



# Security Council

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## Letter dated 25 November 2025 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015), whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2781 (2025) have the honour to transmit herewith the interim report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 18 of resolution 2781 (2025).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) on 31 October 2025 and was considered by the Committee on 11 November 2025.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the final report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Michael Gibb

Coordinator  
Panel of Experts on South Sudan

(Signed) Joseph Farha

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Expert



## Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution [2781 \(2025\)](#)

### *Summary*

In the preamble of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (peace agreement), the signatories recalled the ideal of independence and expressed regret for the “untold human suffering that had befallen our country and people as a result of disregarding this commitment”. They pledged, accordingly, “not to repeat mistakes of the past”.

In September 2025, the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, dismissed the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), Riek Machar, from his position as First Vice President in the Transitional Government of National Unity that had been ushered in by the peace agreement. Earlier that same day, a series of criminal charges, including treason, had been filed against Mr. Machar and several other detained opposition figures.

The President and his allies in Juba have insisted that the implementation of the peace agreement remains unaffected, having persuaded a faction of SPLM/A-IO, led by Stephen Par Kuol, to remain engaged in the process in the absence of Mr. Machar. Those who have refused to join him, siding instead with Nathaniel Oyet, Mr. Machar’s former Deputy, have largely been removed from their positions, forcing many to flee the country.

Regional states and multilateral bodies, including the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, have called for Mr. Machar’s release, while remaining steadfast in their support for the implementation of the peace agreement.

As Mr. Machar’s trial has unfolded in Juba, however, armed confrontations between the primary signatories to the peace agreement have continued across much of the country.

The political and security landscape in South Sudan has changed considerably since 2018, and the conflict that now threatens looks much different to those that came before. Years of neglect have fragmented government and opposition forces alike, resulting in a patchwork of uniformed soldiers, defectors and armed community defence groups that are increasingly preoccupied by local struggles and often unenthused by the prospect of a renewed national confrontation. With limited supplies and low morale, the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) has relied increasingly on relatively indiscriminate aerial bombardments as their principal means of disrupting opposition forces.

SSPDF has, however, been able to rely on the continued support of Ugandan forces, whose armed troops, tanks and armoured vehicles have remained in South Sudan since March 2025, in violation of the arms embargo established by Security Council resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#) and renewed by resolution [2781 \(2025\)](#).

While the contours of the conflict may be altered, the resulting human suffering has remained unchanged. Ongoing conflict and aerial bombardments, coupled with flooding and the influx of returnees and refugees from the Sudan, have led to near-record levels of food insecurity, with pockets of famine reported in some of the communities most affected by renewed fighting.

The resumption of Dar blend oil exports in May 2025 has offered some economic relief, although mounting debts continue to constrain government finances while the conflict in the Sudan complicates the sale of oil from South Sudan. Despite these challenges, however, the Government has pledged more than \$600 million for the purchase of food for SSPDF, despite failing to produce a budget for the current financial year.

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\* Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

## I. Background

### A. Mandate and travel

1. By its resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council imposed a sanctions regime targeting individuals and entities contributing to the conflict in South Sudan and established a sanctions committee (the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan). The Committee designated six individuals for targeted sanctions on 1 July 2015. With the adoption of its resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), the Council imposed an arms embargo on the territory of South Sudan and added two individuals to the list of designated individuals. On 30 May 2025, with the adoption of its resolution [2781 \(2025\)](#), the Council renewed the sanctions regime until 31 May 2026.

2. By resolution [2781 \(2025\)](#), the Security Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan until 1 July 2026 so that it might provide information and analysis in support of the work of the Committee, including as relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities that might be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 7 of resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#).

3. On 1 July 2025, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, appointed the four members of the Panel ([S/2025/452](#)). The position of humanitarian expert has been vacant since January 2025.

4. The members of the Panel sought to travel to South Sudan in September and October 2025 but were not issued visas in time to travel. The Panel will travel to South Sudan and the region in the coming months, prior to drafting its final report.

### B. Cooperation with international organizations and other stakeholders

5. While the Panel operates independently of United Nations agencies and institutions, it wishes to express its gratitude to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and other United Nations staff, including in New York.

6. Despite being unable to travel to South Sudan as planned during the reporting period, the Panel did meet, including remotely, with a broad range of actors, including present and former members of the Government of South Sudan, representatives of security mechanisms established by the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (peace agreement), local government officials, senior figures within the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) and other branches of the security sector, senior representatives of opposition groups, members of the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly, journalists and civil society organizations, and representatives of companies active in South Sudan.

7. In paragraph 17 of its resolution [2781 \(2025\)](#), the Security Council emphasized the importance of the Panel consulting with concerned Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations and UNMISS. The Panel was able to consult, remotely, with United Nations bodies and agencies in South Sudan, as well as with other multilateral institutions active in the country.

8. The Panel sent 17 official letters to the Government of South Sudan, regional Member States and other individuals and entities, to which it received five substantive responses prior to drafting the present interim report.

## C. Methodology

9. The present report was prepared on the basis of the Panel's own independent research and investigations conducted, primarily, between July and October of 2025. The Panel conducted numerous interviews to gather a body of credible information. The Panel reviewed documentation made available by individuals, commercial entities, the Government of South Sudan and other sources, as well as extensive audio and video recordings. The Panel has made a conscious effort to ensure its reporting is informed by the full range of perspectives within the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity, as well as by the views of groups and individuals that have not participated in this process. The Panel also drew on its earlier work, including previous reports to the Security Council and the Committee, both public and confidential.

10. The Panel followed the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 (S/2006/997). The Panel has corroborated the information contained in the present report using multiple independent sources to meet the appropriate evidentiary standards.

11. The Panel conducted its research with the greatest transparency possible, while giving priority to confidentiality where necessary. A source or document is described as confidential only when its disclosure could compromise the safety of the source, or ongoing Panel investigations. The Panel has sent letters to the Governments of South Sudan and Uganda, outlining the Panel's key findings, and has offered to include any responses as annexes to the present report.

## II. Severe setbacks to the peace agreement

### A. Trial of the First Vice President

12. On 23 September 2025, Freedom Hall in Juba turned into a courtroom for the trial of the First Vice President, Riek Machar, the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), and seven other opposition figures, including the Minister of Petroleum, Puot Kang Chol, and the former SSPDF Deputy Chief of Staff, Gabriel Duop Lam.<sup>1</sup>

13. Twelve days earlier, the eight defendants had been charged with several crimes relating to the "Nasir incident" of March 2025,<sup>2</sup> which saw local community forces and armed Nuer youth, sometimes referred to as the "White Army", overrun an SSPDF garrison in Nasir in Upper Nile State.<sup>3</sup> The incident resulted in the death of an SSPDF Major General, David Majur Dak, and, according to prosecutors, an additional 250 soldiers. An UNMISS helicopter was also fired upon while attempting an evacuation, resulting in the death of an UNMISS pilot.<sup>4</sup>

14. It is alleged by prosecutors that, during the incident, the White Army "operated under the command and influence of certain leaders of SPLM/A-IO, including Mr. Machar, through coordinated military and political structures."<sup>5</sup> The eight defendants are, accordingly, charged with murder, conspiracy, terrorism, treason, the

<sup>1</sup> The five other defendants are Mam Pal Dhuor, Gatwech Lam Puoch, Camilo Gatmai Kel, Mading Yak Riek and Dominic Gatgok Riek.

<sup>2</sup> See annex 2.

<sup>3</sup> See S/2025/442.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> See annex 2.

destruction of public property and military assets, and crimes against humanity. Initial attempts by the defendants' legal team to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court were unsuccessful.

15. Soon after the charges were announced, on 11 September 2025, the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, issued a decree suspending Mr. Machar from his position as First Vice President and Puot Kang Chuol from his position as Minister of Petroleum.<sup>6</sup>

16. During the initial days of the trial, independent journalists and civil society organizations complained of challenges in attending the hearings.<sup>7</sup> In later weeks, however, they were permitted to attend the trial, but not to photograph or record proceedings.

## **B. Political implications**

17. These events have further eroded the relationship between the principal parties to the peace agreement. This relationship was already faltering further to a series of unilateral political decrees issued by the President, and escalating armed confrontations between SSPDF and SPLA-IO forces, starting around December 2024.<sup>8</sup> SPLM/A-IO remains divided in its response to these developments.

18. One faction is led by Stephen Par Kuol, who was designated by his supporters as the Interim Chairperson of SPLM/A-IO soon after the arrest in March 2025 of Mr. Machar.<sup>9</sup> This faction has been persuaded to remain engaged with the mechanisms of the peace agreement as representatives of SPLM/A-IO. Officials, including the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, Martin Elia Lomuro, have stressed, therefore, that the implementation of the peace agreement is unaffected by the detention and trial of individual opposition leaders.<sup>10</sup>

19. A second faction, however, led by Nathaniel Oyet, who served as Mr. Machar's Deputy prior to his arrest, has fled Juba and rejected Mr. Par Kuol's designation as Interim Chairperson. This faction enjoys significant support from many Nuer and opposition communities, particularly outside of Juba, and considers the peace agreement and accompanying Transitional Government of National Unity to have collapsed.<sup>11</sup> Soon after Mr. Machar's dismissal, for example, Mr. Oyet stated that "the Government that was formed pursuant to the [peace agreement] has collapsed; its structure, mandate has been destroyed and the legitimacy has ended."<sup>12</sup>

20. As a result, some senior figures, including within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and several opposition groups, are now proposing alternative transitional arrangements, such as the appointment of a technocratic government.<sup>13</sup>

21. Prior to his arrest and trial, interviews with opposition commanders had suggested that support for Mr. Machar and other Juba-based opposition leaders had started to erode.<sup>14</sup> Many Nuer and opposition communities reported feeling increasingly disappointed by their leaders, complaining that the dividends of the peace agreement

<sup>6</sup> Decree broadcast on South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation.

<sup>7</sup> Interviews with South Sudanese journalists, September 2025. See annex 3.

<sup>8</sup> See [S/2025/442](#).

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> See Eye Radio, "Dr. Lomuro: detentions won't derail 2018 peace deal", 4 July 2025.

<sup>11</sup> Interviews with civil society, journalists and international observers, July to October 2025.

<sup>12</sup> See annex 4.

<sup>13</sup> Interviews with senior opposition leaders and members of SPLM, October 2025.

<sup>14</sup> Interviews with SPLA-IO commanders outside Juba, October 2025.

were largely concentrated in Juba and within Mr. Machar's immediate family.<sup>15</sup> Recent developments, however, had helped to restore some of Mr. Machar's standing and, by extension, that of Mr. Oyet and other perceived loyalists. Mr. Machar's arrest had also helped to reinforce the opposition narrative that he had never truly been in charge while in Juba, and that "he was a prisoner without being in a traditional prison."<sup>16</sup>

22. This revival has, however, not fully bridged the divisions between the senior leadership and the commanders, soldiers and community militia that comprise the opposition's fighting force. Mr. Oyet has encouraged military action as a means of expressing popular discontent over Mr. Machar's arrest and has enacted a range of changes to the political and military command structures of SPLM/A-IO. Many commanders and loosely allied community forces are, however, tired of fighting, lack resources and fear provoking aerial bombardments by SSPDF.<sup>17</sup>

### C. Escalating conflict

23. In July 2025, the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, which monitors the implementation of the peace agreement, noted that "the key provisions of the [peace agreement] faced severe setbacks ... with progress largely stalled and the risk of renewed conflict increasing."<sup>18</sup> They also noted that the ceasefire had been "severely compromised by repeated clashes" between SSPDF and SPLA-IO.

24. The security landscape in South Sudan has, however, been fundamentally transformed since 2018 and the preceding periods of conflict.

25. Intense competition between elites in Juba, coupled with years of strategic neglect, have fragmented and weakened SSPDF and other government security forces. As a result, SSPDF has become increasingly reliant on an assortment of local militia forces and defectors that have only recently, and loosely, been integrated into its ranks. These include, for example, Shilluk Agwelek and Dinka Padang forces in Upper Nile and Jonglei States, as well as Azande forces under the command of James Nando in Western Equatoria State.<sup>19</sup>

26. Opposition forces have also been fragmented, in part as a result of the halting and incomplete implementation of the security sector reforms outlined in chapter II of the peace agreement.

27. This fragmentation has resulted in a conflict that is now populated by a multitude of armed actors and alliances. While their respective objectives overlap, they do so only imperfectly, with many now also predominantly focused on local agendas and survival rather than on a national political contest.

28. Parts of Upper Nile State and northern Jonglei State have, for example, witnessed some of the most intense fighting in recent months. There, SPLM/A-IO and the White Army control significant territory. SSPDF has, in turn, entrusted many of its operations to recently integrated Shilluk Agwelek forces and Dinka militias, which

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. See also [S/2022/359](#).

<sup>16</sup> Interview with SPLA-IO commander stationed outside Juba, October 2025.

<sup>17</sup> Interviews with SPLA-IO commanders in Unity and Western Bahr el Ghazal States, October 2025.

<sup>18</sup> Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, "RJMEC quarterly report on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS from 1 April to 30 June 2025", July 2025.

<sup>19</sup> See [S/2022/359](#).



have their own historic disputes with local Nuer communities.<sup>20</sup> Over several months, SSPDF has sought to take control of urban centres, checkpoints and supply routes, but has grown increasingly reliant on disrupting opposition forces through bombardments from the air and riverine barges. SSPDF soldiers have also been observed using uncrewed aerial vehicles as part of their military operations.<sup>21</sup>

29. Since retaking the towns of Nasir in April 2025 and New Fangak in May 2025, SSPDF has repeatedly bombed SPLA-IO and White Army positions in Longechuk, Nasir and Ulang Counties, all in Upper Nile State; as well as in Fangak, Panyikang and Pigi Counties, in Jonglei State.<sup>22</sup> Opposition forces have, in turn, ambushed and attacked SSPDF forces and positions.

30. In August and September 2025, SSPDF also conducted multiple aerial attacks on villages in Pigi County and Ayod County, both in Jonglei State.<sup>23</sup> Those attacks aimed to disrupt the threatened advance of White Army forces loyal to the prominent Nuer spiritual leader, the “prophet” Makuach Tut, northwards into Upper Nile State.

31. While sympathetic to Mr. Machar and SPLM/A-IO, Mr. Tut’s forces retain their own agenda. “We are not concerned with the politics in Juba,” one follower told the Panel, “We are here to defend our community. Now, we have a common enemy with SPLM/A-IO, so we coordinate our attacks when it serves our interests.” Other followers cited their need for food and ammunition, historical grievances against the Dinka and the desire to recover raided cattle as grounds for their advance. “Currently, Makuach is infuriated because his people are being bombarded,” said one. Following extensive aerial bombardments, flooding and interventions from local leaders, however, Mr. Tut’s forces halted their advance in October 2025.<sup>24</sup>

32. SSPDF has also targeted opposition-held checkpoints and supply routes. SSPDF has, for example, repeatedly shelled locations along the Sobat River, close to Makak and the border town of Burebiey, aiming to disrupt suspected supply routes. This was followed by a significant military confrontation along the Ethiopian border between SPLA-IO and allied White Army forces, and SSPDF.<sup>25</sup>

33. SSPDF has also sought to dislodge SPLM/A-IO from positions in Diel and Atar,<sup>26</sup> while in late August 2025, combined aerial and ground attacks, including shelling from barges, forced SPLA-IO forces to relocate from the lucrative and strategic port of Tonga to Wunkur.<sup>27</sup> A few weeks later, Wunkur was itself taken by Shilluk Agwelek forces and SSPDF in an attempt to disrupt potential supply routes from the Sudan.<sup>28</sup>

34. In Western Bahr el Ghazal State, SSPDF has also made use of aerial attacks. Here too, however, much of the conflict is focused on local concerns, such as SSPDF

<sup>20</sup> See also, J. Craze, *A Country Only for Old Men: The State of the Nuer White Armies in South Sudan* (Small Arms Survey, forthcoming).

<sup>21</sup> See annex 5.

<sup>22</sup> Interviews with local residents, community leaders, county officials, SSPDF officers and international observers, July to October 2025.

<sup>23</sup> Interviews with security services, international observers and other local sources, September 2025.

<sup>24</sup> Interviews with Nuer community leaders in Upper Nile State, October 2025.

<sup>25</sup> Interviews with Nuer community leaders and individuals within the SPLM faction of the Government, September and October 2025.

<sup>26</sup> Interviews with local civilians and international observers, May to October 2025.

<sup>27</sup> Interviews with security services and local sources, September 2025.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

efforts to wrest lucrative checkpoints from SPLA-IO forces, as well as tensions resulting from the defection of SPLA-IO forces to SSPDF in Jur River County.<sup>29</sup>

35. On 14 October 2025, for example, SSPDF bombed Jebel Tik and surrounding areas in Jur River County.<sup>30</sup> SSPDF sources stated that the purpose of the operation had been to secure the Wau–Kuajiena–Tonj road and to eliminate SPLA-IO elements responsible for ambushes and checkpoints along that important supply route.<sup>31</sup>

36. One SPLA-IO commander told the Panel, however, that the conflict “has always been about finding a way to serve our interests. I am frustrated with Machar and tired of fighting ... we still identify as IO [but] I control territory and collect taxes. That is good enough for me.”<sup>32</sup>

37. The security situation has also continued to deteriorate in Western Equatoria State since the President’s dismissal, in February 2025, of a Governor appointed by SPLM/A-IO, Alfred Futuyo.<sup>33</sup> Clashes have continued between SSPDF and SPLA-IO in Tambura, Mundri East, Mundri West and Maridi Counties. SSPDF Division VI and Mobile II Azande units under the command of Mr. Nando, along with remnants of SSPDF forces that were deployed to the State in November 2022 as part of a regional intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have attacked suspected opposition positions, who have responded, in turn, with attacks on SSPDF patrols and positions, including in an effort to loot weapons and ammunition.<sup>34</sup>

38. On 3 September 2025, an UNMISS patrol travelling from Tambura to Mapuse was ambushed by suspected opposition forces, who seized weapons and ammunition.<sup>35</sup>

39. These security dynamics have led National Salvation Front (NAS) forces under the command of Thomas Cirillo to ally with local SPLA-IO forces. On 24 September, for example, a combined SPLA-IO and NAS force launched an attack on SSPDF positions in Kediba, in Mundri East County, killing several SSPDF soldiers and seizing weapons and vehicles.<sup>36</sup> Mr. Cirillo stressed to the Panel, however, that their collaboration with SPLA-IO does not signify an official merger, but that they were only working together to counter a common adversary.<sup>37</sup>

### III. Arms

#### A. Uganda People’s Defence Forces operation “Mlinzi wa Kimya”

40. On 10 March 2025, a contingent of armed soldiers of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) arrived in Juba as part of operation “Mlinzi wa Kimya” (“silent guardian”).<sup>38</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Interviews with international observers, local youth and SPLA-IO commanders in Western Bahr el Ghazal State, October 2025.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Interviews with SSPDF sources and local officials in Western Bahr el Ghazal State, October 2025.

<sup>32</sup> Interview with a SPLA-IO commander in Western Bahr el Ghazal State, October 2025.

<sup>33</sup> See [S/2025/442](#).

<sup>34</sup> Interviews with government officials, security agents, local community leaders and international observers, September 2025.

<sup>35</sup> Spokesperson of United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), statement on ambush of peacekeepers in Western Equatoria, 4 September 2025.

<sup>36</sup> See annex 6.

<sup>37</sup> Interview with Thomas Cirillo, May 2025.

<sup>38</sup> See [S/2025/442](#).

41. In a letter to the Panel, the Government of Uganda confirmed the UPDF presence in South Sudan, stressing that the deployment had been made further to a request from the President of South Sudan and in accordance with the 2014 status-of-forces agreement between Uganda and South Sudan.<sup>39</sup> The deployment, they added, had been made “in order to avert a security catastrophe in the region” and the escalation of hostilities between the parties to the 2018 peace agreement.

42. Since the deployment, the Panel has confirmed the arrival of additional military personnel and equipment and the expansion of the UPDF presence in South Sudan.<sup>40</sup> While UPDF forces are reportedly stationed at multiple sites, the deployment is primarily headquartered a few kilometres east of Juba.

43. UPDF has confirmed the presence of its forces at that location, as well as the conduct of several military training exercises at or near the site.<sup>41</sup> In addition to supporting SSPDF operations, UPDF has also undertaken outreach activities, including the provision of medical support to local communities.<sup>42</sup>

44. Satellite imagery analysis confirms the construction of several new structures at the site since March 2025, as well as a perimeter fence and two firing ranges.<sup>43</sup> Also visible at the location are several tanks and armoured vehicles. This is consistent with video footage, reviewed by the Panel, of several UPDF convoys travelling to or through South Sudan in recent months. The convoys included troops in a variety of soft-skinned vehicles; wheeled armoured vehicles identified as Katmerciler Hizir, models of which are known to have been imported to Uganda; Nyoka models, which are manufactured in Uganda; as well as tracked armoured fighting vehicles including BMP 2 and T-55 tanks.<sup>44</sup>

45. The Panel considers the presence of armed UPDF forces in South Sudan to be a violation of the arms embargo as outlined in paragraph 4 of resolution 2428 (2018), eased by paragraph 2 of resolution 2683 (2023) and renewed by resolution 2781 (2025).

## B. Armed helicopters

46. Aerial bombardments have been a significant feature of the renewed conflict and mark a departure from the previous tactics and capabilities of SSPDF. Reports and evidence reviewed by the Panel indicate the use of both fixed-wing and rotary platforms to deploy a range of standard<sup>45</sup> and improvised munitions.<sup>46</sup>

47. SSPDF is known to operate Mi-24 attack helicopters.<sup>47</sup> The Panel has, however, also documented the presence of at least three Bell 412 helicopters in South Sudan in recent months. At least two of these helicopters are armed with UB-16-57 unguided rocket pods and have been deployed in both Upper Nile and Jonglei States since

<sup>39</sup> See annexes 7 and 8.

<sup>40</sup> See annex 9.

<sup>41</sup> See annex 17. See also the section of the UPDF website dedicated to operation “Mlinzi wa Kimuya”, available at <https://www.updf.go.ug/category/operation-mlinzi-wa-kimuya/>.

<sup>42</sup> UPDF, “UPDF extends humanitarian support to Bilnyang communities”, 17 July 2025.

<sup>43</sup> See annex 9.

<sup>44</sup> See annexes 10 and 17.

<sup>45</sup> Rotary aircraft operating in South Sudan are known to be able to deploy both 57mm (Bell 412) and 80mm (Mi-24) rocket systems.

<sup>46</sup> Interviews with local officials in Upper Nile State, May 2025, corroborated by photographs on file with the Panel. See also, Sudans Post, “Chemical firestorm in Nasir as gov’t uses ethyl acetate in deadly attack”, 18 March 2025.

<sup>47</sup> See S/2023/922.

March 2025.<sup>48</sup> Satellite imagery depicts three four-bladed helicopters, with a rotor-span matching that of a Bell 412, stationed at the Paloich airfield in Upper Nile State.

48. These helicopters match those deployed in support of UPDF operations in Western Bahr el Ghazal State in 2024.<sup>49</sup> The Government of Uganda has confirmed to the Panel that it has deployed three Bell 412 helicopters in South Sudan.<sup>50</sup>

49. As these armed helicopters had not been observed in South Sudan prior to 2024, the Panel also considers their presence a likely violation of the arms embargo.

## IV. Humanitarian situation

50. The humanitarian situation in South Sudan has continued to deteriorate further to the compounding effects of renewed fighting, flooding, conflict in the Sudan, aid cuts and a domestic economic crisis. These forces have increased humanitarian need, while simultaneously disrupting the humanitarian response.

### A. Food insecurity

51. In the most recent Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis, 7.7 million people, or roughly 57 per cent of the population, are identified as facing “crisis” levels of food insecurity, corresponding to IPC phase 3 or worse, including around 83,000 who are now also projected to face “catastrophic” levels (IPC phase 5) and localized famine-like conditions.<sup>51</sup>

52. These figures are among the worst recorded since South Sudan gained independence,<sup>52</sup> with around 600,000 more people facing “crisis” levels of food insecurity than during the corresponding period in 2024.<sup>53</sup> Only around 15 per cent of the population of South Sudan is currently classified as food secure.<sup>54</sup>

### B. External factors

53. Several external factors have contributed to the current humanitarian crisis.

54. More than 1.2 million people are now estimated to have fled the conflict in the Sudan into South Sudan since April 2023. Around 850,000 of them are South Sudanese returnees but, as the conflict has progressed, the proportion of Sudanese refugees has increased and now totals almost 400,000.<sup>55</sup> These returnee and refugee communities remain extremely vulnerable, accounting for almost half of those currently facing famine in South Sudan.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>48</sup> See annex 11.

<sup>49</sup> See [S/2024/855/Rev.1](#).

<sup>50</sup> See annex 17.

<sup>51</sup> Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), “South Sudan: acute food insecurity situation projection update for April–July 2025”, 12 June 2025.

<sup>52</sup> See <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/04/1162046>.

<sup>53</sup> IPC, “South Sudan: acute food insecurity situation for September–November 2023 and projections for April–July 2024”, 6 November 2023.

<sup>54</sup> IPC, “South Sudan: acute food insecurity situation projection update for April–July 2025”.

<sup>55</sup> See <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoizTMwNTljNWYtYmVhYi00ZGI2LTgwYzAtN2UyNDZmZTRlNjBkIiwidCI6IjE1ODgyNjJkLTlzMlItNDNiNC1iZDZlLWJjZTQ5YzhINjE4NiIsImMiOiJh9&pageName=ReportSection95859b8850a76994e6fb>.

<sup>56</sup> IPC, “South Sudan: acute food insecurity situation projection update for April–July 2025”.

55. As in previous years, the rainy season in South Sudan has brought significant flooding. As of October 2025, 639,225 people across six states were estimated to have been affected, with Unity and Jonglei States accounting for 87 per cent of the flood-affected population.<sup>57</sup>

56. Floodwaters have displaced 175,000 individuals from their homes, but have also forced the closure of medical facilities, submerged agricultural and grazing land and contributed to the spread of water-borne disease.<sup>58</sup> In September 2025, almost all of the major roads used by humanitarian service providers in Jonglei and Upper Nile States were deemed “not passable”.<sup>59</sup>

57. External funding cuts have also put substantial pressure on humanitarian operations. In October 2025, the World Food Programme reported that all 2.7 million people receiving food aid in South Sudan would only receive 50 to 70 per cent of their rations, following a \$398.9 million funding shortfall.<sup>60</sup>

### C. Impact of renewed conflict

58. While external factors have compounded the impact of the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan, conflict and insecurity remain its primary drivers.

59. In October 2025, UNMISS estimated that 321,000 people had been newly displaced in 2025 as a direct result of fighting.<sup>61</sup> Areas at the centre of renewed conflict have seen some of the most dramatic declines in food security, including Nasir and Ulang Counties, where segments of the population now face famine;<sup>62</sup> and in Fangak County, where one community leader said that residents faced severe hunger, with many stranded on small patches of land,<sup>63</sup> while fighting and shelling prevented their access to food or medical aid.<sup>64</sup> Humanitarian supplies, he complained, were not being allowed to pass through SSPDF-controlled areas to reach them.

60. Fighting has also led to displacement in Central Equatoria State, where local civilians and officials described serious food insecurity, as well as looting of crops and food by opposition groups.<sup>65</sup> “It’s difficult to get a safe area for cultivation,” one individual told the Panel. “The bushes are full of guns.”<sup>66</sup>

61. The increase in humanitarian need has coincided with renewed conflict, which has disrupted the delivery of aid. Several humanitarian aid workers confirmed that their access had deteriorated,<sup>67</sup> while UNMISS described a sharp increase in access incidents.<sup>68</sup> In August 2025, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs similarly noted that its partners had reported “a marked surge in violence targeting

<sup>57</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan: floods snapshot”, 2 October 2025.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> WFP, “South Sudan: physical access constraints”, 18 September 2025.

<sup>60</sup> WFP, “Funding cuts: six critical WFP operations at risk”, 15 October 2025.

<sup>61</sup> UNMISS, “Peace partners call for immediate cessation of hostilities and return to the peace deal in South Sudan”, 8 October 2025.

<sup>62</sup> IPC, “South Sudan: acute food insecurity situation projection update for April–July 2025”.

<sup>63</sup> See annex 12.

<sup>64</sup> Interview with a community leader in Fangak County, August 2025.

<sup>65</sup> Interviews with civilians and an official from Central Equatoria State, August to October 2025.

<sup>66</sup> Interview with an official from Central Equatoria State, October 2025.

<sup>67</sup> Interviews with aid workers, July to October 2025.

<sup>68</sup> See <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/4th-r-jmec-extraordinary-plenary-meeting-statement-ms-anita-kiki-gbeho-officer-charge-srsg-and-dsrg>.

staff, compounds and supplies”.<sup>69</sup> In the Equatoria region, in particular, armed groups and criminal gangs have targeted humanitarian workers, including through a rise in reported kidnappings for ransom.<sup>70</sup> In August 2025, the Office reported that South Sudan was the second most dangerous country in the world for aid workers.<sup>71</sup>

## D. Forced recruitment

62. Renewed conflict has also resulted in other human rights abuses, including a rise in forced recruitment. The Panel spoke with 15 boys and young men aged between 14 and 18.<sup>72</sup> They described being detained in July 2025 by South Sudanese security forces on the streets of Juba. “They just stopped the car and called me,” one told the Panel. “When I reached the car, they pointed a gun at me and pushed me into the car.”

63. The boys and young men said that, once detained, they were first held at local police stations before being transferred to the Giada military police station in Juba, where they suffered significant mistreatment, including being held in overcrowded cells without sanitation facilities, and being beaten and denied adequate food and water. They claimed they were accused of belonging to gangs, and told “You young boys here are the youth spoiling Juba.”

64. Several also claim that, while in detention, they were extorted by junior officers. “In jail, I was given a phone to make calls. They told me to call my family so they can bring money to release us,” said one, claiming that several detainees were told to ask their families to pay between SSP 500,000 and SSP 3 million to secure their release.

65. The boys reported that, after about a week, they were forcefully recruited, transferred to Malakal in Upper Nile State and told they were going to be trained to fight in Nasir. After a week in Malakal, one described being loaded onto a boat with 10 sacks of sorghum. After two days, they reached Baliet County, Upper Nile State, where they were trained for several weeks with very inadequate food. One said, “We were all starving because the sorghum had run out within five days of our arrival.” Prior to their deployment from the training site, however, several of the boys managed to escape. Similar accounts of forced recruitment have also been reported elsewhere in South Sudan.<sup>73</sup>

## V. Regional issues

66. South Sudan has remained active in its international engagements, with a particular focus on regional States and multilateral bodies.

<sup>69</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan: humanitarian access snapshot”, August 2025.

<sup>70</sup> Interviews with aid workers, local officials and civilians, July to October 2025.

<sup>71</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “World Humanitarian Day 2025: South Sudan is one of the most dangerous countries for humanitarian workers”, 19 August 2025.

<sup>72</sup> The Panel has not verified these ages. Accounts corroborated by interviews with civil society organizations, October 2025.

<sup>73</sup> Eye Radio, “‘They demand over SSP 250,000 for Bail’ – Gumbo residents accuse security of extortion”, 29 September 2025; and Radio Tamazuj, “Juba crackdown: arrested youth ‘forcibly conscripted’”, 28 July 2025.

67. Both the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have expressed alarm of the deteriorating security situation and continued detention of Mr. Machar, while pledging continued support for the peace process.<sup>74</sup>

68. During a two-day visit to Juba in July 2025, for example, the Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Workneh Gebeyehu, met with high-ranking South Sudanese officials and reaffirmed the support of IGAD for the implementation of the peace agreement.<sup>75</sup> Similarly, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, appointed the former Prime Minister of Somalia, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas, as the African Union Special Representative for South Sudan<sup>76</sup> and stressed that he would lead the efforts of the African Union to support peace, reconciliation and stability under the framework of the peace agreement.

69. On 9 September 2025, in Ethiopia, the President attended the official opening of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, where he held bilateral talks with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, as well as with other regional leaders. Discussions focused on strengthening cooperation in trade, regional affairs and infrastructure, as well as on South Sudanese access to electricity from Ethiopia.<sup>77</sup> Ethiopia also continued to host a significant number of persons displaced by the ongoing conflict in Upper Nile State, with several recent clashes between SPLA-IO and SSPDF taking place near the Ethiopian border.

70. The relationship between South Sudan and Kenya, which hosts a number of opposition leaders, has also remained significant, with the President of Kenya, William Ruto, reaffirming his country's commitment to peace and unity in South Sudan.<sup>78</sup> While the Kenya-led Tumaini Initiative has largely stalled, the Vice President of South Sudan, Josephine Lagu, told the General Assembly in September 2025 that the Government remained open to resuming the Initiative, and urged regional and international partners to help facilitate that process.<sup>79</sup>

71. A three-day visit by the South Sudanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Monday Semaya Kumba, to Port Sudan, the Sudan, in October, reaffirmed the continued significance of the relationship between the two countries. The Minister met with senior Sudanese officials, including the Chair of the Transitional Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan; the Deputy Chair of the Council, Malik Agar; and the Prime Minister, Idris Gamel Idris.<sup>80</sup> The two Governments pledged to strengthen security ties, intelligence-sharing and border controls, while also agreeing to form a joint committee focused on trade, investment, energy, agriculture and infrastructure.

72. Discussions also focused on securing the continued flow of South Sudanese oil to Port Sudan. In May 2025, the Government of South Sudan exported its first cargo of Dar blend crude oil through Port Sudan since February 2024, when damage to the

<sup>74</sup> Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), "IGAD alarmed by escalating tensions in the Republic of South Sudan", 27 March 2025; and African Union, press statement of the 1270th meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the situation in South Sudan, 1 April 2025.

<sup>75</sup> Eye Radio, "IGAD chief hails Juba's commitment to peace", 3 July 2025.

<sup>76</sup> African Union Commission, "AUC Chairperson received H.E. Abdiweli Ali, the AU Special Representative and Head of Mission to South Sudan", 13 October 2025.

<sup>77</sup> Statements by the Office of the President of the Republic of South Sudan, 8 and 10 September 2025.

<sup>78</sup> Eye Radio, "Kenya's Ruto takes over as COMESA chair", 10 October 2025.

<sup>79</sup> Radio Tamazuj, "South Sudan opposition bets on new Tumaini talks promise", 1 October 2025.

<sup>80</sup> Radio Tamazuj, "South Sudan foreign minister returns from Sudan after talks", 6 October 2025.

pipeline forced the suspension of all exports. The Dar blend accounts for around 70 per cent of South Sudanese oil revenues.<sup>81</sup>

73. The conflict in the Sudan has, however, continued to threaten South Sudanese oil exports. On 9 May 2025, the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum of the Sudan reported several attacks, allegedly carried out by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), against Sudanese oil infrastructure in Port Sudan.<sup>82</sup> Additional attacks on facilities in Heglig, the Sudan, were reported on 30 August 2025,<sup>83</sup> and on the al-Jaili refinery, near Khartoum, on 9 September 2025.<sup>84</sup> While none of the attacks significantly disrupted exports, they have complicated operations and the maintenance of these critical facilities.

74. Additional complications have resulted from the relationship between authorities in Port Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. In August 2025, the latter suspended the docking of ships originating from Port Sudan,<sup>85</sup> including tankers carrying South Sudanese oil. Refineries in Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, have historically received almost half of all of South Sudanese oil exports.<sup>86</sup>

75. In July 2025, the President of South Sudan paid a 10-day visit to the United Arab Emirates. According to an official statement, the visit aimed at strengthening bilateral relations and exploring new avenues for economic cooperation.<sup>87</sup> The Vice President of South Sudan for the Economic Cluster, Benjamin Bol Mel, also visited the United Arab Emirates in August 2025.<sup>88</sup>

## VI. Finances and natural resources

### A. Oil

76. Resumed Dar blend oil exports have been of significant benefit to the public finances of South Sudan. Since May 2025, the Government has exported an average of one Nile blend cargo and two Dar blend cargos per month,<sup>89</sup> with total oil revenues for the first six months of 2025 of around \$370,195,666.<sup>90</sup> Despite the provisions of the peace agreement, however, the 2024/25 and 2025/26 financial years have been among the least transparent since independence.<sup>91</sup>

77. The ongoing conflict in the Sudan and the lengthy suspension of Dar blend exports have, however, continued to limit the oil revenues of the Government of South Sudan. The private producers of South Sudanese oil have received additional allocations of oil to cover the costs associated with repairing the pipeline and to recoup the loans made to the Government during the suspension of exports.<sup>92</sup> Several of the private

<sup>81</sup> Data from the Ministry of Petroleum and interviews with market participants, August to October 2025. See [S/2023/922](#), [S/2024/343](#), [S/2024/855/Rev.1](#) and [S/2025/442](#).

<sup>82</sup> See annex 13.

<sup>83</sup> See annex 14.

<sup>84</sup> See Sudans Post, “Khartoum refinery damaged as RSF escalates drone war, SAF government confirms”, 9 September 2025.

<sup>85</sup> Interviews with market participants, August to October 2025.

<sup>86</sup> See [S/2023/922](#).

<sup>87</sup> Statements by the Office of the President of the Republic of South Sudan, 2 July 2025.

<sup>88</sup> Statement by the Office of the Vice President, 18 August 2025.

<sup>89</sup> Data from the Ministry of Petroleum and interviews with market participants, August to October 2025.

<sup>90</sup> Data from the Ministry of Petroleum.

<sup>91</sup> See annex 15.

<sup>92</sup> Interviews with market participants and current and former government officials, January to October 2025. Eye Radio interview with the Undersecretary for the Ministry of Petroleum, Deng Lual Wol, 14 May 2025.



creditors of South Sudan have also initiated legal proceedings in 2025 over outstanding oil-backed loans.<sup>93</sup>

78. The Government has attempted to manage these challenges by taking advance payment for future oil cargos, with almost all of the Government's 2025 cargos pre-sold around four to six months in advance.<sup>94</sup> Such pre-payments carry a heightened risk of diversion, and the Panel has identified at least one payment made directly to a third party, rather than to the Government's nominated oil account.<sup>95</sup>

79. The Government has also increasingly relied on borrowing from the Central Bank to bridge growing budget deficits. This has significantly increased the supply of South Sudan pounds, thereby depreciating its value against other currencies. Between May 2024 and May 2025, for example, government borrowing from the Central Bank rose from just over SSP 1 trillion to over SSP 2.1 trillion.<sup>96</sup> Consequently, over the same period, the official exchange rate against the United States dollar went from SSP 1,561 to over SSP 4,500.<sup>97</sup> Given the dependence of South Sudan on imports, this has had a direct impact on food security. In September 2025, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations estimated that the cost of maize and sorghum had almost quadrupled in Juba over the previous year.<sup>98</sup>

## **B. Military food procurement**

80. The Government has also invested heavily in the procurement of food for the military.

81. On 30 August 2024, the Ministry of Defence and Veterans' Affairs signed a contract worth \$602,828,372.50 with Galda, Ltd., for the supply of food to the Ministry and SSPDF. The company was incorporated in South Sudan in 2020 and is majority owned by a prominent South Sudanese businessman who is also a Brigadier General in the National Security Service.<sup>99</sup>

82. The South Sudan Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act (2018) calls for open and competitive tendering of government contracts, except in certain specified cases. In a letter dated 16 August 2024, however, the Ministry of Defence and Veterans' Affairs confirmed that "due to the urgency of the need for food rations", a single-source procurement process had been utilized for the contract.<sup>100</sup> When discussing a previous large food procurement contract for SSPDF, a representative of the Ministry of Finance noted that single-source tenders "lead to higher prices and poor service delivery".<sup>101</sup>

83. According to company documents, 49 per cent of the value of the contract covers Galda, Ltd.'s profit margins and transportation costs, with the rest covering the cost of the food.<sup>102</sup> A negotiations team that assessed the contract on behalf of the

<sup>93</sup> See annex 16.

<sup>94</sup> Data from the Ministry of Petroleum and interviews with market participants, August to October 2025.

<sup>95</sup> Interviews with market participants, August to October 2025. Around April 2025, South Sudan also instructed buyers to make payment to its account with First Abu Dhabi Bank in the United Arab Emirates, rather than to the previous oil revenue account with the New York Federal Reserve.

<sup>96</sup> Documents prepared by the Central Bank of South Sudan.

<sup>97</sup> Official exchange rate data from the Central Bank of South Sudan.

<sup>98</sup> Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Country brief: South Sudan, 17 September 2025.

<sup>99</sup> Photographs of promotion ceremony on file with the Panel.

<sup>100</sup> See [S/2019/301](#), [S/2022/359](#) and [S/2022/884](#).

<sup>101</sup> Minutes of the meeting on M/S Lou for Trading and Investment Co. Ltd., dated 7 August 2018.

<sup>102</sup> Confidential contract documents on file with the Panel.

Ministry also noted that higher food costs were due to the “urgency and sensitivity of these food items”.<sup>103</sup> The contract includes a provision for an advance payment of up to 30 per cent of the contract value.

84. Further to the award of the contract, in May 2025, the Ministry of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs budgeted the dollar-denominated contract as equivalent to SSP 1,539,155,868,547,<sup>104</sup> with one third of this amount – SSP 513,051,956,182 – allocated to the 2024/25 financial year and one third to each of the two subsequent financial years.

85. The approved goods and services budget for the entire Ministry of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs in the 2024/25 financial year was just SSP 22,155,255,122,<sup>105</sup> with the entire budget for the security sector of South Sudan, including salary payments, SSP 440,925,847,600. This contract would, therefore, if paid in full, exceed the approved annual budget for the entire security sector.

86. The Panel has not been able to confirm how much of the contract value has been paid, but in November 2024, the Ministry of Presidential Affairs directed that two cargos of oil, scheduled for delivery in August and October 2025, be awarded to Galda, Ltd.<sup>106</sup> On 23 September 2025, however, the Minister of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs and senior SSPDF officers inspected the arrival at the SSPDF headquarters in Juba of a large food consignment by Galda, Ltd.<sup>107</sup> Officials described it as the sixth such shipment of food delivered by the company.

## VII. Conclusions

87. As the humanitarian toll of renewed fighting continues to grow, the leaders of South Sudan’s need urgent support in order to halt the alarming escalation of conflict and avoid the regrets of yet another failed peace agreement.

## VIII. Recommendations

88. The Panel of Experts recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan:

(a) Issue a press release encouraging all Parties to the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (peace agreement) to cease hostilities and uphold the permanent ceasefire; pursue a dialogue that includes all factions of SPLM/A-IO, with a view to addressing the current political and security crisis; reaffirm their commitment to the inclusive implementation of the peace agreement; and take urgent measures to protect and preserve humanitarian access;

(b) Send a letter to the Government of South Sudan, encouraging officials to reaffirm their commitment to the implementation of the transitional security mechanisms outlined in chapter II of the peace agreement and the financial transparency provisions outlined in chapter IV, including the adoption of a national budget, the timely publication of expenditure reports and oil marketing reports and an accounting of all public debts;

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Approved budget for the financial year 2024/25, on file with the Panel.

<sup>106</sup> Allocation document on file with the Panel. It is unclear whether these cargos were ultimately awarded to the company.

<sup>107</sup> Video of delivery ceremonies on file with the Panel.

(c) Send a letter to Member States bordering South Sudan, outlining the scope of the arms embargo established by the Security Council in its resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#) and eased in its resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#), as well as drawing attention to the availability of the exemption request template;

(d) Send a letter to the Governments of Kenya and South Sudan requesting updated information on the progress of and prospects for resuming the Tumaini Initiative.

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## Annex 1: List of abbreviations

AU	The African Union
IGAD	The Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
NAS	National Salvation Front/Army
NSS	National Security Service
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (referring to its armed wing)
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (referring to both its armed wing and political party)
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (referring to its political party)
SSP	South Sudan Pound
SSPDF	South Sudan People's Defence Forces
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces

## Annex 2: Summary of charges against First Vice President Riek Machar and additional co-defendants prepared by the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, September 2025

Republic of South Sudan

Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs

Juba, 11th September 2025

*Press briefing*

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### ON THE CONCLUSION OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE NASIR INCIDENT (3-7 MARCH 2025)

By: Hon. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs

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#### Opening remarks

Good afternoon, members of the press.

I welcome you all to this important press briefing. Today, I speak to you on behalf of the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, in my capacity as the prosecuting authority, to announce the outcome of the investigations into the tragic Nasir incident of 3rd to 7th March 2025.

This briefing is divided into 7 sections. In the instance, I will highlight the background to the Nasir attacks to situate the incident (section I). This is followed by an outline of findings of the investigations (section II) and the particulars of the accused persons (section III) including the charges pressed against them (section IV). The briefing provides a synopsis of adherence to due process and international standards in criminal proceedings (section V). I conclude with a message to the international community, public and the media (section 6) and a reminder that law and order are the cornerstone of our constitutional system (section 7).



### 1. Background of the incident

On 3rd March 2025, a militant armed group known as the **White Army** launched a coordinated attack on the Nasir barracks of the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF), resulting in the killing of **Maj. Gen. David Majur Dak**, **over 250 SSPDF soldiers**, and a **United Nations pilot**. These crimes were marked by gross violations of the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law, including the desecration of corpses, persecution of civilians, and attacks on humanitarian workers.

Evidence further reveals that the White Army operated under the command and influence of certain leaders of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-in Opposition (SPLM/A-iO), including **Dr. Riek Machar Teny**, through a coordinated military and political structures.

### 2. Findings of the investigation

The Investigation Committee, established by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, interrogated **83 suspects**, of which:

- **21 individuals** have been indicted.
- **8 are under arrest and charged.**
- **13 accused remain at large.**
- **76 individuals** were discharged due to lack of sufficient evidence against them.

### 3. The accused persons

The following **eight accused persons** have been charged:

1. **Dr. Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon;**
2. **Mr. Puot Kang Chol;**
3. **Lt. Gen. Gabriel Duop Lam;**
4. **Mr. Mam Pal Dhuor;**
5. **Mr. Gatwich Lam Puoch;**
6. **Brig. Gen. Camilo Gatmai Kel;**
7. **Mr. Mading Riek Yak; and**
8. **Mr. Dominic Gatgok Riek.**



Thirteen (13) additional suspects remain at large and are subject to on-going efforts for arrest and prosecution.

#### 4. Charges filed

Based on the evidence, the following charges are preferred under **South Sudan laws** and applicable **international laws**:

- **Murder** – *Section 206, Penal Code Act, 2008* (killing of Maj. Gen. David Majour, 250+ SSPDF soldiers, and a UN personnel).
- **Conspiracy and common intention** – *Sections 67–69, Penal Code Act, 2008* (Coordination with the White Army).
- **Terrorism and financing terrorist acts** – *section 44, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (AML/CFT) Act, 2012 as amended in 2024* (White Army designated as a terrorist organization).
- **Treason and acts against State authority** – *Section 64, Penal Code Act, 2008* (undermining the sovereignty and security of the State).
- **Destruction of public property and military assets** – *Section 334, Penal Code Act, 2008*.
- **Crimes against humanity** – *Section 186, Penal Code Act, 2008* (systematic attacks on civilians and ethnic-based persecution).

#### 5. Due process and international standards in criminal proceedings

The accused persons have been informed of the charges against them and their constitutional rights, including the right to a fair trial and legal representation of their choice.

**For avoidance of doubt, the Republic of South Sudan reaffirms:**

- Its commitment to the **rule of law**;
- The **protection of victims and witnesses**; and
- Its obligations under the **Geneva Conventions and other applicable international instruments**.





The case will now proceed to trial before the competent court, where evidence will be adduced to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The court shall henceforth be moved by the prosecution to serve summons for appearance of the accused.

#### 6. Message to the international community, public and the media

While the Government of the Republic of South Sudan appreciates the engagement of international partners, public and media on the Nasir incident, this matter is now **sub judice**. As in many jurisdictions, ongoing court cases cannot be subject of policy or diplomatic debate until judicial pronouncements are made.

The opening and closing of trial proceedings will be accessible to accredited media, in line with best practices of transparency and public accountability.

#### 7. Closing statement

This case sends a clear message: **those who commit atrocities against the people of South Sudan, against our armed forces, and against humanitarian personnel will be held accountable, no matter their position or political influence.**

The victims and their families deserve justice. South Sudan deserves peace, and this government will uphold that promise.

May God bless South Sudan!

Thank you for your attention.

\*\*\*\*\*Ends\*\*\*\*\*

We will now take **three questions only**.



### Annex 3: Statement by UJOSS on press access to trial of First Vice President Riek Machar, September 2025



Sept. 22<sup>nd</sup> .2025

**PRESS RELEASE  
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

**UJOSS condemns denial of court access for journalists, it undermines the principles of open justice and press freedom.**

September 22<sup>nd</sup> 2024 (Juba, South Sudan) The Union of Journalists of South Sudan (UJOSS) was dismayed this morning when its members who went to cover commencement of trial for the now suspended First Vice President, Dr. Riek Machar and his co-accused were denied entry into the court facility.

Our members were told that, only journalists working for South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation (SSBC) are allowed to cover the court proceedings.

Whereas, we appreciate the access given to SSBC, our members work for and serve various media houses and audience.

Furthermore, the denial of access to court for journalists is a direct attack on freedom of the press found in Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 2011, as amended articles, 24 and 32. UJOSS condemns this act unequivocally, especially, when the denial is facilitated by the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs which is supposed to be the institution protecting the constitution.

UJOSS urges the government to grant media/journalists full access to cover the trial of Dr. Riek Machar and his co-accused and any other trial of public interest.

**OYET PATRICK CHARLES**



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**Annex 4: SPLM-IO statement on charges against First Vice President Riek Machar and additional co-defendants, dated 15 September 2025**

**SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (IO)**  
**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS**

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15 September, 2025


**RESOLUTION**  
**ON THE ILLEGAL INDICTMENT AND SUSPENSION OF H.E. DR. RIEK**  
**MACHAR TENY (FVP), AND OTHER POLITICAL DETAINEES**

The SPLM/SPLA-IO held virtual consultative meetings between 12-14 September, 2025, on the indictment and suspension from the R-TGoNU of H.E. Dr. Riek Machar Teny, the First Vice President, Chairman and Commander-In-Chief and other Political Detainees. The Political and Military leadership also deliberated on the Press Statement by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs on the Report of Investigation of Nasir Incidence and subsequent indictment of the members of the SPLM/SPLA-IO. After extensive deliberations and in light of this development, the SPLM/SPLA-IO Political leadership and Military Command and Staff resolved as follows:

**The Suspension of First Vice President and Status of R-TGNU**

1. Rejects and condemns the suspension of H.E. Dr. Riek Machar Teny, the First Vice President, the Chairman and Commander-In-Chief and other Political Detainees from the RTGNU as the suspensions of the First Vice President and other Political Detainees are contrary to Article, 1.3, on the Composition of the R-TGoNU; Article, 1.5-10, on the Structure of the R-TGoNU; Article. 1.12; on allocation and Selections of Ministries and Appointments Procedures for Ministers and Deputies in the R-TGoNU at all levels;

Page 1 of 3



Article. 1.16; on Responsibilities Sharing at States and Local Government levels;

2. The suspension of the First Vice President from the Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGNU) is a grave violation which effectively brings the implementation of the Political and Security provisions of the R-ARCSS to a complete stop. In light of this unfortunate development the SPLM/SPLA-IO further resolves;
  - a. The government that was formed pursuant to R-ARCSS has collapsed; its structure, mandate has been destroyed, and the legitimacy has ended.
  - b. The current regime in the Republic of South Sudan is not based on the R-ARCSS, it is a setup of dictatorship, peace spoilers and state capture that is holding power illegally and by violence, and as such, the SPLM/SPLA-IO shall work to effect in the Republic of South Sudan a regime change and a new political dispensation of peace, justice, equality, democracy, rule of law and development.

**The Charges against the First Vice President, other Political Detainees and Members of SPLM/SPLA-IO**

1. Condemns and rejects all charges against the members of SPLM/SPLA-IO as these charges are violations of R-ARCSS, politically motivated, denials of Political Space, and witch-hunt against Dr. Riek MacharTeny and the SPLM/SPLA-IO Party as such the SPLM/SPLA-IO;
  - a. Does not recognize the court process, and shall not take part in the politically motivated trials nor file any legal defense against members who are illegally arrested and detained in contravention of the Peace Agreement.

Page 2 of 3




- b. Welcomes, on the account of abuse of power by SPLM-IG, efforts by legal professionals and activists to challenge the illegal arrest, detention and trials of the First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan and other Political Detainees.
- c. Legal Defense or representation in the illegal political and incompetent court of the SPLM-IG shall proceed on account of individual Human Rights and freedom of the Political Detainees.
- d. Reiterates calls for immediate and unconditional release of the First Vice President and all Political Detainees from illegal detention, failure to do so, the SPLM/SPLA-IO shall use all means to demand the release of the First Vice President and other Political Detainees.

#### **Call for National Service and Mobilization**

In light of the political trials, abrogation of the R-ARCSS and ongoing military campaign by the regime's forces, the SPLM/SPLA-IO hereby calls upon all its supporters, members in the political and military wings, the citizens of the Republic of South Sudan to report for National Service in defense of the citizens and the Country and use all means available to regain their Country and Sovereignty.

Signed:




Rt. Hon. Gen. Oyet Nathaniel Pierino  
Acting Chairman and Commander-in-Chief,  
First Deputy Speaker,  
TNLA, RSS

## **Annex 5: Use of UAV as part of military operation in South Sudan**

SSGTV News video showing the deployment of a “quadcopter” style unmanned aerial system.



Source: SSGTV video available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QecWiO9qwAA>

## Annex 6: Joint SPLA-IO / NAS press release on attacks on Kediba in Western Equatoria State, 24 September 2025



Date: 24<sup>th</sup> September 2025

### Joint Press Release

This morning, 24<sup>th</sup> September, 2025, at approximately 04:00 hours, the Joint Force of National Salvation Front NAS and South Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition SPLA IO attacked and overran the strategic enemy garrison of Kadi'ba County, Mundri Area, Western Equatoria State.

This Joint Operation came as a response to the continuous and unprovoked enemy blatant incursion to the Joint Force position and also due to unrelenting and systematic harassment and looting of the civil population by the indiscipline elements of the South Sudan People's Defense Forces SSPDF in Kadi'ba and the surrounding villages.

In this Joint Operation, the enemy force suffered both serious human and material casualties and these include the following; One **(1)** APC tank captured in good condition, Two **(2)** 12.7 heavy machine guns, Four **(4)** PKM machine guns, Seventeen **(17)** AK 47 rifles and other assorted ammunitions.

Thirteen **(13)** enemy soldiers killed in action, the rest ran into disarray and are being hotly pursued by the Joint Force. By the capture of this enemy base, the Joint Force announces the complete control of Kadi'ba County in Mundri area, Western Equatoria State.

The Joint Operation Command is unequivocally committed to continue with such surgical and special operation throughout South Sudan in order to harass, exhaust, contain and limit the enemy incursions and excessive violations against the innocent civil population.

Once again, the Joint Operation Command reiterates its call to all civilians commuting the high-ways in Equatoria Region and other parts of South Sudan to refrain from using military convoys.

The NAS and SPLA IO military Commands congratulate the Joint Force and their Command for this successful operation and wishes quick recovery to the injured.

**Col. Lam Paul Gabriel**  
SPLA-IO Spokesperson

**Lt.COL Kenyi Mogga Lomeling**  
NAS/A Spokesperson

## **Annex 7: Letter to the Panel from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uganda, dated April 2025**

### **RESPONSE TO ISSUES RAISED IN UN PANEL OF EXPERTS ON SOUTH SUDAN LETTER TO UGANDA PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN DATED 21<sup>ST</sup> MARCH 2025**

Reference is made to the communication from the UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan (PoE) dated 21<sup>st</sup> March 2025 to Uganda's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York. The communication advises that the following information is contained in their draft final report, and requests for a response from the Government of Uganda:

- A. The PoE notes that UPDF personnel entered South Sudan territory in early March 2025, following significant violations of the ceasefire in Western Equatoria State, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile State. The PoE further makes reference to UN SC resolution 2731 (2024) and states that the said UPDF deployment is a violation of the arms embargo as established by the resolution.
- B. The PoE further alleges that there is transit of gold, timber and charcoal illegally produced in South Sudan to Ugandan territory by private companies/individuals.

The Government of Uganda takes the opportunity to respond to the issues raised in the PoE letter (and included in their draft final report) as follows:

### **ON UPDF DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTH SUDAN IN EARLY MARCH 2025:**

1. The Government of Uganda noted with concern the recent tensions and clashes in the Republic of South Sudan, specifically in Nasir and Ulang Counties in Upper Nile State, Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el-Ghazal States. This includes the clashes of 7<sup>th</sup> March 2025 in Nasir town, in which an SSPDF General and dozens of soldiers were killed after a United Nations helicopter trying to evacuate them came under attack by forces affiliated to members of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU). This incident reaffirms the PoE observation of *"...significant violations of the ceasefire in Western Equatoria State, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile State."*



2. Risk assessments by foreign missions and international organisations accredited to South Sudan, similarly observed a high likelihood of an escalation of tensions between the different members of the R-TGoNU, possibly resulting in full-scale civil war in the country.
3. These recent clashes, if allowed to escalate, have the potential to undermine the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), and reverse significant achievements made under the transition roadmap.
4. On 10<sup>th</sup> January 2014, the Republic of Uganda, in accordance with section 39 of the UPDF Act, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation and the Status of Forces Agreement with the Republic of South Sudan relating to the deployment of the UPDF in the territory of South Sudan.
5. On 10<sup>th</sup> March 2025, following a request by H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, and in accordance with Article 98(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda and sections 38(1)(b) and 39 of the UPDF Act, the UPDF deployed a force to the Republic of South Sudan in order to avert a security catastrophe in the region.
6. The deployment of UPDF to South Sudan will prevent the escalation of hostilities among members of the R-TGoNU and related groups, and the resulting potential rapid spread of the conflict throughout the country and by extension the entire region.
7. It will be recalled that Uganda has made a historical commitment to national, regional and international security and has been at the forefront of deploying its forces in order to achieve peace, security and stability of the region and Africa at large.
8. It will be further recalled that for many years, Uganda experienced insecurity in the northern and eastern regions of the country perpetuated by terrorist rebels, who launched their offensives from the territory of South Sudan. The Government of South Sudan subsequently allowed the UPDF to enter its territory to pursue the terrorist rebels, which

resulted in peace and security in Uganda. As such, Uganda has a responsibility to prevent a situation of protracted conflict in South Sudan that would ultimately affect Uganda's territorial integrity and national security.

9. It should also be noted that unabated insecurity within the region would provide an opportunity for regional rebel groups such as Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to mobilise, recruit, train and transform into affiliates of international terrorist associations like the Islamic State ('IS') making them a threat to regional peace and security.
10. The Republic of South Sudan is a valued regional partner to the Republic of Uganda, and destabilization in South Sudan has negative repercussions on both countries and the region including trade disruption, destruction of infrastructure, displacement of communities and influx of refugees. The Republic of Uganda hosts a large number of foreign nationals that are seeking refuge from conflicts in the region, including from the Republic of South Sudan. The Republic of Uganda will continue to exercise an open-door policy towards providing refuge to people affected by conflict in the region, while also contributing towards prevention of conflicts in the region that precipitate the increased influx of refugees.
11. The Government of Uganda adheres to the principles of non-interference in the domestic matters of a state, and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and independence. The Government of Uganda re-emphasises that the intervention of UPDF was upon the request of the Government of South Sudan, and acted to avert a crisis similar to the ongoing conflict in the Republic of Sudan.
12. On 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2025, in support of resolution of the ongoing conflict in Republic of South Sudan, and in spite of the prevailing volatile security situation, H.E. Yoweri Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda visited Juba, South Sudan and held engagements with his counterpart H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit, a demonstration of Uganda's commitment to regional peace and security.

**ON ALLEGATIONS OF TRANSIT OF GOLD, TIMBER AND CHARCOAL ILLEGALLY PRODUCED IN SOUTH SUDAN TO UGANDAN TERRITORY BY PRIVATE COMPANIES/INDIVIDUALS:**

There are no recorded incidents of transit of illegally produced gold, timber and charcoal from South Sudan to Uganda. However, it is important to note that the international border between South Sudan and Uganda is not demarcated and significant sections of the border are porous, increasing risk of small quantities of items being transported across the border without the knowledge of the authorities. We request the PoE to provide specific information about instances of transit of illegally produced goods across the border from South Sudan to Uganda, to enable the relevant authorities review them.

For information, the Uganda government has taken several steps to address the problem of transit of items illegally produced in South Sudan. Uganda Customs together with the Customs authority of South Sudan, have implemented different approaches to contain illegal activity across the border and these include but are not limited to the following:

1. Customs enforces Certificate of Origin requirement for Timber Imports. The importers of Timber are required to present a Certificate of Origin issued by the Management Authority of South Sudan for the Non-Listed Species of timber like mahogany. Through this timber not cleared by the South Sudan Authorities is not admitted into Uganda.
2. Customs Collaborates with other strategic stakeholders such as the National Forestry Authority (NFA) in regulating activities related to the importation of timber into Uganda.
3. Community involvement: Uganda Customs has adopted community involvement approaches in the fight against smuggling along the porous border through continuous sensitization meetings to enlighten the population along the borders on the dangers of smuggling.
4. Collaboration with other key stakeholders: Customs collaborates with other key stakeholders such as the UPDF especially on patrols along the border areas to detect and deter illegal activities.


5. Strategic checkpoints across major transit routes: Customs has also established checkpoints across major transit routes from South Sudan to check smuggling.
6. Use of Electronic Cargo Tracking technology to monitor Transits. For cargo declared to be for Transit through the territory of Uganda, Customs uses electronic seals to monitor in real-time the entire movement of such goods to the declared Exit points. Central Command Centre monitors any incidents, and rapid response teams are strategically positioned to respond to transit violations in real-time.
7. Use of Non-Intrusive Technology: Customs has deployed drive-through scanners across major borders in the country. This has ensured the detection of any concealments much more easily.
8. Conducting Focused Enforcement Operations: Customs also conducts regular focused operations periodically which are often coordinated in nature.

### **Conclusion**

The Government of Uganda adheres to the principles of non-interference in the domestic matters of a state, and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and independence. In this regard, the Government of Uganda values, and attaches great importance to a harmonious existence with all its neighbours. The Government also values and respects the importance of the promotion of regional and international peace and security. It is in Uganda's national interest to work for peace.

**MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**  
**APRIL 2025**

## Annex 8: Visiting armed forces agreement between South Sudan and Uganda, July 2024

National Security Service Office of the Director General General Headquarters		Jebel Road, Nyokuron West P.O. Box 96, Juba, South Sudan +211 92 891 1113 / 091 909 0899
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**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**  
**Internal Security Bureau**


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In any correspondence on this  
 Subject, please quote No: **RSS/NSS/DG/ISB/J/ 925 /24**
Date: **23/07/ 2024**

Ambassador Joseph Owet  
 Director General  
 External Security Organization (ESO)  
**THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA**

*Dear Ambassador,*

**REF: APPROVAL OF VISITING ARMED FORCES AGREEMENT; BETWEEN THE FRIENDLY REPUBLICS OF SOUTH SUDAN AND UGANDA.**

This is in reference to your letter REF GOSS/ISB-DG/1/7/24 dated 20 July 2024, requesting for visiting armed forces agreement; between the friendly Republics of South Sudan and Uganda.

As per the meeting between His Excellency the President of the Republic of South Sudan, General Salva Kiir Mayardit and Brigadier General Nyakikuru Asaph Mweteise in a capacity as Special Envoy of His Excellency the President of the Republic of Uganda, His Excellency the President of the Republic of South Sudan, granted permission on the request from President Yoweri Museveni for One Unit of Military Forces from the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF), to visit and conduct training sessions in specific locations inside South Sudan, near the western border areas.

I am pleased to inform you that we are ready to receive the permitted One Unit of Military Forces by the President of the Republic of South Sudan, to come and engage in training activities in South Sudan. This training will provide both sisterly countries with valuable knowledge and skills related to advanced military techniques.

I welcome and offer my support and collaborations to Brigadier General Nyakikuru Asaph Mweteise, the Deputy Commander of the Special Forces Command (SFC) and who will be the Operations Commander for the training programs here in South Sudan.

1

The Internal Security Bureau (ISB) and the South Sudan Peoples' Defence Forces (SSPDF), will cooperate and work with UPDF during the training exercises. The training program is approved for one month only, beginning on 22 July 2024 to 22 August 2024.

The Government of South Sudan therefore, approves and authorizes the Government of Uganda to begin transportations and deployment of logistical equipment, training materials, troop carriers, helicopters, 20 training experts, 60 armed military personnel, welfare preparations and medical facilities from 22 July 2024.

Finally, the Government and people of South Sudan are always ready to strengthening our already excellent bilateral relations between the Government and the people of Uganda.

We look forward to a cooperative and successful training.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.  
Yours truly,



Gen. Akol Koor Kuc  
Director General  
Internal Security Bureau (ISB)  
National Security Service (NSS)

23/7/2024

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
P.O. BOX 7168  
KAMPALA, UGANDA



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL  
EXTERNAL SECURITY ORGANISATION  
P.O. BOX 7168 KAMPALA, UGANDA  
Tel. +256-414-254505/255295/6  
Telefax. +256-414-257986

IN THIS CORRESPONDENCE ON **GOSS/ISB-DG/1/7/24**  
THIS SUBJECT PLEASE QUOTE NO.

20 July 2024

General Akol Koor Kuc  
Director General  
Internal Security Bureau (ISB)  
**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

Dear Director General,

**VISITING ARMED FORCES AGREEMENT; BETWEEN THE  
FRIENDLY REPUBLICS OF SOUTH SUDAN AND UGANDA**

The Government of Uganda most highly appreciates the recent audience which His Excellency the President of the Republic of South Sudan, granted to Brigadier General Nyakikuru Asaph Mweteise; in a capacity as a Special Envoy of His Excellency the President of the Republic of Uganda. During the meeting at State House in Juba city, President Salva Kiir kindly permitted the request from President Yoweri Museveni, for one unit of Military Forces from the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF), to conduct training sessions in specific locations inside South Sudan, near the western border areas.

Sir, in respect to the permission granted by the President of South Sudan, for UPDF to engage in training activities in South Sudan, the


President of Uganda assigned Brigadier General Asaph Mweteise to be the Operations Commander of the short training programmes, that shall last for one month. He is the Deputy Commander of Special Force Command (SFC), that is an elite specialised component of the UPDF.

My esteemed Brother, the purpose of this communication is to introduce General Asaph to you; and to request that through your coordination, as well as your support and collaborations; Internal Security Bureau (ISB) and South Sudan Peoples' Defence Forces (SSPDF), as usual, cooperate with UPDF in the training exercises.

Subject to the final approval and authorisation from the Government of South Sudan, the Government of Uganda is ready to start transportations on 22 July 2024; by deploying logistical equipment, training materials, troop carriers, helicopters, 20 training experts, 60 armed military personnel, welfare preparations, medical facilities, etc.

We sincerely express our heartfelt gratitude to His Excellency the President, the Government and people of South Sudan; who are the best friends of Uganda; for your readiness to always strengthen the excellent bilateral relations, between our two neighbouring countries.

I am so grateful, in solidarity




**AMBASSADOR JOSEPH OCWET  
DIRECTOR GENERAL  
EXTERNAL SECURITY ORGANISATION**






## Annex 9: UPDF base near Juba, South Sudan



Source: Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), UPDF Troops in South Sudan Urged to Maintain Discipline and Plan Finances Wisely, 12 September 2025: <https://www.updf.go.ug/operation-mlinzi-wa-kimya/updf-troops-in-south-sudan-urged-to-maintain-discipline-and-plan-finances-wisely/> and Lt Gen Muhanga Rallies UPDF Troops In South Sudan To Sustain Discipline And Readiness, 16 May 2025: <https://www.updf.go.ug/operation-mlinzi-wa-kimya/updf-troops-in-south-sudan-urged-to-maintain-discipline-and-plan-finances-wisely/> (last accessed 31 October 2025) Satellite imagery source is "Planet."

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## Juba, South - West, South Sudan


UN Panel of Experts  
Established pursuant to Resolution 2206 (2015)

Images (C) CNES (2025), Distribution Airbus DS Pléiades  
UNITED NATIONS  
Map No. 4706.1 (OCT 2025)

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## Juba, South - West, South Sudan

UN Panel of Experts  
Established pursuant to Resolution 2206 (2015)


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## Juba, South - West, South Sudan

UN Panel of Experts  
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
Images (C) CNES (2025), Distribution Airbus DS Pléiades  
UNITED NATIONS  
Map No. 4706.3 (OCT 2025)

Office of Information and Communications Technology  
Geospatial Information Section

Source of training image: UPDF website, UPDF Graduates 48 Trainees in South Sudan, 16 September 2025:  
<https://www.updf.go.ug/operation-mlinzi-wa-kimya/updf-graduates-48-trainees-in-south-sudan/>

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## Juba, South - West, South Sudan

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UNITED NATIONS

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## Annex 10: UPDF convoy entering South Sudan through the Nimule border crossing on 17 March 2025

### T-55 Tank



Smooth bore and cylindric muzzle



5-wheel undercarriage

Source: Video on file with Panel, and available from:

<https://www.tiktok.com/@chiefofdefenceforces/video/7482837500218707205>

### BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle



Source: SSG TV, available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKmKdaYp>



## Armed Convoy in Juba



Centre image: Katmerciler Hizir armoured personnel carrier. According to reports, Uganda purchased Hizir armoured vehicles in 2019, with deliveries being made in 2020.<sup>108</sup>

Top right image: Nyoka armoured personnel carrier, manufactured in Uganda.<sup>109</sup>

Satellite image source: Planet

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<sup>108</sup> Military Africa, Uganda displays Turkish Katmerciler HIZIR 4×4 Armoured vehicles ahead of election, 12 January 2021

<sup>109</sup> ADF Magazine, Uganda opens armoured vehicle factory, May 202

## Annex 11: Armed Bell 412 helicopters

Two armed Bell 412 / AB 412 helicopters observed in South Sudan on 14 May 2025. Both helicopters display UB-16 57mm unguided rocket pods



Source: Video on file with the Panel, and available from:  
<https://x.com/africaken1/status/1924426106884530210?s=46>



Armed Bell 412 helicopters observed in Mathiang Headquarters, Longechuk County, 12 September 2025



Source: Photographs on file with the Panel, and available from: <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/17DFcRK8rP/>

3 helicopters observed at Paloich Airfield, Upper Nile State (10.5292, 32.5006) on 4 April 2025




Source: Planet




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## Annex 12: Flooding in Jonglei State




Area around New Fangak, Jonglei State, 26 June 2025



Same area on 23 October 2025, after substantial flooding



# Annex 13: Ministry of Energy and Petroleum of the Sudan, letter concerning attacks on oil infrastructure, dated 9 May 2025

	 جمهورية السودان Republic of the Sudan وزارة الطاقة والنفط	
Undersecretary	Ministry of Energy & Petroleum	الوكيل
9 May 2025		Ref: MEP/A/EXJ 23
<b>HON. ENG. DENG LUAL WOL</b> Undersecretary Ministry of Petroleum Republic of South Sudan		
Honorable,		
<b>SUBJECT: ATTACKS ON THE CRUDE OIL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS AND OTHER SUPPORTING FACILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN</b>		
<p>At the outset of my letter allow me to reiterate our commitment to the continued flow of crude oil from South Sudan. It's an achievement we have made jointly despite the ongoing security situation in the Republic of the Sudan. We remain true to the spirit of the Cooperation Agreement signed between the two states and we adhere to the principle of <b>mutual viability of the two states</b> stipulated for in the said agreement. We aspire that GoRSS considers the same end in actions and decisions. We also acknowledge the indispensable role GoRSS has played in realizing the continued flow of oil in the PETCO Pipeline.</p>		
<p>Notwithstanding the above, the repeated attacks by RSF on facilities in the Republic of the Sudan has taken its toll on both nations culminating in grave losses for both national economies and the foreign investors including the deferred production for almost one and half years of stoppage and costs of restarting both the oil fields and the transportation systems.</p>		
<p>The recent wave of drone attacks launched by RSF and its backers against civilian infrastructure has targeted oil facilities in Sudan which are bound to have an impact on Sudan's capability to complete export operations. The attacks can be summarized as follows:</p>		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. In the early morning hours of 9 May 2025 drones attacked PETCO's PS#5 in al-Hudi resulting in grave damage to the Pump Station. While maintenance teams remain at site, the risk of stoppage of export operations is very high, especially when considering that PS#5 is a functioning station crucial to export operations.</li> <li>2. In the early morning hours of 8 May 2025 drones attacked a major diesel depot in the White Nile state from which BAPCO withdraws diesel for operations purposes.</li> </ol>		
<p>Tel: +249 183 775 595 +249 183 773 196 Fax: +249 183 777 940 +249 183 776 569 P.O. Box: 2087 Khartoum - Sudan, Email: ministry@spc.sd, ministeroffice@spc.sd</p>		



جمهورية السودان  
Republic of the Sudan  
وزارة الطاقة والنفط



Undersecretary

Ministry of Energy &amp; Petroleum

الوكيل

3. Ports and airports which were being used by PETCO and BAPCO to import crucial materials for the operation of the pipeline have been attacked. Both companies currently have pending shipments of critical chemicals which they are unable to receive.
4. The attacks on the electricity substations including the substation inside the BAPCO MT and which was directly utilized to supply power to the loading facilities has led to a power outage in both marine terminals and has affected the ability of the two terminals to load crude oil simultaneously.
5. The attacks on the fuel depots in Port Sudan and other storage facilities threatens a critical shortage in supplies of fuel critical for operating the transportation systems.

With the above in mind, we have instructed both PETCO and BAPCO to deliver a fast-track roadmap to enable us to shut down the facilities. The plan will be set into action if these attacks, which jeopardize these facilities and disable us from carrying out our commitment under the AOREM, continue.

Best regards






9/5/2025

**DR. MOHIEDDIEN NAIEM MOHAMED SAIED**  
Undersecretary  
Ministry of Energy and Petroleum

Tel: +249 183 775 595 +249 183 773 196 Fax: +249 183 777 940 +249 183 776 569  
P.O. Box: 2087 Khartoum - Sudan, Email: ministry@spc.sd, ministeroffice@spc.sd



## Annex 14: Letters concerning attacks on oil infrastructure in Sudan, dated August 2025

	 جمهورية السودان Republic of the Sudan وزارة الطاقة والنفط	
Undersecretary	Ministry of Energy & Petroleum	الوكيل
30 August 2025		Ref: MEP/A/EX/36
<b>HON. ENG. DENG LUAL WOL</b> Undersecretary Ministry of Petroleum Republic of South Sudan		
Honorable,		
<b>SUBJECT: RENEWED ATTACKS ON HEGLIG OIL FACILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN</b>		
Reference is also made to our letter dated 28 August 2025 regarding attacks by RSF on Heglig and on other critical petroleum infrastructure used for the export of crude oil from South Sudan.		
While we understand the criticality of crude oil exports to RSS, we aspire that RSS understand the importance of personnel safety in the Heglig Area and of keeping these facilities in operable condition; and that their continued operation despite ongoing attacks by the RSF will render them inoperable in the long run.		
RSF, in a continuation of their aggression on critical civilian infrastructure related to petroleum export operations, at ~2:30am this morning attacked the Heglig Operations Basecamp, destroying the airport's terminal. Shrapnel from the attack reached the basecamp and the attack caused widespread panic among the staff operating the Heglig CPF and PS#1 of the export system.		
We note that Heglig Airport has been non-operational for any activity since April 2023 and there is no military presence inside the Heglig Operations Basecamp. Such unprovoked attacks against civilian infrastructure represent a serious threat to the stability of oil flows from South Sudan and we cannot in good faith continue to man the operation there.		
We have accordingly issued instructions to 2B OPCO and PETCO to activate the <b>Emergency Shutdown Plan</b> and to coordinate the evacuation of all personnel from the Heglig Area. We would also like to inform you that due to the attacks on 26 August and today's attacks we have reduced the manning of the facilities to minimum. As such we expect that PETCO will be unable to meet the lifting schedule for this month.		
We will continue to update you on the developments and the progress of the shutdown procedure and we look forward to continued coordination between us.		
Please accept assurances of my highest consideration.		
 <b>DR. FADUL MAHMOUD</b> Acting Undersecretary Ministry of Energy and Petroleum		
Tel: +249 183 775 595 +249 183 773 196 Fax: +249 183 777 940 +249 183 776 569 P.O. Box: 2087 Khartoum - Sudan, Email: ministry@spc.sd, ministeroffice@spc.sd		



## 2B Operating Company

GNPOC Tower – Plot No (91), Block No (4), Al-Mugran  
District  
Khartoum – Sudan, P.O. Box 12527

30<sup>th</sup> August 2025

Ref: 2BOPCO/PRESIDENT/PO/25/011

**To: Mr. HE Yanhui**  
President  
GPOC  
Republic of South Sudan

**Subject: PREPARATION FOR 2B OPCO OPERATIONS SHUTDOWN**

Dear Sir,

Reference is made to the above-mentioned subject, we regret to inform GPOC that Heglig airport was attacked by an Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drone) at 2 am on August 30<sup>th</sup>, 2025. This is the second round in the vicinity of Heglig field, as the first attack occurred on August 26<sup>th</sup>, 2025, leading to five (5) fatalities and injury of seven (7) others.

2B OPCO would like to reiterate its commitment to the continued operations, however as the safety of our personnel is top priority, we will prepare for a potential shutdown should these attacks continue.

Best Regards,

*MH 30.8 2025*

**Mohamed Siddig Elhusein**  
President





# PETROLINES FOR CRUDE OIL CO. LTD

شركة بترول نفط الخام المحدودة

30<sup>th</sup> August 2025

Ref: PETCO/GM/PO/25/047

**To: Mr. Diew Charow Walok**  
A/President, SPOC  
E-mail: [spoc@spocss.com](mailto:spoc@spocss.com)

**Mr. HE Yanhui**  
President  
GPOC  
Republic of South Sudan

**Cc: Hon Eng. Deng Lual Wol**  
Undersecretary,  
Ministry of Petroleum  
Republic of South Sudan

**Mr. Joseph Ezbon Waiwal**  
Director General  
Petroleum Authority  
Ministry of Petroleum  
Republic of South Sudan

## Subject: PREPARATION FOR SCOTS SHUTDOWN

Dear Sir,

Reference is made to the above-mentioned subject; we regret to inform SPOC that Heglig airport was attacked by an Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drone) at 2 am on August 30<sup>th</sup> 2025. This is the second round in the vicinity of Heglig field, as the first attack occurred on August 26<sup>th</sup>, 2025, leading to five (5) fatalities and injury of seven (7) others.

PETCO would like to reiterate its commitment to the continued operations, however as the safety of our personnel is top priority, we will prepare for a potential shutdown should these attacks continue.

Best Regards,

*MU 30.8 2025*

**Mohamed Siddig Elhusein**  
General Manager



GNPOC Tower, Plot No (91), Block No (4), AlMugran District, Khartoum, Sudan  
P.O. Box: 11856, Tel: +249-187-0370311, Fax: +249-187-760065  
Web site: <http://www.petrolinead.com> Email: [info@petrolinead.com](mailto:info@petrolinead.com)





## **Annex 15: Publication of financial transparency data in South Sudan since independence**

South Sudan's 2018 Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan requires the publication of a range of financial data in an effort to restore trust and confidence between the parties to the government of national unity. These include:

1.6.2.10 The President shall cause the preparation of the annual budget of the RTGoNU by the Minister of Finance and Planning to be presented to the Council of Ministers and the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA).

1.6.2.10 The Council of Ministers shall manage and allocate resources to support the implementation of these policies and programs, within the framework of the approved national budget of the RTGoNU.

4.14.1. The RTGoNU shall ensure that government finances are managed responsibly and that budget execution is enforced in accordance with the law;

4.14.2. The RTGoNU shall ensure that all its transactions are transparent and subject to auditing and oversight to promote accountability;

4.14.3. The RTGoNU shall ensure that debts, arrears and prepayments will be audited, fully accounted for, responsibly managed and controlled. New debt and payables will be issued and undertaken in an open, transparent and responsible fashion and shall be contracted strictly in accordance with the law;

4.14.4. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning shall identify all loans and contracts collateralized or guaranteed with oil, checked, and made publicly available for the purposes of transparency and accountability;

Article 4.14.8. All revenues, expenditures, deficits, and debts of the RTGoNU shall be accounted for and the information shall be made accessible to the public. An annual report which details the RTGoNU financial activities shall be required by the Transitional National Legislative Assembly.

4.14.4. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning shall identify all loans and contracts collateralized or guaranteed with oil, checked, and made publicly available for the purposes of transparency and accountability;

4.14.8. All revenues, expenditures, deficits, and debts of the RTGoNU shall be accounted for and the information shall be made accessible to the public. An annual report which details the RTGoNU financial activities shall be required by the Transitional National Legislative Assembly;

Since the beginning of the 2024/25 financial year on 1 July 2024, however, the government of South Sudan has ceased the publication of almost all financial data, including data that was previously made available further to the terms of the peace agreement and domestic South Sudanese laws:

Financial year	National budget	Budget expenditure reports				Oil marketing reports	Central Bank statistical bulletin
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Full year		
2011/12							
2012/13							
2013/14							
2014/15							
2015/16							
2016/17							
2017/18							
2018/19							
2019/20							
2020/21							
2021/22						partial	
2022/23						partial	
2023/24							Last: Nov 2024
2024/25							
2025/26							

Available	
Previously available	
Not available	

This table is based on a review of available documents conducted by the Panel in October 2025. It is intended to illustrate a trend only and is not intended as a definitive catalogue of available documentation.

A document is identified as available when it can be retrieved from an official government website, principally the website of the Ministry of Finance and Planning or the Ministry of Petroleum. The Panel cannot rule out the existence of some documents elsewhere on the internet.

A document is identified as previously available when it was successfully retrieved, by the Panel, previously from an official government website. The Panel cannot rule out the possibility that some documents listed as not available were previously available.

Except in the case of Oil Marketing Reports, this table does not attempt to assess the completeness or accuracy of the information contained within these documents, nor whether they were published within the required timeframe. Several were published months, or even years, after their legally required publication date.

The South Sudanese financial year runs from 1 July to 30 June the following year.

## Annex 16: Ongoing legal proceedings against the government of South Sudan

In recent months, a number of international commodity traders and banks have initiated legal actions against the Government of South Sudan. These cases all concern the failure, by the Government of South Sudan, to repay loans secured against future crude oil deliveries, or pre-payments for crude oil.

- On 27 June 2025, **BB Energy (GULF) DMCC** initiated legal action against the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in UK Commercial Court. Case number CL-2025-000296. BB Energy (GULF) DMCC is seeking the repayment of an outstanding commercial debt owed to the company by the Government of South Sudan further to a series of pre-payments for crude oil.
- On 13 June 2025, the **Qatar National Bank (QNB)** petitioned the United States District Court in the District of Columbia to enforce the \$1.1 billion award previously secured by QNB, against the Government and Central Bank of South Sudan, in May 2024. The Panel detailed this legal dispute in its final report S/2024/343.
- On 20 May 2025, **Vitol Bahrain EC** initiated legal action against the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, also in UK Commercial Court. Case number CL-2025-000231. The dispute relates to the delivery of a cargo of crude oil.
- On 26 April 2024, the **African Export-Import Bank** initiated legal action against the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, also in UK Commercial Court. Case number CL-2024-000246. The Court found in favour of the Bank on 24 May 2025 and ordered the Government of South Sudan to repay \$657 million in oil-backed loans dating back to 2019 and 2020. See the Panel's final report S/2025/442.

Estimated oil-backed commercial debts owed by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, based on data from the Ministry of Petroleum, Panel interviews and correspondence, and Court documents. These figures are estimates only, and may not account for recent or unreported repayments and/or all accrued interest and fees:

Debt owed to:	Estimated outstanding balance (US\$)	Notes:
African Export Import Bank	\$657 million	See above and the Panel's report S/2025/442
Qatar National Bank	\$1.068 billion	See above and the Panel's report S/2024/343
NASDEC General Trading	\$366,680,000	See the Panel's report S/2022/359
Sahara Energy	\$149,852,000	
Trade Development Bank	\$147,910,000	See the Panel's report S/2024/343
Euro American	\$271,123,000	
BB Energy	\$142,000,000	See above
Total	In excess of \$2.8 billion	

**Annex 17: Response from the Government of the Republic of Uganda to the Panel, dated 4 November 2025**

- 1. Could you please confirm the total number of UPDF personnel currently deployed in South Sudan?**

**Answer**

The UPDF deployed a sizeable number of troops in South Sudan to support the implementation, oversight and ensure adherence to the tenets of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan of 12<sup>th</sup> September 2018.

- 2. Could you please confirm whether the entire UPDF force is stationed in Bilinyanga, or whether UPDF forces are also stationed elsewhere in South Sudan?**

**Answer**

The entire UPDF force is not only stationed in Bilinyanga. It is also stationed in other areas mostly affected in the Upper Nile that include Malakal, Palouch, Wao and Juba.

- 3. Can you confirm whether the cost of the current UPDF deployment in South Sudan is being paid, in part or in full, by the Government of South Sudan or its officials?**

**Answer**

The UPDF presence in South Sudan fully funded by the Government of the Republic of Uganda.

- 4. Could you please confirm the number of battle tanks and armoured fighting vehicles currently deployed in South Sudan?**

**Answer**

The UPDF has two (02) battle tanks and four (04) armoured fighting vehicles currently deployed in South Sudan.

5. **Could you confirm whether UPDF forces have participated in any combat operations in South Sudan, including the Upper Nile State, Jonglei State or Central Equatoria State?**

**Answer**

The UPDF has not participated in any combat operations in South Sudan, including the Upper Nile State, Jonglei State or Central Equatoria State.

The UPDF is securing SSD national vital assets and resources in the upper Nile that are under imminent and actual hostile action and it only reacts in self defence to ward off hostile action in furtherance of regional stability and maintenance of peace.

6. **Could you confirm whether UPDF forces have provided any training or logistical support to any branches of South Sudan's security forces since their deployment on 10 March 2025?**

**Answer**

The UPDF has not provided any training or logistical support to any branches of South Sudan's security forces since their deployment on 10 March 2025. The UPDF is alive to UN Security Council Resolution 2428 (2018) which was renewed by the UN Security Council Resolution 278 which prohibits the same.

7. **Could you confirm whether UPDF forces have transferred any military equipment or materiel to any branches of South Sudan's security forces since their deployment on 10 March 2025?**

**Answer**

The UPDF has not transferred any military equipment or materiel to any branches of South Sudan's security forces since their deployment on 10 March 2025. The UPDF is alive to UN Security Council Resolution 2428 (2018) which was renewed by the UN Security Council Resolution 278 which prohibits the same.

8. **Could you confirm whether UPDF forces have assisted in the maintenance of any military equipment in South Sudan, including helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, and armoured vehicles?**

**Answer**

The UPDF has not assisted in the maintenance of any military equipment in South Sudan, including helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, and armoured vehicles. The UPDF is alive to UN Security Council Resolution 2428 (2018) which was renewed by the UN Security Council Resolution 278 which prohibits the same.

9. **Could you confirm the number and type of air assets currently deployed in South Sudan in support of the UPDF, including helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or 'drones'); and whether these are owned and operated by UPDF, Bar Aviation, or any other third party?**

**Answer**

The UPDF has only deployed 03 (three) B412s and 01 (one) caravan which are dry leased by Bar Aviation and operated by the UPDF.

10. **Specifically, whether the Bell 412 helicopters deployed variously to Central Equatoria State, Jonglei State, and Upper Nile State are operated by the UPDF or Bar Aviation?**

**Answer**

The Bell 412 helicopters are all operated by the UPDF.

11. **Specifically, whether the Cessna 208 Caravan plane (tail number N208PM), operating over Wunaliet, 25 km west of Juba, on 24 March 2025, is operated by the UPDF or Bar Aviation?**

**Answer**

The Cessna 208 Caravan plane (tail number N208PM) is operated by the UPDF.

12. **Could you confirm whether the UPDF is participating in air operations against military targets in South Sudan and, if so, provide additional information about the nature of the UPDF participation in such operations?**

**Answer**

The UPDF is not participating in air operations against military targets in South Sudan. The UPDF aircrafts in South Sudan are solely for troop movement, aerial surveillance and logistical support self-sustenance.