



European Union
Election Observation Mission

GUYANA 2025

Final Report

General and Regional Elections

1 September 2025



EU ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION

Guyana 2025

GENERAL AND REGIONAL ELECTIONS

FINAL REPORT

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFC	Alliance for Change
AG	Attorney General
ALP	The Assembly for Liberty and Prosperity
AmCham	American Chamber of Commerce
ANUG	A New and United Guyana
APNU	A Partnership for National Unity
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CCJ	Caribbean Court of Justice
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEO	Chief Election Officer
CEOM	CARICOM Election Observation Mission
CERD	Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CG	Change Guyana
CLPR	Closed-List Proportional Representation
COG	Commonwealth Observer Mission
CRC	Constitutional Reform Commission
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CVE	Civic and Voter Education
DCEO	Deputy Chief Election Officer
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPO	Data Protection Office
DRO	Deputy Returning Officer
EOM	Election Observation Mission
EQ	Electoral Quota
ERC	Ethnic Relations Commission
EU	European Union
EUR	Euro
FDA	Fixed Date Application
FGM	Forward Guyana Movement
GC	Geographical Constituencies
GCCI	Georgetown Chamber of Commerce and Industry
GECOM	Guyana Elections Commission
GNBA	Guyana National Broadcasting Authority
GPA	Guyana Press Association
GPSU	Guyana Public Service Union
GYD	Guyana Dollar
IACAC	Inter-American Convention against Corruption
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICRMW	International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families
LJP	Liberty and Justice Party
MCC	Media Code of Conduct
NA	National Assembly
NCD	National Commission on Disability
NCN	National Communications Network
NRA	National Registration Act
NRRD	National Register of Registrants Database
OAS	Organization of American States
OLE	Official List of Electors
OVP	Organisation for the Victory of the People

PLE	Preliminary List of Electors
PNC/R	People's National Congress/Reform
PPP/C	People's Progressive Party/Civic
PRO	Public Relations Officer
PRP	People's Republic Party
PS	Polling Station
PSC	Private Sector Commission
RDC	Regional Democratic Council
RLE	Revised List of Electors
RO	Returning Officer
RoPA	Representation of the People Act
SoP	Statement of Poll
SRO	Supernumerary Returning Officer
TCI	The Citizenship Initiative
TNM	The New Movement
UN	United Nations
UNCAC	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UPR	Universal Periodic Review
WG	Working Group
WIN	We Invest in Nationhood

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2025 general and regional elections in Guyana were peaceful and well-run, with Election Day and tabulation processes administered efficiently and voters able to cast their ballots in an orderly environment. The polls, however, unfolded in a context of deep political polarisation and mistrust lingering from the 2020 elections, alongside high expectations linked to growing oil revenues. Six political parties contested, with new movements challenging the established historical two-party dominance. The legal framework is broadly adequate. Despite some positive recent reforms, persistent gaps remain in party regulation, campaign finance, and the media environment. GECOM managed operations effectively. Its politicised structure, however, undermined trust in the process among the opposition parties. Campaigning was generally calm but marked by confrontational rhetoric, instances of unequal access, and allegations of pressure on civil servants. The undue advantage of the ruling party, misuse of state resources, partisan media coverage, and unregulated campaign finance distorted the level playing field.

Six political parties contested, including the long-established People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) and A Partnership for National Unity (APNU), traditionally aligned respectively with Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese communities, the Alliance for Change (AFC), and three new movements founded in 2025: Forward Guyana Movement (FGM), Assembly for Liberty and Prosperity (ALP), and We Invest in Nationhood (WIN). Indigenous peoples were viewed as a pivotal constituency, while WIN emerged as a notable challenger to the two-party dominance by positioning successfully itself as an alternative beyond ethnic lines.

The legal framework provides an adequate basis for conducting key stages of democratic elections, including candidate nomination, voting, counting, and tabulation. It is rooted in the Constitution and supported by core electoral laws, most notably the Representation of the People Act (RoPA) and the National Registration Act, both amended in 2022. The reforms, tested for the first time in the 2025 elections, included new key transparency measures, including real-time on-line publication of polling station results protocols, Statements of Poll (SoP), on receipt by designated returning officers, marking a significant legal improvement for the traceability of results. Despite these changes, a number of ambiguities and issues remain to be addressed in areas relating to the regulation of political parties, financial accountability, and the media environment. International obligations, including UN and regional treaties, are formally recognised but some remain only partially operationalised in domestic law, leaving gaps in the protection of rights and transparency. The Constitutional Reform Commission was formed in 2024 to consult on the review, among other matters, the legal framework but it has yet to begin its work.

The Guyana Elections Commission's (GECOM) structure and decision-making remain heavily influenced by political divisions. Commission members often expressed conflicting stances about the election process, publicly compromising an already reduced trust in the institution. The current composition of GECOM, appointed between 2007 and 2022, represents a fixed tenure that does not reflect the changing configuration of the National Assembly. The GECOM Secretariat managed the elections efficiently. However, GECOM's public communication was inconsistent; there was insufficient direct engagement with the public and media, leaving space for uncertainty and misinformation to spread.

The final voter list contained a total of 757,690 registered voters, including those living abroad and Commonwealth citizens residing in Guyana. Opposition parties questioned the accuracy of the voter list, claiming it was inflated. Combined with the absence of reliable population data, this fuelled a narrative of potential voter list manipulation in the elections. Prisoners and non-convicted detainees cannot vote although there are no legal restrictions (with limited

exceptions). In practice, the lack of specific rules and practical arrangements for voting in places of detention results in the disenfranchisement of this category of voters.

In an inclusive and timely candidate registration process, GECOM approved six political parties to contest, all of which complied with the legal requirements, including having one third women candidates and competing in at least six of the ten regions. The People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C), A Partnership for National Unity (APNU), We Invest in Nationhood (WIN) and Alliance for Change (AFC) contested all ten geographical constituencies while Forward Guyana Movement (FGM) ran in seven, and Assembly for Liberty and Prosperity (ALP) in six. In total, 2,424 candidates contested the general and regional elections. For the National Assembly, 771 candidates (50 per cent women) competed for 65 seats.

The campaign was largely peaceful with no major incidents, yet increasingly confrontational rhetoric involving PPP/C, WIN, and APNU representatives was observed closer to Election Day. Part of this rhetoric was linked to the reported use of US sanctions against WIN Presidential candidate Azruddin Mohamed to impose no-fly restrictions and to close his bank accounts. Banks extended account closures to over 70 WIN members, including candidates, in a process criticised for lack of transparency by various stakeholders. Most candidates were able to campaign freely. The EU EOM received reports from opposition political parties alleging they had been unfairly denied the use of public venues in a few instances and that they had been hindered to campaign in some Indigenous villages. Cases of direct pressure on civil servants and part-time governmental employees were also reported, with instances of demotions or transfers based on support for WIN candidates.

An undue advantage of incumbency distorted the level playing field during the election campaign. The President and his administration inaugurated a high number of public projects (hospitals, schools, roads and bridges), at the same time, the state media and government-run social media accounts were instrumentalised to amplify campaign messages, further blurring the line between state and party. New or expanded social programmes were launched in the pre-election period, while beneficiaries of government cash grants reported receiving unsolicited calls encouraging them to support the ruling party, raising concerns over misuse of personal data.

Campaign finance is under-regulated, resulting in a lack of transparency and accountability. Although RoPA sets expenditure ceilings for candidate lists and mandates detailed reporting of expenses, the current limit is outdated and unrealistic, and permissible expenditures are narrowly defined. Sanctions exist for violations, yet in practice with little effective enforcement. The legal framework does not address the use of social media or digital campaigning, leaving space for significant spending by parties and third parties. There are also no provisions on permissible sources of funding, donations, foreign contributions, third-party spending, or online advertising. Political parties frequently fail to report as required, while GECOM lacks the capacity to oversee compliance.

The media environment in Guyana is vibrant but highly polarised, with state-run and most private outlets strongly favouring the ruling PPP/C, limiting voters' access to balanced information. While a few independent media maintained impartial coverage, overall reporting was shaped by partisanship, confrontational relations with political actors, and occasional threats or legal pressure on journalists. State funded broadcasts largely excluded opposition voices, and campaign coverage is not subject to any media regulation, leaving contestants without guarantees of balanced and equitable access. Independent broadcasters and print outlets provided more balanced coverage, yet the absence of effective safeguards and the overlap between government communication and campaign activities further constrained pluralistic and objective reporting.

The digital information environment was vigorous and antagonistic, marred by manipulative content, leaving little space for a respectful and pluralistic debate. Political discourse on Facebook and TikTok was driven by a small number of influencers and digital media, many of whom showed close alignment with the PPP/C, WIN or APNU. Legal gaps enabled misuse of some voters' private data for political gains. Encouragingly, a few popular digital media and personal pages offered a nonpartisan view on the elections, helping voters to make an informed choice.

Guyana's legal framework supports women's political participation through special measures, resulting in strong representation in the 2025 elections, with 43 per cent of national Top-up and 51 per cent of Regional Democratic Councils (RDC) candidates being women, including two presidential contenders. Women played a crucial role and were active across campaigns, GECOM leadership, and public life, reflecting progress that placed Guyana 31st globally for women in parliament in 2024. However, gaps remain in ensuring party transparency on gender equality, while online abuse targeting women politicians and activists underscored the need for stronger protections against gender-based on-line harassment in the electoral process.

Indigenous peoples, estimated at 10–15 per cent of the population, remain an important electorate with established local governance systems and involvement in national politics, though their participation faces challenges of remoteness, limited access to information, and socio-economic dependency on government subsidies. Community leaders (Toshaos) often contributed positively to inclusive campaigning. In other instances, however, reports indicated that opposition parties faced restricted access to villages under the Amerindian Act, compared to the ruling party. Indigenous representation following the 2025 results comprised six National Assembly members with one cabinet appointee.

Persons with disabilities in Guyana continue to face significant barriers to equal electoral participation, as the legislative framework lacks effective enforcement. Representative organisations highlighted low compliance with accessibility standards, noting that recommendations for ramps and tactile ballots were not implemented before Election Day. While the law foresees options such as proxy voting or voting with an assistant, some stakeholders expressed concerns about insufficiently targeted information on their use. EU EOM observed on Election Day some 59 per cent of the Polling Stations (PS) did not provide independent access for persons with reduced mobility and 32 per cent of PS had unsuitable layouts for these voters.

The accreditation process for observers was efficient. GECOM accredited 12 domestic observer organisations primarily from the private sector and five international observer missions. Most prominent domestic observers were professional bodies and interest groups, there were no civil society groups observing these elections. The legal framework does not provide for the same guarantees of access for national as for international election observers.

Overall, Election Day was assessed as peaceful and calm, with the voting and counting efficiently administered. All polling staff were present and performed professionally, with women comprising 87 per cent of staff and 81 per cent of presiding officers. Party agents from PPP/C, APNU and WIN were present in all observed polling stations, enhancing transparency, while local observers were seen in only 17 per cent. Campaign activities were noted near six per cent of polling stations. The opening was evaluated positively by EU EOM observers, with most polling stations opening on time and procedures followed correctly. Voting, procedures were generally respected, with polling staff explaining the process to voters in 93 per cent of observations, though rules on the use of mobile phones were inconsistently applied and secrecy of the vote was not always safeguarded.

GECOM announced the final results of the 2025 general and regional elections, with the PPP/C securing 55 per cent of the vote, 36 National Assembly seats, and the re-election of President Irfaan Ali. The newly formed WIN movement emerged as the main opposition with 16 seats, while APNU registered its weakest performance to date with 12 seats; FGM gained one seat, and the other two contesting parties failed to secure representation. The regional results closely mirrored the national outcome, with PPP/C winning majorities in six of the ten RDCs, APNU losing ground in traditional strongholds, and WIN taking control of Regions 7 and 10.

Priority Recommendations

- 1. Enhance the prospects for key electoral reforms through necessary electoral expertise as part of a robust CRC operational framework.*
- 2. Update the voter list in light of most recent available population data, and data from all relevant state institution, ensuring linking to ongoing digitalisation solutions.*
- 3. Adopt clear and comprehensive campaign rules, including for the conduct of public officials and for the use of all types of state assets to avoid undue advantage of incumbency.*
- 4. Strengthen the operational oversight for campaign finance through an independent oversight body and revising outdated legal provisions, including expenditure ceilings and permissible expenses.*
- 5. Establish media campaign coverage rules on equitable airtime and space for electoral contestants as well as political advertising, in a timely and consultative manner.*
- 6. Implement the Data Protection Act and establish a publicly accountable Data Protection office, thus effectively protect voters' personal data from undue publication and from misuse for political gains*

II. INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) deployed an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to observe the 1 September General and Regional Elections in Guyana following an invitation from the Government. The EOM was present from 23 July to 21 September 2025.

The EU EOM was led by the Chief Observer, Robert Biedroń, Member of the European Parliament from Poland. The EU EOM comprised a core team of nine experts based in Georgetown and 14 long-term observers who arrived on 2 August and deployed to all regions of the country. In addition, a total of 20 short-term observers reinforced the mission from 26 August to 4 September and deployed throughout the country.

For the Election Day, four locally recruited short-term observers from diplomatic representations of EU Member States supported the EOM. In total, the EU EOM deployed some 50 observers from 26 EU Member States, as well as from Norway.

The mission's mandate was to observe all aspects of the electoral process and assess the extent to which the elections complied with regional and international commitments and standards for elections, as well as with national legislation. The EU EOM is independent in its findings and conclusions and followed an established methodology while also adhering to the "Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation", endorsed under United Nations auspices in October 2005 and now followed by over 50 organisations.

III. POLITICAL CONTEXT

On 1 September 2025, Guyanese voters elected their President, the 65 members of the unicameral National Assembly (NA), and representatives to the ten Regional Democratic Councils (RDCs), in the 12th general and regional elections since the country's independence in 1966.

The elections took place in a highly polarised and evolving political landscape, against the backdrop of exponential oil revenue growth. Since the 2020 disputed elections, political divisions have remained strong, confidence in electoral institutions has not been fully restored, and demands for electoral and constitutional reform have intensified, but resulted in few substantive changes. A constitutional reform process, launched in 2024, has yet to start its public consultations.

The elections were contested by six political parties: The People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C), A Partnership for National Unity (APNU), the Alliance for Change, (AFC), and three newly created movements formed in 2025; Forward Guyana Movement (FGM), Assembly for Liberty and Prosperity (ALP) and We Invest in Nationhood (WIN). Guyana's traditional political opposing forces, PPP/C and APNU historically drew their respective support base from the Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese population. Indigenous peoples were considered a key electorate by all political parties. Regarded as a significant third political force during the campaign, WIN challenged the traditional two-party dominance, presenting itself as an alternative beyond ethnic divisions. In this context, both PPP/C and APNU sought to broaden their support base by emphasising national unity.

This political landscape was characterised by escalating tensions among key stakeholders. Since June 2025, the leadership of the ruling PPP/C engaged in open conflict with WIN's founder and presidential candidate Azruddin Mohamed, once perceived as a close ally of the ruling party. In June 2024, Mr. Mohamed was placed under United States of America sanctions for corruption, tax evasion and money laundering, alongside Mae Thomas Toussaint, the then Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Labour. Though the candidate appears not to have been formally charged in Guyana, during the election campaign, the sanctions were reportedly used as a pretext to impose on him no-fly restrictions with domestic airlines and by local commercial banks to close his accounts. Closures of bank accounts were extended to over 70 WIN members including candidates, in a process criticised for a lack of transparency by various stakeholders. Several candidates launched legal actions against the banks, alleging unlawful and improper conduct.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVIOUS EU EOM RECOMMENDATIONS

The first full-fledged EU EOM to Guyana in 2020 (EOM 2020) offered 26 recommendations for reforms on election processes and to better align current legislation and processes with Guyana's international and regional commitments for democratic elections. The recommendations encompassed proposals to incorporate human rights treaties into domestic law, to consolidate fragmented electoral legislation, to provide certainty and awareness for voters through an improved voter list, to increase voter education, to enhance access for persons with disabilities, to develop data protection measures, and to ensure voter awareness of candidates before elections. The recommendations also signalled a need for rules for political parties, transparency in campaign financing including on-line, controls on the misuse state resources, and improved regulation for the media, including oversight on digital platforms.

The EOM 2020 also recommended to revise the structure and operations of GECOM and improve its stakeholder engagement, for GECOM to publish disaggregated data, and to enhance transparency in results processing and tabulation procedures. It also recommended to ensure citizen observer's access to all election processes by law

Electoral reforms in 2022 fully implemented three EOM 2020 priority recommendations. The newly revised laws to an extent consolidated electoral legislation and the steps taken enhanced legal clarity. The revised laws incorporated transparency measures in line with two other of the EOM 2020 recommendations.

Some important steps taken by Guyana entailed the partial implementation of other EOM 2020 recommendations. on data protection, data disaggregation and defamation. Positively, in mid-2025, the High Court ruled that certain criminal sanctions for defamation were unconstitutional.

V. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The legal framework is an adequate basis for holding democratic elections but some uncertainties remain.

Guyana’s electoral legal framework offers an adequate basis to conduct key stages of democratic elections including candidate nominations, voting, counting, and tabulation. The framework comprises the Constitution and three core laws; the Representation of the People Act (RoPA), the National Registration Act (NRA), both amended in 2022, and the Local Democratic Organs Act.¹ The courts play a central role in deciding, among other matters, electoral disputes and applications related to fundamental and constitutional rights as well as judicial review of administrative acts. Recent legal reforms have made an important difference regarding, for example, transparency during the electoral process. Despite these important changes, some gaps and inconsistencies in the aspects of legal framework relating to, among others, participation and inclusion, campaigning, financial accountability, and the media environment persist. Such shortcomings undermine the independence of key authorities, diminish transparency, and leave room for uncertainty.

International Principles and Commitments

Guyana is a member of the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). It is also a state party to the key United Nations (UN) and regional instruments for democratic elections.² Some UN treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination are embedded in Guyana’s Constitution, yet with limitations. International and regional undertakings, including the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, remain to be operationalised, thus leaving transparency, accountability, and inclusion gaps in domestic law, which remain to be aligned with Guyana’s commitments.

The UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Working Group (WG) concluding observations to Guyana’s third UPR in 2024 appreciated several of Guyana’s recently enacted laws. The WG also underlined a need for effective actions in several spheres, including on aspects pertinent

¹ [Representation of the People Act](#) (RoPA) (as [amended 2022](#)) (it was further amended in early 2025 to correct a definitional omission) and the [National Registration Act](#) (NRA) (as [amended 2022](#)) Other relevant laws include the [National Assembly \(Validity of Elections\) Act](#), the [National Assembly \(Disqualification\) Act](#), the [General Elections \(Observers\) Act](#), and the [Local Democratic Organs Act](#).

² Guyana has not ratified key OAS human rights treaties. As a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the state recognises the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice. Guyana is also a member of the [Interparliamentary Union](#). UN commitments include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ([ICCPR](#)), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ([ICERD](#)), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ([CEDAW](#)), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ([CRPD](#)), the UN Convention against Corruption ([UNCAC](#)), and the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families ([ICRMW](#)).

to elections.³ It expressed concern about access to information and freedom of expression based on overly broad provisions in cybercrime law. The WG’s report also noted excessively lengthy periods of pre-trial detention.⁴ Further, the observations noted the political nature of judicial service appointments and the practice of appointing “acting Judges” as impeding guarantees of an independent judiciary. The EU EOM was fully able to observe election relevant court proceedings as they arose during the mission.⁵

Constitutional Framework

Positively, the Constitution enshrines fundamental freedoms including expression, assembly and association, and assures due process rights. A key constitutional independent oversight body, the Human Rights Commission, has yet to be operationalised, thus weakening the intended framework for protection of fundamental and human rights. The foundational law also underpins election processes such as the electoral system, candidacy eligibility, voter registration, and aspects of political party conduct and it establishes the election management body GECOM. However, the Constitution entrenches a partisan framework for GECOM, splitting the commission between opposing sides in the National Assembly and precluding broader stakeholder inclusion.⁶ Such appointment model risks inefficient decision making and paralysis, and thus diminished stakeholder trust. As such, existing legal bars to political parties’ active management in the electoral process could be further strengthened to insulate GECOM from partisan conduct.⁷

A 21-member Constitutional Reform Commission (CRC) was legislated in 2022 and formed in 2024 to engage in public consultations including on electoral matters, however it has yet to commence its work, which was reportedly delayed due to logistical and financial challenges and deficiencies in member selection.⁸ This body could be crucial to promoting consensus around key electoral reforms including on the future of GECOM. Importantly, the law sets requirements for financing the CRC and a target period for publicising its methodology and timeframes, which are positive measures to increase trust once carried out. The publication is overdue at the time of writing.⁹

Still, a robust electoral reform process based on inclusive stakeholder engagement is essential to strengthen the case for faithful and timely implementation of recommended reforms by the NA. Given the CRC key role, a necessary electoral expertise will be important for robust outputs and meaningful electoral reform outcomes.

PRIORITY Recommendation: Enhance the prospects for key electoral reforms through necessary electoral expertise as part of a robust CRC operational framework.

³ [Concluding Observations](#). The report raised concerns that the Constitution allows the state to limit the extent of ICCPR obligations and that the covenant has not been fully incorporated into the domestic legal system, especially calling for training for the legal profession on the correct interpretation of the Covenant.

⁴ In its [UPR Fourth Cycle National Report](#), Guyana reported a drop in pre-trial detainee levels from 22.9 per cent in 2020 to 13 percent by 2024, with reforms ongoing.

⁵ On 4 August, the then acting Chief Justice and acting Chancellor offices, both key judicial offices for deciding election matters, were re-assigned to new appointees, reportedly on temporary bases. Media outlets were not invited to the appointment ceremony (the latter as reported by [Demerara Waves](#)). In a move somewhat echoing concerns of the WG. The then acting Chief Justice was assigned to the acting Chancellor role and a new acting Chief Justice appointed, reportedly due to the previously acting Chancellor going on leave.

⁶ When, as in the past, one party dominates the opposition, the opportunity for inclusion of smaller minority parties and broadening the membership of GECOM is further reduced.

⁷ Constitution, Article 161B,

⁸ [Constitutional Reform Commission Act, 2022](#). The difficulties were noted by the CRC chairperson in a [media report](#) 21 September,2025.

⁹ Further, by law, the CRC composition is linked to the make-up of the previous NA including parties that are no longer represented to the same extent or at all in the newly elected NA.

Legislative Context

In a welcome development, legal reforms in 2022, to a certain extent, streamlined electoral laws including the repeal of previous legislation and consolidation of various provisions in the RoPA and NRA.¹⁰ The reforms, tested for the first time in the 2025 elections, introduced as many as one hundred technical changes in the law. Importantly, the amendments provided new key transparency measures, including real-time online publication of polling station results protocols, Statements of Poll (SoP), on receipt by designated returning officers, marking a significant legal improvement for the traceability of results. The changes also created new procedures for corrections to SoPs, introduced time bound requests for recounts, and established significantly increased penalties for various electoral offences, thus enhancing the dissuasive value of sanctions.¹¹ Other recently enacted laws, including on access to information, data protection, digital identity cards, and money laundering, when operationalised, could further enhance transparency and accountability for election processes.

Still, some aspects of electoral and related legislation could be further improved. There remains an inconsistency in use of terms ‘polling stations’ and ‘polling places’ in RoPA.¹² Some of the timelines in the RoPA are quite tight or uncertain, such as the periods for voter list complaints and objections, the short timeframe for appeals on candidate list rejections, and a seeming overlap between the period when defects in lists are notified and date by which lists can be withdrawn.¹³ Further, the 2022 changes to RoPA did not adopt a constitutional requirement to ensure voters’ awareness of the candidates they are electing (see *Electoral System*), but it does set minimum conditions for parties to contest elections, including some not stated in the Constitution.¹⁴

Recommendation: Ensure compliance with the Constitution by allowing voters to know before elections, the order of candidates on lists and those candidates they are electing.

Legal prohibitions, ostensibly to avoid conflicts of interest, meaning certain public servants and officials cannot run for elective office, including high-ranking officials and members of the judiciary. These prohibitions appear too strict in some instances while ignoring others with a much higher conflict of interest potential. For example, an Attorney General (AG) is not prevented to contest but, as chief legal advisor to the government, the AG’s office may lawfully provide advice to state authorities including the election authorities on request. This leaves undue scope for perceptions of conflicts of interest, especially if the AG is a candidate. At the same time, less high-ranking state employees, such as some civil defence personnel, including prison officers and employees of the fire service, cannot contest. Thus, without an option for leave of absence to seek elective office, such restrictions can be considered uneven.

The Constitution also empowers Parliament to make provision that the proportion women make up of the electorate is considered when candidates are being identified to take up seats won by lists, yet this matter is also not addressed in the RoPA. Additionally, political parties must comply with some rules on inciteful speech and candidate lists. They are, however, not bound to prescribed minimum standards of party-internal democracy, or adherence to transparency

¹⁰ A newly consolidated version of both the RoPA and the NRA appeared not to have been made publicly available but was made available to the EU EOM two days prior to the elections.

¹¹ These included including new offences for the results processing stages and if committed by election officials.

¹² The National Assembly (Disqualification) Act refers to the ‘Election Act’ which has been repealed.

¹³ There is for example only three days for the High Court to hear appeals against a refusal of a list between the 26th and 23rd day before elections. While contestants also only have one day to correct list defects after notification by the Chief Election Officer and not later than the 29th days before elections.

¹⁴ Constitution article 160(3) (a) (ii) states voters must be “sure” of whom they are voting. Parties must contest at least 6 of the 10 constituencies for seats in the National Assembly. While this may enhance opportunities to contest, it also entails some legal uncertainties (see *Electoral System*) that are not addressed in the law.

and accountability, including financial, except by the different administrative rules governing their legal personality.

Electoral System

The 65-seat NA is elected for a five-year term in a variant of a closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) system. Voters select one political party list on a single ballot to fill 25 NA seats in 10 geographical constituencies (GC) and 40 Top-up seats nationally.¹⁵ To allot seats after voting, an electoral quota (EQ) is established for each constituency; in each GC the total valid vote is divided by the number of seats. The number of seats then allotted to each party list is calculated by dividing the valid vote for each list by the EQ. Based on the answer, the number of seats equals the whole number, and a largest remainder decides any outstanding seat(s). The same approach applies for the Top-up list. The national EQ is the total national valid poll divided by 65. Each party list's valid national vote is then divided by the national EQ. The final NA seat tally for each list is the number of national Top-up seats won less the number of GC seats won. The winning party takes the presidency. The RDCs are similarly elected through a dedicated a regional ballot.

While acknowledging the State's right to choose its electoral system, the current rules entail a misalignment with some of Guyana's international commitments for democratic elections. For example, constitutionally, candidates must be aligned to one and only one GC list and not any other, while the RoPA contemplates only contesting parties and party lists, effectively preventing unaffiliated independent candidates from contesting, though there is no clear prohibition as such.¹⁶ Further, political parties assign seats from their candidates' lists only after polling, limiting voter awareness of eventual representatives prior to elections, contrary to what the Constitution prescribes, and creating uncertainty for candidates. Also, parties are mandated to present lists in at least six of the ten geographical constituencies. There is no legal safeguard to ensure all GCs are contested; thus, if all contesting parties do not present a list for at least one, and as many as four, of the same GCs, voters in those GCs would not have a ballot, depriving the opportunity to vote. There is no mechanism in the law to address such a scenario.¹⁷ GECOM is empowered by RoPA to remove difficulties in the law, including by changing the legislation.¹⁸ However, such actions could prove problematic in terms of achieving consensus and also in terms administrative alteration of legislation.

Such inconsistencies, ambiguities, and gaps in law leave undue scope for legal uncertainty, challenge accurate awareness of the law and thus legal stability. Further reforms building on the important 2022 legal changes could further to strengthen democratic and electoral processes

Recommendation: Protect the interests of voters and contestants by clarifying uncertain aspects of the electoral law and addressing legal gaps.

¹⁵ Constituencies have between one and seven seats. There are two one-seater GCs, effectively making the contests in those areas a first past the post competition.

¹⁶ Constitution 160 (2) (a). ICCPR, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25 at par. 15 "Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as...by reason of political affiliation." The issue of independent candidates was raised unsuccessfully by a non-contesting applicant in the High Court constitutional division in June 2025. The full judgment and reasoning of the court is yet to be published.

¹⁷ This anomaly was flagged in a recent court action - Fischer V GECOM, High Court, August 2025. See below *Election Dispute Resolution*.

¹⁸ RoPA section 153 (1) allows the Commission to vary the legislation by Order. This appears to conflict with the exclusive mandate of the Parliament.

VI. ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION

While GECOM administered the elections efficiently, the structure of the election management body does not promote impartiality.

Structure and Composition of the Election Management Body

GECOM is a constitutional body with a range of responsibilities, including the conduct of elections, voter and candidate registration as well as oversight of campaign expenditures.¹⁹ The political structure of the election management body has become a matter of controversy as the commission struggles to function in a cohesive manner. GECOM is composed of seven members appointed for an indefinite term comprising three commissioners nominated by the president, three from the parliamentary opposition and the chairperson mutually agreed upon. The current composition of GECOM, appointed between 2007 and 2022, represents a fixed tenure that does not reflect the changing configuration of the National Assembly.²⁰

The GECOM commissioners are split along party lines, with the chairperson's deciding vote often reinforcing perceptions of partisanship. The Commission members have not been presenting unified positions, including on election preparations, and have often publicly expressed conflicting stances, eroding trust in the institution. Furthermore, the Commission's statutory meetings are closed to the public and there is no systematic information sharing on the meeting proceedings, limiting the transparency of its work. This structure of GECOM, a legacy of the political landscape of the 1990s, endures but any changes would require constitutional reform.

Recommendation: Review the current composition of GECOM to guarantee an inclusive and impartial functioning and decision-making.

GECOM has a permanent Secretariat with professional staff managed by a Chief Elections Officer (CEO). GECOM's field structure includes ten Returning Officers (ROs), one in each region. The 2022 legal amendments introduced an additional ten Supernumerary Returning Officers (SROs) to enhance capacities for the most populated regions 3, 4 and 6. The regional GECOM staff was assessed by the EU EOM as professional and offices fully operational. GECOM recruited 11,718 poll workers. Trainings for poll workers were conducted in different stages between January and August, training sessions observed by EU EOM were mostly assessed as comprehensive and professional.

Administration of the Election

The GECOM Secretariat administered the elections well. Although there were some delays, including for the assignation of polling stations and the reception of non-sensitive election materials, these did not impact the election process. To address logistical challenges for the distribution of election materials, GECOM established multiple regional staging areas and made use of air, land and riverine transport. For these elections, GECOM established 2,790 polling stations (PS) on Election Day as well as 83 polling stations for early voting of the Disciplined Forces on 22 August.

GECOM's public communication strategy would have benefitted from being more consistent and thereby leaving less space for confusion and reduced transparency. Between nomination

¹⁹ GECOM has operated with financial independence, receiving lump-sum allocations approved by Parliament, thereby reducing financial executive interference. The election administration was sufficiently resourced with a budget of 7.3 billion GYD (approximately 40 EUR per voter) for these elections.

²⁰ GECOM commission includes six men and a woman who serves as Chairperson.

day and Election Day, 24 press releases were issued, yet messages were often formalistic and difficult for the general public to understand. In response to repeated calls from stakeholders for direct public engagement, starting only in the last two weeks prior to Election Day, GECOM held three press conferences and one on Election Day. For Election Day, GECOM set up a media centre, for journalists to follow the election process.

Recommendation: Implement a clear and comprehensive communication strategy for the entire electoral cycle including i) timely access to information of public interest including GECOM decisions, regulations and instructions, ii) media access to all stages of the election process, iii) strengthening GECOM’s public communications unit.

Two key GECOM decisions, though adopted late in the process, ultimately contributed positively to the conduct of the elections. On 19 August, GECOM prohibited the use of mobile phones and other recording devices within polling stations on Election Day to address concerns by political parties for possible vote buying. The day prior to early voting, GECOM also announced its decision to allow for the use of Guyanese passports and driver’s licences for voter identification.

By law, political parties are entitled to observe all stages of the election process, including in polling stations and tabulation centres. In an inclusive approach, GECOM accredited party agents from all political parties contributing to the transparency of the process despite four political parties not meeting the legally foreseen deadline for nomination of party agents seven days before Election Day. In addition, GECOM organised a briefing session for political parties on Election Day procedures.

Voter information outreach was generally good, including the publication of the full voter list, voter guides and election manuals, and use of digital channels. In July 2025, GECOM intensified its voter information campaign in person and through traditional and social media, including educational videos with sign language, flyers and infographics, notices in print media, as well as a search tool on its website to identify polling stations. GECOM also instituted a telephone hotline for questions related to the election process. GECOM voter information was, however, perceived as inadequately tailored for remote Indigenous communities with reduced access to information and could thus explore options to improve outreach to such communities.

VII. VOTER REGISTRATION

Perceptions about the inaccuracy of the voter list combined with a lack of recent and reliable population data fuelled narratives of potential voter list manipulation.

The right to vote extends to citizens of 18 years and to Commonwealth citizens domiciled and resident in Guyana for the year prior to the closure of the voter list. Among few legal restrictions, persons deemed by court order as “insane” or otherwise of “unsound mind” cannot vote. Prisoners and non-convicted detainees cannot vote although there are no legal restrictions except for individuals convicted of electoral offences. In practice, the lack of specific rules and practical arrangements for voting in prisons and places of detention results in the disenfranchisement of this category of voters.

Although there is a legal obligation for employers to provide their staff with the opportunity to vote, in practice, this possibility is limited for offshore and other remote workers due to the nature of their work, therefore other voting options could be explored for these categories of voters.

Recommendation: Ensure all eligible voters can exercise their right to vote, including the possibility for pre-trial detainees and prisoners, away from their registered place of voting on Election Day.

A total of 757,690 voters including those living abroad were on the official list of electors, published by GECOM on 30 July, an increase of 15 per cent compared to 2020. More than 320,000 voters (43 per cent) were concentrated in the capital region Demerara-Mahaica. While GECOM did not publish disaggregated data on the voter list, figures from technical assistance providers show women represent 50 per cent of registered voters. Despite repeated call from stakeholders, disaggregated figures on the registered Commonwealth citizens were also not published, further contributing to a lack of transparency.

Recommendation: Publish timely voter list disaggregated data by different categories of voters, including by gender, age and citizenship, with due regard to the Data Protection Act.

Voter Registration Procedures

Guyana has a continuous voter registration and voters are included in the voter list based on their place of registration. GECOM has the legal responsibility of registering persons who have attained the age of 14 in the National Register of Registrants Database (NRRD) and issues ID cards with indefinite validity. The voter list is updated twice a year. A cut-off date of 30 June for the 2025 elections effectively disenfranchised those turning 18 years of age between the cut-off date of the voter list and polling day.

The preliminary voter list is extracted from the NRRD and displayed in public spaces and online for claims and objections. For these elections, the claims and objections period was reduced from an already short legal timeframe of eleven days to one week (16 to 22 June), limiting opportunities for corrections. In this period, GECOM removed four names and 25 duplicates from the voter list.

The final voter list was certified and published on the GECOM website on 30 July in a searchable format, enhancing easy access.

The accuracy of the voter list was a subject of concern among the opposition political parties, with concerns linked to the lack of reliable population data in the broader context of the 2022 population census, the results of which were not released by the government without explanation. The 2022 amended National Representation Act provides new mechanisms for the removal of deceased voters through reporting from the General Register Office, Police, and the Ministry of Health. However, for the 2025 elections there was no mechanism in place to incorporate information from the latter two institutions therefore updates were not processed. In addition, there is no procedure to obtain information on deceased citizens abroad. The absence of recent and reliable population data together with the lack of political will for transparency fuelled a narrative of potential voter list manipulation in the run-up to the elections.

PRIORITY Recommendation: Update the voter list in light of most recent available population data, and data from all relevant state institutions, ensuring linking to ongoing digitalisation solutions.

VIII. REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES

An inclusive candidate registration process.

Inclusively, citizens attaining the age of 18 years qualify to stand for election to the NA, RDCs, and for the presidential office if resident in Guyana for at least seven years. The law includes some positive measures such as promoting genuine candidacies by prohibiting a candidate on

more than one list in the same constituency. Also, convicted hate-crime and electoral offenders may not contest.

In an inclusive and timely manner, on 14 July GECOM approved six political parties to contest, all of which complied with the legal requirements, including an obligation to present one third women candidates, and to compete in no less than six of the ten GCs. The PPP/C, APNU, WIN and AFC contested all ten GCs, while FGM ran in seven, and ALP in six. A seventh party, whose lists were incomplete, did not submit corrections by the deadline. A total of 2,424 candidates contested the general and regional elections. In all, 771 candidates (50 per cent women) competed for the NA seats.

Contestants must submit lists for both the national Top-up and GC. Each national list must include at least 42 candidates, while regional lists require at least two more candidates than available seats in the region. Lists must be supported by a defined number of nominators, between 300 and 330 nationally and between 150 and 175 for each GC. All nominators must be registered voters and may support only one party. For regional elections, political parties may compete for any of the 10 regional council elections. They must present a list of 12 to 36 candidates living in the region

IX. CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

A largely peaceful and vibrant campaign, yet undue advantage of incumbency, created an uneven playing field.

WIN and the PPP/C conducted the most active campaigns, organising 129 and 118 activities respectively, covering all ten regions. Medium and large-scale rallies were organised by the PPP/C, APNU, and, to a lesser extent, WIN, while the other parties focused on door-to-door canvassing and smaller gatherings. The EU EOM directly observed 56 events, the majority of which were calm and orderly. On a positive note, women and youth were actively involved in the events observed (75 per cent and 46 per cent, respectively).

With the exception of APNU, all campaign messages focused strongly on national unity. The PPP/C emphasised the need for continuity, focusing on infrastructure development and job creation, while APNU highlighted equitable oil revenue sharing and economic diversification. WIN positioned itself as an anti-establishment, community-focused alternative. All opposition parties, including the AFC, FGM, and ALP, stressed the need for governance reform and stronger anti-corruption measures. While the campaign was largely peaceful, the weeks leading to the elections, were marked by few instances of confrontational rhetoric involving PPP/C, WIN and APNU representatives, resorting to derogatory messages and inflammatory language, leading to a instances of altercations between supporters and disruptions of campaign events.²¹

Fundamental freedoms of association and assembly were generally respected during the campaign. However, several opposition political parties indicated that they faced difficulties in securing venues, particularly in PPP/C strongholds, where most locations were reportedly all pre-booked by the ruling party.²² EU EOM observers received reports from WIN representatives alleging they were unfairly denied the use of public venues in a few instances and hindered from campaigning in some Indigenous villages. Opposition parties, including APNU, FGM, and WIN, alleged that the ruling party was purposefully obstructing their campaign efforts by organising simultaneous activities in close proximity of their events. As a consequence, some opposition parties became reluctant to disclose their campaign schedules

²¹ On 5 August, the Ethnic Relations Commission (ERC) facilitated the signing of a Code of Conduct for political parties, aimed at promoting a peaceful campaign. APNU and FGM declined to sign, both citing concerns regarding the impartiality and transparency of the ERC, and the lack of enforcing mechanisms.

²² Particularly in Region 2 and Region 6.

in advance, and chose to organise smaller-scale gatherings. While the police provided security at all PPP/C events, APNU and WIN reported a limited presence at their gatherings, and highlighted a few instances of police passivity when PPP/C supporters disrupted their activities.

An undue advantage of incumbency distorted the level playing field during the election campaign. This has been an enduring issue in Guyanese elections due to inadequate regulations for campaigning and no effective rules to minimise the misuse of state resources to the advantage of incumbency.²³ After the announcement of the elections, the President and his administration inaugurated a large number of public projects such as hospitals, schools, police stations, and major transportation projects, representing a significant increase compared with previous months.²⁴ Most inauguration events observed were largely attended by PPP/C supporters in party colours and symbols, while candidates' speeches urged participants to vote for the ruling party. EU observers noted that state resources were used in 29 per cent of observed campaign events organised by the ruling party, including five instances of state-owned vehicles used for voter transportation.²⁵

The government launched several new or expanded social programmes in close run up to the elections.²⁶ The GYD 100,000 (EUR 410) universal grant scheme increased from 121,000 beneficiaries in February to 629,498 by mid-June. Beneficiaries of government cash supports reported receiving unsolicited phone calls encouraging them to vote for the ruling party, raising concerns over misuse of personal data. Among other benefits to the public sector, on 10 August the President announced an unprecedented mass promotion and bonuses for more than 2,800 police officers, the timing of which raised concerns. In addition, an eight per cent annual increase of salary for civil servants was announced and paid retroactively in July 2025. The PPP/C made further use of incumbency advantages, using government-managed online platforms and party campaign pages to disseminate identical content. State media was instrumentalised to the exclusive benefit of the ruling party.

PRIORITY Recommendation: Adopt clear and comprehensive campaign rules, including for the conduct of public officials and for the use of all types of state assets to avoid undue advantage of incumbency.

Opposition political parties raised concerns of pressure on civil servants due to their political stance. The EU EOM received several reports of pressure on civil servants and part-time government employees, including cases of demotion or reassignment following expressions of support for opposition candidates. Observers were informed that civil servants were compelled to attend ruling party rallies, and directly witnessed two such instances.

In this context, also voters reportedly refrained from openly supporting opposition parties, while some civil servant candidates limited their campaign activity due to concerns over potential loss of employment or social benefits. In the final week before the elections, the mission was further informed that several APNU party agents had withdrawn, citing fear of negative repercussions.

²³ [Concerns about misuse of state resources were flagged in 2020 by the then leader of the opposition Bharat Jagdeo.](#)

²⁴ From 25 May 2025, the President and his administration inaugurated 6 hospitals, over 20 schools and nursery, 8 police stations, 6 water plants or water supply projects, 4 major transportation projects (bridges, highways and new roads), among other projects.

²⁵ The use of state-owned vehicles for campaign purposes was directly observed in Tapakuma (Region 2), Eccles (Region 4), Bath Settlement (Region 5), Lethem (Region 9), and Coomaka Mines (Region 10).

²⁶ E.g. "Because we care" cash grant programme; reimbursement of certain student fees; Paraprofessional social service programme for hinterland communities.

Campaign Finance

Legal provisions are inadequate and outdated leaving the campaign finance framework ineffective and in need of revision to protect voters.

Campaign finance is inadequately regulated leading to a lack of transparency and accountability. The RoPA stipulates a maximum expenditure limit for groups of candidates at GYD 50,000 (EUR 200) multiplied by the number of candidates in a list up to a maximum of 53 (thus a maximum of GYD 2,650,000 or approximately EUR 11,000). This unrevised ceiling is outdated and unrealistic. Permissible expenses are narrowly defined, covering items like printing, advertising, public meetings, and personal candidate expenses. RoPA mandates transparency through reporting, so that nominated election agents must submit detailed election expenses returns on behalf of contesting lists, itemising all payments, personal expenses, and claims, while candidates must make their own declarations to GECOM's CEO within 35 days of election results. These returns are subject to publication. These measures are aligned to the principle of expenditure limitations to prevent distortion of the democratic process, but merit review.²⁷

Sanctions including fines (e.g., GYD 32,500 to 65,000 / EUR 150 to 300) are relatively low, though other harsher sanctions are foreseen in the law including imprisonment and, potentially, a five-year disqualification from being an elector, based on illegal practices such as unauthorised expenses, payments beyond the stipulated period, and false declarations. Still, more significant are regulatory gaps such as no provisions defining permissible sources of funding or donations, as well as no rules on third party spending and donations, foreign funding, bank account controls, or spending and advertising on-line. Political parties do not report as envisaged by the current law with no effective sanctions and GECOM has no operational oversight mechanism.

PRIORITY Recommendation: Strengthen the operational oversight for campaign finance through an independent oversight body and revising outdated legal provisions, including expenditure ceilings and permissible expenses.

The electoral legal framework is silent on the use of social media and other digital tools for electioneering, tilting the playing field in favour of the parties with more financial resources and know-how at their disposal, the PPP/C in particular.²⁸ Spending by third parties on digital ads is not capped or reported; service providers such as global tech companies and media are not obliged to disclose prices or revenue generated from political ads. Consequently, voters were not informed about the actual costs and sponsors of elaborated digital campaigns, including those amplifying smear campaigns. Thus, to ensure transparency, a level playing field, and to protect the interests of the voters and candidates alike, a substantial overhaul of the campaign finance framework is necessary to bring Guyana in line with its international and regional commitments.

X. MEDIA

Lack of media regulations and access to public information; biased media coverage favouring the ruling party.

²⁷ ICCPR General Comment 25, para. 19 – “Reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may be justified where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters is not undermined, or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party”

²⁸ For further details of paid-for content on Meta platforms see Annex III, Charts 9, 10 and 11.

Media Environment

The media landscape is vibrant, but highly polarised with numerous outlets aligned with the government, resulting in a disproportionate coverage in favour of the ruling party. State-run media favoured the government, while the editorial output of most private broadcast, print and digital outlets reflected their owners' political alignment, more frequently with the PPP/C. Positively defying this trend, a few private outlets upheld journalistic standards, providing non-partisan scrutiny of candidates, their policies, and the electoral process.

The traditional media scene comprises some 60 outlets, with broadcast and digital media being the most important sources of news. More than 40 audio-visual media outlets are registered, with their main reporting hubs concentrated in the capital and towns along the coast, reducing news reporting on issues important to hinterland communities. Despite declining circulations, newspapers and their online versions are still seen as important and reputable sources of information.

A partisan division within the journalistic community, aggravated by an openly confrontational relationship between the media and some political actors from the ruling party as well as opposition, has led to an adverse media environment, which does not foster independent and analytical reporting. A few independent journalists were singled out and verbally attacked by high-ranking government officials and their supporters at public events and online.²⁹ A few reporters faced threats of legal action by government ministers, who considered their reporting as defamatory, which further contributed to the chilling effect on media environment. In parallel, the government withheld payments to independent newspapers for already printed advertising. At the same time, some opposition figures also made harsh public commentary towards journalists perceived to be aligned with the government.³⁰ In addition, some journalists openly campaigned for contesting parties across the country, mostly the PPP/C, further reducing the integrity of independent reporting and public trust in media.

Legal Framework for the Media

The legal and regulatory framework for media is sparse. The Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and criminal defamation was deemed unconstitutional in June 2025.³¹ However, costly and complex civil defamation lawsuits are often used by the government and business community, to target critical reporting.³²

The right to access information of public interest is not fully guaranteed. The 2011 Access to Information Act provides for individuals to request government-held information of public interest, however, it is not effectively implemented.³³ Owing to inadequate action by the Commissioner of Information to address requests for information, journalists often face difficulties in obtaining information of public interest, which led to protests against the Commissioner. During the campaign, the PPP/C promised to change the Commissioner if re-elected.

²⁹ PPP/C General Secretary Bharrat Jagdeo repeatedly accused a number of independent media for working with WIN during weekly press-conferences. Pro-PPP/C influencer echoed these accusations on his social media account which resulted in [civic defamation lawsuits](#).

³⁰ Journalists working for state-aligned media outlets admitted that they had been verbally attacked whilst covering the party rallies of APNU and WIN.

³¹ On 20 June 2025 Justice George held that Section 113 of the Criminal Law (Offences) Act, Chapter 8:01 criminalising defamatory libel, violates Article 146 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of expression. The judge argued that the resort to criminal defamation to protect individual reputation is “unnecessary, disproportionately excessive, and not justified”. There is no written judgement as yet.

³² See ‘Hostility towards Guyanese Independent Media’ by [Civicus Monitor](#).

³³ See [Constitution](#) of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, [Telecommunication Act](#) of 1990, amended in 2008, [Broadcasting Act 2011](#), [Broadcasting \(Amendment\) Bill 2017](#), [Access to Information Act 2011](#).

The 2011 Broadcasting Act establishes the licencing system for broadcast media. The Telecommunication Act, governs the ICT sector, including internet services and online media. The 2017 Broadcasting (Amendment) Act aimed to expand the legal provisions and clarified the definition of different types of broadcasting services, though not providing mechanisms for the state broadcaster's operations.

The media regulator Guyana National Broadcasting Authority (GNBA) is mandated to oversee audio-visual media compliance with the law and licence requirements and maintains a media monitoring unit but does not release its reports for public scrutiny. The GNBA board is composed mostly of ruling party nominees, its hearings are closed to the public and decision-making process is non-transparent, further eroding media trust in the regulator's impartiality and independence.

Recommendation: Strengthen independence of broadcast media regulator GNBA by impartial and inclusive appointment of the board members and its accountability through a transparent decision-making process.

Campaign coverage for broadcast, print and digital media is largely unregulated, reducing opportunities for voters' access to independent, pluralistic and balanced information. There are no legal obligations for media to offer equitable airtime or space to all candidates, nor to label political advertising as such; paid-for content was neither time-limited nor subject to disclosure regarding sponsors or costs. Further, state-run media was not obliged to provide free airtime to all contestants or to hold debates. Although the Broadcasting Act requires the GNBA to issue election-related broadcasting guidelines, the regulator, instead, published a non-binding advisory on its website, which had no effect on biased media coverage, to the detriment of voters.

PRIORITY Recommendation: Establish media campaign coverage rules on equitable airtime and space for electoral contestants as well as political advertising, in a timely and consultative manner.

In an attempt to establish unified rules for media coverage of the campaign, GECOM drafted a Media Code of Conduct (MCC), gathered journalist's feedback on the document, and held a training for media on election coverage. However, many media outlets refused to sign the MCC objecting primarily to its prohibition to be present in polling stations and tabulation centres.³⁴

Media Monitoring Findings

The PPP/C dominated the prime-time election coverage of the state-run broadcaster.³⁵ The EU EOM media monitoring shows that the Voice of Guyana radio and NCN TV devoted up to 98 per cent of their election-related coverage to PPP/C and the incumbent President among all electoral contestants. Both media outlets covered in full all the ruling party rallies held across the country.

Recommendation: Ensure state-funded broadcaster guarantees equitable coverage to all contestants during the campaign and consider introducing provisions on free airtime for electoral contestants.

The President's official ceremonies and speeches, sometimes accompanied by the Vice-President and Prime Minister, regularly featured in broadcast media exemplifying the lack of clear distinction between their official and campaign roles. During those events government officials encouraged voters to support the PPP/C, but also smeared APNU, FGM and WIN. Additionally, the direct speech of the incumbent President overwhelmingly exceeded that of

³⁴ RoPA Article 78 defines 200 yards' perimeter around polling stations to protect voters from interference.

³⁵ See Annex II, Chart 3 and Chart 9.

other presidential candidates in broadcast media, especially on state-run NCN TV with seven hours 17 minutes and Voice of Guyana with six hours 44 minutes in absolute numbers within the monitored period.³⁶

A large part of state-run media's electoral airtime comprised video and audio clips that promoted the ruling party but were not labelled as political advertising. An overall duration of such videos and audios was, respectively, 11 hours on NCN TV and one hour nine minutes on the Voice of Guyana radio.³⁷

Up to two per cent of prime-time political coverage of the state-run channels featured APNU and up to one per cent WIN, while all other parties were practically excluded from the election-related airtime. Such coverage runs counter to the public service remit of state-run media, to the detriment of voters' access diverse information.

Among broadcast media, only privately-owned HGPTV was inclusive, with news airtime equitably divided among all parties and mostly neutral in tone. Privately-owned HJ Boom Radio featured oppositional parties mostly in its paid for airtime.³⁸ Thus, broadcast coverage of the election campaign monitored left voters with limited objective information.

Monitored print media demonstrated similar trends as the broadcast media. State-owned Guyana Chronicle and government-aligned Guyana Times predominantly covered PPP/C, the incumbent President and the Government in their front page articles, whereas Kaieteur News and Stabroek News featured all the contesting parties, providing a more balanced and equitable coverage of the campaign.³⁹ Among monitored news websites, News Source demonstrated more balanced coverage of the election campaign, providing space for multiple articles and featuring all the parties in an equitable way with a neutral tone of reporting.⁴⁰

All monitored broadcast and print media outlets made a positive contribution to GECOM's voter education efforts, airing video ads during their prime-time hours and printing GECOM voter information materials.⁴¹

XI. SOCIAL MEDIA AND DIGITAL RIGHTS

The pre-election debate on social media was strident, subduing balanced, nonpartisan views, while loopholes in the legislation on privacy rights were exploited for political gains.

Social Media Environment

The digital information environment was vigorous, yet also antagonistic and polluted with manipulated and misleading content, leaving little space for a respectful and pluralistic debate on politics and elections. Encouragingly, a few digital media outlets and influencers, including from Indigenous communities, promoted an inclusive, nonpartisan discussion on pressing social issues, party promises, and candidates, thus helping voters to make an informed choice.

Most Guyanese have access to the internet using smartphones.⁴² However, connectivity is still sparse in many rural communities, with no TV, radio or mobile phone coverage as observed by the EU EOM. In such cases, the government-installed free Wi-Fi or a Starlink terminal, was the sole source of internet available, but only in a small area around the community centres. In the electoral context, this limited access to the news and reduced the effectiveness of

³⁶ See Annex II, Chart 5.

³⁷ See Annex II, Chart 2.

³⁸ See Annex II, Chart 3 and Chart 4.

³⁹ See Annex II, Chart 14 and Chart 15.

⁴⁰ See Annex II, Chart 11 and Chart 12.

⁴¹ See Annex II, Chart 2 and Chart 8.

⁴² For further details on population data and the use of social media in Guyana see Annex III, Chart 1.

GECOM's digital voter information efforts for the citizens residing in those areas. Overall, more collaborative efforts would be beneficial to align with international recognition of access to the internet as essential for the full enjoyment of human rights such as access to information and freedom of expression.⁴³

Country-wide Facebook and TikTok are the two dominant social media platforms people use to access news.⁴⁴ However, voters in rural areas were more frequently informed by content retrieved from WhatsApp channels and spread by the word-of-mouth, which, coupled with moderate levels of media and digital literacy, made many prone to online deceit. Positively, there were a few promising private initiatives to enhance voters' digital literacy and access to diverse sources of information in the hinterland communities, which merit support and continuation.

The entrenched political polarisation defined the social media scene during the 2025 electoral campaign. A few influencers and digital media outlets with large pools of followers shaped the discourse on Facebook and TikTok and had a spillover effect on in-person campaigns. Most of them were clearly aligned with either of the PPP/C, APNU or WIN campaigns, rarely engaging voters from the opposing political camp. Similarly, official and fan pages of parties operated in silos, hence paid artificially boosted posts were the most effective tool for reaching online communities beyond the already established support bases. GECOM's digital footprint in reaching voters was rather small compared to influencers or digital media.⁴⁵

Legal Framework related to online communications and digital rights

Constitutional safeguards for freedom of expression online are diluted by vague definitions in the 2018 Cyber Crime Act, opening an opportunity to prosecute for legitimate forms of expression, such as political criticism or calls for civil disobedience.⁴⁶ In particular, concerns were raised about partisan interpretation and undue, selective application of Section 18 of the act (Offences against the State). In 2024 and early 2025, the police arrested and charged several digital content creators and citizens who called for protests or used harsh language against the President.⁴⁷ Interlocutors noted the subduing effect these cases had on pre-election debates on sensitive topics, such as corruption and police performance. On Election Day, the repeated, stern warnings from the police that "spreading false news is a criminal offence", evidently silenced the usually energetic online parley.⁴⁸ In parallel, there was no enforcement against instances of cyberbullying offences including online intimidation and harassment of several digital content creators, journalists and opposition politicians.⁴⁹ Overall, equitable protection ought to be granted to all public figures regardless of political affiliation, while content restrictions should not exceed those foreseen in international commitments.⁵⁰

Recommendation: Protect freedom of political expression by clearly aligning the legal definitions for content restrictions in the Cyber Crime Act with international commitments.

⁴³ See also [ICCPR, General Comment 34](#) and UN HRC Resolution "[The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet](#)" adopted on 13 July 2021.

⁴⁴ For further details related to Guyana's digital landscape see Annex III, Chart 1.

⁴⁵ For further details related to GECOM's activities on Facebook see Annex III, Chart 12 and Chart 13.

⁴⁶ The Cyber Crime Act, Section 18, Offences against the State.

⁴⁷ Harsh remarks against the president made by two men were interpreted as "[incitement to commit a criminal offence against the President](#)", NewsRoom, 2 May 2025. Those who called for protests on social media during the investigation of Adriana Younge case faced similar charges.

⁴⁸ See also Facebook post from [Guyana Police Force](#) on 1 September 2025.

⁴⁹ Three digital content creators, and several journalists informed the EU EOM about death threats, received in form of a multiple comments on social media.

⁵⁰ [ICCPR, General Comment 34](#), para.35: "When a state party invokes a legitimate ground for restriction of freedom of expression, it must demonstrate [...] the necessity and proportionality of the specific action."

Data protection legislation is not in effect, hence politically motivated doxing occurred with impunity and government-held personal data of cash grant receivers appears to have been misused for political gains.⁵¹ The 2023 Data Protection Act is largely aligned with international standards, detailing the processing of personal data held by various state agencies and private entities, requiring individual consent for the use of personal data and shielding from unwarranted profiling. The law also establishes a Data Protection Office (DPO), overseen by a Commissioner appointed by the President. Yet, there has not been a public debate on the selection process of the Commissioner or operationalisation of the DPO.

Doxing was primarily used to discourage political participation and critical expression, as well as to expose candidates and voters to harassment. Several opposition leaning influencers and politicians informed about unlawful publication of their and their family members' personal data on social media. Verified images also showed PPP/C activists profiling people visible in photos from WIN events. Such unwarranted publicity was intimidating, yet no action against the perpetrators was taken by the police. Further, the PPP/C call centre used mobile phone numbers of citizens who received cash grants to solicit votes. Such practices do not accord with Guyana's international commitments, including the EU – Latin America and Caribbean Joint Declaration on a Digital Alliance.⁵²

PRIORITY Recommendation: Implement the Data Protection Act and establish a publicly accountable Data Protection office, thus effectively protect voters' personal data from undue publication and from misuse for political gains.

The right to access information of public interest online is not adequately ensured, reducing transparency and accountability, including in the electoral context. The 2024 Open Data Act has not come into the effect yet. If properly implemented, the Act would require a timely and comprehensive publication of all relevant data in a user-friendly format, including on population census and various types of disaggregated election-related data. To grant citizens unimpeded access to information of public interest, an independent and efficient institutional oversight is essential.

Social Media Monitoring Findings

The canvass for votes on social media was fierce, with topics broached by influencers and digital media shaping candidates' speeches during the rallies or press conferences and aiming to alter voters' sentiments, as illustrated by the EU EOM social media monitoring findings. Applying quantitative and qualitative monitoring methods, the EU EOM tracked communication on some 100 Facebook pages and close to 70 TikTok accounts; more than 35,000 posts were recorded and assessed based on virality and author's political leaning. The sample of pages and accounts was designed to capture a balanced snapshot of Guyana's digital communication landscape.⁵³

All electoral stakeholders used social media to inform and mobilise, yet only PPP/C, WIN and APNU had a well-established digital support base, access to resources and know-how – all key to an impactful digital campaign.⁵⁴ A sizeable pool of online PPP/C and WIN campaigners robustly amplified party leaders' messages cross sharing each such post 160 and 300 times respectively. With similar intensity, WIN and PPP/C fans attempted to sway public sentiment

⁵¹ Doxing – unwarranted and unlawful profiling of a person and publication of his/her personal data (name, address, occupation, etc.) on social media.

⁵² Guyana signed the [Declaration](#) on [24 September 2024](#), committing to “work with other LAC governments, EU Member States, [...] on key digital challenges like connectivity, regulatory dialogue and data security”.

⁵³ For further details on social media monitoring methodology see Annex III, Section 1.1, Charts 2 and 3.

⁵⁴ For further details on all presidential candidates' digital footprint see Annex III, Section 1.2, Charts 4 and 5.

towards the respective party in the comment sections of most viral posts placed by lead digital media. The APNU online campaign was limited, mirroring the party's internal struggles.

Messaging by social media influencers was integral to all three lead campaigns, setting a contentious tone across social media.⁵⁵ Partisan influencers traded personal insults daily, entwining allegations with official campaign messages and aiming to disrepute the opposing party. The PPP/C strongly relied on several digital media outlets and a few macro influencers primarily active on Facebook, with affiliated nano influencers amplifying vitriol and deceit; APNU had a few well-known mid-tier Facebook influencers, while WIN's strongest support came from a few established Facebook personalities and a dozen of mid-tier TikTokers.⁵⁶

The credibility of WIN's presidential candidate was the dominant topic across all social media platforms. Posting by the four most-followed PPP/C-leaning media/influencer Facebook pages illustrates this striking level of attention to one person. Since nomination day, each of those pages placed twice as many posts targeting WIN than the WIN party posted itself. There were also concerted efforts by pro-PPP/C accounts to elevate the topic of "sanctions" (referring to US sanctions to WIN candidate) by applying scare tactics to discourage voting for WIN, with up to 35 per cent of their posts alluding to this issue.⁵⁷ To reach voters outside the PPP/C's echo chamber, several new, anonymous accounts paid to push posts that exploited fear and instrumentalised geopolitics. In parallel, pro-WIN TikTokers focused on replacing the "sanctions" narrative with various allegations against the PPP/C and equalling voting with "a fight against the oppression".

The PPP/C messages were kept highly visible on the digital agenda through paid-for content and the use of the government's digital assets. The Department of Public Information Facebook page and those of several ministries posted identical content to that of PPP/C campaign pages, misusing administrative resources and reach. The PPP/C ads were the most visible on Google platforms and jointly with its affiliates, placed 85 per cent of all political ads on Meta.⁵⁸ Two-thirds of all pro PPP/C ads came from anonymous accounts, making impossible for voters to identify the source of funding.

Manipulative and outright false content stained the digital space, which, exacerbated by a polarised media environment, contributed to the erosion of public confidence in the integrity of the process. AI generated videos and fake Facebook pages were misleading, AI voiceovers shielded from exposure those critical of the president and false statements on sensitive topics (geopolitics) were attributed to some politicians. Meta and Google did not offer a country-specific content moderation around Election Day and there was no direct collaboration between global tech companies, GECOM, and lead digital outlets to promptly remove or deplatform content harming electoral integrity. Hence, especially in the absence of non-partisan fact-checking, it was difficult for voters to distinguish facts from fiction.

Notwithstanding the shrinking space for non-partisan activism online, some popular influencers promoted a respectful and pluralistic debate and encouraged voters to make informed choices. For example, a young Toshao on his Facebook page compared all party promises related to Indigenous communities and was seen by his young peers as a role model for promoting democracy. A TikToker stood up against the use of demeaning slang towards the youth, while another influencer explained particularities of Guyana's electoral system. Reassuringly, such independent, small-scale initiatives made a positive impact on the electoral process, promoting a political communication culture that genuinely embraces differences

⁵⁵ For further details on online support base per party see Annex III, Chart 9 and the subsequent description.

⁵⁶ Macro influencer - a digital content creator with more than 500,000 followers (in Guyana's context – above 300,000); mid-tier influencer - from 50,000 to 300,000 followers; niche and nano influencers up to 50,000.

⁵⁷ For further details on the prevalence of posts alluding to "sanctions" see Annex III, Charts 6,7 and 8.

⁵⁸ For further details related to paid content on Meta platforms see Annex III, Section 1.3, Charts 9, 10 and 11.

among the youth and fosters a meaningful civic engagement of young people that should be further nourished.

Recommendation: *Promote an inclusive online communication environment through collaborative efforts by independent civic initiatives, media, digital content creators and GECOM to foster a meaningful engagement with global tech companies on timely removal and deplatforming of harmful content throughout the pre- and post-election period.*

XII. PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN

Strong women's presence in public and political life, and room to strengthen legal protections against intimidation and harassment.

Guyana's legal framework positively supports women's electoral and political participation, largely aligning with international commitments. During the elections, candidate lists reflected solid gender inclusion efforts; women constituted 43 per cent and 51 per cent on the national Top-up and RDC lists respectively, as calculated by the EU EOM.⁵⁹ Two women contested as presidential candidates. Women were also highly active during political campaigns and rallies. EU EOM observers noted high female attendance at campaign events for various political parties, often exceeding 50-60 per cent, including the PPP/C and WIN, and with significant youth participation.

Positively, Guyana was ranked 31 of 181 for women in parliament in a 2024 IPU report.⁶⁰ Following the declaration of the 2025 results and the allocation of seats, women made up 38.5 per cent of NA members (a 3.2 percent increase on 2020), while women account for 61.3 percent of seats in RDCs. This level of involvement, across roles from candidates and voters to electoral officials, indicates a positive trajectory for women's political participation in Guyana.

Guyana's Women and Gender Equality Commission represents an institutional commitment to promoting women's rights and gender issues, and women play a prominent role in elective offices, across the professions, and in all strata of public life.⁶¹ For the 2025 elections, women were well-represented in decision-making roles at various levels of GECOM and from diverse ethnic backgrounds.

The Constitution enshrines the equality of women and the RoPA incorporates special measures as advocated by the UN Committee on the Rights of Women.⁶² By law, at least one-third of candidates on each party's national Top-up list must be female, a requirement that also applies to GC lists when taken together. These provisions correspond to CEDAW's aim to achieve a "critical mass" of women in political life for meaningful impact. Despite these positives, there remains room for further improvements, particularly for rules to ensure that political parties' approaches on gender equality and inclusion are transparent.

Notwithstanding these very positive trends, the topic of violence against women, a broader social concern, spilled into the 2025 campaign space, notably online. Abusive content aimed to denigrate women politicians and activists was observed on social media. The FGM presidential candidate, the WIN presidential candidate's sister, the President's mother, the Minister of Education, and two opposition-leaning influencers were the most targeted public

⁵⁹ For example, half of APNU's candidates in *Region Nine* were female.

⁶⁰ [IPU MONTHLY RANKING 2024](#).

⁶¹ The Constitution explicitly encourages and facilitates women's participation in management and decision-making processes across private, public, and state sectors. Also, EU EOM Observers note a solid presence of women in Indigenous village authorities, for example In Region 2, many village councillors were women.

⁶² The Constitution mandates that CEDAW be respected and upheld by all organs of the state and all natural and legal persons. See also CEDAW, General Recommendation 23.

figures, with denigrating comments made about their personal appearances, faith and integrity. This warrants stronger collaborative efforts between GECOM, police, traditional and digital media, and party leaders to tackle such abusive conduct during elections.

XIII. PARTICIPATION OF VULNERABLE AND MARGINALISED GROUPS

Legal protections for inclusion and non-discrimination lack practical operational supports.

Persons with disabilities in Guyana, estimated to number in the region of 24,000, continue to face barriers to inclusion and to opportunities for equal participation in political life and electoral process. The Constitution mandates that due regard be paid to international law obligations bearing on human rights, thus including the CPRD, and some efforts have been made towards this but much still remains to be done. The Persons with Disabilities Act 2010 appears to be broadly in line with international commitments.⁶³ It mandates GECOM shall ensure that barrier-free polling stations or arrangements are provided for persons with disabilities, but 15 years since its enactment, practical implementation remains an issue. Thus, the legislative framework offers an insufficient practical support for persons with disabilities' electoral and political participation. Representative organisations criticised a lack of regulatory action and low levels of compliance with the law on accessibility, including by various government ministries.

Several recommendations by representative organisations to GECOM to improve independent access for voting opportunities, including by installing ramps and making tactile ballots available at all polling places, were not addressed prior to the elections.⁶⁴ The RoPA to a certain extent aligns with international commitments as it foresees different options for voting for people with disabilities including voting in person, by proxy, or with an assistant of choice (including an interpreter).⁶⁵ Yet prior to Election Day, some stakeholders expressed concerns about insufficiently targeted information on the option to vote by proxy.⁶⁶

Still, applying the law as it finds it, GECOM deployed mobile registration teams to reach persons with disabilities seeking to use the proxy option. In some regions, the proxy vote, which is available to various categories of voter, was used exclusively by persons with disability.⁶⁷ Meanwhile, the EU EOM noted that some political parties actively engaged on disability issues in their campaigns; a policy promise of cash grants for all disabled persons was announced by PPPC, and the WIN party pledged to raise public assistance for persons with disabilities.

Before Election Day, at least five political parties publicly demonstrated a positive commitment to promoting inclusion and addressing lingering discriminatory aspects of the law impacting LGBTQIA+ rights, including the right to privacy.⁶⁸ At the same time, advocates' calls to include provisions on sexual orientation and gender-based discrimination in the Ethnic

⁶³ [The Persons with Disabilities Act 2010](#)

⁶⁴ Recommendations stemmed from experience in 2023 local elections set out in the Access [REPORT](#) of the Guyana Council Of Organisations for Persons with Disabilities.

⁶⁵ The assistance option aligns with CRPD's call for accessible voting procedures and facilities, and the right to assistance in voting by a person of one's own choice.

⁶⁶ The CRPD explicitly obliges States Parties to guarantee political rights and opportunities for PWDs on an equal basis with others, ensuring their effective and full participation in political life, including the right to vote and be elected. The CPRD specifically calls for measures to protect "indigenous women and girls with disabilities" who are at greater risk and require targeted support for justice and access to services.

⁶⁷ The EU EOM Observers noted that in Region 10, all 73 approved proxy applications concerned PWDs, predominantly those with mobility, hearing, or visual impairments.

⁶⁸ Same sex intimacy between consenting males is an offence under Guyana's law prosecutable with up to two years in prison, although no formal prosecutions has taken place in recent years, community advocates note that the provision legitimises homophobia, overshadows the community, and impedes realisation of anti-discrimination measures in the other aspects of law and services

Relations Commission's Code of Conduct were not addressed, underscoring a need for timely engagement by the authorities with civil society and the will to address their issues of concern.

XIV. PARTICIPATION OF INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES

Solid democratic participation in Indigenous communities, with room for greater voter education outreach.

Indigenous citizens have well-established systems for democratic governance at the local level as well as some involvement in regional and national political life. During the campaign, the Indigenous population, estimated at 10 to 15 per cent, was perceived by political parties as a critical electorate. Since the declaration of results and submission of candidates' names to GECOM for the selection of members to the new NA, it appears that six members are from Indigenous backgrounds, while one was appointed to cabinet.⁶⁹

During the 2025 campaign, several community leaders (Toshaos), notably young village heads, contributed positively to the democratic process by promoting inclusive campaigning, supporting villagers in making informed choices. Some representatives of Indigenous organisations expressed concerns over limited access to telecommunications and media and noted varying degrees of digital literacy, flagging a need for greater face-to-face voter education outreach.

Under the 2006 Amerindian Act, physical access to Indigenous villages requires prior authorisation.⁷⁰ During campaigns, EU Observers received reports of instances when Toshaos hindered campaigns by opposition parties, mostly WIN, but also APNU, AFC and FGM, while government ministers were given undue advantage. Despite constitutional recognition of Indigenous rights and the promoting good governance, EU EOM observers noted that some communities and, in particular, Toshaos were vulnerable to pressure from the Government owing to various dependencies, including related to land rights and financial supports.⁷¹

The legal framework for the electoral and political participation of Indigenous persons is generally aligned with international commitments. Constitutional and legislative instruments, including the Amerindian Act, support the protection of Indigenous culture and provide for local government mechanisms. Recent revisions to mechanisms to enable citizens prove their identity and, consequently, to register to vote also benefits members of Indigenous communities as those changes allow persons lacking official documentation to be vouched for by the sworn testimony of a Toshao (among others).

XV. CITIZEN AND INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION

Accreditation process was efficient, still the legal framework does not provide for the same guarantees of access for national as for international election observers.

GECOM accredited 12 domestic observer organisations primarily from the private sector and five international observer missions. Most prominent domestic observers in these elections were professional bodies and interest groups. The process used by GECOM for the accreditation of observers was efficient.

⁶⁹ This appears to mark a reduction of one such member of the national assembly compared to 2020.

⁷⁰ [The Amerindian Act](#) provides for village consent for certain activities but its application to political campaigning is not explicitly clarified, potentially allowing for arbitrary decisions.

⁷¹ One Toshao stated to the EU EOM that *"To be granted projects you have to follow the government."* This dependency contradicts the UN Declaration on Indigenous People's Rights regarding financing autonomous functions and exercising self-government and highlights a seeming gap in mechanisms for independent resource allocation.

The law provides a solid basis for international election observation but adequate guarantees for domestic observation were not included in the 2022 legal reforms.⁷² Independent civil society organisations (CSO) previously involved in election observation were not active in these elections and, reportedly, underfunding was a factor in their non-participation.

Recommendation: Ensure by law and regulation citizen observers rights to unhindered access to all electoral processes and election related data at all levels and stages.

Other international observation missions included: The Carter Center, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Commonwealth, and the Organization of American States (OAS).

XVI. ELECTORAL DISPUTES

Adequate avenues for judicial remedies, but some GECOM administrative dispute processes risk being compromised by short timelines.

There were overall few pre-election disputes and none arising from the candidate list approvals. Only three pre-election matters came before the High Court during the deployment of the EU EOM. One case challenged the exclusion of independent candidates, and another disputed the constitutionality of some of the legal conditions for political parties to contest elections. Both matters were publicly and expeditiously heard and rejected by the then acting Chief Justice. Ten days prior to elections, an FGM candidate sought to suspend the polls altogether, alleging GECOM unlawfully omitted her list from the ballot in the GCs where her party was not participating. Despite the closeness to the Election Day, the new acting Chief Justice granted almost three days to public hearings before ruling against the applicant.⁷³

The arguments presented by the applicants in each case failed to convince the Court and, in at least one case, no question about the constitutionality of the RoPA was raised. However, these cases exposed uncertainties in aspects of the electoral law, thus raising the prospects for such issues to come before the courts again, either in fresh proceedings or by way of appeal.⁷⁴

The legal framework provides a structured and transparent system for resolving electoral disputes. The Constitution establishes the High Court as the primary body for deciding questions regarding NA membership and elections, while the National Assembly (Validity of Elections) Act details the process for challenging election results through an election petition.⁷⁵ Such petitions must be made within 28 days of the declaration of results.⁷⁶ Decisions in election cases at the High Court or the Court of Appeal (in the case of presidential petitions) cannot be appealed to the CCJ. At the time of writing, there were no petitions.

GECOM manages claims and objections to voter lists and the RoPA also outlines procedures for handling defective candidate lists by GECOM and appeals to the courts against a refusal of approval by the Commission. Despite a reduced timeline for claims and objections to the preliminary voter list, no legal challenges were brought on that issue. Still, law and practice

⁷² RoPA section 4E provides only that the Commission may approve local organisations subject to unspecified conditions to be determined by the Commission, whereas the General Elections (Observers) Act that applies to international observers, stipulated rights of access to polling and counting and to information.

⁷³ *Krystal Fisher V GECOM*, (High Court Ordinary Division) August 2025. In its judgment, the Court derided the substance of certain points argued by the applicant as ludicrous.

⁷⁴ The EU EOM is aware that at least one appeal regarding the question of the right of candidates to contest independently. Cases of this nature may eventually find their way to the court of last instance for Guyana which is the Caribbean Court of Justice. The outcome may take some considerable time to be determined.

⁷⁵ This Act, through the Local Democratic Organs Act, extends judicial review to disputes concerning RDC elections.

⁷⁶ There is specified deadline for final decisions in the constitution or electoral law, although judicial law and decisions require civil case to be decided within 120 days of trial.

should ensure reasonable opportunities for access to due process at all stages and levels of the elections.

XVII. VOTING, COUNTING AND TABULATION OF RESULTS

Election Day was peaceful and efficiently run.

Overview of Voting

The EU EOM observed the opening in 21 polling stations (PS), voting in 222 PS, and counting in 19 PS.⁷⁷ Overall, Election Day was assessed as peaceful and calm, with the elections efficiently administered. However, the EU EOM noted campaign activities near six per cent of observed PS.

All PS staff were present in the observed PS, and their overall performance was assessed by EU EOM observers as professional and organised. Women made up 87 per cent of polling staff in those polling stations, including 81 per cent of presiding officers. At least three party agents were present in 100 per cent of all the PS observed, enhancing the transparency of the process, with PPP/C, APNU and WIN fielding the biggest share. Local observers were present only in 17 per cent of the observed PS. Party agents could monitor the process without restrictions. Some 59 per cent of the observed PS did not provide independent access for persons with reduced mobility and 32 per cent of PS had unsuitable layouts for these voters.

Recommendation: Provide independent access and equal opportunities to vote for persons with disabilities by implementing different and suitably adapted measures with a clear regulatory framework.

The opening was assessed as very good or good by all EU EOM observers. Most PS observed opened on time, with a few experiencing delays of up to 30 minutes. No essential material was missing in the observed polling stations and opening procedures were overall followed. The ballot boxes were shown to be empty and sealed securely. In two observations, police present unduly interfered with the work of the polling station staff. All people present had a clear view of the opening procedures, and the EU EOM as well as citizen observers and party agents were able to observe the opening process without restrictions. Long queues in front of polling stations were observed in a few locations.

Overall, the voting process was assessed as very good or good by all EU EOM observers. Throughout the day, voting procedures were mostly followed, however, the prohibition on the use of mobile phones in PS was applied inconsistently but taking pictures of ballots was not observed. During the morning hours, long queues were observed in eight per cent of polling stations. As a security measure, indelible ink was used to mark voters' index finger to prevent multiple voting. However, checks for traces of ink prior to voting were not consistently conducted in 27 per cent of observed PS. Positively, in 93 per cent of PS, polling staff explained the voting process to all voters.

The secrecy of the vote was not respected in 35 per cent of PS observed during voting, due to the positioning of the voting compartment, the layout of the PS, and interference by party agents in the voting process. In 20 per cent, voters were unable to mark their ballot in secret due to the positioning of the voting screens – seemingly caused by the inconsistent application of instructions regarding prohibition of the use of phones in PS.

Proxy voting is permitted under RoPA for specific categories of voters, including polling station staff, members of the disciplined forces, transport and harbour department workers, and

⁷⁷ This sample consisted of 170 PS in urban areas, 92 PS in rural areas, including 28 PS in Indigenous communities.

persons with disabilities. Applications had to be submitted to ROs by 11 August, with the proxy also being a registered voter.⁷⁸ The same proxy could be appointed for a maximum of two electors, listed on the voter list for the same polling station. Proxy voting took place in 41 per cent of PS observed.

The EU EOM directly observed only one instance of organised transportation of voters.⁷⁹ In two instances, party agents or unidentified individuals from outside the PS unduly interfered with the work of PS staff.⁸⁰ Insufficient or missing voter information materials were reported in 14 per cent of PS observed. Observers noted campaign material inside of two per cent of PS. In more than 50 per cent of observations, the information clerk had to redirect voters to other polling places, an indication that many voters were not familiar with their polling place, despite the online PS search tool on the GECOM website. No voters were turned away by the polling staff without a lawful ground. However, in two PS, EU observers saw persons attempting to influence voters' choice.⁸¹ EU EOM observers were able to observe the voting without restriction in all PS.

Early voting of 10,482 disciplined forces (military, police and prison service representing 1.4 per cent of the total electorate) was conducted on 22 August in a calm and orderly manner. The EU EOM observed 15 out of 83 early voting PS in eight of the ten regions. While polling staff was professional and well-organised, the voting was slow and at times lengthy. Party agents were present in 100 per cent of the PS observed, while local observers were reported in 53 per cent. GECOM later reported a voter turnout of 83 per cent for early voting. Disciplined forces ballots were mixed and counted on Election Day in 354 designated polling stations.

Closing and Counting

The EU EOM assessed closing and counting procedures in 18 out of 19 PS observed as very good and good. Overall, observed PS closed on time and counting procedures were mostly followed. The seals of the ballot boxes were intact before counting in all observed PS. In all PS, the election material remained in plain view of observers and party agents during the count. During the count, the validity of the ballots in all observed PS observed was determined in a consistent manner, and no undue interference was observed. EU EOM observers reported from five counts that PS staff had difficulties in filling in the SoPs. All SoPs observed were fully completed, and the presiding officer publicly displayed copies of the SoPs as required by law in all PS observed. Observers and party agents were able to observe without restrictions in all observed PS.

Positively, the PS staff reconciled the number of voters not only by counting the ballot counterfoils, but also by counting the number of voters who had voted from the voter list in 89 per cent of PS observed. This type of reconciliation is not prescribed by law, but in line with good practice, as the counting of ballot counterfoils is not sufficient in determining the number of voters.

Tabulation of Results

After the counting, PS results started to be processed in the 20 district and sub-district tabulation centres. Following the 2022 legal amendments, GECOM established 10 sub-regional tabulation centres in three regions (3, 4 and 6). Upon receipt of the election materials, the ROs and SROs verified all envelopes and checked the SoPs for accuracy and consistency,

⁷⁸ GECOM ROs received 3,971 applications, of which 3,624 were approved after verifications, including home visits, to mitigate potential abuse and ensure the integrity of the process. Approved proxy votes represent 0.5 per cent of registered voters and 0.8 per cent of votes cast.

⁷⁹ In Hiawa in region 9.

⁸⁰ In Wismar in region 10 and in Georgetown.

⁸¹ In Lethem in region 9 and in Linden in region 10.

which were then uploaded to the GECOM website. GECOM published the first SoPs almost three hours after the closing of the polls, yet their website was not always accessible to the public due to insufficient server bandwidth. The tabulation process began on 2 September, after the SoPs were scanned in each region. The results for the national elections were processed first, followed by the regional race.

On the election night and the following day, the EU EOM visited 19 of the 20 tabulation centres, all of them were adequate for the reception of election materials. Police were present outside 17 tabulation centres. Party agents were present in all the tabulation centres observed.

The EU EOM was able to observe the tabulation process without restriction. The EU EOM assessed the tabulation process as very good or good in all tabulation centres observed.

Recounts

GECOM approved requests for recounts submitted by APNU in sub-district 4 in region 4 and a limited recount for 77 PS in district 5. Recount requests by WIN for regions 4 and 8 and by APNU in regions 7 and 10 were rejected by GECOM for not meeting legal requirements. The recounts started in the morning of 4 September at GECOM Headquarters with 25 counting stations, and in the presence of party agents, and continued non-stop until late afternoon of 5 September. The EU EOM was able to observe the recount process without restriction. The results of the recounts for the general and regional elections were tabulated in parallel. The EU EOM assessed the recount process as well-organised and transparent. The recounts did not affect the election results.

Publication of Results

Preliminary results from polling stations were published on the GECOM SoP portal throughout election night, starting around 21:00 hrs. GECOM published partial results per district throughout the day on 3 September. The publication of PS results increased transparency, in line with a 2020 EU EOM recommendation.

On 6 September, shortly before midnight, GECOM issued a press release, declaring the incumbent President re-elected and announcing the number of NA seats won per political party. The Commission convened a meeting to declare results on the evening of 5 September, but due to a lack of quorum, results could only be legally be declared 24 hours later. The official results were gazetted on 17 of September. The EU EOM calculated turnout for these elections was 58 per cent, a historic low for Guyana.

XVIII. RESULTS AND POST-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT

A peaceful post-election environment, but repeated claims of irregularities by opposition parties.

Post-election developments

GECOM announced the final results of the 2025 general and regional elections. With 55 per cent of the vote, the PPP/C secured 36 seats in the National Assembly and re-elected its presidential candidate, Irfaan Ali. The newly formed WIN movement obtained 16 seats, emerging as the main parliamentary opposition, while APNU won 12 seats, its weakest performance to date. Of the other three parties contesting, only FGM gained representation with one seat. The outcome of the regional elections closely reflected the national results. The PPP/C won majorities in six of 10 RDCs. In regions 4 and 8, traditionally APNU strongholds, the results were split without any party gaining a comfortable majority. WIN secured control of region 7 and 10, historically aligned with APNU. The President was sworn in on 7 September.

Following the announcement of results, opposition political parties (APNU, WIN and FGM) continued raising concerns regarding alleged irregularities. Addressing the nation on 6 September, the APNU presidential candidate, Aubrey Norton, asserted that the elections lacked credibility, citing deficiencies in the electoral system, including an inflated voters' list and irregularities observed on Election Day. WIN and FGM presidential candidates underlined similar irregularities.

XIX. RECOMMENDATIONS

NO	CONTEXT (including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL PRINCIPLE – COMMITMENT – NATIONAL LEGISLATION
LEGAL FRAMEWORK					
1	The GECOM, as a constitutional body, has a partisan framework which splits the commission into opposing sides in the NA, precluding broader stakeholder inclusion and risking inefficient decision making. A 21-member Constitutional Reform Commission which could address this issue has yet to begin its work, including on electoral reforms and a target period for publicising its methodology and timeframes is overdue, reportedly due to logistical challenges and deficiencies in member selection. Its role, underpinned by the necessary expertise, will be crucial to several aspects of electoral reform.	Enhance the prospects for key electoral reforms through necessary electoral expertise as part of a robust CRC operational framework.	None	CRC	<p>Transparency and access to information</p> <p>ICCPR, article 19, HRC GC 34, para. 19 “States parties should proactively put in the public domain Government information of public interest.”</p> <p>UN CAC article 7.4 “Each State Party shall [...] endeavor to adopt, maintain and strengthen systems that promote transparency.”</p>
2	The 2022 changes to RoPA did not adopt a constitutional requirement to ensure voters’ awareness of the candidates they are electing. Political parties assign seats	Ensure compliance with the Constitution by allowing voters to know before elections the order of	Legislation RoPA	Parliament	<p>Genuine elections that reflect the free expression of the will of the people</p> <p>ICCPR, article 25: “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the</p>

NO	CONTEXT (including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL PRINCIPLE – COMMITMENT – NATIONAL LEGISLATION
	from their candidates lists only after polling, limiting voter awareness of eventual representatives prior to elections, contrary to the Constitution, and creating uncertainty for candidates.	candidates on lists and those candidates they are electing.			<p>distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives”.</p> <p>Constitution, article 160(3)(a)(ii): “[The manner in which lists of candidates shall be prepared] shall allow voters to be sure which individuals they are electing to the National Assembly.”</p>
3.	Legal reforms in 2022, to a certain extent, streamlined and clarified aspects of electoral laws. Still, some aspects could be further improved, including legislative or regulatory measures to resolve to remove uncertainties for example on inconsistent use of terms ‘polling stations’ and ‘polling places’ in RoPA, some tight or uncertain timelines, including on voter list complaints and objections, and appeals on candidate list rejections, on mechanisms for women’ selection to winning seats, and the status of non-party independent candidates.	Protect the interests of voters and contestants by clarifying uncertain aspects of the electoral law and addressing legal gaps.	<p>Regulation e.g.</p> <p>i) Clarify RoPA terms polling stations and polling places</p> <p>ii) Clarify “Elections Act” in the National Assembly (Disqualification) Act.</p> <p>iii) Clarify the position in RoPA of non-party candidates</p>	<p>Parliament</p> <p>GECOM corrective measures</p>	<p>Rule of Law</p> <p>UNCAC, article 7(4): “Each State Party shall, [...] adopt, maintain and strengthen systems that promote transparency and prevent conflicts of interest.”</p> <p>ICCPR, Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment (GC) 25, para. 9 “The rights and obligations provided for in [ICCPR article 25] paragraph (b) should be guaranteed by law.”</p> <p>ICCPR, HRC GC 34, para. 25, “...a norm, to be characterized as a “law”, must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to the public.”</p>

NO	CONTEXT (including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL PRINCIPLE – COMMITMENT – NATIONAL LEGISLATION
ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION					
4	<p>The elections were held in an atmosphere marked by a lack of confidence in the work of the election administration, notably among opposition political parties and some media and civil society organisations. The GECOM structure and decision-making remain heavily influenced by political divisions, and the commission struggles to function in a cohesive manner. This structure of GECOM, a legacy of the political landscape of the 1990s, endures but changes to it require constitutional reform. The commissioners are split along party lines, with the chairperson’s deciding vote often reinforcing perceptions of partisanship.</p>	<p>Review the current composition of GECOM to guarantee an inclusive and impartial functioning and decision-making</p>	<p>Constitution Legislation Regulations</p>	<p>Constitutional Reform Commission Parliament GECOM</p>	<p>Independence of the election management body ICCPR, HRC GC 25, para. 20: “An independent electoral authority should be established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially.” IPU, Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections, art. 4(2): “States should take the necessary policy and institutional steps to ensure the progressive achievement and consolidation of democratic goals, including through the establishment of a neutral, impartial or balanced mechanism for the management of elections.” Commonwealth Secretariat: Organizing Free and Fair Elections at Cost-Effective Levels, p. 44: “Behind any successful recruitment policy for election officials is the recognition that the appointees must not only be fair-minded and impartial in their dealings with the public and political parties but that they must be perceived to be so by all concerned.” Commonwealth Secretariat: Dimensions of Free and Fair Elections: Frameworks,</p>

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					<p>Integrity, Transparency, Attributes, Monitoring, p. 18: “In order for the body which is responsible for the governance and control of an electoral system to play its rightful role in nurturing the integrity of the election process, it must not only be independent of government control, it must be perceived to be so by the general public and the political parties.”</p>
5	<p>GECOM’s public communication strategy was inconsistent, leaving space for confusion and reducing transparency. The commission members did not present unified positions, including on election preparations, and often publicly expressed conflicting stances, eroding trust in the institution. The Commissions statutory meetings are closed to the public, and there was limited direct engagement with the public and media, leaving space for uncertainty and misinformation to spread. Due to provisions in the law, media could not operate within a 200 yards perimeter from PS and did not have access to tabulation centres.</p>	<p>Implement a clear and comprehensive communication strategy for the entire electoral cycle including i) timely access to information of public interest including GECOM decisions, regulations and instructions, ii) media access to all stages of the election process, iii) strengthening GECOM’s public communications unit.</p>	Regulations	GECOM	<p>Transparency and access to information</p> <p>ICCPR, article 19(2): The right to freedom of expression] shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information (...) of all kinds.</p> <p>ICCPR, HRC GC. 34, para. 19: States parties should proactively put in the public domain Government information of public interest. States parties should make every effort to ensure easy, prompt, effective and practical access to such information.</p> <p>UNCAC, article 10: Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, take such measures as may be necessary to enhance transparency in its public administration, including with regard to its organization, functioning and decision-making processes, where appropriate</p> <p>Human Rights Council, 60th session, Report of the Working Group on UPR, Guyana,</p>

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					recommendation 102.9 (enjoys the support by Guyana): Strengthen civic participation by establishing formal and transparent mechanisms for regular consultations with civil society organisations.
VOTER REGISTRATION					
6	Prisoners and non-convicted detainees cannot vote although there are no legal restrictions except for individuals convicted of electoral offences. In practice, the lack of specific rules and practical arrangements for voting in prisons and places of detention results in the disenfranchisement of this category of voters.	Ensure all eligible voters can exercise their right to vote, including the possibility for pre-trial detainees and prisoners, away from their registered place of voting on Election Day.	Legislation (RoPA) Regulations	Parliament GECOM	<p>Universal and equal suffrage</p> <p>ICCPR, HRC GC 25, para. 11: States must take effective measures to ensure that all persons entitled to vote are to exercise that right.</p> <p>ICCPR, HRC GC 25, para. 14: Persons who are deprived of liberty but who have not been convicted should not be excluded from exercising the right to vote.</p> <p>Human Rights Council, 60th session, Report of the Working Group on UPR, Guyana, recommendation 102.12 (enjoys the support by Guyana): Strengthen democratic institutions, especially in the criminal justice system.</p>
7	GECOM did not publish disaggregated data on the voter list, figures from technical assistance providers show women represent 50 per cent of registered voters. Disaggregated figures on the registered commonwealth citizens were also not published despite repeated calls	Publish timely voter list disaggregated data by different categories of voters, including by gender, age and citizenship, with due regard to the Data Protection Act	Regulations	GECOM	<p>Transparency and access to information</p> <p>ICCPR, article 19(2): The right to freedom of expression] shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information (...) of all kinds.</p> <p>ICCPR, HRC GC. 34, para. 19: To give effect to the right of access to information, States</p>

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	from stakeholders further contributing to the lack of transparency.				parties should proactively put in the public domain Government information of public interest. States parties should make every effort to ensure easy, prompt, effective and practical access to such information.
8	The accuracy of the voter list was a subject of concern among the opposition parties linked to the lack of reliable population data in the broader context of the 2022 population census, the results of which have not yet been released by the government without explanation. The 2022 amended NRA provides new mechanisms for the removal of deceased voters through reporting from the General Register Office, Police, and the Ministry of Health. However, for the 2025 elections there was no mechanism in place for incorporating information from the latter two institutions. In addition, there is no mechanism in place to obtain information on deceased citizens abroad.	Update the voter list in light of most recent available population data, and data from all relevant state institutions, ensuring linking to ongoing digitalisation solutions.	Legislation (NRA) Regulations	Parliament GECOM	<p>Universal and equal suffrage</p> <p>ICCPR, article 25(b): Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any distinction and without unreasonable restrictions ... to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage.</p> <p>UNGA, Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerised Personal Data Files, art. 2: Persons responsible for the compilation of files or those responsible for keeping them have an obligation to conduct regular checks on the accuracy and relevance of the data recorded and to ensure that they are kept as complete as possible ... and that they are kept up to date regularly.</p> <p>Joint Declaration on a Digital Alliance (EU-Latin America and Caribbean): Promote connectivity, inclusion, innovation and the digitalization of public services and registries.</p>

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CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT					
9	<p>There are no regulations to ensure a level playing field for campaigning, nor adequate rules to minimise the misuse of state resources to the advantage of incumbency.</p> <p>During the election campaign, an undue advantage of incumbency distorted the level playing field. The President and his administration inaugurated a large number of public projects, launched or expanded social programmes, and used state resources for campaign purposes.</p> <p>The ruling party used government-managed online platforms and party campaign pages to disseminate identical content. State media was instrumentalised to the exclusive benefit of the ruling party, contributing to its dominant presence in the broadcast sector</p>	<p>Adopt clear and comprehensive campaign rules, including for the conduct of public officials and for the use of all types of state assets to avoid undue advantage of incumbency.</p>	<p>Legislation (RoPA)</p>	<p>Parliament</p>	<p>Prevention of corruption / Fairness in the election campaign</p> <p>ICCPR, HRC GC 25, para. 19: “Voters should be able to form opinions independently, free of violence or threat of violence, compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference of any kind.”</p> <p>UNCAC, article 19: “Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the abuse of functions or position, that is, the performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity.”</p> <p>UNCAC, article 17: “...the embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his or her benefit or for the benefit of another person or entity, of any property, public or private funds or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to the public official by virtue of his or her position.”</p>

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CAMPAIGN FINANCE					
10	<p>Campaign finance is inadequately regulated, leading to a lack of transparency and accountability.</p> <p>While the RoPA stipulates a maximum expenditure limit for groups of candidates, the ceiling is outdated and unrealistic (GYD 2,650,000, ca. EUR15,000).</p> <p>There are significant regulatory gaps such as no provisions defining permissible sources and uses of funding, donations, or campaign expenditures, as well as no rules on third party spending or donations, foreign funding, bank account controls, or spending and advertising on-line.</p> <p>Political parties do not report as envisaged by the current law and GECOM has no operational oversight mechanism.</p>	<p>Strengthen the operational oversight for campaign finance through an independent oversight body and revising outdated legal provisions, including expenditure ceilings and permissible expenses.</p>	<p>Amendment to RoPA</p>	<p>Parliament</p>	<p>Prevention of corruption/ Fairness in the election campaign, Transparency and access to information</p> <p>ICCPR, article 25: „Every citizen shall have the right ... to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.”</p> <p>ICCPR, HRC GC 12, para. 19: “Reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may be justified where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party.”</p> <p>UNCAC, article 7(3): “...enhance transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the funding of political parties.”</p> <p>IADC, article 5: “The strengthening of political parties and other political organizations is a priority for democracy. ... establishment of a balanced and transparent system for their financing.”</p>

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MEDIA					
11	The media regulator GNBA board is composed mostly of ruling party nominees, its hearings are closed to the public and decision-making process is non-transparent, further eroding media trust in the regulator’s impartiality and independence.	Strengthen independence of broadcast media regulator GNBA by impartial and inclusive appointment of the board members and its accountability through a transparent decision-making process.	Broadcasting Act 2011	Parliament	<p>Freedom of opinion and expression Transparency and right to access information</p> <p>ICCPR, HRC GC 34, para. 39: “States parties should ensure that legislative and administrative frameworks for the regulation of the mass media are consistent with the provisions of paragraph 3... It is recommended that States parties that have not already done so should establish an independent and public broadcasting licensing authority...”</p> <p>UN (OHCHR), OAS, OSCE: Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Elections in the Digital Age, para. 1.b.ii “Any administrative body which has the power to oversee rules relating to the media during election periods should be independent of the government and its decisions should be subject to timely judicial review.”</p> <p>Article 19: Joint Declaration by the UN Special Rapporteur (SR) on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression (2003), p. 31 “All public authorities which exercise formal regulatory powers over the media should be protected against</p>

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					interferences, particularly of a political or economic nature, including by an appointments process for members which is transparent, allows for public input and is not controlled by any particular political party.”
12	The law provides that GNBA shall establish regulations on the campaign coverage by the media, in consultation with GECOM and political parties, There is no mechanism to ensure reasonable and fair application of the rules. The GNBA relied on non-binding advisories published on its website. As a result, campaign coverage remained largely unregulated, and concerns about media bias remained unaddressed.	Establish media campaign coverage rules on equitable airtime and space for electoral contestants as well as political advertising, in a timely and consultative manner.	Broadcasting Act 2011 Legislation	GNBA GECOM Parliament	Freedom of opinion and expression Transparency and right to access information UN (OHCHR), OAS, ACHPR, OSCE: Joint Declaration on Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade, para. 1.d: “Ensure that regulatory bodies for the media are independent, operate transparently and are accountable to the public, and respect the principle of limited scope of regulation, and provide appropriate oversight of private actors.” ICCPR, HRC GC 25, para. 25: “...the free communication of information and ideas about public and political issues between citizens, candidates and elected representatives is essential. This implies a free press and other media able to comment on public issues without censorship or restraint and to inform public opinion.”
13	The PPP/C dominated the prime-time election coverage of the state-run broadcaster. Both NCN TV and Voice of Guyana radio covered in full all the ruling	Ensure state-funded broadcaster guarantees equitable coverage to all contestants during the campaign and consider introducing provisions	Legislation	Parliament	Right and opportunity to participate in public affairs and hold office/ Transparency

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	<p>party rallies held across the country. A large part of state-run media electoral airtime composed of video and audio clips that promoted the ruling party but were not labelled as political advertising. Only up to two per cent of prime-time political coverage of the state-run channels featured APNU and up to one per cent WIN, while all other parties were practically excluded from the electoral-related airtime.</p>	<p>on free airtime for electoral contestants.</p>		<p>NCN</p>	<p>and right to access information/ Freedom of opinion and expression</p> <p>UNHRC: Report of the SR on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (1999), para. 17(a): “With these broad principles in mind, the Special Rapporteur wishes to emphasize that in pre-election periods...Media inform the public about the political parties, candidates, campaign issues and voting processes; government media are balanced and impartial in election reporting, do not discriminate against any political party or candidate in granting access to air time and ensure that news, interview and information programmes are not biased in favour of, or against any party or candidate.”</p> <p>Also at para. 17(d): “With these broad principles in mind, the Special Rapporteur wishes to emphasize that in pre-election periods...(d)There is a clear distinction between news and press conferences related to functions of office and activities by members of the governments, particularly if the member concerned is seeking election.”</p> <p>UN SR on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression.</p>

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					<p>International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression: Joint Statement on the Media and Elections, p. 2, para. 20.3: “All publicly-owned media, including public service broadcasters, should be under the following obligations during an election period: To grant all parties and candidates equitable access to the media to communicate their messages directly with the public, either for free or at subsidised rates. Equitable access means fair and non-discriminatory access allocated according to objective.”</p>
SOCIAL MEDIA AND DIGITAL RIGHTS					
14	<p>Constitutional safeguards for freedom of expression online are diluted by vague definitions in the 2018 Cyber Crime Act 2018; section 18 (Offences against the State) has been applied to prosecute social media activists, leading to a perception of undue and selective application to discourage dissent. In parallel, there was no enforcement of the Cyber Crime Act against several instances of cyberbullying offences including online intimidation and harassment. Such environment is not</p>	<p>Protect freedom of political expression by clearly aligning the legal definitions for content restriction in the Cybercrime Act with international commitments.</p>	<p>Cyber Crime Act Provisions for its implementation</p>	<p>Parliament The police</p>	<p>Freedom of expression and opinion ICCPR, art.19: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression [...]” ICCPR, HRC GC 34, para. 35: “When a state party invokes a legitimate ground for restriction of freedom of expression, it must demonstrate in specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat, and the necessity and proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by establishing a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the threat.”</p>

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	conducive to an open and pluralistic debate online.				
15	The 2023 Data Protection Act establishes a Data Protection Office, (DPO) led by the Commissioner, who is appointed by the President and is tasked to oversee the enforcement. The Commissioner is not appointed, the DPO is not established and there has not been a public debate on the implementation of the Act. Hence, politically motivated doxing occurred with impunity and citizens' mobile phone numbers collected by the government were used to solicit votes.	Implement the Data Protection Act and establish a publicly accountable Data Protection office, thus effectively protect voters' personal data from undue publication and from misuse for political gains.	Put into effect 2023 Data Protection Act Provisions for its enforcement and oversight	Parliament Data Protection Commission	<p>Right to privacy</p> <p>ICCPR, article 17: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy [...] Everyone has the right to the protection [...] against such interference or attacks.”</p> <p>ICCPR, HRC GC 16, para. 10: “The gathering and holding of personal information [...] whether by public authorities or private individuals or bodies, must be regulated by law.”</p> <p>Joint Declaration on a Digital Alliance (EU-Latin America and Caribbean): “We are strongly committed to [...] promoting [...] an inclusive digital society [...]. This includes [...] a democratic governance model based on high levels of privacy, data protection and security.”</p>
16	Manipulative and false content polluted the digital space, eroding public confidence in the integrity of the elections. Character assassination and cyberbullying occurred with impunity; commentary aimed to denigrate women politicians and activists was very visible. Meta and Google did not offer a country-	Promote an inclusive online communication environment through collaborative efforts by independent civic initiatives, media, digital content creators and GECOM to foster meaningful engagement with global tech companies on timely removal and	No legal change required.	GECOM Civil society Digital media Digital content creators Global tech	<p>Right to participate in public affairs Freedom of expression and opinion</p> <p>ICCPR, HRC GC 25 para. 19: “Voters should be able to form opinions independently, free of [...] manipulative interference of any kind.”</p> <p>UN, OSCE, OAS, ACHPR Joint declaration on freedom of expression and “fake news”,</p>

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	specific content moderation around Election Day and there was no direct collaboration between global tech companies, GECOM and lead digital outlets to promptly remove or deplatform harmful content	deplatforming of harmful content throughout the pre- and post-election period.		companies	disinformation and propaganda, 6(a): “All stakeholders – including intermediaries, media outlets, civil society and academia – should be supported in developing [...] initiatives for creating a better understanding of the impact of disinformation and propaganda [...], as well as appropriate responses to these phenomena.”
ELECTION OBSERVATION					
17	The law provides a solid basis for international election observation but adequate guarantees for domestic observation were not included in the 2022 legal reforms. Independent civil society organisations previously involved in election observation were not active. In practice, GECOM accredited 12 domestic observer organisations primarily from the private sector and interest groups.	Ensure by law and regulation citizen observers rights to unhindered access to all electoral processes and election related data at all levels and stages.	Legislation (RoPA)	Parliament GECOM	<p>Transparency</p> <p>ICCPR, CG 25, para. 20: There should be independent scrutiny of the voting and counting process... so that electors have confidence in the security of the ballot and the counting of the votes.</p> <p>Inter-American Convention against Corruption, para 11: Maintain and strengthen mechanisms to encourage participation by civil society.</p> <p>UN, Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations and Code of Conduct for Nonpartisan Citizen Election Observers and Monitors, pp. 1-2: 'Non-partisan observation and monitoring of elections by citizen organizations is part of participating in public affairs, which “relates to legislative, executive and administrative</p>

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					<p>powers” and “covers all aspects of public administration, and the formulation and implementation of policy....”</p> <p>UNHRC, Resolution 38/12 on Civil Society Space: Engagement with International and Regional Organizations, p. 3: 'The Human Rights Council (...) 1. Reaffirms that creating and maintaining a safe and enabling environment in which civil society can operate free from hindrance and insecurity assists States in fulfilling their existing international human rights obligations and commitments, without which equality, accountability and the rule of law are severely weakened.</p>
POLLING, COUNTING AND TABULATION					
18	<p>Persons with disabilities continue to face barriers for inclusion and opportunities for equal participation. Several recommendations by representative organisations to GECOM on tactile ballots, curbside voting and ramps were not addressed prior to the elections. Some 59 per cent of the PS did not provide independent access for persons with reduced mobility and 32 per cent of PS had unsuitable layouts for these voters</p>	<p>Provide independent access and equal opportunities to vote for persons with disabilities by implementing different and suitably adapted measures with a clear regulatory framework.</p>	<p>Legislation (RoPA)</p> <p>Regulations</p>	<p>Parliament</p> <p>GECOM</p>	<p>Right and opportunity to vote</p> <p>CPRD, article 29, States Parties shall [...] undertake to: a) Ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political and public life [...] by: i. Ensuring that voting procedures, facilities and materials are appropriate, accessible and easy to understand and use.</p> <p>ICCPR GC 25, para. 11: Voter education and registration campaigns are necessary to ensure</p>

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					<p>the effective exercise of article 25 rights by an informed community.</p> <p>Human Rights Council, 60th session, Report of the Working Group on UPR, Guyana, recommendation 102.85 (enjoys the support by Guyana): Improve accessibility for persons with disabilities by redoubling efforts to improve the accessibility of public spaces.</p>

ANNEX 1 – ELECTION RESULTS

Total number of registered voters	757,690
Total number of voters who voted	442,551
Total number of valid votes	438,468
Total number of rejected ballots (including blank ballots)	4,083

General Elections								
Regions	APNU	AFC	ALP	FGM	PPP/C	WIN	Rejected Ballots	Geographical Constituencies Seats
Region 1 - Barima Waini	469	35	0	75	9030	5716	321	PPP/C-1, WIN-1
Region 2 - Pomeroon-Supenaam	1835	91	0	147	17478	7400	266	PPP/C-1, WIN-1
Region 3 - Essequibo Islands	8992	322	138	522	48055	12969	563	PPP/C-2, WIN-1
Region 4 - Demerara-Mahaica	46949	1761	497	2437	87538	41615	1447	APNU-2, PPP/C-3, WIN-2
Region 5 - Mahaica-Berbice	6477	209	58	128	18429	5817	293	APNU-1, PPP/C-1
Region 6 - East Berbice-Corentyne	6223	315	132	361	41320	12623	650	PPP/C-2, WIN-1
Region 7 - Cuyuni-Mazaruni	983	415	59	0	3577	5098	133	PPP/C-2, WIN-1
Region 8 - Potaro-Siparuni	276	57	0	0	2872	2562	103	PPP/C-1
Region 9 - Upper Takutu-Upper Essequibo	450	192	0	0	9938	4817	151	PPP/C-1
Region 10 - Upper Demerara-Berbice	5334	210	85	662	4260	10458	186	APNU-1
Total	77988	3607	969	4332	242497	109075	4113	25

National Assembly seat allocation

Geographical constituencies	4	0	0	0	14	7		25
National Top-up seats	8	0	0	0	1	23	8	40
Total								65

Regional Elections								
Regions	APNU	AFC	ALP	FGM	PPP/C	WIN	Rejected Ballots	Regional Democratic Council Seats
Region 1 - Barima Waini	344	25	0	61	9021	5830	364	PPP/C-9, WIN-6
Region 2 - Pomereroon-Supenaam	1791	93	0	143	17442	7433	313	APNU-1, PPP/C-11, WIN-5
Region 3 - Essequibo Islands	8907	299	148	540	47754	13020	888	APNU-4, PPP/C-18, WIN-5
Region 4 - Demerara-Mahaica	46770	1835	550	2689	87028	41936	1933	APNU-9, FGM-1, PPP/C-17, WIN-8
Region 5 - Mahaica-Berbice	6640	209	59	126	18272	5808	496	APNU-4, PPP/C-11, WIN-3
Region 6 - East Berbice-Corentyne	6251	306	122	355	41014	12580	1001	APNU-3, PPP/C-21, WIN-3
Region 7 - Cuyuni-Mazaruni	980	414	65	0	3508	5085	219	APNU-1, AFC-1, PPP/C-5, WIN-8
Region 8 - Potaro-Siparuni	253	54	0	0	2847	2558	158	APNU-1, PPP/C-7, WIN-7
Region 9 - Upper Takutu-Upper Essequibo	430	265	0	0	9853	4794	202	PPP/C-10, WIN-5
Region 10 - Upper Demerara-Berbice	5370	224	82	818	4197	10262	241	APNU-5, FGM-1, PPP/C-3, WIN-9
Total	77736	3724	1026	4732	240936	109306	5815	202

ANNEX 2 – MEDIA MONITORING FINDINGS

Starting from 28 July, the EU EOM systematically monitored a sample of broadcast, print and online media outlets with a nation-wide reach. The sample comprised of 12 outlets and was as follows:

- **State-owned media** – one TV channel (NCN TV), one radio station (Voice of Guyana) and one newspaper (Guyana Chronicle);
- **Privately owned audio-visual media** – two TV channels (TVG and HGPTV) and two radio stations (HJ Boom FM and Kaieteur Radio);
- **Commercial print media and news web-sites** – three newspapers (Guyana Times, Stabroek News and Kaieteur News) and two websites (News Source Guyana and News Room Guyana).

Media monitoring included quantitative and qualitative analysis of the coverage of campaign and other socio-political issues, assessing the amount of time and space allocated to party candidates, political parties, public officials, and other politically relevant subjects. The tone of the coverage, and the gender balance across the media landscape was also evaluated. The latter contributed to the EU EOM’s assessment of female participation in the public and political life. The monitoring also registered voter education campaigns in the media. All monitored media were in English, with sporadic publications in Creole in one newspaper.

1.The EU EOM monitoring results for broadcast media with a nation-wide reach

The quantitative monitoring was done from 28 July to 31 August. On Election Day, as well as during the announcement of the results only qualitative analysis was performed.

The broadcast media monitoring focused on programmes aired during the prime-time hours:

- For radio stations – from 06:00 to 09:00, and from 17:00 to 20:00 in the evening for all radios except Kaieteur Radio which was monitored from 17:00 to 21:00, so that an important evening talk-shows were included to the sample;
- For television channels – from 18:00 to 00:00.

For the print media the front page articles, as well as all voter information materials and all political advertising was monitored and measured applying quantitative method. For news websites all articles related to elections and political dynamics were monitored and measured in pixels.

1.1. Total time allocated to political communication in national broadcast media’s primetime programming


Chart 1 demonstrates the share of political and electoral content on broadcast media coded by the Media Monitoring Unit (MMU).

During the 35-days’ monitoring period, the EU EOM coded TV broadcasts lasting 600 hours in total, with an average of 16 per cent of airtime being allotted to political and election-related content. The EU EOM coded radio broadcasts lasting 630 hours in total with an average of 24 per cent of airtime being devoted to political and election-related content.

Chart 1.

Volume of political and electoral coverage in broadcast media

Media monitoring period 28.07.2025 - 31.08.2025



Base Airtime: HGPTV Channel 67 34:13:39, NCN Channel 11 47:25:23, TVG Channel 28 14:12:36, HJ 94.1 Boom FM 12:29:22, Kaieteur Radio 99.7 FM 29:48:11, Voice of Guyana 102.1 FM 109:49:02.

Source: EU EOM Guyana 2025

Chart 2 demonstrates the programme format used by broadcast in their electoral coverage. State-owned NCN channel primarily covered election-related issues in direct broadcasts of PPP/C rallies (coded as ‘special election programme’), whereas the privately-owned TVG TV and HGPTV mostly covered them in their news and editorial programmes. Privately-owned Kaieteur Radio devoted a large portion of their airtime to special election programmes and current-affairs programmes, where the presenter was commenting on the news and current affairs in the country and abroad.


The state-owned Voice of Guyana radio, similarly to NCN TV, mostly rebroadcast PPP/C rallies (coded as ‘special election programme’), hence reducing voters access to journalistic coverage of elections. Such editorial policy undermines the main principle of media to inform the audience on the newsworthy events in a balanced manner. Positively, NCN and HGPTV devoted a notable share of their prime-time programmes to voter education among TV stations; so did HJ Boom FM and Voice of Guyana among radios.

Chart 2.

Political and electoral coverage by format in broadcast media

Media monitoring period 28.07.2025 - 31.08.2025

■ Voter education
 ■ Special election programme
 ■ PSA
 ■ Paid political advertising
 ■ Other
 ■ News
■ Government Promotion
 ■ Current-affairs programme



Total time measured in seconds. Base Airtime: HJ 94.1 Boom FM 11:56:59, Kaieteur Radio 99.7 FM 29:48:11, Voice of Guyana 102.1 FM 109:48:48, HGPTV Channel 67 34:13:39, NCN Channel 11 47:25:23, TVG Channel 28 14:12:36.

Source: EU EOM Guyana 2025

1.2. Exposure of political actors in broadcast media

Chart 3 shows the proportional distribution of time among various political and electoral actors within the prime-time programmes such as special election programmes and news. Coverage of the PPP/C was dominant in all monitored broadcast media, especially in state-owned Voice of Guyana radio and state-owned NCN TV, taking up to 98 per cent and 93 of their prime-time the coverage, respectively.


Chart 3.

Electoral actors coverage in broadcast media

Media monitoring period 28.07.2025 - 31.08.2025

AFC ALP APNU FGM Government PPP/C President WIN

TV



Radio




Total time measured in seconds. Base Airtime: HGPTV Channel 67 30:54:39, NCN Channel 11 46:16:17, TVG Channel 28 13:10:41, HJ 94.1 Boom FM 11:44:07, Kaieteur Radio 99.7 FM 22:59:42, Voice of Guyana 102.1 FM 108:08:51.

Source: Source: EU EOM Guyana 2025

Chart 4 demonstrates the tone of coverage of the political parties, president and the government by the broadcast media with the total amount of airtime devoted to each actor. State-owned NCN TV and Voice of Guyana aired most of their election and political coverage in a positive tone for the ruling PPP/C, whereas Kaieteur Radio was mostly negative towards the incumbent. The chart also demonstrates the disproportion of the coverage of different actors by different media outlets whereby the ruling party clearly dominates the state-owned media NCN Channel 11 and the Voice of Guyana.

Chart 4.




1.3. Direct speech by presidential candidates by broadcast media

Chart 5 shows the proportion of airtime allotted to direct speech broadcast within news and special election programmes covering rallies by broadcast media. Mohamed Irfaan Ali dominated state-owned NCN TV and Voice of Guyana with widely disproportionate coverage of other candidates across all broadcast media.

Direct speech by presidential candidates in broadcast media

Media monitoring period 28.07.2025 - 31.08.2025



Total time measured in seconds. Base Airtime: HGPTV Channel 67 34:13:39, NCN Channel 11 47:25:23, TVG Channel 28 14:12:36, Voice of Guyana 102.1 FM 108:08:15.

Source: EU EOM Guyana 2025

Chart 5.

1.4. Campaign topics by party and the president featured in broadcast media


Chart 6 shows the distribution of campaign topics by party and the President featured in news and special election programmes covering rallies in broadcast media. The President mainly spoke about health and social issues, while WIN and FGM devoted most of their messages to political accusations. ALP and AFC mainly addressed ethnic relations. ALP and AFC mainly addressed ethnic relations.

Chart 6.

Campaign topics by party and the president featured in broadcast media

Media monitoring period 28.07.2025 - 31.08.2025

Ethnic Relations Political accusations Economy Education Electoral Violence Health and social issues
 Justice/Corruption Security Foreign affairs and policies



Total time measured in seconds. Base Airtime: HJ 94.1 Boom FM 11:56:59, Kaieteur Radio 99.7 FM 29:48:11, Voice of Guyana 102.1 FM 109:48:48, HGPTV Channel 67 34:13:39, NCN Channel 11 47:25:23, TVG Channel 28 14:12:36.

Source: EU EOM Guyana 2025

1.5. Gender balance in broadcast media


Chart 7 demonstrates the gender balance across monitored media, exemplifying underrepresentation of the coverage of female candidates. Kaieteur Radio’s airtime share of female candidates’ airtime during the monitoring period was close to zero, whereas HGPTV Channel 67 provided the largest share of their airtime to women running for the parliament, with almost 16 per cent.

Chart 7.

Coverage of the candidates by gender in broadcast media

Media monitoring period 28.07.2025 - 31.08.2025

Male Female



Total time measured in seconds. Base Airtime: HJ 94.1 Boom FM 11:56:59, Kaieteur Radio 99.7 FM 29:48:11, Voice of Guyana 102.1 FM 109:48:48, HGPTV Channel 67 34:13:39, NCN Channel 11 47:25:23, TVG Channel 28 14:12:36.

Source: EU EOM Guyana 2025

1.6. Voter information and education across the monitored broadcast media

During the 35-days’ campaign period, a total of 260 voter education clips were broadcasted by the monitored TV stations and 1519 voter education clips were aired on the radios.

Chart 8 shows the proportional distribution of voter education clips per broadcast media. The state-run Voice of Guyana (VOG) placed the highest number of voter education clips if compared with other outlets. All voter education materials were produced by the GECOM.

Chart 8.

GECOM voter education clips across the broadcast media

Media monitoring period 28.07.2025 - 31.08.2025

■ TV ■ Radio

TV



Radio



Total number of GECOM voter education clips in broadcast media. Base Airtime: HJ 94.1 Boom FM 11:56:59, Kaieteur Radio 99.7 FM 29:48:11, Voice of Guyana 102.1 FM 113:32:08, HGPTV Channel 67 34:13:39, NCN Channel 11 47:25:23, TVG Channel 28 14:12:36.

Source: Source: EU EOM Guyana 2025

1.7. Political advertising in broadcast media

All monitored broadcast media aired paid political advertising, with HGPTV Channel 67 providing a more diverse political advertising by competing parties among the TV channels. The monitored radio stations aired a larger volume of paid political advertisements, with Voice of Guyana having the largest overall political advertisement airtime, devoted to PPP/C and HJ 94.1 Boom FM providing the most versatile coverage among radios, featuring ALP, APNU and PPP/C. WIN and FGM did not utilise broadcast media for political advertising purposes.

Chart 9 shows the share of paid political advertising videos and audios played on the monitored media, where the PPP/C dominated among other parties in absolute length of airtime.

Chart 9.

Political advertising in broadcast media in minutes

Media monitoring period 28.07.2025 - 31.08.2025

■ AFC ■ ALP ■ APNU ■ PPP/C

Radio



TV



Total time measured in seconds. Base Airtime: HGPTV Channel 67 34:13:39, NCN Channel 11 47:25:23, TVG Channel 28 14:12:36, HJ 94.1 Boom FM 12:29:22, Kaieteur Radio 99.7 FM 29:48:11, Voice of Guyana 102.1 FM 109:49:02.

Source: EU EOM Guyana 2025

2. The EU EOM monitoring results for news websites

News Source Guyana and News Room Guyana were monitored from 28 July to 31 August using quantitative and qualitative monitoring methodology. To analyse news websites' coverage of the elections, the EU EOM measured space allocated to political actors on each website in pixels and analysed the tone of publications.

2.1. Allocation of space to electoral content on news websites

Chart 10 shows the allocation of space devoted to election-related content on news websites. Both privately-owned News Room Guyana and News Source Guyana websites and showcased most focus on news articles.

Chart 10.

Political and electoral coverage by format on news websites

Media monitoring period 28.07.2025 - 31.08.2025

■ Editorial ■ Interview ■ News ■ Photo



Total space measured in pixels. Base Pixels: News Room 466,990,855.00, News Source 277,784,142.00.

Source: EU EOM Guyana 2025


2.2. Exposure of political actors on news websites

Chart 11 demonstrates the allocation of space to political actors on news websites, where coverage of PPP/C was more prominent in the online space, followed by the President in mostly positive tone, as demonstrated in Chart 12, which also shows that the ruling party was the most featured actor in absolute numbers. News Source Guyana provided a more distributed coverage of electoral actors, as illustrated by both Charts 11 and 12

Chart 11.

Electoral actors coverage on news websites


Media monitoring period 28.07.2025 - 31.08.2025



Total space measured in pixels. Base Pixels: PPP/C 284,362,562.00, President 97,118,814.00, WIN 92,489,798.00, APNU 92,019,882.00, GECOM 78,612,431.00, FGM 42,115,063.00, AFC 24,152,160.00.

Source: Source: EU EOM Guyana 2025

Chart 12.



3. The EU EOM monitoring results for newspapers with a nation-wide reach

The quantitative monitoring was done from 26 July to 31 August. On Election Day, as well as during the announcement of the results only qualitative analysis was performed. To analyse the election coverage by print media, the EU EOM measured space allocated to political actors on front pages and continuation of the stories, as well as voter information and political advertising in cm and analysed the tone of publications.


3.1. Allocation of space to electoral content in print media

Chart 13 illustrates the distribution of political and electoral content across newspaper formats, revealing greater emphasis on voter education in comparison to paid advertising, with Kaieteur News being the only exception.

Chart 13.

Political and electoral coverage by format in newspapers

Media monitoring period 26.07.2025 - 31.08.2025



Total space measured in cm. Base cm: Guyana Chronicle 151,923.32, Guyana Times 151,165.04, Kaieteur News 109,017.71, Stabroek News 85,470.30.

Source: EU EOM Guyana 2025


3.2. Exposure of political actors in print media

Chart 14 displays the allocation of newspaper coverage among electoral actors, with President and PPP/C receiving the most prominent attention across all four publications, but in a predominately negative tone in case of Kaieteur news (See Chart 16). State-owned Guyana Chronicle and PPP/C-leaning Guyana Times heavily favoured government-related content, while non-partisan Kaieteur News and Stabroek News offered more diversified coverage, including notable space for the WIN, and APNU parties. ALP and FGM parties registered minimal presence in all outlets.

Chart 14.

Electoral actors coverage in newspapers

Media monitoring period 26.07.2025 - 31.08.2025



Total space measured in cm. Base cm: PPP/C 190,528.06, President 84,142.18, APNU 35,426.76, WIN 35,393.66, Government 18,070.57, AFC 10,009.54.


Source: EU EOM Guyana 2025

Chart 15 presents a comparative overview of the political advertising space purchased by electoral actors across the four major newspapers. Only APNU and PPP/C had placed advertising in print media, with PPP/C, however, dominating the space in all other newspapers.

Chart 15.

Political advertising in newspapers

Media monitoring period 26.07.2025 - 31.08.2025



Total space measured in cm. Base cm: Guyana Chronicle 151,923.32, Guyana Times 151,165.04, Kaieteur News 109,017.71, Stabroek News 85,470.30.

Source: EU EON Guyana 2025

Chart 16 shows the tone of coverage of the political parties in print media. State-owned Guyana Chronicle and state-aligned Guyana Times covered PPP/C and the President mostly in positive tone. While all other parties had a significantly smaller front-page coverage, only the WIN and APNU were portrayed in a negative tone in Guyana Chronicle and Guyana Times. In addition, for both Guyana Chronicle and Guyana Times PPP/C and the President were the most featured actors in absolute numbers, in comparison with other electoral contestants.

Chart 16.





Chart 17 illustrates the distribution of coverage for candidates by gender in the major newspapers showing clear disproportionate representation across all outlets.

Chart 17.

Coverage of the candidates by gender in newspapers

Media monitoring period 26.07.2025 - 31.08.2025

■ Male ■ Female



Total space measured in cm. Base cm: Guyana Chronicle 151,923.31, Guyana Times 151,165.04, Kaieteur News 109,017.71, Stabroek News 85,425.30.

Source: EU EOM Guyana 2025


3.3. Voter education and information in print media

During the 37-days' monitoring period, a total of 143 voter information notices were printed in newspapers. [Chart 18](#) shows the number of voter information articles published during the monitoring period; where state-owned Guyana Chronicle together with privately-owned Stabroek News being the major distributors of voter information in newspapers.

Chart 18.

GECOM voter information across print media

Media monitoring period 26.07.2025 - 31.08.2025



Total number of GECOM notices and advisories in newspapers. Base cm: Guyana Chronicle 151,923.32, Guyana Times 151,165.04, Kaieteur News 109,017.71, Stabroek News 85,470.30.

Source: Source: EU EOM Guyana 2025


ANNEX 3 – SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING FINDINGS

Eighty-one per cent or more than 680 thousand Guyanese have access to the internet and use smartphones to receive information and to converse on elections and politics. To assess the content and impact of online political communication on the electoral process, the EU EOM Guyana 2025 conducted social media monitoring, applying several complementary methods and techniques to analyse and gather relevant content from social media platforms.⁸² These methods included quantitative and qualitative data analysis, OSINT, legal analysis, meetings with relevant stakeholders and collaboration within the EU EOM core team.

1. Digital landscape, monitoring sample and EU EOM monitoring tools.

Chart 1 – Digital landscape. The chart provides background information on key statistical data related to elections and use of social media in Guyana by June 2025.

Chart 1



To capture a balanced snapshot of Guyana’s digital communication landscape and considering the prevalence of Facebook and TikTok, the EU EOM analysed an indicative set of pages, accounts and profiles on those two platforms, considering:

- **The relevance and prospective impact** on political agenda and discourse - number of followers, interaction with posts on the respective page, quotation level in legacy media and cross-posts by mid-tier and nano influencers.
- **The content of the page / account** - participation in the public debate on social, political, and electoral issues.
- **Political affiliation** of the account/page – the EU EOM selected an equitable number of pages and accounts supporting each of the three leading parties and at least one Facebook page and one TikTok, account per each of the remaining three parties, contesting the elections, yet having a small digital footprint and limited political weight.

⁸² Instant messaging platforms, such as WhatsApp, were not included in the scope of the EU EOMs monitoring due to data protection and privacy matters. However, EOMs may include relevant information shared by credible national and international organisations and interlocutors in this regard.


The selection of pages and profiles was in part affected by technical limitations of the ready-made social media monitoring tools, which offer a comprehensive data collection only from public “pages” not public “profiles” or “groups”. This limitation primarily affected the quantitative data collection from a few well-established popular influencer profiles, from profiles of several candidates representing three leading parties, as well as from profiles that were set up as an official page of a smaller party or a fan page of the PPP/C.

The social media monitoring and data collection was done using following tools:

- **Gerulata and SentiOne** – social media monitoring and data extraction.
- **WhoTargetsMe and Meta Ad Library Report** – monitoring and data extraction related to political ads on Meta platforms.
- **Python, R and Excel** – data processing and analysis.
- **Infogram, Gephi and Python** – data visualisation.

Chart 2 – Social media monitoring sample - provides information on number of pages and accounts consistently monitored by EU EOM per given category of political, electoral actors.

Chart 2



2. Observation and analysis of organic content on Facebook and TikTok

The EU EOM analysed all posts and videos placed by selected Facebook pages and TikTok accounts during the so-called campaign period (since the nomination of candidates till Election Day). The EU EOM downloaded posts and videos using ready-made tools (Gerulata and SentiOne), and coded the content, using quantitative method. The accuracy of quantitative analysis was confirmed using qualitative verification of a representative sample of posts and videos.

Chart 3 – Number of Facebook posts and TikTok videos analysed by EU EOM – shows a total number of posts and videos placed by electoral stakeholders by respective category.

Chart 3





Chart 4 – Digital footprint of all presidential candidates - illustrates the digital weight of all presidential candidates contesting the elections.

Chart 4




For each presidential candidate the main official Facebook page and TikTok account was selected. As the WIN presidential candidate did not have an official Facebook page, his digital footprint was assessed by coding posts from the party’s key campaign page on Facebook (“Team Mohamed’s”). APNU presidential candidate did not have a TikTok account.

Considering the evident digital support gap between the two front-runners and other presidential candidates, the EU EOM carried out a focused cooperative analysis of PPP/C and WIN online campaigns.

The Chart 5 – Digital footprint of PPP/C and WIN candidates (Facebook) – illustrates the differences in the engagement levels with each of those pages.

Chart 5




Both pages published a comparable number of posts; the engagement with WIN posts was almost two-fold of that of the president. The average number of shares per post was used as a key reference to illustrate the reach and proliferation of the content. WIN official page run an exclusively positive campaign, focusing on the presidential candidate’s meetings with voters, introduction of WIN candidates, as well as listed instances of alleged victimisation of the party. The official page of the president had an overall positive tone. Most posts promoted his record in office, inauguration of development projects and introduction of social support schemes, yet there was also a considerable number of posts related to “sanctions” and “the geopolitical danger” if WIN presidential candidate would take any elected office (5 per cent of all posts).

The topic “sanctions” and by the extension the credibility of WIN presidential candidate was the dominant theme, hence the EU EOM conducted a focused analysis of proliferation of such content and its correlation with newsworthy events, comparing data from Facebook and TikTok.

Charts 6A and 6B illustrate the timeline of the topic and show the key amplifiers. Chart 6A – Timeline of posts related to topic “sanctions” (organic content) – allows to assess the virality of the topic against news-worthy events.


Chart 6A



The first spike of posts relates to the news on the closure of WIN presidential candidate’s bank accounts. The following spikes do not correspond news-worthy events, rather reflecting the role of influencers who kept the topic high on political discourse and by media who amplified the topic by reporting on all instances when a PPP/C politician made a comment on the topic.

Chart 6B – Network analysis – illustrates the structure by the author of posts related to “sanctions”. The size of the bubble in the chart corresponds the number of followers of the given page, the thickness of the arrow correlates with the number of posts related to “sanctions”.


Chart 6B



All related posts placed by government, PPP/C and affiliated pages were negative in tone towards WIN. Media posts primarily reiterated negative statements made by political actors. Notably, APNU abstained from participating in the online debate related to sanctions, while WIN mentioned “sanctions” only as an example of victimisation of the party and its members.

Chart 7 – TikTok videos dismantling sanctions narrative or promoting PPP/C – illustrates attempts by WIN-aligned TikTokers to suppress the “sanctions” narrative by viral commentary on president’s and PPP/C performance.

Chart 7



The data in the chart reflects only those trending videos that were placed by public accounts.


Chart 8 (below) – Network analysis – illustrates the authors’ structure of prevailing topics on Facebook and TikTok. The size of the bubble in the chart correlates with the number of followers of the given page, the thickness of the arrow correlates with the number of posts related either to “sanctions” or to the incumbent.

Chart 8

Network analysis - communication across monitored Facebook pages and TikTok accounts

Monitoring period: 14 July - 31 August, 2025

- PPP/C official pages, aligned influencers and media
- Government pages
- AFC
- FGM
- APNU official and aligned pages
- WIN official and aligned pages
- News media - relatively balanced
- News media and influencers - clearly critical towards the government



All posts placed by government or PPP/C and affiliated pages were negative in tone towards WIN, while highly positive towards the incumbent. Digital media posts, apart from the few clearly critical towards the government, were always either positive or neutral towards the incumbent, while simply quoting the PPP/C or like-minded experts in posts related to “sanctions”. APNU largely abstained from participating in the online debate related to sanctions, while were critical towards the PPP/C. WIN mentioned “sanctions” only as an example of victimisation of the party and its members and largely abstained from directly criticising the incumbent.

3. Observation and analysis of paid-for content on Meta platforms

To compliment findings related to campaign finance, the EU EOM analysed strategies employed by different parties regarding the use of paid content across Meta platforms. This section does not reflect the full scale of spending on digital ads as Google and TikTok have not introduced their ad transparency tools for Guyana and there was also direct advertising by parties on Facebook pages of media and influencers, which appeared as organic content, marked with a disclaimer “promotion” or “paid ad”. Such content (and payments) are not listed in Meta Ad Library Report.

Chart 9 – Political advertising on Meta platforms – illustrates how much each political camp spent on advertising and how many ads were placed by each electoral contestant. Notably, all nine ads of WIN were placed within the last week prior to the elections.

Chart 9





Chart 10 – Expenditure breakdown per party and affiliated pages - illustrates the level of third-party ads, that while promoting PPP/C messages were placed by in fact anonymous pages. Spending by such pages was four-fold, if compared with spending by official pages of PPP/C or its candidates.

Chart 10



Chart 11 – Tone and content of political advertising on Meta platforms – illustrates what messages were pushed across Meta platforms. Notably, PPP/C affiliates spent almost as much on negative advertisement targeting WIN as on the promotion of the party or new development projects implemented by the government.

Chart 11



4. Observation and analysis of GECOM communication on Facebook.

To assess GECOM’s outreach efforts using social media platforms, the EU EOM conducted a detailed analysis of all posts placed by the Commission. Although commission also maintained YouTube channel (969 subscribers), where all voter information videos were posted, none of them was further shared. On average each video was viewed 520 times. GECOM was not active on TikTok or Instagram but had a dedicated WhatsApp channel. GECOM also used paid advertising option on Facebook to promote its voter information videos. In total EUR 1,418 were spent by GECOM to promote 18 voter information posts from 14 July to 31 August.

Chart 12 – GECOM communication on Facebook - illustrates the content of posts and the average engagement per each category of the post.

Chart 12

GECOM communication on Facebook

Monitoring period: 14 July - 31 August, 2025




Chart 13 – Timeline of GECOM communication on Facebook - illustrates how frequently the commission used Facebook to inform and to educate.

Chart 13

GECOM communication intensity by day

Monitoring period: 14 July - 7 September, 2025

