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Human rights situations that require the Council's attention**Situation of human rights in Myanmar****Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews****Summary*

Five years after launching a military coup against a democratically elected government, the Myanmar military junta continues to relentlessly attack civilians and obstruct humanitarian aid, driving Myanmar into a spiraling humanitarian crisis. Thousands of political prisoners remain behind bars. The situation of the Rohingya people has become more perilous than ever.

The military junta's efforts to assert its authority across Myanmar and wrestle its people into submission are failing. It has lost control of vast swathes of territory and is more reviled than ever. Violence and chaos have reverberated across Myanmar's borders, with armed conflict, cyberscam operations, drug trafficking and refugee flows impacting its neighbors' sovereignty and citizens.

In a sign that international pressure is impacting the junta, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing orchestrated a sham election in an apparent attempt to hide military oppression behind the trappings of a nominally civilian government. The spectacle fooled no one, least of all the people of Myanmar, who continue to demand respect for human rights and the establishment of a federal, democratic system of government free from military control.

The international community's response to the situation in Myanmar has shown promise, impeding the junta's ability to secure the weapons and financing that it needs to sustain itself and its military assaults on civilians. Alarming, however, the resolve of many governments to support the people of Myanmar appears to be waning. Sanctions regimes - which have played an important role in isolating the junta and weakening its capacity to attack civilians - have not been kept up to date. Global cuts to foreign aid are devastating humanitarian programs for refugees and vulnerable populations. The Security Council continues to be unwilling to act, and there is a lack of political will to ensure accountability for grave human rights violations.

In this, his final report to the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur urges governments that value human rights to double down on effective measures that have been taken to support the people of Myanmar and deny the junta the three things that it needs to sustain itself: money, weapons and legitimacy. Just as most governments refused to recognize a sham election as legitimate, he urges that they similarly refuse to recognize the government that will emerge as legitimate. Finally, he reiterates his call for concerted, coordinated action by the international community including reversing funding cuts that undermine humanitarian aid and human rights.

* The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline so as to include the most recent information.

I. Introduction

1. Sources of both hope and despair can be found in Myanmar five years after an illegal military coup ousted a democratically elected government: despair over the devastation wrought by the military junta's unrelenting violence, brutality and oppression; hope in the courage and tenacity of a people who are steadfastly pursuing a future where human rights, justice and democracy prevail.
2. The military junta's efforts to assert its authority across Myanmar and wrestle its people into submission have failed. It has lost control of vast swathes of territory and is more reviled than ever. Its relentless attacks on civilians have taken thousands of lives, displaced millions, and precipitated a spiralling humanitarian crisis. The situation of the Rohingya people, already scarred by genocidal violence at the time of the coup, has become more perilous than ever. Violence and chaos have reverberated across Myanmar's borders, with armed conflict, cyberscam operations, drug trafficking and refugee flows impacting its neighbors' sovereignty and citizens.
3. In a sign that international pressure is impacting the junta, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing orchestrated a sham election in an apparent attempt to hide military oppression behind the trappings of a nominally civilian government. The spectacle fooled no one, least of all the people of Myanmar, who continue to demand respect for human rights and the establishment of a federal, democratic system of government free from military control.
4. The international community can play a critical role in a critical moment by refusing to recognize the illegitimate government arising from the junta's election scheme. Some in the international community have expressed a hope that—despite the obvious shortcomings of the election—the installation of a new government could be a catalyst for political dialog and resolution of the crisis in Myanmar. Precisely the opposite is the case. An illegitimate election can only lead to an illegitimate government. A return to business as usual with a military junta in civilian clothes would relinquish hard-won leverage that could force the military to finally come to terms with the fact that its reign of violence and oppression is unsustainable.
5. Myanmar is at a crossroads, with a brutal military junta desperately seeking legitimacy. But, the international community is also at a crossroads. Will it bring to scale measures that have proven to be effective and work to change the current trajectory of escalating violence against civilians? Or will it retreat and abandon the people of Myanmar to their fate?
6. The international community's response to the situation in Myanmar has shown promise, impeding the junta's ability to secure the weapons and financing that it needs to sustain itself and its military assaults on civilians. Alarming, however, the resolve of many governments to support the people of Myanmar appears to be waning. Sanctions regimes—which have played an important role in isolating the junta and weakening its capacity to attack civilians—have not been kept up to date. Global cuts to foreign aid are devastating humanitarian programs for refugees and vulnerable populations. The Security Council continues to be unwilling to act, and there is a lack of political will to ensure accountability for grave human rights violations.
7. It is critical that governments that are committed to human rights and democracy step up, halt the current slide, and rebuild momentum in support of the people of Myanmar. This, of course, is easier said than done. The current geopolitical climate is less than conducive to the international attention and action that is required. The United Nations and the principles on which it was founded more than 80 years ago are under severe strain. Isolationism, transactional relationships and might-equals-right approaches to global affairs are undermining respect for international law and human rights.
8. In this, his final report to the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur urges governments that value human rights to double down on effective measures that have been taken to support the people of Myanmar and weaken the junta. He reiterates his call for concerted, coordinated action by the international community to deny the junta the three

things that it needs to sustain itself: money, weapons and legitimacy. And, he implores governments to reverse devastating funding cuts for humanitarian aid and human rights.

ASEAN's Role

9. No external stakeholders have more at stake in Myanmar's crisis than ASEAN and its member states. That is why ASEAN leaders came together in Jakarta in April 2021 to forge a consensus to end the crisis. All participants, including Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, agreed to a Five-Point Consensus. Optimism surrounding the agreement was short-lived, however, as the Senior General immediately violated its terms, starting with point one—the immediate cessation of violence and exercise of “utmost restraint” by all parties to the conflict. Min Aung Hlaing's campaign of violence and oppression against the people of Myanmar continued unabated, with attacks on civilians growing more widespread and more brazen in the years since.

10. ASEAN has remained steadfast in its commitment to the Five-Point Consensus, reaffirming it most recently at its January Foreign Ministers Meeting. As ASEAN approaches the five-year anniversary of the summit that created the Five-Point Consensus, it is imperative that ASEAN reassess the agreement.

11. ASEAN took a positive step by not formally observing the junta's sham election or officially endorsing the results. This unquestionably frustrated Min Aung Hlaing, who hoped to use his election ploy to generate regional and international recognition of a nominally “civilian,” but military-controlled, government and thereby reduce international pressure and isolation.

12. What is now required are accountability provisions for the Five-Point Consensus. Without consequences, the junta's intransigence and violence against the people of Myanmar will only be expected to worsen. ASEAN engagement with the new military-controlled government should be made contingent on implementation of the first two points of the Five-Point Consensus: an “immediate cessation of violence” and “constructive dialogue among all parties.” Measures that pressure and isolate the junta should be expanded upon until attacks on civilians end and all political prisoners are released. ASEAN must not welcome political representatives from Myanmar back to the ASEAN Summit and Foreign Minister Meetings while military jets bomb villages or while State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and thousands of other political prisoners remain behind bars.

13. But this should only be a starting point. Engagement with Myanmar stakeholders should focus on constitutional reform, the establishment of a representative, federal, democratic government free from military control—the central demand of the people of Myanmar—and ensuring accountability for grave human right violations. Myanmar's experience in the previous decade exposes the folly of pursuing any “transition” that is subject to a military veto and does not address the need for accountability.

14. Five years have already been lost to violence, oppression and hardship. ASEAN and the international community must face a hard truth: the current approach has failed to end the crisis in Myanmar or secure Myanmar's implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. It is past time to take measures that hold the military accountable for its actions.

II. Sham elections: A desperate and dangerous charade

15. Beginning at the end of last year, the junta staged a highly choreographed, multi-phase general election that was little more than electoral theater intended to hide military oppression behind the trappings of a civilian government. As expected, the exercise played out amid intense repression, triggered further violence, and did nothing to resolve the crisis in Myanmar. The polls were neither free, nor fair, nor the least bit credible.

16. Knowing that a free and fair election would result in another landslide victory for the pro-democracy movement, the junta ensured that its proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), would not face any serious competition. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint remained in incommunicado detention and could

neither contest the election nor engage political leaders or the electorate during the election period. Nearly all credible political leaders remained in detention or exile throughout the election period.

17. Taking no chances, the junta dissolved more than 40 political parties, including the National League for Democracy, which won over 80 percent of the parliamentary seats contested in the 2020 election.

18. The election was carried out amid a climate of repression, with the systematic denial of fundamental freedoms. Having crushed political rights and civic space following the coup, the junta further tightened restrictions on political expression in the lead up to the polls.

19. In July 2025, the junta unilaterally adopted the *Law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic General Elections from Obstruction, Disruption, and Destruction*, which imposed penalties of up to 10 years' imprisonment for disrupting elections through public speeches, protests, written materials or threats. It subsequently began a campaign to suppress all opposition to the polls and the military's political proxies. According to state media reports prior to the final round of voting, charges were initiated against 404 people for violating the new law. The junta used the law to target those who criticized the election, junta-backed candidates or the military. Individuals were charged for actions such as posting or liking others' posts on social media, hanging posters, destroying USDP placards, participating in street protests, or encouraging an election boycott.

20. The election was held in three phases between 28 December and 25 January. Lacking control of much of the country, the junta only held polls in 263 out of 330 townships. In many of those townships, polling stations were limited to urban areas or locations controlled by the military. Even in townships involved in the vote, polling did not occur in thousands of wards and village tracts. The limited scope of the election disenfranchised millions of people, many of whom belong to ethnic minority groups.

21. Faced with a blatantly illegitimate process and without the opportunity to cast votes for the political leaders of their choice, many Myanmar citizens refused to vote. Despite the immense pressure placed on citizens, voter turnout was low. According to a junta spokesperson, 54 percent of eligible voters cast a ballot, compared to 71 percent in the 2020 elections. Anecdotal reports indicate that the true turnout may have been far lower than the figures advanced by the junta.

22. Those who voted often did so out of fear. Faced with an unenthusiastic electorate, the junta turned to coercion, using all possible points of leverage to drive people to the polls. Local administrators reportedly went door-to-door and approached people in public spaces to pressure them to vote. Residents were warned that records would be kept of those who voted, with implicit or explicit consequences for those who did not. Officials warned they would refuse administrative services, such as the issuance of passports, to individuals who did not vote. Administrators reportedly threatened to withhold humanitarian aid from internally displaced persons who did not vote. Civil servants were reportedly pressured to show proof they went to the polls. Young people were threatened with conscription if they did not vote. Armed, uniformed soldiers were often seen at polling stations, with voters describing a climate of intimidation. In some places, people were not allowed to observe vote counting.

23. As expected, the three rounds of voting were marred by violence. The junta carried on with its campaign of terror against the civilian population throughout the election period. Military airstrikes continued unabated, with the junta often targeting urban areas controlled by opposition groups but in which it hoped to hold polls. Resistance groups carried out dozens of attacks on polling stations, some of which reportedly killed or injured civilians, and assassinated election officials.

24. By and large foreign governments refrained from endorsing the elections or taking other actions to legitimize an illegitimate process. Credible regional and international election-monitoring organizations refused to send observers. Instead, several made

statements underscoring the polls' lack of legitimacy and credibility.¹ Crucially, ASEAN declined to send observers to monitor the polls and explicitly refrained from certifying the results of the election.

25. The junta, however, sought to maximize the propaganda opportunity presented by the election observation delegations sent by some foreign countries. State media published glowing assessments of the election by some foreign observers, which were starkly at odds with the facts on the ground.

26. The final, preordained result of the election—a landslide victory for the USDP—surprised no one. The USDP won 339 of the 420 national seats contested in the election. Together with 166 unelected seats allocated to the military by the constitution, the military and its proxy will hold 86 percent of seats in the national parliament. The USDP is likewise set to dominate state and regional parliaments.

27. The junta has announced that the new parliament will be convened in the third week of March. Parliament will subsequently select a President, who will form a government. The election results ensure the military's domination of all steps in this process and preclude the possibility of parliament emerging as a forum for meaningful political dialog or democratic, rights-based reform.

28. It is imperative that the international community recognize the government that emerges from this process for what it is: military rule in civilian garb. The junta's civilian makeover should not be mistaken as progress or be used to justify abandoning key levers of pressure against the military. An illegitimate election can only lead to an illegitimate government.

III. A devastating human rights and humanitarian crisis

A. Relentless repression, fundamental freedoms crushed

29. Since the 2021 military coup, the junta has systematically crushed fundamental freedoms and carried out a relentless campaign of repression against the people of Myanmar.

30. In the days and weeks after the coup, peaceful protesters turned out en masse to demand that the military return to its barracks and allow the formation of the government they elected in the November 2020 elections. Hundreds of thousands of civil servants walked out on their jobs, launching a mass Civil Disobedience Movement that impeded the military's takeover of state institutions. The military responded with unyielding violence and brutality, opening fire on protesters, hunting down resistance leaders and unleashing a campaign of murder, torture and mass detention that continues to this day.

31. The junta declared a nationwide state of emergency, consolidating executive, legislative and judicial authority under the military. It also declared martial law in scores of townships, suspending rights and allowing civilians to be tried in military tribunals. The junta quickly amended the penal code to criminalize statements that "cause fear" or spread "false news"; removed protections against arbitrary arrest, search and seizure; and granted itself sweeping surveillance and censorship powers.

32. The junta has also tried to dismantle Myanmar civil society. Junta forces have rounded up activists, human rights defenders and other community leaders; searched the offices of civil society organizations and frozen their bank accounts; and dissolved groups perceived as threats. In October 2022, the junta imposed the draconian *Organization Registration Law*

¹ Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), "Myanmar: A Junta-Staged Election in the Midst of a War," Data Dive Issue No. 25, 19 December 2025, <https://anfrel.org/myanmar-a-junta-staged-election-in-the-midst-of-a-war-data-dive-issue-no-25/>; International IDEA Statement on the Situation in Myanmar, 12 August 2025, <https://www.idea.int/news/international-idea-statement-situation-myanmar>; Joint Statement by International Election Experts and Organizations on Myanmar, 6 February 2025, <https://www.idea.int/news/joint-statement-international-election-experts-and-organizations-myanmar-2025>.

requiring all non-profit groups to register with military-controlled bodies and provide extensive information about their members, activities and sources of funding. The law also gave officials wide discretion to reject applications, imposed vague prohibitions on the work of registered groups, and established severe criminal penalties for working with unregistered organizations. Many groups have shuttered their doors, curtailed their work, taken their activities underground, or set up operations outside Myanmar's borders.

33. The junta's crackdown on fundamental freedoms extended to virtual spaces. As the coup unfolded, the military imposed a nationwide internet and telecommunications shutdown. The nationwide blackout was eventually lifted in favor of local shutdowns in areas affected by armed conflict or where opposition groups were strong. The junta has often cut services in areas prior to launching attacks, impairing the ability of civilians to protect themselves. In areas where people are able to get online, their access to websites and apps is restricted, with Facebook and other platforms blocked. A new *Cybersecurity Law* was imposed in January 2025, formalizing many of the junta's restrictions on digital rights, including by banning virtual private networks (VPNs) used to circumvent censorship and surveillance.

B. Political prisoners

34. According to data from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), the junta has arrested more than 30,000 people on political grounds since the coup. 130 political prisoners are on death row, with an additional 44 charged with death in absentia. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint and many other political leaders remain in detention.

35. Other political prisoners include activists, human rights defenders, religious leaders, trade unionists, journalists, lawyers, celebrities, artists, filmmakers, students and student leaders, and doctors, nurses and teachers who participated in the Civil Disobedience movement. Citizens have been jailed for donating money to opposition groups or making critical social media posts.

36. Even the smallest acts of defiance—banging pots and pans; participating in a “silent strike” by staying at home; buying, selling or carrying flowers on Aung San Suu Kyi's birthday; posting a blank black panel on social media to mourn a deadly attack—have led to arrest and imprisonment. When the junta has not been able to secure the arrest of an individual, it has often arrested family members, holding them hostage in an effort to compel the wanted individual to surrender herself. Dozens of children have reportedly been held as hostages.

37. The conditions of detention for political prisoners are dire. Cells are reportedly so crowded that prisoners are forced to sleep with body parts overlapping. Poor sanitation, hygiene and bathing facilities have led to rampant skin disease and other health concerns. Food is usually dirty and lacking in nutritional value, often consisting of little more than boiled rice. Political prisoners are systematically denied access to medical care, at times leading to death.

38. Political prisoners are routinely tortured by junta forces, especially during periods of interrogation. The Special Rapporteur has received reports of severe beatings with fists, guns and rods, stabbing or cutting, burning of the skin, electrocution, pulling out of fingernails and teeth, the use of stress positions, hanging by ropes, the denial of food or water, sleep deprivation, mock executions, waterboarding, shackling, and the prolonged use of blindfolds or hoods, often in conjunction with other torture techniques. Sexual harassment and gender-based violence is exceedingly common for female and LGBT persons in the custody of junta forces, although men also experience sexual violence. The experience of arrest and detention leaves many former political prisoners with lasting psychological trauma.

39. So long as thousands of political prisoners remain behind bars, no meaningful progress can be made toward genuine political dialogue, democracy or respect for human rights.

C. Attacks on civilians

40. In the five years since the 2021 military coup, the junta has carried out a relentless and brutal campaign of violence against the people of Myanmar. Unable to defeat its enemies on the battlefield, the junta has routinely targeted civilian populations in areas controlled by resistance forces. The junta's attacks on civilians have been widespread and systematic and likely constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes.

41. AAPP has verified the killing of more than 7,800 civilians by the junta since the coup. The true death toll is certainly much higher, given the difficulty of collecting and verifying information in Myanmar. Civilians have been shot during ground assaults, tortured to death, executed en masse, and burned alive in their homes. Victims have included women, children, elders and persons with disabilities. Soldiers have sexually assaulted and gang raped victims before killing them. They have beheaded, dismembered, disembowelled and burned the bodies of victims, at times displaying body parts after a killing in an apparent effort to terrorize the local population.

42. In the context of Myanmar's long history of military atrocities, three features distinguish the past five years.

43. First, the Myanmar military has relied on airstrikes to target opposition groups—and civilians in the areas they control—to an unprecedented extent. Unable to control territory with ground troops, the junta has relied on relentless attacks from the sky.

44. Junta airstrikes have killed or injured civilians in towns, villages, displacement sites, markets, tea shops, mining sites, medical clinics, schools, religious buildings and locations hosting weddings, funerals, festivals or other celebrations. Airstrikes usually come without warning and often at night, making it less likely that civilians are able to flee or take shelter. The junta has often evinced an intention to destroy population centers it cannot hold, pummeling towns and cities after they come under the control of opposition groups.

45. According to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), junta airstrikes on civilian targets have increased each year since the coup. There were nine such attacks in 2021, 139 in 2022, 290 in 2023, 810 in 2024 and 1,140 in 2025.² More than 4,000 people have died in these attacks, according to ACLED's records.

46. This data exposes the junta's lies about its own actions and the situation in the country. ACLED recorded more airstrikes on civilian targets in April 2025 than in any other month since the coup, despite the junta announcing a "ceasefire" to facilitate recovery from the devastating earthquake the prior month. While the junta projected its fraudulent "election" exercise as a marker of increased stability, it launched 95 airstrikes on civilian targets in December 2025 and 104 in January 2026. The UN reported that at least 170 civilians were killed by airstrikes during the election period.

47. A second defining feature of the junta's campaign of violence has been the widespread use of arson attacks against civilians. According to credible reports, the junta has burned 100,000 or more civilian homes since the coup. While the military has torched villages in opposition areas for decades, the widespread use of arson attacks in ethnic-Bamar areas is unprecedented. More homes have been burned in Sagaing and Magway regions, in central Myanmar, than anywhere else.

48. A third feature of the past five years of violence has been the heavy toll exacted on civilians by landmines and unexploded ordnance. According to the *Landmine Monitor*, Myanmar recorded the most landmine casualties in the world in 2024, the second consecutive year it topped the list.³ UN data indicates that in each of the past two years for which there is complete data—2023 and 2024—there were roughly four times as many landmine casualties as in 2020. Junta forces have planted landmines in locations that evince an intent to cause civilian casualties and terrorize the local population. The Special Rapporteur has received

² Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, Data Export Tool (accessed 2 February 2026).

³ International Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Landmine Monitor 2025," December 2025, <https://www.the-monitor.org/api/assets/reports/Landmine-Monitors/LMM2025/Downloads/Landmine-Monitor-2025-Final-Online-updated.pdf>.

reports of landmines planted in homes, gardens, rice fields and plantations, around churches and schools, on roads used by civilians, and in bunkers used to protect civilians from junta airstrikes.

49. The junta stands apart in its systematic targeting of civilians and the brutality of its human rights violations. However, credible reports also link resistance forces to serious human rights abuses, including killings, sexual violence, and forced recruitment. Human rights defenders told the Special Rapporteur they face intense pressure not to report abuses by opposition groups and risk retaliation if they do.

D. Gender-based violence

50. The threat of sexual and gender-based violence is a dark shadow that follows women, girls and LGBT people throughout Myanmar. Men have also been the victims of sexual violence. The Special Rapporteur has received credible reports of rape and other forms of sexual violence in conflict zones, at checkpoints, and in places of detention. Cruelty and dehumanization are hallmarks of sexual crimes perpetrated by junta forces, with reports of gang rapes, rape with objects, the rape of children and pregnant women, and rape followed by execution. Victims have been mutilated, beheaded and burned alive after being raped.

51. Junta forces often violate the human rights of women and LGBT political prisoners in ways that target their gender, gender identity or sexual orientation. Female political prisoners regularly experience sexual harassment and sexually explicit questioning during interrogation, and have been raped, mutilated, groped and deliberately beaten on their breasts and hips. LGBT people, and especially those who are transgender, have experienced extremely cruel and dehumanizing treatment.

52. However, it is not only junta soldiers who are responsible for gender-based violence. Violence within homes and communities is one of the greatest concerns of women, girls and LGBT people in Myanmar. Domestic violence has risen dramatically since the coup, driven by displacement, difficult living situations, economic stresses and the abuse of drugs and alcohol.

53. Resistance forces have also been responsible for acts of gender-based violence. These crimes often go unreported. Women human rights defenders have told the Special Rapporteur that survivors face enormous pressure to not report gender-based violence by opposition groups because doing so would be to “undermine the revolution.”

54. Too often, survivors and Myanmar’s courageous women human rights defenders have been left to carry on the struggle against gender-based violence without the support they need and deserve from the international community. In recent years, women’s rights groups have seen dramatic funding cuts, threatening their ability to provide essential services to survivors of gender-based violence.

E. Conscription and forced recruitment

55. In February 2024, the junta began a formal conscription program targeting young men. The conscription program has been chaotic, corrupt and violent. Junta forces have routinely abducted young men from their homes, on the street or at checkpoints, sending them directly for medical tests and military training. Bribery and favoritism have allowed men and boys from wealthy or influential families to avoid conscription. To avoid conscription, many young people have gone into hiding or fled the country. In Rakhine State, the junta has conscripted thousands of Rohingya men and boys and deployed them on the frontlines of the fight against the Arakan Army. Young men and boys have reportedly been immediately sent to military training after being forcibly repatriated by neighboring countries.

56. The Special Rapporteur has also received credible reports of forced recruitment by People’s Defense Forces and ethnic resistance organizations.

F. Humanitarian needs and the obstruction of humanitarian aid

57. The junta has unleashed a spiralling humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, using hunger and deprivation as weapons of war, systematically blocking the delivery of food, medicine and supplies to conflict areas, destroying food aid and confiscating humanitarian supplies for its own use.

58. Nearly a third of Myanmar's population is now in need of humanitarian assistance.⁴ Malnutrition is rising, with more than 12 million people facing acute hunger. The World Health Organization and World Food Programme named Myanmar one of their "Hunger Hotspots" of "very high concern" for 2026.

59. Humanitarian organizations have told the Special Rapporteur that their efforts have been severely constrained because of armed conflict, military checkpoints, onerous bureaucratic processes imposed by the junta, the withholding of registration, visas and travel authorizations, intimidation, extortion and harassment. The UN reported more than 1,000 "access-related incidents" in 2025. It assessed that more than a third of Myanmar's townships had "extremely high access difficulties." According to credible reports, at least 285 aid workers have been arrested or detained since the coup, and at least 48 have been killed.⁵

60. According to UN estimates, approximately 3.6 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar at the end of 2025, a figure that is projected to rise to 4 million by the end of this year. Civil society organizations often report higher levels of displacement at the local level, suggesting that the true number of those displaced could be significantly greater. In addition, there are approximately 1.5 million refugees from Myanmar in Bangladesh, Malaysia, India, Thailand and Indonesia, according to UNHCR, plus millions of others who reside abroad under other legal frameworks—such as those available to migrant workers—or who have had no contact with the UN refugee system.

61. Internally displaced persons usually live in makeshift shelters in jungles, fields or other villages. They struggle to access adequate food, medical supplies or sanitation facilities. Many have reportedly died from exposure, and most have been displaced multiple times.

62. Displacement, natural disasters and the breakdown of the public health system have contributed to the spread of infectious diseases. Displaced, rural and urban communities have all been affected by outbreaks of cholera and acute watery diarrhea. Malaria cases have quadrupled in the past few years because of a shortage of bed nets, testing and treatment. 1.5 million children under the age of five have missed basic immunizations since 2018.

63. The junta has responded to the health crisis engulfing the country by impeding the flow of medicines and medical supplies, arresting doctors and nurses and attacking health care facilities. Hospitals and medical clinics are frequent targets of junta airstrikes. Insecurity Insight has recorded more than 1,800 attacks on healthcare in Myanmar since the coup, including the destruction or occupation of clinics and hospitals and the killing or arrest of health workers.⁶

64. Civil society organizations provide a lifeline to displaced populations or those in dire need of aid and medical care. Tragically, the international support that is available to these

⁴ The UN estimates that 16.2 million people require humanitarian assistance in 2026. In 2025, the UN estimated that 19.9 million people required humanitarian assistance. The decrease in the number of people in need of humanitarian aid does not, however, reflect an improvement of the situation in Myanmar, but rather a change in the UN's methodology to focus only on areas affected by armed conflict or the March 2025 earthquake (227 out of 330 townships) rather than the entire country (as in 2025). UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026," 10 December 2025, <https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1505/document/myanmar-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2026>.

⁵ Insecurity Insight, "2020-2025-MMR Aid Worker KICA Incident Data," <https://data.humdata.org/dataset/myanmar-attacks-on-aid-operations-education-health-and-protection> (accessed 3 February 2026).

⁶ Insecurity Insight, "Attacks on Health Care in Myanmar," 7-20 January 2026, <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/attacks-health-care-myanmar-07-20-january-2026>.

groups pales in comparison to the needs of the communities they serve. Civil society leaders have told the Special Rapporteur that they have the capacity to expand their reach but are constrained by the lack of financial resources, a challenge made worse by donor governments' recent cuts to foreign aid budgets.

IV. The situation of the Rohingya

65. At the time of the coup, the Rohingya people—stateless and persecuted—were already living in the shadow of genocidal violence. Approximately one million Rohingya refugees were residing in camps in Bangladesh, dispossessed of their lands and unable to return to their homes. Of the 600,000 Rohingya remaining in Rakhine State, 140,000 were confined to squalid displacement camps.⁷ Over the past five years, the situation of the Rohingya has—tragically—become even more harrowing and desperate.

66. In Rakhine State, where the Arakan Army is battling junta forces and Rohingya armed groups, Rohingya civilians are caught in a vortex of violence and oppression. All parties to the conflict stand accused of grave human rights abuses against the Rohingya—as well as Rakhine and other civilian populations.

67. The junta has operated in Rakhine State as it has in other theaters of conflict, terrorizing local populations and targeting civilians in areas controlled by opposition groups. Both Rakhine and Rohingya people have been killed in massacres and deadly airstrikes on villages, towns, marketplaces, hospitals, detention centers and other civilian locations in areas controlled by the Arakan Army. Junta forces have used civilians as human shields, set up bases in displacement camps, and destroyed or confiscated humanitarian aid. The junta has forcibly recruited thousands of Rohingya men and boys, deploying them to the frontlines of the conflict with the Arakan Army and ordering them to attack and destroy the property of Rakhine people.

68. Rohingya armed groups, while committing horrific abuses against the Rakhine population, have also exploited, oppressed and terrorized Rohingya people. They have forcibly recruited Rohingya men and boys in the refugee camps in Bangladesh, at times “selling” recruits to junta forces in Rakhine State. They have also killed scores of Rohingya refugees in the refugee camps, including community and religious leaders, teachers and human rights defenders.

69. Notwithstanding the crimes of the junta and Rohingya armed groups, many Rohingya now view the Arakan Army as the primary source of violence and oppression against their community. The Arakan Army has been accused of grave human rights abuses against the Rohingya, including arbitrary detention, torture, killings, arson attacks, forced recruitment and forced labor. Rohingya who fled Rakhine State told the Special Rapporteur about killings, torture, the abduction and disappearance of family members, and being shot at while fleeing their homes—abuses which they attribute to the Arakan Army. In some parts of northern Rakhine State, Rohingya reportedly suffer severe movement and livelihood restrictions imposed by the Arakan Army. Senior leadership of the Arakan Army has consistently and vehemently denied allegations of grave human rights abuses.

70. In late-2024, the UN warned of “imminent famine” in Rakhine State, putting over two million people at risk of starvation.⁸ Then, in early 2025, insufficient funding forced the World Food Programme to cut food assistance to over one million people in Myanmar, including over 100,000 people in central Rakhine State whose only source of food was WFP aid. Anecdotal accounts suggest that malnutrition, starvation and suicides driven by desperation are rising.

71. The violence and deprivation in Rakhine State have prompted a new wave of Rohingya refugees to flee to Bangladesh. At least 150,000 Rohingya have arrived in refugee camps in Bangladesh since the beginning of 2024.

⁷ <https://www.msf.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis-depth>.

⁸ UNDP, “Rakhine: A Famine in the Making,” 7 November 2024, <https://www.undp.org/asia-pacific/publications/rakhine-a-famine-in-the-making>.

72. The situation for refugees in Bangladesh is dire, with conditions deteriorating significantly in the past year. Insufficient funding has led to the suspension of education, health and other services for the Rohingya. Rohingya refugees have twice experienced cuts to their food rations, leading to spikes in malnutrition.

73. Given the grave threats in Rakhine State and the desperate conditions in the refugee camps in Bangladesh, many Rohingya are risking their lives to seek shelter and safety elsewhere. According to UN data, 5,600 Rohingya attempted to flee Myanmar or Bangladesh by boat in 2025, with at least 892 reported dead or missing at sea.⁹

74. While the plight of the Rohingya has generated a steady stream of resolutions and statements of concern, the international community's response to date has failed to approach the scale of the crisis. A series of high-level conferences on the situation of the Rohingya in 2025 failed to deliver tangible action. The Security Council and UN member states have not taken available opportunities to hold the Myanmar military and others accountable for their crimes against the Rohingya. Governments have by and large refused to consider the resettlement of significant numbers of Rohingya refugees or other durable solutions. Many states, including those that are vocal supporters of the Rohingya at international fora, have contributed little or nothing to humanitarian programs for refugees in Bangladesh. Donors that have disproportionately funded such programs are reducing their support even as the needs in the camps are greater than ever.

75. Ultimately the solution to the Rohingya crisis lies in Myanmar, with a return of the Rohingya to their homes and lands with guarantees of security, human rights and citizenship. Such a return will not be possible while conflict rages in Rakhine State and the Myanmar military dictates policy from Naypyidaw. The emergence of the Arakan Army as the dominant force on the ground in Rakhine State undoubtedly complicates this picture but also offers opportunities to the extent that it can be engaged in building a federal democratic Myanmar where the rights of all—including the Rohingya—are upheld.

V. Violence and chaos spills across Myanmar's borders

76. The violence, lawlessness and economic collapse that characterize post-coup Myanmar have reverberated beyond its borders, exporting instability and turning a national catastrophe into a regional crisis with international reach.

77. With many major battles unfolding in border areas, Myanmar's neighbors have been directly affected by armed conflict, often in ways that violate their territorial sovereignty. Bullets or munitions fired by the Myanmar military have landed in the territory of Bangladesh, China, India and Thailand, at times killing or injuring civilians. Junta forces have reportedly crossed into the territory of all four countries to escape or evade opposition forces. Thailand has on multiple occasions scrambled jets after Myanmar military aircraft crossed into its airspace. The Myanmar military has fired on boats from Thailand and Bangladesh, affecting shipping, transportation and fishing.

78. The announcement by junta-controlled state media that human rights defender Thuzar Maung and her family—who were abducted from their home in Malaysia in 2023—are being held in a prison in Myanmar—also raises profound questions about the junta's willful violation of its neighbors' sovereignty.¹⁰

79. Armed conflict, human rights violations and economic collapse have led to untold numbers of people making their way into neighboring countries. According to UNHCR, 286,200 refugees and asylum seekers have arrived in other countries in the region since the coup. This figure vastly underestimates the scale of the exodus from Myanmar, as it does not include many who have had no contact with the UN refugee system or who reside abroad

⁹ UNHCR, Operational Data Portal, Myanmar Situation, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/myanmar> (accessed 4 February 2026).

¹⁰ Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, letter to Malaysia concerning the abduction of Thu Zar Maung, 1 December 2025, <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30527>.

under other legal frameworks—such as those available to migrant workers—but may nevertheless be refugees under international law.

80. Since the coup, international criminal networks have exploited lawlessness and corruption in Myanmar to build massive cyberscam operations in the country's border regions. Tens of thousands of workers have been trafficked into scam compounds, where they face debt bondage, torture, sexual violence and execution for resisting orders or failing to meet scam targets. Victims of these scams have lost billions of dollars, with vast profits accruing to criminal enterprises and armed groups in Myanmar, many with close links to the junta.

81. In the past three years, China and other foreign governments have pressured the junta and other armed groups in Myanmar to curb cyberscam operations. In 2023 and 2024, more than 50,000 Chinese nationals believed to be involved in cyberscam operations in northern Shan State were repatriated to China. In late 2025 and early 2026, junta forces raided, bombed and destroyed scam compounds along the border with Thailand, declaring “zero tolerance” for cyberscam operations. However, this crackdown appears to be performative, as other compounds continue to operate in areas controlled by junta allies.

82. Since the coup, illicit drug production and trafficking have increased dramatically, fundamentally reshaping the global narcotics landscape. Opium production, which declined each of the six years prior to the coup, has more than doubled since 2020.¹¹ Myanmar is now the world's largest source of opium. Myanmar has also seen a surge in methamphetamine production and trafficking since the coup, with junta-allied Border Guard Forces linked to production and cross-border trade.

83. The chaos, crimes and violence spilling across Myanmar's borders expose the military's central lie: that the 2021 coup and five years of junta rule were needed to restore stability and order. In fact, the exact opposite is true. The junta has only produced lawlessness and disorder, devastating the country and destabilizing the region.

VI. The path forward: meeting the Myanmar challenge

84. The path to a resolution of the crisis in Myanmar begins, and ends, with the people of Myanmar, who continue to demonstrate remarkable courage and tenacity in the midst of escalating military attacks and repression. To succeed, they need and deserve the partnership of a supportive international community.

85. The elements of that partnership have already been identified and deployed. They include targeted sanctions, trade restrictions, principled diplomacy, investigations, proceedings at international tribunals, generous humanitarian contributions and protections for refugees and asylum seekers. These measures have yielded results and, if brought to scale, could play a critical role in Myanmar.

86. However, while the need to escalate these actions has never been greater, the international community appears to be in retreat. Persistent inaction from some governments and institutions, uneven coordination, and insufficient political will have undermined the international response. Even more concerning, the resolve of some governments that have been staunch allies of the people of Myanmar seems to be ebbing even as the crisis deepens.

A. Denying the junta weapons, money and legitimacy

87. The Special Rapporteur has identified three fundamental needs of the military junta to sustain itself and its attacks on the people of Myanmar: weapons, money and legitimacy. He has published a series of conference room papers identifying the governments, arms dealing networks and financial institutions that facilitate the junta's access to foreign

¹¹ UNODC, “Myanmar Opium Survey 2025: Cultivation, Production, and Implications,” December 2025, https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2025/Myanmar_Opium_survey_2025_web.pdf.

revenues, weapons and military supplies while recommending actions that the international community can take to further isolate the junta and degrade its ability to attack civilians.¹²

88. Governments have, in fact, taken many impactful measures that demonstrate the potential of state action in support of the people of Myanmar. Sanctions on military-controlled institutions and arms-dealing networks have disrupted the junta's ability to acquire weapons and materials used in attacks on civilians as well as the funds needed to purchase those weapons.

89. As reported by the Special Rapporteur, the junta's procurement of weapons and related materials through the formal banking system declined by roughly a third between the year ending March 2023 to the year following, in large part because of sanctions on Myanmar state-owned banks and arms dealing networks. The junta's imports of weapons and related materials from suppliers in Singapore fell by nearly 90 percent over the same period following an investigation by Singapore authorities.

90. Despite the demonstrable impact of these actions, progress has stalled. In 2025, only the United States, Canada and Switzerland added new sanctions relating to Myanmar, with US sanctions focused on cyberscam operations and entities facilitating weapons deals with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The United Kingdom has not added new sanctions relating to Myanmar since October 2024. No government has added new sanctions against Myanma Economic Bank, the junta-controlled bank that has become the primary vehicle for military procurement and repatriating foreign revenues. In July 2025, the United States government lifted sanctions on several individuals and entities previously sanctioned for their ties to the junta.

91. For sanctions regimes to be effective, they must be rigorously monitored, updated and enforced. That has not been the case over the past two years, as the military's efforts to reroute its supply chains have outpaced the work of governments to revise listings and fill gaps. It is imperative that this trend be reversed.

92. States and intergovernmental bodies have played an important role in denying the junta the legitimacy it seeks, but, as described above, they will face a key test in responding to the installation of a new nominally civilian, but military-controlled, government. Any easing of measures imposed against Myanmar since the coup will legitimize continued military oppression and set back efforts to end the crisis and protect human rights in the country.

B. Humanitarian aid

93. The humanitarian response to the crisis in Myanmar has been consistently and severely underfunded. Since 2022 the UN's main humanitarian program for Myanmar has never been more than 45 percent funded. Things went from bad to decidedly worse in 2025 when the United States announced draconian cuts to its aid programs. The impact of these cuts was particularly severe because of the United States's prior leadership on humanitarian aid for the people of Myanmar. Even after its contributions dropped from \$116 million in 2024 to \$32 million in 2025, the United States remained the second largest donor—behind only Australia—to the main humanitarian fund for Myanmar.

94. While the Special Rapporteur appealed for other nations to increase support for critical humanitarian projects, just the opposite occurred, as many governments also cut humanitarian contributions.

¹² "Enabling Atrocities: UN Member States' Arms Transfers to the Myanmar Military," UN Doc. A/HRC/49/CRP.1, 22 February 2022; "Illegal and Illegitimate: Examining the Myanmar military's claim as the Government of Myanmar and the international response," UN Doc. A/HRC/52/CRP.2, 31 January 2023; "The Billion Dollar Death Trade: The International Arms Networks that Enable Human Rights Violations in Myanmar," UN Doc. A/HRC/53/CRP.2, 17 May 2023; "Banking on the Death Trade: How Banks and Governments Enable the Military Junta in Myanmar," UN Doc. A/HRC/56/CRP.7, 26 June 2024.

95. In 2025 the main humanitarian program for Myanmar was only 18 percent funded. The relief program for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh received just over half the funding it required. The funding picture for 2026 appears to be equally dire.

96. With fewer resources, it becomes even more critical for donors and humanitarian agencies to ensure that assistance reaches those with the greatest needs. Many opposition-controlled areas are only accessible by local civil society organizations. It is imperative that donors identify and robustly support these organizations. Civil society leaders have told the Special Rapporteur that they have the capacity to reach even the most inaccessible villages and encampments but lack the financial resources to do so.

C. Support for refugees

97. The humanitarian aid funding crisis is threatening the lives, health and wellbeing of refugees from Myanmar, especially those residing in camps in Bangladesh and Thailand. UN and humanitarian agencies in Bangladesh have already slashed staff, ended stipends to Rohingya volunteers, and made deep cuts to education, medical, mental health, gender-based violence and disabilities programs. Rohingya refugees may again face steep cuts to food rations without additional contributions from donors.

98. In 2025, funding cuts forced the suspension of food rations to most refugees residing in camps in Thailand. In a very encouraging development, the Thai government adopted a policy allowing camp-based refugees to work outside the camps, offering a vital lifeline to refugee families.

99. States are failing their obligations to refugees from Myanmar in ways that extend far beyond flagging financial support. As the Special Rapporteur has highlighted in previous reports, many refugees from Myanmar face human rights violations and serious threats to their health, safety and wellbeing in their host countries.¹³ Some governments have prevented UNHCR from contacting new arrivals, limited access to education and livelihood opportunities, obstructed resettlement to third countries, and arrested, detained and extorted refugees and migrants from Myanmar. Some of Myanmar's neighbors have violated the principle of non-refoulement by pushing back refugees at their borders and deporting people to Myanmar despite the risk they will face violence and oppression. Regional governments have failed to mount an effective response to the perilous boat journeys taken by Rohingya refugees and others, leading to thousands of preventable deaths at sea.

100. More broadly, the challenges facing refugees from Myanmar reflect the breakdown of the international refugee system. Wealthier countries have by-and-large abandoned the principle of responsibility-sharing, failing to provide significant resettlement quotas, complementary pathways and other durable solutions. The United States government's decision to end most refugee resettlement through its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, as well as its attempt to terminate the Temporary Protected Status for Myanmar (which has been blocked by a court order), is deeply concerning given the United States' historic role in resettling refugees from Myanmar and the limited opportunities available elsewhere.

D. Accountability

101. For decades, Myanmar's military has enjoyed near complete impunity for grave human rights violations, some of which likely amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Without a viable short-term path to accountability in Myanmar's courts, international processes and mechanisms have been left to fill the gap. In recent years, some important steps have been taken in this regard.

102. In November 2024, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court requested an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing in relation to the crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution against the Rohingya population. In February 2025, an Argentinian judge

¹³ See, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, UN Doc. No. A/HRC/52/66, 9 March 2023.

approved arrest warrants for 25 military and government officials—including Min Aung Hlaing and Aung San Suu Kyi—in a universal jurisdiction case concerning acts of genocide and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya. In January 2026, judicial authorities in Timor-Leste opened legal proceedings in a universal jurisdiction case concerning post-coup crimes in Chin State. The same month, the International Court of Justice held public hearings in a case brought by the Gambia alleging that Myanmar violated the Genocide Convention through military-directed attacks on the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017. A judgement is expected in the coming months. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar—established by the Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and preserve evidence for criminal proceedings—has shared evidence with relevant authorities in these and other cases.

103. While these developments are important and welcome, the international community could do much more to promote justice for the people of Myanmar. The Security Council has not referred the situation of Myanmar to the International Criminal Court, severely limiting the Courts' jurisdiction, given that Myanmar is not a party to the Rome Statute. Judicial and prosecutorial authorities in several countries have declined to take up universal jurisdiction cases despite having the authority to do so. States could do more to support ongoing litigation, aid investigations, establish new venues for accountability, protect witnesses, enforce arrest warrants, develop Myanmar's legal sector, and support institutions in Myanmar to develop transitional justice mechanisms.

104. These and other opportunities to promote accountability for grave human rights violations in Myanmar will be explored in a forthcoming conference room paper by the Special Rapporteur.

VII. Conclusion and recommendations

105. **The international community is at a crossroads in addressing the crisis in Myanmar. The actions taken or not taken in the next year could influence whether the crisis in Myanmar becomes even more entrenched and deadly or begins a trajectory toward justice, hope and peace.**

106. **The military junta knows that its options are limited. Its election ploy, as transparently illegitimate as it was, signaled its understanding that it needed a course correction. States must now decide whether to build on measures that have proven to be effective or relax pressure on the junta and abandon support for the people of Myanmar.**

107. **It is imperative that countries in the region not brush off concerns about the chaos at their borders as Myanmar's internal problem. The junta's actions threaten their citizens and their sovereignty. It is in the interest of Myanmar's neighbors to hold the military accountable for its actions.**

108. **The Special Rapporteur strongly urges States to immediately build on measures that have proven to be effective including:**

- (a) **Sanctioning the military's major sources of revenue and the financial institutions that it uses to repatriate revenues and purchase weapons, including Myanma Economic Bank and Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise;**
- (b) **Sanctioning arms-dealing networks and entities involved in the provision of weapons, weapons materials and aviation fuel to the Myanmar military;**
- (c) **Sanctioning entities with known connections to the Myanmar military while coordinating the imposition and enforcement of all sanctions regimes;**
- (d) **Engaging financial institutions located in their jurisdictions to ensure that they are conducting enhanced due diligence on all transactions related to Myanmar, while terminating relationships with Myanmar's state-owned banks; and**
- (e) **Proactively engaging and supporting the organizations and institutions that are building the foundation for a democratic and rights-respecting Myanmar,**

including the National Unity Government, ethnic resistance organizations and civil society organizations.

109. The Special Rapporteur calls on the international community to condition the relaxation of any of these measures on the cessation of all attacks on civilians and the release of all political prisoners. Engagement with stakeholders in Myanmar to resolve the crisis in the country should prioritize constitutional reform, the establishment of a representative federal democratic government free from military control, and ensuring accountability for grave human rights violations.

110. The Special Rapporteur calls on ASEAN to work toward a resolution of the crisis in Myanmar by:

(a) Making clear that the Myanmar military and the incoming military-controlled government will be held accountable for failure to implement the Five-Point Consensus;

(b) Launching a robust public and private effort to stop all junta attacks on civilians and release all political prisoners, as required by the first two points of the Five-Point Consensus;

(c) Continuing to bar high-level political representatives from Myanmar from the ASEAN Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings and continuing to deny Myanmar the ASEAN chairmanship, until such conditions are met; and

(d) Adopting new measures to impose accountability for violations of the Five Point Consensus, including terminating Myanmar's chairmanship of and participation in all ASEAN meetings, processes and bodies.

111. States, United Nations agencies, international donors and international humanitarian organizations should address the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar by:

(a) Reversing cuts to humanitarian assistance and life-saving programs for the people of Myanmar;

(b) Facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid to all populations in need, including by supporting cross-border humanitarian assistance delivered through local civil society organizations;

(c) Ensuring that aid reaches displaced and vulnerable populations, especially women, girls, LGBT people and persons with disabilities; and

(d) Lifting measures that hinder the delivery of aid, including by supporting unregistered organizations, adopting flexible reporting requirements, and allowing the transfer of funds outside of the formal banking system of Myanmar.

112. The Special Rapporteur calls on all States to protect the rights of people fleeing violence and human rights violations in Myanmar by:

(a) Increasing contributions to the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Joint Response Plan;

(b) Expanding programs for the resettlement of refugees from Myanmar, including Rohingya refugees;

(c) Respecting the principle of non-refoulement, including by not blocking Myanmar nationals fleeing violence from crossing borders and halting all deportations of Myanmar nationals back to Myanmar;

(d) Coordinating and proactively carrying out search and rescue efforts for Rohingya and other refugees and migrants in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea, providing support to refugees and protection for victims of human trafficking, and holding perpetrators fully accountable;

(e) Providing UNHCR and other human rights and humanitarian actors access to refugees from Myanmar, including in border areas, encampments and immigration detention centers; and

(f) **Removing barriers to livelihoods, education, health care and other services for Myanmar nationals.**

113. **Comprehensive recommendations concerning accountability for grave human rights violations in Myanmar will be included in the Special Rapporteur's forthcoming conference room paper.**

Advance unedited version