



Security Council

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**Letter dated 28 November 2025 from the Chair of the
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023)
concerning Al-Shabaab addressed to the President of the
Security Council**

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) concerning Al-Shabaab, and in accordance with paragraph 32 (c) of Council resolution 2776 (2025), I have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023).

In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Eloy Alfaro de Alba
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023)
concerning Al-Shabaab



**Letter dated 20 November 2025 from the Panel of Experts
pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) addressed to the Chair of the
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023)
concerning Al-Shabaab**

In accordance with paragraph 32 (c) of Security Council resolution [2776 \(2025\)](#), we have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#).

(Signed) Matthew **Rosbottom**
Coordinator and armed groups and regional issues expert

(Signed) Lydelle **Joubert**
Maritime issues and natural resources expert

(Signed) Abigail **Kabandula**
Humanitarian affairs expert

(Signed) Saleh **Mansour**
Arms expert

(Signed) Madina **Sere**
Finance expert

Summary

The threat posed by Al-Shabaab to peace, security and stability in Somalia goes beyond the impact of conventional military action and asymmetric warfare to include sophisticated extortion, forced recruitment practices and an effective propaganda machine. Similarly, Al-Shabaab's influence over populations and its ability to generate income extends beyond the areas in which it has a presence.

Al-Shabaab remains the most immediate threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region. Despite ongoing efforts by Somali and international forces to curb Al-Shabaab's operational capacity, the group's ability to carry out complex, asymmetric attacks in Somalia remains undiminished. The group is able to strike within Mogadishu; on 18 March 2025, it attempted to assassinate the President of Somalia close to the presidential palace. The group's goal remains to remove the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, rid the country of foreign forces and establish a Greater Somalia, joining all ethnic Somalis across East Africa under strict Islamic rule.

During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab continued to exert its influence in large areas of central and southern Somalia, including over some areas where security forces are deployed.

The start of the year marked the transition of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia. Amid this security transition, Al-Shabaab's offensive posture changed, and the group attacked and held key areas in Middle and Lower Shabelle, rapidly gaining strategic and territorial ground. Increasing its area of influence during the reporting period gave the group increased access to major supply routes and financial resources, and pushed its area of operations closer to Mogadishu. However, the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#) has noted some pushback in these areas in recent months by Somali security forces.

Al-Shabaab continues to generate more than enough revenue to fund its insurgency through checkpoints and the extortion of businesses. It continues to be able to extort outside areas where it has a heavy presence.

The Panel has also investigated the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia (ISIL-Somalia). Foreign terrorist fighters were recruited from around the world to join the group, the majority from East Africa. The Panel mapped out the routes taken by foreign terrorist fighters to join ISIL-Somalia in Puntland, looking at both international and East African recruits. The Panel further took note of Operation Hilaac ("Lightning"), which was initiated by Puntland forces in December 2024 and has significantly degraded the strength and capabilities of ISIL-Somalia over the course of 2025.

Al-Shabaab continues to have access to an uninterrupted illicit supply of weapons that it regularly showcases in propaganda videos. The smuggling of weapons and military equipment into Somalia by dhows and small skiffs continued during the reporting period.

The Panel noted a decline in pirate activity since the previous reporting period. From September 2024 to the end of October 2025, the Panel noted five hijackings. All recorded hijackings were on foreign fishing vessels and dhows fishing in Somali territorial waters.

No further charcoal shipments, authorized in terms of the one-off disposal of charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismaayo in line with Security Council resolution [2696 \(2023\)](#), were noted after the three most recent shipments in early September 2024. However, the Panel noted fluctuations in the stockpiles in and around Kismaayo during the reporting period.

The civilian population of Somalia continues to face severe and complex humanitarian challenges, caused by increased Al-Shabaab attacks, ongoing clan conflicts and repeated natural disasters. Humanitarian workers have been unable to reach some affected populations in Al-Shabaab strongholds. Over 300,000 people were displaced between February and October 2025. The main cause of displacement is the conflict involving Al-Shabaab.

The Panel is grateful to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab for granting an exceptional extension of the deadline for submission of the final report to the Council until 28 November 2025, bearing in mind that the first members of the Panel were appointed on 2 September 2025 and started work on 26 September. While this enabled the Panel to conduct more thorough investigations, gather more detailed information and engage with key interlocutors, the reporting timeline remained tight, and several aspects require further work by the Panel, as indicated in the report.

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Mandate and methodology	6
II. Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia	6
A. Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab)	6
B. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia	12
III. Al-Shabaab finances	15
IV. Implementation of the arms embargo	16
A. Federal government compliance and weapons management	16
B. Weapons and ammunition management	16
V. Improvised explosive devices and explosive ordnance: scale and civilian cost	17
A. Scale of improvised explosive devices and explosive ordnance	17
B. Humanitarian impact of improvised explosive devices	18
VI. Charcoal ban	19
A. Implementation of the charcoal ban	19
B. One-off, complete disposal of charcoal stockpiles	19
VII. Maritime security	19
A. Arms trafficking and maritime interdictions	19
B. Piracy and armed robbery of vessels	20
C. Attacks by Somali pirates since August 2024	20
D. <i>Sea World</i> incident	23
E. Interdictions, arrests and prosecutions of pirate suspects	23
VIII. Key protection and humanitarian considerations	24
A. Impact of conflict and insecurity on the civilian population	24
B. Key considerations concerning internally displaced persons	24
C. Humanitarian access	25
D. Sexual and gender-based violence	25
IX. Recommendations	26
Annexes*	27

* Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Mandate and methodology

1. In its resolution [2776 \(2025\)](#), the Security Council outlines the mandate of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#). In accordance with paragraph 32 (c) of the resolution, the Panel submits to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab the present final report on its investigations from the period 16 August 2024 to 31 October 2025.
2. The Panel comprises six experts. The armed groups, armed groups and regional issues, maritime issues and natural resources, and humanitarian affairs experts were appointed by the Secretary-General on 2 September 2025. Although the armed groups expert subsequently withdrew, the three remaining experts began work on 26 September. The arms and finance experts were appointed on 25 September 2025 and subsequently joined the Panel on 17 October.
3. Due to time constraints, the Panel was unable to visit Somalia or meet with the authorities of the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia and the federal member states during the reporting period. The Panel is ready to travel to Mogadishu at the earliest opportunity, to meet the Government and work collaboratively on the mandate. The Panel was, however, able to meet with interlocutors, international partners and diplomatic missions. It also received support from representatives of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia.
4. The Panel is guided by the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see [S/2006/997](#)) and the Secretary-General's bulletin on information sensitivity, classification and handling ([ST/SGB/2007/6](#)). A detailed note on its methodology is contained in annex 1 to the present report.

II. Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia

A. Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab)

5. Al-Shabaab remains an adaptable, opportunistic and flexible organization capable of shifting its approach to retain influence in Somalia. During the reporting period, there was no significant degradation of the group's ability to carry out attacks in Somalia. In 2025, Al-Shabaab significantly escalated its operations in central and southern Somalia. In the first quarter of 2025, its monthly attacks increased by about 50 per cent compared with 2024 in regions such as Hiraan and Middle Shabelle.¹ Al-Shabaab endures and remains the greatest threat to both Somalia and the region.
6. Al-Shabaab's leadership structure remained stable and intact during the reporting period. Sources indicated to the Panel there are currently 18 leaders who form the overarching organizational structure of Al-Shabaab and 29 regional leaders who sit below them. Seven of the 18 senior leaders hail from sub-clans of the Hawiye. The Panel continues to gather additional information on individuals that could be used by the Committee to update its sanctions list.
7. As reported previously, Al-Shabaab still has a heavy presence throughout large swathes of territory in south-central Somalia, mainly in Hiraan, Galmudug and southern Somalia, occupying key supply routes across south-central Somalia. Its de

¹ See www.ftisomalia.com/acled-says-al-shabaab-has-increased-monthly-attacks-in-somalia-by-50-in-2025.

facto capital is in Jilib, Middle Juba. Al-Shabaab also contests and exerts its influence in other areas of the country.

1. Al-Shabaab leadership structure and losses

8. The Panel continues to update information on the structure of Al-Shabaab (inscribed on the sanctions list pursuant to Security Council resolution 1844 (2008) as SOe.001) to identify potential leadership changes and develop its understanding of the group. Ahmed Diriye, also known as Sheikh Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah (SOi.014), still serves as Al-Shabaab's emir. He has cemented his leadership role in the past two years after being in the shadow of Ahmed Abdi Godane, the former leader. Abukar Ali Adan (SOi.018) and Mahad Karate (SOi.020) are the group's two deputy emirs, with Karate holding some oversight over intelligence (*amniyat*) and finance (*zakhat*) functions. The group retains its strict hierarchical structure, with the Shura Council as the top executive body. Other emirs hold functions for military (*jaish*), religious affairs (*wilayat*) and religious policing (*hisba*) offices.

9. Changes in senior leadership have, nevertheless, occurred. Abdullahi Osman Mohamed (SOi.022), also known as "Engineer Ismail", replaced Yusuf Ahmed Hajji Nurow (not listed, also known as Gees Adde) in early 2025 as emir of *amniyat*, and still retains his role as emir of explosives. The group also has a new finance emir, Abdullahi Wadad (also known as Abdullaahi Hassan Abdi), who replaced Abdikarim Horseed (not listed). Bashir Furqan (not listed, also known as Guled Ilkacase) is the military emir, and Moalim Osman (not listed) is the emir of foreign affairs, overseeing the Kenya, Ethiopia and northern Somalia offices.²

10. The Government achieved some success in eliminating mid-level Al-Shabaab operatives during the reporting period. Somali security forces, supported by an increase in air strikes by international partners, coordinated to target the individuals. The increase in air strikes has been noted by the Al-Shabaab leadership with a recent directive to the group not to gather in large groups. Below are some of the key individuals reported killed during the reporting period:

- On 26 October 2025, Mahmoud Abdi Hamud (also known as Jaafar Gurey), a founding member of the group and previous head of external security, was reported killed in an air strike in Bu'aale, Middle Juba.³
- On 13 October 2025, Ali Ahmed Guure (also known as Ali Qoyane), a commander operating in the Hiraan region who was sentenced to death by a military court in 2019 for planning an attack that killed a deputy mayor, was reported killed in Mabah, Hiraan.⁴
- On 24 September 2025, Ali Xiirey (also known as Hassan Muse), a commander in the Hiraan region, was reported killed in an air strike targeting his residence in the village of Muqakoori in the Hiraan region. He was instrumental as a mastermind in weakening the cohesion of Hawadle local militia during the group's advances in east Hiraan in 2025.⁵
- On 9 September 2025, Mohamed Abdi Dhiblaawe Afrah, a commander involved in the attack on the President's convey on 18 March 2025, was reported killed in an operation in Ugunji, Lower Shabelle.⁶

² Confidential sources.

³ See <https://x.com/MoDSomaliya/status/1982811941300056314>.

⁴ See <https://x.com/MoDSomaliya/status/1977930857357738370>.

⁵ Confidential reports.

⁶ See https://x.com/HSNQ_NISA/status/1965460791831756924 (in Somali).

- On 17 August 2025, Hussein Moalim Hassan, a long-serving commander, was reported killed in the village of Warta Eey Duure in the Bakool region. He had previously held numerous positions, including head of operations in Bay, Bakool and Gedo, and was involved in forcibly recruiting children and in financial extortion in Bakool.⁷
- On 13 August 2025, Abdullahi Ganey, a long-serving commander, was reported killed in an air strike in Daarul-Nimca, Middle Shabelle.⁸
- On 14 July 2025, Abdullahi Mohamed (also known as Arab), a head of *zakat* extortion collection in Lower Shabelle, was reported killed.
- On 17 June 2025, Abas Mohamed Hool, a commander responsible for operations in the Banaadir region, reportedly died after an operation by Somali security forces.⁹
- In June 2025, Khalif Gaambo, leader of the Galmudug office, was reported killed.¹⁰

11. The Panel will continue to monitor the possible impact that the reported deaths of these individuals may have on the group's operational capacity.

2. Notable attacks by Al-Shabaab

12. From 26 to 28 February, Al-Shabaab launched a coordinated attack on the town of Balcad, briefly holding it until Somali security personnel forced them back during the reporting period. Reports vary on the number of casualties. The significance of the attack relates to the strategic location of the town, 40 km north of Mogadishu, which permitted intense renewed operations by the group in Middle Shabelle.¹¹

13. On 11 March, Al-Shabaab launched a complex attack on the Qahira hotel in Beledweyne, Hiraan. The attack was initiated by a person-borne improvised explosive device and a motorcycle suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, followed by six gunmen entering the complex. The siege lasted 18 hours with at least 21 people killed and many injured in the attack. The hotel was targeted when it hosted traditional elders and military officers involved in government coordination against the group on the day of the attack. In response, the security forces launched air strikes against Al-Shabaab targets in Hirshabelle, reportedly killing 50 Al-Shabaab members, including Mansoor Tima Weeyne, a commander involved in the preparation of vehicles for attacks.¹²

14. On 18 March, a remote-controlled improvised explosive device detonated at a house near the road at Ceel Gaabta in the Xamar Jajab district near Villa Somalia, targeting the motorcade of the President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, as he was travelling to the airport to oversee military operations against the group in the Middle Shabelle region. The blast impacted the last two vehicles in the motorcade, damaging them. There were reportedly 15 casualties, including security personnel, as a result of the blast. This high-profile attempt to assassinate the President signalled the group's ability to attack in the heart of Mogadishu. On 9 September 2025, the National Intelligence and Security Agency launched an operation in the village of Ugunji,

⁷ See <https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1957057736895606990>.

⁸ Confidential reports.

⁹ See <https://shabellemedia.com/top-al-shabaab-commander-dies-from-injuries-somali-government-confirms>.

¹⁰ Confidential sources.

¹¹ Confidential reports.

¹² Ibid.

Lower Shabelle, reportedly killing Mohamed Abdi Dhiblaawe Afrah (also known as Khaalid Dheers), believed to be one of the coordinators of the attack on 18 March.¹³

15. Two attacks involving person-borne improvised explosive devices, one on 18 May and the other on 9 July, targeted military facilities in Mogadishu. On 18 May, a person-borne improvised explosive device exploded at the Damaanyo military base in Hodan, Mogadishu. The attacker, dressed in a military uniform, targeted new Somali National Army recruits. The attack killed 22 people, including 15 new recruits. On 9 July, a man detonated his person-borne improvised explosive device vest at a teashop inside the highly guarded Jaalle Siyaad military academy in Mogadishu, killing four Army soldiers.¹⁴ These attacks showcased Al-Shabaab's capacity to target military infrastructure in Mogadishu.

16. On 4 October 2025, Al-Shabaab launched a complex attack on the Godka Jilicow prison, a high-security prison holding high-value targets and also housing the headquarters of the National Intelligence and Security Agency. The assault began when a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated at the main entrance, allowing seven Al-Shabaab fighters to breach the compound. Heavy clashes ensued inside the facility as government forces engaged the attackers and eventually neutralized them after eight hours. The attack coincided with the recent removal of several city security checkpoints in Mogadishu. The attackers were dressed in military uniforms, and closed-circuit television footage shows that the pick-up used was liveried as a security intelligence vehicle, with the attackers in the rear passing through various checkpoints en route to the prison.¹⁵ The Panel received information that the architect behind the attack and the attempt in March to assassinate the President was Abdullahi Osman Mohamed (SOi.022), also known as "Engineer Ismail".

3. Al-Shabaab regional capabilities

17. During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab continued to operate and have a presence in the border regions with both Kenya and Ethiopia, mainly in the Bakool and Gedo regions bordering Ethiopia and along most of the Kenyan border from Mandera to Lamu counties. The composition of leadership for regional operations remains unchanged, with Moalim Osman as the emir of the military directorate for operations and units in Kenya, Ethiopia and northern Somalia. Under him is Moalim Adan, who acts as his deputy for these units. Below these two, the leader of the Jaysh Ayman, the unit focused on Kenyan operations, is Musab Yare.¹⁶ The structure has evolved in these specialized units into sector-based command zones in the Gedo, Bakool, Middle Juba and Lower Juba regions, allowing for semi-autonomous, geographically tailored operations.

4. Al-Shabaab in Ethiopia

18. The Panel did not note any major attacks in Ethiopia during the reporting period. The last major attack occurred in 2022, when the group launched a large-scale attack into Somali Regional State through Aato and Yeed (see S/2022/754, para. 22). Since that attack, Al-Shabaab has embedded itself across the Bale, Liben and Afder zones for recruitment and intelligence purposes.

¹³ See <https://sonna.so/en/somali-security-forces-eliminate-senior-al-shabaab-leader-in-lower-shabelle>.

¹⁴ Confidential reports.

¹⁵ See <https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1974824977510613189>.

¹⁶ Confidential sources.

19. Officials raised concerns that Al-Shabaab continues to recruit vulnerable Ethiopian migrants as they transit north through Somalia to Yemen, and eventually to the Gulf States. The number of Ethiopian fighters within the group grew during the reporting period from around 200 to 300 to approximately 600, the majority from the Oromo, Amhara and Somali tribes.¹⁷

5. Al-Shabaab in Kenya

20. Al-Shabaab continues to pose a significant threat in Kenya by conducting attacks that vary from attacks with improvised explosive devices, which predominantly target security personnel, to attacks on infrastructure, kidnappings, home raids and stealing of livestock. In 2025, the group averaged around six attacks a month in Kenya. Most occurred in Mandera county, with a recent increase in attacks from July to September in Lamu county.¹⁸

6. Al-Shabaab training in Yemen

21. Trade routes between Somalia and Yemen are centuries old. Arms traffickers have operated from northern Somalia for many years trafficking illicit weapons from Yemen to Somalia, as previously reported by the Panel (see [S/2019/858](#) and [S/2019/858/Corr.1](#), paras. 130–132).

22. The Panel has investigated links and found that Al-Shabaab has been sending its fighters for training in Yemen. The Panel learned that in the past year four cadres of 30 Al-Shabaab fighters travelled to Yemen to be trained. One cadre of 30 fighters left Somalia on a Yemeni dhow at a natural harbour between Baraawe and Homboy in Lower Shabelle in late October 2024, travelled up the coast and landed in Mukalla, Yemen. From there they were transported to the outskirts of Hudaydah for training, which lasted approximately two months, with training in rifles, anti-aircraft weapons and improvised explosive devices. The Panel will continue to investigate to ascertain if any individuals or entities involved meet the listing criteria for possible future measures by the Security Council, including a travel ban and assets freeze.

7. Al-Shabaab recruitment

23. Al-Shabaab continued to recruit from a cross-section of Somali clans. Recruitment can be voluntary or forced. The reporting period has seen an increase in the tempo of Al-Shabaab recruitment.

24. From September to November 2024, the group trained 1,100 new fighters, including recruits from Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. In October 2024, a further 825 young people were trained in two camps, one located in Gobanle, Lower Shabelle, and another in Middle Shabelle.¹⁹ In November 2024, in Lower Shabelle, Al-Shabaab gathered seven leaders from minority clans and forced them to collectively provide 100 recruits, \$100,000, 100 camels and 300 sheep to the group.²⁰ On 20 September 2025, an Al-Shabaab spokesperson, Ali Mahmoud Raage (also known as Ali Dheer, SOi.021), gave a video address from the Shaykh Muhammad Mire training camp in front of recently graduated fighters.²¹

¹⁷ Confidential sources.

¹⁸ Confidential reports.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ SITE Intelligence Group, “At training camp graduation ceremony, Shabaab spokesman vows revenge for land-grabbing and uses Gaza war to highlight western injustice”, 22 September 2025.

25. There has been increased evidence in 2025 of forced recruitment and directives from the senior leadership to forcibly recruit fighters for the group. Sources indicated that Bashir Furqan (also known as Gulled Ilkacase), the current overall emir of the military units, instructed commanders to forcibly recruit 1,000 new fighters for the Ethiopian front.²²

26. The training of new recruits has been shortened, with some receiving only two weeks of training before being deployed to combat areas. Training for specialized units has decreased from six to three months to allow quicker mobilization of forces. Experienced fighters who had been in retirement were brought back into the ranks to bolster experience.²³

27. Sources indicated to the Panel that Al-Shabaab had increased investment in medical equipment during 2025. The emir of health, Abdirahman Siro, received additional resources to improve medical services to fighters.²⁴

28. Sources also indicated to the Panel that *zakawat* collection had increased throughout areas with an Al-Shabaab presence, resulting in conflict with local clans. In addition, the Mutaba'ah ("The ones who follow"), an Al-Shabaab unit used to register cattle and map out the debt environment for the group, has seen its ranks bolstered and is now working full time whereas previously it was employed seasonally.²⁵

8. Al-Shabaab advances in 2025

29. In February, Al-Shabaab adjusted its posture and engaged in offensive strikes, first in areas of the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions. The exact trigger for this move is not publicly known, but the transition from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) must be seen as a key driver of the planned offensive. In the past, Al-Shabaab would attack then withdraw. However, the new offensive has seen it attempt to consolidate and hold its positions and gains. The group advanced towards and took Bariira in March and Aadan Yabaal in April. It pushed towards Jawhar and entered Balcad, 30 km north of Mogadishu, before being repelled.²⁶

30. At the same time, the group advanced in Lower Shabelle into Awdheegle and Afgooye, further towards Mogadishu, and set up new checkpoints along the Afgooye-Mogadishu road north-west of Mogadishu and the Balcad-Mogadishu road north of Mogadishu.²⁷ While there was no assault on Mogadishu, the increased pressure on supply and access routes could have implications for the security of the Banaadir region.

31. There has been pushback from Somali security forces in the past two months, with two of three forward operating bases taken by Al-Shabaab retaken. Bariira was recaptured by Somali security forces and AUSSOM troops after a three-week battle in August. Al-Shabaab also retreated from a key bridge in Awdheegle, and areas of Jamaame district north of Kismaayo were liberated from Al-Shabaab after over a decade.

²² Official confidential sources.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Confidential sources.

²⁷ Ibid.

9. Al-Shabaab media and propaganda

32. Propaganda is a key strategic pillar for Al-Shabaab to promote itself and disseminate information to the Somali people. The group's propaganda apparatus has consistently worked well both domestically and regionally, with recruitment videos being released in multiple languages. The group released a recruitment video in Somali, English and Arabic, but more significantly also in Amharic, Oromo, Swahili and French.²⁸ Propaganda is churned out consistently, highlighting battlefield successes, promoting nationalist sentiments and highlighting supposed government failures and political issues, the group's ongoing recruitment and training of specialized units, as well as its purported philanthropy and governance. Releases from senior leaders focus on both the "domestic and international suffering of Muslims". A speech by Ahmed Diriye in February 2025 praised Hamas for its continued resistance, accused the Government of auctioning public and private property and indicated that the new AUSSOM deployment would be an easier target for his fighters.²⁹

33. Residents in areas of Lower Juba reported to the Panel that they were consistently exposed to Al-Shabaab propaganda through a variety of media platforms, including social media, radio broadcasts and leaflets. Messaging focusing on anti-western/federal government sentiments, calls for imposing Sharia law and claims of defending Somali Muslims from foreign invaders are prominent in Al-Shabaab messaging.³⁰

34. Targeting Al-Shabaab's propaganda is a key pillar in degrading the capabilities of the group. The Panel noted efforts by the Government through the National Intelligence and Security Agency in December 2024 to shut down approximately 12,000 accounts (including 5,648 on Facebook, 4,340 on TikTok, 1,978 on Telegram, 24 on X (formerly Twitter) and 15 on WhatsApp) and deactivate five websites belonging to Al-Shabaab between July and December 2024.³¹

B. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia

35. In October 2015, a small group of Somali nationals headed by Abdulkadir Mumin (not listed) defected from Al-Shabaab in the Cal Madow mountains in the Sanaag region of Puntland. The group relocated to the Cal Miskaat mountains in the Bari region, where Mumin is originally from, to conceal itself and initially recruit from within the pastoralists residing there.

36. In its previous report, the Panel noted the increased strength and capabilities of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) faction in Somalia (see S/2024/748, para. 30). In December 2024, an offensive by security forces in Puntland was launched and revealed the extent to which the group had developed into a key hub for ISIL globally.³² By late 2024, the group had set up a well-fortified base in the Cal Miskaat mountains with a fighting force of over 1,000. Some 60 per cent or more of the fighting force were foreign terrorist fighters.³³ The group had weapons including AK47s, G3s, PKMs, sniper rifles, DShK, RPG-7, person-borne improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, landmines and anti-personnel mines, and over 100 uncrewed aerial vehicles (see annex 2). Although small in terms

²⁸ See <https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1803286089362264469>.

²⁹ SITE Intelligence Group, "Following meeting of top officials, Shabaab chief gives speech threatening AUSSOM and praising group fighters", 28 February 2025.

³⁰ Telephone interviews carried out with residents in Lower Juba, November 2024.

³¹ See https://x.com/HSNQ_NISA/status/1868346824547041460.

³² Confidential report.

³³ Official confidential sources.

of numbers and financial resources compared with Al-Shabaab, the group's expansion constituted a significant threat to peace and security in Somalia and the broader region.

37. The Al-Karrar office, as noted by the Panel in its previous report, was run by ISIL-Somalia and constituted a key coordination, management and financial hub for ISIL in Africa and globally (ibid., para. 32). Abdiqadir Mumin is the head of the general directorate of provinces and the leader of ISIL affiliates in Africa, while Abdirahman Fahiye Isse Mohamud remains the emir of ISIL-Somalia. Beneath Mumin were reportedly five non-Somalis who were the strategic and organizational leaders of the group.

38. The group suffered heavy losses in 2025. In July, Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf (also known as Abdiwali Waran-Walac), the finance emir for the group, was reportedly captured.³⁴ Abdirahman Shirwac Aw-Saciid, head of the group's assassination squad, surrendered to security forces in February.³⁵

39. Evidence recovered from the ISIL base in Cal Miskaat shows traces of cryptocurrency transfers, documents pertaining to arms smuggling and deals, and documents revealing communications between ISIL individuals in Cal Miskaat and ISIL affiliates outside Somalia.³⁶

40. From the end of 2024, the group's area of operations stretched over the three districts of Qandala, Balidhidin and the eastern part of Boosaaso, covering nearly 400 km from Timirshe to Qandala and from Qandala to Balade and Bacad.³⁷ The Panel did not find evidence linking ISIL-Somalia with any attacks outside the country. In July 2025, however, the National Intelligence and Security Service of Ethiopia announced the arrest of 82 ISIL members recruited for missions in Ethiopia. These 82 individuals were trained by ISIL-Somalia and involved in intelligence, financial and logistical support for the group. The arrests were made throughout the country, including in Addis Ababa and Jijiga, indicating a wide network.³⁸

41. ISIL-Somalia funded its activities through the extortion of businesses and individuals. Extortion activity was centred in Boosaaso, Puntland. This extortion had an impact on Boosaaso, with some businesses closing or relocating due to the demands of the group.³⁹ The group utilized these funds to form a network of dedicated couriers to bring supplies to its isolated location. Sources reported to the Panel that a courier would be paid up to \$1,000 to transport a box to its location in Cal Miskaat.⁴⁰

42. ISIL-Somalia was estimated to be making \$4 million annually, using extortion money to finance its affiliate terrorist cells in other countries, including ISIL-Mozambique and elements in the Democratic Republic of Congo.⁴¹

1. Foreign fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia

43. In December 2024, the number of ISIL-Somalia fighters was around 1,000, over half being foreign terrorist fighters. Those fighters came from a range of countries,

³⁴ See www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/07/us-ground-raid-captures-islamic-state-leader-in-northern-somalia.php.

³⁵ See www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2025/2/3/senior-isil-somalia-commander-captured-in-puntland.

³⁶ Official confidential sources.

³⁷ Official confidential report.

³⁸ See www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_6956212.

³⁹ Official confidential report.

⁴⁰ Official confidential sources.

⁴¹ Official confidential report.

including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye,⁴² with the largest numbers coming from Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen.⁴³ An intake of trained foreign terrorist fighters who had fought in Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen joined the group and acted as training leads for other recruits.

44. Some of the foreign terrorist fighters travelled to Puntland between September and November 2024.⁴⁴ The Panel examined some passports and identity documents recovered from Cal Miskaat and found that the recruits were young, mostly with dates of birth in the 1990s and early 2000s.⁴⁵

2. Routes taken by foreign fighters

45. Foreign fighters reportedly arrive in Puntland using both maritime and overland routes, many arriving by boat through the Gulf of Aden. The Panel investigated the routes taken by 30 individuals who travelled to join ISIL-Somalia in September and October 2024, their identity documents having been recovered in Cal Miskaat. Passport stamps show individuals arriving from outside East Africa, then travelling onward overland to Somalia through neighbouring countries. No further passport stamps were found, indicating that they entered Somalia across the border unofficially. Sources indicated that they had passed into Somaliland and onward to Cal Miskaat.⁴⁶ Identity documents recovered in Cal Miskaat and reviewed by the Panel indicate that approximately 15 individuals, including a woman and four children under 5 years, appear to have travelled to join ISIL-Somalia in a two-week period in October 2024. These include three Moroccans, two Saudi Arabians, a Tunisian, a German, an Argentinian, a Bangladeshi, a Bahraini and a Lebanese national. The woman is a South African national who travelled with her four children via Johannesburg. This transport operation highlights ISIL-Somalia's organizational capacity outside its base in Puntland for the movement of foreign terrorist fighters.⁴⁷ Furthermore, a large proportion of the group's foreign fighters were recruited from the East Africa region. The Panel also investigated the routes of 14 Tanzanians who travelled to Somalia in September and October 2024. The Panel will continue to investigate the means and modes of transit of individuals associated with ISIL-Somalia.

3. The offensive against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia

46. In December 2024, Puntland security forces launched Operation Hilaac ("Lightning"), a phased offensive against ISIL-Somalia. Around 4,000 soldiers were assembled, drafted mainly from the Puntland Security Force, the Puntland Maritime Police Force and the Puntland Dervish Force. The offensive was launched with widespread community support. On 31 December, ISIL-Somalia launched a pre-emptive attack on Puntland forces, starting with a wave of 12 foreign suicide bombers, followed by a wave of uncrewed aerial vehicles armed with explosive devices. This attack was eventually repelled.⁴⁸

47. Since January 2025, security forces have made significant advances into the Cal Miskaat region and have cleared valleys such as Miraale and Lugta Tirciil, seizing strongholds of the group from Timirshe to Dhasaan and Balade. ISIL-Somalia also established bunker systems, tunnel and cave hideouts, and supply caches in the area

⁴² See https://x.com/AhmedA_Sheikh/status/1977785639878754629.

⁴³ Official confidential sources.

⁴⁴ Identity documents examined by the Panel, September 2025.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Official confidential report.

of operation. Various weapons, uncrewed aerial vehicles, improvised explosive device equipment, medical and surgery facilities, vehicles, computers and satellite equipment were recovered by security forces. The Panel has not had time to examine this evidence. Security forces have reportedly suffered significant casualties, with 241 soldiers killed and more than 900 injured up to early October 2025.⁴⁹

48. Officials reported to the Panel that around 900 ISIL fighters had been killed in the operation either in air strikes or by the security forces, 70 per cent of them by direct fighting on the ground along with support helicopters and 30 per cent in air strikes by international partners.⁵⁰

49. On 23 September 2025, ISIL-Somalia killed Brigadier General Ahmed Abdi Ali Qarjab in a roadside explosion in Dhasaan, Bari region, demonstrating that despite the offensive operations against it the group still posed a threat to the region.⁵¹

50. On 25 October 2025, the President of Puntland, Said Deni, declared ISIL-Somalia eliminated after 11 months of operations against the group, while some unofficial estimates report that a small fighting force remains.⁵² Sources indicate that the Al-Karrar function has been moved to ISIL-Mozambique.⁵³ The fate of the leader, Abdiqadir Mumin, remains unclear, some sources indicating that he had fled the country, assimilated back into his sub-clan or been killed in the offensive. The Panel could not substantiate any of these claims. It will continue to monitor the activity of ISIL-Somalia for any signs of resurgence.

51. The significant degradation of ISIL-Somalia will be seen as an opportunity by Al-Shabaab to fill the vacuum and expand its influence and territory outside Galgala and the Cal Madow mountains. The group has already deployed fighters into North-East State in 2025, with 400 located around Galgala. Another 200 are operating under the leadership of Abdi Madobe, a long-serving senior commander in the region, in the south of North-East State. Their objective appears to be to exert more influence on areas and supply routes to Ceerigaabo in the Sanaag region.⁵⁴ On 6 September 2025, Ahmed Cadib, an Al-Shabaab logistics operative in charge of liaison and facilitation for the group between Ceerigaabo and Galgala, was killed in Hargeysa, highlighting the group's continued presence in northern Somalia.⁵⁵

III. Al-Shabaab finances

52. The Panel previously highlighted Al-Shabaab's ability to generate domestic revenue through extortion (see [S/2023/724](#), para. 37, and [S/2024/748](#), paras. 43, 48 and 51). The group continues to generate ample revenue via these means to fund its insurgency.

53. In its 2021 report, the Panel highlighted a means of revenue generation for the group through its network of checkpoints throughout Somalia (see [S/2021/849](#), paras. 54–58). Checkpoints remain one of Al-Shabaab's primary sources of income, and the push by the group in early 2025 in Lower and Middle Shabelle gives it

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ See www.hiraan.com/news4/2025/Sept/203034/senior_puntland_commander_killed_in_landmine_explosion_during_anti_isis_operation.aspx.

⁵² See <https://en.kaabtv.com/puntland-president-declares-major-victory-over-isis-in-northeastern-somalia>.

⁵³ Official confidential report.

⁵⁴ Official confidential sources.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

increased access to revenue streams with more influence over access roads and checkpoints.

54. Al-Shabaab continues to be able to extort in areas outside its influence, in particular Mogadishu.⁵⁶ In February, the Government warned businesses in Mogadishu not to pay the group, or the businesses would face legal action.⁵⁷ In July, the National Intelligence and Security Agency also warned businesses not to cooperate with the group or pay any money demanded under threats or coercion.⁵⁸ In February, a Banaadir regional commander reported that businesses in Bakara market, Suuq Bacaad and Xamar Weyne were key revenue generators for the group in Mogadishu.⁵⁹

55. The Government issued a directive to businesses in 2023 to install closed-circuit television cameras to watch and map Al-Shabaab in the city. Al-Shabaab has targeted businesses that have installed such cameras with improvised explosive devices and shootings. In October and November 2024 alone, 10 attacks on business centres and owners that had installed closed-circuit television devices were recorded.⁶⁰ These actions by Al-Shabaab highlight how Mogadishu is a key revenue generator for the group. The business community is therefore placed in a difficult position between maintaining the security of its businesses through payments to Al-Shabaab and adhering to government regulations.

56. The Panel has not been able to further investigate in detail how Al-Shabaab raises, moves or stores its money during the reporting period, due to the finance expert starting work only on 17 October 2025.

IV. Implementation of the arms embargo

A. Federal government compliance and weapons management

57. In its resolution [2714 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council lifted the general and complete arms embargo established in relation to Somalia in resolution [733 \(1992\)](#), as amended by subsequent resolutions, and, in its resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#), imposed a general and complete arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab. Some arms control procedures were maintained in relation to federal member states and private security companies.

B. Weapons and ammunition management

58. The Secretary-General's technical assessment of the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab ([S/2025/673](#)) reaffirmed the ongoing progress by the Government in consolidating national frameworks relating to weapons and ammunition management, including standardization of marking, registration and oversight of captured materiel. However, the Secretary-General noted that there continued to be capacity constraints at the federal member state level, combined with inconsistent coordination with

⁵⁶ Confidential sources.

⁵⁷ See www.voanews.com/amp/authorities-in-somalia-warn-against-financing-terrorism/7968302.html.

⁵⁸ See <https://shabellemedia.com/somali-intelligence-probes-al-shabaabs-finances-warns-public-against-zakat-payments>.

⁵⁹ See https://hiiraan.com/news4/2025/Feb/200142/al_shabaab_s_deadly_mogadishu_attacks_cost_up_to_80_000_unknowingly_funded_by_local_traders.aspx.

⁶⁰ See <https://acleddata.com/report/al-shabaab-targets-civilians-somalia-retaliation-installing-cctv-cameras-november-2024>.

international partners and issues with the timely documentation, transfer and secure storage of material captured from Al-Shabaab. The Secretary-General noted that national systems were still susceptible to diversion risks, especially in areas beyond the institutional footprint of Mogadishu.

Arms embargo violations by Al-Shabaab

59. During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab primarily obtained arms through battlefield captures and black market purchases. During the offensive in Middle Shabelle in February and July, Al-Shabaab forces briefly seized several towns (e.g. Muqokori and Tardo) following the withdrawal and redeployment of Somali units, which enabled them to capture significant quantities of weapons and equipment from Somali National Army stockpiles.⁶¹ Earlier, in March, Al-Shabaab fighters had ambushed Army units in the Aadan Yabaal district and captured multiple vehicles, including a technical vehicle mounted with a ZU-23 anti-aircraft cannon.⁶² In addition, the temporary seizure of a military base near the town of Balade on 27 February had enabled direct access to arms and ammunition from government stocks. Al-Shabaab further exploits explosives and remnants of war, habitually collecting unexploded ordnance, as well as military-grade explosives, converting them into improvised explosive devices.⁶³

60. In addition to battlefield captures, Al-Shabaab is assessed to benefit from broader procurement mechanisms, including access to local arms markets and exploitation of unsecured stockpiles. While the full extent of these networks remains unclear, repeated incidents of base overruns, seizures of government materials and the use of remnants of war suggest that diversion represents a recurring feature of their supply chain. The Panel will continue to investigate and further report on these networks as a priority.

V. Improvised explosive devices and explosive ordnance: scale and civilian cost

A. Scale of improvised explosive devices and explosive ordnance

61. The widespread use of improvised explosive devices in Somalia continues to pose a major threat to civilian lives and humanitarian access in Somalia. Data from the Mine Action Service showed that between January and September 2025 nearly 600 incidents occurred involving improvised explosive devices, causing an estimated 1,400–1,500 casualties, including civilians, security personnel and humanitarian workers.⁶⁴ January 2025 recorded the highest number of incidents at 86, followed by 69 in February, and 56 each in July and August. The trend likely represents Al-Shabaab's tactical response to government and AUSSOM operations, particularly during the liberation of Bariira in Lower Shabelle under Operation Silent Storm.⁶⁵

62. Despite the consistently high number of improvised explosive devices placed across the country, the coordinated efforts of the Somali security forces with the support of AUSSOM and the Mine Action Service have been crucial in reducing

⁶¹ See <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-july-24>.

⁶² Somali Guardian, “Al-Shabaab militants capture two key towns in Somalia’s Middle Shabelle region”, 8 March 2025.

⁶³ Africa Defense Forum, “Somalia’s counter-IED strategy is ‘whole-of-society’ effort”, 14 October 2025.

⁶⁴ See <https://unson.unmissions.org/un-launches-month-long-training-reduce-threat-explosive-devices-somalia>.

⁶⁵ Confidential report.

civilian harm. Through targeted training, clearance operations and risk-education programmes, these actors have considerably lowered the number of casualties relative to the scale of improvised explosive device contamination in Somalia.

B. Humanitarian impact of improvised explosive devices

63. While only 27 improvised explosive devices were recorded as directly targeting civilians in a 12-month period (September 2024–August 2025), the data significantly underreport civilian harm. Civilians are often killed or injured when such devices detonate near security convoys, AUSSOM patrols or clan militias, or in densely populated areas where Al-Shabaab aims to disrupt government activities. Injuries caused by the devices blur the combatant-civilian divide.

64. Improvised explosive devices cause both immediate and collateral harm to civilians. Immediate casualties occur during attacks in public areas and near civilian infrastructure. For example, on 4 October 2025, an improvised explosive device exploded at a teashop in Diinsoor, Bay region, popular among local security personnel, killing and injuring several civilians.⁶⁶ On the same day, a device detonated inside a house in a residential neighbourhood of Heliwa district in Banaadir, injuring three bystanders. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack.⁶⁷ These incidents illustrate how proximity to government or security sites increases civilians' risk of explosive violence. The destruction of bridges and culverts by explosive devices in South-West State, Hirshabelle and Galmudug has also made many areas inaccessible, further limiting humanitarian access, to the detriment of civilians living in these areas.⁶⁸

65. Recognizing the persistent threat posed by improvised explosive devices, the Government, in partnership with the Mine Action Service and the United Nations Support Office in Somalia, launched the country's first national counter-improvised explosive device strategy in September 2025.⁶⁹ The strategy seeks to strengthen Somali-led coordination in improvised explosive device prevention, clearance and response, develop national improvised explosive device and risk education capacity and improve the safety of humanitarian and civilian movements through better inter-agency coordination. The strategy is a critical policy milestone, aligning with broader efforts to localize mine action capabilities and incorporate counter-improvised explosive device measures into national security and humanitarian planning. However, implementation remains affected by limited resources, capacity gaps and ongoing insecurity, which prevent sustained clearance operations in high-risk districts.

66. The proliferation of improvised explosive devices in Somalia illustrates the widening intersection between armed conflict, terrorism and humanitarian crisis. While their tactical purpose is to counter State security and international partner operations, the strategic effect is the systematic terrorization and isolation of civilian populations. The highest number of improvised explosive device incidents occurred in areas of ongoing intense conflict, especially along front lines in the Lower and Middle Shabelle regions, as well as in Banaadir, Hiraan, Galguduud, Bay and Lower Juba.⁷⁰ In these regions, civilians are both the direct and indirect victims of explosive

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ See www.unocha.org/publications/report/somalia/somalia-humanitarian-access-snapshot-january-march-2025-13-april-2025.

⁶⁹ See www.unmas.org/en/un-welcomes-launch-of-somalias-new-strategy-to-counter-ieds.

⁷⁰ Confidential report.

violence, facing casualties, displacement and disruption to their livelihoods, while humanitarian actors face shrinking operational space.

VI. Charcoal ban

A. Implementation of the charcoal ban

67. The Panel does not currently have any active investigations into possible violations of the charcoal ban. However, it continues to monitor the one-off disposal of charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismaayo in line with resolution [2696 \(2023\)](#).

B. One-off, complete disposal of charcoal stockpiles

68. In its resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), the Security Council recognized the need to reduce the size of the charcoal stockpile in and around Kismaayo and, in its resolution [2696 \(2023\)](#), it therefore authorized a one-off disposal of charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismaayo for that purpose.

69. No further shipments of charcoal were reported to the Panel by the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the Jubaland State government or the Jubaland business community during the reporting period.

70. The Government of the United Arab Emirates confirmed on 19 August 2025 that the country had received three shipments of charcoal up to that time as part of the one-off charcoal disposal authorized under Security Council resolution [2696 \(2023\)](#). These shipments contained a total of 125,000 bags of charcoal delivered to Dubai on the cargo vessels *Fahad 4*, *MSV Fazlerabbi 2192* and *Al Salima-MNV-2190*. That report corresponds to the shipments reported in the Panel's previous report (see [S/2024/748](#), para. 139). The Panel received the customs declarations from the Federal Customs Authority of the United Arab Emirates, as well as invoices and permits issued by the country's Executive Office for Control and Non-proliferation for the three shipments.

71. The United Arab Emirates informed the Panel that there were no other shipments by Waamo Trade and Logistics Company to the United Arab Emirates and that the quantity of shipments delivered had no significant impact on the charcoal market in the country.

72. The Panel noted changes to the charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismaayo on satellite images, with reductions and additions between 3 November 2024 and 9 September 2025. However, it is not possible to determine if charcoal has been moved or new charcoal added.

VII. Maritime security

A. Arms trafficking and maritime interdictions

73. The Panel continues to monitor maritime smuggling networks active in Somali waters potentially involved in supplying weapons and ammunition to Al-Shabaab, ISIL-Somalia and pirate groups in Somalia in violation of the arms embargo pursuant to resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#). The Panel noted two weapon interdictions on vessels during the reporting period by the Puntland Maritime Police Force near Boosaaso.

74. The Panel also recorded rocket-propelled grenades intercepted on a skiff off Bereeda by Puntland authorities during a pirate-related arrest on 1 September 2024 (see annex 5).

75. On 16 April 2025, United States Africa Command, in coordination with the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, conducted air strikes against a flagless vessel and a smaller supporting vessel inside Somali territorial waters allegedly in the process of smuggling weapons to/for Al-Shabaab.⁷¹

B. Piracy and armed robbery of vessels

76. In paragraph 29 of resolution [2776 \(2025\)](#), the Security Council urged the Government, AUSSOM and partners to share information with the Panel regarding conduct or activities by Al-Shabaab and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia and the region, where covered by listing criteria for targeted sanctions. These listing criteria include having engaged in, or provided support for, acts that threatened the peace, security or stability of Somalia. Piracy and armed robbery against vessels⁷² threaten the peace, security or stability not only of Somalia, but also of the region as a whole, as well as shipping engaged in innocent passage in the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Western Indian Ocean. In this context, the Panel has been investigating the recent uptick of piracy and armed robbery of ships by suspected Somali pirates (see annex 3).

C. Attacks by Somali pirates since August 2024

77. In the Panel's previous report, 25 attacks were recorded between 24 November 2023 and 15 August 2024 (see [S/2024/748](#), paras. 150 and 152). A substantial decrease in incidents was noted during the current reporting period, during which the Panel noted five incidents, including four successful hijackings (see figure below and annex 4). All recorded hijackings were on foreign fishing vessels and dhows within the territorial waters of Somalia. In addition to these hijackings, a fifth hijacking of a dhow was reported but has not yet been verified by the Panel. On 26 October 2025, the Maritime Security Centre Indian Ocean received an alert of the possible presence of a pirate group in the Garacad area in Puntland.⁷³ On 28 October, the Puntland Police Force reported to the Maritime Security Centre that two dhows had been engaged by pirates, with the pirates successfully hijacking one of the two vessels. The captured dhow could not be located by the authorities at the time of writing of the present report.⁷⁴


⁷¹ See <https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/35789/us-forces-conduct-strike-targeting-al-shabaab>.

⁷² Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea limits piracy to acts in international waters launched from a second vessel for private or financial ends, excluding attacks with a political motive. Acts committed in coastal waters up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles are considered armed robbery. In the present section, piracy is used in a general sense to include both piracy and armed robbery against vessels.

⁷³ Maritime Security Centre Indian Ocean, alert, 26 October 2025.

⁷⁴ Maritime Security Centre Indian Ocean, alert no. 013/25, 28 October 2025.

Figure
Attacks by Somali pirates, 16 August 2024 to 31 October 2025



Source: Panel of Experts.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ Compiled from several sources such as the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa, the European Union Naval Force, the Combined Maritime Forces, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations Centre, the Puntland Maritime Police Force, the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre, the Information Fusion Centre, the International Maritime Organization Ransom Global Integrated Shipping Information System, maritime security companies and media reports.

78. Although outside the reporting period, for the purpose of indicating the most recent developments, the Panel notes that attacks on commercial vessels in international waters resumed on 6 November 2025, when the Maltese-flagged product tanker *Hellas Aphrodite* (International Maritime Organization (IMO) No. 9722766) was attacked and boarded by suspected pirates 710 nautical miles off Mogadishu. The crew retreated to the citadel. On 7 November, a team from the Spanish frigate *Victoria* attached to the European Union Naval Force boarded the vessel and confirmed that the pirate suspects were no longer on board and that the crew was safe.

79. On 27 November 2024, thanks to open-source reporting, it was noted that the Chinese-flagged commercial fishing vessel *Liao Dong Yu 578* (IMO No. 8590350) had been boarded and hijacked by six armed men in the vicinity of Garmaal, Puntland. The *Liao Dong Yu 578* had a crew of 18 on board, including 16 Chinese nationals. On 30 November, the vessel left Jiifle in Puntland with approximately 40 armed pirates on board sailing to the open sea, leading to the assumption that the vessel would be used as a mothership.⁷⁶ The vessel was released on 13 January 2025⁷⁷ on payment of a ransom (see annex 7).⁷⁸

80. Since then, three Yemeni-flagged fishing dhows, *Al-Najma No. 481*,⁷⁹ *Saytuun-2*⁸⁰ and *Al-Hidayah 1*,⁸¹ were hijacked. They were all boarded by five or six individuals armed with assault rifles (see annex 8).

81. Inter-agency collaboration at the national and regional levels with the help of the Indo-Pacific Regional Information Sharing maritime operational coordination and communications platform has proven to be effective in putting pressure on the pirate groups. This is a possible reason why the hostage periods were relatively short, with vessels and crew held for between three and six days. In the case of the *Al-Najma No. 481* hijacking, the Yemeni Coast Guard notified all partners on the platform at 5.32 p.m. (Universal Time Coordinated) on 7 February 2025, seeking assistance. Photographs of the blue and white dhow were also uploaded to the system.⁸² On 13 February, the hijackers abandoned the vessel after stealing the crew's possessions close to the coast of Garacad, where it was then spotted by European Union Naval Force Operation Atalanta assets.

82. In the case of the *Saytuun-2*, the Yemeni Coast Guard reported that the vessel was stationary south of Eyl after running out of fuel. The Puntland Maritime Police Force then reported on the afternoon of 18 February 2025 that the vessel with the pirates on board had moved to Jiifle to replenish logistics. Over the next few days, the *Saytuun-2* could not be located.⁸³ However, on 22 February, the Yemeni Coast Guard reported that the armed men had abandoned the vessel after they had stolen some of the crew's possessions. The vessel was located by a helicopter from Operation Atalanta later that day. On 23 February, a Spanish navy vessel attached to

⁷⁶ Official source.

⁷⁷ See <https://x.com/ChineseSomalia/status/1878739830907215958>.

⁷⁸ Confidential sources.

⁷⁹ Commercial Crime Services, International Maritime Bureau, "Piracy and armed robbery against ships report for the period 1 January to 31 March 2025", April 2025.

⁸⁰ Martin Kelly, "MarSec incident alert, 2/25/041 of EOS Risk Group", 16 February 2025. Available at www.linkedin.com/posts/activity-7297306357714616321-9vVU.

⁸¹ See www.mscio.eu/media/documents/MSCIO_ATALANTA_WEEKLY_REPORT_29_AUG_-04_SEP.pdf.

⁸² See https://www.linkedin.com/posts/eu-crimario_somalia-ioris-yemenicoastguard-activity-7300467756494151681-Hxat.

⁸³ See www.mscio.eu/media/documents/MSCIO_ATALANTA_WEEKLY_REPORT_21-27_FEB_25_v.0.1.pdf.

Operation Atalanta conducted a friendly approach on the *Saytuun-2* south-east of Mukalla.

D. *Sea World* incident

83. The fifth reported incident was not perpetrated by a pirate group, but was a crime of opportunity. It was of concern that 49 machine guns were stolen by members of the public from the cargo ship *Sea World*.

84. On 18 July 2025, the Comoros-flagged general cargo ship *Sea World* (IMO No. 9324411) was drifting for reasons unknown for almost a day, 3 nautical miles off the coast of Bereeda, Puntland, on its way to the port of Mogadishu.⁸⁴ The vessel had departed from Izmir, Türkiye, on 28 June, carrying military equipment visible on the open deck.

85. The vessel did not request any assistance after encountering difficulties or when it was boarded by local fishermen, who broke open a container and stole 49 MG 3 machine guns.⁸⁵ Puntland Maritime Police Force members subsequently boarded and secured the remaining cargo on the *Sea World*.

86. A statement issued by the Office of the Attorney of Raas-Casayr region of Puntland ordered the return of the looted small arms and light weapons.⁸⁶ According to a confidential source, 21 of the stolen weapons were recovered, leaving 28 unaccounted for (see annex 9). This incident highlights the importance of verifying that shipping companies used to transport arms and ammunition are reliable and have a trustworthy record of ensuring that arms shipments reach their intended final destination.

E. Interdictions, arrests and prosecutions of pirate suspects

87. Between the end of November 2023 and mid-2024, at least 74 piracy suspects were apprehended in 13 cases by the European Union Naval Force, the United States Navy, the Indian Navy, the Seychelles Coast Guard and Somali authorities. The five pirates involved in the *Central Park* hijacking were convicted by authorities in Mogadishu on 26 December 2023. The Panel has no current updates of piracy cases in Puntland.

88. The Panel submitted official correspondence to the International Criminal Police Organization to cross-check the information on 74 pirate suspects arrested by various authorities since November 2023 against the Organization's Global Database on Maritime Piracy, but no further linkages other than those contained in the Panel's previous report could be found with the available data. The Panel continues to monitor progress relating to suspects arrested since 2023 and to report on any possible links to Al-Shabaab or any other armed groups or pirate networks.

89. In the cases of the Maltese-flagged bulk carrier *Ruen* hijacked on 14 December 2023 and the Iranian-flagged fishing dhow *Al Kambar 786* hijacked on 29 March 2024, the suspects arrested by the Indian Navy for perpetrating the incidents are being prosecuted in India (see annex 4).⁸⁷

⁸⁴ See <https://maritime.ihs.com>.

⁸⁵ Confidential source.

⁸⁶ See www.caasimada.net/puntland-oo-amartay-in-shacabka-laga-soo-celiyo-hubkii-lagala-dagay-markabka.

⁸⁷ The Panel wrote to India on 20 October 2025 for further information and awaits a reply.

90. In the case of the suspects arrested for the attempted hijacking of the Marshall Islands-flagged oil products tanker *Chrystal Arctic* and the hijacking of the Sri Lankan fishing dhow *Lorenzo Putha-4*, suspects are being prosecuted in the Supreme Court at Île du Port, Seychelles.⁸⁸ Both cases are ongoing.⁸⁹

91. Puntland authorities arrested an additional five piracy suspects during the reporting period. On 1 September 2024, they intercepted a suspected pirate skiff off Bereeda. Three of the seven suspects were apprehended. The confiscated equipment, such as rocket-propelled grenades, a ladder, electric extension cords, a grinder (for breaking into a ship's citadel) and fuel tanks, is typically associated with pirate operations.⁹⁰ On 27 September 2024 and 13 January 2025, respectively, authorities arrested an additional two suspects involved in the *Abdullah* hijacking, one of whom was allegedly the accountant for the pirate group (see annex 4).

92. In the Panel's assessment, it is unlikely that pirate attacks will end soon, and the risk to both commercial vessels and fishing dhows is still high. Piracy incidents are, however, unlikely to rise to the levels reached between 2008 and 2012 if operational cooperation among international and regional countries and stakeholders remains in place and vessels continue to implement best management practices on ships such as onboard armed guards.

VIII. Key protection and humanitarian considerations

A. Impact of conflict and insecurity on the civilian population

93. Conflict continues to cause severe protection and displacement crises across the country. The humanitarian situation is compounded by cyclical droughts and flash floods, which further strain limited coping capacities. In the reporting period, Al-Shabaab conducted major operations in Hiraan, Galguduud and Middle Shabelle, including the seizure of Aadan Yabaal, Moqokori, Tardo and Maxaas, which disrupted supply routes and displaced civilians. Between 24 March and 21 September 2025, the United Nations recorded 395 civilian casualties in Somalia, a slight decrease of 1.7 per cent from the period 23 September 2024 to 23 March 2025, when there were 402 casualties. Of these casualties, 144 were killed and 251 injured, compared with 146 killed and 194 injured in the period from 25 January to 23 May 2024. Of those killed, 103 were men, 21 women, 13 boys and 7 girls. Meanwhile, 138 men, 43 women, 39 boys, 23 girls and 8 persons of unspecified gender were injured. Al-Shabaab remained the primary perpetrator, responsible for 40 per cent of the total (see [S/2025/613](#), para. 36).

B. Key considerations concerning internally displaced persons

94. As of October 2025, an estimated 3.5 million people remain internally displaced in Somalia, many of whom have experienced multiple displacements over several years. According to the most recent report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, between January and July 2025, approximately 219,000 people were newly displaced, 54 per cent due to conflict and insecurity. During the same period, 141,900 individuals were forcibly evicted from informal settlements, primarily in urban areas such as

⁸⁸ The Panel wrote to Seychelles on 20 October 2025 for further information and awaits a reply.

⁸⁹ Supreme Court of Seychelles, criminal cases for hearing at Île du Port. Available at www.judiciary.sc.

⁹⁰ Official confidential source, see picture in annex 6.

Mogadishu, Baidoa and Beledweyne, due to land tenure disputes and pressure from urban redevelopment (*ibid.*, paras. 50 and 51).

95. Conflict involving Al-Shabaab continued to be a main cause of displacement across 12 regions. The highest numbers were recorded in Banaadir and Middle Shabelle, where 58,269 and 24,293 people, respectively, were displaced, accounting for 90 per cent and 98 per cent of all conflict-related movements in those regions.⁹¹ Similarly, in both Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba, more than 90 per cent of conflict-related displacement was linked to Al-Shabaab, with 12,989 and 10,193 people, respectively, affected during the reporting period. The Panel will continue to investigate the reasons behind displacement in more detail.

C. Humanitarian access

96. Access remains severely constrained. The United Nations logged 90 access incidents between March and September 2025, including road closures, threats and violence against aid workers (*ibid.*, para. 49). Between August and October 2025, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported 50 humanitarian access incidents, a slight rise from 45 incidents in the previous three months. August 2025 recorded the highest number of incidents (22), with hotspots including Kismaayo in Lower Juba, Beled Xaawo and Luuq in Gedo, Buloburde and Muqakoori in Hiraan, and Banaadir. These incidents were caused mainly by armed clashes, inter-clan violence and administrative barriers. The main constraints reported were violence or threats against personnel and assets (12 incidents), movement restrictions (11 incidents), military operations and hostilities (11 incidents) and interference with humanitarian activities (8 incidents).⁹²

97. Road closures, movement restrictions and general insecurity have become common along critical corridors in Lower Shabelle, Bay and Middle Shabelle, delaying or obstructing the delivery of food, medical supplies and emergency shelter to affected populations.⁹³ The risk of improvised explosive device contamination has escalated operational costs, as agencies must deploy specialized clearance, risk assessment and security escort teams before each convoy movement.⁹⁴ The Panel will continue to investigate humanitarian access constraints in Somalia.

D. Sexual and gender-based violence

98. Sexual and gender-based violence remains endemic in the conflict and displacement landscape of Somalia. Between March and August 2025, 14,915 cases were reported nationwide, with 9,210 survivors able to access some form of medical, legal or psychosocial care (see [S/2025/613](#), para. 51). The United Nations verified eight conflict-related sexual violence incidents, involving five girls and seven women – all internally displaced persons – including six gang rapes and two cases of sexual slavery (*ibid.*, para. 43). Al-Shabaab continues to be among the main perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence (*ibid.*, para. 41). The Panel notes that sexual and gender-based violence in Somalia remains widespread and significantly underreported. It continues to affect vulnerable groups, such as children, women and

⁹¹ Numbers calculated based on International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix dataset. Available from <https://dtm.iom.int/datasets/somalia-emergency-trend-tracking-dataset-february-2025>.

⁹² See www.unocha.org/publications/report/somalia/somalia-humanitarian-access-snapshot-july-september-2025.

⁹³ See <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/07/1165537>.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

internally displaced persons. The Panel will continue to investigate reports and cases of sexual and gender-based violence as they apply to the Panel's mandate.

99. For instance, according to open-source reporting, it was noted that on 13 June 2025 in the town of Laascaanood two sisters aged 16 and 17 years were assaulted and gang-raped by 25 men aged 17 to 20 years. Both sisters were critically injured. They had moved from Ceerigaabo to Laascaanood to escape conflict. Their experiences attest to the brutality and perversity of sexual and gender-based violence resulting from armed conflict in Somalia.

100. Legislative efforts in 2025 signal some progress. The revision of the rape and indecency bill of 2023 represents an incremental step towards harmonizing the country's legal framework with international human rights standards (*ibid.*, paras. 44 and 45). Nonetheless, impunity remains widespread, with survivors facing social stigma, threats of retaliation and a judicial system ill equipped to prosecute sexual crimes effectively. In Al-Shabaab-influenced districts, sexual violence is largely unreported, driven by fear, restricted mobility and the near absence of specialized services.⁹⁵

IX. Recommendations

101. The Panel recommends that the Security Council:

- (a) Encourage the Government, the federal member states and States Members of the United Nations to facilitate Panel access to suspected members of Al-Shabaab and other persons of interest held in custody, including defectors and detainees held on terrorism, terrorist financing and weapons smuggling charges;
- (b) Encourage Member States to share information and work with the Panel regarding individuals supporting Al-Shabaab through propaganda, financing, recruitment and materiel support.

102. The Panel recommends that the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) concerning Al-Shabaab:

- (a) Request, considering the recent transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM, that the African Union facilitate cooperation between the Panel and AUSSOM, including access to documents, and trace recovered weapons, ammunition and related material, in line with its mandate;
- (b) Work with the Panel to conduct an immediate, and thereafter annual, review of the sanctions list pursuant to resolution 1844 (2008) and produce recommendations to the Committee to amend or delist individuals who no longer fit the listing criteria for the mandate;
- (c) Engage with the Panel to produce, if available, statements of case for any individuals or entities that, through its investigations, meet the standards for listing on the sanctions list pursuant to resolution 1844 (2008) and provide these statements of case to the Committee to consider listing these individuals or entities.

⁹⁵ See www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/somalia.

Annex 1: Methodology

1. The Panel ensured compliance with the methodological standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). As a matter of principle, the Panel strives to rely on verified documents and, wherever possible, on first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves, including photographs.⁹⁶ It endeavours to ensure that their assertions are corroborated by solid information and that their findings are substantiated by credible sources.⁹⁷
2. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, in the development of its reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of four out of the five members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be made based on unanimity.
3. The Panel used satellite imagery procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations, as well as open-source imagery. Commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data were referenced. Public statements by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. While the Panel wishes to be as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel decided not to include identifying information in this document.
4. The Panel reviewed social media and always seeks to corroborate using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
5. All major locations in Somalia are spelled or referenced as per the UN Geographical Information System (GIS).
6. The Panel is committed to impartiality in investigating incidents of non-compliance by any party.
7. The Panel is conscious that upholding the confidentiality of sources of information regarding sanctions-busting or non-compliance may be necessary to ensure the personal safety of individual sources. In all cases, the Panel makes effort to ensure the veracity of information gained in confidence against independent and verifiable sources.⁹⁸ While maintaining confidentiality, the Panel may provide more clarification on such sources by attributing such information received from States to an “official but confidential” source.⁹⁹
8. With regards to the opportunity to reply, the Panel observes impartiality and fairness during the report drafting process, and make available to relevant parties (State authorities, entities or individuals), if appropriate, any evidence of wrongdoing for their review, comment and response, within a specified deadline. Responses will be assessed by the Panel and when the Panel agrees, it will seek to address this in future reports by noting the change in previously reported assessments.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ S/2006/997, para 22

⁹⁷ S/2006/997, para 23

⁹⁸ S/2006/997, para 24

⁹⁹ S/2006/997, para 25

¹⁰⁰ S/2006/997, para 28

Annex 2: Pictures of seized materials from ISIL Somalia in Al-Miskaat

Source for all: confidential report received by the Panel



Travel documents



Weapons and ammunition



Weapons and ammunition (continued)



Weapons and ammunition (continued)



Weapons and ammunition (continued)



Weapons and ammunition (continued)



Weapons and ammunition (continued)



Medical supplies



UAVs and components



UAVs and components (continued)




UAVs and components (continued)




IED components

Annex 3: Overview Piracy and Armed Robbery of Ships off Somalia 2003 to 2025


Piracy and Armed Robbery of Ships off Somalia 2003 to 2025



Piracy and Armed Robbery of Ships off Somalia 2003 to 2025



Total Hostages held in Somalia 2003 to 2025



Source: Panel of Experts

Annex 4: Interceptions, Arrests and Prosecution of Pirate Suspects

Update on Piracy Prosecutions

Name of Vessel and Flag	Date Intercepted	Country Prosecuting	Case Number	Update on Case	Number suspects arrested
Lorenzo Putha-4, Fishing Dhow, Sri Lanka	28/01/2024	Supreme Court and Constitutional Court at Ile Du Port, Seychelles	SPC-00-CR-CO-0036-2024 "The Republic Vs 1.Abdihalim Ali. Ahmed 2.Mohammed Ali Mousa 3. Aidarous Youssouf"; CON-00-CV-CP-0002-2025 The Republic (C/o Kimberly Doffay) Vs Abdihalim Ali Ahmed, Mohammed Ali Mousa, Aidarous Youssouf	The case was scheduled for hearing from 3 to 7 February 2025 in the Supreme Court before Judge D.Esparon. Three subsequent hearings. Matter referred to Constitutional Court for hearing on 8 Jul 2025 in accordance with Article 46 (7) of the constitution which outlines how individuals can petition the court for redress regarding human rights violations. Last appearance on 8 September 2025. ¹⁰¹	3
Unknown	5/02/2024	Puntland, Somalia		Unknown	3
Ruen, Bulk Carrier, Malta	24/02/2024	Puntland, Somalia		Unknown	3
Ruen, Bulk Carrier, Malta	16/03/2024	Mumbai, India		On 26 August 2024, reports indicate that a 4,000-page chargesheet was filed by the Yellow Gate police in Mumbai. The police recorded statements of 70 witnesses, including crew of the MV Ruen and crew of the Indian Navy Ship Kolkata. The chargesheet noted that two foreign nationals were wanted in the case. In addition, two boats, three engines, 196 live cartridges, one magazine, a knife and a rocket launcher	35

¹⁰¹ The Republic of Seychelles in the Supreme Court at: Ile Du Port Criminal Cases for Hearing; <https://www.judiciary.sc>

				were seized by the Navy from the pirate suspects. ¹⁰²	
Abdullah, Bulk Carrier, Bangladesh	17/03/2024	Puntland, Somalia		Unknown	2
Al Kambar 786, Fishing Dhow, Iran	29/03/2024	Mumbai, India		On 30 June 2025 a 1,500 chargesheet was filed. No statements of the Pakistani nationals were recorded at that stage.	9
Chrystal Arctic, Products Tanker, Marshall Islands	10/05/2024	Supreme Court at Ile Du Port, Seychelles	SPC-00-CR-CO-0038-2024 The Republic vs Daioud Isalah Abdikader Youssouf Ahmed Aden Ahdilahi Mohamed Mohamed Abshi Dayah Ali	Three court appearances before Hon.Judge B. Adeline. Last hearing on 11 September 2025.	6
N/A	1/09/2024	Puntland		Puntland authorities intercepted a suspected pirate skiff off Bareeda.	
Abdullah, Bulk Carrier, Bangladesh	27/09/2024	Puntland		Suspect arrested in Jiffle. ¹⁰³	1
Abdullah, Bulk Carrier, Bangladesh	13/01/2025	Puntland		Puntland authorities arrested the accountant believed to have managed finances for the group that hijacked the MV Abdullah ¹⁰⁴	1

Source: Panel of Experts

¹⁰² Vinay Dalvi, 4,000-page chargesheet: 35 Somali pirates hijacked MV Ruen vessel to demand ₹500 crore ransom, Hindustan Times News, 27 August 2024, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/mumbai-news/4000page-chargesheet-35-somali-pirates-hijacked-mv-ruen-vessel-to-demand-500-crore-ransom-101724699621203.html>

¹⁰³ PMPF Intelligence, Piracy Incident Report, 27 September 2025.

¹⁰⁴ https://hiiraan.com/news4/2025/Jan/199804/puntland_captures_pirate_accountant_linked_to_mv_abdullah_hijacking.aspx

On 1 September 2024, Puntland authorities intercepted a suspected pirate skiff off Bareeda. Equipment confiscated is typically associated with pirate operations such as rocket propelled grenades, a ladder, electric extension cords, a grinder (for breaking into a citadel), and fuel tanks.

Pirate suspects arrested on 1 September 2024



Source: Puntland Police Force¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Puntland Police Force, 2 September 2024,
https://www.facebook.com/PLPoliceForce/posts/pfbid038xQoTdPsr6WUvwxFBDTiKEHqU1Sngv2kC3vcc4ujSs3Uv2NR7depRG1GAwH42wFl?_rdc=1&_rdr

Annex 5: Rocket propelled grenades, electric extension cords, and a grinder (for breaking into a citadel) were confiscated



Source: Puntland Police Force

Annex 6: Equipment confiscated - ladder and fuel tanks




Source: Puntland Police Force

Annex 7: Liao Dong Yu 578 Hijacking

On 27 November 2024, the Chinese flagged fishing vessel, Liao Dong Yu 578 (IMO No 8590350), owned by Liaoning Daping Fishery Group Co Ltd (Company IMO No 4305173)¹⁰⁶ was hijacked in the vicinity of Garmaal¹⁰⁷, Puntland in territorial waters.

Prior to the hijacking the Liao Dong Yu 578 AIS track ended on 10 May 2024 north of Muscat, Oman.



Source: Data Source Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ <https://maritime.ihs.com/Companies/Details/4305173>

¹⁰⁷ PMPF

¹⁰⁸ <https://maritime.ihs.com>

A EUNAVFOR ATALANTA naval vessel monitoring the hijacked fishing vessel Liao Dong Yu 578 off Puntland



Source: EUNAVFOR ATALANTA

The Pirates and 18 hostages onboard the Liao Dong Yu 578



Source: Mohamud Nadif¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ <https://x.com/MohamudNadif/status/1868925472022950247>

Annex 8: Hijacking of Fishing Dhows

On the night 7 February 2025, the Yemen flagged dhow Al-Najma No. 481 was hijacked by six armed perpetrators while underway 6nm SE of Eyl, Puntland¹¹⁰. The vessel had 12 Yemeni seafarers and a Somali guard onboard¹¹¹. The guard was released later. The attackers seized two skiffs from the dhow each equipped with 60hp engines.¹¹² On 13 February 2025 the hijackers abandoned the vessel after stealing crew's possessions close to the coast of Garacad where it was spotted by ATALANTA assets.

Al-Najma No. 481



Source: MSCIO¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Commercial Crime Services, International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Report for the Period 1 January to 31 March 2025.

¹¹¹ MSCIO, Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin (IRTB) 044 (Update 2 – Final Update), 11 February 2025, https://mscio.eu/documents/108/20250210-Industry_Releasable_Threat_Bulletin_update2.pdf

¹¹² EO CRIMARIO, https://www.linkedin.com/posts/eu-crimario_somalia-ioris-yemenicoastguard-activity-7300467756494151681-Hxat/

¹¹³ MSCIO, IRTB 044

Al-Najma No. 481



Source: MSCIO

ESP SANTA MARIA assisting Al-Najma No. 481 after their release




Source: MSCIO¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ MSCIO, IRTB 044

On 16 February 2025 at 23:30LT, the Yemeni-flagged fishing vessel Saytuun-2 was hijacked off Garmaal, North of Eyl in Puntland.¹¹⁵ The vessel has a crew of five. On 18 February 2025 the Yemen Coast Guard reported that the vessel was stationary south of Eyl after running out of fuel. The Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) reported on the afternoon of 18 February 2025 afternoon that the vessel with the pirates on board moved to Jiifle to replenish logistics. In the next few days, the Saytuun-2 could not be located.¹¹⁶

Waypoints of fishing dhow SAYTUUN-2 during the capture



Source: MSCIO¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Martin Kelly, MarSec Incident Alert, 2/25/041: 16 February 2025, EOS Risk Group, <https://www.linkedin.com/posts/activity-7297306357714616321-9vVU>

¹¹⁶ MSCIO ATALANTA, Weekly Report 21- 27 February 2025, https://www.msocio.eu/media/documents/MSCIO_ATALANTA_WEEKLY_REPORT_21-27_FEB_25_v.0.1.pdf

¹¹⁷ Ibid

SAYTUUN-2



Source: MSCIO

SAYTUUN-2 after released



Source: MSCIO


SAYTUUN-2 after released



Source: MSCIO

On 16 March 2025 the Yemeni flagged fishing dhow Al- Hidaya 1 was hijacked while underway off Durdura, 80 NM north of Eyl by a group of five armed men¹¹⁸. The dhow has a crew of eight Somalis. The vessel has been abandoned by the hijackers near Dhinowda on 19 March 25¹¹⁹.

Yemeni flagged fishing dhow Al- Hidaya 1



CS CamScanner - المسحوبة بجهاز

Source: MSCIO¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT 29 August – 04 September,

https://www.ms cio.eu/media/documents/MSCIO_ATALANTA_WEEKLY_REPORT_29_AUG_-04_SEP.pdf


¹¹⁹ MSCIO, IRTB 046, (Update 1 – Final Update), ch20 MAR 2025, https://www.ms cio.eu/documents/145/20250320-Industry_Releasable_Threat_Bulletin_046_Upd1.pdf

¹²⁰ Ibid

Annex 9: Theft of weapons from Sea World

On 18 July 2025, the Comoros flagged General Cargo Ship, Sea World (IMO 9324411) was drifting 3 nautical miles off the coast of Bareeda, Puntland while underway to Mogadishu Port June carrying military equipment intended for the TURKSOM Military Training Centre in Mogadishu¹²¹. A group of local fishermen boarded the vessel, and stole 49 MG 3 machine guns.¹²²

In the early morning hours of 18 July the Sea World drifted for a day 3nm off Bareeda, Puntland. The PMPF boarded, after which the vessel sailed to Bossaso, where it remained from 19 July to 6 August. It first sailed in the direction of Mogadishu, but turned back to Djibouti on 10 August. It arrived at Djibouti Outer Anchorage on 14 August, had ship to ship bunkering operations on 22 August and left for Mogadishu on 25 August. Sea World reached Mogadishu anchorage on 12 September and discharged the arms cargo at port as of 13 September.



Source: Data Source Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite¹²³

¹²¹ Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite, <https://maritime.ihs.com>

¹²² Confidential Source

¹²³ <https://maritime.ihs.com>

Letter by the office of the Public Prosecutor Raas-Casayr region of Puntland



Xafiiska Xee r-Ilaaliya Gobolka Raas Casayr - Caluula
Office Of the Prosecutor Rasa Asayr Region - Alulua

SUM: XXI/GR/296/2025

TR: 19/07/2025

Ku: Taliyaha Qaybta Booliska G/Raasa-Casayr	Caluula
Og: Xeer-ilaaliyaha Guud Ee Dowladda Puntland	Garoowe
Og: Taliska Guud Ee Ciidanka Boolisska DPL	Garoowe

Ujeeddo: Amar Baariseed si waafaqsan Qod: 24 XHCS :-

Waxaa soo gaadhadh XXI G/Rasa-Casayr warbixin sheegeysa in Markab sida hub lagu qabtay biyaha Badda ee Degmada Bareeda, Markabkaas oo magaciisu yahay (Sea World), kaas oo siday hub, hubkaas oo qayb ka mid ah uu gacanta u galay dad shacab ah, oo ku dhaqan Degmadda Bareeda iyo Caluula taariikhdu markii ay ahayd 18/7/2025 abaaro 2:00pm Duhurnimo.

Sidaa darteed waxaa la farayaan Taliyaha Qaybta Booliska ee G/Raasa-casayr, in aad xafiiska la soo wadaagto warbixinta Markabka Sea World, iyo hubka gacanta shacabka galay, iyo cidda ka masuulka ah.

F/G, waxaa sidoo kale lagaa doonayaa in aad warbixinta ku soo lifaaqdo dadka fulay Markabkan xogtooda oo dhamaystiran.

FULIN WACAN

Xeer-Ilaaliyaha G/Raasa-casayr

Abdirahman Mahamuod Ali

Saxiixa :



Alluula District
Raas-Casayr Region
Puntland - Somalia

Laqanya01@gmail.com
3939

P.O.BOX 96

Source: Caasimada¹²⁴

¹²⁴ Jamaal Maxamed, Puntland oo shaacisay in la bililiqeystay hub saarnaa markabkii ay ka qabsatay DF, Caasimada, 20 July 2025; <https://www.caasimada.net/puntland-oo-amartay-in-shacabka-laga-soo-celiyo-hubkii-lagala-dagay-markabka/>

Unofficial translation:

Date: 19/07/2025

To: Commander of the Police Division G/Raasa-Asayr, Alula

CC: Attorney General of Puntland, Garowe

CC: General Command of the DPL Police Force, Garowe

Purpose: Investigation Order in accordance with Article: 24 of the Criminal Procedure Code:

G/Rasa-Asayr has received a report stating that a ship carrying weapons was seized in the waters of the Bareeda District. The ship, named (Sea World), was carrying weapons, some of which were seized by civilians in the Bareeda and Alula Districts on 18/7/2025 at around 2:00pm.

Therefore, the Commander of the Police Department of G/Raasa-Asayr is instructed to share with the office the information about the Sea World ship, the weapons that have fallen into the hands of the public, and who is responsible.

F/G, you are also required to attach to the report a complete list of the people who boarded this ship.

Abdirahman Mahamuod Ali

Sea World docked in Bosaso



Source: Jama Deperani Spokesperson Puntland State House¹²⁵

¹²⁵ https://x.com/jama_deperani/status/1946626182574731681