officials to describe protesters in 2022-23,⁹²² and in 2019,⁹²³ to discredit and delegitimize their demands, and justify the use of force against them.⁹²⁴

524. During and after the June 2025 hostilities, and during the protests that began on 28 December 2025, the same rhetoric persisted. Authorities labelled individuals expressing dissenting views as “spies” or “hostile,” and charged them with “propaganda against state” or for “collaborations with hostile governments,” in line with previously established patterns.

525. Notes 1 and 2 to Article 41⁹²⁵ of the Code of Criminal Procedure for Armed Forces exempt state agents from criminal responsibility when they use firearms in compliance with the Law on Firearms, even when causing death or injury.⁹²⁶ If victims (of the killing or injury) are considered “not guilty” or “innocent,” they or their families are entitled to financial compensation, with no criminal consequences for the perpetrators.⁹²⁷ The Law does not define who may be regarded as “innocent,” and does not specify who determines an individual’s “guilt.” Absent references to international standards to justify the use of firearms by armed forces, peaceful protesters who refuse to disperse, or individuals engaging in throwing stones, may be deemed “guilty,” which in turn, may justify lethal force against them.

526. Article 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for Armed Forces imposes three months to one year of imprisonment, and liability to pay compensation, on any agent found to have

⁹¹⁷ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 608-612.

⁹¹⁸ See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 607.

⁹¹⁹ Article 633 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for Armed Forces.

⁹²⁰ Article 32 states that any person covered under the Act (Article 1) who refuses to use their weapons, ammunition, or other military means available to fight, or flagrantly commits acts which weakens the spirit of the forces or intentionally refuses to face, fight, take the enemy forces as prisoner, or destroy the enemy ships, planes or any other equipment, as delegated to them or required under their military responsibilities, will be sentenced to death if their actions result in the defeat of “the Islam’s front” or face imprisonment between three to 15 years.

⁹²¹ According to Article 25, “the term enemy means: evil doers [*ashrar*], groups and governments which are at war with the Islamic Republic of Iran or intend to overthrow it or their actions are against [the Islamic Republic of Iran’s] national security.”

⁹²² See A/HRC/58/CRP.1, para. 218.

⁹²³ “The Supreme Leader’s remarks regarding the issues that arose following the implementation of the fuel consumption management plan”, 17 November 2019.

⁹²⁴ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 87, 481, 636 (among others).

⁹²⁵ Article 41 stipulates that any member of the armed forces, who during service or a mission, intentionally discharges firearms in breach of laws and regulations, will be sentenced to imprisonment from three months to one year, as well as being made liable for compensating for the damages. If the shooting results in death or injury, the perpetrator shall be sentenced to either *qisas* (retribution in kind) or the payment of blood money.

⁹²⁶ Note 1 and 2 stipulate that in cases where shooting has been in accordance with the law, the perpetrator will not be subjected to any punishments. In such cases, if the victim of the killing or the individual injured has been “not guilty” and “innocent”, they will receive financial compensation from the state. Note 2 clarifies that the applicable law governing the use of firearms is the 1995 Law on the Use of Firearms.

⁹²⁷ This is also stipulated under Article 13 of the Law on Firearms.

intentionally discharged firearms in breach of the law. If the intentional unlawful discharge leads to death or injury, the agent may also face *qisas* or to be made to pay *diyeh* (“blood money”).

3. Arbitrary arrests and detention

527. As previously found, although Iran’s Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure provide for the right to liberty of person, vague and overly broad provisions in the Islamic Penal Code and other laws enable arbitrary arrest and detention. The Code of Criminal Procedure requires that individuals be brought before an investigator located within the prosecutor’s office, rather than an independent and impartial judicial authority. As a result, the same body that orders detention also reviews and extends it, leaving detainees without fully effective means to challenge the lawfulness of their deprivation of liberty. By-laws also continue to allow intelligence and security bodies to maintain special detention facilities for people accused of vaguely defined national security offences.⁹²⁸

528. At the same time, Iran’s Penal Code criminalizes a broad range of conduct associated with peaceful protest. For example, individuals who organize or participate in protests may be charged under Article 610, which states: “When two or more individuals collude and conspire to commit crimes against the national or foreign security of the country or prepare the facilities to commit the aforementioned crimes, unless they are regarded as *mohareb* (“enemy of God”) [they] shall be sentenced to two to five years’ imprisonment.”⁹²⁹ According to credible information, Articles 514⁹³⁰ and 609⁹³¹ are frequently used against individuals for chanting slogans critical of state officials.⁹³²

B. Recurrence of gross human rights violations

529. The serious human rights violations found previously by the Mission across successive mandates did not occur in isolation. Rather, they stem from, and, in some cases are systematized by, the legislative and constitutional provisions (above) that continuously enable law enforcement and judicial authorities to suppress and silence individuals critical of or perceived as having criticized State-sanctioned ideologies and rules (see also Sub-section C).

530. In situations such as past protest movements and, as observed during and after the June 2025 hostilities, and during the protests that began on 28 December 2025 (see section III), punitive measures enabled by these flawed legal frameworks intensify (see also Section IV).

1. Use of force

531. On 15 November 2019, Iranian authorities announced a threefold increase in petrol prices, which triggered nationwide protests⁹³³ that spread to more than 200 cities.⁹³⁴ Video footage and reports by numerous credible human rights organizations began emerging soon after, indicating that security forces were using lethal force including live ammunition against

⁹²⁸ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 624-625.

⁹²⁹ See A/HRC/55/CRP.1 para. 343, 434, 1435.

⁹³⁰ Article 514 of the Islamic Penal Code states: “Anyone who, by any means, insults Imam Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, and/or the Supreme Leader shall be sentenced to six months to two years’ imprisonment.”.

⁹³¹ According to Article 609 “Anyone who insults any of the Heads of three powers [of the Executive, Judiciary and Legislature] or Vice-Presidents or Ministers or Members of Parliament or Members of the Council of Experts [for Leadership] or Members of the Guardian Council or judges or Members of the Audit Court or civil servants of Ministries and governmental organizations and companies and municipalities while they are performing their duties, or [if the (offender) insults them] in connection with their duties, shall be sentenced to 74 lashes or a fine of fifty thousand to one million Rials.”.

⁹³² FFM-IRAN-D-008542 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-000062 (FFMI Submission).

⁹³³ The Government revised the price of gasoline/ rationing started in the morning of November 15”, Mehr News, 15 November 2019.

⁹³⁴ “20 points regarding the incidents of November 2019”, Fars News Agency, 30 November 2019.

unarmed protesters across the country.⁹³⁵ On 6 December 2019, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that “security forces responded to unarmed protesters with water cannons, tear gas, batons and live ammunition” and that “according to some reports, the Basij militia and IRGC used live ammunition against demonstrators.”⁹³⁶ According to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, security forces resorted to unnecessary and disproportionate use of lethal force killing at least 328 people, including 12 children, although the death toll is believed to be much higher.⁹³⁷ Most deaths were reported in Tehran (142), and in minority populated provinces including Khuzestan (59), Alborz (34) and Kermanshah (31).⁹³⁸

532. On 1 June 2020, a member of Parliament acknowledged the death of 230 individuals, including six members of the security forces.⁹³⁹

Mahshahr city, Khuzestan province

533. Some of the most serious violence was reported to have taken place in minority-populated provinces,⁹⁴⁰ including Khuzestan province,⁹⁴¹ where Iran’s Arab minority primarily resides.

534. Between 15 and 18 November 2019, authorities responded to roadblocks set up by protesters in Mahshahr city, Khuzestan province, and nearby towns with lethal force, killing between 30⁹⁴² to over 100 protesters.⁹⁴³ On 18 November, according to witnesses, security forces, including the IRGC, used heavy machine guns against protesters who had blocked main roads in Chamran, Mahshahr city, and chased them into nearby marshlands. Security forces surrounded the protesters and continuously shot at them in the reeds.⁹⁴⁴ State media reported that one security force member was shot in the head and killed, while another officer was shot in the chest and abdominal area and later perished.⁹⁴⁵

535. Video footage reviewed by the Mission showed uniformed IRGC staff standing with weapons by tanks and armoured vehicles that were driving down a road, as multiple rounds were fired and people were heard shouting.⁹⁴⁶ On 15 June 2020, when asked about the number of deaths in Mahshahr, the Governor of Khuzestan reportedly responded that he “cannot say [because he] cannot disclose these things.” He reportedly continued stating that the “responsible authorities will act if they consider it appropriate” and noted that “[reports on] what happened in the reeds” are “false.”⁹⁴⁷

536. The Mission’s investigations into the Mahshahr protests, and other instances in which serious human rights violations were reported during the “Aban” protests are on-going.

⁹³⁵ See A/HRC/43/61, para. 8. See also “Iran: Deliberate Coverup of Brutal Crackdown, 12 Days After Protests, Authorities Refuse to Announce Death Toll”, Human Rights Watch, 27 November 2019.

⁹³⁶ UNOG Bi-weekly press briefing: Iran Protests OHCHR, 6 December 2019.

⁹³⁷ A/HRC/43/61, para. 6.

⁹³⁸ “Iran: details of 324 deaths in crackdown on November 2019 protest”, Amnesty International, 16 November 2021.

⁹³⁹ “The Number of Those Killed in the Aban Incidents in Iran: 230 Dead / 2,000 Injured.”, ISNA, 1 June 2020.

⁹⁴⁰ “Five Years Later, Still No Justice for Iran’s Massacre of November 2019 Protesters”, Centre for Human Rights in Iran, 13 November 2024. See also “Protests Over Fuel Prices In Iran Spread To Multiple Cities”, Radio Free Europe, 15 November 2019.

⁹⁴¹ “Iran: No Justice for Bloody Crackdown”, Human Rights Watch, 25 February 2020, Aban Tribunal Judgement, para. 176.

⁹⁴² “Iran: Details of 321 deaths in crackdown on November 2019 protests.”, Amnesty International, 22 July 2022.

⁹⁴³ “With Brutal Crackdown, Iran Is Convulsed by Worst Unrest in 40 Years”, New York Times, 1 December 2019.

⁹⁴⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008334 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008364 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006477 (FFMI Interview); International People’s Tribunal on Iran’s Atrocities (ABAN TRIBUNAL), Judgement, 1 November 2022, para. 117 and para. 168. See also “Aban 98: How Did the Neyzar Massacre Unfold?”, Radio Zamaneh, 19 November 2021.

⁹⁴⁵ “A police officer was martyred in Mahshahr”, Defa Press, 21 July 2021.

⁹⁴⁶ Social media posts on file with the Mission. See also “Aban 98: How Did the Neyzar Massacre Unfold?”, Radio Zamaneh, 19 November 2021.

⁹⁴⁷ “Khuzestan Governor denies massacre in the reeds”, Radio Free Europe, 15 June 2020.

Patterns of use of lethal force by law enforcement agents

537. In the context of its investigations into the 2022-2023 protests, the Mission established patterns of unnecessary and disproportionate use of lethal force resulting in deaths and injuries of protesters and bystanders who did not pose an imminent threat of death or serious injury. According to credible figures, up to 551 people were killed, among them as many as 49 women and 68 children, in 26 out of 31 provinces in Iran.⁹⁴⁸

538. Impunity in cases of unlawful use of force is already enshrined in the Law on Firearms (above), which – as noted above – fails to establish a clear threshold for the use of force, including lethal force, that aligns with international human rights law. This is compounded by a lack of transparency and accountability in its application, as authorities systematically fail to disclose the circumstances in which force was used or whether any assessments of legality, necessity, proportionality, precaution, accountability, and non-discrimination have been conducted. In most cases, the absence of effective investigations and prosecutions, or of any information indicating that such assessments were carried out, further entrenches impunity.

539. Against this background, instances of the unlawful use of lethal force are not limited to the context of protests. As documented above (see Section V), the Mission documented incidents of use of force violations in the context of the June 2025 hostilities, and up to at least November 2025, well after the Israeli airstrikes had already subsided and when there was a reduced security risk. Authorities did not publish any information indicating that the victims' conduct during these incidents would have permitted law enforcement officers to use lethal force under international human rights law. The Mission is currently investigating allegations of use of lethal force by security forces during the protests that began on 28 December 2025 (see section III, above).

540. The Law on Firearms also allows for the use of firearms for purposes such as “border protection” but, as noted above, does not mention the threshold for the use of force, including lethal force. Indeed, reports by the UN Secretary-General, the UN Special Rapporteur on Iran, and human rights organizations have demonstrated that security forces regularly fire lethal ammunition at *kulbars* in Kurdistan and *soukhtbars*⁹⁴⁹ in Sistan and Baluchestan, killing and severely injuring many.⁹⁵⁰

2. Patterns of arrests and detention

541. The Mission notes that UN human rights bodies, including the Mission itself, as well as corroborating credible sources, have previously found that Iran has relied on arbitrary arrest and detention to suppress dissent and silence critical voices in Iran. The Mission is currently investigating allegations of mass arbitrary arrests and detention of protesters and/or bystanders, including children, in the context of the protests that began on 28 December 2025 (see section III above).

542. Many of the opinions between 2015 and 2025 of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) demonstrate that Iranian authorities regularly subject protesters, journalists, artists, human rights defenders, and dual nationals to arbitrary arrests and detention. The WGAD's findings continuously highlight systemic fair trial and due process violations including arrests without legal bases; detention used as punishment for protected conduct such as the right to freedom of expression, association and of peaceful assembly; denial of access to legal counsel; absence of an arrest warrant; failure to inform detainees of reasons or grounds for their arrest and detention; prosecution under vaguely worded offences; closed trial and appeal processes conducted by courts that lack independence;

⁹⁴⁸ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 482.

⁹⁴⁹ *Kulbar* are Kurdish cross border couriers, while *Soukhtbar* are Baluch fuel porters. See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 1008.

⁹⁵⁰ See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, A/74/188, 18 July 2019, para. 91. See also “Protests, discrimination and the future of minorities in Iran”, Minority Rights Group International, Center for Supporters of Human Rights in Iran 2022; Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report of the Secretary-General, A/77/525, 14 October 2022, para. 8. See also Press briefing notes on Iran, OHCHR, 5 March 2021.

disproportionately harsh sentencing; torture and ill-treatment; denial of medical care; and coerced confessions.⁹⁵¹

543. In the context of the 2022 protests, for example, protesters and others supporting them were subjected to mass arbitrary arrests and detention for protected speech and conduct. In an apparent spike in arrests, Iran's "Special Committee Investigating the 2022 Unrest" stated that 34,000 individuals had had "judicial cases" filed against them in the context of the protests.⁹⁵² State affiliated media announced that, as of March 2023, a total of 22,628 persons⁹⁵³ had been pardoned.⁹⁵⁴ Arbitrary arrests and detention of victims and/or their family members in the context of the 2022-23 protests continued into early 2025.⁹⁵⁵

544. Likewise, according to Iranian media, nearly 7,000 people were arrested in connection with the 2019 protests,⁹⁵⁶ with credible information indicating that security forces arrested individuals in 28 out of Iran's 31 provinces.⁹⁵⁷ According to the findings of the "International People's Tribunal on Iran's Atrocities" (the "Aban Tribunal"),⁹⁵⁸ many of these arrests were carried out without a warrant and absent legal grounds, with detainees routinely denied due process including legal counsel and the right to a fair trial.⁹⁵⁹ The Aban Tribunal found that Iranian security forces engaged in the widespread and systematic arbitrary arrest, deprivation of liberty, and imprisonment of individuals, including both participants and non-participants in the 2019 "Aban" protests, which, the Tribunal found, amounted to a crime against humanity.⁹⁶⁰

545. Large-scale arrests and detention were also announced by state officials during and after the Israeli airstrikes in June 2025. Though numbers vary, the Head of the Judiciary has indicated that some 21,000 "suspects" had been arrested in the context of the hostilities, and by mid-August 2025, some had been released (see Section V, above). Such large-scale arrests appear to also have occurred during and after the protests that began on 28 December 2025, with credible organization reporting that over 50, 000 people had been arrested and detained in this context (see Section III, above)

3. Restrictions on access to information including Internet shutdowns

546. As previously found by the Mission, Iran has established an extensive framework to control digital space that restricts access to the Internet, censors online content and overall tightens State control including through the development of the National Information Network (NIN). State bodies, under the ultimate authority of the Supreme Leader, exercise powers to regulate connectivity, impose Internet shutdowns, conduct digital surveillance, and control access to social media, with decisions that lack transparency and avenues for appeal.⁹⁶¹

547. The Iranian government heavily restricts access to social media during protest movements. The first reported instance of Iranian authorities imposing an Internet shutdown occurred during the 2017-2018 protests, when internet access in Iran was severely disrupted

⁹⁵¹ A/HRC/WGAD/2021/85.

⁹⁵² Statement of the President of the Special Committee investigating the 2022 Unrests, 18 March 2024. See also A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 1845.

⁹⁵³ "22,000 of pardoned are related to the recent riots/pardon of 82000 prisoners" IRNA, 13 March 2023.

⁹⁵⁴ The Iranian Government has not made public any detailed or disaggregated information on the overall number of individuals arrested and detained in connection with the 2022 protests. The Mission continued to document arrests and detention of protesters and/or of those expressing solidarity with the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement during the period under review.

⁹⁵⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-006159 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006004 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006005 (FFMI Interview). See also A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 91-106. See also "Continued arrest and lack of information about Bitā Shafiei's condition in Khorramshahr," HRANA, 17 November 2025.

⁹⁵⁶ "Naqavi-Hosseini: Around 7,000 People Arrested in the Unrest in Iran.," Entekhab, 26 November 2019.

⁹⁵⁷ Aban Tribunal, Judgment, para. 238, ft. 508.

⁹⁵⁸ The "Aban Tribunal" was an international People's Tribunal established to investigate the alleged atrocities that took place in November 2019 in the Islamic Republic of Iran during protests that erupted on 15 November 2019 following a government announcement that fuel prices had tripled.

⁹⁵⁹ Aban Tribunal, Judgment, para. 235.

⁹⁶⁰ Aban Tribunal, Judgment, para. 298.

⁹⁶¹ See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 1128-1135.

on 30 December 2017, and, at one point, completely cut off for half an hour.⁹⁶² After the Supreme National Security Council ordered a shutdown, according to credible information, the authorities cut off the Internet on 17 November 2019 until at least 23 November 2019. In some provinces, such as Khuzestan, the Internet was cut off for over 10 days, until 27 November 2019.⁹⁶³ The same practice was applied when people in Khuzestan protested water shortages in the summer of 2021, where the government throttled the Internet during the then protests.⁹⁶⁴

548. Though there was no blanket Internet shutdown documented during the 2022 protests, the authorities implemented targeted Internet shutdowns, while mobile communication networks and home broadband connections experienced deliberate disruptions. The Mission has provided extensive analysis on the use of digital space in the context of the 2022-2023 protests. As noted above, a complete Internet and communications shutdown was likewise imposed during the protests that began on 28 December 2025 (see section III, above).

549. In a similar vein, between 14 and 17 June 2025, after the Israeli airstrikes commenced, authorities likewise restricted communications and shut down the Internet. In a Resolution dated 4 November 2025,⁹⁶⁵ the UN General Assembly expressed “concern” about “renewed efforts” by Iran to “limit access to information, criminalize dissent and the sharing of information, both online and offline,” including through espionage charges imposed without due process and fair trial guarantees (see also Section IV and V),⁹⁶⁶ and most recently, during the protests that began on 28 December 2025 (see section III, above).

C. Persistent lack of investigations and accountability

1. In the context of the 2019 November (“Aban”) protests

550. On 5 December 2019, the Government of Iran created a committee, consisting of the Vice President for Legal Affairs, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice, to investigate the 2019 events and ensure compensation to all those affected by the violence and destruction.⁹⁶⁷ In July 2020, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the committee did not comply with international standards, as it lacked independence, impartiality, transparency, thoroughness, and effectiveness.⁹⁶⁸ As of the time of writing, the findings of this committee had not been made public. In 2022, the then President of Iran established the “Special Committee to Investigate the 2022 Unrest”, which the Mission previously found did not meet international human rights standards for domestic investigations, particularly regarding independence, impartiality, transparency, thoroughness, and effectiveness.⁹⁶⁹

551. According to information available to the Mission, to date, no senior official has been held accountable for violations or crimes committed in the context of the 2019 protests.⁹⁷⁰ On 14 November 2021, according to Iranian media, the Chairman of Iran’s Parliamentary Committee for Judicial Affairs, Hassan Norouzi, said: “One of those who fired shots at the people was me. We killed them. Now, who wants to put us on trial? The guy came and set

⁹⁶² “Iran’s Severely Disrupted Internet During Protests: ‘Websites Hardly Open’”, Center for Human Rights, 2 January 2018.

⁹⁶³ FFM-IRAN-D-008806 (FFMI Submission).

⁹⁶⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008806 (FFMI Submission); “Deadly Repression of Khuzestan Protests”, Human Rights Watch, 29 July 2021.

⁹⁶⁵ See A/C.3/80/L.30.

⁹⁶⁶ See A/RES/80/222, para. 20.

⁹⁶⁷ “The Damage Assessment Committee has begun”, Donya-e-Eghtesad, 5 December 2019.

⁹⁶⁸ See A/75/213, para. 12.

⁹⁶⁹ See A/HRC/55/67, para. 117; A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 1839-1844.

⁹⁷⁰ “Iran: No Justice for Bloody 2019 Crackdown”, Human Rights Watch, 17 November 2020. See also “Mockery of justice: State policies and laws regarding the victims of Iran’s 2019 November protests”, Justice for Iran, 2020; “Five Years Later, Still No Justice for Iran’s Massacre of November 2019 Protesters”, Center for Human Rights in Iran, 13 November 2024. See also Report by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, July 2020, A/75/213, para. 9; “Six Years Later, the Cases of Families of the Victims of the November 2019 Protests Remain Unanswered.”, Sedayemardom, 24 November 2025; FFM-IRAN-D-008776 (FFMI Submission).

fire to a bank and we killed him.”⁹⁷¹ On 15 November 2021, he said that he had only been “joking.”⁹⁷² The Mission found no information indicating that Mr. Norouzi has been the subject of any investigations following this statement.

552. According to Iranian media, as of early 2026, authorities had not responded to complaints by the families of those killed during the 2009 “Aban” protests. According to a lawyer involved in related cases, the Judiciary has so far solely sought to close complaints after offering financial compensation (or “blood money”), rather than conducting investigations into the reported killings.⁹⁷³

Policy preventing victims and families from 2019 protests from obtaining accountability

553. On 4 December 2019, Iran’s then Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, approved a proposal by the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, to classify victims of the 2019 protests into three categories: (i) “ordinary citizens” or those killed “accidentally” while passing by; (ii) protesters who took part in the protests but did not take arms; and (iii) “armed rioters.”⁹⁷⁴

554. This classification led to discriminatory treatment of families of victims. Under this policy, families of bystanders were recognized as “martyrs” and entitled to *diya* or “blood money,”⁹⁷⁵ and additional benefits from the “Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs.” Families of protesters were entitled only to “blood money,” while families of those labelled as “armed rioters” received no compensation and could only be offered “consolation” if deemed “respectable.” This policy does not include any references to investigations into the alleged killings, suggesting that the deaths during the protests were deemed lawful.⁹⁷⁶

555. In late December 2019, Ali Shamkhani, the then Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council announced that the classification of victims was requiring significant time and was thus delaying compensation for victims and their families.⁹⁷⁷

Delayed investigations and denied justice

556. The Mission’s investigations showed that, in the cases where families filed complaints for violations suffered in the context of the 2019 “Aban” protests, judicial authorities dismissed legal complaints or stalled investigations into potentially unlawful killings, including in cases where families provided evidence of the killings by way of medical reports or video footage of the incidents.⁹⁷⁸

557. In one such case, according to credible information, when a family filed a complaint with a prosecutor’s office to investigate the killing of their son, prosecutorial staff instead pressured the family to file a complaint against unspecified “thugs” and “gangs”. Despite multiple follow-ups by the family, no investigative steps were taken until several months later, when an official at the court told the family to stop pursuing the case, saying they would “get nowhere” and that there were “hundreds of cases like this.”⁹⁷⁹ According to a family member, authorities acknowledged to the family that “something had happened” but insisted it was “not intentional.” Nearly six years later, there were no updates in the investigation, effectively denying the family truth, justice, accountability and reparations.

⁹⁷¹ <https://x.com/SharghDaily/status/1459821961513771011>.

⁹⁷² “A Bitter ‘Nowruzi’ Joke in the Court of Public Opinion.”, ISNA, 14 November 2021.

⁹⁷³ “Six Years Later, the Cases of Families of the Victims of the November 2019 Protests Remain Unanswered.”, Sedayemardom, 24 November 2025.

⁹⁷⁴ “Response to the Report of the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council on How the Situation of Those Killed and Injured in the Recent Incidents Was Managed.”, Khamenie.ir, 4 December 2019.

⁹⁷⁵ See A/HRC/58/CRP.1, para. 862.

⁹⁷⁶ “Response to the Report of the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council on How the Situation of Those Killed and Injured in the Recent Incidents Was Managed.”, Khamenie.ir, 4 December 2019.

⁹⁷⁷ “Details of the November 2019 events in the western cities of Tehran”, ISNA, 12 December 2019.

⁹⁷⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-006480 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008948 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008949 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-004920 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008320 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008364 (FFMI Interview).

⁹⁷⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008948 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008949 (FFMI Interview).

558. In other cases, instead of opening a criminal investigation to identify those responsible, judicial authorities referred their case for the payment of “blood money.”⁹⁸⁰ In one such case, a family refused to declare their loved one a “martyr,” which led to authorities declaring the victim a “rioter.” No criminal investigation was opened, and the family was not provided with “blood money.”⁹⁸¹

559. In another case, a young protester was shot and killed with a heavy weapon,⁹⁸² allegedly after setting a fire at a protest in Tehran province. As his hands were stained with ash, authorities declared him a “rioter” and denied his family “blood money.”⁹⁸³ The family lodged a complaint with a military court; three years later, the case effectively stalled, after staff from the military court reportedly told the family that they should be “thankful that [their] other two children were still alive.”⁹⁸⁴

560. Families of victims of the 2019 protests are consistently threatened, harassed around the anniversary of the death of their loved ones, arrested, and subjected to criminal prosecution for seeking accountability for their killings.⁹⁸⁵

561. According to a credible human rights organization, the parents of another young man reportedly killed by security forces while peacefully protesting in late November 2019, have been harassed, intimidated, arrested, detained, and prosecuted for calling for justice and accountability. Since his death, his father and mother have been sentenced to imprisonment, and internal exile, among other penalties; while other relatives have been also arrested, with their phones and electronic devices confiscated during a house raid.⁹⁸⁶

2. Update on accountability for killings resulting from the unlawful use of lethal force by security forces in the context of the 2022-2023 protests

562. The Mission examined the following cases during this mandate because they were among the few for which limited information or developments were documented in 2025 and 2026. As with the 2019 “Aban” protests, State investigations into reported killings during the 2022-2023 protests have largely stalled, while the State has prioritized the payment of “blood money” as a means of addressing harm, rather than pursuing meaningful criminal investigations. Families of victims continue to face threats and intimidation for seeking truth and accountability.⁹⁸⁷ In the few instances where criminal proceedings were initiated against security forces convicted for the killing of protesters, the said members of the security forces received reduced sentences, thus reinforcing systemic impunity.⁹⁸⁸

“Permanent Commission for Redress”

563. In March 2025, the Government communicated to the Mission that the Ministry of Interior had promulgated a new directive establishing a “Permanent Commission for Redress” (the “Permanent Commission”) and a protocol for compensating individuals for damages arising from “security-related” incidents that year.⁹⁸⁹ On 7 March 2025, the Mission asked about the adopted protocol for compensating for damages arising from security related incidents, and requested that the Government of Iran provide a copy of the reported directive and a copy of the Permanent Commission’s terms of reference (see Annex I).

⁹⁸⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-006480 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008320 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008364 (FFMI Interview).

⁹⁸¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008948 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008949 (FFMI Interview).

⁹⁸² FFM-IRAN-D-006480 (FFMI Interview).

⁹⁸³ FFM-IRAN-D-006480 (FFMI Interview).

⁹⁸⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-006480 (FFMI Interview).

⁹⁸⁵ FFM-IRAN-D-008948 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008949 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-004920 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008320 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-006480 (FFMI Interview); FFM-IRAN-D-008364 (FFMI Interview). See also “Iran: Authorities violating absolute prohibition of torture through harassment of witnesses involved in Iran Atrocities Tribunal”, Amnesty International, 7 April 2022.

⁹⁸⁶ “Five Years Later, Still No Justice for Iran’s Massacre of November 2019 Protesters”, Centre for Human Rights in Iran, 13 November 2024.

⁹⁸⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008542 (FFMI Submission).

⁹⁸⁸ See also A/HRC/58/CRP.1 at Section XI, Subsection B.

⁹⁸⁹ See also A/HRC/58/CRP.1 Annex I.

564. On 25 December 2025, the Mission received a response to this letter. In its reply, the Government clarified that, in relation to “defined security incidents” such as “widespread terrorist acts, military attacks, riots and civil unrest, and actions or conduct by military, law enforcement, and security personnel resulting in harm to citizens”, the Permanent Commission is mandated to fulfil “the three fundamental pillars of State accountability in the security domain, namely truth-seeking, ensuring justice, and providing compensation.”⁹⁹⁰

565. According to the Government, the Permanent Commission serves as “a mechanism within the Ministry of Interior and the Supreme National Security Council” for addressing rights in relation to security incidents. It is responsible for identifying affected individuals and facilitating the provision of compensation where “harm” results from “security operations” or “anti-security actions.” Local authorities, including governors and provincial security councils, are assigned responsibilities from the outset of a security incident, including facilitating medical care for the injured, assisting with burial procedures, and providing ongoing support to injured persons and the families of those killed, encompassing compensation for damages incurred. Following an “incident,” the Permanent Commission is further tasked with monitoring the performance of security institutions, identifying sources of harm, promoting harm-reduction measures, coordinating support services provided by organizations such as the “Martyrs Foundation,” and ensuring effective coordination among relevant authorities to protect the rights of affected individuals. In relation to “military attacks”, the Government noted that compensation would be provided without “prejudice to Iran’s international efforts to identify the responsible aggressor or aggressor States and to pursue their international responsibility for reparations.”

566. The Mission notes, with concern, that some provincial security councils are, based on the Law on Firearms (above), authorized to assess which protest may warrant the use of firearms during protests, as noted above, and have previously been said to be co-responsible for use of force violations.⁹⁹¹ Moreover, the reference to the “Martyrs Foundation,” suggests that victims may be required to be formally recognized as “martyrs”, which families often refuse. Where victims are formally recognized as “martyrs,” compensation would be provided in the form of “blood money” (see also above on 2019 policy), a practice that is consistent with the pattern previously identified by the Mission whereby the State utilizes financial compensation to avoid criminal accountability.⁹⁹²

567. The Mission notes that the offer of “blood money” represents a form of acknowledgement by the State of wrongdoing and responsibility. The Mission reiterates its previous finding that “blood money” offered to some victims in the context of complaints lodged against the authorities, do not constitute satisfactory reparation, and even less adequate redress because it does not come with recognition of responsibility and acknowledgement of the harm suffered.⁹⁹³

568. The Mission obtained information from a credible human rights organization and herein outlines the relevant updates in relation to the below cases the Mission had investigated earlier.⁹⁹⁴

Mehdi Babrnejad, 21 September 2022

569. According to this information, the Military Prosecutor’s Office of Razavi Khorasan Province terminated the criminal investigation into the killing of Mehdi Babrnejad. The Mission previously found that Mr. Babrnejad was killed by security forces using lethal force during a protest in Ghouchan, Razavi Khorasan Province on 21 September 2022.⁹⁹⁵

570. An investigator in his case reportedly concluded that the use of firearms by security forces was lawful under Article 13 of the Law on Firearms (see Section IX, above). This assessment relied on reports from the FARAJA and the IRGC Provincial Corps of Khorasan Razavi, including assessments by internal “expert committees” of those bodies. The

⁹⁹⁰ Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the establishment of a restoration commission, dated 24 December 2025.

⁹⁹¹ Law on the Use of Firearms.

⁹⁹² A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 862, 992.

⁹⁹³ See also A/HRC/58/CRP.2, paras. 862, 922.

⁹⁹⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-008542 (FFMI Submission).

⁹⁹⁵ A/HRC/55/CRP.1, Annex III, paras. 32-33.

investigator determined that firearms were necessary to disperse protesters allegedly throwing stones and damaging property, and claimed that Mr. Babrnejad had participated in the protest, and on this basis, found no criminal offence had occurred with respect to his death.⁹⁹⁶

571. Reportedly, Branch 1 of the Military Court I of Khorasan Razavi upheld the termination of Mr. Babrnejad's case and registered it to determine the family's eligibility for *diyeh*. In a judgment dated 18 September 2023, the court denied "blood money" to the family, after it found that the deceased was not "innocent" and "bore fault," based on the investigator's note (above).⁹⁹⁷

572. Following an appeal lodged by the family, Branch 1 of the Military Appeal Court of Khorasan Razavi partially amended the decision on 29 April 2024, awarding 30 per cent of the *diyeh* amount designated for a Muslim man. The Court reasoned on the basis of "the manner of shooting, the [bodily] part of the victim struck by the bullet, and the fact that the shooting was carried out by an agent of FARAJA or the IRGC," without providing further explanation. It denied the rest of the *diyeh*, asserting that Mr. Babrnejad had "participated, filmed, supported, and instigated protests."⁹⁹⁸

Mohammad Jameh Bozorg

573. According to credible information, Mohammad Jameh Bozorg was killed in his home in Malard, Tehran province, after he questioned the legality of a raid by several security officers of his home on 24 September 2022. After an argument, Mr. Bozorg was shot in the face at close range. On 14 January 2024, Shahram Bazrbouy, an IRGC Basij agent, was convicted of his murder and sentenced to death through *qisas*.⁹⁹⁹

574. Reportedly, the Head of the Judiciary, Gholamhossein Ejei, upon a request from the then-Head of the IRGC, reclassified the killing as "unintentional" on the basis of Shahram Bazrbouy's own statement. According to credible information, given that Shahram Bazrbouy had not received "proper training in the use of firearms and their ammunition," responsibility for the killing lay with the IRGC as an institution rather than with Mr. Bazrbouy individually; accordingly, the *diyah* was to be paid by the IRGC.¹⁰⁰⁰

575. In a judgment issued on 11 October 2025, Branch 1 of the Supreme Court convicted Shahram Bazrbouy of "quasi-intentional homicide" instead of murder. The Court sentenced him to three years imprisonment and ordered the IRGC to pay "blood money" to the victim's family.¹⁰⁰¹

"Bloody Friday," 30 September, Sistan and Baluchestan province

576. As previously reported, in early January 2025, Ali Movahedirad, Head of the Sistan and Baluchestan Justice Department, announced that the charge of "murder" was dropped due to difficulties in identifying the perpetrator(s), and thus, 11 officers were sentenced to the maximum of 10 years imprisonment and "blood money",¹⁰⁰² for causing fatal shootings and injuries.

577. In September 2025, on the third anniversary of "Bloody Friday", Mr. Movahedirad announced on State affiliated media that, since "multiple individuals used gunfire" during the protest, the main shooter could not be identified and therefore the prison sentence was issued.¹⁰⁰³

578. To date, the State has not published any further information on this trial, or the names and ranks of those who were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. No documents,

⁹⁹⁶ FFM-IRAN-D-008542 (FFMI Submission).

⁹⁹⁷ FFM-IRAN-D-008542 (FFMI Submission).

⁹⁹⁸ FFM-IRAN-D-008542 (FFMI Submission).

⁹⁹⁹ FFM-IRAN-D-008542 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁰⁰⁰ FFM-IRAN-D-008542 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁰⁰¹ FFM-IRAN-D-008542 (FFMI Submission); FFM-IRAN-D-008542 (FFMI Submission)

¹⁰⁰² "Explanation of the latest details of the 8 October Zahedan incident case by the Head of the Justice Department of Sistan and Baluchistan.", ISNA, 12 January 2025.

¹⁰⁰³ "Issuing sentences for the defendants of the Zahedan incident of 8th Mehr 1401", ILNA, 21 September 2025

including indictments or judgments, have been made public or shared with victims or their families.

X. Legal findings

A. International humanitarian law

579. International humanitarian law (IHL), the law of armed conflict, is binding on all parties to an armed conflict. It comprises the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols I and II, as well as customary international law binding on all States.¹⁰⁰⁴ The four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I apply to armed conflicts of international character between two or more States parties.¹⁰⁰⁵ Iran and Israel signed the four Geneva Conventions on 8 December 1949 and ratified them on 20 February 1957 and 6 July 1951, respectively. Iran has signed but not ratified Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, and Israel has neither signed nor ratified it.¹⁰⁰⁶ Protocol I, however, largely reflects customary international law.¹⁰⁰⁷

580. The notion of armed conflict under Article 2(1), common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, requires the hostile resort to armed force involving two or more States”.¹⁰⁰⁸ The existence of an international armed conflict presupposes the involvement of the armed forces of at least one of the opposing States.¹⁰⁰⁹ Based on the facts established in Section IV, the Mission found that an international armed conflict pursuant to common Article 2(1) existed between Iran and Israel at least between 13 June 2025, the date of the first airstrikes by Israel on Iranian territory, and 25 June 2025, when the airstrikes ended.¹⁰¹⁰

581. The Mission therefore examined whether acts of the parties to the conflict that it investigated constituted violations of IHL pursuant to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary international law.

582. A party to an armed conflict is under the obligation to distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. IHL prohibits directing attacks against civilian objects.¹⁰¹¹ Military objectives are defined as objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action *and* whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage (two cumulative requirements).¹⁰¹² Civilian objects are objects that are not military objectives.¹⁰¹³

583. The Evin prison compound is under the overall administration of the State Organization for Prisons and Correctional and Educational Measures (“Prison Organization”), a Government entity.¹⁰¹⁴ Within the compound, Ward 2A and Section 325

¹⁰⁰⁴ See for rules of customary IHL and their underlying practice, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Cambridge University Press, 2005, Rules 1, 7 and 8 (“ICRC Study”).

¹⁰⁰⁵ Pursuant to Article 2(1) common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Article 1 (3) of Additional Protocol I.

¹⁰⁰⁶ For States parties and signatories to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their protocols, see International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law Databases.

¹⁰⁰⁷ See e.g., A/HRC/2/7, para. 23; Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Central Front, Eritrea’s Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22 between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 28 April 2004, para. 23; Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Central Front, Ethiopia’s Claim 2 Between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea, 28 April 2004, 17. See rules as reflected in the ICRC Study.

¹⁰⁰⁸ See 2025 commentary to Geneva Convention IV, para. 289.

¹⁰⁰⁹ See 2025 commentary to Geneva Convention IV, para. 295.

¹⁰¹⁰ The Mission’s pronouncements on the existence of an armed conflict are limited to the timeframe in which the Mission investigated relevant facts.

¹⁰¹¹ This principle is customary. See International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or the Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, para. 79; ICRC Study.

¹⁰¹² ICRC Study, Rule 8.

¹⁰¹³ ICRC Study, Rule 9.

¹⁰¹⁴ See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 182.

are operated by the IRGC, and Ward 209 by the Ministry of Intelligence.¹⁰¹⁵ The Mission has previously found that detainees have been interrogated and subjected to psychological torture and long solitary confinement by IRGC members in Ward 2A,¹⁰¹⁶ demonstrating the law enforcement, detention and intelligence role of the IRGC within the compound. Nevertheless, the Mission has been provided no information or evidence that, leading up to the airstrikes by Israel on Evin prison compound, any activities by the Prison Organization, Ministry of Intelligence or IRGC on the compound, constituted an effective contribution to military action against Israel *and* that the destruction of the compound or neutralization of the State entities based on the compound offered a definite military advantage to Israel. Israel also has not provided to the Mission any information supporting its allegation related to “intelligence operations against the State of Israel” taking place in Evin prison compound.¹⁰¹⁷ Rather, the statement by Israel’s Minister of Defence suggests that Evin prison compound was considered by Israel to be one of the “regime and governmental suppression bodies in the heart of Tehran”. This shows that at the highest level of the cabinet of Israel, Evin prison compound was considered a civilian object; a position mirrored by the statement of the IDF Spokesperson, referring to Evin prison compound as “symbol of repression for the Iranian people.”¹⁰¹⁸ The Mission therefore concludes that the Evin prison compound is a civilian object. Consequently, the consecutive airstrikes by Israel against the prison compound on 23 June 2025 constituted an attack intentionally directed against a civilian object, a serious violation of IHL.

584. Under the principle of precaution, a party to a conflict must take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and objects under its control against the effects of attacks. The obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks has been interpreted as meaning precautions which are practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.¹⁰¹⁹ According to practice, the construction of shelters, digging of trenches, distribution of information and warnings, withdrawal of the civilian population to safe places, direction of traffic, guarding of civilian property and the mobilization of civil defence organizations, are measures that can be taken to spare the civilian population and civilian objects under the control of a party to the conflict.¹⁰²⁰

585. The Mission found that during the June 2025 hostilities, Iran unduly restricted Internet and mobile phone services and access to information and expression regarding the airstrikes on Iran and their impact and on evacuation. Shelter was not made sufficiently available for the detainees in Evin prison compound. Moreover, no apparent measures were taken by judicial, prosecutorial, and prison authorities to protect detainees in the Evin prison compound, despite requests by detainees and their representatives for temporary or conditional release or transfer to safer locations arising from concerns regarding possible airstrikes on the compound.¹⁰²¹ The Mission, taking into account these circumstances, is concerned by the lack of “practicable or practically possible” precautions by Iran, including the failure to construct shelters, distribute information and warnings, or to mobilize resources to assist evacuations. The Mission also recalls that the obligation to take all feasible precautions against the effects of attacks includes avoiding locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas.¹⁰²²

¹⁰¹⁵ See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 182, 1808; A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 733, 736-737.

¹⁰¹⁶ A/HRC/58/CRP.1, para. 736.

¹⁰¹⁷ For statement, see Section IV. *Cf.* On providing information supporting statements, OHCHR, Thematic Report - Attacks on hospitals during the escalation of hostilities in Gaza (7 October 2023 – 30 June 2024), 31 December 2024, para. 38.

¹⁰¹⁸ For both statements, see Section IV.

¹⁰¹⁹ ICRC Study, Rule 22.

¹⁰²⁰ ICRC Study, Rule 22.

¹⁰²¹ See Section IV. On Internet shutdowns under human rights law, see also A/HRC/55/CRP.1.

¹⁰²² ICRC Study, Rule 23. Equally, each party to the conflict must, to the extent feasible, remove civilian persons and objects under its control from the vicinity of military objectives. See ICRC Study, Rule 24.

B. International human rights law

586. Iran is responsible for gross human rights violations during the reporting period, including during and in the aftermath of the June 2025 airstrikes by Israel. As reflected in the Mission's report and detailed in this document, under each of the sections and sub-sections, they include violations of the rights to life, freedom from torture and ill-treatment, personal security and liberty, fair trial, effective remedy, of peaceful assembly, to freedom of religion or belief, expression and association, and equality and non-discrimination, privacy, health, livelihood and work. In particular, the Mission notes that victims continued to be convicted and sentenced following unfair trials before courts lacking independence and impartiality and after having been coerced to confess to the commission of particular acts and denied the right to a lawyer of one's choice and to present a defence. As detailed in sections V and VI, many victims were convicted of national security offences for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and to participate in political and public life, and were, in some cases, sentenced to death in violation of the right to life.

587. The Mission recalls that international human rights law continues to apply in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable. Both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.¹⁰²³ While certain derogations may be permitted, including under ICCPR Article 4,¹⁰²⁴ the protection of human rights under treaty and customary law does not cease during armed conflict.¹⁰²⁵ Based on its review, the Mission is satisfied that Iran, had not informed, at any time, starting on 13 June 2025, the other States Parties to the ICCPR, through the intermediary of the UN Secretary-General, per Article 4 (3) of the Covenant, that it had derogated from any of the treaty's provisions.

588. Accordingly, the Mission also examined acts of the parties to the conflict that it investigated under international human rights law. This includes Iran's conduct during and in the aftermath of the Israeli strikes against Evin prison compound as set out in Section IV.

1. Evin prison compound

589. The Human Rights Committee has found that practices inconsistent with international humanitarian law, entailing a risk to the lives of civilians and other persons protected by international humanitarian law, including, *inter alia*, failure to apply the principle of precaution, would also violate the right to life under the ICCPR.¹⁰²⁶

590. As detailed in Section IV, evidence shows that ahead of the airstrikes on Evin prison compound on 23 June 2025, Iranian authorities were requested to take measures including temporary or conditional release or transfer of prisoners to safer locations. Those measures were not taken. The Mission also did not find evidence of any alternative action taken ahead of the airstrikes after other objects in Tehran had already been hit by Israel's airstrikes from at least 13 June onwards, including conducting emergency drills or providing information on evacuation plans or shelter options to detainees. Information also shows that as airstrikes were ongoing, detainees remained locked in prison cells, including solitary confinement cells, causing panic. As the airstrikes subsided, information reveals scenes of chaos and violence against detainees and undue delays in firefighting, rescue and medical assistance efforts.

591. Pursuant to the ICCPR, Iran is under an obligation to ensure the right to life and exercise due diligence to protect lives.¹⁰²⁷ The lack of sufficient protective measures before and during the airstrikes and of adequate assistance after the strikes is indicative of a violation of its positive obligation under ICCPR Article 6.

592. As discussed in Section IV, following the airstrikes on Evin prison compound, State authorities refused to give information on the fate or whereabouts of some detainees who had

¹⁰²³ See CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 64.

¹⁰²⁴ ICCPR, Article 4 (2) provides that no derogation from Articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made.

¹⁰²⁵ See International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, para. 106.

¹⁰²⁶ See CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 64.

¹⁰²⁷ See CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 7.

been transferred, particularly some human rights activists and dual and foreign nationals held by security and intelligence bodies. Families and lawyers were unable to obtain information on their fate or whereabouts for days, weeks and sometimes months after their transfers, causing serious anguish and distress. Some detainees were not informed of the location in which they were held and were taken to undisclosed detention facilities, including “safe houses” or a secret facility. Some detainees, who eventually were allowed to contact their families, were prohibited by security officers from disclosing their location.

593. The Mission recalls that the prohibition of enforced disappearances is a norm of peremptory law (*jus cogens*).¹⁰²⁸ Enforced disappearance is the deprivation of liberty, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate of the disappeared person, in effect placing that person outside the protection of the law and their life at serious and constant risk, for which the State is accountable.¹⁰²⁹ The practices by State authorities of refusing to give information on the fate or whereabouts of detainees or holding them in undisclosed and unofficial detention facilities for a period of time following Israel’s airstrikes on Evin prison compound and their transfer, as described in Section IV, amount to enforced disappearance.

2. Gender persecution

594. In law and practice, Iran continued to commit acts against women, girls and persons expressing support for gender equality and women’s rights that constitute individual violations, and, cumulatively, gender persecution. In particular, authorities continued to enforce discriminatory laws and policies against women and girls and continued their repression against those advocating against gender discrimination through the commission of violations.¹⁰³⁰

595. To find persecution on the grounds of gender, the element of an identifiable group is required. The Mission previously found that Iran targeted persons or groups by reason of their identity as women, girls, and men and boys supporting demands for gender equality and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, including in the context of the protests that began on 16 September 2022.¹⁰³¹ Based on the facts established in sections VI and VII, the Mission found that, in particular in the context of the use of the death penalty, of mandatory *hijab* enforcement and femicide, women, girls and those supporting demands for gender equality and women’s rights continued to be targeted by reason of their identity as a group (“the group”). The continued intention of the Islamic Republic to discriminate on the basis of gender is apparent through its actions to uphold and enforce a system of institutionalized and structural discrimination against women and girls, and to punish those who are or are perceived as challenging it. The Mission found that State resources were mobilized to repress and persecute the members of the group.¹⁰³²

596. The Mission also examined the requirement of deprivation of the fundamental rights¹⁰³³ of the members of the group in the context of the use of the death penalty, of

¹⁰²⁸ International Law Commission, Third report on peremptory norms of general international law (*jus cogens*) by Dire Tladi, Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/714, 12 February 2018, para. 131.

¹⁰²⁹ See General Assembly, Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, resolution 47/133.

¹⁰³⁰ See for all factual determinations, sections V and VII.

¹⁰³¹ See also A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 1661-1667.

¹⁰³² On the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement and 2022 protests, see A/HRC/55/CRP.1, Section XI (D).

¹⁰³³ The jurisprudence of international tribunals and courts provide examples of fundamental rights. See ICTY, IT-95-14-T, *Prosecutor v. Blaškić*, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 3 March 2000, para. 220. See also ICTY, IT-97-25-T, *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 15 March 2002, para. 433; ICTY, IT-98-30/1-T, *Prosecutor v. Kvočka*, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 2 November 2001, para. 186; ICTY, IT-94-1-T, *Prosecutor v. Tadić*, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 7 May 1997, para. 710; ICTY, IT-95-16-T, *Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al.*, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000, para. 615; ICTY, IT-98-32-T, *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 29 November 2002, para. 246; ICC, ICC-01/12-01/18, *Prosecutor v. Al Hassan*, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, Pre-Trial Chamber, 22 May 2018, para. 88; ICC, ICC-01/17-X, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi, Pre-Trial Chamber, 9 November 2017, para. 132. See; Office of the Prosecutor, Policy on the Crime of Gender Persecution, International Criminal Court, 7 December 2022, para. 23.

mandatory *hijab* enforcement and femicide. It found that the members of the group continued to be deprived of fundamental rights in law and in practice. As shown in Section VII, this includes the ongoing enforcement of the mandatory *hijab*, resulting, in cases of alleged non-compliance, in digital surveillance, vehicle confiscations, restrictions of women's professional activities and education, and their harassment, arrest, detention, prosecution and denial of services, in violation of their human rights. Women human rights defenders and activists continued to be arbitrarily arrested and detained and subjected to ill-treatment in detention. The Mission also found a pattern of deaths in custody of women detainees, including in Qarchak prison, after a failure, despite their deteriorating health, to provide adequate medical care to women detainees who later died,¹⁰³⁴ and recalls the presumption under international human rights law of State responsibility for prisoner deaths until such responsibility is refuted.¹⁰³⁵

597. As discussed in sections VI and VII, Iran continued to impose the death penalty against women activists and women human rights defenders in ways that violated the right to life, including as a result of discriminatory laws and policies that contribute to serious fair trial violations, such as lack of adequate facilities for the preparation of the defence¹⁰³⁶ and other violations of the principle of equality of arms.¹⁰³⁷

598. In relation to femicide cases, the Mission recalls that pursuant to ICCPR Article 6(1), Iran is under the obligation to give effect to the right to life through legislative and other measures, and to provide effective remedies and reparation to all victims of violations of the right to life.¹⁰³⁸ Yet the continued lack of a domestic violence law in Iran, as well as the unequal valuation of women's lives under Iran's Penal Code, the legitimization of so-called crimes of honour in the said Code and the application of this legislation by the Judiciary, as detailed in Section VII, are discriminatory and violate the obligation to protect the right to life. Legislation and its application allowing family forgiveness of a male family member in who murdered a female victim in the context of an "honour" crime also constitutes a violation of the obligation to protect the right to life.

599. Patterns of lethal violence against women in Iran are enabled by gender discrimination that is embedded, endorsed or tolerated through law, policy, and practice. As shown in Section VII, discriminatory laws and practices lead to a failure to protect women from domestic violence, "honour"-based killings or other forms of gendered abuse. Iran is under an obligation to ensure the right to life and exercise due diligence to protect the lives of women and girls against deprivations caused by their family members, and is in violation of the right to life in cases in which officials or public authorities, including judges, ignore reasonably foreseeable threats or a life-threatening situation that can result in loss of life of a woman or a girl or ensure impunity for perpetrators.¹⁰³⁹

600. In sum, the failure to repeal "honor defences", criminalize, systematically prevent, investigate and prosecute cases of femicide and adequately punish perpetrators, following a trial conducted in accordance with international human rights law, constitutes a violation of the right to life and materially contributes to the prevalence of lethal violence against women.

3. Non-refoulement

601. The Mission recalls the obligation of States on non-refoulement under international human rights law, refugee law and customary international law, and the prohibition of collective expulsions. The principle of non-refoulement prohibits States from transferring and removing a person from their jurisdiction or effective control when there are substantial

¹⁰³⁴ See sections V and VII.

¹⁰³⁵ See e.g. Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, A/HRC/53/29, 18 April 2023, paras. 14-15.

¹⁰³⁶ The Human Rights Committee found that "adequate facilities" include access to exculpatory material, i.e. material establishing innocence or that could assist the defence. See CCPR/C/GC/31, para. 33.

¹⁰³⁷ E.g. Examining evidence against them or presenting mitigating evidence. See on examining witnesses, CCPR/C/GC/31, para. 39; and on presenting mitigating factors and circumstances, A/HRC/27/23, paras. 11, 45; A/HRC/36/26, para. 21.

¹⁰³⁸ See CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 4.

¹⁰³⁹ See on the positive obligation to protect life from non-State actors, CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 7. See also on femicide and positive obligations, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, *Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala*, Judgment, 19 November 2015.

grounds for believing that they would be at risk of irreparable harm upon return, including persecution, torture, ill-treatment or other serious human rights violations,¹⁰⁴⁰ and a guarantee grounded in the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights.¹⁰⁴¹ On the prohibition of collective expulsions, the Human Rights Committee has stated that the right of a foreigner to a decision “reached in accordance with the law” in their own case and to submit reasons against expulsions would make mass or collective expulsions incompatible with ICCPR Article 13.¹⁰⁴² States parties should also take legislative, administrative, judicial and other preventive measures against possible violations of the principle of non-refoulement.¹⁰⁴³ In light of concerns regarding serious human rights violations amounting to persecution on the grounds of gender in Afghanistan,¹⁰⁴⁴ the Mission considers involuntary deportations or expulsions of women, girls and LGBTQ+ persons from Iran to Afghanistan to be in violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Moreover, any mass or collective expulsions contrary to ICCPR, Article 13, are equally a violation of human rights law.

4. Transnational repression

602. The Mission examined acts of transnational repression directed against Iranians and dual nationals, including human rights defenders, journalists, dual nationals and victims from past protest movements in Iran, including the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, present on the territory of third States. As detailed under Section VIII, Iranians and dual nationals abroad were also subject to human rights violations, offline and online, including to the rights to life, personal security and liberty, freedom of religion or belief, expression and association, equality and non-discrimination, privacy, livelihood and work. In some cases, acts of transnational repression also amounted to persecution on the grounds of gender.

603. Violations of the rights of Iranians on the territory of third States give rise to positive human rights obligations of the territorial State. Particularly, States parties to the ICCPR must ensure the right to life and exercise due diligence to protect lives against deprivations caused by actors whose conduct is not attributable to them.¹⁰⁴⁵ As stated above, the obligation to respect and ensure the right to life requires States to take reasonable, positive measures that do not impose disproportionate burdens on them in response to reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations that can result in loss of life. States may be in violation of ICCPR Article 6 even if such threats and situations do not result in loss of life, as human rights mechanisms, including the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, have found.¹⁰⁴⁶ The Mission also recalls relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights stating that, where “authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and [...] failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been

¹⁰⁴⁰ See e.g. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention of Torture, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

¹⁰⁴¹ See e.g. CAT/C/GC/4, paras. 15-16.

¹⁰⁴² Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 15, para. 10; CCPR/CO/71/DOM, 26 April 2001, para.16.

¹⁰⁴³ CAT/C/GC/4, para. 18.

¹⁰⁴⁴ See also UNHCR, Statement on the concept of persecution on cumulative grounds in light of the current situation for women and girls in Afghanistan, 25 May 2023 (issued in the context of the preliminary ruling reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union in the cases of *AH and FN v. Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl* (C-608/22 and C-609/22)); Court of Justice of the European Union, *AH, FN, v Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl*, C-608/22 and C-609/22, Judgement of the Court, 4 October 2024, paras. 42-46.; Swedish Migration Agency, Legal Position on the Protection Needs Assessment for Nationals from Afghanistan, RS/089/2021; Denmark, Refugee Appeals Board, The Refugee Board Grants Asylum to Women and Girls from Afghanistan, 30 January 2023.

¹⁰⁴⁵ CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 7. See also, CCPR/C/GC/31, para. 8; European Court of Human Rights, *Osman v. United Kingdom*, Judgment, 28 October 1998, para. 116.

¹⁰⁴⁶ CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 7. See also, *Chongwe v. Zambia* (CCPR/C/70/D/821/1998), para. 5.2; European Court of Human Rights, *İlhan v. Turkey*, Judgment, 27 June 2000, paras. 75-76; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, *Rochela massacre v. Colombia*, Judgment, 11 May 2007, paras. 127-128.

expected to avoid that risk”, they are in violation of the positive obligation to protect the right to life that is the duty to prevent and suppress offences against the person.¹⁰⁴⁷ This theory of foreseeable risk was similarly applied by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, including when it stated that a State’s “obligation to adopt measures of prevention and protection for private individuals in their relations with each other is conditional on its awareness of a situation of real and imminent danger for a specific individual or group of individuals and the reasonable possibility of preventing or avoiding that danger”.¹⁰⁴⁸ Moreover, investigating these acts thoroughly is critical to ensure accountability of those involved in executing, planning, and ordering them.

604. In light of the evidence on transnational repression against Iranians and dual nationals abroad, the Mission considers that adequate measures to ensure the right to life and protect lives may include the establishment by States of an in-government focal point; early warning and rapid-response mechanisms, such as hotlines or online platforms; protection measures, including voluntary evacuation to a safe place; victim support, including legal, psycho-social or livelihood support; prompt and systematic investigations; and prosecutions of any perpetrators, as well as safe asylum procedure and, secure residency pathways.

605. In addition, a review and amendment of national legislation is warranted where there are gaps in the protection of individuals from transnational threats, including digital threats such as hacking, use of malware, phishing, online harassment and surveillance, smear campaigns, doxxing, the blocking of websites or disruption of internet access, and cyber-attacks against individuals and organizations.¹⁰⁴⁹

606. Finally, in light of the increasingly serious and complex nature of transnational repression, collaborative efforts and coordinated international and multilateral action is required, including within the intergovernmental bodies and human rights mechanisms of the United Nations.

C. Crimes

607. The Mission examined whether the violations documented amounted to crimes under international law, including crimes under IHL (war crimes) and crimes against humanity.

1. War crimes

608. In relation to the attack on Evin prison compound, the Mission found that in the context of an international armed conflict, Israel attacked a civilian object and intended such civilian objects to be the object of the attack, while being aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of the armed conflict. Israel therefore is responsible for the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against a civilian object.¹⁰⁵⁰

609. As noted above, the Mission sent information requests to the Governments of both Iran and Israel on that matter.

¹⁰⁴⁷ European Court of Human Rights, *Osman v. United Kingdom* (case No. 87/1997/871/1083), judgment of 28 October 1998, para. 116.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Inter-American Court of Human Rights, *Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia*, Judgment, 31 January 2006, para. 123; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, *González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico*, Judgment, 16 November 2009, para. 280. See also *Ríos et al. v. Venezuela*, Judgment, 28 January 2009, para. 110; *Perozo et al. v. Venezuela*, Judgment, 28 January 2009, para. 121.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Any criminal laws or regulations should, however, be narrow, precise, and specific to comply with the principle of legality and have to respect, *inter alia*, the right to freedom of expression. On the issue of violations in the digital space, see also the International Criminal Court’s Prosecutor’s December 2025 “Policy on Cyber-Enabled Crimes under the Rome Statute”.

¹⁰⁵⁰ See elements of crime in relation to Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8 (2)(b)(ii), as reflective of customary law, as well as authoritative jurisprudence of international tribunals. See also, ICRC Study, Rule 156; ICTY, Trial Chamber I, IT-95-14-T, *Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić*, Judgment, 3 March 2000, Vol. II, Ch. 2, para. 181; ICTY, Trial Chamber III, IT-95-14/2-T, *Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Cerkez*, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 182.

2. Crimes against humanity

610. The Mission also established that many gross human rights violations by Iran described in this report amount to the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment and other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, sexual violence, gender persecution, enforced disappearance and other inhumane acts, committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian population, namely women, ethnic and religious minorities, human rights defenders and perceived dissenting or opposing actors.

611. The Mission found that judges issuing death sentences relied on torture-tainted evidence and presided over trials marred by serious fair trial violations in cases amounting to the crimes against humanity of murder, torture, persecution and other inhumane acts. This was particularly evident for charges related to the 2022 protests, for national security and espionage offences in connection with the June 2025 Israel-Iran hostilities and for membership in a political group, as detailed in the facts set out under Section VI.¹⁰⁵¹ As reflected in Section V, security and intelligence forces continued to arbitrarily arrest and detain individuals, including during and in the aftermath of the June 2025 Israel-Iran hostilities, in cases amounting to the crimes against humanity of imprisonment and other severe deprivation of physical liberty.¹⁰⁵²

612. As for the contextual elements for crimes against humanity,¹⁰⁵³ the Mission remains satisfied that, during the reporting period, an attack on a civilian population occurred, since conduct involving the commission of acts of violence continued and several prohibited underlying acts of crimes against humanity were committed. Based on the victims' civilian nature, the collective nature of the crimes and the number of victims, the Mission concludes that the attack was directed against a civilian population.

613. The attack remained "widespread", based on the number and multiplicity of victims and the prevalence across the country of the recurring patterns of violations amounting to crimes. It also remained "systematic" because of the organized nature of the crimes and the improbability of their random occurrence. As shown particularly in sections V, VI, and VII, crimes continued to be committed as part of a pattern of organized conduct, following instructions, encouragement or endorsement by high-level State authorities and senior members of State institutions, and implemented by many physical perpetrators, including security and intelligence forces and judges.

614. On the last contextual element, the Mission examined the conduct of the State, including its entities such as security and intelligence entities and the Judiciary, to establish whether the underlying acts were committed in furtherance of a State policy.

615. In particular, the Mission considered the recurrent patterns of violence, including in multiple locations,¹⁰⁵⁴ and similar patterns of violations to be part of the conduct, indicating a policy.¹⁰⁵⁵ As discussed in Section V, during and in the aftermath of the June 2025 Israel-Iran hostilities, security forces and intelligence forces, including IRGC Intelligence, carried out large-scale arrests in Tehran, Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Fars, Isfahan, Sistan and Baluchistan, North Khorasan, and Razavi Khorasan provinces. Social media users were brought before Revolutionary Courts in Tehran, North Khorasan, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, and Isfahan provinces, and charged with offences of "espionage", "propaganda against the state", "spreading false news" and "disturbing the public mind". As reflected in Section VI, defendants across the country faced national security charges in trials marred by serious fair trial violations that lead to the death penalty. Investigation showed that arrests, detention and criminal prosecutions were conducted in a similar fashion across different locations, as described in sections V and VI.

¹⁰⁵¹ On previous findings on the role of the Judiciary in relation to serious human rights violations and crimes under international law, including crimes against humanity, see A/HRC/58/CRP.1, paras. 785ff.

¹⁰⁵² See previous findings on the elements of the crime against humanity of imprisonment and other severe deprivation of physical liberty, A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 1627-1629.

¹⁰⁵³ For more information on contextual elements, see also A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 1611ff.

¹⁰⁵⁴ See e.g. ICC, ICC-01/05-01/08, *Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo*, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber, 21 March 2016, para. 677; A/HRC/25/CRP.1, para. 1062; A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 1480.

¹⁰⁵⁵ See e.g. A/HRC/30/CRP.2, para. 591; A/HRC/25/CRP.1, para. 1084.

616. The Mission considered the systematic identification of victims to be another indicator of the existence of a policy.¹⁰⁵⁶ As discussed in Section V, during and in the aftermath of the June 2025 Israel-Iran hostilities, different groups were targets of arbitrary arrests and detention, forced public confessions, ill-treatment, interrogations and criminal prosecutions or fair trial violations, including journalists, lawyers, human rights defenders, social media users, academics and members of the creative community, including women, as well as members of minorities, including the Baha'i, Arabs, Kurds, Christians and Jews. The Mission found that this was a concerted and coordinated effort by security and intelligence forces and by the judicial system, including judges and prosecutors. State officials, including from the Ministry of Intelligence, the FARAJA, and the IRGC, urged the public to report "suspicious individuals" or "activities" people may deem "supportive of the Zionist regime" in an apparent effort to identify individuals to target. Additionally, as described in Section VII, women and girls were identified and subjected to harassment, surveillance, restrictions, arrests, detention and prosecution in violation of their human rights for alleged non-compliance with the mandatory *hijab*. Statements by State officials characterized those opposing the mandatory *hijab* as "enemies".

617. The continued systematic failure of the State to condemn violations, and to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish them, and the impunity enjoyed by alleged perpetrators,¹⁰⁵⁷ is further evidence of a policy. As described in sections VII and VIII, the pattern of impunity previously established¹⁰⁵⁸ continued. Statements by officials continue to reveal instructions, encouragement or endorsement of violations, as shown in sections V and VI.

618. In particular, the Mission considered the recurrent patterns of violence, including in multiple locations,¹⁰⁵⁹ and similar patterns of violations to be part of the conduct, indicating a policy.¹⁰⁶⁰ As discussed in Section V, during and in the aftermath of the June 2025 Israel-Iran hostilities, security forces and intelligence forces, including IRGC Intelligence, carried out large-scale arrests in Tehran, Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Fars, Isfahan, Sistan and Baluchistan, North Khorasan, and Razavi Khorasan provinces. Social media users were brought before Revolutionary Courts in Tehran, North Khorasan, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, and Isfahan provinces, and charged with offences of "espionage", "propaganda against the state", "spreading false news" and "disturbing the public mind". As reflected in Section VI, defendants across the country faced national security charges in trials marred by serious fair trial violations that lead to the death penalty. Investigation showed that arrests, detention and criminal prosecutions were conducted in a similar fashion across different locations, as described in sections V and VI.

619. The Mission also examined the motivation underlying the commission of the violations as an indicator of a State policy.¹⁰⁶¹ The Mission notes that in the context of violations, in particular in relation to arbitrary arrests and detention, forced confessions and ill-treatment, mandatory *hijab* enforcement, and arbitrary deprivation of life, as discussed in sections V, VI and VII, State officials and authorities frequently labelled victims as "enemies", "terrorists" or "spies", thus justifying the repression of persons deemed critical of or in any other way threatening to the Islamic Republic. Victims, including lawyers, journalists, human rights defenders and activists, social media users, and members of political groups, were subjected to repressive acts solely for expressing, holding, or perceived to be holding political opinions, convictions and beliefs, including on gender equality and women's rights; for sharing information or organising politically; or for their real or perceived role in opposing the Islamic Republic.

¹⁰⁵⁶ See e.g. ICC, ICC-01/21, Decision on the Prosecutor's request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Statute on the Philippines, Pre-Trial Chamber, 15 September 2021, para. 99; A/HRC/51/CRP.3, para. 431.

¹⁰⁵⁷ See e.g. A/HRC/32/CRP.1, para. 260; A/HRC/25/CRP.1, para. 1085.

¹⁰⁵⁸ See also A/HRC/55/CRP.1, sections III, V, VI, VIII, IX, X and XI.

¹⁰⁵⁹ See e.g. ICC, ICC-01/05-01/08, *Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo*, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber, 21 March 2016, para. 677; A/HRC/25/CRP.1, para. 1062; A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 1480.

¹⁰⁶⁰ See e.g. A/HRC/30/CRP.2, para. 591; A/HRC/25/CRP.1, para. 1084.

¹⁰⁶¹ See e.g. ICC, ICC-01/12-01/18-461-Corr-Red, *Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud*, Decision on Confirmation of Charges against Al Hassan, Pre-Trial Chamber, 13 November 2019, para. 182.

620. The Mission has considered these indicators individually and in aggregate, and each indicator may itself be sufficient to show the continued existence of a State policy in furtherance of which the underlying acts were committed.

3. Crimes under domestic law of third States

621. As previously noted, crimes under international law may also give rise to individual criminal responsibility under domestic criminal law.¹⁰⁶²

622. Separately, under the domestic legal systems in third States, violations found by the Mission in the context of transnational repression may also amount to offences under national law and give rise to investigations, including into the responsibility and role of entities or officials of the State of Iran, and prosecutions by those States.

XI. Further areas of investigations

A. Israeli airstrikes meriting further investigation in the context of the June 2025 hostilities

623. The Mission investigated four additional airstrikes including on Farabi hospital in Kermanshah city, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Qods square, and the Chamran residential building in Tehran city. The Mission believes that these airstrikes merit further investigation, noting that the list of sites is not exhaustive.

624. Across these incidents, the Mission collected and preserved credible information, including witness interviews, video footage, satellite imagery, and official statements by both Iranian and Israeli officials. The nature and extent of the information obtained, however, varied among cases, with some incidents supported by more comprehensive documentation than others, in particular in relation to the civilian or military nature of intended targets as well as the resulting casualties. Additionally, the Mission notes that a general reluctance among witnesses to speak for fear of reprisal, the arrest of journalists in at least one instance, and broader pressure exerted by State authorities on the civilian population (See Section V, below) have collectively impeded its ability to gather additional information, in accordance with its methodology. Accordingly, the Mission considers that, at this stage, the available evidence is not yet sufficient to reach a factual determination or legal conclusions on these four additional airstrikes, in accordance with its standard of proof. The Mission will continue to investigate these incidents and may investigate new incidents as further information becomes available.

1. 16 June 2025, Farabi hospital, Kermanshah

625. In relation to Israeli airstrikes on 16 June 2025 near Farabi hospital, evidence collected by the Mission, including witness accounts and satellite imagery from before and after the strike, indicated that the hospital sustained minor damage from the blast wave resulting from airstrikes that allegedly targeted a warehouse in the vicinity of the hospital.¹⁰⁶³ The Government recorded two persons being injured at the hospital, though the Mission was unable to independently verify this information.

2. 15 June 2025, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) headquarters, Tehran city

626. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) is the state-owned broadcaster of Iran. Its head is appointed by Iran's Supreme Leader.¹⁰⁶⁴ Its main headquarters complex is located in District 3 of Tehran and is widely referred to by staff and media as the "Glass Building".¹⁰⁶⁵

¹⁰⁶² See A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para. 1731.

¹⁰⁶³ FFM-IRAN-D-006109 (FFMI Interview).

¹⁰⁶⁴ <https://www.leader.ir/en/content/25281/The-Supreme-Leader-of-the-Revolution-appointed-Dr-Jebelli-as-the-new-IRIB-chief>.

¹⁰⁶⁵ FFM-IRAN-D FFM-00663 (FFMI Submission).

627. According to open-source analysis provided by a credible organization, IRIB headquarters was struck by airstrikes on 15 June at around noon.¹⁰⁶⁶ A video released by the Israeli media showed that an explosion interrupted a live broadcast.¹⁰⁶⁷

628. In a post on Telegram, the IDF spokesperson stated that the IRIB facility was being used by the Iranian armed forces for military purposes, and warnings were issued on 15 June (see Section V above); an image showing the Glass Building within the IRIB complex was also published.¹⁰⁶⁸ The building was targeted as a “communications centre of the Iranian regime, which served Iran’s armed forces,” and was “used by military forces to advance operational activity under the cover of civilian assets and infrastructure.”¹⁰⁶⁹ The Mission was unable to gather further information in relation to the military nature of the intended target.

629. According to State affiliated media, at least three persons were killed in the strike, and several other employees were injured. Some employees were reportedly evacuated prior to the attack, after the warning (above) was issued that day.¹⁰⁷⁰

3. 15 June 2025, Quds square, Tehran city

630. On 15 June 2025, Israeli air forces struck the Quds square in the north of Tehran, reportedly targeting the center for the Supervision of Mosque Affairs.¹⁰⁷¹ According to an Iranian official, the airstrike resulted in 12 casualties, including a pregnant woman.¹⁰⁷² On 4 July 2025, the Israeli army, in response to media request, stated that it will not comment on the Quds explosion.¹⁰⁷³ The Mission was unable to obtain more information in relation to the intended target in this attack, as well as in relation to the casualties.

4. 13 June 2025, Shahid Chamran residential building, Tehran city

631. According to open-source analysis provided by a credible organization, at around 2 a.m. on 13 June, Israeli strikes hit the Chamran residential building in Tehran, killing at least 42 people, including 23 women and girls, and 17 men and boys, and injuring around 50 other people, while also causing extensive damage to the structure. Reports suggested that the building housed Iranian nuclear scientists and their families, including their spouses and children, according to the Government’s report. Reports also suggested that other individuals amongst the casualties were affiliated with the State, or had positions with Iran’s Ministry of Defense.¹⁰⁷⁴

632. Shahid Chamran Residential Complex is located in the Nobonyad neighbourhood of northeast Tehran, within Municipal District 1, a predominantly residential and commercial area. The complex is a housing development of 19 apartment buildings referred to as “Blocks.” According to Iranian media, administrative responsibility for the complex is held by the Cooperative Foundation and Welfare Services Company of SASAD, the Defense Industries Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is formally described in

¹⁰⁶⁶ FFM-IRAN-D FFMI-00663 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁰⁶⁷ “IDF bombs Iran state broadcaster after issuing major evacuation warning for Tehran”, The Times of Israel, 16 June 2025.

¹⁰⁶⁸ <https://t.me/IDFSpokespersonArabic/9521>.

¹⁰⁶⁹ FFM-IRAN-D FFMI-00663 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁰⁷⁰ FFM-IRAN-D FFMI-00663 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁰⁷¹ “What do we see in the new video of Israel’s attack in Tajrish Square, Tehran?”, BBC Persian, 4 July 2025; “WATCH: Iranian media releases footage of IDF strike in Quds Square, Tehran”, Jerusalem Post, 3 July 2025.

¹⁰⁷² “Minister of Health: At least 1,800 people were injured in the attacks by the Zionist regime. The number of female victims killed is 35 and the number of child victims killed is 10. Twelve people were killed in the explosion at Quds Square, including a pregnant woman. The number of injured women is 60, and 15 of the injured are under the age of 20, the youngest being four years old”, Entekhab, 16 June 2025.

¹⁰⁷³ “What do we see in the new video of Israel’s attack in Tajrish Square, Tehran?”, BBC Persian, 4 July 2025.

¹⁰⁷⁴ FFM-IRAN-D-00665 (FFMI Submission) ; See “Brazen Attack on International Law by the Israeli Regime and the United States Vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic of Iran Through their Acts of Aggression of 13-24 June 2025, Updated Report By the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, June 2025.

official documents as a sub-organization of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistic.¹⁰⁷⁵

633. Israeli airstrikes appear to have struck the 14-story residential building called “Block 12” in the Shahid Chamran Residential Complex. In a public statement issued on the morning of 13 June, the IDF reportedly announced the launch of “Operation Rising Lion,” stating that Israeli Air Force fighter jets conducted coordinated strikes across Iran during the night, which would correspond to the reported date and time of the strike impacting the Shahid Chamran Residential Complex.¹⁰⁷⁶

XII. Conclusion and recommendations

634. While the risk of further gross human rights violations remains, the unprecedented crackdown following the protests that began on 28 December 2025 increases the likelihood that such violations will become more entrenched and that repressive measures will be routinely used to suppress protests and other dissent, with increasingly serious consequences for victims and their families. This compounds the harm suffered by victims of earlier protests and their families, including in the 2019 and 2022 protests, whose rights to truth, justice, accountability, and reparations remain violated by the State.

635. The Mission reiterates its previous recommendations, which regrettably have not been implemented to date, and makes additional recommendations as outlined in A/HRC/CRP.155 and A/HRC/58/CRP.1 as follows:

A. To the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran

- (a). Immediately halt all executions, including of protesters and implement a moratorium on the use of the death penalty, with a view to complete abolition of the death penalty for all crimes;
- (b). Immediately and unconditionally release all persons detained arbitrarily, including in the context of the protests, including women and children;
- (c). Ensure that family members are immediately informed of the whereabouts of detained individuals;
- (d). Cease and desist from any practices, including those described in the present document, that amount to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, including acts of sexual and gender-based violence and the use of solitary confinement and enforced disappearances;
- (e). End the use of temporary or unofficial places of detention and provide urgent and unconditional medical and health care to detainees;
- (f). Ensure the immediate protection of children from all forms of violence, including unlawful use of force, torture or cruel, degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment in full compliance with international human rights standards; provide children who endured or witnessed serious human rights violations, including in relation to the protests appropriate survivor-centred and child friendly services including psycho-social, medical and other support services;
- (g). Provide access to justice, due process, and fair trial guarantees to all protesters charged with offences, in line with international human rights standards;
- (h). Ensure victims and their families the right to mourn their loved ones without threat, intimidation or fear of reprisals;
- (i). End the harassment, including judicial harassment, of protesters, their families and those seeking truth, justice and reparations in the context of the protests, including journalists, lawyers, medical professionals and human rights defenders;

¹⁰⁷⁵ FFMI-IRAN-D-00665 (FFMI Submission).

¹⁰⁷⁶ FFMI-IRAN-D-00665 (FFMI Submission).

(j). Undertake, effective, thorough, independent, impartial and transparent investigations, into alleged violations of international human rights, and international criminal law described in this document, including in relation to the protests that began on 28 December 2025, in accordance with international standards.

(k). Restore internet and grant equal access to internet to all individuals in Iran. Cease undue restrictions on digital space and repression of online activities; and ensure surveillance is not used to unduly restrict the exercise of fundamental freedoms, especially the rights of women and girls to freedom of expression and autonomy.

(l). Put an end to all online and offline hate speech, especially against women, LGBTQ+ persons, and minorities, in accordance with international standards.

The Mission also urges the Government of Iran to:

(a). Promptly adopt and implement legislation addressing gender-based violence in line with international human rights standards, addressing impunity, prevention, a clear and comprehensive definition of gender-based violence, including marital rape, and the establishment of effective protection mechanisms, such as shelters and survivor-centered support services;

(b). Criminalize, prevent, investigate and prosecute cases of femicide and adequately punish perpetrators, in accordance with international human rights law;

(c). Ensure schools, hospitals, and child-centered spaces remain protected from security operations and arrests;

(d). Guarantee access to confidential, child-friendly support services, including medical care, mental health and psychosocial support, and rehabilitation for child victims;

(e). Comply with the principle of non-refoulement, in line with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, taking into consideration that Afghanistan does not constitute a safe country of return due to the risk of irreparable harm upon return, including torture, ill-treatment, and the heightened risk of persecution, particularly for women, girls and LGBTQ+ persons, among other serious human rights violations;

(f). Prohibit interrogation, summons, arrests, or detention of family members of journalists, human rights defenders and victims or witnesses of past and recent protest movements who had relocated abroad, solely due to dissenting (or perceived as dissenting) activities of their family members abroad;

(g). Prohibit connectivity shutdowns except in states of emergency that have been formally declared in full compliance with international human rights law.

B. To Member States

(a). Support people in Iran in accessing legitimate and safe communication networks so that they may fully enjoy their human rights amid Internet and communication shutdowns that violate international human rights law;

(b). Refrain from providing arms, equipment or technology to Iran if they have knowledge at the time of authorization that these items would be used in the commission of human rights violations, taking into account the principles of due diligence and the responsibility for aiding or assisting in the commission of an internationally wrongful act, while also taking into account international standards of corporate responsibility, in particular the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights;

(c). Refrain from any unilateral military intervention in violation of the United Nations Charter;

(d). Take protection measures within their powers that can be expected to avoid the risk of loss of life for Iranian victims of transnational repression, including journalists, human rights defenders, and victims or witnesses of past and recent protest movements, where information is available on reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations;

(e). Consider measures such as early warning and rapid-response mechanisms, hotlines or online platforms; victim support; prompt opening of investigations; and

prosecutions of perpetrators to protect the lives and security of human rights defenders, activists, and journalists working in or on Iran;

(f). Promptly open criminal investigations into any allegations of transnational repression against human rights defenders, activists, and journalists on Iran, in their territory or jurisdiction, including into the responsibility and role of entities or officials of the Government of Iran, and prosecute those responsible; regularly inform victims of the progress of the investigation and legal proceedings;

(g). Where acts of transnational repression also constitute crimes under international law, consider investigating, and as applicable, prosecuting them as crimes under international law, including crimes against humanity or the crime of torture, in addition to offenses under national law;

(h). Establish information-sharing among law enforcement and security services in countries to which victims had relocated to facilitate accountability for harm suffered, such as threats, surveillance, and pressure on families;

(i). Stress the responsibility of technology companies to carry out comprehensive human rights and gender-focused due diligence regarding in relation to their services and digital platforms.

(j). Take measures and coordinate action to ensure access to safe legal immigration pathways for victims of serious human rights violations and persecution in Iran and to humanitarian visas, asylum, medical and life-saving assistance outside of Iran.

C. The Mission also makes the following recommendations in the context of an armed conflict

1. Urges parties to:

(a). Urgently and unconditionally end hostilities.

(b). Respect international humanitarian law, including the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols I and II, as well as customary international law binding on all States. This includes the principles of precaution, proportionality and distinction.

(c). Commit fully to pursuing justice and change through lawful accountability instead of violence, noting that war cannot deliver the outcomes that truth, justice, due process, and transformative reparations can achieve.

2. To the Government of Iran:

(a). Take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and civilian objects under its control against the effects of attacks, including but not limited to, a thorough risk analysis, in particular in urban areas, the construction of shelters, development and implementation of national protocols ensuring the transparent, prompt and effective distribution of warnings and information, and protocols for the deployment of civil defence organizations, as well as the removal of military objectives within or near densely populated areas;

(b). Take all feasible precautions to protect detainees in Evin prison compound and all other official or unofficial detention facilities against the effects of attacks, including but not limited to, constructing shelters, conducting regular emergency training with and providing instructions for emergency situations to all regular staff present at the facility, conducting regular emergency drills with detainees, providing detainees information on evacuation plans and shelter options, and taking any additional measures, which are practicable or practically possible, to ensure the safety and well-being of detainees and facilitate prompt and effective firefighting, rescue and medical assistance efforts, especially during an armed conflict, considering requests for temporary or conditional release or transfer to safer locations.

Annex I



**UNITED NATIONS INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION
ON THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN**

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28 April 2025

Excellency,

On behalf of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran ("the Mission"), I write to express our concern in relation to the reported imminent confiscation of property of Ms. Marzieh Mohebbi, attorney-at-law and a member of the Khorasan Bar Association in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Based on available information, we understand that Ms. Mohebbi was summoned by a Court in connection with allegations of having engaged in "propaganda against the Islamic Republic of Iran", in connection with her activities in support of legal practitioners providing support to women and her legal support to female prisoners. Her conviction followed a ruling by Branch 49 of the Revolutionary Court of Mashhad in July 2023 and was later upheld in January 2025 by Branch 54 of the Court of Appeals of Tehran, which included her being sentenced to the confiscation of her assets for the benefit of the "Execution of Imam Khomeini's Order" organization. In this situation, and under the threat of imprisonment, Ms. Mohebbi was effectively forced to leave the country in the autumn of 2022.

Previously, Ms. Mohebbi has been engaged in the "Soura Women Lawyers' Association", in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi province, providing free legal services to women prisoners and victims of gender-based violence, legal education to women and girls in the community, and engaging on legal reform, including in relation to addressing child marriage and violence against women.

The Mission recalls that the harassment of lawyers for exercising their profession prevents lawyers from fulfilling their professional obligations. The UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers assert that governments must ensure that lawyers can perform all their professional functions without intimidation, harassment, or improper interference. Moreover, harassment of lawyers may result in violations of the rights of their clients, including their rights to due process (article 14 of the ICCPR), liberty and legal security (article 9 of) and to freedom from torture or other ill-treatment (article 7).

..

His Excellency Mr. Ali Bahreini
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In its general comment No. 13, the Human Rights Committee emphasized that lawyers should be able to counsel and to represent their clients in accordance with their professional standards and judgment without restriction, influence, pressure, or undue interference. In its resolution 35/12, the Human Rights Council also established that all States must guarantee the independence of lawyers and their ability to perform their functions accordingly, by taking appropriate measures that will enable them to carry out their professional functions without interference, harassment, threats or intimidation of any kind.


Furthermore, in accordance with the [Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers](#) (adopted on 7 September 1990 by the eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders), States must ensure that lawyers are able to perform all of their professional functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment or improper interference, and that they do not suffer and are not threatened with prosecution or other administrative, economic or other sanctions for any action taken in accordance with recognized professional duties, standards and ethics (principle 16). Lawyers are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly (principle 23), and to form and join self-governing professional associations to represent their interests, promote their continuing education and training and protect their professional integrity (principle 24).

We are concerned that Ms. Mohebbi was convicted solely for legitimately exercising her professional activities as a lawyer and for exercising her rights to freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of association. The Mission is concerned that Ms. Mohebbi's actions do not amount to a recognizable criminal offence complying with requirements under international human rights law, including foreseeability and precision.

In light of the international human rights obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Mission calls for a review of the judgment against Ms. Mohebbi by the competent appellate body. Pending such review and to prevent irreparable harm, we urgently call on a stay of the ruling of Branch 54 of the Court of Appeals of Tehran, including with respect to the confiscation of Ms. Mohebbi's property. The Mission also requests a copy of Ms. Mohebbi's court judgment.

We recall that your responses and submissions will be taken into account by the Fact-Finding Mission on Iran as we carry out our mandate to thoroughly and independently monitor and investigate allegations of recent and ongoing serious human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.



Sara Hossain
Chairperson of the
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran

cc. Shaheen Sardar Ali (member)
Viviana Krsticevic (member)



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10 May 2025

Excellency,

On behalf of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran ('the Mission'), we write to bring your urgent attention to, and seek your intervention regarding, Ahmadreza Djalali, Iranian-Swedish scholar, who has been sentenced to death for "corruption on earth" (efsad-e fel-arz) in October 2017 on espionage charges by a revolutionary court in Tehran. The Supreme Court upheld this sentence in December 2017. On 9 May 2025, it was reported that Mr. Djalali suffered a cardiac arrest in prison. We urge the Iranian authorities to provide him with urgent specialized medical care.

We recall that under international human rights law, and in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is a party, the death penalty must be reserved for the most serious crimes, involving intentional death, following a fair trial and strict compliance with due process rights.

Mr. Djalali was in Iran at the invitation of the Universities of Tehran and Shiraz to attend workshops on disaster medicine. According to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD), Mr. Djalali was arrested by the Ministry of Intelligence while travelling by car from Tehran to Karaj on 25 April 2016.

..A..

His Excellency, Mr. Ali Bahreini
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According to the UNWGAD, Mr. Djalali was held in an unknown location for a week, before being transferred to section 209 of Evin Prison, where he spent seven months. During this time, he spent three months in solitary confinement, and another four months in the same cell, with another inmate. During those seven months, Mr. Djalali was denied access to a lawyer. In January 2017, nine months after his initial arrest, Mr. Djalali was tried before Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court in Tehran. Our concerns are heightened by credible allegations, as reported in the media, of serious fair trial rights violations, including of coerced confessions on which the convictions are allegedly based.

Since Mr. Djalali's arrest in 2017, these forced "confessions" have been repeatedly aired on State television. In one such broadcast, he described having been hired by a foreign intelligence service in Europe to provide them with information related to Iran's nuclear programme.

In February 2018, Mr. Djalali's lawyer reportedly requested a judicial review before the Supreme Court, which was denied. Later in May 2022, Djalali's lawyers filed another request for judicial review before the Supreme Court and, separately, an appeal to the Head of the Judiciary under Article 477 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to order a review of the case but received no response. Furthermore, in May 2022, Zabihollah Khodaian, then Spokesperson for the Judiciary of the Islamic Republic, stated that Mr. Djalali's sentence was final, and that the judiciary would act based on the issued judgment.

According to information reviewed by the Mission, during the past nine years, Mr. Djalali has been subject to ill-treatment and torture, including prolonged solitary confinement, with a constant risk of his imminent execution. Mr. Djalali has also suffered from medical issues resulting in dramatic weight loss, and he has reportedly been denied access to proper medical treatment outside prison.

Based on the information available in the public domain, the Mission is concerned that fair trial guarantees enshrined in Article 14 of the ICCPR, to which Iran is a state party, have been violated.

The Mission is alarmed about the confessions which appear to have been obtained under coercion from the defendant, as apparent breach of the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt. The Mission is also concerned that the defendant appears to have been delayed the right to access a lawyer of his own choosing from the moment of his arrest till now, and that he has been subjected to ill-treatment during this period.


We therefore respectfully request the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide the following information:

- A copy of Mr. Djalali's complete judicial files, including his indictments;

- Any information about the underlying alleged crimes of which Mr. Djalali is accused, the evidence relied upon and the standard of proof applied;
- Clarification on how the acts which Mr. Djalali was accused of committing qualify as “most serious crimes” under international human rights law;
- Clarification as to whether an investigation was launched into the allegations that Mr. Djalali was subjected to torture and ill-treatment, the outcome of such investigation and whether reports of torture were taken into account by the relevant courts (including the revolutionary court); and
- Clarification as to whether or not Mr. Djalali had access to a lawyer of his own choosing and exactly when he was granted access to a lawyer following his arrest, as well as information on the time and facilities granted for the preparation of his defence and whether he was given the opportunity to present exculpatory evidence under the same conditions as incriminating evidence is presented.

The Mission is deeply concerned over Iran’s consistent pattern of arresting dual-nationals for what appears to relate to their use for so-called hostage diplomacy. We recall and reiterate the concerns of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which found Dr. Djalali’s detention to be arbitrary and we call for his immediate release and for his death sentence to be commuted.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.



Sara Hossain
Chairperson of the
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran

cc. Viviana Krsticevic (member)



UNITED NATIONS INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION
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08 July 2025

Excellency,

On behalf of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran ("the Mission"), we write to express our deep concern over the impact on the civilian population of the recent hostilities between Iran and Israel.

In this regard, the Mission brings to your attention a [press statement](#) issued on 23 June 2025 jointly with the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the statement, we raised serious concerns over reports of civilian casualties, damage to residential areas and civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and a clinic, and on the media and humanitarian workers, and the lack of effective warnings, as potential violations of international humanitarian law, particularly the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution.

At present, we are seeking updated information about locations where civilians have been reportedly killed or injured, and/or where protected civilian objects have been damaged or destroyed. This includes information on the reported airstrikes on medical facilities, airstrikes on the main office of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcaster (IRIB) in Tehran, where we understand three individuals were killed, and the airstrikes during a rescue operation in Tehran that allegedly resulted in the killing of three members of the Iranian Red Crescent.

Moreover, and as detailed below, we express our concern in relation to the impact on prisoners from the 23 June Israeli airstrike on Evin Prison, where many activists, journalists, lawyers, and human rights defenders, both men and women, were being held. This includes, for example, the case of **Dr. Ahmadsheza Djalali**, who had been sentenced to death in 2017, and who appears to have been separated from other prisoners following the airstrikes and subsequently transferred from Evin prison to a location unknown to the Mission. We have previously expressed our concerns in relation to his case in a letter dated 10 May 2025 addressed to your Government.

His Excellency, Mr. Ali Bahreini
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To assist in the complete and impartial delivery of our mandate, the Mission seeks to clarify the following:

1- The situation of all Evin inmates after the airstrike by the Government of Israel

Gathering information about the Israeli airstrike(s) on Evin prison the Mission has understood that a significant number of people were killed, while the prison structures sustained extensive damage. We have also understood that many if not all remaining detainees have since been evacuated to other prison facilities within Tehran province. The Mission is concerned that many detainees have not yet had any opportunity to be in contact with their lawyer or family members who currently remain unaware of their whereabouts. The Mission recalls States' human rights-based obligations to afford detainees and prisoners access to their lawyers and families.

The Mission respectfully requests that the Government provide the following information:

- Measures taken to ensure the safety of detainees and prisoners in Evin Prison since the first strike on it by the Government of Israel; measures taken to afford detainees and prisoners access to their lawyers and families;
- Information, including any available video footage from the airstrike(s), any previous warning by the Israeli authorities, the extent of the destruction and information on casualties (disaggregated by gender, age and status – i.e., whether detainees, visitors, prison, security personnel or other); and
- Information on the conditions in the prisons to which the prisoners were transferred, in particular their access to adequate facilities such as drinking water, sleeping arrangements, and a hygienic environment.

2- The accelerated pace of executions

The Mission is alarmed to learn that since 13 June 2025, the Government has executed at least six individuals convicted and sentenced on espionage and other national security-related charges, including [همکاری با رژیم صهیونیستی] collaboration with the Government of Israel.

- On 16 June 2025, the Government announced that **Mr. Ismail Fekri**, arrested in December 2023, had been executed upon being convicted of *efsad-e fel-arz*, "corruption on earth" and *moharebeh* "enmity against god" for having allegedly collaborated with the Government of Israel.
- On 22 June 2025, the Government announced the execution of **Mr. Majid Mosibi**, having been convicted of *efsad-e fel-arz*, "corruption on earth" for allegedly collaborating with the Mossad.
- On 23 June 2025, the Government executed **Mr. Mohammad Amin Mahdavi Shayesteh**, reportedly arrested in fall 2023, having been convicted on similar charges alleging espionage and collaboration with the Government of Israel.
- On 25 June 2025, the Government announced the execution of three Kurdish individuals, **Mr. Edris Aali**, **Mr. Azad Shojai**, and **Mr. Rasoul Ahmad Rasoul** in Urmia, West Azerbaijan province, having convicted the men of *efsad-e fel-arz* "corruption on earth" due to allegedly having collaborated with Israel.

Recent statements from the judiciary, dated 18 and 25 June, further indicated that rather than upholding the principles of a fair trial and undue delay, the Judiciary seems positioned to expedite convictions. Iran's Parliament recently approved an emergency bill that increases punishments for collaboration with foreign adversaries. Together, these raise serious concerns about the integrity of such judicial processes.

The Mission recalls that, under international human rights law, and in particular Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), fair trial guarantees, such as the presumption of innocence and the right to access a lawyer of one's own choosing, must be upheld.

The Mission therefore respectfully requests the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide the following information about these executions:

- A complete copy of the judicial files, including indictments;
- Any information about the underlying alleged crimes of which individuals above were accused, the evidence relied upon and the standard of proof applied;
- Clarification on how the acts which the individuals were accused of amount to the "most serious crimes" as required under international human rights law;
- Clarification as to whether an investigation was launched into the allegations that the individuals were subjected to torture and ill-treatment, the outcome of such investigation and whether reports of torture were considered by the relevant courts (including the revolutionary court); and
- Clarification as to whether or not the individuals had access to a lawyer of their own choosing, exactly when they were granted access to a lawyer following their arrest, as well as information on the time and facilities granted for the preparation of their defense and whether they were given the opportunity to present exculpatory evidence under the same conditions as incriminating evidence was presented.

3- Arbitrary arrests

The Mission has also been receiving mounting reports of arrests of activists, journalists, artists and social media users who had expressed their views on the recent hostilities. If confirmed, these arrests were arbitrary under international human rights law. The Mission seeks to raise with you this deeply troubling, emerging pattern of arrests which includes foreigners and dual nationals, during crisis, at times in connection with allegations of espionage or "collaboration with hostile governments". It is a double burden for the people of Iran to first face the brunt of Israel's airstrikes, only to have their own Government's security forces begin detaining them on questionable charges. We ask that your Government review these arrests and release immediately anyone for whom the necessity, proportionality and legality thresholds are not met.

The Mission respectfully requests that the Government provide the following information:

- The number of people arrested since 13 June charged with "espionage" or "collaboration with hostile governments," and the factual basis for the charges;
- Information on the whereabouts of those people and the due process protections being afforded, including access to their lawyers and family, in line with international human rights standards.
- Conditions within the prisons, including detainees' access to adequate facilities such as drinking water, sleeping arrangements, and a hygienic environment; and


The Independent Fact-Finding Mission for the Islamic Republic of Iran recalls the universality of all human rights and the commitments your Government has undertaken to respect, protect and fulfill them. It is precisely in the face of political and security challenges that human rights protections are paramount. Governments must act robustly to avoid any semblance of double standards. The Mission

therefore reiterates its request to your Government to free all those arbitrarily arrested, including those whose arrest and detention were related to the individual's role or support to the September 2022 protest and the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement.

In this context, the Mission would value highly an opportunity to understand your assessment of the situation, learn of the measures taken to protect the civilian population and explore constructive avenues for cooperation on the above-mentioned topics, ensuring the Mission's investigations can proceed fully and impartially.

To further this aim, the Mission would like to propose a meeting with your Permanent Mission in Geneva. Should you be amenable, the Mission will make itself available at a mutually suitable time and modality. We look forward to a positive reply at your earliest convenience.

The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran takes this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran the assurances of its highest consideration.



Sara Hossain
Chairperson of the
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran

cc. Viviana Krsticevic (member)



**UNITED NATIONS INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION
ON THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN**

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Webpage: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffm-iran/index>

Reference: FFMIRAN

His Excellency Mr. Ali Bahreini
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office
Chemin du Petit-Saconnex 28
1209 Geneva
Switzerland

27 August 2025

Re: Death sentence against Ms. Sharifeh Mohammadi and other women activists at risk of execution

Excellency,

I write on behalf of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (the 'FFM Iran'), established pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-35/1 on the "Deteriorating situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially with respect to women and children". Most recently, on 3 April 2025, through resolution 58/21, the Human Rights Council further extended the mandate of the FFM Iran, expanding the scope of the investigations to "recent and ongoing serious human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran", "establishing their "facts, circumstances and structural causes", and collecting and preserving evidence.

The FFM Iran writes with utmost urgency to express its grave concern at the decision of Branch 39 of the Supreme Court on 16 August 2025 to uphold the death sentence imposed on Ms. Sharifeh Mohammadi. This decision has been taken despite concerns raised about the arbitrary nature of her detention and the denial throughout her judicial proceedings of fair trial guarantees enshrined in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is a State Party.

According to the information reviewed by the FFM Iran, Ms. Sharifeh Mohammadi was arrested in December 2023, subjected to torture in detention, and denied fair trial rights. In July

2024, she was sentenced to death for her peaceful activism. Although the Supreme Court initially overturned the ruling, a flawed retrial led to a second death sentence, which was upheld in August 2025. She now faces imminent execution.

As previously conveyed in our communications of 2 September 2024 and 12 February 2025, the FFM Iran has repeatedly raised concerns regarding the flawed legal processes that culminated in Ms. Mohammadi's conviction and death sentence. We recall also the response of the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 7 October 2024, to the joint communication by mandate holders of 29 July 2024. In that reply, the authorities denied that Ms. Mohammadi is a human rights defender or labour rights activist, accused her instead of membership in the "Komala terrorist group," and dismissed allegations of torture and ill-treatment. The reply also rejected concerns about her inability to be represented by legal counsel of her choosing.

Arbitrary detention and criminalization of peaceful activism

The FFM Iran reiterates that Ms. Mohammadi's arrest on 5 December 2023 was arbitrary. Agents of the Ministry of Intelligence arrested her at her home in Rasht, seized her personal belongings, and subjected her to incommunicado detention and solitary confinement. These measures were taken solely in connection with her peaceful activism, including her past activities with the Committee to Help Form Workers' Organizations, her advocacy against the death penalty, and her writings on labour rights and women prisoners. Such activities fall within the legitimate exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and association, as guaranteed under international human rights law. Equating Ms. Mohammadi's peaceful activism with "armed rebellion" under Article 287 of the Islamic Penal Code is contrary to international human rights law. The vague and overly broad definition of "baghi" permits the authorities to conflate labour organizing with violent insurgency, without presenting any credible evidence of armed activity or violent conduct by Ms. Mohammadi.

The death penalty and the "most serious crimes" standard

International human rights law, including Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, restricts the application of the death penalty exclusively to the "most serious crimes," understood to mean crimes of extreme gravity involving intentional killing. Conduct that is non-violent and which is protected under international human rights law, such as political expression, association, or non-violent activism, can never lawfully justify capital punishment.

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has repeatedly affirmed that States are under an obligation to review their legislation to ensure that the death penalty is not imposed for crimes that do not meet this threshold. By upholding a death sentence imposed for acts of alleged association with an organization and the exercise of rights protected under international law, the Supreme Court's decision is incompatible with Iran's international obligations and undermines the credibility of the judicial system.

Fair trial violations

The FFM Iran concerns are compounded by the proceedings against Ms. Mohammadi, which were marred by serious and repeated violations of judicial guarantees set out in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

- Her first trial on 9 June 2024 consisted of a single 30-minute session conducted by video link, during which she was denied the right to speak. Her lawyer was granted only 10 minutes to present a defence.
- After the Supreme Court overturned her first death sentence in October 2024, citing major deficiencies, the retrial before Branch 2 of the Revolutionary Court in December 2024 was again limited to a brief video hearing, during which the court relied on submissions from interrogators that were not shared with her defence team. This practice deprived her counsel of the opportunity to examine or contest the evidence, violating the principle of equality of arms. According to the information received by the FFM Iran, no new factual information or evidence was provided, and none of the fundamental flaws identified by the Supreme Court were addressed.
- According to the information reviewed by the FFM Iran, Ms. Mohammadi was subjected to torture and ill-treatment during her interrogations, including beatings and threats intended to coerce a confession of ties to the Komala Party of Kurdistan, which she consistently denied. Despite her lodging a formal complaint in January 2024, no investigation was initiated, and she was pressured into withdrawing the complaint under threat of continued isolation. The authorities' blanket denial of torture, without any independent inquiry, falls far short of the obligation to investigate such allegations promptly, thoroughly, and impartially.

Such violations of the fair trial guarantees provided for in Article 14 of the Covenant in proceedings resulting in the imposition of the death penalty render the sentence arbitrary in nature.

A broader pattern of death sentences

The FFM Iran views the case of Ms. Mohammadi in the wider context of what it observes to be the intensified use of the death penalty by the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly against individuals engaged in political activism and activities otherwise protected by international human rights law in the aftermath of the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement. At least two other women—Ms. Varisheh Moradi and Ms. Pakhshan Azizi—currently face death sentences on charges of "baghi" under circumstances raising similar human rights concerns. The continued resort to capital punishment in politically motivated cases is deeply troubling, particularly where the death penalty is being used as a tool of repression rather than justice.


In light of the above, the FFM Iran urgently appeals to the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran to:

1. Abide by its international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Iran is a State Party.
2. Vacate the conviction and immediately commute the death sentence of Ms. Sharifeh Mohammadi.
3. Ensure her release pending any proceedings that meet the requirements of fairness, transparency, and impartiality under international human rights law.
4. Open a prompt, independent, and impartial investigation into the allegations of torture and ill-treatment to which she has been subjected.
5. Review and amend the application of Article 287 of the Islamic Penal Code to ensure that non-violent activities are not prosecuted under charges of "armed rebellion."
6. Take meaningful steps to bring the administration of justice in line with Iran's international human rights obligations and put in place a moratorium on the use of the death penalty, with a view to abolition.

The flaws listed by the FFM Iran in this letter expose the deficiencies of the criminal justice system of the Islamic Republic of Iran and call into question Iran's respect for its international commitments. **We therefore respectfully urge the authorities to take immediate action to remedy these violations and to prevent the execution of Ms. Sharifeh Mohammadi.**

We thank you for your attention to this urgent matter and remain at your disposal for further engagement.

Yours Sincerely



Sara Hossain

Chairperson of the Fact-Finding Mission on Iran

Cc: Ms. Viviana Krsticevic, Member of the FFMI
Mr. Max du Plessis, Member of the FFMI



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Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations Office
and other international organizations in Geneva
Avenue de la Paix 1-3
1202 Geneva
Switzerland

24 October 2025

**Re: Request for information relating to airstrikes originating from the Islamic Republic of Iran
and Israel during the armed conflict between Iran and Israel from 13 to 25 June 2025**

Excellency,

I write on behalf of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (the 'FFM Iran'), established pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution 58/21 on the "Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran".

In the context of its mandate to thoroughly and independently monitor and investigate allegations of recent and ongoing serious human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as to establish the facts, circumstances and structural causes thereof, we would be grateful if your Excellency could kindly submit the attached Annex containing a list of questions to the authorities of the Government of Israel for their responses and possible follow-up.

We look forward to hearing from you in this regard.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours Sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Sara Hossain".

Sara Hossain

Chairperson of the FFM Iran

Cc: Ms. Viviana Krsticevic, Member of the FFM Iran

Mr. Max du Plessis, Member of the FFM Iran

ANNEX I

List of questions on airstrikes in Israel originating from the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran between 13 and 25 June 2025

- Please provide the names and locations of any civilian objects, including specially protected objects, reported to have been destroyed or damaged because of the airstrikes carried out between 13 and 25 June; time and date of the reported airstrikes, means and methods of warfare used, including any use of cluster munitions, and any supporting material. Affected objects may include but are not limited to medical facilities, schools or residential buildings. Please indicate to what extent these were located or not in the vicinity of military installations;
- Please provide, with informed consent, the full name, date of birth/age, sex, gender, civilian status, and profession/school of any victim reported to have been injured or killed as a result of the airstrikes, in addition to the exact location and time/date of the reported incident and injury/death, along with methods and means of warfare used, medical reports, forensic reports, death certificates, relevant audio visual material and images, and with their informed consent, testimonies, contact details of family members of killed victims, injured victims and potential witnesses.; and
- Please facilitate secure, unrestricted, unmonitored and strictly confidential access to victims and potential witnesses of these events, including eyewitnesses, expert witnesses, Government officials, journalists, lawyers, medical personnel, and other potential sources for the purpose of the FFM Iran conducting interviews in private, freely and without impediment, in accordance with international human rights standards.

ANNEX II

List of questions related to airstrikes by Israel on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran between 13 to 25 June 2025

- In relation to the locations and objects reported to have been damaged by airstrikes carried out by the Government of Israel on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as individuals reported to have been targeted, please disclose the criteria for attacking with lethal force objects or individuals whose targeting is expected to result in deprivation of life, including the legal basis for such targeting, the process of identification of military targets and combatants or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, the circumstances in which relevant means and methods of warfare have been used and whether less harmful alternatives were considered prior to launching the airstrike(s).

The Mission is particularly interested in seeking information related to the following reported incidents:

- 14 June, Chamran residential complex, Tehran;
 - 15 June, Quds Square, Tehran;
 - 16 June, Farabi hospital, Kermanshah province;
 - 16 June, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Tehran
 - 23 June 2025, Evin prison compound, Tehran; and
 - Alleged killing of five International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) staff members and volunteers between 13 and 22 June in East Azerbaijan, Tehran, Hamedan and Isfahan provinces.
-
- Please provide information on precautions taken in the conduct of military operations by Israel in Iran to avoid and minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects, including in relation to the specific incidents above;
 - Please provide a copy of all official advance warnings given by Israel to Iranian civilians of any airstrike, including the date and exact time such warnings were issued, language used, through which channels they were broadcast and at what time the subsequent airstrike was carried out, including for the specific incidents above; and
 - Please specify if any investigations have been conducted by Israel into reported loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects in Iran resulting from military operations by Israel in Iran, and if so, please share detailed findings and recommendations, including for the specific incidents above.



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His Excellency, Mr. Ali Bahreini
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office
Chemin du Petit-Saconnex 28
1209 Geneva
Switzerland

18 November 2025

Re: Request for access to the Islamic Republic of Iran and to victims and witnesses in Iran, as well as questions to the Government, including on the Government reports in follow-up to the armed conflict between Iran and Israel from 13 to 24 June 2025

Excellency,

I write on behalf of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (the 'FFMI' or "the Mission"), established pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution 58/21 on the "Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran".

Further to our previous correspondence under Human Rights Council Resolutions S-35/1 and 55/19, we wish to reiterate our strong interest in engaging with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and in receiving information and clarifications from relevant Iranian authorities with respect to allegations of recent and ongoing human rights violations.


In this context, we are pleased to inform you that we have reviewed the reports published by the Government, that provide information on various allegations of human rights violations, including information pertaining to events that occurred since 13 June 2025. Based on this review, we have prepared a list of follow-up questions to the Government that are contained in the attached annex. We would be grateful if your Excellency could kindly submit these questions to the Government authorities for their response.

In order to fulfil our mandate and pursuant to the Human Rights Council's call to grant unhindered access to the country (Resolution 58/21, para. 9), we also seek the opportunity to visit Iran and to meet with all concerned stakeholders in the country, in particular the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and citizens of Iran, to receive any pertinent information and hear first-hand their evaluation of the evolving situation.

We look forward to hearing from you in this regard.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours Sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Sara Hossain', with a stylized, cursive script.

Sara Hossain

Chairperson of the FFMI

Cc: Ms. Viviana Krsticevic, Member of the FFMI

Mr. Max du Plessis, Member of the FFMI

ANNEX I

List of questions resulting from the Mission's review of reports from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. "Not in the Battlefield nor in Combat Uniform, They were Massacred by the Israeli Regime: A Story [sic] of Blatant Violations of International Law, Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity", report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran [undated]

- Please provide additional and detailed information on each victim named in the report (full name, date of birth/age, gender, occupation/function, profession/school), including exact location and time/date of reported incident and death, means and methods of warfare used, death certificates, medical reports, relevant audio visual material and images, relevant testimonies, and contact details of injured victims and potential witnesses, as well as information on whether investigations were/are being conducted and if so, what the findings were, and whether compensation was obtained by victims/families of victims, and by whom and the type and amount of compensation.
- Provide the names and location of the following facilities reported to be destroyed or damaged, namely; 7 hospitals destroyed, 4 healthcare units destroyed, 6 emergency bases destroyed, and 11 ambulances destroyed; in relation to these facilities, please provide time/date of reported airstrike(s), means and methods of warfare used, related deaths or injuries, any military objectives in the immediate vicinity of said facilities; and any other supporting material.
- Where investigations into the events described in the report were carried out, please provide details on who carried out the investigation, on the methodology of the investigations, including terms of reference, and compatibility with international human rights standards and the victims' rights to justice, truth and reparations.
- Where investigations into the events described in the report were carried out, please provide information as to whether witnesses or victims were identified, and interviews conducted. If witnesses or victims were interviewed, please provide their full statements, if informed consent can be obtained.
- Please provide, with their informed consent, contact details and facilitate secure, unrestricted, unmonitored and strictly confidential access to victims and potential witnesses of the events covered in this report, including eyewitnesses, expert witnesses, Government officials, journalists, IRIB personnel, medical personnel, and other potential sources for the purpose of the FFM Iran conducting interviews in private, freely and without impediment, in accordance with international human rights standards.
- In relation to the locations and objects damaged or destroyed following the incidents as described in this report, including Evin prison compound, please provide information on precautionary measures taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran to protect the civilian population and civilian objects against the effects of attacks, before 13 June 2025 and between 13 and 24 June 2025. Please also indicate what steps were taken to protect the female and male detainee population, once the airstrikes on Evin prison compound were underway.
- Since 24 June 2025, have additional precautions being taken to minimize the risk of civilian harm, including by avoiding the location of military objectives within or near densely populated areas? If so, please provide information on the steps taken.

2. “Brazen Attack on International Law by the Israeli Regime and the United States Vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic of Iran Through their Acts of Aggression of 13-24 June 2025 - Updated Report, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran [undated]

- Please provide information on the 5,750 people reported to be injured and 1,060 people reported to be killed (encompassing 935 killed persons reported to be identified), including, with informed consent, personal identifiable data (full name, date of birth/age, gender, occupation/function, profession/school), exact location and time/date of reported airstrikes and deaths, means and methods of warfare used, death certificates, medical reports, relevant audio visual material and images, relevant testimonies, and contact details of injured victims and potential witnesses, as well as information on whether investigations were/are being conducted and if so, what the findings were, and whether compensation was obtained by victims/families of victims, and by whom and the type and amount of compensation.
- Provide the detailed location (address and section of building) of each facility reported to have been damaged or destroyed in the chronological list in the report, as well as corresponding supportive material such as detailed maps, satellite imagery, audio visual material and images, official statements or reports, as well as contact details of potential witnesses (with their informed consent) and information on whether investigations were/are being conducted and if so, what the findings were. These facilities reportedly include, but are not limited to, hospitals, residential buildings, government buildings, energy and nuclear facilities, universities, private businesses.
- Where investigations into the events described in the report were carried out, please provide details on who carried out the investigation, composition, on the methodology of the investigations, including terms of reference, and compatibility with international human rights standards and the victims' rights to justice, truth and reparation.
- Where investigations into the events described in the report were carried out, please provide information as to whether the investigations identified and conducted interviews with witnesses or victims. If witnesses or victims were interviewed, please provide their full statements, if informed consent can be obtained.
- Please provide, with their informed consent, contact details and facilitate secure, unrestricted, unmonitored and strictly confidential access to victims and potential witnesses of the events covered in this report, including eyewitnesses, expert witnesses, Government officials, journalists, IRIB personnel, medical personnel, and other potential sources for the purpose of the FFM Iran conducting interviews in private, freely and without impediment, in accordance with international human rights standards.
- In relation to the locations and objects reportedly damaged or destroyed, please provide information on precautionary measures taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran to protect the civilian population and civilian objects against the effects of attacks, before 13 June 2025 and between 13 and 24 June 2025.
- Since 24 June 2025, have additional precautions been taken to minimize the risk of civilian harm, including by avoiding the location of military objectives within or near densely populated areas? If so, please provide information on the steps taken.
-

3. Key Measures Undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Field of Human and Citizens' Rights, by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (dated Second Quarter 2025)

- Please specify whether any of the cases of the 92 individuals sentenced to punishment of retribution-in-kind mentioned on page 3 of the report, including the 36 whose cases have been terminated, relate to protests in 2022, 2021, 2019 or any other protests. For those cases, please provide details.
- Please specify whether any of the cases related to the 5,972 prisoners mentioned on page 3 of the report, and the prevention of imprisonment of 633 individuals mentioned on page 3 of the report, relate to: protests in 2022, 2021, 2019 or any other protests, compliance with mandatory *hijab*, the exercise of journalistic or legal work, advocacy against discrimination on any grounds recognized under international law, expression online or offline, or the freedoms of association or assembly. For those cases, please provide details.
- Please specify whether any of the cases related to the individuals who have been pardoned or released through the recourse to leniency mechanisms mentioned on page 4 of the report relate to: protests in 2022, 2021, 2019 or any other protests, compliance with mandatory *hijab*, the exercise of journalistic or legal work, advocacy against discrimination on any grounds recognized under international law, expression online or offline, or the freedoms of association or assembly. For those cases, please provide details.
- Please provide a list of the detention facilities visited and inspected as mentioned on page 5 of the report and any official reports on the reported 32,350 prison inspections by judges and meetings with 128,367 prisoners. What human rights concerns have been found by these inspections and what measures have been taken by the authorities to address them? Have these inspections found any cases of torture or inhumane treatment of detainees or cases of arbitrary detention? Is there a complaint mechanism in place, are victims able to file a complaint, and has anyone been held accountable for concerns involving criminal conduct on the part of officials?
- Please provide information on the provision of emergency shelter and rental housing for those who lost homes during the Israel-Iran armed conflict between 13 and 25 June 2025, including the number of persons sheltered/housed, disaggregated by location and other relevant information.
- Please provide information on the provision of free treatment in hospitals of victims wounded during the armed conflict between 13 and 24 June 2025, including the number of persons treated, disaggregated by location, type of injuries, type of treatment, and other relevant information.
- In relation to the reported "Reduction of the Cycle of 'Domestic violence' by forty percent through the established women's safe houses" as noted on page 10 in your report, please provide any official statistics the government has on domestic violence disaggregated by province, since the start of 2025. Please also provide the number of cases related to domestic violence which have resulted in the deaths of women and girls, disaggregated by province, since the start of 2025. We would also welcome information on what investigations the government has undertaken into such deaths and the results of those investigations.
- We would welcome information on the current status of planned law reforms related to violence against women. We would also welcome information on what other measures of prevention the government has put in place to respond to violence against women
- In relation to the Ethnic and Religious Minorities Working Group of the National Headquarters for Women and Family, reportedly established on 19 May 2025, as noted on page 11 of the report, please provide the following information including: mandate and

composition of the group, whether the group has the authority to record and/or investigate complaints or recommend reforms, and how the working group will ensure the safe and meaningful participation of minority representatives, civil society and/or religious leaders. Please also provide information on whether there are any follow-up mechanisms in place to ensure that the recommendations of the Working Group will be implemented, and how the Working Group will address past and on-going grievances stemming from restrictions to the right to freedom of religion or belief and provide reparations. Please also provide information on whether the Government plans to review or amend existing laws or practices that have contributed to discrimination and marginalisation of minorities, and whether measures have been put in place to protect individuals that engage with the working group from reprisals and/or intimidation.



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18 November 2025

Excellency,

I write to acknowledge receipt of your letter and the accompanying response of the Government, transmitted on 10 October 2025, to our previous correspondence dated 4 July 2025. The Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran ("FFM Iran" or "the Mission") wishes to thank you for the transmission.

In your letter, you mention on page 1 that the Mission has "demonstrated blatant hostility" and "disregard for the gross human rights violations of Iranian citizens' rights by deliberately and meaningfully remaining silent in the face of the Zionist regime's blatant aggression against Iran and its refusal to condemn it". You also mention, on page 2, that "the killings of women and children are met with silence [by the Mission]", and the coordinated and planned attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities, vital civilian infrastructure, residential areas, medical centers, and hospitals, Red Crescent aid workers, media institutions, Evin prison" have not been "condemned" by the Mission.

In this context, we draw your Government's attention to the joint [press statement](#) issued on 23 June 2025 by the FFM Iran and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this statement, we clearly expressed our serious concerns regarding the disproportionate impact of the June 2025 conflict on civilians, the reported lack of effective warnings by Israel, and the potential violations of the principles of proportionality, distinction, and precaution under international humanitarian law. The FFM Iran and the Special Rapporteur further called upon all parties to respect their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law.

In this regard, we sent a letter to the Government of Iran on 4 July 2025 requesting information, including on the effect of Israeli airstrikes specifically on residential areas, medical facilities, ambulances across the country, as well as on the main office of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcaster (IRIB) and the Evin prison compound in Tehran city. We also requested information on Israeli airstrikes during reported rescue operations leading to the killings of five staff and volunteers of the Iranian Red Crescent Society.

The Mission respectfully reiterates its request for the specific information requested in our communication dated 4 July, which it has not as yet received. It further requests additional information, including information on the exact number of casualties at Evin Prison, the safety measures undertaken to protect detainees following the airstrikes, and details regarding the transfer of detainees, including those whose whereabouts were reportedly unknown after their transfer from Evin (see Annex I).

It also wishes to take this opportunity to request the Government of Iran to provide information on its compliance with the principles of distinction, precaution, and proportionality in airstrikes against

Israel launched from Iranian territory between 13 and 25 June 2025 (Annex II). Kindly note that the Mission has already submitted a letter to the Government of Israel seeking information on these incidents, including clarification on the measures the Government of Israel undertook to ensure compliance with the principles of distinction, precaution, and proportionality when launching airstrikes into Iran during the same period.

The Mission has taken note of the factual and substantive comments provided by the Government of Iran. These and any other information received by the Mission will be taken into account to the extent that they are relevant to its mandate and can be independently verified, in line with its methodology (see the FFM Iran Terms of Reference in Farsi [here](#)).


In order to process the information ahead of its next reporting obligations, the Mission kindly requests that a response be received no later than 1 December 2025.

We also take this opportunity to reiterate our earlier requests for access to the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran to meet with concerned stakeholders in the country, including representatives of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and members of civil society, to receive any pertinent information and hear their first-hand accounts of the evolving situation.

...

His Excellency Mr. Ali Bahreini
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office
Chemin du Petit-Saconnex 28
1209 Geneva
Switzerland

Yours Sincerely,



Sara Hossain
Chairperson of the
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran

cc. Viviana Krsticevic /Max du Plessis Members, FFMI

Annex I

“The brutal actions of the Zionist regime in its aggression against Iran”, p.2-6

- Please provide disaggregated data on civilian casualties resulting from the airstrikes in Iran to which you referred on page 3 of your report, specifying the number of individuals killed and injured, disaggregated by location, sex, gender, age, ethnicity and religion. Please also include, where available, information on the circumstances of each incident and the steps taken to verify these figures.
- Please provide detailed information and supporting documentation concerning the damage and/or destruction of civilian sites referred to on page 3 of your report, including medical facilities such as the Farabi hospital (Kermanshah), as well as the Chamran residential building (Tehran), Quds square (Tehran), IRIB broadcast offices (Tehran), Evin prison (Tehran), and the Peace Building of the Red Crescent Society (Tehran); please provide identification and location of affected sites, the nature of their civilian use prior to the strikes, the extent of the damage sustained, and any available evidence, such as photographs, maps, damage assessment reports, satellite imagery, or (with their informed consent) victim or/and witness testimonies.
- Please provide additional information on damage and/or destruction of residential homes as a result of the airstrikes, and whether any form of compensation (material, financial or otherwise) has been provided to or is intended for the victims and/or their families whose homes were rendered uninhabitable as a result of the strikes.
- Please further provide information on whether any investigation was launched into the circumstances of the airstrikes that struck the reported civilian sites and caused civilian casualties and whether any form of compensation or assistance was provided to or is intended for the victims and/or their families.

Evin prison

Please provide additional information on the reported casualties and structural damage which you refer to on page 6-8 of your report (“Dimensions of the brutal crime of the attack on Evin prison”), namely:

- Noting that you mentioned on page 6 in your report, that “these attacks resulted in the deaths of at least 80 individuals, including prisoners, administrative staff, conscripted soldiers, families of inmates, and even neighbours of the prison”, please confirm the exact number of the individuals killed and injured following the airstrikes on Evin prison; how many prisoners and family members were killed or injured; how many prison staff were killed or injured, and what was their affiliation, and the type of work/duties they performed during the strikes; and
- Please further confirm whether the relatives of those killed have been informed and the manner in which they were informed, including whether the government has facilitated the identification of the deceased and their honourable burial by family members or relatives.
- In addition to the above, please also provide information on the number and type of buildings damaged or destroyed within the prison compound.

In relation to the “series of immediate measures to manage the crisis and protect the health and safety of prisoners [...] in accordance with recognized principles of International Law and human rights requirements (p. 11-12 in your report)

“Emergency transfers”, page 11

- Please provide an updated list of women and men prisoners who were in Evin prison at the time of the airstrikes and those who have been transferred to other prison facilities; please also provide a list of women and men prisoners who have by now been transferred back to Evin prison.
- Please provide additional information on the criteria used to determine who would be transferred to which prison, whether families and lawyers were informed of the transfer, and if so, when and how; and whether prisoners were allowed to communicate with their families and lawyer after being transferred, and to inform them of their whereabouts.
- Please provide information on the conditions of detention during and after the transfer (transport, overcrowding, access to medical care, food, water and sanitation); whether medical and psychological care was provided to injured prisoners, and what kind of steps have been taken to ensure that detainees were not subjected to torture, ill-treatment or incommunicado detention; please also clarify who organized the transfers of prisoners.
- In relation to Dr. Djalali, and your mention on page 15 that “following the horrific crime of the attack on Evin Prison, the individual, along with other prisoners, was transferred to a secure location to ensure their safety and observe precautionary measures. According to the inquiries made, he has had unrestricted access to essential facilities, healthcare services, and other necessary amenities, and his general condition is reported to be satisfactory.”: Please note that the Mission has previously sent a letter in relation to his case in May 2025 and inquired about his whereabouts again in its letter dated 4 July. For the purposes of this present investigation, please confirm Dr. Djalali’s place of detention between his transfer and end of September 2025, and indicate whether, during this period, he has had unrestricted and uninterrupted access to a lawyer of his own choosing, and regular contact with his family.
- Please clarify what measures have been taken to ensure adequate conditions of detention at Tehran Central Prison and Garchak Prison, to which men and women prisoners were respectively transferred in the aftermath of the airstrikes. In particular, please provide information on access to medical care and on any investigations conducted into reports of deaths in custody allegedly resulting from the denial of such care.

“The Special Directive issued by the honourable Head of the Judiciary”

- In relation to the indication at page 11 of your report (“The Special Directive issued by the honourable Head of the Judiciary to grant leave to eligible prisoners was an effective measure to reduce overcrowding, alleviate psychological pressure, and facilitate emergency management”): Please provide a copy of the Directive, and indicate the number of prisoners released, the charges for which they were detained, the prisons from which they were released, and the duration of their leave. Please also clarify the Judiciary’s reported statement¹

¹ Request by the Head of the Judiciary to plaintiffs: if possible, drop your complaint”, Ekhtebareh, 25 June 2025.

regarding conditions attached to such releases, including references to plaintiffs being required to withdraw complaints for prisoners to qualify for release.

- In relation to your statement on page 12 of your report that “no documented reports of torture or inhumane treatment have been recorded or confirmed. Internal oversight, continuous judicial inspections, and active complaint systems are in place and responsive”: Please provide information on the number of complaints received by prisoners regarding torture and ill-treatment, the outcome of these complaints, and the number of site visits conducted by the Judiciary; please also provide information on how torture survivors are able to access the complaint mechanism in place, and what measures exist to protect victims, their families and legal representatives from potential reprisals.

Annex II

Airstrikes launched from Iran against the territory of Israel

In relation to the locations and objects reported to have been damaged and persons killed or injured by airstrikes carried out by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the territory of Israel:

- Please disclose the criteria and process of identification of military targets and combatants and the means and methods of warfare, including the type of delivery vehicles and munitions, which have been used.
- Please provide information on precautions taken in the conduct of military operations to avoid and minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects, including in relation to the specific incidents above.
- Please provide a copy of all official advance warnings given by Iran to any Israeli civilians of any airstrike, including the date and exact time such warnings were issued, language used, through which channels they were broadcast and at what time the subsequent airstrike was carried out, including for the specific incidents above.
- Please specify if any investigations have been conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran into reported loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects in Israel resulting from military operations by Israel in Iran, and if so, please share detailed findings and recommendations.



**UNITED NATIONS INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION
ON THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN**

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His Excellency, Mr. Ali Bahreini
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office
Chemin du Petit-Saconnex 28
1209 Geneva
Switzerland

18 November 2025

Request for information on implementation of the death penalty, handling of national security cases, and accountability for the use of firearms in law enforcement contexts

Excellency,

I write on behalf of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (the 'FFMI'), established pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution 58/21 on the "Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran".

Further to our previous correspondence under Human Rights Council Resolutions S-35/1 and 55/19, we wish to reiterate our strong interest in engaging with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and in receiving information and clarifications from relevant Iranian authorities with respect to allegations of recent and ongoing serious human rights violations and their structural causes. We are seeking information on such violations including the extent that they relate to the death penalty, cases considered to involve national security matters, or the use of firearms in law enforcement by Iranian authorities.

Implementation of the death penalty in relation to cases considered national security matters: In this regard, we would like to express our concern that the recently promulgated "Law on Intensifying the Punishment for Espionage and Collaboration with the Zionist Regime and Hostile States Against National Security and Interests" further expands the application of the death penalty to conduct that is not clearly defined, as required by Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Iran is a party. This Law does not moreover restrict the imposition of the death penalty to "the most serious crimes", as required by Article 6 (2) ICCPR, which has been interpreted by the longstanding jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee to refer to crimes of extreme gravity involving intentional killing. The Law also appears to criminalize conduct that is protected by the right to freedom of expression, including the right to freedom of information, according to Article 19 ICCPR.


Surge in executions: We would also like to express our deep concern about the reported surge in executions during the course of 2025 and reiterate our call for an immediate moratorium on the death penalty, with a view to abolition.

Use of Force: Finally, we would like to share our concern about reported additional instances of unnecessary and disproportionate use of force, including with firearms, and renew our call for previous instances of such use of force that were documented by the FFMI to be promptly and effectively investigated by independent and impartial authorities. We urge you to bring any perpetrators to justice and provide victims with adequate, effective and prompt reparations.

We would be most grateful for your response to the questions outlined in the Annex no later than 5 December 2025 so that relevant information provided can be reflected in our forthcoming report to the United Nations Human Rights Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.

Yours Sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Sara Hossain', written in a cursive style.

Sara Hossain

Chairperson of the FFMI

Cc: Ms. Viviana Krsticevic, Member of the FFMI

Mr. Max du Plessis, Member of the FFMI

ANNEX

List of questions in relation to the FFMI's on-going investigations

1. Death penalty sentences and executions

1.1 Please provide figures for the years 2022, 2023, 2024 and the ongoing year 2025 detailing the number of cases in which Iranian courts have imposed the death penalty. Kindly provide information for each case on the criminal offense under Iranian Law and facts forming the basis for the conviction and sentence, the court issuing the sentence, the appeal court confirming it, date of the sentence, the age of the sentenced person at the time of the alleged offense, and their gender, nationality, ethnic origin, religion and belief. In this listing, please also include updates on the reported death sentences against Ehsan Fardi and Manouchehr Fallah.

1.2 Please provide the reasoning for further expanding the application of the death penalty under the "Law on Intensifying the Punishment for Espionage and Collaboration with the Zionist Regime and Hostile States Against National Security and Interests", as reportedly promulgated on 16 October 2025, and an explanation for why each of the offenses set out by this law should be considered to be "most serious crimes" with respect to Article 6 (2) ICCPR.

1.3 Please provide information on newly established or reintroduced legal provisions, and related sentencing guidelines, that have expanded the application of the death penalty to drug-related offenses since 2021, and please clarify why the Government of Iran considers drug-related offenses to be among the "most serious crimes" with respect to Article 6 (2) ICCPR. Please also provide an update on any legislative efforts to restrict the application of the death penalty to drug-related offenses.

1.4 Please provide detailed information regarding laws allowing for the imposition of the death penalty on, and its use against, individuals for crimes they committed when they were under the age of 18 years.

1.5 Please provide figures on executions carried out by the Iranian authorities during the years 2022, 2023, 2024 and the ongoing year 2025, with the date, place and method for each execution and, the criminal offense forming the basis for the sentence and execution; please also supply disaggregated data on the age of the sentenced person at the time of the alleged offense, their gender, current age, nationality, and ethnic origin, religion and belief. In this regard, we also reiterate our request for information in relation to the executions of six persons - Esmail Fekri, Edris Ali, Azad Shojaei, Rasoul Ahmad Rasoul, Mohammad Amin Mahdavi Shayesteh and Majid Mosayebi- which occurred between 16 and 25 June 2025, and in relation to any other cases of executions raised by the FFMI in previous correspondence with the Iranian authorities.

1.6 Please provide detailed information on all methods of execution permitted under the law and used in practice in Iran. Please also provide information on the legal requirements and policies in place to ensure that families of individuals sentenced to death receive prior notice of executions, can visit their loved one a final time and also ensure their burial.

2. Arrests, detention and legal proceedings, including confiscation of property, in relation to “national security”

2.1 Please provide information on the number of individuals summoned or arrested or detained during the years 2022, 2023, 2024 and the ongoing year 2025, and especially since 13 June 2025, in relation to allegations of “espionage”, “collaboration with hostile governments,” and any other allegations of cooperating with or spying for any foreign actors or any other matters considered to be national security-related, disaggregated by age, gender, ethnic origin, religion and belief of the persons concerned. Please indicate how many of those arrested since 13 June 2025 remain in detention. Please indicate the factual basis for the summons/arrest/detention, and the whereabouts of the person, if still detained. Please specify also how many of these individuals were human rights defenders, dual nationals or foreigners, political, civil rights or social activists, journalists or lawyers.

2.2 Please provide information on the number of individuals charged or prosecuted during the years 2022, 2023, 2024 and the ongoing year 2025, and especially since 13 June 2025, for allegations of “espionage”, “collaboration with hostile governments,” and any other offense related to “cooperating with or spying for foreign actors” or any other matters considered to be national security-related. Please indicate the factual basis for the charges. Please provide disaggregated data of detainees based on gender, ethnic origin, religion and belief, nationality, and age at the time of the alleged offense.

2.3 Please provide information on the number of individuals tried, convicted and/or sentenced since 13 June 2025 for “espionage”, “collaboration with hostile governments,” and any other offense related to “cooperating or spying with the State of Israel, the United States of America or other foreign actors”. Indicate the factual basis for the prosecution/conviction, the sentence imposed and the name of the relevant court(s). Specify also which of these individuals are human rights defenders, journalists or lawyers and where the individuals were already subject to legal proceedings prior to 13 June 2025. Please disaggregate by gender, ethnic origin, religion and belief, nationality and age at the time of the alleged offense. Please provide information on the fair trial protections and due process guarantees afforded, including access to a lawyer of their own choosing, and ability to communicate with their family, in line with international human rights standards.

2.4 In responding to the requests immediately above, please provide in particular also information on the implementation of the “Law on Intensifying the Punishment for Espionage and Collaboration with the Zionist Regime and Hostile States Against National Security and Interests,” (the “Law on Espionage”), including how many persons have been arrested, charged, prosecuted or convicted under this law to date, and on what factual basis. Kindly clarify whether this Law applies retroactively.

2.5 Please indicate which other actors, in addition to the State of Israel and the United States of America, have been designated as “hostile” by the Supreme National Security Council or as “hostile networks” by the Ministry of Intelligence in accordance with the Law, for what reasons and how such decisions have been made known to the public.

2.6 Please also share any guidance shared with prosecutors, judges or other officials on how to interpret and apply the Law in light of its broad and vague provisions.

2.7 Please provide information on safeguards and steps taken to prevent torture, rape, sexual and gender-based violence and ill-treatment in national security-related cases, including through monitoring and inspection, and specify relevant action (e.g. name of facilities inspected, date, inspecting authority, findings and criminal or disciplinary measures imposed).

2.8 Have any confessions or witness statements been dismissed by courts or prosecutors during legal proceedings for having been obtained under torture (please provide details on such cases, including also regarding any disciplinary and criminal measures taken against officials involved in such torture)?

2.9 Please provide information on the number of persons, disaggregated by gender, detention facility and month that have died in detention centres since the start of 2025. Please provide the results of any investigations into such deaths, including autopsy and medical reports, witness statements and conclusions. Please provide information on any accountability measures taken against officials responsible and any measures to address inhumane conditions within detention facilities, including detainees' access to medical attention and adequate facilities such as drinking water, sleeping arrangements, food, and a hygienic environment.

2.10 Please provide information on all cases during the years 2022, 2023, 2024 and the ongoing year 2025 (especially since 13 June 2025), in which courts (or other authorities) ordered the confiscation of all or some of the property of persons found responsible for the commission of national security-related offenses, including those set out in the new Law on Espionage. Please provide information on the offense and facts calling for the confiscation and, on the age, gender, nationality, ethnicity, religion and belief and place of residence (in Iran or abroad) of the person sentenced to confiscation of property.

3. Use of force and firearms

3.1 The FFMI understands that Article 6 of the Law on the Use of Firearms by Armed Forces in Necessary Cases, authorizes security forces to shoot at vehicles in order to stop them where, based on credible evidence and information, the vehicle is stolen or carries people on the run, stolen property, trafficked goods, narcotics or weapons or ammunition without a licence, or where the vehicle has been used for deliberate attacks against law enforcement officers or people. Please provide detailed information on how the above-mentioned circumstances meet the high threshold for the use of potentially lethal force under international law, namely an imminent threat of death or risk of serious injury.

3.2 Please provide information on any instances, in which officials used firearms against persons passing checkpoints, including children, particularly in relation to checkpoints set up since 13 June 2025 on national security grounds. Have incidents of the use of firearms in the context of the checkpoints set up since June 2025 triggered investigations as required under international law? If so, please provide details on the following:

- Based on which laws and regulations was the legality of the use of force assessed? Please provide copies of all cited laws and regulations.
- Was adherence to the principals of legality, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination, precaution and accountability and the existence of "an imminent threat of death or serious injury", where applicable, assessed, as required under international law, as part of any such investigation?
- What investigative bodies have been in charge of these cases and how was their independence, impartiality and investigative effectiveness ensured?

- What have been the findings? Please include criminal or disciplinary sanctions imposed on officials who used unnecessary or disproportionate force and whether adequate, effective and prompt reparations have been provided to the victims and/or their families.

3.3 Please also provide an update on your efforts to investigate and ensure accountability for victims and their families, through criminal and disciplinary sanctions against perpetrators of use of force violations and also to provide adequate, effective and prompt reparations to victims, for all instances of unnecessary and disproportionate use of firearms and other force leading to loss of life and serious injuries that have been flagged in previous reports of the FFMI, including the emblematic cases of concern set out in the FFMI's 2023 detailed report A/HRC/55/CRP.1 (see Annex III) and 2024 detailed report A/HRC/58/CRP.1 (see paras. 200-219 and paras. 697-715). Please also provide such information regarding the unlawful death in custody of Ms. Jina Mahsa Amini and the protest on 30 September 2022 in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan province, where credible figures suggest that 103 fatalities occurred in a single day.



**UNITED NATIONS INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION
ON THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN**

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His Excellency Mr. Ali Bahreini
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office
Chemin du Petit-Saconnex 28
1209 Geneva
Switzerland

2 January 2026

Excellency,

On behalf of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran ('the Mission'), I write to express our utmost concern at the risk of execution of at least nine individuals in Iran for national security charges after the Supreme Court has approved their death sentences.

The Mission is alarmed that the Supreme Court has reportedly upheld the death sentences against seven individuals, including Ehsan Faridi, for their alleged membership in a political group, conduct which is protected under international human rights law (IHRL). The confirmation of the death sentences against two other individuals, Mehrab Abdollahzadeh and Pakshshah Azizi, in relation to the 2022 protests is equally troubling.

While the reported momentary suspension of the death sentence against Mohammad Javad Sani is welcomed, we remain concerned as the sentence has not been overturned, vacated or commuted and Mr. Javad Sani continues to be on death row.

In this context, the Mission notes that, according to credible information, the Government of Iran has executed over 1,000 people in 2025, including many because of their political beliefs.

The Mission recalls that IHRL, including Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR, oblige Iran to respect and ensure the rights recognized in the Covenant for all persons in its jurisdiction without discrimination, including on the bases of religion, political or other opinion, or social origin. Conduct protected under IHRL, such as political expression, association, or non-violent activism, can therefore never lawfully justify capital punishment.

We are also deeply troubled by reports of serious fair trial violations and allegations of forced confessions in relation to the nine cases mentioned, which would render the death sentences upheld by the Supreme Court and ensuing executions arbitrary and in violation of Article 6 of the ICCPR.

We wish to acknowledge the letter of the Judiciary Deputy for International Affairs and the High Council for Human Rights (HCHR) of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights dated 24 December 2025, which refers to the issue of the death penalty in Iran, as well as the report by the HCHR of September 2025 referring to pardons.

Notwithstanding, in light of our concerns in relation to the cases against aforementioned individuals and others against whom the Supreme Court has upheld death sentences on national security or espionage charges or of being a member in political groups or parties, we respectfully request the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide the following information:


- Complete judicial files, including copies of judgments by the courts of first instance and of the appeal judgment by the Supreme Court, including the names of the judges, judicial officers, prosecutors and intelligence officers involved in these cases;
- Clarification as to whether an investigation was launched into the allegations of confessions obtained under torture and of ill-treatment; and
- Information on whether the defendants had access to a lawyer of their own choosing, when such access was granted, on the time and facilities granted for the preparation of their defence, and whether they were given the opportunity to present exculpatory evidence under the same conditions as incriminating evidence was presented.

We recall that your responses and submissions will be taken into account by the Mission as we carry out our mandate to conduct an impartial and independent investigation.

The Mission reiterates its call for an immediate moratorium on executions in Iran as a first step towards the complete abolition of the death penalty. It urges the Government, in light of its obligations under the ICCPR, to review the death sentences of all persons on death row and vacate all sentences related to conduct protected under international law, including in relation to the nine aforementioned cases, as well as to review relevant legislation and its application to ensure that protected conduct is not prosecuted under national security charges.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.

Sincerely,



Sara Hossain
Chairperson of the
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran

cc. Ms. Viviana Krsticevic, Member of the FFM on Iran
Mr. Max du Plessis, Member of the FFMI