



Security Council

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Implementation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) during the period from 21 October 2025 to 20 February 2026

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) since the previous report, dated 11 November 2025 ([S/2025/738](#)), and highlights progress and areas of continued concern. While the parties reiterated their commitment to the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), the situation remained fragile as violations of the resolution persisted.

2. Marking an important milestone, on 8 January, the Lebanese Armed Forces announced that “its plan to restrict weapons has entered an advanced stage ... focused on ... extending operational control over the territories that have come under its authority in the South Litani Sector”. The Cabinet of Lebanon subsequently tasked the Army with developing a road map for the implementation of its plan north of the Litani River. In a second significant development, participation in the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Mechanism was expanded, on two occasions, to include civilian representatives of the parties.

3. Outside the reporting period, there has been significant military escalation across the Blue Line which resulted in deteriorating conditions on the ground, undermining the 27 November 2024 cessation of hostilities arrangement. Until 20 February, there was no progress with respect to the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Lebanese territory pursuant to the cessation of hostilities arrangement and resolution [2790 \(2025\)](#), with a presence retained at five positions and the maintenance of two “buffer zones” north of the Blue Line ([S/2025/153](#), para. 1). The Israel Defense Forces also continued military activity in Lebanon, both north and south of the Litani River. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) continued to experience incidents of aggressive behaviour and restrictions on freedom of movement, involving the Israel Defense Forces and local actors.




II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Cessation of hostilities

4. UNIFIL radars detected 242 trajectories of projectiles fired from south to north of the Blue Line.¹ The Mission observed or detected 11 air strikes and the firing of light weapons from south to north of the Blue Line on over 199 occasions. UNIFIL also heard or detected explosions over 19 times, consistent with media reports of strikes on motorbikes and vehicles. There were no trajectories from north to south of the Blue Line.

Figure I

Trajectories of projectiles across the Blue Line detected by UNIFIL, 21 October 2025 to 20 February 2026



Source: UNIFIL.

5. There were repeated Israel Defense Forces strikes on alleged Hizbullah targets, including individuals allegedly involved in efforts to rehabilitate the weapons production, storage facilities and other infrastructure of Hizbullah, both south of the Litani River and in the Biqa', Jazzin, Nabatiyah and Sidon regions north of the Litani.

6. On 2 November, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, stated: "Hizbullah is indeed taking hits all the time ... but it is also attempting to rearm and recover ... we will exercise our right to self-defense as stipulated in the ceasefire conditions." The same day, the Minister of Defence of Israel, Israel Katz, stated: "Maximum enforcement will continue and intensify – we will not allow a threat to the residents of the north."

¹ Each trajectory may represent multiple projectiles. Almost all trajectories recorded were of rockets, mortar and artillery shells. UNIFIL radars cannot detect some types of projectiles, such as air-to-surface missiles, tank rounds, portable anti-tank missiles or those fired from light weapons.

7. On 23 November, the Israel Defense Forces struck a residential building in the southern suburbs of Beirut, killing Haytham Ali Tabatabai, who Hizbullah subsequently stated was its “top military commander” responsible for “rebuilding capability”. The Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon stated that the strike had resulted in 5 fatalities and 28 people injured.

8. On 16 December, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had targeted a Hizbullah operative in a strike on a vehicle in the Shuf District of Mount Lebanon Governorate which, according to the Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon, resulted in one fatality and injuries to five others. The Amal Movement claimed the deceased as one of its members. Three of the five injured were General Security personnel, one of whom subsequently succumbed to his injuries. Following a strike in Sidon District on 22 December, the Israel Defense Forces stated that one of the three alleged Hizbullah operatives killed “simultaneously served with the Lebanese Armed Forces Intelligence Unit”. The Lebanese Armed Forces acknowledged that the person killed was one of its soldiers, while refuting allegations about ties of “some military personnel” to Hizbullah.

9. On several occasions, the Israel Defense Forces issued “urgent warnings” for residents to relocate in advance of planned strikes on alleged Hizbullah targets both south and north of the Litani River. Two Lebanese Armed Forces positions were reportedly proximate to a building in Kafr Dunin (Sector West) cited in a warning given on 6 November. The Lebanese Armed Forces, which remained in position, stated that the strikes were intended “to prevent the completion of the Lebanese Army’s deployment”.

10. On 13 December, the Israel Defense Forces issued an “urgent warning” regarding a building in Yanuh (Sector West) which, it stated, contained Hizbullah “military infrastructure”. The Lebanese Armed Forces, which had earlier inspected the building in coordination with the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Mechanism, subsequently undertook a second inspection. During both visits, UNIFIL secured the outside perimeter while the Lebanese Armed Forces entered the building. The Lebanese Armed Forces claimed that it had found “no weapons or ammunition”. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently stated that the planned strike had been “temporarily suspended”. On 21 January, the Israel Defense Forces claimed that it had “eliminated a terrorist who was responsible for obstructing an operation against a Hezbollah terrorist weapons depot” on 13 December. The Israel Defense Forces claimed that the individual, who was “the Hezbollah liaison officer in Yanuh”, had received notification from the Lebanese Armed Forces and “passed warnings to Hezbollah operatives, who prevented dismantling and moved weapons out”.

11. The Israel Defense Forces on 11 January struck alleged Hizbullah underground weapons storage sites across Jazzin, Nabatiyah and Sidon Districts. Following strikes on a residential building in Sidon, the Israel Defense Forces stated: “The underground site struck today had been targeted for the first time about a week ago, after the IDF warned the Lebanese Army of terrorist activity at the site. While Lebanese forces inspected the site, the terrorist infrastructure was not fully dismantled, so the IDF struck it again today.” During those earlier strikes on 6 January, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had “struck Hamas weapons production sites in southern Lebanon”.

12. On 21 January, the Israel Defense Forces, which accused Hizbullah of “using civilian areas for terrorist purposes”, carried out extensive strikes on alleged Hizbullah sites located in multiple residential areas in Nabatiyah and Sidon Districts following the issuance of “urgent warnings”. The Lebanese Armed Forces stated that the strikes “hinder the Army’s efforts and obstruct the completion of its operational plan”. In another strike in Yanuh on 9 February, the Israel Defense Forces said that it

had “eliminated” a Hizbullah operative, while acknowledging that “uninvolved civilians were killed” and noting, “the incident is under review”. Three people, including a member of the Internal Security Forces and his child, were killed, according to Lebanese authorities.

13. The Israel Defense Forces on 20 February claimed responsibility for strikes “eliminating a large number of terrorists belonging to Hezbollah’s missile unit” in the Bīqa‘. The President of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, condemned the strikes – which, according to the Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon, had resulted in 10 fatalities and injuries to 24 people, including 3 children – as “a blatant act of aggression aimed at thwarting the diplomatic efforts ... to establish stability”. Hizbullah acknowledged that eight of those killed were members of the group.

14. The Israel Defense Forces on 14 December stated that Hizbullah had “violated the ceasefire agreement more than 1,900 times”, adding that Israel had “eliminated approximately 40 terrorists, who operated to reestablish terrorist infrastructure, in approximately 30 different areas across southern Lebanon since the beginning of October [2025]”.

15. On 21 November, Mr. Aoun stated that “since the declaration of the cessation of hostilities agreement ... Lebanon has fully adhered to the agreement, while Israel continues to violate it and escalate its attacks”. In identical letters dated 25 November addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2025/767](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations stated: “Israel continues to violate the sovereignty of Lebanon. There have been 4,229 such violations from the time that the cessation of hostilities was announced to 13 November 2025.”

16. Since 27 November 2024, at least 134 civilians have been killed by Israeli military operations in Lebanon, including 22 women and 24 children, as verified by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with no reported casualties in Israel.

17. One Lebanese Armed Forces soldier was killed by Israeli fire during the reporting period (see para. 8). There were no reported Israel Defense Forces casualties.

B. Respect for the Blue Line

18. During the reporting period, the Israel Defense Forces remained present in five positions and maintained two “buffer zones” north of the Blue Line. UNIFIL removed the roadblocks installed by the Israel Defense Forces preventing access to the “buffer zones”. In identical letters dated 25 November addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2025/767](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations called upon the Security Council to compel Israel “to withdraw immediately south of the Blue Line from all areas in Lebanon ..., including the five border posts; not to establish so-called buffer zones in Lebanese territory; and to allow Lebanese civilians to return to their villages on the border”.

19. On 14 December, the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, Eyal Zamir, stated: “Our presence at these points enables better security for residents alongside freedom of operation for the troops. Along the Lebanon border as well, we serve as a security buffer between the enemy and the communities”. Mr. Netanyahu on 19 February stated: “Terrorist armies will no longer camp on our borders ... Buffer zones or demilitarized zones, several kilometres wide along the borders of the State, are a necessary requirement. This is to reduce the risk of a ground invasion, and we

insist on this. In light of the above, the IDF remains in the buffer zones in Lebanon and Syria.”

20. UNIFIL observed the Israel Defense Forces firing from those five positions on 21 occasions, in particular the positions near Markaba (Sector East) and Alma al-Sha‘b (Sector West).

21. UNIFIL also frequently observed Israel Defense Forces personnel outside those positions engaged in earthworks and troop movements north of the Blue Line. UNIFIL confirmed the demolition of several buildings by the Israel Defense Forces in villages north of the Blue Line. On 30 October, the Israel Defense Forces entered a Lebanese municipal building in Blida (Sector East), killing one municipal worker. The Israel Defense Forces stated that the building had “recently been used for terrorist activities by Hezbollah under the guise of civilian infrastructure”. The Prime Minister of Lebanon, Nawaf Salam, condemned what he described as a “blatant assault on Lebanese state institutions and sovereignty”, while Mr. Aoun instructed the Lebanese Armed Forces to “confront any Israeli incursion into the liberated southern territories”. The Israel Defense Forces on 9 February stated that it had “raided a building in the Mount Dov area [in southern Lebanon] during the night and arrested a senior terrorist from the Islamic Jama‘a terrorist organization”, adding that he had been “transferred for further interrogation in Israeli territory”. Mr. Salam condemned the “abduction ... following an incursion by Israeli forces into Lebanese territory”.


22. UNIFIL observed almost daily small arms or machine gun fire from south to north of the Blue Line, especially in the Shab‘a Farms area towards Kafr Shuba (Sector East) from November to mid-January. UNIFIL issued numerous stop-firing requests to the Israel Defense Forces (see annex I).

23. The Israel Defense Forces continued construction of a T-wall south of the Blue Line ([S/2025/738](#), para. 12). On 11 November, UNIFIL confirmed that a second segment had crossed north of the Blue Line near Yarun (Sector West), covering an area of approximately 19 m². In identical letters dated 25 November addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2025/767](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations called upon the Security Council to “compel it [Israel] to remove the wall from Lebanese territory”.

24. The Israel Defense Forces continued to occupy northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). The Government of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, while the Government of Israel has yet to respond.

25. UNIFIL detected 3,091 violations of Lebanese airspace, with a total overflight time of 4,682 hours and 28 minutes. Drones accounted for 90 per cent of the violations, fighter aircraft 8 per cent, and helicopters and unidentified aircraft 2 per cent. On 2 February, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that it would drop what it stated was “a non-toxic chemical substance” over areas near the Blue Line. At the request of the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL assisted in collecting samples to be tested for toxicity. On 4 February, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of the Environment issued a joint statement indicating as follows: “Laboratory analysis results showed that the substance sprayed was the herbicide ‘Glyphosate’. This will lead to damage to vegetation cover in the targeted areas”.

Figure II
**Violations of Lebanese airspace detected by UNIFIL, 21 October 2025 to
 20 February 2026**



Source: UNIFIL.

C. Lebanese Armed Forces deployment

26. As at 20 February, over 9,000 Lebanese Armed Forces personnel were deployed in the area south of the Litani River.

27. The Lebanese Armed Forces made progress in the implementation of its plan to establish exclusive State control over weapons south of the Litani River (S/2025/738, para. 29). UNIFIL conducted an average of 1,296 operations each month in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, with operations until December focused on assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces in the implementation of the above-mentioned plan.

28. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force undertook 126 training exercises with the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy and 12 with the Lebanese Air Force. Following the departure of three Maritime Task Force vessels (see para. 61), UNIFIL shifted its focus to capacity-building for the operational self-sustainability of the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy.


29. As part of continued international efforts to support the strengthened deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon convened in Beirut on 16 and 17 December. On 14 January, France announced that an international conference in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces would be held in Paris (see annex III).

D. Disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, including the presence of unauthorized personnel, assets and weapons south of the Litani River

30. UNIFIL identified unauthorized weapons in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River on 114 occasions, including 73 unguarded arms caches consisting of small arms and ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades and launchers, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, mortar shells and tubes, and various unexploded ordnance

devices, in addition to individuals carrying rifles or pistols on 4 occasions and armed hunters on 73 occasions. The Lebanese Armed Forces reported that 98 per cent of the caches referred to them by UNIFIL had been removed. Separately, UNIFIL identified 42 locations of interest and, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, visited 40 of them.

Figure III
Caches of weapons identified by UNIFIL and removed by the Lebanese Armed Forces, 21 October 2025 to 20 February 2026



Source: UNIFIL.

Abbreviation: LAF, Lebanese Armed Forces.

31. In identical letters dated 25 November addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2025/767), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations stated: “The Lebanese army continues to implement the national plan aimed at restricting the possession of arms to the State ... Security measures have been reinforced at the entry points to the southern Litani sector in order to prevent the entry or transfer of weapons”.

32. The Lebanese Armed Forces organized a media tour on 28 November to “review the implementation of the ... Army’s plan in the South Litani Sector”. It subsequently reported that, between December 2024 and February 2026, it had closed 235 underground facilities in the South Litani Sector, sealed off 11 irregular crossing points along the Litani River and seized 579 rocket launchers, and that army engineering units had confiscated 3,848,000 weapons or units of related materiel. On 9 February, the Commander of the United States Central Command, Admiral Brad Cooper, released a statement congratulating the Lebanese Armed Forces on “recently finding a massive underground Hizbollah tunnel for the second time in the past two months”, adding, “job well done by the LAF and [United States]-led Mechanism team that is helping enforce commitments made by Israel and Lebanon”.

33. On 8 January, the Lebanese Armed Forces announced that “its plan to restrict weapons has entered an advanced stage ... focused on expanding the Army’s operational presence, securing vital areas, and extending operational control over the territories that have come under its authority in the South Litani Sector, with the exception of lands and sites that remain under Israeli occupation. The Army notes that

operations in the sector are still ongoing until the clearance of unexploded ordnance and tunnels is completed, in addition to addressing Requests for Action ... to consolidate control and prevent armed groups from irreversibly rebuilding their capabilities.”

34. The Cabinet on 16 February took note of the “plan for the area north of the Litani” with which it had tasked the Lebanese Armed Forces on 8 January. Mr. Salam emphasized “the urgent need to support the Lebanese army logistically and materially, in order to enhance its capabilities to implement the second phase of the plan extending between the Litani River and the Awali River, and the phases that follow”. In identical letters dated 26 January addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2026/42), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations stated: “The second phase will cover the area between the Litani River to the south and the Awali River to the north. The third phase will focus on Beirut and Mount Lebanon. That will be followed by a fourth phase in the Bekaa. The plan will then be implemented in all regions of Lebanon.”

35. On 8 January, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel stated: “Efforts ... by the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese Armed Forces are an encouraging beginning, but they are far from sufficient, as evidenced by Hezbollah’s efforts to rearm and rebuild its terror infrastructure with Iranian support”, adding, “Hezbollah is rearming faster than it is being disarmed”. In its statement, the Ministry also indicated that “the IDF’s strikes against Hezbollah do not delay the goal of disarming the organization – on the contrary, they advance it”.

36. Mr. Aoun on 11 January stated: “[The context] which led to those weapons no longer exists, it has lapsed and now the army is present ... so the role of those arms has ceased” and “keeping them has become a burden on their community and on Lebanon as a whole”. Mr. Aoun added, “I want to tell the other side: it is time for you to be reasonable ... You have ministers and deputies represented in the state; put your hands in the hands of the state and it will take care of the protection”.

37. In a statement issued on 9 January following a meeting in Beirut with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Abbas Araghchi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of Lebanon, Youssef Raggi, requested that support from the Islamic Republic of Iran be “directed solely to the Lebanese state and its institutions, rather than to any other party” and “called on Iran to discuss with Lebanon on a new approach to Hizbullah’s weapons”. According to that statement, Mr. Araghchi reportedly stated: “Iran supports Hizbullah as a resistance movement but does not interfere in its affairs”, noting, “any decision concerning Lebanon is the sole prerogative of the party itself”.

38. In an earlier open letter dated 6 November addressed to Mr. Aoun, Mr. Salam and the Speaker of Parliament of Lebanon, Nabih Berri, Hizbullah stated that Israel had “exploited this governmental misstep [the decision taken by the Cabinet on 5 August] to impose the disarmament of the resistance throughout Lebanon as a condition for stopping hostilities”. Hizbullah further stated that “the issue of the monopoly on weapons must not be discussed in response to foreign demands or Israeli extortion, but rather within a national context, in which a comprehensive strategy should be agreed for security, defence and the protection of national sovereignty”. On 5 December, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Naim Qassem, stated that the weapons of Hizbullah were an intra-Lebanese matter that could be solely addressed through talks on a national defence strategy. On 17 January, Mr. Qassem stated: “Whoever says the agreement is a ‘first stage’ and that we will move to a ‘second stage’, we respond: No there are no stages Lebanon implemented the agreement, while Israel did not implement any part of it. Therefore, what is called a ‘second stage’ no longer exists”.

39. At a rally organized by Hizbullah in solidarity with the Islamic Republic of Iran on 26 January, Mr. Qassem stated: “We are obliged to confront this threat [to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran] and we consider it directed at us as well ... we will choose how to act – whether to intervene or not ... But we are not neutral”. On 3 February, Mr. Qassem declared: “We are facing an existential aggression that seeks to eliminate our very existence.”

40. Pursuant to the 21 May 2025 agreement between the President of the State of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, and Mr. Aoun (S/2025/460, para. 33), the process of disarmament in Palestine refugee camps continued. On 30 December, the Lebanese Armed Forces received weapons and ammunition from the Palestine refugee camp of Ein El Hilweh in Sidon. Weapons held by factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization have been transferred to the custody of the Lebanese Armed Forces in 8 of the 12 Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon. An agreement regarding the status of weapons belonging to other factions, including the Hamas movement and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, has yet to be reached. On 22 December, the head of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee, Ramez Dimashqieh, noted “the lack of cooperation from some Palestinian factions with the state’s plan to confine weapons south of the Litani River to state control”.

41. Violence involving firearms and explosives persisted across the Beddawi, Burj al-Barajneh, Ein El Hilweh, El Buss, Rashidieh and Shatila camps. On 26 October, a young Lebanese man was fatally shot at a checkpoint near the entrance of Shatila camp. The Lebanese Armed Forces announced on 29 October that it had taken custody of six suspects from the Palestinian National Security Forces from Shatila camp in connection with the incident. Killings in the Ein El Hilweh and Beddawi camps on 9 and 11 January, respectively, prompted the temporary closure of the facilities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The Lebanese Armed Forces conducted raids to counter drug trafficking in the Nahr el-Bared camp near Tripoli on 10 November and 6 December, and in Shatila camp on 16 January. Four UNRWA schools in the Ein El Hilweh camp remain inaccessible due to the continued presence of armed actors.

42. The Israel Defense Forces on 18 November claimed a strike in Ein El Hilweh camp on “a Hamas training and indoctrination compound in Lebanon that was part of a plan to carry out attacks against Israel”. Hamas rejected the allegations made by Israel as “pure fabrication and lies, aimed at justifying its criminal aggression”, adding that “what was targeted was an open sports field frequented by boys from the camp”. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 13 civilians, including 8 children, were killed and at least 6 others injured. The Israel Defense Forces on 20 February struck what it called a “Hamas command centre” in Ein El Hilweh camp, killing two people according to the Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon.

43. The Israel Defense Forces on 15 February struck a vehicle carrying what it described as elements of the “Islamic Jihad terrorist movement in the Majdal Anjar area” near the border with the Syrian Arab Republic, killing four people according to the Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon.

E. Arms embargo and border control

44. Repeated strikes by the Israel Defense Forces targeting alleged Hizbullah “smuggling routes to transfer combat assets” across the border of Lebanon with the Syrian Arab Republic continued. In a strike near Baalbek on 26 October, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had “eliminated an arms dealer in Hezbollah ... involved in purchasing and transporting weapons from Syria to Lebanon”. In a strike in Biqua

on 25 December, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had “eliminated” “a key terrorist in the ... Quds Force” of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of the Islamic Republic of Iran involved in “planning and advancing terror attacks against the State of Israel from Syria and Lebanon”. On 21 January, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had struck “four border crossings used by Hezbollah to smuggle weapons in the area of Hermel”. In a separate strike that day in Sidon, it stated that it had eliminated “a key Hezbollah weapons smuggler” who had used “a front company that ordered and transferred prohibited goods from countries such as Iraq, Syria, and the Gulf states, while operating smuggling networks moving weapons from Iraq into Syria and Lebanon”.

45. The Deputy Prime Minister of Lebanon, Tarek Mitri, visited Damascus on 20 November for consultations with the President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Ahmad Al-Sharaa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Asaad Al-Shaibani, and the Minister of Justice, Mazhar al-Wais, concerning prisoners, missing persons and border management. A bilateral agreement between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic related to the transfer of convicted persons was signed on 6 February in Beirut.

46. Since 31 December, the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy has assumed responsibility for all maritime interdiction operations. With limited support from the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force, the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy hailed 808 vessels, clearing all 431 vessels referred for inspection.

47. Lebanese State security forces conducted at least 46 counter-trafficking operations, mostly in eastern and north-eastern Lebanon, involving the seizure of light and medium weapons, ammunition and rockets, in addition to narcotics. Two Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers were killed and three others injured during a raid in Baalbek on 18 November. On 12 February, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that it had closed “illegal crossings” used for “infiltration and smuggling operations across the northern and eastern borders”. The Internal Security Forces on 13 February stated that it had conducted a raid in the southern suburbs of Beirut to “combat the illicit trade in military-grade weapons”.

48. In identical letters dated 25 November addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2025/767](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations stated: “During the first phase of the plan ... the Lebanese army intensified its security measures throughout Lebanese territory, including at the northern and eastern borders, seaports and Rafic Hariri International Airport, and intensified joint maritime patrols in coordination with the UNIFIL maritime task force ... to prevent the illegal entry or transfer of weapons and money”.

F. Landmines and cluster bombs

49. At least 47 operations south of the Litani River and 15 operations north of the Litani River to detonate unexploded ordnance were announced by the Lebanese Armed Forces. On 20 November, the Lebanese Armed Forces reported that a soldier sustained moderate injuries when a suspicious object exploded near its post in Zibqin (Sector West).

50. UNIFIL responded to 184 reports of suspected unexploded ordnance and cleared 1,500 m² of contaminated areas. UNIFIL handed over cleared minefields to the Lebanese Mine Action Centre, near the Blue Line in Blida (Sector East) on 19 December and near Marun al-Ra’s (Sector West) on 4 February. UNIFIL also carried out 65 quality assurance and control visits to demining sites and completed three accreditations.

51. In support of humanitarian demining activities, UNIFIL destroyed 2,025 anti-personnel mines and cleared 11,863 m². UNIFIL delivered eight explosive ordnance risk awareness sessions benefiting 213 mission military and civilian personnel. In partnership with the Lebanese Mine Action Centre, UNIFIL also conducted eight explosive ordnance risk education joint activities benefiting local communities.

III. Extension of State authority and institutional stability

52. For the first time since September 2025, following a boycott by some blocs due to the omission of proposed electoral law amendments from the agenda, the Parliament of Lebanon secured a quorum to convene on 18 December. Parliament subsequently adopted an amended version of the law on the organization of the judiciary ([S/2025/738](#), para. 49) and ratified a \$250 million World Bank loan agreement for reconstruction in conflict-affected areas (*ibid.*, para. 55). On 29 January, Parliament adopted the State budget for 2026. A draft financial gap law on the “restoration of financial order and restitution of bank deposits” was adopted by the Cabinet on 26 December and was pending in Parliament as at 20 February. In a statement on 13 February, a visiting mission of the International Monetary Fund underlined the “improvements needed to align this draft [financial gap] law with international principles”, “amendments to the Bank Resolution Law”, and preparations for “a medium-term fiscal framework, which is critically needed”.

53. The newly appointed members of the electoral oversight body, the Supervisory Commission for Elections, were sworn in by Mr. Aoun on 12 January. On 31 January, the official decree calling for parliamentary elections on 10 May was published. A draft law amending electoral provisions related to out-of-country voting and the establishment of large-scale polling centres was adopted by the Cabinet on 6 November but had yet to be submitted to Parliament as at 20 February.

54. The investigation by Judge Tarek Bitar into the 4 August 2020 Beirut Port explosion continued. On 11 December, Judge Bitar travelled to Bulgaria to question the charterer of the vessel that had allegedly transported the ammonium nitrate to Beirut Port, after a Bulgarian court had rejected the extradition request submitted by Lebanon for the individual. Separately, a ruling of the Beirut Court of Appeals dated 8 January was upheld by the Indictment Chamber on 11 February, effectively clearing Judge Bitar of abuse of power and other complaints filed against him by defendants in the case ([S/2023/184](#), para. 54).

55. On 14 November, the Central Bank of Lebanon imposed “precautionary measures on all non-banking financial institutions licensed by the Central Bank of Lebanon, including money transfer companies, exchange companies, and other entities that conduct cash transactions in foreign currencies and transfer them to and from Lebanon”, requiring them to collect data about their customers and operations for transactions exceeding \$1,000. In a speech on 17 November, Mr. Qassem requested a stop to the pressure being applied on Hizbullah and all the Lebanese. A subsequent Central Bank circular on 9 January provided for an overhaul of the regulatory framework for electronic payment services to prevent illicit transactions.

56. On 26 November, Lebanon and Cyprus signed an agreement formalizing the delimitation of their exclusive economic zones, which had been pending since 2007. On 9 January, the TotalEnergies, Eni and QatarEnergy oil and gas consortium signed an agreement with Lebanon for an exploration licence in offshore block 8.

57. For the first time since 2019, the Internal Security Forces recruited new personnel in 2025. With approximately 1,750 personnel recruited in two rounds earlier in 2025, a third call, for 500 officers, was announced in December.

58. More than 64,400 people, 51 per cent of whom are women, remain displaced. The presence of the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line, in combination with their persistent kinetic activity, the presence of unexploded ordnance and extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, continued to have a direct impact on the population and impeded returns. Humanitarian partners continued to support conflict-affected communities in meeting essential needs and navigating protection risks amid security and funding constraints. The Cabinet approved on 30 January a framework governing the reconstruction process ([S/2025/738](#), para. 55), following which Mr. Salam visited south Lebanon on 7 February. Mr. Salam stated that the Government was “working on three integrated tracks: continued relief efforts, reconstruction, and creating the conditions for recovery and economic and social development”.

59. As at 31 December, the 2025 appeal for the Lebanon Response Plan was 37 per cent funded at \$1.10 billion of the \$3 billion requested, with \$851.6 million received in 2025 and \$251.6 million carried over from 2024. Partners reported \$244.2 million in outstanding commitments for 2026 and beyond. Separately, UNRWA continues to face projected cash flow gaps that imperil the continuity of essential services for 222,000 Palestine refugees in Lebanon.

60. As at 31 January, 518,635 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, including 507,666 registered Syrians of an estimated 1.12 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon and 10,969 refugees and asylum-seekers of other nationalities. Since 8 December 2024, some 115,000 Syrians have fled to the northern and eastern governorates of Lebanon. From 21 October to 19 February, 122 deportation incidents, involving 5,972 Syrians, were recorded. In January, 552,413 Syrian refugees, including 57,444 refugees under the auspices of the voluntary repatriation programme of UNHCR, were removed from the database of UNHCR following their return to the Syrian Arab Republic.

IV. United Nations presence

A. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon deployment and adaptation

61. As at 20 February, UNIFIL consisted of 8,304 military personnel from 48 contributing countries, 665 of them women (8 per cent). In addition, UNIFIL had 627 civilian staff, comprising 205 international and 422 national personnel, including 217 women (34.61 per cent). The Maritime Task Force was reduced from five to two vessels and comprised 292 military personnel, including 19 women (6.50 per cent). There were 47 military observers, comprising 41 men and 6 women (14.6 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization serving with the Observer Group Lebanon under the operational command and control of UNIFIL. The highest-ranking military women hold the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, while the most senior civilian women serve at the D-1 level.

62. To address financial challenges facing all United Nations peacekeeping operations, UNIFIL initiated measures to reduce expenditure by 15 per cent ([S/2025/738](#), para. 59). As at 20 February, 2,094 military personnel had been repatriated and 153 civilian personnel separated from the Organization, including through voluntary separation. Two vessels of the Maritime Task Force were repatriated

under liquidity measures, and a third vessel was withdrawn by the contributing country. While key capabilities, including engineering, aviation, medical services, explosive ordnance disposal and liaison, and the multinational composition of UNIFIL, were maintained, the number of operational activities decreased from 8,164 in October to 6,835 in January. Nineteen per cent of the activities were conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces in January, down from 21 per cent in October. Forty per cent of operations involved mixed-gender teams. UNIFIL maintained an average of 148 monthly air activities.

63. In February, pursuant to Security Council resolution [2436 \(2018\)](#), UNIFIL completed the assessment of 19 subordinate military units and 2 vessels for logistics, training and operational preparedness, and all identified shortfalls were addressed.

B. Safety and security

64. Movement restrictions remained in place throughout Lebanon. With the exception of Tyre and along the Tyre-Naqurah coastal road, the use of armoured vehicles, as well as 48 hours' notice, was required for movement of civilian personnel in the UNIFIL area of operations.

65. Kinetic activity, unexploded ordnance and other remnants of war continued to pose a threat to the safety and security of personnel. UNIFIL reported the following drone strikes: on 26 October in Naqurah, on a road used by UNIFIL personnel to commute, and on 2 February in Qulaylah (both Sector West); on 26 January in Tyre, in an area with 10 UNIFIL staff members residing within 1 km of the impact site; and on 2 February on the UNIFIL main supply route connecting the area of operations to Sidon and Beirut.

66. UNIFIL experienced several incidents in which the Israel Defense Forces fired weapons or dropped grenades from small drones in the proximity of peacekeepers. UNIFIL also experienced several incidents of aggressive behaviour involving local actors (see annex I).

67. UNIFIL opened three technical investigations into violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) that involved direct impacts on UNIFIL personnel or assets. The mission concluded one technical investigation and shared its findings with the parties.

C. Conduct and discipline

68. UNIFIL recorded four allegations of possible unsatisfactory conduct. No allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation were reported in UNIFIL or the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon. UNIFIL briefed 117 commanders and subunit commanders on sexual exploitation and abuse. Training on United Nations standards of conduct was provided to 1 civilian and 1,617 military personnel (182 women and 1,436 men).

D. Accountability for attacks on peacekeepers

69. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings in Lebanese military courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against peacekeepers. Following the issuance of an indictment on 13 November in relation to the attack on a UNIFIL convoy outside Rafic Hariri International Airport on 14 February 2025, which resulted in injuries to the then Deputy Force Commander and one other peacekeeper ([S/2025/153](#), para. 56), 13 arrest warrants and 34 search

warrants were issued and the case was referred for trial. Hearings were held on 12 December and 13 February, and the next hearing is scheduled for 13 March.

70. The prosecutorial appeal challenging the acquittal of one individual and the sentences of five of the six individuals convicted on charges related to the fatal attack against UNIFIL near Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022 (see [S/2023/184](#) and [S/2025/738](#)) remains pending.

71. There was no progress in criminal proceedings related to the incident in Majdal Zun on 4 August 2018 (Sector West) (see [S/2018/1029](#)). Investigations are still ongoing into acts of aggression against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Shaqra on 22 December 2021, in Bint Jubayl on 4 January 2022, in Ramiyah on 25 January 2022 (see [S/2022/214](#)) and in Dayr Qanun al-Nahr on 10 June 2025 (see [S/2025/460](#)).

72. Appeal hearings in the cases of attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Sidon on 26 July 2011 and Burj al-Shamali (Sector West) on 9 December 2011 were postponed by the Military Cassation Court from 3 February to 27 October 2026 ([S/2025/738](#), para. 72).

V. Liaison and progress towards sustainable solutions

73. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon exercised her good offices in Lebanon and Israel, and in the region and beyond, to promote confidence-building measures to consolidate the cessation of hostilities. The Special Coordinator also advocated that the parties take concrete steps towards negotiated solutions to advance long-stalled provisions of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), including through expansion of the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Mechanism.

74. On 31 October, Mr. Aoun reiterated the readiness of Lebanon “for negotiations to end the Israeli occupation” but stressed that “any negotiation cannot be unilateral; it requires mutual will, which is not yet present”. On 15 December, he affirmed that “contacts are ongoing both domestically and internationally to consolidate security and stability in the South through negotiations via the ‘Mechanism committee’”, stressing that “negotiation is the alternative to war”.

75. UNIFIL hosted meetings of the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Mechanism on 29 October, 12 November, 3 December, 19 December and 7 January. The meetings were chaired by the United States of America with the support of France, and with the participation of the Israel Defense Forces, the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL and the Special Coordinator for Lebanon. Discussions centred on implementation of the Lebanese Armed Forces plan to establish exclusive State control over weapons (see paras. 30–36). Civilian representatives of the parties participated in the two meetings in December. Following the meeting on 19 December, the United States Embassy in Lebanon stated that civilian participants “focused on setting conditions for residents to return safely to their homes, advancing reconstruction, and addressing economic priorities”, adding that “participants reaffirmed that progress on security and political tracks remain mutually reinforcing and essential to ensuring long-term stability and prosperity for both parties”.

76. UNIFIL engaged with the parties to promote security arrangements aimed at facilitating the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from north of the Blue Line and seeking an agreed understanding of its verification role, including with respect to the presence of unauthorized assets, weapons or armed personnel, as provided for in resolution [2790 \(2025\)](#). UNIFIL utilized its liaison and coordination mechanisms to defuse tensions along the Blue Line. There were 9,328 interactions with the Israel Defense Forces to deconflict activities. UNIFIL issued 148 force protection requests to the Israel Defense Forces, including 3 on behalf of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

For the first time since 27 November 2024, UNIFIL intervened after Israel Defense Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces personnel directed weapons at each other, near Udaysah on 19 January and near Khiyam on 16 February (both Sector East).

77. UNIFIL maintained liaison with both parties and adopted updated standard operating procedures for the protection of civilians.

78. Since 8 October, UNIFIL has repaired 18 of 62 damaged or destroyed Blue Line markers (S/2025/460, para. 66, and S/2025/738, para. 77).

79. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area proposed in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2007/641, annex).

VI. Observations

80. I am deeply concerned about the regional military escalation since 28 February, which has gravely undermined the 27 November 2024 cessation of hostilities arrangement and placed the people of Lebanon once again in the cross hairs of conflict. This carries potentially catastrophic consequences for communities on both sides of the Blue Line. I underscore the absolute imperative of the parties preserving and building on the progress made during the reporting period towards the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). I call upon Hizbullah to respect the decision taken by the Government on 2 March reaffirming the State's exclusive authority over all arms and military activity in Lebanon, and I also call upon Israel to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. I welcome diplomatic efforts towards consolidating the cessation of hostilities. With genuine political will, the outstanding provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), including a permanent ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, can be implemented. I urge the parties to avail themselves of diplomatic avenues, including the enhanced arrangements under the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Mechanism, the established liaison and coordination channels of UNIFIL and the good offices of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon to address any disputes or threats without resorting to unilateral military action.

81. The continued presence and recent incursions of the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line, coupled with their continued military activities in Lebanon, hinder the efforts of the Government of Lebanon to extend its authority, and impede the return of residents to their homes. I urge the Israeli authorities to fulfil their obligations under resolution 1701 (2006) to withdraw from all areas north of the Blue Line and to cease violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

82. I welcome the progress made by the Lebanese Armed Forces in implementing their plan to establish exclusive State control over weapons south of the Litani River. It is a testament to the necessary resolve of the Government of Lebanon to meet its obligations under the cessation of hostilities arrangement and resolution 1701 (2006). UNIFIL stands ready to support related security and verification arrangements.

83. I call upon the Lebanese authorities to build, swiftly and decisively, on initial steps towards realizing a State monopoly on arms by expanding efforts to establish exclusive State control over weapons throughout Lebanon. I call upon Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups to cooperate with the authorities in this regard. Achieving a State monopoly on arms requires a whole-of-government approach, with sufficient allocation of domestic resources and efforts to address the long-standing needs of all communities. I therefore urge the Lebanese authorities to prioritize recovery, reconstruction and socioeconomic development initiatives and the elaboration of a national security architecture to address the legitimate socioeconomic

and security concerns of all segments of Lebanese society. In this regard, I welcome the commitment expressed by Mr. Salam during his visit to the south on 7 January.

84. It is vital that donors bolster tailored material and financial support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, commensurate with their own commitment to the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and the challenge of establishing exclusive State control over weapons. I also call upon donors to support government-led recovery efforts, essential for the extension of State authority.

85. The freedom of movement of UNIFIL is essential for the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). The firing of weapons by the Israel Defense Forces at or near UNIFIL personnel and premises is unacceptable, as are acts of aggression by Lebanese individuals. I condemn the incident on 6 March that resulted in three peacekeepers being injured. I reiterate that both parties must ensure the protection of civilians, comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, and ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel, their freedom of movement and the inviolability of United Nations premises and property.

86. In line with resolution [2790 \(2025\)](#), preparations continue with respect to the request to explore options for the future of the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) after the withdrawal of UNIFIL.

87. Acknowledging the initial steps taken by the Government of Lebanon in preparation for the timely conduct of parliamentary elections, I count on the Lebanese authorities to take all necessary steps to hold the elections when conditions allow.

88. Taking note of incremental steps towards the implementation of economic reforms, I call upon Parliament to accelerate the adoption of relevant legislation in line with international standards. In addition, the adoption of a medium-term fiscal framework will enable the Government to rightsize its budget and align spending priorities within the broader objective of extending State authority.

89. I encourage continued bilateral cooperation between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic in the interest of stability in both countries and security along their shared border. Progress under the voluntary repatriation programme of UNHCR for Syrian refugees in Lebanon augurs well for the gradual and sustainable voluntary return of Syrian refugees.

90. Palestine refugee camps are already experiencing considerable hardship and volatility. Sustained donor support to UNRWA remains vital to ensure the continuity of essential services for Palestine refugees in Lebanon and safeguard stability in the camps.

91. I express my sincere gratitude to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and the Observer Group Lebanon. I thank the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, and the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Diodato Abagnara. I also thank the troop-contributing countries, whose forces continue to be vital to supporting the parties to uphold their obligations under the cessation of hostilities arrangement and resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), and all members of the United Nations country team for their continued dedication to stability in Lebanon.

Annex I

Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 October 2025 to 20 February 2026

1. In paragraph 15 of its resolution 2695 (2023), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations, including access to all parts of the Blue Line, was fully respected and unimpeded. It called upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access to sites requested by UNIFIL for the purpose of swift investigation, including all locations of interest, all relevant locations north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line (as reported in S/2019/237) and unauthorized firing ranges, in line with resolution 1701 (2006), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.

2. During the reporting period, UNIFIL conducted a monthly average of 6,835 operational activities, including 148 air operations. The percentage of UNIFIL's operational activities conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces was maintained at approximately 20 per cent.

3. The Mission experienced impediments in the vicinity of the Blue Line, including with respect to access due to explosive remnants of war and Israel Defense Forces' operations. UNIFIL removed roadblocks around the two Israel Defense Forces "buffer zones", and around UN position 9-64, south of Kfar Kila (Sector East). Peacekeepers continued to encounter roadblocks around the five Israel Defense Forces positions north of the Blue Line. The Israel Defense Forces presence continues to complicate access to UN Position 1-31, southwest of Alma al-Sha'b (Sector West), and UN position 9-63, south of Udaysah (Sector East). [x]

4. There were numerous incidents in which the Israel Defense Forces opened fire near peacekeepers, in particular in the Shab'a farms area (Sector East), prompting UNIFIL to issue 148 force protection requests. Incidents of note in this regard occurred on 26 October near Kfar Kila, 16 November near Sarda, 26 December near Bastrah, and 12 January again near Sarda.


5. UNIFIL also continued to experience interference by drones, sometimes equipped with grenades, flying at a low altitude over peacekeepers, prompting peacekeepers to deploy countermeasures on eight occasions. On three occasions, small drones dropped grenades impacting within 100 meters of peacekeepers. On 27 January, the Israel Defense Forces protested to UNIFIL in writing with respect to UNIFIL's interference with Israel Defense Forces operated drones.

6. UNIFIL also experienced incidents in which local residents used violence to intimidate peacekeepers or damage UN assets, sometimes resulting in UNIFIL having to use alternative routes. The most serious incident during this reporting period took place near Bint Jubayl (Sector West) on 4 December, when individuals fired a projectile into the back of a moving UNIFIL vehicle damaging the rear window of the vehicle. In addition to the incidents listed below, UNIFIL experienced minor incidents during which items such as stones or bottles were thrown at UNIFIL property or personnel without causing damage or injuries. Each of the incidents has been raised by the Mission with the Lebanese Armed Forces.

7. While not attributed to any of the parties, UNIFIL also experienced small drones flying intrusively at low altitudes, over UNIFIL positions or operational activities. The Mission also experienced repeated electronic interference, both on land and at sea.

Figure IV

Incidents of restrictions of freedom of movement and aggressive behaviour against UNIFIL



Source: UNIFIL

Restrictions of the freedom of movement or aggressive behaviour involving the Israel Defense Forces

8. On 26 October, UNIFIL peacekeepers downed an Israel Defense Forces drone flying at about 20-meters altitude over troops near Kfar Kila. Shortly thereafter, a second small Israel Defense Forces drone dropped a grenade approximately 30 metres from the peacekeepers, while heavy gunfire was heard, prompting peacekeepers to assume a defensive position. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces. A technical investigation was launched, with the findings shared with the parties on 23 January.

9. On 14 November, machine gun rounds from an Israel Defense Force position north of the Blue Line near Sarda impacted about five metres from UNIFIL troops while one round was fired from a tank, prompting UNIFIL to issue a “stop-firing” request. An Israel Defense Force statement on social media said that its “personnel had fired warning shots” at “two suspects” which later were identified as “UN soldiers”. The Israel Defense Force stressed that “no deliberate fire was directed toward UNIFIL soldiers” and the incident was “under review”.

10. On 16 November, an Israel Defense Forces tank at one of their five positions north of the Blue Line opened machine gun fire towards a UNIFIL foot patrol northeast of Sarda, with rounds impacting approximately five meters from the peacekeepers, who had to take shelter in the terrain. UNIFIL issued a “stop-firing request”. The peacekeepers were able to leave safely 30 minutes later, when the tank moved inside the Israel Defense Forces position. In a letter to UNIFIL dated 9 December, the Israel Defense Forces said that it had not received proper notification and “due to poor weather conditions, which severely limited visibility the IDF could not identify the individuals as UNIFIL personnel and acted in accordance with its rules of engagement for suspicious or unexpected activities and fired a series of warning shots at a safe distance”.

11. On 17 November, the Israel Defense Forces opened fire near a combined UNIFIL Lebanese Armed Forces movement to escort shepherds back to the main village of Kfar Shuba (Sector East),

after a shepherd had been shot and injured in the area, earlier the same day. UNIFIL issued a stop-firing request.

12. On 6 December, a UNIFIL patrol near Ghajar (Sector East) heard two shots followed by the sound of a ricocheting round impacted close to their patrol vehicle. UNIFIL peacekeepers left the area and continued their movement.

13. On 9 December, an Israel Defense Forces tank located at one of its position five positions north of the Blue Line fired approximately 50 rounds from its coaxial machine gun, 10 of which passed in very close proximity to a UNIFIL patrol northeast of Aarma (Sector East). UNIFIL issued a “stop-firing request”, after which the fire ceased, and the peacekeepers resumed their movement.

14. On 18 December, approximately 20 rounds of small arms fire were fired from an unknown origin towards an area south of Kfar Shuba, where a UNIFIL patrol vehicle was moving. The patrol sent a “stop-firing” request to the Israel Defense Forces.

15. On 19 December, three soldiers in an Israel Defense Forces vehicle, approached a UNIFIL patrol near Majidiyeh (Sector East) and asked the peacekeepers to leave the area. The soldiers subsequently directed their weapons towards the peacekeepers, prompting the patrol to reposition itself further north. Later the same day, a second UNIFIL patrol moved into the area, supported by an armoured personnel carrier. Following a short verbal exchange, two Israel Defense Forces vehicles took up position facing the UNIFIL patrol, while a drone overhead jammed all communication devices, prompting the UNIFIL patrol move back to its point of origin.

16. On 26 December, the Israel Defense Forces fired three bursts of machine gun fire from an Israel Defense Forces position south of the Blue Line, impacting near Observer Group Lebanon personnel at a temporary observation post southeast of Kfar Shuba, forcing the observers to take cover. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently wrote to UNIFIL on 10 February that it “did not monitor any activities as described in your letter during the relevant time frame ... [and] ... after reviewing footage from the Israel Defense Forces observation post ... we can confirm that no harm was caused to UNIFIL personnel”.

17. On 26 December, an explosion occurred around 20 meters from UNIFIL peacekeepers near Bastrah. This was followed by approximately 200 rounds of heavy machine gun fire from two separate Israel Defense Forces positions south of the Blue Line, with some impacting as close as 75 metres from the peacekeepers. Three peacekeepers suffered ear trauma injuries from the blast. In a letter to UNIFIL dated 10 February, the Israel Defense Forces stated, “UNIFIL personnel were neither targeted nor placed in any danger”.

18. On 2 January, about 15 rounds of small arms fire assessed to originate south of the Blue Line, impacted within 50 meters of peacekeepers in Kfar Shuba, prompting the peacekeepers to move to a safe location. Later the same day, 50 and 100 machine gun rounds impacted within 50 meters of a second UNIFIL patrol in the same area, prompting peacekeepers to take cover in their vehicles. UNIFIL issued a “stop fire request” to the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL has protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces in writing.

19. On 10 January, a small quadcopter drone dropped an object, which appeared to be either a stun grenade or a small explosive grenade, approximately 200 metres from a UNIFIL patrol in Kfar Kila.

20. On 12 January, a projectile fired from the south of the Blue Line, exploded outside the main gate of a UN Position in Rumaysh (Sector West). UNIFIL issued a “stop-firing” request to the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL has launched a technical investigation into the incident.

21. On 12 January, UNIFIL submitted a “stop activity” request to the Israel Defense Forces after observing two tanks moving north of the so-called Israel Defense Forces “buffer zone” near Sarda. Subsequently, a third tank appeared and discharged three rounds from its cannon in the direction of the UNIFIL patrol. Two of the rounds impacted approximately 150 metres from the peacekeepers, the third 350 to 400 metres from the patrol. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces in writing.
22. On 14 January, three gunshots were fired, from a southern direction, impacting approximately 50 metres from a UN position northwest of Wata el Khiyam (Sector East). UNIFIL immediately issued a “stop-firing” request to the Israel Defense Forces. While the exact point of origin could not be determined, the shots are assessed to have originated north of the Blue Line.
23. On 15 January, a drone dropped a grenade approximately 30 meters from peacekeepers, following up on a report regarding an explosive device in a building in Udaysah. UNIFIL issued a “stop-firing” request to the Israel Defense Forces.
24. On 16 January, a round from a coaxial weapon at an Israel Defense Forces position south of the Blue Line impacted an observation tower and accommodation unit at a UNIFIL position near Kfar Shuba. No personnel were present when the bullet entered the accommodation. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident. In a letter to UNIFIL dated 18 February, the IDF confirmed “an operational error occurred resulting in one bullet unintentionally hitting the UN position”, and that the Israel Defense Forces had taken “corrective measures and reinforced relevant procedures to avoid a recurrence of such an incident.”
25. On 17 January, approximately 100 rounds of machine gun fire, originating from an Israel Defense Forces position south of the Blue Line, passed overhead a patrol southwest of Yarin (Sector West) and a drone dropped a grenade, detonating in the air 30 metres from a UNIFIL vehicle. UNIFIL issued a “stop-firing” request.
26. On 2 February, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that it would drop what it stated was “a non-toxic chemical substance” over areas north of the Blue Line and recommended that peacekeepers stay in positions (see para 23). As a result, UNIFIL halted operations along about a third of the Blue Line for more than nine hours.
27. On 3 February, peacekeepers deployed uncrewed aerial systems countermeasures against two drones flying at a low altitude over peacekeepers in Kfar Kila. Shortly thereafter, one of the drones dropped a stun grenade which detonated approximately 50 meters from the patrol.
28. On 6 February, Israel Defense Forces personnel in a vehicle north of the Blue Line southwest of Sarda (Sector East) approached a UNIFIL patrol and demanded that the peacekeepers leave the area, prompting the peacekeepers to move close to its position.
29. Lasers of unknown origin were pointed at UNIFIL helicopters mid-flight east of Marjayoun (Sector East) on 22 December and near Ghajar and Kfar Kila on 23 December. Analysis of direction and flight tracks indicated that the laser sources were located south of the Blue Line. UNIFIL has protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces, in writing. Israel Defense Forces personnel also pointed lasers at UNIFIL peacekeepers from south of the Blue Line near Naqurah on 30 October and Aytarun on 6 February (both Sector West), as well as Kfar Kila on 7 February and Udaysah on 11 February (both Sector East). The Israel Defense Forces also pointed lasers at peacekeepers from north of the Blue Line, in the occupied northern Ghajar on 11 December, and from its positions north of the Blue Line near Alma al-Sh’ab on 19 November and 4, 6, 9, 15, 28 and 29 December, near Marun al Ra’s (Sector East) on 27 November and 19 December, near Aytarun (Sector West)

on 7 and 11 November and 20 February, near Sarda on 11 November and 22 December, and near Kfar Kila on 23 January.

30. Israel Defense Forces personnel south of the Blue Line also directed their personal weapons towards UNIFIL personnel on 7 November near Yarun (Sector West), on 18 January near Aytarun, on 31 January near Marun al Ra's, and on 17 February near Naqurah. Israel Defense Forces personnel south of the Blue Line directed cannons towards UNIFIL personnel on 5 January near Aytarun and 19 January near Udaysah. On 3 December, an Israel Defense Forces tank south of the Blue Line pointed its cannon at an Observer Group Lebanon patrol east of Udaysah.

31. The Israel Defense Forces also directed cannons from its position north of the Blue Line towards UNIFIL personnel on 3, 16, 18 and 28 November, 3, 4, 6, and 7 December, and 22 January near Markaba (Sector East), 3 November near Majidiye (Sector East), 17 December near Marwahin (Sector West) and on 18 and 24 December near Alma al-Shab (Sector West). Israel Defense Forces personnel also pointed machine guns towards peacekeepers from their positions north of the Blue Line near Aytarun on 3 November and near Markaba on 14 November. On 16 January, a remote-controlled weapon system at one of the Israel Defense Forces positions north of the Blue Line, was directed at a UNIFIL patrol near Marwahin (Sector West).

Restrictions of the freedom of movement or aggressive behaviour by Lebanese actors

32. On 26 October, five boys, approximately 10–14 years old, placed large rocks on the road in front of a UNIFIL patrol near Aytarun and threw small stones at the patrol vehicles. The patrol ceased its activity and left the area. On motorcycles, the boys followed the patrol until it reached Aytarun.

33. On 30 October, approximately 25 individuals blocked a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Blida (Sector East), prompting the patrol to reverse and leave the area. A municipal official later informed UNIFIL that locals blocked the road in protest at the Israel Defense Forces entering the village earlier the same day, killing a municipal official (see para.19).

34. On 31 October, approximately 20 individuals stopped a UNIFIL patrol southeast of Jabal al-Butm (Sector West). Subsequently, more individuals gathered around the patrol. After the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, the patrol continued its movement. The mayor of Jabal al-Butm later informed UNIFIL that the locals were suspicious of UNIFIL's intentions, as the patrol was not accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces.

35. On 6 November, approximately 10 individuals, including the mayor of Bafliyah, were protesting a recent bushfire and stopped a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Bafliyah (Sector West). As the patrol attempted to reposition itself, a civilian vehicle obstructed its path. Upon the arrival of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the patrol resumed its movement. The mayor of Balfiyah later informed UNIFIL that it had been the second time a fire breaks out immediately after a UNIFIL patrol in the area, which raised suspicions among the locals.

36. On 18 November, two boys threw a stone towards a UNIFIL patrol vehicle, south of Zibqin (Sector West), damaging the right rear window.

37. On 20 November, one vehicle and two motorcycles blocked a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Tibnin (Sector West). The patrol continued its activity upon the arrival of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The municipal police in Blida later informed UNIFIL that it was investigating the incident.

38. On 25 November, three teenage boys, approximately 10 metres away, pointed shotguns at a UNIFIL vehicle patrol southwest of Burj ash Shamali (Sector West). The patrol continued its movement.

39. On 4 December, individuals fired a projectile into the back of a moving UNIFIL vehicle in Bint Jubayl (Sector West), damaging the rear window. An UNIFIL investigation into the incident concluded that the projectiles were likely from small arms fire. The Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that it had launched an investigation into the incident.

40. On 8 December, an individual on a motorcycle threw a glass bottle at the lead vehicle of a UNIFIL patrol southeast of Sabriha (Sector West), causing a minor crack in the windscreen.

41. On 15 December, three individuals stopped a UNIFIL patrol northeast of Wadi Jilu (Sector West) and requested that the patrol be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The patrol continued its activity once the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived.

42. On 18 December, six individuals blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol west of Jibal al-Butm (Sector West) and requested the patrol be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The patrol continued after the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived. The mayor of Jibal al-Butm later informed UNIFIL that it was the result of a translation problem, where the municipal officials and the peacekeepers had different interpretations of what the activities would entail.

43. On 21 December, a vehicle with Hizbullah flags blocked a road west of Bra'shit (Sector West), obstructing the movement of a UNIFIL patrol. The patrol continued its movement after a municipal police officer arrived. Subsequently, a second UNIFIL patrol was blocked in the same area. Following the intervention of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the obstructions were removed and the patrol resumed its movement. The mayor of Bra'shit later informed UNIFIL that the patrols were stopped as they were entering a side road that was not part of their usual itinerary.

44. On 25 December, a UNIFIL patrol north of Kafra (Sector West) was approached by two individuals on a motorcycle, who requested the patrol not to proceed further. The peacekeepers completed their activity using a different road.

45. On 27 December, two vehicles blocked a UNIFIL patrol in Al-Ahmadiya (Sector East) and then approximately 10 individuals gathered around the UNIFIL vehicles. One individual climbed onto one of the UNIFIL vehicles and refused to dismount. The peacekeepers in the UNIFIL vehicle used an irritant spray, following which the individual dismounted and the patrol resumed its scheduled itinerary. The administrator of Al-Ahmadiya later informed that the patrol had been stopped in connection with a funeral and asserted that two people had been hospitalized following UNIFIL's use of "smoke grenades".

Incidents not attributed to either party

46. On 31 October, drones of unknown origin interfered with UNIFIL helicopter flights while the helicopters were in the air over Bra'shit, flying at an altitude of 1,200 metres.

47. On 3 November, drones of unknown origin interfered with UNIFIL helicopter flights over Bra'shit, flying at an altitude of 500 meters.

Annex II

Implementation of the arms embargo

1. Paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) states that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States regarding allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution 1701 (2006).
2. In a 6 November statement, the United States Treasury Department stated that “since January 2025, the U.S.-designated Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) has transferred over \$1 billion to Hezbollah, mostly through money exchange companies”.
3. The Ministry of Interior of Syria announced on 2 December that local security forces in the Yabroud region, southern Syria, “thwarted an attempt to smuggle large quantities of landmines destined for Lebanon”, adding that “1,250 mines equipped with detonators [...] prepared for smuggling to Hezbollah militia in Lebanon” were seized. According to the statement, one individual was killed and four others arrested during the operation. On 17 December, the Ministry of Interior of Syria stated that it had “thwarted an attempt to smuggle a shipment of weapons”, including “large quantities of RPG rockets”, to Lebanon. According to the statement, the weapons were seized in the Zabadani area of southwestern Syria near the Lebanese border. On 26 January, the Ministry of Interior of Syria stated that it had “foiled an attempt to smuggle weapons into Lebanese territory” from the al-Qusayr, Homs region, noting that a “vehicle loaded with nine Konkurs guided missiles, 68 RPG charges, two 107 rockets and five boxes of BKS ammunition was intercepted”.
4. The Ministry of Interior of Syria announced on 1 February that “security units in the rural Damascus governorate, in cooperation with the General Intelligence Directorate, carried out a series of precise and well-executed operations targeting a terrorist cell involved in carrying out several attacks that targeted the Mezzeh area and its military airport. These operations resulted in the complete dismantling of the cell and the arrest of all its members”. The Ministry stated: “During the preliminary investigations of those arrested, it was found that they are linked to external parties, and that the source of the rockets and launch platforms they used to carry out the attacks, in addition to the seized drones, goes back to the Lebanese Hezbollah militia.” Hezbollah subsequently issued a statement “commenting on the accusations made today by the Syrian Ministry of Interior, which included Hezbollah’s name arbitrarily”, clarifying that “Hezbollah has no activity, affiliation, or relationship to any party in Syria, and it has no presence on Syrian territory”.
5. As detailed in paragraphs 26 and 44 of this report, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to support maritime interdiction operations, hailing 808 vessels. As of 31 December, the Lebanese Armed Forces -Navy conducted 100 per cent of hailing and inspections.
6. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution 1701 (2006) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard.

Annex III

Mobilization of international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces

1. In paragraph 11 of its resolution 2790 (2025), the Security Council urged “the international community to intensify its support, including equipment, material and finance, to the LAF in order to ensure their effective and sustainable deployment south of the Litani River and to enhance their capacities to implement resolution 1701 (2006) ... [and requested] ... the Secretary-General to continue adapting UNIFIL’s activities, within its mandate, to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL”.

2. Lebanon’s leadership, including the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces General Rodolph Haykal, continued outreach efforts towards mobilizing international support to bolster the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces. In this regard, General Haykal took part in several meetings on the sidelines of the Manama Dialogue, hosted from 31 October to 2 November in Bahrain, on opportunities for enhanced support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as for the consolidation of the cessation of hostilities arrangement.

3. General Haykal also visited the Kingdom of the Netherlands on 27 and 28 November for a meeting with the Chief of Defense of the Netherlands Armed Forces, General Onno Eichelsheim. According to a Lebanese Armed Forces statement released after the visit, both Generals emphasized the need to strengthen stability in Lebanon and across the region, support Lebanon in international fora, deepen cooperation between the Lebanese and Netherlands Armed Forces, and “continue the Dutch authorities’ multi-phase support programme for the Lebanese Army, given its crucial role in maintaining Lebanon’s stability”.

4. On 17 and 18 December, Commander Haykal visited France, where he met with his French counterpart, Chief of the Defense Staff, General Fabien Mandon. According to a Lebanese Armed Forces communiqué, discussions focused on opportunities for further cooperation, including with regards to capability enhancement and joint training.

5. General Haykal visited the United States from 2 to 5 February where he held a series of “high-level meetings with White House advisers and officials from the Departments of Defense and State, in addition to members of the Senate, House of Representatives and National Security Council, and military and security officials”. The statement from his office noted that General Haykal met the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, for a discussion on the situation in Lebanon and the wider region, as well as on ways to develop cooperation between the Lebanese and United States armies. The Lebanese Armed Forces Commander’s meeting with the Commander of the United States Central Command, Admiral Brad Cooper, and the chair of the cessation of hostilities monitoring mechanism, Lieutenant General Joseph R. Clearfield, was also reflected in the statement, which noted that the three discussed “mechanisms for supporting the army to enhance its capabilities in the upcoming phase”, among other matters.

6. In the margins of the World Defense Show in Riyadh from 8 to 9 February, General Haykal met with his Saudi counterpart, General Fayyad bin Hamed Al-Ruwaili, for a discussion on “ways to enhance cooperation between the Lebanese and Saudi armies in light of the current challenges and regional developments, as well as preparations related to the conference in support of the Lebanese Army”, according to a Lebanese Armed Forces communiqué.

7. Commander Haykal attended the Munich Security Conference from 13 to 15 February, where he participated in a meeting of army commanders focused on enhanced military cooperation, as well as a number of bilateral discussions with commanders or defence chiefs from Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, as well as NATO. He also met with the United States Senior Adviser on Africa and on Arab and Middle Eastern Affairs, Massad Boulos, and Diplomatic Advisor to the President of the United Arab Emirates, Anwar Mohammed Gargash. According to a statement issued by the Lebanese Armed Forces, these discussions addressed Lebanese and regional developments, as well as opportunities to enhance cooperation and to

continue assistance to the Army, including by “strengthening its capabilities to confront challenges during the current exceptional phase.”

8. On 23 December in Beirut, addressing leadership of the army’s general staff and commanders of operational units and regiments, General Haykal, according to an official statement, stressed, “We aspire to strengthen the army’s capabilities so that it can serve as the protector and guarantor of the Lebanese people’s security, with the capacity to defend our citizens throughout the country”. He also stated that this required “balanced and qualitative support, which is something friendly countries recognize as they move to provide assistance to the army and other security institutions”.

9. During the 21 January meeting of the High-Level Steering Committee of the Border Security Assistance Programme, General Haykal emphasized the importance of the assistance provided by the British, Canadian and United States governments to the Lebanese Armed Forces in the area of border security, expressing his gratitude for their continued support in light of current challenges in border regions.

10. According to a 2 February statement released by his office, President Aoun, in a meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez Pérez-Castejón in Madrid, stressed the achievements of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon and the army’s extensive responsibilities throughout the country, while underscoring the “need for military equipment, vehicles and supplies to enable [the Lebanese army] to fulfill all its responsibilities”.

11. The Military Technical Committee for Lebanon convened in Beirut on 16 and 17 December, with the participation of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander. The Lebanese Armed Forces issued a statement noting that participants “reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the capabilities of the military institution, given its essential role in safeguarding Lebanon’s security and stability and extending the authority of the Lebanese state across all its territories”.

12. During the reporting period, several Member States continued to provide technical and material support to the Lebanese Armed Forces in coordination with the Military Technical Committee. Training courses and related equipment were provided by Canada, Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with training infrastructure delivered by Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Civil-military coordination activities in support of populations affected by the hostilities were funded by Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States. Sustainment support was provided to the Lebanese Armed Forces by Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom.

13. The United States delivered “Medium Tactical Vehicles and related equipment for an estimated cost of \$90.5 million” and “High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles and related equipment for an estimated cost of \$34.5 million” in December 2025, according to releases from the United States Defense Security Cooperation Agency. France supplied vehicular spare parts and equipment, Germany provided engineering and observation equipment, and the Netherlands delivered equipment for tactical operations centres, while equipment deliveries from the European Peace Facility’s 2025 allocation continued. The United Kingdom continued its support to border management infrastructure. A statement released on 22 January following the above-referenced High-Level Steering Committee of the Border Security Assistance Programme confirmed that the United Kingdom had supported the construction of six new “operating bases along the border with Syria” since January 2025.

14. The Embassy of Qatar to Lebanon announced on 29 January that 37 vehicles had been donated by the State of Qatar, through the Qatar Fund for Development, to the Lebanese Armed Forces. The statement noted that this represented the first batch of a “total donation of 162 vehicles intended to support the Lebanese military institution”.

15. Pursuant to the memorandum of understanding between UNIFIL, the Lebanese Armed Forces, and France signed in June 2025 (see S/2025/460), UNIFIL delivered its final batch of fuel and food to the Lebanese Armed Forces in December. A total of more than 130,000 kilograms of food rations and more than 885,000 litres of fuel were delivered.

16. Efforts to enhance the integration and complementarity of funding mobilized through the United Nations in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces continued during the reporting period. Of \$43.8 million in donor funding, including pledges, received by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes from Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, and the United States, \$36.6 million is being channeled through the “Livelihood Ecosystem” project (see S/2025/460, annex III, para. 9) in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Under a broader United Nations framework of support to the security sector, seven United Nations agencies, funds and programmes are supporting the implementation of 19 projects in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces, in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, including in support of operational capabilities as well as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), border control, maritime security and capacity development in the areas of migrant protection, human rights, mediation, and women, peace and security, as well as into the “Livelihood Ecosystem” to respond to basic needs and the socio-economic well-being of Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers. Funding totaling \$2.1 million from the European Union and the Netherlands is being directed to the Lebanese Mine Action Centre. The Lebanese Armed Forces also strengthened gender mainstreaming through a memorandum of understanding with UN Women, who also delivered training for Army senior officers on its anti-sexual harassment and domestic violence policy.

17. On 15 December, during a visit by Germany’s Federal Ministry of Defense State Secretary Nils Hilmer to Lebanon, two agreements were signed to support the Lebanese Armed Forces “through the provision of fuel supplies and the strengthening of military medical services”, according to a statement by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The German Embassy in Beirut issued a corresponding communiqué, noting that this step underscored Germany’s “long-term commitment stability, resilience and security for the LAF and for Lebanon as a whole”.

18. The ninth meeting of the European Union-Lebanon Association Council was held in Brussels on 15 December. According to a European Union press release, “Both sides welcomed the EU’s longstanding commitment and support to Lebanon’s key security institutions, notably the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces, which remain essential pillars of sovereignty and national and regional stability, and expressed their willingness to further support the Lebanese security sector through the full use of EU tools, including European Peace Facility, NDICI programs and explore possible future CSDP engagement.”

19. Two days after the 14 January announcement by France of its plans to host an “International Conference in Support of the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces” (see para.27), President Aoun tasked the heads of security entities and agencies in Lebanon, at a joint meeting with the Ministers of Defense and Interior, to prepare “detailed reports” on their needs so that “participants in the Paris conference (...) are fully informed, thus contributing to achieving the conference’s objectives”. The same statement noted that the Lebanese Cabinet was working to “improve the salaries of military personnel, bringing them in line with those of public sector employees”, relaying that the President requested that Lebanon’s Defense and Interior Ministers undertake a review of military salaries and benefits.

20. Following a meeting between Prime Minister Salam and French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on 23 January, a statement from the Lebanese premiership noted that the discussion touched on preparations for the Paris conference, with both principals emphasizing the “importance of the Lebanese Army’s achievement in establishing sole authority over the area south of the Litani River”. Meanwhile, a statement from President Macron’s office noted the objective of the conference was to strengthen the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces and “their essential role in serving Lebanon’s stability and sovereignty”. On 18 February, a statement from the Lebanese Armed Forces confirmed that Commander Haykal received, on the same day, the ambassadors to Lebanon of Egypt, France, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States in a discussion focused on “preparations

for the conference to support the Army, as well as the preparatory meeting for the conference to be held in the Arab Republic of Egypt on February 24, 2026". It noted the attendees stressed the importance of strengthening the capabilities of the Army, "given its role in preserving Lebanon's security and stability amid the current delicate phase".
