



# Security Council

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## The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

### Report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 1 November 2024 ([S/PRST/2024/7](#)), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to keep it informed about the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) every six months. It provides an assessment of the major political and security trends in Central Africa since the report dated 30 May 2025 ([S/2025/342](#)). It also provides an update on the situation in the Lake Chad basin region, pursuant to Council resolution [2349 \(2017\)](#).

#### II. Major developments in the Central Africa subregion

##### A. Political, peace and security developments and trends

###### Political development and trends

2. The reporting period was characterized by the holding of a presidential election in Cameroon and legislative and local-level elections in Burundi and Gabon. It was also marked by the appointment of a new President of the Commission of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), as well as political tensions within the organization's membership.

3. The twenty-sixth ordinary session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECCAS was held in Malabo on 6 and 7 June. The discussions were focused on regional integration, maritime governance and the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. After the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supported by Burundi, opposed the assumption by Rwanda of the rotating chairmanship of ECCAS, the organization's leaders decided to extend the tenure of the President of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, as Chairperson of ECCAS for one year and tasked him with ensuring the active involvement of ECCAS in ongoing peace initiatives for eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In a communiqué, Rwanda deplored what it described as "the instrumentalization" of ECCAS by the Democratic Republic of the Congo "with the support of certain member States" and announced that it would withdraw from the organization.



4. The seventh extraordinary session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECCAS was held in Malabo on 7 September. Ezéchiel Nibigira of Burundi was appointed as the new President of the ECCAS Commission, succeeding Gilberto Da Piedade Veríssimo of Angola.

5. Further to the call contained in the Pact for the Future for countries to consider developing national prevention strategies, on 29 May, the President of São Tomé and Príncipe, Carlos Manuel Vila Nova, introduced his country's conflict prevention strategy for the period 2025–2029 before the Peacebuilding Commission. The strategy is aimed at strengthening democratic governance and further building public confidence in justice and security institutions. On 30 September, the Deputy Minister of Finance and Economic Planning of Chad presented to the Commission her country's national strategy on social cohesion for the period 2024–2029, in which emphasis is placed on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as a key element of conflict prevention.

6. In Angola, on 3 June, the Constitutional Court rejected two legal claims filed by União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), the main opposition party, which sought to challenge a parliamentary resolution appointing the members of the National Electoral Commission. By that resolution, nine seats are allocated to the ruling Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, four to UNITA and one each to three other opposition parties. The Court upheld the resolution, and UNITA has appealed against that decision. The case was still pending in the Constitutional Court. Meanwhile, on 13 August, the National Assembly unanimously approved a new electoral law package that is meant to improve electoral transparency.

7. In Burundi, legislative and municipal elections were held on 5 June. The National Independent Electoral Commission and observers, including from the African Union, ECCAS and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, reported a generally calm process with a high turnout. The media and civil society organizations, however, denounced intimidation and incidents linked to youth militias of the ruling party, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie–Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD). The Government announced that several members of CNDD-FDD had been arrested in connection with those incidents. On 11 June, the National Independent Electoral Commission announced that CNDD-FDD had won more than 96 per cent of the vote and all 100 seats in the National Assembly. CNDD-FDD also secured 1,031, or 98 per cent, of the seats in the municipal councils. The Conference of Catholic Bishops of Burundi noted several serious irregularities in the elections, including reported ballot stuffing, multiple and forced voting and improper handling of material and counts. The President of Burundi, Évariste Ndayishimiye, defended the results and the then Prime Minister, Gervais Ndirakobuca, reaffirmed the country's commitment to multiparty democracy. On 20 June, the Constitutional Court validated the results. On 23 July, Senate elections were held, in which CNDD-FDD won all 10 seats. The 2025 elections marked a major overhaul of the decentralized administration enacted in March 2023, under which the number of provinces was reduced from 18 to 5 and the number of municipalities from 119 to 42. On 5 August, Mr. Ndayishimiye reshuffled the Cabinet and appointed Nestor Ntahontuye as Prime Minister. The new Cabinet is composed of 13 ministers, including four women, whereas the previous Cabinet had been composed of 15 ministers.

8. Heightened tensions characterized the political environment in Cameroon in the period preceding the presidential election. The Minister of State and Minister of Tourism and Leisure, Bello Bouba Maigari, and the Minister of Employment and Vocational Training, Issa Tchiroma Bakary, both resigned from the Government and announced their respective presidential candidacies in June. Subsequently, the

political activities of Mr. Tchiroma were restricted by the Government and he was prevented from travelling abroad on 31 July. On 13 July, the President, Paul Biya, confirmed that he would seek re-election.

9. On 8 and 9 June, Maurice Kamto, the leader of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement opposition party, was prevented from convening meetings in Douala, with security forces surrounding his residence and the party headquarters. The Government cited a lack of official authorization as the reason why Mr. Kamto was prevented from holding meetings. Given that the Cameroon Renaissance Movement had boycotted previous local elections, it had no seats in the National Assembly and therefore was not entitled to nominate a presidential candidate pursuant to the electoral code. To circumvent this constraint, Mr. Kamto declared his candidacy under an allied party, the African Movement for New Independence and Democracy, after which he resigned from the Cameroon Renaissance Movement on 18 July. A rival faction within African Movement for New Independence and Democracy, however, also submitted a presidential nomination. Citing this “multiple nomination” conflict, the national electoral body, Elections Cameroon, rejected Mr. Kamto’s candidacy on 26 July. On 5 August, a final list of 12 candidates, including the incumbent President, Mr. Biya, was approved to contest the election. On 13 September, a faction of the opposition designated Mr. Tchiroma as its consensus candidate, a move that was contested by other opposition leaders. On 26 September, Mr. Kamto called on supporters of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement to freely choose among opposition candidates. On 28 September, Elections Cameroon published the approved lists of candidates for the 30 November regional council elections.

10. On 12 October, Cameroon held its presidential election. While the vote was generally calm, serious disturbances occurred in the city of Garoua, North Region, involving supporters of Mr. Tchiroma and State security forces. Calm was partially restored, but security forces remained deployed in all major urban centres. On 20 October, the provisional results of the presidential election were made public, placing the President, Mr. Biya, in the lead followed by Mr. Tchiroma. On 21 October, demonstrations occurred in the cities of Garoua, Yaoundé and Douala. Clashes between protesters and security forces in Garoua resulted in one fatality, while police used tear gas to disperse crowds in Yaoundé and Douala. On 22 October, Mr. Tchiroma rejected the provisional figures, claimed that he had won the vote and called for protests against what he asserted to be potentially fraudulent results. On 27 October, the Constitutional Council announced the official results of the presidential election, crediting Mr. Biya with 53.66 per cent of votes and Mr. Tchiroma with 35.19 per cent. The latter accused the Council of “institutional fraud” and announced a campaign of “resistance until truth prevails”. On 26 and 27 October, demonstrations and confrontations between opposition supporters and security forces were reported in a number of locations across the country, resulting in 16 fatalities and the detention of almost 830 people, according to the Government. Civil society organizations reported between 39 and 48 fatalities and almost 2,000 arrests.

11. Mr. Tchiroma call for a three-day “ghost town” campaign throughout Cameroon from 3 to 5 November received a mixed response. On 6 November, Mr. Biya addressed the nation on the occasion of his inauguration for an eighth term; he acknowledged the “depth of public frustrations” and appealed for a “united front” to face the challenges before Cameroon. He also praised the defence forces, called for community-led disarmament and encouraged international partners to prosecute sponsors of violence. Mr. Biya attributed the recent unrest to “irresponsible politicians” and vowed that order would prevail.

12. On 10 July, in the Central African Republic, the Government organized a ceremony in Bangui to mark the official return of two armed groups, Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation and Union pour la paix en Centrafrique, to the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, pursuant to an agreement signed in N'Djamena on 19 April. The agreement for the groups' return, which was facilitated by the President of Chad, includes provisions for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the disarmament and demobilization of the groups' members at designated sites.

13. The political space in Chad faced significant constrictions with the conviction of Succès Masra, the former Prime Minister and leader of the opposition party, Les Transformateurs, who was arrested in May on charges relating to intercommunal violence in Mandakao on 14 May. During his pretrial detention in June, Mr. Masra went on a seven-day hunger strike. On 9 August, he was found guilty of spreading racist and xenophobic messages and of complicity in murder, among other charges, and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment and a fine of 1 billion CFA francs (approximately \$1.79 million). The Government prevented senior members of Les Transformateurs from travelling abroad and several civil society organizations were dissolved on 26 June. On 18 September, the President of Chad, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, revoked the citizenship of two prominent activists residing in France, accusing them of collaborating with foreign entities.

14. From 21 to 25 July, Mr. Itno presided over a seminar that produced a road map for decentralization that includes harmonization of the legal framework, strengthening of local governance and resource mobilization. On 21 August, the Prime Minister signed a policy letter on demobilization, disarmament and reintegration to guide efforts to disarm and reintegrate former politico-military groups. On 3 October, the Parliament adopted, by 236 votes (out of 257 registered parliamentarians) to none, with 3 abstentions, a constitutional amendment extending the term of office for president from five to seven years and abolishing term limits for the presidency. The amendment, which was promulgated by the President on 8 October, was denounced by some members of the opposition as a measure to perpetuate executive power.

15. In the Tibesti Province of Chad, the Government and the Diffa Al-Watan Popular Committee of Miski signed a peace agreement on 23 September. On 3 October, two other armed groups, the Yorogoi Self-Defence Committee and the Movement for Action for Democracy and Change in Chad, handed over their weapons after signing peace agreements with the Government. These accords contain provisions on the integration of former fighters, amnesty for past acts of conflict and State investment in regional infrastructure.

16. In the Congo, on 6 June, the Government announced the termination of an agreement with Rwanda, signed in April 2022, granting agricultural land to Rwandan companies for 20 years because of the companies' alleged failure to meet contractual obligations. On 30 June, the Government published an order listing 42 recognized political parties. It later stated that parties not on that list would not be included in electoral consultations pending their regularization. The members of parties that are not officially recognized cannot run under the banner of their party until the party has been regularized. Six political parties filed an administrative appeal to restore their status. On 7 August, the Government announced that the next presidential election would be held on 22 March 2026. Eight opposition political parties formed a coalition to pool their resources and present a joint candidate on the ballot. The revision of the electoral list began on 1 September and concluded on 30 October.

17. The Government of the Congo, eight years after signing a ceasefire with the Ninja rebels in the Pool Department, launched the second phase of a demobilization,

disarmament and reintegration programme targeting approximately 20,000 individuals, including 7,500 ex-combatants, 2,500 associates and 10,000 community members. The Government has committed to providing 2 billion CFA francs (approximately \$3.54 million) out of a total projected programme cost of 8.3 billion CFA francs.

18. In Equatorial Guinea, on 4 June, a total of 476 prisoners were pardoned, including 2 South African engineers who had been detained since February 2023 on charges of drug trafficking, as well as 37 individuals who had been arrested following a protest on the island of Annobón in July 2024. In August, main Government operations were moved from Malabo to Bata, in line with efforts to decentralize the administration.

19. In Gabon, in the run-up to the legislative, local and senatorial elections, a new law regulating the creation and operation of political parties was enacted on 27 June. Under the law, parties must have a minimum of 10,000 members in order to obtain legal recognition; have members in all nine provinces of the country; and provide information on their registered members, among other conditions. Existing political parties were given one year to comply with the new law. Ahead of the elections, the President, Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, launched the Union démocratique des bâtisseurs party, while the opposition parties questioned the impartiality of the National Commission for the Organization and Coordination of Elections and the Referendum, led by the Minister of the Interior, owing to the absence of some of their candidates from the official lists. In addition, they called for the postponement of the elections, because they claimed that the conditions for a transparent and inclusive electoral process had not been met, pointing to alleged inconsistencies in the electoral timeline.

20. On 27 September, local elections and the first round of the legislative elections were held in Gabon, followed by a second round of legislative elections on 11 October. Civil society organizations deployed nearly 1,500 observers throughout the country. The African Union and ECCAS sent electoral missions, while the International Organisation of la Francophonie sent an observation mission. According to the Ministry of Interior, the results indicate that the Union démocratique des bâtisseurs secured 101 out of 145 seats in the National Assembly, while the Parti démocratique gabonais won 17 seats. The Union démocratique des bâtisseurs and Parti démocratique gabonais jointly won four additional seats on shared tickets. Eight other parties secured between one to three seats, while independent candidates secured seven seats. Of the newly elected members of Parliament, 30 are women, representing 20 per cent of the body's membership. In the local elections, the Union démocratique des bâtisseurs topped the polls in most municipalities and departments. National electoral observers reported serious irregularities in the first round of the legislative elections, including the absence of ballots for some candidates, leading to tensions, the reported intervention of security forces and the closure of one polling station in Estuaire Province. Subsequently, several political figures voiced concerns over the integrity of the elections process, with some calling for the poll to be cancelled. The Ministry of Interior, after referring the allegations of irregularities to the Constitutional Court, ordered re-runs in three constituencies owing to irregularities, while the Court suspended voting in two others pending its ruling.

21. In the first round of indirect senatorial elections in Gabon on 8 November, the Union démocratique des bâtisseurs won 47 of 70 seats, followed by the Parti démocratique gabonais with 5 seats. Seven other parties each secured either one or two seats, while two independent candidates each won a seat. Mayoral elections on 9 November saw the Union démocratique des bâtisseurs win all 13 major cities,

including Libreville, Port-Gentil and Franceville. A second round of the senatorial elections was held on 22 November.

22. On 10 November, the Special Criminal Court of Gabon opened proceedings against the country's former First Lady, Sylvia Bongo Ondimba, and her son, Noureddin Bongo Valentin, on various charges, including embezzlement, money-laundering and corruption. The pair, who were tried in absentia and without their lawyers, denounced the two-day trial as politically motivated. On 12 November, the Court sentenced them to 20 years in prison, ordered fines totalling more than \$2.1 billion and a payment of \$1.6 million in moral damages, and it issued international arrest warrants. Ten of their former associates were also tried and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 2 to 15 years and fines of up to \$10 million.

23. On 23 July, the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, appointed Justin Nsengiyumva as the new Prime Minister, replacing Édouard Ngirente. The following day, Mr. Kagame announced a new Cabinet, in which women hold approximately 36 per cent of ministerial posts.

24. On 19 August, the Constitutional Court of São Tomé and Príncipe issued a unanimous ruling rejecting, on procedural grounds, the appeal filed by the Office of the Public Prosecutor to have the trial related to the alleged coup d'état of 25 November 2022 moved from a military court to a civil court. The President, Mr. Vila Nova, has emphasized the importance of a swift judicial resolution, while acknowledging the capacity deficits of the military tribunal. On 27 October, Mr. Vila Nova dismissed the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces following the disappearance of files related to the events of 25 November 2022 from the military court. Meanwhile, on 29 August, the National Assembly approved a revision of the National Election Commission Act establishing a permanent electoral commission, which is set to take office in January 2026. On 1 September, Patrice Trovoada, the former Prime Minister, was reinstated as deputy for Lobata in the National Assembly.

### **Security development and trends**

25. In the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon, security incidents continued to result in fatalities and disrupt socioeconomic activities. The military carried out operations to secure educational zones, killing three armed fighters in Kumbo and Ndop, North-West Region, on 17 August. On 5 September, a roadside improvised explosive device detonated near Malende, South-West Region, killing seven soldiers. On 14 September, in Batibo Division, North-West Region, an improvised explosive device, reportedly planted by the members of an armed group, exploded in a bar opposite a police station, killing three civilians and causing life-threatening injuries to four others. On 21 September, an improvised explosive device allegedly planted by separatists in Kumbo killed one soldier and seriously injured two others, while another improvised explosive device attack on a military patrol in Muyuka, South-West Region, resulted in the death four soldiers and injured six others on 1 October. Between July and September, armed groups perpetrated attacks on military positions, killing more than 20 soldiers and injuring 12 others. Separatist groups enforced "ghost town" lockdowns from 8 September to 14 October in order to impede the start of the academic year and disrupt the presidential election, killing some civilians whom they had accused of collaborating with the military and attacking government schools. An attack by separatists in Muea, South-West Region, on 16 September resulted in at least three deaths.

26. In Chad, on 14 June, armed individuals attacked the village of Arronga, Ouaddaï Province, reportedly killing some 12 people. On 19 June, armed herders targeted the village of Oregomel, Mayo-Kebbi Ouest Province, killing at least 19 persons, including 11 children and 6 women, and injuring 17 others. On 13 July, a

confrontation between herders and farmers over land access in Sila Province resulted in at least eight dead and dozens injured, the displacement of hundreds and property damage. In mid-August, fighting between Arab pastoralist groups and sedentary farming communities in Batha Province led to 12 fatalities and more than 20 injured. These incidents are part of a recurring pattern of violence during the rainy season, when transhumance routes intersect with cultivated land. Additional, smaller-scale incidents were reported in Mayo-Kebbi Ouest and Mandoul Provinces involving clashes over cattle theft and water access that resulted in at least seven deaths and numerous persons injured. On 3 September, a dispute between two communities in Salamat Province resulted in five deaths and several injuries. On 4 November, a dispute over access to water wells in Dibebé, Hadjer-Lamis Province, led to at least 33 deaths. On 15 November, a clash in Guskoro, Kanem Province, also over access to water, resulted in 26 injuries.

#### *Boko Haram/Lake Chad basin crisis*

27. In Cameroon, between 1 June and 15 November, 317 Boko Haram-related security incidents resulting in 72 civilian fatalities were confirmed and reported by the United Nations, compared with 365 incidents resulting in 109 civilian fatalities for the same period in 2024. In Chad, also between 1 June and 15 November, 50 Boko Haram-related security incidents resulting in 15 civilian fatalities were confirmed and reported by the United Nations, compared with 70 incidents resulting in 127 civilian fatalities for the same period in 2024.

28. On 20 June, in the Far North Region of Cameroon, militants attacked a security post in Bonderi, resulting in the death of two soldiers and one civilian. Between 14 and 15 August, 11 passengers were abducted from a bus along a critical trade route with Chad. On the night of 17 August, an attack on Djibrili resulted in one civilian fatality and five injuries. On 19 September, an attack claimed by Islamic State West Africa Province on a military base in Banki, Nigeria, forced thousands of civilians to seek refuge in Cameroon.

29. In late October, the Far North Region of Cameroon experienced a resurgence of violence attributed to Boko Haram-affiliated and splinter groups. On 28 October, a member of the elite Rapid Intervention Battalion was killed near the border with Nigeria, during an attack on a military post, prompting a military response and heightened security measures around the camp in Mayo-Moskota. On 31 October, two soldiers from the Multinational Joint Task Force were ambushed and killed on the Dabanga-Kousséri road while returning to their post in Gassama. The attackers retreated towards the border with Nigeria after the assault.

30. On 16 July, in Lac Province, Chad, alleged Boko Haram fighters attacked the islet of Gomirom, killing at least 11 civilians. On 19 August, the Chadian police confirmed the arrest of the youngest son of the founder of Boko Haram, who is suspected of leading a cell affiliated with Islamic State West Africa Province.

#### *Lord's Resistance Army*

31. On 6 November, the International Criminal Court issued a decision confirming all charges brought by the Prosecutor and committing Joseph Kony, the fugitive leader of the Lord's Resistance Army, to trial before a Trial Chamber on 39 charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, allegedly committed in northern Uganda between at least 1 July 2002 and 31 December 2005. The decision marks the first time that the Court has confirmed charges in the absence of a suspect. The trial cannot proceed, however, unless Mr. Kony is physically present before the Court.

*Effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters on regional stability, including farmer-herder dynamics and intercommunal conflict in Central Africa*

32. According to the Climate Application and Forecasting Centre of Central Africa, between June and August 2025, maximum temperatures across Central Africa increased by 0.5°C to 2°C compared with the 1991–2020 average. Above-average rainfall affected 6 of the 11 countries in the subregion over the same period. Those developments heightened the vulnerability of communities by straining agriculture, increasing food insecurity and exacerbating competition over water and land resources. For instance, on 17 August, violent clashes broke out between two communities in Namibe Province, Angola, over access to a water dam amid a prolonged drought. Some 12 to 20 people were killed and thousands displaced.

## **B. Humanitarian developments**

33. The humanitarian situation in Central Africa remained of major concern, driven by armed conflict, intercommunal violence, food insecurity, underdevelopment, governance challenges, weak infrastructure and climate shocks. Deteriorating security conditions increased the needs of affected people and their displacement and also limited humanitarian access. Meanwhile, while funding shortages further constrained assistance.

34. In Angola, a cholera outbreak continued to affect 18 provinces. As at 16 November, the national authorities, with support from the World Health Organization, reported that there had been 34,750 cases, with 877 deaths. The Government, with the support of the United Nations and partners, has been conducting vaccination campaigns and mobilizing resources to support the response.

35. In Burundi, following a needs analysis and response prioritization that the Government, the United Nations and humanitarian partners completed in July, it was determined that 1.1 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance. Of that number, 600,000 are targeted for urgent life-saving aid during the second half of 2025.

36. In Cameroon, epidemics of yellow fever, measles and polio compounded a food security crisis, with 2.6 million people projected to face severe acute food insecurity. As at 31 October, Cameroon hosted approximately 407,508 refugees and 17,508 asylum-seekers. In addition, there were some 845,000 internally displaced people overall, of whom some 334,100 were in the North-West and South-West Regions. Humanitarian access was further constrained by recurrent security incidents, floods in the Far North Region and lockdowns imposed by non-State armed groups in the North-West and South-West Regions, while the humanitarian response capacity remained critically underfunded. As at 17 November, the 2025 humanitarian response plan was 21.3 per cent funded, with \$76.5 million out of the \$359.3 million required having been received.

37. Chad remained one of the largest refugee-hosting countries in the world, with more than 1.4 million refugees, including 1.3 million from the Sudan and around 330,000 Chadian returnees. Since the onset of the conflict in the Sudan in 2023, more than 890,000 refugees and asylum-seekers had arrived in Chad as at 31 October. Overcrowded camps in the east were straining natural resources and essential services, increasing risks of malnutrition, disease outbreaks and protection concerns. Food insecurity remained severe, with 3.8 million people projected to face crisis levels during the June to August 2025 lean season and around 7 million expected to require humanitarian assistance throughout the year. Chad was also affected by cholera, with more than 2,890 cases and 164 deaths recorded as at 5 November. The

2025 humanitarian response plan for Chad had received \$374.4 million, or about 25.7 per cent of total requirements, as at 18 November, while the Sudan Emergency Regional Refugee Response Plan, which includes Chad, had only received \$94.9 million, or 15.5 per cent, of the required \$611.8 million.

#### *Lake Chad basin crisis*

38. The Lac Province in Chad was hosting around 225,000 internally displaced persons as at 31 October and 21,573 refugees and asylum-seekers as at 30 August. In the Far North Region of Cameroon, as at 31 October, there were some 510,855 internally displaced persons, 125,340 refugees and asylum-seekers and 296,395 returnees.

### **C. Human rights trends**

39. In Angola, during demonstrations in Luanda on 12 July against a government decree that increased the price of fuel, law enforcement officials allegedly used tear gas, rubber bullets and batons without warning. Their actions allegedly resulted in several injuries, while 17 protesters were reportedly arrested arbitrarily. Civil society actors noted that the protest had received official authorization and raised concern over the use of disproportionate measures, despite compliance with legal requirements. On 28 July, the first day of a three-day strike organized by the National Association of Taxi Drivers, some demonstrators in Luanda reportedly resorted to violence, with incidents of looting and barricades prompting a forceful police intervention. According to the Government, at least 30 people were killed and 277 injured, including 110 police officers, and more than 1,200 were arrested. In a press release issued on 31 July, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) voiced concern about allegations of the excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators and urged the authorities to ensure accountability while safeguarding the rights to life, freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association. On 1 August, the President, João Lourenço, expressed his condolences to the families of the victims, acknowledged the social grievances underlying the unrest, condemned acts of vandalism and looting and commended the police for their response.

40. On 1 September, several special procedure mandate holders expressed concern at the increase in serious human rights violations in Burundi, including attacks against civil society and political opponents, and elections violence. On 23 September, the Senate of Burundi deferred consideration of proposed amendments to the enabling law on the Independent National Human Rights Commission and adopted a revised timetable in order to allow further review of the law. The Senate took its decision after receiving advice from the Commission and other actors, which had pointed out that there were inconsistencies between the amendments, on the one hand, and international standards enshrined in the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles) and best practices, on the other. On 7 October, the Human Rights Council extended by one year the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burundi and urged the Government to cooperate fully with him.

41. In Cameroon, on 18 June, civil society organizations and the Cameroon Bar Association issued a joint statement condemning the rise of hate speech, misinformation and disinformation ahead of the presidential election. In August, civil society organizations and media sources reported arbitrary arrests of opposition supporters and bans on political gatherings, including the arrest of at least 53 individuals in Yaoundé, who were later released, and the obstruction of meetings of a

political party in Adamaoua and East Regions. On 2 September, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights warned that increasing restrictions on civic and democratic space risked undermining the credibility of the polls. The High Commissioner urged the authorities to ensure an environment that is conducive to a free, transparent, inclusive and genuine election and to address rising hate speech, disinformation and incitement to violence. On 22 September, the Cameroon Human Rights Commission expressed grave concern about the dissemination of inflammatory rhetoric and hate speech on online platforms. According to OHCHR, several people were killed, injured or arrested during nationwide post-electoral protests before and after the announcement of the presidential election results on 27 October. The authorities confirmed that 4 people were killed and 105 were arrested on 26 October in Douala alone.

42. In the North-West and South-West Regions of Cameroon, armed separatist groups reportedly continued to commit human rights abuses, including unlawful killings, attacks on schools and restrictions on freedom of movement. On 16 July, in Ngo-Ketunjia, North-West Region, security and defence forces allegedly arrested seven individuals, including women and two infants, suspected of being relatives of armed separatists. On 19 August, in Bamenda, security forces allegedly killed a taxi driver and a pregnant passenger for failing to stop at a checkpoint. The following day, separatist fighters reportedly set fire to a Catholic primary school in Muyuka, South-West Region. On 23 August, suspected armed separatist groups allegedly attacked the Sonne/Likomba Rubber Estate of the Cameroon Development Corporation in Tiko, South-West Region, killing two people, including a member of the national security forces, and injuring two others.

43. In Chad, on 27 June, the Government suspended two political movements and banned two civil society organizations. On 16 July, the four entities filed a petition before the Supreme Court challenging the decrees. According to one of the entities, the measures violated legal procedures and were linked to their call for the urgent establishment of an independent international commission of inquiry, under the auspices of the United Nations and the African Union, to determine responsibility for killings that occurred during incidents of communal violence in Logone Occidental, Mayo-Kebbi Ouest and Ouaddaï Provinces in May and June.

44. In the Congo, a lawyer was reportedly arrested on 9 July without a warrant. The country's national bar associations denounced the arrest, considering it as tantamount to enforced disappearance. According to reports, he was later charged with conspiracy and attempted breach of state security in connection with an alleged planned insurrection involving former Séléka combatants from the Central African Republic.

45. In Equatorial Guinea, the authorities reportedly initiated legal proceedings against churches that they described as "satanic," raising concerns about restrictions on freedom of religion. On 11 June, the Government stated that those churches violated national law and threatened social harmony. Meanwhile, on 9 October, the European Parliament adopted an emergency resolution in which it denounced the arbitrary detention of two Spanish citizens in Black Beach Prison, in Malabo.

46. In Gabon, the authorities carried out evictions in Libreville and Port-Gentil, citing the need to address illegal occupation of public land, advance urban modernization and strengthen flood control measures. The evictions were reportedly carried out without sufficient resettlement measures or safeguards, leaving many families homeless.

47. In Rwanda, opposition leader Victoire Ingabire was arrested on 19 June on charges of forming a criminal group, inciting unrest and disseminating false information abroad. Ms. Ingabire's detention was reportedly linked to the ongoing

trial of several members of her political unregistered party, who are accused of plotting to destabilize the State. After a court, in July, denied her request for provisional release, citing flight-risk concerns, on 4 August, an intermediate court heard her appeal against being placed in administrative detention and upheld her detention. On 29 September, a court dismissed her request to disqualify the panel of judges presiding over her trial.

48. In São Tomé and Príncipe, the lawyer of the sole civilian convicted of involvement in the events of 25 November 2022 was released on 29 August after spending more than three months in preventive detention, without timely judicial review, following allegations of sexual abuse of a minor. The case raised concerns regarding judicial independence and respect for due process and caused public protests following allegations that the civilian was being mistreated and that the condition of his health had deteriorated. The authorities denied those allegations.

## **D. Socioeconomic trends**

49. The economies of the subregion continued to grow at a modest pace. Inflationary pressures continued to ease. The Bank of Central African States projected an inflation rate of 2.8 per cent for 2025 for the countries of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). That figure is below the 3 per cent threshold established by CEMAC. In Angola, inflation was projected to be around 22 per cent in 2025, although that figure represents a decrease from the 28.2 per cent that was recorded in 2024. In Burundi, inflation was forecast to be around 39 per cent in 2025, up from 20.2 per cent in 2024.

50. The overall fiscal balance in 2025 was expected to remain in deficit in most countries, except for the Congo and São Tomé and Príncipe. The Bank of Central African States warned of reduced external reserves as export receipts from oil plateau, while total imports remain high. The subregion continued to be exposed to debt vulnerabilities, with several countries in debt stress or at high risk of distress.

51. Those constraints have compounded fiscal and social pressures. Reductions in government subsidies, including for fuel, remained a sensitive issue. Equatorial Guinea continued to phase out fuel subsidies in order to strengthen fiscal sustainability. Structural bottlenecks in infrastructure continued to impede economic growth and poverty reduction. Four out of five provinces in Burundi had five-day power outages in August, disrupting essential services. In São Tomé and Príncipe, nationwide energy rationing led to serious power outages across the country after the contract of an electricity production company was suspended on 19 August.

52. High global borrowing costs and declining official development assistance continued to constrain access to affordable financing, with debt service obligations accounting for large shares of some national budgets. In Burundi, pursuant to the Finance Law promulgated on 24 June, about 21 per cent of the 2025/26 budget is allocated to domestic and external debt service. Meanwhile, in August, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund approved a 48-month arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility in the amount of SDR 455.65 million (approximately \$625 million) to support economic reforms in Chad and address the country's protracted balance of payment needs.

### **III. Activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa**

#### **A. Good offices, preventive diplomacy and mediation**

##### **Cameroon**

53. On 24 June, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa participated in a meeting of the steering committee of the United Nations electoral assistance project in Mbankomo. He also participated in a two-day multistakeholder dialogue platform organized by Elections Cameroon and supported by the United Nations. The approximately 120 participants, including representatives from political parties, civil society organizations, religious and traditional authorities, media outlets and government institutions, made several recommendations aimed at enhancing transparency and inclusivity in voter participation and increasing the participation of local peacemakers.

54. On 10 and 11 September, the Special Representative participated in the eighth national consultation organized by Elections Cameroon in Yaoundé, which brought together 700 people representing the Government, political parties, the judiciary, security forces, civil society organizations and religious and traditional leaders. The forum concluded with the adoption of a code of good conduct to guide engagements before, during and after the 12 October election. On 25 October, in response to post-electoral violence, UNOCA issued a communiqué in which it urged all political actors to exercise restraint, uphold respect for human rights and maintain a peaceful climate. The Special Representative, in consultation with the resident coordinator in Cameroon and the Subregional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa, engaged with national and regional stakeholders to identify pathways for dialogue and the peaceful settlement of grievances.

##### **Gabon**

55. Ahead of the local and legislative elections, the Special Representative met with the President, Mr. Oligui Nguema, government officials, representatives of the opposition and civil society. Authorities highlighted their commitment to ensuring a peaceful and transparent electoral process. The Special Representative emphasized the importance of the elections to strengthening the trust of Gabonese citizens in their institutions and the political process. Following the elections, the Special Representative sustained his engagement with the authorities and political stakeholders, emphasizing the importance of maintaining political dialogue as the country concludes its political transition.

#### **B. Enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation**

##### **Collaboration with regional, subregional and intergovernmental organizations, including support provided to Economic Community of Central African States**

56. The Special Representative participated in the twenty-sixth ordinary and seventh extraordinary sessions of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECCAS. Consultations have commenced between the President of the ECCAS Commission and the Special Representative on enhanced collaboration.

### **Partnerships with civil society and support to civil society networks**

57. In July and August, UNOCA, in collaboration with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, provided technical advice to the mentoring programme for women's political participation and representation of the Challenge démocratie au féminin initiative in Gabon. The mentoring programme was aimed at parliamentarians and women leaders from the government, civil society organizations, private sector and rural areas.

58. On 12 August, to mark International Youth Day, UNOCA and ECCAS organized a virtual conference for regional dialogue among young people from Central Africa, institutional actors and international partners on integrating the principles of the youth and peace and security agenda into local actions that directly contribute to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

## **C. Support to the United Nations, regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security**

### **Lake Chad basin crisis**

59. UNOCA continued its cooperation with the Lake Chad Basin Commission on the revision of the territorial action plans that will guide the implementation of the revised Regional Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin Region, which the Peace and Security Council of the African Union adopted on 10 June.

### **Climate, peace and security**

60. From 4 to 8 August, UNOCA, the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and the United Nations Office to the African Union conducted a field mission along the coastal region of Gabon as part of a United Nations-led integrated assessment of climate-related risks for peace and security in the Gulf of Guinea region. The findings of the mission made it clear that there is a need for comprehensive approaches that link environmental, economic and security priorities in order to strengthen resilience.

61. On 26 and 27 August, UNOCA participated in a workshop convened by the Gabonese authorities to review the implementation of the second nationally determined contribution of Gabon. UNOCA worked closely with national stakeholders in Gabon to give more importance to integrating the climate-peace-security nexus into future climate commitments.

62. On 8 September, during the second African Climate Summit in Addis Ababa, UNOCA supported a side event on climate, peace and security in the Congo basin that was focused on the effects of climate change on young people and their role as agents of change for peace and sustainability.

63. From 29 September to 13 October, UNOCA conducted a field assessment of climate, peace and security in eastern Chad that included visits to refugee camps and host communities and engaging with local authorities, displaced populations and humanitarian actors. UNOCA emphasized the urgent need for integrated, conflict-sensitive and climate-responsive approaches that bridge humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts.

### **Transhumance and farmer-herder conflicts**

64. From 24 to 26 September, UNOCA, ECCAS, the Congo Basin Forest Partnership and the Community of Practice on Farmer-Herder Dynamics co-organized

a regional colloquium in N'Djamena on transhumance, protected areas and sustainable pastoralism in Central Africa. More than 50 participants renewed their commitments to cross-border mobility, inclusive mediation and integrating climate security into pastoral policies.

#### **D. Enhancing United Nations coherence and coordination in the subregion**

65. On 30 October, UNOCA and UNOWAS conducted a review of their 2025 joint activities and reaffirmed their focus on climate security, transhumance, maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and violent extremism.

### **IV. Observations and recommendations**

66. As the countries of Central Africa continue on their path towards sustainable peace and development, I am deeply concerned by the increasing restrictions that are being imposed on civil and political rights. Pluralism, respect for fundamental freedoms and credible democratic processes are essential for sustaining peace. All political parties should be able to operate and contribute to public debate in accordance with the law. I welcome the steps taken towards further decentralization in the interest of inclusive local governance. This presents an opportunity to enhance the representation of women and youth, as well as to include their perspectives are considered in the design, delivery and evaluation of public policies.

67. I remain deeply concerned at the impact of the conflicts in the Sudan and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo on the stability of the Central Africa subregion. I am particularly concerned that the continued influx of Sudanese refugees is increasingly straining social cohesion and national resources in Chad. It is essential that the international community increase its support to Chad, with a view to helping it respond to those challenges.

68. I remain convinced that strong subregional organizations are key to regional stability and the multilateral system. In that regard, I encourage all ECCAS member States to contribute to efforts to mend internal tensions, with a view to enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation. I congratulate Mr. Nibigira on his appointment as President of the ECCAS Commission, and I reiterate the commitment of UNOCA and the entire United Nations system to support the ECCAS Commission in advancing our joint priorities for the subregion.

69. Cameroon continues to face multidimensional challenges. I deplore the loss of life during recent electoral-related violence and am deeply concerned by reports of excessive use of force during demonstrations. I call for a thorough and impartial investigation into these incidents and for due process guarantees to be fully respected. I urge on political leaders and their supporters to exercise restraint and prioritize inclusive dialogue, in order to bring about a peaceful and credible conclusion to electoral processes. The aspirations of the Cameroonian people for sustainable peace, development and democracy can only be fulfilled if durable solutions are found to political divisions and security challenges across the country.

70. I welcome the latest steps taken towards the conclusion of the transition in Gabon with the holding of local, legislative and senatorial elections. The people of Gabon have placed high expectations on their new institutions. I encourage the newly elected authorities to exercise their mandate with the highest transparency, in line with their dedication to public service. I wish to stress the importance of sustained dialogue among all political actors within and outside the institutional framework.

The challenges and shortcomings in the local and legislative elections highlight the need for continued attention to electoral reform and capacity-building in order to safeguard the integrity of future electoral processes and strengthen public trust. The implementation of governance, institutional and economic reforms will require sustained support. I reiterate the continued readiness of the United Nations to supporting Gabon and encourage the international community to sustain its engagement beyond the transition.

71. I am concerned by the rising levels of intercommunal violence in Chad and the additional risks that it poses to a country already confronting the activities of armed groups, the long-term effects of natural disasters and the challenges of hosting one of the largest number of refugees in the world. I encourage the Government of Chad to work towards broadening political and civic space, safeguarding human rights, fostering inclusivity and ensuring that institutions are accountable. I call on all Member States to support Chad in strengthening its national peace architecture and welcome the mobilization of international partners and private sector actors in support of its national development plan.

72. I remain deeply concerned at the worsening humanitarian situation in Central Africa, where conflict, displacement and climate shocks continue to cause immense human suffering. Widespread food insecurity, recurrent disease outbreaks and severe resource constraints are overwhelming already fragile systems, while insecurity and funding gaps hinder the timely delivery of life-saving assistance. There is an urgent need for stronger international solidarity, predictable financing and coordinated action to prevent further deterioration and to safeguard the protection and dignity of affected populations.

73. Civilians continue to bear the brunt of terrorist attacks across the subregion, with mass killings, kidnappings and raids on villages. Such unacceptable violence is occurring amid global funding shortfalls and shrinking humanitarian budgets. I call on the international community to continue supporting the States of Central Africa in effectively addressing terrorism and its root causes.

74. The countries of Central Africa have made significant progress in the implementation of Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#). I welcome efforts to further increase the representation of women in decision-making positions.

75. I express my appreciation to the Governments of the subregion, the African Union, ECCAS, CEMAC, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Gulf of Guinea Commission and other regional and subregional institutions for their continued collaboration with UNOCA. I remain grateful to Gabon for its hospitality towards and support for UNOCA.

76. Lastly, I would like to thank my Special Representative, Abdou Abarry, and the staff of UNOCA for their continuing commitment to and support for regional efforts to advance the cause of peace and security in Central Africa.