

**Human Rights Council****Sixty-first session**

23 February–2 April 2026

Agenda item 2

**Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General****Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher****Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the
Sudan****Summary*

The independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan assesses that the mass killings and related atrocities committed by the Rapid Support Forces in and around El Fasher, during its takeover of the city on or around 26 and 27 October 2025, are indicators of a genocidal path. These crimes followed an 18-month siege during which the Rapid Support Forces deliberately imposed conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of non-Arab communities, in particular the Zaghawa and the Fur.

The mission documented an escalating pattern that demonstrates coordination and identity-based targeting linked to ethnicity, gender and perceived political affiliation, resulting in mass killings, serious bodily and mental harm, widespread rape and other forms of sexual violence, arbitrary detention, torture and cruel treatment, and enforced disappearances, accompanied by dehumanizing and exterminatory rhetoric. This cumulative factual matrix reveals the intent of the Rapid Support Forces to destroy the Zaghawa and Fur communities in whole or in part. The conduct in El Fasher is an aggravation of earlier patterns of mirror attacks against other non-Arab communities elsewhere in the Sudan, but on a far more lethal scale. Accountability of perpetrators, including those who facilitate, aid or abet these crimes, remains imperative. As the conflict expands to other regions, urgent protection for civilians is needed more than ever.

* The present document was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline so as to include the most recent information.



I. Mandate, methodology and cooperation

1. At its thirty-eighth special session, held on 14 November 2025, the Human Rights Council adopted its resolution S-38/1, requesting the mission to conduct an urgent inquiry into the recent violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law allegedly committed in and around El Fasher and to identify, where possible, all those for whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that they are responsible. The Council also requested the mission to give due regard to ensuring the complementarity of its efforts with those of other actors.
2. In fulfilling this request, the mission applied its previously outlined methodology and guiding principles.¹ While recognizing the standard of proof of “reasonable grounds to believe”, common to the United Nations investigative bodies, the mission paid particular attention to the question of whether clear and fully convincing evidence, as articulated by judicial bodies, exists to invoke the crime of genocide.² It also considered whether genocidal intent was the sole reasonable explanation for the conduct documented.
3. The mission identified persons of interest in relation to the commission of violations and related international crimes in and around El Fasher. It is developing confidential dossiers, taking account of all possible modes of liability, including command responsibility, which it may share with judicial and other entities, as appropriate, in pursuit of individual criminal accountability and access to justice for victims.³
4. The mission has interviewed 320 witnesses and victims from El Fasher and surrounding areas, including on the impact of the prolonged attacks and siege on the civilian population. Following the request by the Human Rights Council for an urgent inquiry, the mission conducted consultations with survivors (on 28 November 2025), as well as targeted investigative missions to Chad (from 6 to 17 January 2026) and South Sudan (from 10 to 21 January 2026) where it interviewed additional survivors from the El Fasher area. A total of 131 interviews have been conducted so far in 2026 alone (107 in-person and 24 remote), with 54 women and 77 men. The mission is deeply grateful to all survivors for their courage in sharing their experiences, to the Governments of Chad and South Sudan for facilitating the missions and to host communities for their generosity.
5. The mission also collected non-testimonial evidence and information, including around 40 public reports and related materials. It authenticated, verified and corroborated 25 videos and held more than 37 meetings with civil society, human rights defenders, and experts, including global health experts.
6. The mission engaged with a range of international and regional entities, including the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, the African Union Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the African Union Joint Fact-Finding Mission on the Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, the African Union Mission in South Sudan, and the International Criminal Court.
7. Despite its best efforts, the mission did not receive cooperation from the Sudan. On 24 November 2025, it sent a note verbale to the Government of the Sudan, requesting a visit,

¹ See [A/HRC/60/22](#); [A/HRC/57/23](#); and the conference room paper containing the findings of the investigations conducted by the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, available from <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/a-hrc-57-crp-6-en.docx>.

² Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17 (1) (d); *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*, Judgment, *I.C.J. Reports [2007] (I)*.

³ See the conference room paper containing the findings of the investigations conducted by the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, para. 295.

particularly to El Fasher, and to engage with Sudanese officials and with victims and survivors. The mission also pursued engagement through additional channels. On 13 February 2026, the mission shared the final draft report on El Fasher with the Government of the Sudan. No response was received.

8. On 12 December 2025, the mission sent a letter to the Rapid Support Forces requesting a meeting with their leadership and sharing a list of questions relating to their takeover of El Fasher. No response was received, notwithstanding public assertions by the Rapid Support Forces that they would cooperate with the mission.⁴

II. Legal framework and parties to the conflict

9. In its previous reports, the mission determined that the ongoing conflict in the Sudan meets the threshold for a non-international armed conflict to which article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 applies.⁵ This provision, which applies to all parties to the conflict, sets out minimum protections that must be guaranteed – prohibiting violence and cruel treatment against, and murder of, civilians, the wounded and the sick, and persons hors de combat, and requiring humane treatment and care without adverse distinction. The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) strengthens these protections and is applicable to the Sudan as a State Party.

10. International human rights law applies concurrently with international humanitarian law, including the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, of 1948, to which the Sudan is a State Party. International criminal law also applies, and the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 is subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court pursuant to Security Council resolution 1593 (2005).

11. The parties to the conflict remain the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, and their respective allies. Obligations under international law extend not only to the parties, but also to third States and entities which must respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law and refrain from aiding or abetting violations committed by the parties.⁶

12. Until its takeover on or around 26 and 27 October 2025, El Fasher represented the last remaining stronghold of the Sudanese Armed Forces in Darfur, following the capture by the Rapid Support Forces of four of Darfur's five state capitals between April and November 2023. The city's defence relied on the Army's Sixth Infantry Division, supported by the Joint Forces and locally mobilized civilian units formed to protect families and communities.

13. The Joint Forces comprised armed movements that were signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement. The Joint Forces are closely associated with leadership figures from the Zaghawa community, including factions linked to the Sudan Liberation Army–Minni Minawi and the Justice and Equality Movement–Jibril Ibrahim.

14. The Rapid Support Forces' military campaign was reinforced by local Arab militias and allied groups, and by mercenaries reportedly deployed through foreign security firms or networks and equipped with advanced weaponry and communications systems. Witnesses described the Rapid Support Forces' use of heavy artillery and drones and their electronic warfare capabilities. The Rapid Support Forces appear to have benefited from logistical military support, in violation of the arms embargo under Security Council resolution 1593 (2005). The mission is engaging with several States regarding credible information that it has received about their own involvement or that of their nationals or entities in the ongoing conflict in the Sudan. It will report on this matter in the future.

⁴ See <https://t.me/RSFSudan/8396>.

⁵ See A/HRC/60/22; A/HRC/57/23; and the conference room paper containing the findings of the investigations conducted by the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023.

⁶ A/HRC/60/22, para. 17.

15. Although all parties recruited children,⁷ multiple interviewees emphasized that the Rapid Support Forces deployed a substantial number of children, using them as fighters and for intelligence-gathering within El Fasher.

III. Siege and takeover of El Fasher

16. The siege and eventual takeover of El Fasher unfolded against a backdrop of repeated warnings, clearly identified atrocity risk indicators, and escalating conduct consistent with mass atrocity crimes under international law.

17. From mid-2024, the risk of mass atrocity crimes was repeatedly and explicitly identified. On 13 June 2024, the Security Council demanded that the Rapid Support Forces halt their siege of El Fasher and that all parties protect civilians.⁸ The African Union Peace and Security Council recalled Security Council resolution 2736 (2024) and warned of dangerous ethnic and communal repercussions.⁹ These concerns were reiterated in subsequent international warnings, including the Security Council statement of 30 October 2025.¹⁰

18. Despite these warnings, no effective measures were taken by any party to protect the civilian population. Over approximately 18 months of siege, the Rapid Support Forces steadily squeezed the life out of El Fasher and surrounding displacement camps, cutting off food, water, medical supplies and humanitarian assistance, while subjecting the city to recurring shelling and ground assaults. Civilians were increasingly trapped, as escape routes were restricted or closed, and were forced to endure conditions of life progressively incompatible with human survival.

A. Modus operandi

19. Across Darfur, the Rapid Support Forces exhibited a pervasive, consistent and identifiable operational pattern characterized by ethnically discriminatory targeting, encirclement and siege tactics, and systematic violence against civilians. In West Darfur, including El Geneina and surrounding areas, the mission previously found that the Rapid Support Forces and allied Arab militias had repeatedly attacked predominantly non-Arab communities, particularly the Masalit, through persistent waves of indiscriminate killing, sexual violence, torture, looting, and destruction of homes and infrastructure. These attacks were frequently accompanied by discriminatory and humiliating slurs. Civilians and persons hors de combat were deliberately isolated, escape routes blocked, and fleeing populations attacked. Community leaders, displacement camps and medical facilities were targeted, while entire neighbourhoods were razed.

20. The Rapid Support Forces intensified these tactics in and around El Fasher, revealing the intent to eliminate the city's residents. Survivors describe explicit threats to "clean" the city. The patterns employed included a siege that comprised multidirectional encirclement and repeated encroachments with attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure using drones and heavy weapons in populated areas. The facilities attacked included displacement camps, medical facilities, places of worship, and food systems such as communal kitchens and markets. Humanitarian relief was persistently denied. When the Rapid Support Forces entered a besieged area, mass killings, beatings, looting, sexual violence and destruction of property followed – all accompanied by ethnically discriminatory rhetoric and conduct.

⁷ See the conference room paper containing the findings of the investigations conducted by the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, paras. 219–232.

⁸ Security Council resolution 2736 (2024).

⁹ See PSC/HoSG/COMM.1218 (2024).

¹⁰ See <https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16204.doc.htm>.

B. The people of El Fasher and repeated displacement

21. Prior to the takeover, the population of El Fasher predominantly consisted of non-Arab communities, mainly the Zaghawa. The displacement camps around the city hosted displaced persons predominantly from the Fur community, as well as Berti, Masalit and Tama, particularly persons who had endured multiple waves of displacement from across the five Darfur states, starting from the conflict of 2003 and 2004.¹¹

22. Several witnesses described repeated cycles of flight and return. They recounted fleeing neighbourhoods within El Fasher following attacks by the Rapid Support Forces, ultimately seeking refuge in the Zamzam displacement camp, and after the fall of the camp, returning temporarily to neighbourhoods inside the city, before being forced to flee again following the takeover. Each displacement compounded existing vulnerabilities, particularly for women, children and elderly persons.¹²

23. Survivors consistently reported that the Rapid Support Forces had openly stated their intention to target non-Arab communities. Witnesses had heard the Rapid Support Forces saying: “Is there anyone Zaghawa among you? If we find Zaghawa, we will kill them all”. “We want to eliminate anything black from Darfur.” “What are you doing in this town? We will carry out extermination against you, an extermination like what we did to Masalit.” Others reported statements asserting that Darfur (meaning “the house of the Fur”) now belonged to the Arabs, and that its name would be changed to “house of Arabs”.

IV. Conditions of life imposed through the siege

24. In the words of one interviewee: “Life became unbearable. We were eating only *ombaz* – the food for livestock. When there was no more, we ate the skin of the animal. We soaked it in water and ate.”

A. Starvation and the collapse of medical services

25. In its previous report, the mission described the starvation tactics and the attacks on medical facilities in and around El Fasher.¹³ It had received fresh accounts from survivors describing the severe and progressively worsening food shortages during the siege. Markets were repeatedly attacked, looted or forced to close, supply routes into the city were systematically cut, and trucks carrying food were denied entry or attacked.¹⁴ Persons trying to move in and out of El Fasher to obtain food risked being shot or detained. Prices of basic goods rose beyond the reach of most residents, and food became entirely unavailable for extended periods.

26. Those in El Fasher increasingly relied on community kitchens (*takiyas*), which provided limited shared meals, but even those were attacked. Survivors described how they resorted to extreme measures, including eating animal fodder (*ombaz*), tree leaves or residual peanut oil. Even those items became prohibitively expensive. People were dying from severe malnutrition and starvation, particularly children and older persons.

27. Water also became increasingly scarce. Survivors described the damage to or destruction of water infrastructure, electricity networks and health facilities. Water systems were destroyed, leading to reliance on unsafe water sources, and increasing the spread of disease. The continuous shelling further prevented access to any remaining water sources.

28. Medical supplies were critically limited, and health facilities were repeatedly attacked, leading many to cease functioning. At the time of the takeover, only the Saudi Hospital remained operational, but its capacity was severely compromised by shortages of medicine

¹¹ See <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/05/1149281>; and A/HRC/60/22, para. 31.

¹² See [https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/Flash Update %231 - Darfur and Kordofan Situation.pdf](https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/Flash%20Update%20-%20Darfur%20and%20Kordofan%20Situation.pdf).

¹³ A/HRC/60/22, paras. 88–104.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, paras. 71–115.

and equipment, intermittent electricity, and diminishing staff levels. Patients suffering from treatable illnesses, such as malaria, or moderate injuries,¹⁵ died because of inadequate care.

29. Attacks on humanitarian facilities, convoys and health workers, as well as bureaucratic restrictions imposed, have already been documented, in the mission's previous report; these have significantly impeded humanitarian operations and resulted in denial of humanitarian access. The mission invoked the war crime of starvation, which may also amount to the crime against humanity of extermination, owing to the combined effects of deprivation of access to food and medicine, including through repeated shelling and indiscriminate attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, and attacks on and obstruction of humanitarian assistance.¹⁶

B. Restriction of movement and prevention of civilian escape

30. By mid-2024, the Rapid Support Forces had established positions along key southern and eastern corridors, effectively tightening the siege, with devastating results. Evidence collected confirmed that, months before the takeover, the Rapid Support Forces had constructed earthen berms with trenches encircling El Fasher. Survivors described these berms as being approximately 2 metres wide and more than 2.5 metres deep. The Yale School of Public Health's Humanitarian Research Lab identified more than 31 km of earthen walls surrounding the city since May 2025, enabling the Rapid Support Forces to control and prevent movements.¹⁷

31. Survivors consistently reported that, as the siege tightened, residents were largely unable to flee. Multiple checkpoints manned by the Rapid Support Forces exposed residents, particularly men, to significant risks of being captured, robbed, detained and/or killed. One interviewee described assisting in the clandestine evacuation of women, children and elderly people in the months preceding the city's takeover, while men stayed away from the exit points for fear of being shot. These restrictions effectively trapped civilians inside El Fasher, without adequate water and food, medical care, or protection.

C. Last six months of the siege

32. Due to the constant shelling of El Fasher, many inhabitants left and went to the Zamzam or Abu Shouk displacement camps, where there was relative calm in the initial stages of the siege, due to the presence of Joint Forces and Sudanese Armed Forces bases close by. However, towards the end of 2024, these camps also became targets of repeated shelling and ground attacks, leading to civilian casualties, destroyed shelters and markets, and repeated forced displacement within already overcrowded sites.

33. The mission previously reported on the major attack on Zamzam Camp, where predominantly those displaced from the Fur community lived, that was launched by the Rapid Support Forces from 11 to 14 April 2025, killing over 1,000 inhabitants.¹⁸ The Rapid Support Forces used their usual modus operandi. The inhabitants were chased out from the third day of the attack, with some fleeing back to El Fasher.

34. In the months preceding the takeover of El Fasher, the areas under the protection of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Joint Forces were limited to the centre of El Fasher, western neighbourhoods including Daraja Oula, the Abu Shouk ("Naivasha") displacement camp, and the surrounding Abu Shouk neighbourhood in the north, predominantly populated by the Fur, the Zaghawa and other non-Arab communities. These areas were subjected to intense shelling. The Rapid Support Forces repeatedly entered these areas to loot and to

¹⁵ Ibid., paras. 71–115.

¹⁶ Ibid., paras. 105–111.

¹⁷ Yale University, "Human security alert: RSF walls in El Fasher's population to prevent escape", 28 August 2025.

¹⁸ A/HRC/60/22, para. 28; and see <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/sudan/ohchr-sudan-rapid-support-forces-zamzam-idp-camp-north-darfur-3-days-safe-refuge-offensive-april-terror-1-en.pdf>, para. 34.

assault, detain and/or kill inhabitants, particularly men, before withdrawing again. The fate and whereabouts of those taken remain unknown. Given the intensity of the attacks on Abu Shouk Camp, most inhabitants fled in the weeks preceding the takeover of El Fasher to the Abu Shouk or Daraja Oula neighbourhoods.

35. Women were specifically targeted on the basis of their gender intersecting with their ethnicity. A survivor said that a few weeks before the takeover, she had been abducted and detained in a container. She had been flogged and raped by members of the Rapid Support Forces, who had accused her of being “a woman of the Joint Forces”.

36. On 19 September 2025, a Rapid Support Forces drone struck Al-Safiya Mosque in Daraja Oula during dawn prayers, killing around 70 individuals, including 11 children, and injuring many others. Survivors said that many of their family members had been killed in the attack. On 8 October 2025, another Rapid Support Forces attack targeted a mosque in the Abu Shouk neighbourhood, killing and injuring residents.¹⁹

37. Further attacks on the Abu Shouk neighbourhood occurred on 10 and 11 October 2025, when Rapid Support Forces artillery and drones struck the Dar al-Arqam Centre, an educational institute that had been converted into a site sheltering internally displaced persons and hosting a communal kitchen, as well as houses adjacent to the Centre.²⁰ Survivors described the Centre being hit by multiple munitions, and seeing around 30 to 50 bodies in the aftermath of the attack, including many women and at least 17 children.²¹

38. By the time the Rapid Support Forces entered the city, its residents were physically weakened, malnourished, traumatized, and in part unable to flee, leaving them defenceless against the extreme level of violence that ensued.

V. Three days of horror – the taking of El Fasher

39. In the preceding days, survivors described a rapid collapse of security and of humanitarian conditions, and as the Rapid Support Forces’ strikes intensified, the counterfire by the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Joint Forces diminished.

40. On 24 October 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces received orders to withdraw from El Fasher and hand over responsibility for the protection of civilians to the Joint Forces. On 25 October 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces vacated the Sixth Infantry Division headquarters and began to withdraw from the city to the west. Some soldiers warned civilians that they were withdrawing and told them to flee. Other soldiers were cut off, continued to resist, fled, or were killed while attempting to surrender, or once they were hors de combat.

41. In the early hours of 26 October 2025, while shelling continued, the Rapid Support Forces entered the city and consolidated their control from multiple directions, deploying large numbers of vehicles.

42. Some Joint Forces elements broke out from the city as the defence collapsed, while others went into hiding or were killed. The use of sophisticated jamming equipment by the Rapid Support Forces blocked communication between the defenders, contributing to a breakdown of command and control and the ultimate collapse of the final defence put up by armed civilians.

43. During the night of 25 to 26 October 2025, residents increasingly attempted to flee, particularly along routes toward Tawilah and other areas outside the berms, but the Rapid Support Forces were positioned to intercept escape attempts. Multiple accounts describe those attempting to leave being shot at, intercepted by vehicles, forced back or trapped at exit points.

¹⁹ See https://x.com/UNOCHA_Sudan/status/1976235317108805841 and <https://www.ajnet.me/politics/2025/10/9/تفاصيل-تكرار-الدعم-السريع-قصف-مسجد>.

²⁰ See <https://www.ajnet.me/news/2025/10/11/30-قتيلا>.

²¹ See <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/least-17-children-reportedly-killed-attack-displacement-centre-north-darfurs-al>.

A. Mass killings

1. Killings throughout the city

44. Survivors consistently spoke of widespread killings, including indiscriminate shootings and point-blank executions of civilians in homes, streets, open areas or while attempting to flee the city, particularly in the neighbourhoods that had previously been protected by the Sudanese Armed Forces or the Joint Forces, including the Daraja Oula and Abu Shouk neighbourhoods, the Grand Market area and the airport. They described individuals being gunned down in the streets, trenches and public buildings where they were hiding, while bodies of men, women and children filled the roads. One survivor, fleeing together with 23 others, recounted walking past many corpses when they were attacked by Rapid Support Forces in several vehicles, leaving only seven survivors. He was injured in the shoulder, whipped, beaten and detained.

45. Another survivor described how she and 20 family members had been ambushed by the Rapid Support Forces in several vehicles at the Zeriba (the livestock market, to the northeast of El Fasher) during which seven persons had been taken and killed. One of the perpetrators apparently stated: “I am from the Mahri Arabs, and the Joint Forces killed our people, and today we will kill you all.” When she responded they were civilians, she was whipped on the head.

46. One survivor described hiding near the airport fence, about 150 metres from a massacre site, as many vehicles belonging to the Rapid Support Forces approached those trying to flee. The perpetrators asked whether those fleeing were “Falangiyat, soldiers or civilians”. Irrespective of the response, the men were killed. The survivor also witnessed a woman, holding a child, being killed, and a young woman being taken away. Other survivors saw corpses in civilian clothes near the airport, either shot or run over. Several survivors reported lying down among corpses, pretending to be dead, on the roads out of El Fasher when vehicles of the Rapid Support Forces approached.

2. Mass executions at exit points

47. From 26 October 2025, the Rapid Support Forces rounded up those trying to leave the city at three main exit points: on the northern axis towards Mellit, on the El Fasher–Garni road (north-west of El Fasher)²² and on the El Fasher–Tawilah road (south-west of El Fasher). These three exits led to areas not under the control of the Rapid Support Forces.²³

48. At these exit points, survivors described the Rapid Support Forces separating men from women and children, while beating, detaining or executing them, and accusing them of supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces and/or the Joint Forces. Verified videos show the Rapid Support Forces holding large groups of men in civilian clothes, labelling them “Falangiyat”, chanting “Allahu akbar” and beating them with sticks.

49. Several survivors described a recurring pattern whereby the Rapid Support Forces intercepted those fleeing collectively, held them, and executed the men in groups. According to one, the Rapid Support Forces gathered ten to twenty men together in groups, often tied their hands, and later killed them.

50. Although men were disproportionately targeted for execution, women and children were not spared. Most of the corpses were left unburied along the exit routes.

3. Mass executions at the berms

51. The earthen berms and trenches constructed by the Rapid Support Forces around El Fasher became locations where the Rapid Support Forces separated, detained and killed civilians. There, the Rapid Support Forces opened fire indiscriminately on those attempting to flee, killing those who could not get out of the berms or move away quickly. The wounded

²² See <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/7db4031a-066c-4833-87c9-eea3897219b2>.

²³ See <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/319dd62a-d4d2-454b-8205-47214168dcf5>.

were executed at close range.²⁴ Witnesses saw burned military and civilian vehicles, and hundreds of corpses in and around the berms, including men in civilian clothing with bound hands, as well as women, elderly persons and children.

52. One survivor witnessed a Rapid Support Forces commander ordering the execution of men after questioning whether they were soldiers or civilians. He saw eight men being shot dead and saw what he estimated as hundreds of bodies in or around the berms. Other survivors described being separated from male family members, who were then executed, or witnessing women and girls being killed. Men who were not killed were blindfolded, bound and transported to unknown locations, while the perpetrators chanted “slaves, slaves, slaves”.

53. The Rapid Support Forces also recorded and circulated videos of themselves executing people at the berms, chanting ethnic or religious slogans. Survivors’ testimonies corroborated multiple videos showing members of the Rapid Support Forces accusing people of being “Falangai/Falangayat” or “Abolda”, which are derogatory slurs linked to the victims’ perceived ethnic identity and political affiliation.

54. Three separate verified videos of 27 October 2025 show a notorious Rapid Support Forces commander known as “Abu Lulu” executing detained individuals in civilian clothes, seated or lying in trenches. The detainees were forced to chant slogans such as “Hemedti is on top” or “My master is Abu Lulu” while Abu Lulu said to one of the injured detainees, “I swear to God if you were Burhan himself, I would rape you”. Survivors identified “Abu Lulu”, known as the “Butcher of El Fasher” for his ruthlessness, as having personally carried out executions of defenceless persons in multiple locations, including at the berms.

4. Killings at El Fasher University

55. Thousands of persons, largely civilians, sought refuge at El Fasher University, attempting to escape the shelling and killings in the streets. The Rapid Support Forces targeted the university through shelling and drone strikes, killing and injuring civilians sheltering there. During the morning of 26 October 2025, before their withdrawal from El Fasher University, the Sudanese Armed Forces informed the civilians that they were no longer able to protect them and advised them to leave. What ensued made El Fasher University one of the bloodiest execution sites in the city.

56. At around 5 p.m., people started to flee the university collectively. However, the Rapid Support Forces had surrounded the campus and opened fire on those attempting to leave, referring to them as “Falangiyat”. Many were killed, while others were trapped inside the university buildings.

57. Survivors described the Rapid Support Forces commander, who identified himself as “Abu Lulu”, as particularly ruthless. He became known as the “Butcher of El Fasher”. On 27 October 2025, a family of 13 was forced at gunpoint to walk to El Fasher University, passing numerous corpses along the way. Upon arrival, “Abu Lulu” identified himself, shouting, “I will kill you like fat autumn locusts.” Shooting at people at random and killing several, at one stage he stopped, saying, “I was planning to kill 2,000 people today, but I lost count, so I will start all over again”. He resumed the shooting.

58. Two survivors witnessed “Abu Lulu” asking a pregnant woman how far she was into her pregnancy. When she responded “seven months”, he fired seven bullets into her abdomen, killing her. Multiple witnesses described him moving through the university buildings, ordering people out of rooms and shooting them. At some stage, other members of the Rapid Support Forces stopped him. By then, hundreds of men, women and children had already been killed.

59. Another survivor, hiding with others in a university room, described Rapid Support Forces storming the campus while shouting: “Soldiers, come out, wives of soldiers, come out. Soldiers, do not hide among the women.” Those who identified themselves as soldiers were killed immediately. Civilians, including women and children, were also killed. One witness described how 15 people had been killed in front of her. Some had been executed, while

²⁴ See <https://www.facebook.com/reel/1409599147834443> and <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-ethnic-based-killings-in-fasher>.

others had been hit by random bullets. Another witness, who entered the university building later, found 150 to 200 bodies there.

60. One survivor, found alive while the Rapid Support Forces were inspecting bodies and looting in the university area, was asked about his tribe. After identifying himself as Zaghawa, he was tied to a vehicle and was dragged until he was unconscious. Later, two other perpetrators said: “We will exterminate you, [as] we did to Masalit.” They whipped him, tied a rope fastened to a camel around his neck, and dragged him back to the university.

61. People hiding near the university reported seeing numerous corpses lying on the ground, including in surrounding trenches. Some of the injured lay among the dead for hours, without assistance. One interviewee witnessed a Rapid Support Forces commander opening fire on dozens of people hiding at the Faculty of Education.

62. Videos verified by the mission confirm large numbers of bodies inside the main university building. Footage includes that of a fighter executing a wounded person lying among other injured and deceased persons inside the Faculty of Medical Laboratory Sciences.

5. Killings at the Saudi Hospital

63. Hospitals, medical personnel and the sick and wounded were not spared. The World Health Organization reported that on 26 October 2025, the Saudi Hospital was hit by heavy shelling, killing one nurse and injuring three health workers.²⁵ A survivor described seeing members of the Rapid Support Forces entering the building with large rifles threatening patients and firing in the air while asking those present if they were “Falangayat”. She managed to escape, but continued to hear gunshots for approximately one hour.

64. In the days following, the Rapid Support Forces stormed the hospital. One survivor said he heard them saying, “We want to destroy you all.” They proceeded to search the wards and to kill those they found, including patients, people accompanying them, and medical personnel. Doctors took off their white attire so as not to be targeted. Six health workers – four doctors, a nurse and a pharmacist – were abducted.²⁶ A civilian and an hors de combat soldier were killed in front of their wives, who survived, as were many other men present in the same ward. Children as young as 8 were also killed. Overall, it is estimated that more than 460 patients and others present were killed. According to satellite imagery analysed by the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, the corpses were later burned.²⁷

65. The Rapid Support Forces filmed themselves in front of the Saudi Hospital together with affiliated armed fighters, looting civilian vehicles and celebrating their control over the area.

66. In the early morning of 26 October 2025, at least nine people, including one young woman and two girls, were brought to the University Health Centre with bullet wounds. When the Rapid Support Forces subsequently stormed the Centre with machine guns, shouting “Where is the army?”, over 30 sick and wounded persons and those accompanying them were killed.

6. Continued killings and executions on the road

67. One witness told the mission: “There were bodies everywhere. Some bodies were torn to pieces.”

68. Survivors reported that flight did not bring safety. Civilians endured successive cycles of life-threatening dangers: shelling and killings inside El Fasher, shootings and executions at the berms around El Fasher and at exit points, and renewed attacks along escape routes.

69. Survivors fled in small groups, often at night or in the early morning, to reduce detection. Families were frequently separated to increase their chances of survival, with men moving separately from women and children, while the elderly, or sick relatives, were

²⁵ See <https://www.who.int/news/item/29-10-2025-who-condemns-killings-of-patients-and-civilians-amid-escalating-violence-in-el-fasher--sudan>.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ See <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/b9c14991-6b22-492e-9e16-f903d25d9b49>.

sometimes left behind. Multiple men disguised themselves as women to escape discovery, although some were found and killed. Many survivors reported not seeing separated family members again or later learning that they had been killed.

70. The Rapid Support Forces pursued fleeing civilians along escape routes towards Jabal Wana, Tawilah, Garni, and rural areas around El Fasher, where they had established ambushes and checkpoints. Survivors described the perpetrators chasing people in open fields, firing at them with automatic rifles and mounted submachine guns, and running over fleeing persons with vehicles, causing mass casualties. Survivors estimated that hundreds of persons had been killed in this manner. Verified video material supports this claim.

71. One survivor stated that of 63 civilians fleeing together one night, only seven reached Tawilah alive, with the remainder killed by Rapid Support Forces gunfire during the journey. Others described members of the Rapid Support Forces filming themselves as they opened fire on groups. One such incident took place at Golo, where the Rapid Support Forces shot indiscriminately at hundreds of people attempting to flee.

72. In Jabal Wana, survivors recounted the Rapid Support Forces saying, “If we had killed you in 2003, you would not have come to fight us in 2023. You are Falangiyat, you are the Joint Forces”, killing children as young as 2 years old. One survivor reported seeing a young boy being flogged while hanging from a tree, after his four brothers and his parents had been killed, and stated that he had later succumbed to his wounds.

73. Even if some of the men chased and killed were Sudanese Armed Forces or Joint Forces members, the mission’s information indicates that they were hors de combat and therefore protected.

B. Causing serious bodily or mental harm

1. Rape and other forms of sexual violence

74. One interviewee told the mission: “They raped me in front of the bodies of my mother, my father and my slaughtered brother.”

75. At the centre of the takeover and its aftermath were widespread, systematic and coordinated acts of sexual violence primarily targeted at women and girls from non-Arab communities, particularly the Zaghawa. Women and girls ranging from 7 to 70 years old, including pregnant women, were subjected to rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence. This included acts of killings, whipping, beating, humiliation, forced nudity and sexual harassment, while their belongings were looted. Survivors consistently reported that numerous women had been raped during the same incidents, which indicates that the cases documented by the mission represent only a fraction of a far wider pattern.

(a) Mass and gang rape

76. The mission has collected a substantial body of corroborated information demonstrating that widespread rape, mass rape and gang rape, abduction and other forms of sexual violence began immediately following the takeover of El Fasher. Women and girls from non-Arab communities, particularly the Zaghawa, and those perceived as Sudanese Armed Forces or Joint Forces supporters, were the primary victims.

77. Many survivors reported being raped in front of their relatives, including children, intensifying the humiliation and psychological harm of all victims involved. Multiple perpetrators assaulted victims in succession during the same incident, with assaults being carried out in private homes, public buildings, hospitals and open spaces, including escape routes.

78. Sexual violence was frequently accompanied by extreme physical brutality, including beating and whipping. Survivors described having their clothes forcibly torn off, leaving them completely naked, while their hands were tied to prevent resistance. Rapes occurred both vaginally and anally, sometimes with the insertion of sharp objects, and were often accompanied by ethnic slurs and threats.

79. Multiple survivors also reported that male relatives had been killed while trying to protect them. In one case, a 12-year-old girl was raped by three Rapid Support Forces fighters in front of her mother, shortly after her father had been killed while trying to protect her. The girl later died from her injuries before reaching hospital in Tawilah. One woman reported being raped by two fighters, alongside at least 10 other women, after witnessing men and children being killed.

80. Sexual violence continued during the flight, particularly along the main exit routes out of El Fasher, towards Tawilah, Garni, Jabal Wana and Mellit, as well as in Garni, Golo and Shagra. One survivor stated that after fleeing Daraja Oula and reaching Jabal Wana on 27 October 2025, the Rapid Support Forces killed many children, mutilated a woman by cutting off her breast with a knife, and raped several others, including herself. The mission heard numerous accounts of women, especially from the Zaghawa community, being gang-raped in forests along escape routes.

(b) Abduction and sexual violence

81. Survivors reported the systematic abduction of women and girls by the Rapid Support Forces. Several described seeing victims, frequently below 18 years of age, being physically restrained and transported to unknown locations. More investigations are needed regarding these abductions, which may reflect a pattern of exploitation and amount to enforced disappearances.

82. One survivor described being abducted in late October 2025 on her way to Tawilah, after identifying herself as Zaghawa. The Rapid Support Forces took her to a remote area, tied her to a tree, left her naked and repeatedly raped her over six days. She eventually managed to escape. Her prolonged deprivation of liberty, combined with repeated sexual violence, constitutes sexual slavery.

(c) Rape in the presence of corpses

83. Rape was often committed in locations where mass killings had taken place, including at the Saudi Hospital and at El Fasher University. Witnesses recounted the Rapid Support Forces violently and publicly gang-raping at least 19 women in rooms filled with corpses, including the remains of their own husbands. The women were called “Falangiya”. One survivor described seeing a woman being raped in Jabal Wana in front of the body of her 2-year-old son, who had just been killed.

(d) Normalization of acts of sexual violence

84. The Rapid Support Forces conducted invasive body searches of fleeing women and girls they intercepted, including forcing women to lift their clothes or have their bodies touched under the pretext of searching for money, gold or mobile phones.

85. Survivors consistently reported that sexual violence, including rape, was perpetrated openly and publicly by the Rapid Support Forces while others were forced to watch and were prevented from leaving. In addition, survivors widely reported that perpetrators appeared calm, deliberate, and fully aware of their actions.

86. The Rapid Support Forces sometimes filmed rape and other acts of violence against women and girls. One verified video shows Rapid Support Forces fighters mocking and poking the corpse of a woman, calling her “the slave of El Fasher”. In another video, a female member of the Rapid Support Forces publicly encouraged her male comrades to rape.

(e) Gender and ethnic dimension

87. The violence demonstrated a dual ethnic and gender dimension. By killing or removing men and systematically assaulting women and girls, the Rapid Support Forces attacked the very fabric of the group, undermining its survival. Evidence shows that women and girls were not victims of opportunistic violence but were directly targeted as part of a broader campaign of terror and collective punishment against their community.

88. The sexual violence was closely linked to ethnic targeting, particularly against Zaghawa. Survivors reported the Rapid Support Forces stating: “We have to empty El Fasher

of the Falangiyat.” “These are slaves. Kill them, destroy them, rape them.” “We are your only men, no other men.” “We are allergic to Zaghawa.” “You must give birth to our children.” Women who identified themselves as Arab or who, in the eyes of perpetrators, appeared Arab, were spared. One Zaghawa survivor said that she managed to avoid rape by pretending to be Arab, and speaking their dialect, and because she was light-skinned.

89. Survivors reported that members of the Rapid Support Forces used terms such as “marry”, “bride” and “our ladies” to assert ownership and intimidate women and girls before raping them. The perpetrators told one woman, while raping her in front of her children: “Now El Fasher is under our control. You will come back to us and you will be our ladies”, echoing a pattern of ownership language.

2. Detention, torture, humiliation, extortion, ransom and disappearances

90. The mission documented a widespread and systematic pattern of detention and enforced disappearance of civilians and persons hors de combat by the Rapid Support Forces. These occurred particularly at berms and checkpoints and along escape routes. Survivors described members of the Rapid Support Forces intercepting those fleeing, accusing them of affiliation with the Sudanese Armed Forces or the Joint Forces and using ethnic slurs. The perpetrators would rob their victims of their belongings and detain them in vehicles, shipping containers, makeshift checkpoints or detention sites, often pending payments of ransom. While many are detained in Nyala and Garni, the fate and whereabouts of many others remain unknown.

91. Individuals were often asked to declare their tribal affiliation. Survivors described men and boys being separated from women, girls and elderly persons. Men and boys were at heightened risk of execution, torture, arbitrary detention and/or enforced disappearance. Bound and with their eyes covered, they were taken away in trucks belonging to the Rapid Support Forces. Verified video footage shows detainees being transported on or around 26 and 27 October 2025 by the Rapid Support Forces.

92. Women were not spared. In one documented incident, the Rapid Support Forces detained four women, tying them to a cart and dragging it behind a vehicle for about one kilometre, resulting in their deaths.

93. Torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment were widespread. The Rapid Support Forces subjected detainees and civilians to severe humiliation and physical abuse. One detainee held in a police cell described guards throwing food on the floor, urinating on detainees, and referring to them as “dogs”. He further reported being burned with hot irons and subjected to severe mutilation. Severe beatings with sticks, whips, metal tools and pliers were common, as was deprivation of adequate food and water, or medical assistance.

94. Survivors described being held outside, or in overcrowded, filthy cells with inadequate sanitation and few windows. Many were subjected to forced labour, including carrying ammunition, transporting weapons or digging graves. Some survivors described detainees dying in custody because of wounds, starvation and lack of medical treatment.

95. From at least 26 October 2025, the Rapid Support Forces converted the former children’s hospital in El Fasher into a detention centre and execution site. Survivors reported being held at the hospital for prolonged periods. They were subjected to systematic beatings and ethnic-based slurs, and were forced to drink contaminated water, resulting in widespread illness and deaths in custody. Survivors reported hearing a mass shooting on 27 October 2025. They were later forced to bury dozens of bodies. Satellite imagery analysed by the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab between 1 and 3 November 2025 revealed objects consistent with human bodies and newly disturbed earth east of the facility, assessed as consistent with mass body disposal following killings likely to have occurred between 27 October and 1 November 2025.²⁸

96. Extortion and ransom demands formed an integral component of the Rapid Support Forces’ practices. Either directly or through their allies, they contacted the detainees’ families

²⁸ See <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/8163d430-7a33-458e-be60-f0022a6c31d2>.

by phone, on social media or through intermediaries, demanding payment which sometimes reached 25 million Sudanese pounds in exchange for the detainee's release. Survivors reported a sliding scale for ransom, based on ethnicity, with ransom for Zaghawa being the most extortionate, followed by Fur and Masalit.

97. Witnesses also described being driven around in Rapid Support Forces vehicles while their captors contacted their relatives for ransom. In most cases, the detainees were released when the ransom was paid. The mission has documented cases where the ransom was paid but the release was not effected. Those who did not pay were either killed or remained in detention.

C. Conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction

1. Deliberate starvation and destruction

98. The conditions imposed in and around El Fasher from the time of the siege, as detailed before, amounted to a systematic destruction of the means of survival of its non-Arab communities, particularly the Zaghawa and the Fur. Through prolonged siege tactics, the Rapid Support Forces deliberately deprived the population of food, water, medical care, adequate housing and basic services, dismantling the material foundations of their survival.

99. Throughout the siege, sustained shelling rendered schools inoperable, destroyed markets and shelters and forced civilians to remain in hiding for extended periods. The collapse of commercial supply routes, combined with the denial of humanitarian assistance, eliminated access to food, while repeated shelling of civilian areas and attacks on markets and community kitchens further exacerbated starvation. These conditions were neither incidental nor unavoidable consequences of hostilities; rather, they were the foreseeable and intended result of the Rapid Support Forces' conduct.

100. Following the takeover, these conditions worsened dramatically: civilians could no longer remain in their homes or move through the city without facing a real and immediate risk of death. The seizure and effective closure of the last functioning hospital, combined with the killing, abduction or flight of medical personnel, eliminated access to medical care altogether. Injured persons and those suffering illness were left to die untreated.

101. Inhabitants were compelled to flee the city on foot, often for days and nights, while wounded, severely malnourished and without access to food, water, shelter or medication. Along escape routes, the Rapid Support Forces systematically robbed them of their remaining possessions, including clothes and shoes, further aggravating starvation and contributing to physical collapse. Multiple deaths also occurred during flight due to hunger, exhaustion, and untreated injuries.

102. The cumulative effect of deliberate starvation, denial of medical care, restriction of movement, and violence targeted at life and physical integrity rendered survival increasingly impossible. Taken together, these deliberate acts imposed conditions of life incompatible with the continued existence of the targeted communities, particularly the Zaghawa and the Fur, and were calculated to bring about their physical destruction, in whole or in part.

2. Impact on survivors

103. It has been estimated that around 100,000 out of the estimated population of 260,000 has fled El Fasher since late October 2025.²⁹ Those who were able to visit El Fasher in the aftermath of the takeover spoke of seeing very few civilians inside the city, describing it as a "ghost town".³⁰

²⁹ See <https://mailchi.mp/iom/dtm-sudan-flash-alert-al-fasher-al-fasher-town-north-darfur-update-111?e=538eea95ac>; <https://www.msf.org/people-who-escaped-el-fasher-are-struggling-survive-one-month-after-rsf-takeover>; <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/08/1165731>; and <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/aid-workers-find-little-life-sudans-al-fashir-after-paramilitary-takeover-2025-12-29/>.

³⁰ See <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/aid-workers-find-little-life-sudans-al-fashir-after-paramilitary-takeover-2025-12-29/> and <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/glimpse-ghost-town-el-fasher>.

104. Survivors systematically emphasized the need to know the fate of their family members. Internet connections and communications in El Fasher were cut during the takeover, leaving Starlink, which is controlled and monitored by the Rapid Support Forces, as the only way to reach the outside world. Those currently in El Fasher thus have little ability to freely connect with their families and friends. Most people lost members of their families – mothers, fathers, sons and daughters – and knowing the fate of the missing and the disappeared was a recurrent demand.

105. Those who left El Fasher are also suffering anxiety, loss, trauma and grief, due to their lived experience.³¹ Survivors of sexual violence reported severe and long-lasting physical and psychological consequences, including miscarriages, prolonged bleeding, genital and anal injuries, infections and urinary retention; it has even led to death. Trauma, often accompanied by social stigma, is common. Some became pregnant because of rape. One survivor who aborted after learning she was pregnant said: “My husband and I tried to have children and had never had a child, but to become pregnant after rape, I could not accept it.”

106. Access to medical care is extremely limited. Survivors frequently travelled for several days under dangerous conditions before reaching treatment in Tawilah or Kutum, where medical services were severely overstrained. At least two survivors died in Tawilah due to untreated injuries. During its visit to Tine in Chad, the mission observed that many refugees were women and children, often separated from male relatives. Some women had given birth while fleeing, demonstrating the intergenerational impact of the violence.

107. Many children arrived at safe areas on their own or with one parent or family member or with strangers who picked them up along the way. It was estimated that about 400 children arrived in Tawilah without their parents in the first month following the takeover.

D. Acts by the leadership of the Rapid Support Forces

108. On the day of the takeover of El Fasher, the Rapid Support Forces leaders publicly claimed and celebrated the operation. Deputy commander Lieutenant General Abdel Rahim Dagalo and spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Al-Fatih Al-Qurashi described it as a “major and historic military victory”, praising their forces for “liberating” the city from the “terrorist Islamic army”.³² He threatened opponents with the same fate as “the terrorists”,³³ framing the assault as part of a broader campaign extending to Port Sudan and beyond.

109. On 29 October 2025, the Rapid Support Forces leader, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) likewise praised the “liberation” and praised the fighters as “lions and heroes”. Although he acknowledged that “some violations occurred”, including looting, and described El Fasher as a “catastrophe”, he justified the assault, however, as necessary. He issued instructions not to harm civilians or kill prisoners and promised investigations.³⁴ The mission’s request to the Rapid Response Forces to clarify the steps it has taken in this regard remains unanswered.

110. Furthermore, these statements came after widespread killings, detentions and looting had already occurred in public view. Although one commander, “Abu Lulu”, was arrested after viral footage of brutality surfaced, no information has been provided regarding any judicial proceedings, nor have reports been dispelled that he was subsequently released.

111. Survivors identified Rapid Support Forces commanders issuing orders to kill, detain and loot, with allied Arab militias operating under the same command structure. Survivors described the perpetrators as wearing similar uniforms and a turban. The scale, coordination and public endorsement of the operation by the senior leadership of the Rapid Support Forces point to a planned and organized operation executed through an established hierarchy and structure, rather than isolated acts.

³¹ See <https://media.un.org/unifeed/en/asset/d352/d3525404>.

³² See <https://t.me/RSFSudan/8089> and <https://t.me/RSFSudan/8083>.

³³ See <https://t.me/RSFSudan/8089>.

³⁴ See https://web.facebook.com/groups/262062521587117/posts/1566868297773193/?_rdc=1&_rdt#.

VI. Legal analysis and findings

112. The mission finds that serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, amounting to international crimes, were committed by the Rapid Support Forces in and around El Fasher during the siege and following the takeover of the city. While individual acts constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity, their consolidation, scale, systematic nature and cumulative effects may indicate a path to genocide, when the necessary intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group (*dolus specialis*) is found.

113. In the case of *The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir*, the International Criminal Court held that the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa constituted such distinct characteristics and hence were protected ethnic groups within the meaning of article 6 of the Rome Statute concerning the crime of genocide. The Court found these groups to be stable and identifiable, and perceived as such by both perpetrators and victims (“self-identification”), which it considered the decisive criterion for determining the existence of a protected group for the purposes of genocide.³⁵

114. The mission finds that the widespread and systematic pattern of conduct of the Rapid Support Forces, in particular large-scale killings committed through different means and methods, mass-scale rape, gang rape and other forms of torture and cruel treatment, and deliberate starvation conditions including destruction of means of survival and denial of medical and humanitarian aid, imposed through the extended siege, was committed pursuant to a plan or policy and with knowledge and intent. This is established through numerous consistent survivor testimonies, utterances and statements made by Rapid Support Forces commanders and fighters while committing atrocities, verified videos and satellite imagery, and warnings issued by the Security Council and others that were ignored. It thus demonstrates that at least three of the material crimes of genocide are overwhelmingly present, namely:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.

115. The existence of *dolus specialis* or specific intent to destroy the protected group in whole or in part is a key element of the crime of genocide. Such intent can not only be ascertained through direct statements by perpetrators; it may also be inferred from the body of evidence as a whole. In this regard, based on relevant jurisprudence, consideration is to be had for, among other things, the general context; the scale of atrocities; the systematic targeting of victims, regardless of their status as civilians or persons hors de combat, on account of their membership of the protected group; repetition of destructive or discriminatory acts; the existence of a plan or policy; and displays of intent made during public speeches or in meetings.³⁶

116. In the mission’s assessment, based on a careful consideration of all other possible explanations regarding intent, the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the pattern of conduct of the Rapid Support Forces in and around El Fasher, including the scale and sequence of events, the patterns of targeting, the language used by commanders and direct perpetrators stating their intention to kill, eliminate and destroy all Zaghawa and the Fur, and the cumulative impact of their acts on the victims individually and the protected group collectively, is that they acted with genocidal intent. That intent is inferred from the full body of evidence collected by the mission, which the Rapid Support Forces sometimes sought to destroy to avoid accountability.

³⁵ *The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir*, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ICC-02/05-01/09, 4 March 2009, paras. 135–137; and Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 12 July 2010, para. 9.

³⁶ See, for example, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, *Prosecutor v. Karadžić*, Judgment (TC), IT-95-5/18-T, 24 March 2016, para. 550.

117. Other international crimes are also established by the mission, including crimes against humanity, notably extermination and persecution on ethnic, gender and political grounds, as well as war crimes including murder, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, outrages upon personal dignity, starvation, and directing attacks against civilians, the wounded and sick, and persons hors de combat, as well as against protected objects. These crimes have reached this level of atrocities because of impunity.

VII. Conclusions and recommendations

118. Since the International Criminal Court issued its 2009 arrest warrant against the then President, Omar al-Bashir, for genocide in Darfur, that question has remained before it. Our findings indicate that events in and around El Fasher in 2025 point to renewed acts of genocide by the Rapid Support Forces.

119. The mission concludes that the violence committed by the Rapid Support Forces in and around El Fasher forms part of a coherent, widespread and escalating course of conduct directed, in particular, against the Zaghawa and the Fur, in the context of a prolonged siege followed by a takeover marked by brutal atrocities.

120. The evidence establishes a widespread and systematic pattern by the Rapid Support Forces of killings, ethnically targeted rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary detention, torture and cruel treatment, enforced disappearances, extortion and forced displacement, combined with the deliberate imposition of conditions of life incompatible with survival, including starvation and the destruction of medical care. These acts were committed with knowledge, organization and repetition, and were accompanied by dehumanizing and exterminatory language.

121. Taken together, the scale, severity and cumulative impact of the acts by the Rapid Support Forces, assessed in the light of patterns of targeting, conduct, and inferred intent, present indications pointing to genocide in and around El Fasher.

122. The mission further concludes that crimes against humanity, notably extermination and persecution on ethnic, gender and political grounds, as well as war crimes, including murder, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, outrages upon personal dignity, starvation, and attacks against civilians, the wounded and the sick, and persons hors de combat, as well as against protected objects, were committed. They underscore the gravity and multilayered criminality of the conduct documented.

123. The atrocities committed in and around El Fasher are aggravations of earlier patterns of violence in Darfur, including those previously documented by the mission in Zamzam Camp and elsewhere, demonstrating continuity and escalation. In the absence of effective prevention and accountability, the mission considers that the risk of further genocidal violence remains acute.

124. Earlier warnings about the risk of atrocities in El Fasher did not yield concrete results in protecting civilians. As the conflict now moves further, in particular to Kordofan, marked by the same modus operandi, the international community must act decisively to prevent further atrocities, hold the perpetrators of international crimes to account, and bring an end to this senseless violence.

125. Considering its findings, and given that the conduct documented in and around El Fasher presents indications pointing to genocide, as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity, the mission once again calls upon the international community to act without delay:

(a) To protect civilians and prevent further atrocities, including by fully enforcing and expanding the arms embargo, preventing the transfer of weapons, equipment and financial and logistical support to parties credibly implicated in serious violations, and using all available diplomatic, political and preventive tools to halt further mass violence;

(b) To secure unrestricted humanitarian access into El Fasher and the guarantee of free movement of the remaining civilian population there;

(c) To ensure accountability and deter further crimes, including through targeted sanctions against those who aid or abet the commission of international crimes, by fully cooperating with the International Criminal Court and expanding its jurisdiction, and considering the establishment of a judicial mechanism working in tandem with the Court to advance accountability for perpetrators at all levels and ensure justice for victims;

(d) To support survivors, including through interim reparatory measures and sustained access to medical, psychosocial and legal assistance;

(e) To encourage the documentation of violations and the preservation of evidence for accountability processes, including ensuring access for investigative bodies, including the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, into El Fasher to document and preserve evidence and ascertain the fate of missing and detained persons;

(f) To ensure protection for lawyers, human rights defenders, humanitarian workers, medical workers, journalists and civil society actors, who remain at grave risk;

(g) To end the suffering of the Sudanese people and align with their aspirations for justice, stability and prosperity in the design of any peace process and to embed justice in peace processes through a comprehensive approach to transitional justice.
