



LIVE OFF THE LAND AND DIE

FOR IT

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CONFLICTS BETWEEN HERDERS AND FARMERS IN CHAD

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First published in 2020

by Amnesty International Ltd

Peter Benenson House, 1 Easton Street

London WC1X 0DW, UK

Index: AFR 20/0288/2025

Original language: French

amnesty.org



Cover photo: A farmer walks among his herd of livestock on the road between Adre and Farchana, in the region of Ouaddaï, Chad, on March 25, 2019. In Adre, a city in eastern Chad, the district chief medical officer often receives people wounded by gun shots in hospital. These people are mostly the victims of the hidden conflict between farmers in the region and nomadic herders from the north, most of them Zaghawa, an ethnic group of the Chadian president. In the Ouaddaï, a transhumance zone and strategic province of Chad on the border with Sudan, populated by various ethnic groups, this violence has taken a community turn that divide as much as it worry.

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GLOSSARY

TERM	DEFINITION
ACRA	Association for Rural Cooperation in Africa and Latin America
AFD	Agence française de développement [French Development Agency]
ARED	Association pour la Réinsertion des Enfants et la Défense des Droits Humains [Association for the Reintegration of Children and the Defence of Human Rights]
AFDB	African Development Bank
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
CAMOL	Collectif des associations des Monts de Lam [Mont de Lam Associations Collective]
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CNDH	Commission Nationale de Droits de l'Homme [National Human Rights Commission]
CRASH	Centre de Recherches en Anthropologie et Sciences Humaines [Anthropology and Human Sciences Research Centre]
FIACAT	Fédération des Associations Chrétiennes pour l'Abolition de la Torture [Federation of Christian Associations for the Abolition of Torture]
INSEED	Institut National de la Statistique, des Etudes Economiques et de la Démographie [National Institute of Statistics, Economic Studies and Demography]
LTDH	Ligue tchadienne des droits de l'Homme [Chadian League for Human Rights]
PARJUST	Programme d'Appui à la Réforme de la Justice [Justice Reform Support Programme]
PIRPT	Projet Infrastructures Rurales, Pastorales et de Transhumance [Rural, Pastoral and Transhumance Infrastructure Project]
PSJ	Politique sectorielle de la justice [Justice Sector Policy]

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“I didn't think I'd survive. I was with my husband and others in the house when the attackers opened fire. After that, they set fire to the house.”

Victim of an attack in Bedoli 2, Logone Oriental

This report is the result of research conducted by Amnesty International between March 2023 and September 2025 into violence between farmers and herders in southern Chad. It analyses the context and causes of conflicts, documents cases of violence between 2022 and 2024 and presents the administrative, security and judicial responses provided by the authorities and the shortcomings in this regard.

The research focused on the provinces of Moyen-Chari, Mandoul, Logone Oriental and Logone Occidental, where violent incidents have been particularly frequent and deadly in recent years. Three documentation missions were conducted: from 30 May to 7 June 2023 in N'Djamena; from 5 to 28 July 2023 in Krim-Krim, Goré and Andoum; and from 26 September to 5 October 2024 in N'Djamena and Moundou. A total of 110 people were interviewed, including 70 victims and direct witnesses of violence between farmers and herders. Amnesty International also met with members of civil society, lawyers, and representatives of development organizations, as well as state representatives at national and provincial level. The research was further based on court documents, medical certificates, images, videos, legal texts and other documents. The main conclusions were shared by email with the Chadian authorities on 25 June 2025.

Background to the violence: climate change, population growth, pressure on natural resources and influx of arms

Chad has been the scene of recurrent violence between farmers and herders for several years now, resulting in many deaths, the destruction of homes and property, looting and the displacement of populations.

In the South of the country, this violence is part of a specific context related, in particular, to the effects of climate change, population growth and proximity to the Central African Republic, which is in the grip of an armed conflict. Desertification and the shrinking pastureland in the centre of the country due to ever higher temperatures has led to longer transhumance and increased sedentarization of herders in the southern provinces. Herds have grown in these areas conducive to livestock rearing, leading to the appearance, in recent years, of “neo-herders”, senior officials and military leaders who have become the owners of large herds. Alongside this, southern Chad is facing significant population growth in areas with abundant natural resources. Against this backdrop, and that of climate change, farmers are seeking to diversify their production systems while expanding their cultivated areas to compensate for declining soil fertility, encroaching onto transhumance corridors and limiting herders' access to pastures and water points. This situation weakens the traditional complementarity between herders and farmers and generates recurrent tensions, exacerbated by an influx of arms and the presence of armed groups from the Central African Republic.

Episodes of violence

Amnesty International documented several episodes of violence between 2022 and 2024 (including one that originated in a previous episode of violence in 2019), affecting 14 villages in four provinces. This documented violence between farmers and herders resulted in 98 people dead and more than a hundred injured; the destruction of more than 600 homes, and the theft of hundreds of head of livestock and harvested products.

In Sandana, Moyen-Chari, the same village suffered two attacks in less than three years. On 26 August 2019, a conflict between herders and farmers that allegedly originated because of the intrusion of cattle belonging to herders onto an agricultural plot 5 km from Sandana, degenerated into deadly clashes: seven people were killed, eight injured and more than 140 cattle stolen. On 09 February 2022, a new attack, perpetrated by some of the same protagonists of the 2019 attack, left 13 dead, including a journalist shot dead while covering the incident live on community radio.

In Logone Oriental, attacks in Dogoro, Dangdah, Bendjabo and Mempon on April 2023 by individuals armed with firearms, machetes and bows killed at least a dozen people. While the authorities attributed this violence to “Kodo rebels”, witnesses and victims of these attacks recognized nearby cattle owners and traders among the assailants. A month later, in the villages of Bedoli 2 and Mankate, 19 people were killed, 11 injured, more than 300 homes burned, two churches destroyed and a cultural centre reduced to ashes. The villages of Don and Kamkoutou were also attacked during this period, resulting in 23 deaths and seven injuries.

In November 2022, in the villages of Koutoumare 1 and 2 (Logone Occidental), a conflict broke out when a herd accompanied by herdsman devastated a millet field at peak harvest time. After an initial morning altercation during which a herdsman was injured, the herders returned in the early afternoon with arms and attacked the villagers; the two sides clashed with knives and bows, causing three injuries and some livestock losses.

In Pala Koudja (Dodjé), on 30 August 2024, the repeated grazing of a herd in a potato field triggered an altercation between the offending herder and the farmers. Reinforcements from neighbouring *fericks* intervened; the clash with machetes and knives resulted in three deaths and seven injuries. During the night, unidentified individuals returned and set fire to 53 huts, as confirmed by videos analysed by Amnesty International.

In Mandoul province, a conflict broke out in the village of Bara 2 in May 2023 when a herd of cattle belonging to a sedentary herder living in the *ferick* of Dar Salam 3 km away devastated the field of a farmer. The attack on the village of Bara 2 killed 12 people.

Failures to protect the right to life and the right to justice

Faced with these episodes of deadly violence, this report bears witness to significant failures to protect the right to life and the right to truth, justice and reparation, despite some efforts made by the authorities. In particular, it demonstrates that, despite the diversity of existing conflict prevention and management mechanisms, their lack of coordination, structural ineffectiveness, possible political instrumentalization and lack of impartiality limit their ability to prevent and sustainably resolve conflicts related to natural resources and inter-community coexistence in Chad. The lack of conflict prevention is also revealed in the obsolescence of the texts governing land tenure and transhumance.

Moreover, despite the increase in budget for the Ministry of Public Security since 2022, and increases in the number of security forces and police stations, an analysis of the cases of violence documented in this report reveals that the interventions of the defence and security forces have sometimes been delayed, despite alerts issued by the population and the proximity of some units, located only a few kilometres from the clashes. The Minister of Public Security confirmed to Amnesty International that there had been “delays in responding when villages are attacked”.

The security forces have also been implicated in cases of excessive use of force and illegal use of firearms in conflicts between herders and farmers. Amnesty International documented one case that took place in Krim-Krim (Logone Occidental Province) four days after the clashes between herders and farmers in the villages of Koutoumare 1 and 2 on 18 November 2022. On 22 November, the canton chief and gendarmes from Krim-Krim came to Koutoumare to retrieve the motorcycle that the attackers had left during their escape and arrested the person with whom the motorcycle was parked. Angry, the villagers decided to march to Krim-Krim to demand his release. When the crowd arrived at the gendarmerie, according to the testimony of eye-witnesses, the police fired without warning the demonstrators, using live ammunition. Eight people were killed and 37 injured.

The authorities' response to the influx of weapons in the region has also been insufficient. While the government set up a Joint Disarmament Commission in 2021 (dissolved on 22 July 2024), many witnesses to the various attacks documented in this report stated that they had not received a visit from this commission in their area and claimed that weapons were still circulating freely. According to them, herdsmen are armed by neo-herders, while others have bought their weapons from armed groups in the CAR or from traffickers at the border. According to various observers, the Disarmament Commission did not have the means to carry out large-scale monitoring. It did visit a few villages and retrieve weapons but was unable to carry out excavations throughout the territory.

With regard to the judicial response to violence between herders and farmers, authorities acknowledge the existence of many challenges related to the lack of resources allocated to the judicial institutions, in particular "in the hinterland", which limits their ability to carry out missions.

While several of the cases of violence between herders and farmers studied in this report have been the subject of judicial proceedings, impunity remains a strong marker of these cases, as illustrated by the case of Sandana, for which the Commission of Inquiry set up by the authorities revealed that local authorities and security forces had deliberately prevented the arrest of several individuals wanted by the courts for the attack on the village in 2019 and who were among those launching a new attack on the village in 2022. Although trials were finally held in this case and that of Bara 2, impunity continues for others, despite the occasional arrest of several people after episodes of violence. Furthermore, the Moundou prosecutor did not inform Amnesty International as to whether legal proceedings had been opened into the excessive use of force by security forces against demonstrators in Krim Krim.

As a result, many victims of violence encountered by Amnesty International expressed their lack of confidence in judicial institutions. Victims' lawyers also highlighted the financial costs associated with court proceedings, which are prohibitive for victims who, as a result, may have to prioritize the use of out-of-court arrangements or follow a desire to take justice into their own hands. The structural failure to address this violence risks fuelling a cycle of impunity and the collapse of trust in the institutions. In the long term, the failure to guarantee security, justice and reparations is contributing to undermining the rule of law and exposing populations to serious violations of their fundamental rights.

Under regional and international human rights standards, the Chadian state has a duty to ensure the safety of all citizens, investigate crimes committed, bring those responsible to justice, and ensure effective access to redress mechanisms.

Recommendations

In order to stop such conflicts from recurring, structural, sustainable and human rights-based responses are needed. This includes strengthening conflict prevention mechanisms, providing independent and accessible justice, and ensuring better governance of natural resources.

To this end, in this report, Amnesty International recommends that the Chadian authorities:

- Develop a coherent legal framework on transhumance, in consultation with representatives of herding communities, farmers and civil society organizations, that defines the periods, corridors, resting points and rules for the use of natural resources, taking into account climatic and demographic realities.
- Make the implementation of the national climate change adaptation plan a government priority, especially with regard to the impacts of climate on the agriculture and livestock sectors.
- Revive joint committees composed of herders, farmers, local authorities and state representatives in order to prevent conflicts and locally manage incidents related to the passage of herds.
- Create, as needed, police stations near areas identified as having a high potential for conflict and strengthen existing ones; ensure that these stations are sufficiently staffed, also in terms of communication methods and transport so that they can interact regularly with the surrounding villages, carry out prevention patrols, respond to alerts and reach the scene as quickly as possible in the event of an incident.
- Apply clear guidelines prohibiting the unlawful use of force by security forces during demonstrations or interventions, in accordance with international principles of the use of force and firearms by law enforcement.

- Guarantee the support of security forces for the proper administration of justice and the execution of arrest warrants; sanction security service personnel who obstruct the smooth running of justice.
- Ensure effective, independent and impartial judicial investigations into all cases of violence between farmers and herders; if there is sufficient evidence, prosecute and try those suspected of murder, serious injury, looting/destruction of livestock, houses, fields and other essential livelihood elements through fair trials before competent, independent and impartial courts.
- Ensure that victims of the violence between farmers and herders are able to participate in legal proceedings, by being able to lodge a complaint within or outside any existing proceedings, to be heard by judges, and to benefit from prompt and effective legal aid.
- Take necessary measures to ensure the effective enforcement of court decisions that award damages to victims by levying the costs imposed on victims in order to ensure the enforcement of compensation decisions.
- Ensure effective, independent and impartial judicial investigations into all alleged cases of unlawful use of force by defence and security forces during demonstrations.

The report further invites Chad's international partners to provide financial support to regional programmes aimed at regulating transhumance and reducing conflicts between herders and farmers, to support a review of the legislative and institutional framework in order to strengthen the management of agro-pastoral violence and improve the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, and to support the Chadian authorities in the implementation of climate change adaptation policies, particularly in vulnerable agro-pastoral areas, as well as in the compensation of victims of human rights violations related to these effects.

2. METHODOLOGY

This report, the result of research conducted between March 2023 and March 2025, focuses on conflicts between herders and farmers and the response of the Chadian authorities in terms of human rights protection.

While conflicts between herders and farmers exist in many provinces in the North, Centre and South of the country, Amnesty International's research focused on four southern provinces: Medium Chari, Mandoul, Logone Oriental and Logone Occidental. This choice was guided by the recurrence of episodes of violence in recent years in these provinces but also the ability to access certain places of conflict and victims of human rights violations.

Amnesty International documented seven episodes of violence that took place in 14 villages between 2022 and 2024. One of the cases that occurred in 2022 originated in a previous conflict dating back to 2019, which has also been documented.

To conduct its research, Amnesty International undertook three fact-finding missions to Chad. Amnesty International researchers visited the capital N'Djamena between 30 May and 07 June 2023. A team of consultants visited the sites of Krim-Krim (Logone Occidental Province), Goré and Andoum (Logone Oriental Province) between 05 and 28 July 2023. Amnesty International researchers visited N'Djamena and Moundou (Logone Occidental Province) between 26 September 2024 and 05 October 2024.

During these missions, Amnesty International gathered the testimonies of 70 victims and/or eyewitnesses to conflicts between farmers and herders, including 19 women. Victims and/or witnesses were interviewed in the villages of Krim-Krim, Goré, Andoum and Moundou. Amnesty International conducted one-to-one interviews and group discussions in secure locations to ensure a thorough and diverse gathering of information. A translator/interpreter was requested to facilitate communication during some interviews. Prior to the interviews, Amnesty International briefed the interviewees on the objectives of its research and sought their informed consent for the use of the information gathered in the preparation of this report. For safety reasons, the identity of the victims and eyewitnesses has not been disclosed in this report.

Amnesty International also conducted interviews with representatives of human rights NGOs and representatives of associations involved in the resolution of agro-pastoral conflicts or of those intervening in the areas concerned. The organization also met with lawyers representing victims in several cases of conflicts between farmers and herders.

Amnesty International further met with several authorities, including the Minister of Public Security and Immigration, the Minister of Justice, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice, their Human Rights Adviser, the Governor of Logone Occidental and the former President of the National Human Rights Commission.

In all, Amnesty International interviewed 110 people, including 21 women. This under-representation of women is due, in part, by their limited presence among state representatives and justice actors. Amnesty International was able to collect several testimonies from women victims of violence but social constraints limited their number.

In addition, the research was informed by an analysis of national legislation, the international framework for the protection of human rights, decisions of United Nations human rights bodies, judicial decisions taken by Chadian courts, judicial complaints from victims, medical certificates and death certificates, several dozen videos and photographs, articles from national and international media, official statements, and research documents produced by NGOs, anthropologists, climatologists, conflict analysts and sociologists.

The findings of the report were shared on 25 June 2025 with the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights as well as the Ministry of Security and Immigration by email in order to gather their comments and observations. Amnesty International has not received a response.

3. BACKGROUND TO AND CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH

“Before there were real herders, they lived alongside the farmers and maintained commercial and practical relations. Now, it is the representatives of the decentralized state who have become herders.”

Former President of the Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme, 31 May 2023.

Inter/intra-community conflicts affect almost all provinces of Chad. For example, several community clashes were documented in the East and North of the country between 2016 and 2019, particularly in the provinces of Sila, Borkou and Ouaddai, where at least a hundred people were reportedly killed and thousands more displaced.¹

These conflicts, which generally begin with incidents such as the trampling of a field by livestock or a bushfire, have been particularly violent because of the arming of the different communities that have clashed and the mobilization of community leaders in positions of political responsibility.²

According to the “Association de Coopération Rurale en Afrique et en Amérique latine” (ACRA), in 2021, 11 violent events took place in Ouaddai, in the North of the country, linked to non-compliance with transhumance corridors or disputes over water points.³ In Borkou, several incidents took place within the same communities, their sources lying in disputes related to the exploitation of natural resources but also the practice of illegal gold panning or even the Libyan crisis.⁴

According to a report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in 2022, a review of community tensions in Chad showed an upward trend, with more than 528 deaths as of 09 October 2022

¹ ICG, *Eviter la reprise des violences communautaires à l'Est du Tchad*, 30 December 2019, available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/central-africa/chad/284-eviter-la-reprise-des-violences-communautaires-lest-du-tchad>

² ICG, *Eviter la reprise des violences communautaires à l'Est du Tchad*, December 30, 2019 (op.cit) p. 6.

³ ACRA, *Analyse des causes et dynamiques des conflits sociaux dans les provinces de N'Djaména, Lac, Ouaddaï, Kanem, Moyen-Chari et Borkou*, July 2022, available at https://www.acra.it/images/allegati/cosa_allegati/paesiciad/RapportFinal_ACRA_CRASH.pdf p. 29.

⁴ ACRA, *Analyse des causes et dynamiques des conflits sociaux dans les provinces de N'Djaména, Lac, Ouaddaï, Kanem, Moyen-Chari et Borkou*, July 2022 (op. cit) p. 35.

compared to more than 400 in 2021⁵. Between 2021 and 2024, conflicts between farmers and herders reached an alarming level, with more than 1,000 dead and more than 2,000 injured.⁶ In the second half of 2024, the United Nations documented 28 cases of conflict, 50% of which were conflicts between farmers and herders. 82% of the incidents were recorded in the southern regions of the country.⁷

Since the early 2000s, southern Chad has seen a resurgence of conflicts between sedentary farmers and transhumant or sedentary herders due to a specific context. The increase in violence in the southern provinces is linked to several factors such as demographic pressure, the scarcity of natural resources and the effects of climate change. The expansion of agricultural land encroaches onto transhumance corridors, limiting herders' access to pastures and water points, and generating recurrent tensions. These tensions in the South of the country can also be explained by the region's proximity to the Central African Republic (CAR), which has been plagued by persistent unrest since 2013, favouring an influx of armed groups and displaced populations, which only increases tensions over local resources.⁸

3.1 AN AGE-OLD COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN HERDERS AND FARMERS

The Chadian economy is largely based on the agro-pastoral sector (54% of GDP in 2021),⁹ including food agriculture, cotton and sugar cane crops and harvesting and livestock. Agriculture supports the livelihoods of approximately 88% of households in Chad.¹⁰ Livestock farming accounts for 18% of GDP and 40% of exports with the sale of live livestock.¹¹

Agriculture and livestock are the main economic activities in rural areas (occupying more than 85% of the rural population) and employ two-thirds of the country's working population, more than half of whom are women.¹² These economic activities are fragile because they are subject to climatic hazards and dependent on access to natural resources such as land and water, in a country where 43.2% of the population lives below the poverty line (52.5% of them living in rural areas).¹³

In the northern Saharan zone, which covers 47% of the territory, rainfall is less than 100 mm/year. Only oasis farming and camel and small ruminant breeding can be practised here.¹⁴ In the Sahelian zone located in the centre of the country (43% of the national territory), rainfall is between 100 and 800 mm/year.¹⁵ The northern part of this arid zone has a pastoral vocation for seasonal transhumance. In the southern part of this area, semi-arid, rainfall allows for the practice of mainly sedentary to semi-transhumant agri-livestock.¹⁶

⁵ OCHA, Tchad: *des affrontements intercommunautaires ont fait plus de 500 morts depuis le début de l'année*, 16 November 2022, <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2022/11/1129902#:~:text=Les%20affrontements%20intercommunautaires%20au%20Tchad%20aurait%20fait%20from,reporting%20une%20%C3%A9g%C3%A8re%20hausse%20par%20rapport%20%C3%A0%202021.>

⁶ ICG, Tchad: *Rompre le cycle des violences agropastorales*, 23 August 2024, available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2024-09/b199-tchad-cycle-des-violences-agropastorales.pdf>

⁷ OCHA, Tchad: *Aperçu des conflits inter/intracommunautaires*, February 2025, available at <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/chad/tchad-aperçu-des-conflits-interintracommunautaires-fevrier-2025>

⁸ OCHA, Tchad: *Aperçu des conflits inter/intracommunautaires*, February 2025 (op.cit.)

⁹ World Bank, *Database*, <https://www.ifc.org/fr/pressroom/2023/27474> (Accessed 17 February 2025)

¹⁰ World Bank, *Exploiter les chaînes de valeur de l'agriculture et de l'élevage pour favoriser la diversification économique et accroître le potentiel de croissance*, April

2022, <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099445005122233504/pdf/P1772540836abe0280be250b3df579c214c.pdf>

¹¹ FAO, *le pays en un coup d'œil*, <https://www.fao.org/tchad/notre-bureau/le-pays-en-un-coup-doeil/en/>

¹² HCHR, *Le droit à l'alimentation et les conflits éleveurs, agriculteurs au Tchad*, January 2023,


<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/sdgs/19052023-Rapport-Etude-Droit-alimentation-et-Conflits-Agriculteurs-Eleveurs.pdf>

¹³ Institut National de la Statistique, des Etudes Economiques et Démographiques, *Quatrième Enquête sur les Conditions de vie des ménages et la Pauvreté au Tchad*, 10 September 2020, <https://anad.inseed.td/index.php/catalog/18>

¹⁴ Report of the Institut de Recherches et d'Applications des Méthodes de développement (IRAM) : *Adaptation aux changements climatiques et renforcement de la résilience au Tchad*, September 2019 available at <https://www.iram-fr.org/ouverturepdf.php?file=braced-etude-resilience-et-adaptation-tchad-rapport-1570461350.pdf>, pp.14-17.

¹⁵ According to the Institut du Sahel, good rainfall for the Sahel is between 300 and 750 mm per year, with adequate rainfall distribution during the agricultural season.

¹⁶ IRAM : *Adaptation aux changements climatiques et renforcement de la résilience au Tchad*, September 2019 (op.cit.).



© → Climate zone mapping in Chad © TONLEU and BOUIKOUUM 2017

In the Sudanese zone (southern Chad), which covers 10% of the national territory, agriculture has long been the priority activity. With a tropical climate and an annual rainfall varying between 800 mm and 1,200 mm¹⁷, the population grows cotton, oilseeds, vegetables, cereals (millet, sorghum, rice), and tubers (cassava, sweet potato, yam, taro).

Sedentary livestock farming was previously rarely present in the Sudanese area due to the presence of dangerous insects¹⁸ such as the tsetse fly. In contrast, this area, crossed by the Logone River and its tributaries, has long been a pastureland that attracts transhumant herders from the Sahelian zone or the CAR. Herders use the transhumance corridors to bring their livestock to the grasslands after the harvest season and they leave in June, at the very beginning of the rainy season, during the sowing season.

This transhumance has long been encouraged by the low population density in this host zone, where much land remained unused by farmers. It also responded to a mutual interest. Farmers took advantage of the organic manure produced by animals for the fertilization of cultivable land¹⁹ and a food supply of milk, butter and meat. Herders benefit from grazing areas, crop residues such as fodder for livestock, access to agricultural markets for the supply of cereals and other foodstuffs and a market for the produce of their animals, including travelling to reach the border markets of the neighbouring Central African Republic and Cameroon. Complementarity therefore resulted in exchanges of products and services.

However, this traditional complementarity has been weakened by two developments: the increase in population density in agricultural areas, which reduces the area of land available for grazing, and the gradual sedentarization of certain livestock populations, partly due to climate change. These developments are changing the traditional dynamics of exchange and generating tensions.²⁰

¹⁷ IRAM : *Adaptation aux changements climatiques et renforcement de la résilience au Tchad*, September 2019 (op.cit.)

¹⁸ Claude Arditi, *Paysans Sara et éleveurs arabes dans le sud du Tchad*, 1999, available at https://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/pleins_textes_7/divers2/010020161.pdf, page 9.

¹⁹ A.B Kaou, *Rapport de synthèse sur les systèmes agriculture—élevage au Tchad*, copy with Amnesty International.

²⁰ ICG, *Tchad: rompre le cycle des violences agropastorales*, August 2024, available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/central-africa/chad/b199-tchad-rompre-le-cycle-des-violences-agropastorales>

3.2 CLIMATE CHANGE AND COMPETITION FOR ACCESS TO NATURAL RESOURCES

The coexistence between farmers and herders has gradually become more complex as the amount of available spaces decreases and as the competition to access natural resources increases. This evolution is the result of multiple interconnected factors, including climate change, security challenges, economic changes and increasing demographic pressure.²¹

According to an estimate from the Ministry of Livestock in 2016, Chad's herd numbered some 94 million head of livestock at that time. In 2021, the herd was estimated at more than 137 million head, according to updated data from the General Livestock Census Bureau.²² In 2023, the Ministry of Livestock indicated that the Chadian livestock population now numbered more than 140 million head of cattle.²³ These figures illustrate the notable growth in the herd in Chad in recent years.

The proportion of the national herd in the Sudanese zone is likely to have increased from less than 10% in 1965 to more than 25% in 2006.²⁴ According to the Ministry of Livestock in 2016, the Sudanese zone constantly contains 20% of the cattle population and 36% of the small ruminant population.²⁵ Amnesty International's contacts, whether government officials or NGO representatives, have corroborated this observation of a significant increase in livestock numbers in southern Chad in recent decades.

This growth is confirmed by the increasing presence of *fericks*, an Arabic term for “camp” (originally a temporary camp of transhumant herders made up of tents). According to estimates provided by representatives of “communities of understanding” between farmers and herders working on the issue of transhumance corridors, there were five *fericks* in Logone Occidental in 2009 and this number had risen to 47 by 2024.²⁶ According to a member of an NGO working in the southern provinces of the country and interviewed by Amnesty International in N'Djamena, there are no precise data on the number of *fericks* in Chad, as they are supposed to be temporary and not established for the long term. However, in the opinion of all those interviewed by Amnesty International, including the authorities, the strong growth of these camps is a reality, some of which have become permanent.²⁷

The marked increase in the number of herds and camps in the southern areas of Chad is the result of a gradual reconfiguration of traditional livestock areas that began at the end of the 20th century. This dynamic can be explained by several interrelated factors. On the one hand, climatic variations, in particular desertification and the reduced size of the pastureland in Sahelian areas, have forced herders to move to territories more conducive to livestock farming. On the other, growing insecurity in the central region, exacerbated by the presence of armed and criminal groups, has accelerated these movements. Finally, the proximity of urban centres and densely populated areas is an economic factor, offering herders access to markets and better value for their products.²⁸

According to an official of the Centre de Recherches en Anthropologie et Sciences Humaines (CRASH) interviewed by Amnesty International: **“In the 1960s and 70s, there was no livestock farming in the South, due largely to the presence of the Tse-Tse fly. Livestock farming was undertaken in the centre. With climate change and the departure of flies due to the drop in humidity, herders came down into the South. Previously, herders would leave at the start of the rainy season. Now, they stay.”**²⁹

In terms of climate, apart from the significant droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, Chad has faced high variability in rainfall in recent decades. This instability has led to decreased grazing in the arid and semi-arid areas of the Sahel region, directly affecting pastoral systems and forcing herders to adapt their mobility practices. Projections of rainfall variations over 2030, 2050 and 2100 predict little to no change in

²¹ ICG, *Tchad: rompre le cycle des violences agropastorales*, August 2024, (op.cit.).

²² Alwihda Info, *Tchad: un cheptel de plus de 137 millions de têtes de bétail en 2021*, 05 January 2022, available at https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-un-cheptel-de-plus-de-137-millions-de-tetes-de-betail-en-2021_a110227.html

²³ RFI, *Au Tchad, la viande reste chère malgré une forte production*, 20 October 2023, available at <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/afrique-%C3%A9conomie/20231024-au-tchad-la-viande-reste-ch%C3%A8re-malgr%C3%A9-une-forte-production>

²⁴ Koussou MIAN-OUANANG, Guillaume DUTEURTRE, *Le rôle de la zone soudanienne dans le commerce des bovins sur pied en Afrique centrale*, 30 November 2013, available at <https://www.m.ewela.org/JAPS/2013/20.1/1.pdf>, p.3.

²⁵ Conférence épiscopale du Tchad, *Etude sur le phénomène d'accapement des terres dans la zone soudanienne du Tchad*, April 25, 2019, available at http://plateforme-pastorale-tchad.org/classified/2019-03_Rapport_Final_Djinodji.pdf, p. 27.

²⁶ In-person interview with an NGO representative, 30 September 2024, in Moundou.

²⁷ Interviews in May 2023 and September and November 2024 in N'Djamena and Moundou.

²⁸ Conférence épiscopale du Tchad, *Etude sur le phénomène d'accapement des terres dans la zone soudanienne du Tchad*, 25 April 2019, (op.cit.), p. 52.

²⁹ In-person interview with a researcher from CRASH, 02 May 2023 in N'Djamena.

cumulative precipitation in the South of the country.³⁰ In contrast, they anticipate a sharp decline in the Sahelian zone and in the southern part of the Saharan zone. This is estimated at -20% in 2030 and could reach -70% by 2100 compared to the 2000-2009 average.³¹ In the Saharan and Sudanian zones, temperatures are expected to rise by an average of 1.2 °C by 2030, 2.2 °C by 2050 and 4.1 °C by 2100. The Sahelian zone is expected to be the most affected by this increase in temperature.³²



THE CONSEQUENCES OF FOSSIL FUELS ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Global warming, mainly caused by human production and the burning of fossil fuels, is changing the climate, with serious consequences for human rights around the world, especially in low-income countries such as Chad, which have contributed the least to the problem. Chad is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change and has experienced extreme heat and flooding in recent years. It is one of the hottest countries on the planet, and average annual temperatures have risen by more than 0.5 degrees Celsius since the 1990s, nearly double the global average, with a projected rise that is 1.5 times faster than the global average.³³

Although scientific studies into the contribution of climate change to desertification in Chad remain inconclusive, particularly due to the lack of adequate data, there are signs that rainfall variability has increased in recent years, likely due to climate change. Climate-related damage was estimated at 12% of GDP in 2019, according to the World Bank, and annual losses could exceed 10% of GDP by 2050 in a pessimistic dry climate scenario.³⁴

A complete, rapid, equitable and funded phase-out of fossil fuels is of the utmost urgency to avoid the worst effects of climate change, with increased climate financing of low-income countries by the high-income countries most responsible for global emissions, in order to help them reduce their emissions, adapt to climate change and recover from climate-induced loss and damage.

The desertification of the northern and central areas, added to the security situation, has had the effect of forcing some transhumant herders to move to the South earlier in the year, sometimes arriving in agricultural areas at harvest time, and to remain there longer.³⁵ It has also led herders to change their transhumance routes in order to adapt to changes in grazing areas and water points. An NGO official based in Moundou and working in the field confirms this development and says that **“animals are coming down much earlier than previous years. They arrive around November, December and stay until June.”**³⁶

This evolution has also led many herders to settle in the southern areas of Chad, where climatic conditions, including more abundant rainfall, are more favourable. According to several NGO representatives based in Moundou and N'Djamena, many *fericks* have been transformed into permanent homes, with hard-walled constructions that can accommodate several families. These former transhumant pastoralists, now sedentary, are described as agro-herders because they combine livestock farming with the cultivation of plots around their home in order to meet their food needs. Although permanently settled, these herders continue to practise small transhumance, moving seasonally within the southern regions to guarantee the feeding of their livestock.³⁷

³⁰ Iram, *Adaptation au changement climatique et renforcement de la résilience au Tchad*, September 2019 (op.cit.) p.22.

³¹ Iram, *Adaptation au changement climatique et renforcement de la résilience au Tchad*, September 2019, (op.cit.) p.22.

³² Iram, *Adaptation au changement climatique et renforcement de la résilience au Tchad*, September 2019, (op.cit.) p.22.

³³ International Monetary Fund, *Climate Change in Chad: Challenges and Opportunities*, 12 December 2024, available at <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2024/336/article-A002-en.xml>

World Bank, note on the economic situation in Chad in 2023, April 2023 available at <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099070623113065869/pdf/P1792990644eaf0470b3470684d362fd4a3.pdf> p14

³⁵ Conférence épiscopale du Tchad, *Etude sur le phénomène d'accaparement des terres dans la zone soudanienne du Tchad*, 25 April 2019, (op.cit), p. 27.

In-person ³⁶ interview with an NGO official working on agropastoral issues, October 2024 in Moundou.

³⁷ In-person interviews, May 2023, September 2024 and October 2024, in Moundou and N'Djamena.

Several authorities and NGOs met by Amnesty International also highlighted the fact that, in addition to the phenomenon of agro-herders, the category of neo-herders has also been added in recent years. These are senior officials and military leaders who have become the owners of herds, some of which can exceed 1,000 head of cattle, according to local observers.³⁸

These owners entrust their animals to herdsmen whose role is to move the livestock. They receive a salary for this and may be armed and protected by their bosses. Originally, the purpose of arming herdsmen was to ensure their protection from “*zaraguina*”, a term referring to groups of highway bandits.³⁹ The animals of neo-herders are often held in places close to large cities to allow their owners to monitor them.⁴⁰ Finally, it should be noted that sedentary farmers also invest in livestock, mainly oxen teams but also small ruminants.

The livestock of transhumant, sedentary and neo-herders use the transhumance corridors connecting the *fericks*, allowing the passage of animals between cultivation areas and giving access to pastures, water and resting areas.⁴¹

These corridors, established in the 1960s, have become obsolete over time due to a lack of knowledge and popularization. In addition, for many, their routes remain blurred and they are not adapted to climatic variations and the new areas of concentration of herders and crops.⁴²

Climatic factors, the increase in the animal population and the lack of clarity in the marking of certain transhumance corridors, combined with demographic pressures on agricultural land, thus increase the risk of conflicts.

3.3 POPULATION GROWTH AND EXPANSION OF CROPS IN THE SUDANESE ZONE

Year	Total estimated Chadian population
2005	9,786,000
2010	11,227,000
2015	13,700,000
2017	15,000,000
2023	18,280,000
2050	44,000,000

→ Chadian population growth between 2005 and 2050 based on data from the Institut National de la Statistique, des Etudes Economiques et Démographique © Amnesty International

This increase in livestock in the South has taken place alongside an intensification of agricultural land development, a phenomenon linked to climatic variations and population growth. This dynamic has been reinforced by the adoption of cultivation using oxen and the introduction of mechanization.⁴³

³⁸ In-person interviews, May 2023 and September 2024, in Moundou and N'Djamena.

³⁹ In-person interview with a human rights defender, May 2023, in N'Djamena.

⁴⁰ In-person interview with human rights defenders, October 2024, in Moundou.

⁴¹ In-person interview with human rights defenders, October 2024, in Moundou.

⁴² In-person interview with several mediators, October 2024, in Moundou.

⁴³ Iram, *Adaptation au changement climatique et renforcement de la résilience au Tchad*, September 2019, (op.cit.), P.20.

Chad is experiencing population growth estimated at 3.6% per year.⁴⁴ The population has increased from around 3 million at the time of independence in 1960, to more than 15 million in 2018, half of whom live in the Sudanese area, which accounts for 10% of the country's area. The projections of the Institut National de la Statistique, des Etudes Economiques et Démographique (INSEED) predict a population of more than 23 million by 2030 and more than 44 million by 2050.⁴⁵ Settlement has become denser in areas with abundant natural resources. From 30,000 inhabitants in 1964, the city of Moundou in the Province of Logone Occidental) increased to 100,000 inhabitants in 1993, 136,000 in 2009, 187,000 in 2010, 210,400 in 2020 and is expected to reach 259,700 inhabitants in 2025.⁴⁶

In a context of demographic pressure and climate change, farmers are seeking to diversify their production systems while expanding their cultivated areas to compensate for the decline in soil fertility.⁴⁷ This expansion of cultivated land is accompanied by a diversification of types and methods of cultivation, including the modification of the agricultural calendar and tillage practices, the development of irrigation and market gardening, the cultivation of the shallows and banks of rivers, as well as the adoption of short-cycle varieties.⁴⁸

The available areas are often transformed into fields, taken over by plant production, without necessarily taking into account the preservation of the shared use of natural resources or rural areas intended for livestock grazing. This situation exacerbates tensions between herders and farmers for the use of space and access to natural resources.

3.4 THE ISSUE OF LAND AND ACCESS TO IT

At the heart of tensions related to the use of space between herders and farmers is also the question of access to land and ownership. Over the past 20 years, the land in the Sudanese zone has become a hotbed of various actors, including the State through its various administrative subdivisions, multinational and national companies, as well as elites and businessmen. A competition for land is being played out between these different buyers, who are particularly interested in areas close to major roads and waterways, as well as fertile land.⁴⁹

Since 2004, large multinational companies have been set up to exploit oil, mainly in fertile, cultivated or fallow areas in the Doba basin of Logone Oriental. The expansion of urban areas has also gone hand-in-hand with population growth and economic development in the cities, resulting in new land needs.⁵⁰

The agricultural land, including fields and fallow land located around the villages, is also popular with sedentary herders. In addition, spaces close to large cities are sought after by neo-herders, elites and well-known figures for their access to markets and services.⁵¹

The legal basis for the right to property can be found in Law No. 24 of 22 July 1967⁵² governing the regime of land ownership and customary rights. According to the law, land ownership is established through the registration procedure (Article 1). Any unregistered land is deemed vacant and ownerless, unless proof to the contrary is provided (Article 13). This proof may be the result of officially finding some kind of development of the land, which can vary according to the regions and the methods of soil use (Article 14). Recognition of the development of an area of land can only be requested by the producer of the development or by the State (Article 17).

⁴⁴ INSEED, *Population*, <https://www.inseed.td/index.php/component/content/article/101-theme/179-population?Itemid=437> (Accessed 17 February 2025).

⁴⁵ INSEED, *Population*, <https://www.inseed.td/index.php/thematiques/statistique-demographique/population>, (accessed 17 February 2025).

⁴⁶ Model DJEMON and Innocent NANDIGUIM, *Dynamique des périphéries urbaines en Afrique subsaharienne, le cas des sols limitrophes de Moundou (sud-ouest -Tchad)*, November 2022, available at <https://www.scienceisar.com/sites/default/files/article-pdf/IJSAR-1374.pdf>, p. 2.

⁴⁷ Conférence épiscopale du Tchad, *Etude sur le phénomène d'accaparement des terres dans la zone soudanienne du Tchad*, 25 April 2019, (op.cit), p. 27.

⁴⁸ In-person interviews, May 2023, September 2024 and October 2024, in Moundou and N'Djamena.

⁴⁹ In-person interviews, May 2023, September 2024 and October 2024, in Moundou and N'Djamena.

⁵⁰ Conférence épiscopale du Tchad, *Etude sur le phénomène d'accaparement des terres dans la zone soudanienne du Tchad*, 25 April 2019, (op.cit), p. 22.

⁵¹ In-person interview in Moundou and N'Djamena, May 2023, September 2024 and October 2024.

⁵² *Chad, Law No.67-24 of 22 July 1967 on land ownership and customary rights*, available at <https://droit-afrique.com/upload/doc/tchad/Tchad-Loi-1967-24-propriete-fonciere.pdf>

Decree No. 186-PR of 01 August⁵³, 1967, governing the regime of land ownership and customary rights specifies in detail the ways of applying the procedures and conditions for purging customary rights. Article 48 of this decree determines the composition of the commission of observation, which is chaired by the prefect, and has as its members six representatives of the decentralized services of the State and one representative of the rural community, namely the village chief.

Several of the people Amnesty International spoke to noted the existence of practices that would be illegal in terms of land transfers, in particular by canton chiefs or village chiefs who appear to sell land in defiance of customary law, especially to herders in search of space to serve as a habitat and camping area or resting area for animals. They are thus acting for the sake of profit and/or as accessories to the local administrative authorities, themselves owners of livestock.⁵⁴ Some of these traditional leaders are appointed by the local authorities.⁵⁵ Many of them appear to have given up portions of the land within their territorial jurisdiction either for money or free of charge, without consulting their community. According to the former president of the Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme (CNDH): **“Canton chiefs are contributing to land grabbing.”**⁵⁶

Faced with this situation, people are often unaware of the legal texts relating to land management, or the mechanisms for challenging land transfers that are deemed unfair. In addition, the sluggishness of appeal procedures and the associated financial costs frequently discourage the populations concerned from taking such steps.⁵⁷ This reality was confirmed by the head of an NGO based in Moundou that is working on the issue of land grabbing in the Province of Logone Occidental.⁵⁸ Moreover, due to poverty in rural areas and the difficulties encountered to obtain sufficient income from agriculture, land has become a source of income for some farmers in recent years. Landowners, thus, no longer hesitate before selling plots, especially in villages located near urban areas and in regions favourable to livestock.⁵⁹

“The cause of conflict is access to resources: water, land, agriculture. Everything is disputed. There are provocations on both sides [herders and farmers].”⁶⁰

Conflicts that arise between herders and farmers are often caused by disputes related to the acquisition of land (the phenomenon of land grabbing), damage caused by animals in the fields or the obstruction of transhumance corridors, water access routes and grazing areas with crops.

According to the Minister of Public Security and Immigration: **“Transhumance corridors are identified and marked, together with resting areas. But from the Central African border to the 16th parallel, they are not respected by either party. Untethered animals are allowed into the fields. Herders let the animals graze on the crops in bad faith. Farmers, on the other hand, say that the state has taken up too much land to make the corridors. So they encroach onto these spaces to cultivate. There is also the problem of sedentary herders or neo-herders who buy land on which to put their livestock. Sometimes, the purchase is not made according to the rules or is contested, and this leads to conflicts.”**⁶¹

These conflicts, which have been increasing in number in recent years, can degenerate into violence, sometimes fatal, due, specifically, to the failures of traditional conflict resolution processes and the sometimes partisan role of state representatives, the proliferation of weapons, lack of protection for populations by the defence and security forces and impunity.⁶²

⁵³Tchad, Décret 67-186 1967-08-01 PR sur le régime de la propriété foncière et des droits coutumiers, available at https://juriscom.org/Documentation/Tchad/Urbanisme/Decret-67-186-1967-08-01%20PR_regime_propriete_fonciere_droits_coutumiers.pdf

⁵⁴ In-person interview in Moundou and N'Djamena, May 2023, September 2024 and October 2024

⁵⁵ Tchad, *Loi organique portant statuts et attributions des autorités traditionnelles et coutumières*, available at <https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/cha119397.pdf>

⁵⁶ In-person interview with the former president of the CNDH, May 2023, in N'Djamena.

⁵⁷ Care, *Rapport d'étude sur les textes officiels et mécanismes communautaires de gestion de conflits et couloirs de transhumance dans le département de la Nya Pendé*, April 2018, p. 19, (copy with Amnesty International).

⁵⁸ In-person interview with a director of an NGO working on land grabbing, October 2024, in Moundou.

⁵⁹ In-person interview, May 2023, September and October 2024, in Moundou and N'Djamena.

⁶⁰ Interview at the Centre de Recherches en Anthropologie et Sciences Humaines, May 2023, in N'Djamena.


⁶¹ In-person interview with the Minister of Public Security and Immigration, May 2023, in N'Djamena.

⁶² In-person interview in May 2023, then in September and October 2024 in Moundou and in N'Djamena, May 2023.

4. WAVES OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN 2022 AND 2024

In recent years, many episodes of violence have occurred between herders and farmers in the southern provinces of the country. Among these incidents, Amnesty International documented several episodes of violence between 2022 and 2024 (including one that originated in a previous episode of violence in 2019) that affected 14 villages in four provinces (Moyen Chari Province: Sandana village; Logone Oriental Province: Dogoro, Bendjabo, Mempon, Dangdah, Don, Kamkoutou, Mankate, Bedoli villages; Mandoul Province: Bara 2; Logone Occidental Province: village of Koutoumare 1 and 2, Pala Koudja). This documented violence between farmers and herders resulted in 98 people dead and more than a hundred injured; the destruction of more than 600 homes, and the theft of hundreds of head of livestock and harvested products.

Provinces du Tchad



Source: Base map : Datawrapper • Created with Datawrapper



4.1 MOYEN-CHARI

SANDANA VILLAGE

The village of Sandana is located 700 kilometres South of the capital, N'Djamena, on the border with the Central African Republic, in the department of Barh-Kôh, Koumogo canton, Moyen Chari Province. The village is in an area rich in agricultural land and water, and this has gradually made it an area of tension between farmers and herders who are transhumant or settled in *fericks*. Deadly incidents occurred in 2022 that had their origin in a previous bloody event in 2019.

SANDANA (2019)

On 26 August 2019, violent clashes took place between the communities of Sandana and the residents of various *fericks* established around the village. According to the documents of the judicial inquiry consulted by Amnesty International, the clashes began following the intrusion of cattle belonging to herders onto an agricultural plot 5 kms from Sandana. The initial altercation resulted in two stabbings, one of a farmer and one of a herder. Back in their *fericks*, the herders alerted their respective chiefs, who then organized a punitive expedition against the village of Sandana. On foot, on horseback and on motorbike, armed with firearms, machetes and bows, they attacked the village.⁶³

According to the report of the Commission of Inquiry set up by the government,⁶⁴ the account of the victims' lawyers, who Amnesty International met, and the court documents analysed by the organization, two herders initially entered the village armed with guns. They opened fire, killing three pastors, subsequently mutilating them by cutting off their ears.⁶⁵ When the panicked villagers began to flee, other armed herders were waiting for them on the outskirts of the village and continued the attack. In total, according to the Chadian justice system, seven villagers were killed and eight more wounded.⁶⁶ On the side of the attackers, the death toll was two. 142 cattle belonging to the villagers were also reportedly stolen during the incidents. According to the International Organisation for Migration, this conflict caused the displacement of 1,000 people, who sought refuge in the villages of Koumogo and Danamadji 23 km East of Sandana.⁶⁷

A judicial investigation was opened and entrusted to the gendarmerie of Barh-Kôh department. At the same time, the administrative authorities intervened after the events by organizing discussion sessions between the communities.⁶⁸ These efforts led to the signing of a "reconciliation agreement" under the aegis of the governor of Moyen-Chari and a decision to set up a disarmament commission.⁶⁹ Amnesty International has not been able to confirm the effectiveness of establishing this commission.

According to a member of the Sandana victims' lawyers' collective, in a meeting in N'Djamena, the reconciliation also included the payment of sums of money by the assailants to the residents of Sandana as "*dya*",⁷⁰ a proposal that the victims rejected, demanding a judicial process. It was also pointed out that, in any case and despite the uncertainties regarding the reliability of the judicial system, the people of Sandana had decided to take the case to court with the help of lawyers working at the Sarh High Court.⁷¹ In 2022, at the time of the renewed violence in Sandana, this case had not yet been heard.

⁶³ Sarh Court of Appeal, *Criminal Order No. 05/2023*, 04 April 2023, copy with Amnesty International.

⁶⁴ Commission of Inquiry into the Sandana events instituted by Decision No.001/PCMT/PMT/2022, *Rapport d'enquête sur les événements de Sandana*, September 2022, copy obtained by Amnesty International.

⁶⁵ Sarh Court of Appeal, *Criminal Order No. 05/2023*, 04 April 2023, copy with Amnesty International, and In-person interview with victims' lawyers, June 2023 and September 2024, in N'Djamena.

⁶⁶ Sarh Court of Appeal, *Criminal Order No. 05/2023*, 04 April 2023, copy with Amnesty International, and In-person interview with victims' lawyers, June 2023 and September 2024, in N'Djamena.

⁶⁷ Organization for Migration, *Tchad suivi des urgences*, 29 August 2019;

https://dtm.iom.int/dtm_download_track/8283?file=1&type=node&id=6531

⁶⁸ In-person interview, June 2023 and September 2024, in N'Djamena and Moundou

⁶⁹ Alwihda info, Tchad: *un comité de désarmement au Moyen-Chari après le "bain de sang" d'août*, 29 September 2019,

https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-un-comite-de-desarmement-au-Moyen-Chari-apres-le-bain-de-sang-d-août_a77575.html

⁷⁰ This is a reparatory financial compensation that the perpetrator of a homicide, or their family, must pay to the family of the victim or their beneficiaries. Since 2019, the Chadian authorities have tried to regulate or prohibit this practice, which hinders criminal prosecution.

⁷¹ In-person interview with victims' lawyers, June 2023 and September 2024, in N'Djamena.

SANDANA (2022)

Following the violence of 2019, tension remained high in the area. According to the Commission of Inquiry into the events in Sandana, and media and human rights defenders interviewed by Amnesty International, another incident between herders and farmers began on 09 February 2022 at around 12 noon when the lifeless body of the tribal leader of the Arab Missirié community, who played a role in the 2019 killings and resided in a *ferick* located 7 kms East of Sandana, was discovered by two residents of that *ferick*. They notified the gendarmerie who intervened to make an initial report.⁷² News of this event spread quickly to several *fericks* around Sandana.⁷³

Still according to the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the events in Sandana, as well as testimonies collected from members of civil society, lawyers for the victims and human rights defenders,⁷⁴ several herders, some of whom were still wanted as part of the judicial investigation for the violence committed in Sandana in 2019 but had not been apprehended, then decided to organize⁷⁵ a new attack. According to the same proceedings, an individual suspected by the courts of the death of the three pastors during the killings of August 2019 went to Sandana, to the home of the village chief, where he fired a weapon. The villagers, panicking and trying to flee, were attacked by other herders stationed outside the village. 13 people were killed with knives, machetes, spears or firearms.⁷⁶ Among the⁷⁷ victims was a journalist who was shot several times in the head while reporting the attack live on the Lotiko community radio.

According to the governor of Moyen-Chari, on 09 February 2022, six vehicles from the defence and security forces were deployed in the area.⁷⁸ Government officials travelled to Sandana on 12 February 2022 to meet with victims and pledged to ensure accountability.⁷⁹ The Commission of Inquiry into the events in Sandana was established on 14 February 2022.⁸⁰

In its report published in September 2022, the Commission of Inquiry stated that the impunity of the perpetrators of the August 2019 killings was one of the major causes of the bloody events that took place in February 2022 in Sandana.⁸¹ In addition, the Commission highlighted the establishment of *fericks* around fertile areas and water points, in violation of Law No. 04 of 31 October 1959⁸² governing nomadism in Chad. The commission stated that “**Fericks are occupying fertile areas and water points, stifling the peasant farmers and making it difficult for them to access these areas**”⁸³ and questioned the processes that had led to their establishment.

According to a civil society member who has been working in the area for several years, “**we could have prevented further unrest after 2019 by arresting the main suspects and enabling the progress of justice**”. He denounced the complicity of the local authorities⁸⁴ in allowing the suspects to remain in the area after 2019. He added that, since the 2022 attack, two *fericks* had moved for fear of further clashes.

⁷² Commission of Inquiry into the Sandana events instituted by Decision No.001/PCMT/PMT/2022, *Rapport d'enquête sur les événements de Sandana*, September 2022, copy obtained by Amnesty International.

⁷³ In-person interview in N'Djamena, June 2023 and September 2024.

⁷⁴ In-person interview with a Moundou-based human rights defender in October 2024 and telephone interview with a Sarh civil society member in June 2025.

⁷⁵ Commission of Inquiry into the Sandana Events instituted by Decision No.001/PCMT/PMT/2022, *Rapport d'enquête sur les événements de Sandana*, September 2022, copy obtained by Amnesty International.

⁷⁶ Commission of Inquiry into the Sandana events instituted by Decision No.001/PCMT/PMT/2022, *Rapport d'enquête sur les événements de Sandana*, September 2022, copy obtained by Amnesty International.

⁷⁷ Reporter without borders, *Tchad: un journaliste tué lors d'un massacre dans un village*, 15 February 2022, available at <https://rsf.org/fr/tchad-un-journaliste-tu%C3%A9-lors-d-un-massacre-dans-un-village>

⁷⁸ Alwihda, Tchad: *le gouverneur du Moyen-Chari s'exprime sur le massacre de Sandana*, 19 February 2022,

https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-le-gouverneur-du-Moyen-Chari-s-exprime-sur-le-massacre-de-Sandana_a111457.html

⁷⁹ Minister of Communication, Government Spokesperson, *Press Release, 13 February 2022*, copy with Amnesty International.

⁸⁰ Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, *Decision No.002/PCMT/MATD/PMC/SG/2022*, 14 February 2022, copy with Amnesty International.

⁸¹ Commission of Inquiry into the Sandana Events instituted by Decision No.001/PCMT/PMT/2022, *Rapport d'enquête sur les événements de Sandana*, September 2022, copy obtained by Amnesty International, p. 19.

⁸² Law No. 4 of 31 October 1959 regulating nomadism in the territory of the Republic of Chad, <https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/cha150921.pdf> (consulted in December 2024).

⁸³ Commission of Inquiry into the Sandana Events instituted by Decision No.001/PCMT/PMT/2022, *Rapport d'enquête sur les événements de Sandana*, September 2022, p. 23.

⁸⁴ Telephone interview with a member of civil society in Sarh in June 2025.

4.2 LOGONE ORIENTAL

VILLAGES IN THE DEPARTMENTS OF MONTS DE LAM AND NYA PENDE

The province of Logone Oriental, located on the border with the Central African Republic, is also suffering from conflicts between herders and farmers that sometimes overlap with the conflictual and criminal dynamics present in this region. The porous nature of the border favours the movement into Chad of armed groups that oppose the Central African government, along with criminal gangs.

It is against this complex backdrop that the various attacks that affected several villages located in the departments of Monts de Lam and Nya Pende took place during the months of April and May 2023.

APRIL 2023 ATTACKS

According to the Governor of the Province of Logone Oriental,⁸⁵ the Prefect of Monts de Lam,⁸⁶ and several interviews conducted by Amnesty International with eyewitnesses and victims of the clashes, plus NGOs in N'Djamena and Moundou, a series of clashes in the department of Monts de Lam began with an attack by unidentified individuals against the “Gourbedje” *ferick* on 15 April 2023 causing the death of two people, including a two-year-old child, and that of two assailants. The cause of this attack has not been identified.

The next day, 16 April 2023, **Dogoro** village, close to the *ferick*, was attacked, allegedly by the herders. According to the testimony collected by Amnesty International from a man present at the events, “The attack began at 4 a.m.”⁸⁷ “The attackers were on foot and armed with several firearms and knives.” The attack resulted in the deaths of at least six people, including two children: a 6-month-old girl and an 18-month-old boy. According to the report of the Ligue tchadienne des droits de l'Homme (LTDH), which investigated the scene, 82-year-old cleric Joseph Nonassem was among the victims.⁸⁸ Several items were taken by the attackers.⁸⁹

On 18 April 2023, several attacks targeted the villages of Bendjabo, Mempon and Dangdah.

According to testimonies collected by Amnesty International, including those of people present at the time of the events, the village of **Bendjabo**, located 5 km North of Dogoro, was attacked at 5 a.m. by a group of people on motorcycles and horseback.⁹⁰ According to several witnesses, the inhabitants of Bendjabo were preparing to pay tribute to the victims of the Dogoro attacks of 16 April that morning when they were attacked.⁹¹ According to the toll provided by the victims of the attack that Amnesty International spoke to, five people from the village were killed, including a woman, and 14 others were wounded.⁹² This attack was also documented by the LTDH as well as the Collectif des associations des Monts de Lam.⁹³

The village of **Mempon**, located 800 m from Bendjabo, was also attacked on 18 April 2023 at around 5 a.m., at the same time as the Bendjabo attack. A witness to the attack interviewed by Amnesty International

⁸⁵Alwihda Info, Tchad: *le récit du gouverneur du Logone Oriental sur les violences dans le département des Monts de Lam*, 19 April 2023, https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-le-recit-du-gouverneur-du-Logone-Oriental-sur-les-violences-dans-le-departement-des-Monts-de-Lam_a122741.html

⁸⁶ Association pour la Réinsertion des Enfants et la Défense des Droits de l'Homme, *Rapport de mission suite aux massacres des populations des cantons de Ngadjibian et Bessao*, April 2023 (copy with Amnesty International).

⁸⁷In-person interview with a victim in Goré in July 2023.

⁸⁸ Association pour la Réinsertion des Enfants et la Défense des Droits de l'Homme, *Rapport de mission d'enquête suite aux conflits sanglants dans les provinces du Logone Oriental et du Mandoul*, May 2023 (copy with Amnesty International) and In-person interview in July 2023.

⁸⁹ In-person interview with residents of Bendjabo in Goré, July 2023.

⁹⁰ Ligue tchadienne des droits de l'homme, *Razzia dans les Monts de Lam*, 28 April 2023, (copy with Amnesty International)

⁹¹ In-person interview with residents of Bendjabo in Goré, July 2023.

⁹² Ligue tchadienne des droits de l'homme, *Razzia dans les Monts de Lam*, 28 April 2023, (copy with Amnesty International) and mission report following the massacres of the populations of Ngadjibian and Bessao, 29 April 2023 (copy with Amnesty International).

recounted: **“The day before, there was a death in the village and we were in my yard for the ceremony on 18 April 2023 at 5 a.m. when the attack began. Armed men surrounded the village and started firing.”**⁹⁴ He added, “They were on motorcycles, at least 40 of them. They split up into groups. Some took oxen while others broke into houses, including a group on foot that left with motorcycles. It was well organized.”⁹⁵ Still according the same man: “During the attack, it was as if someone who knew the village was guiding them.

In front of my house, one of them told the others I was still there, so he knew who I was. When they shot my daughter, she screamed and pointed to the one who shot her. It was a man who lives in Bessao. He had even built a house in the village.”⁹⁶ He concluded: “We also recognized another shopkeeper who was living in Bessao. He had a shop in Gadibian. The day before the attack, he came by at 5 p.m., wandered around a bit and left.”⁹⁷ He concluded: “The attackers spoke in Arabic and Fulfulde, they were not from the CAR. They came with the intention of looting us.”

The daughter of this witness, in her twenties, was shot in the hip. She recounted the violence suffered that day: “I ran into the house and closed the door behind me. There were 8 of us inside. The room is around 25 square metres in size. The armed assailants outside started shooting at the door. After a few minutes, they finally managed to enter the room. At that moment we tried to play dead. Five of us were shot and wounded. In the room, they executed Yolande and attacked her with a machete.”⁹⁸ She confirmed what her father had said, **“I recognized the man who shot me. He is a trader who lives in Bessao. He lived in Gadibian for a while.”**⁹⁹

According to witnesses interviewed by Amnesty International in Moundou, but also in Goré, the attack resulted in one death (a woman) and five wounded. This assessment is also reflected in the reports of the LTDH and the Collectif des associations des Monts de Lam (CAMOL),¹⁰⁰ which also investigated the attack. As a result of the attack, the village was emptied of its inhabitants,¹⁰¹ with some moving to Gadibian, 5 km North of Mempon.

Dangdah village, 6 km East of Dogoro and 4 km South of Bendjabo, was attacked around 8 a.m. on 18 April.¹⁰² A victim of the attack, met by Amnesty International, said she was woken up by a phone call warning her of an ongoing attack in Bendjabo at around 5 a.m., and that the attackers were on their way to Dangdah.¹⁰³ According to this same person: “At 8 a.m., the attackers attacked the village. There was a hundred of them, on foot and on motorcycles, armed with arrows, swords and firearms. They killed four men and wounded two more, including me. I was shot in the thigh. We didn't know them. They left at around 9 a.m. with 25 head of oxen and 20 sheep.”¹⁰⁴ She added: “We were afraid that the attackers might return, so everyone left.” She didn't recognize the attackers, as they were firing from a distance.

On 20 April 2023, two of these villages were once again the scene of attacks and looting, according to testimonies gathered by Amnesty International. An eyewitness recounted¹⁰⁵ that he had decided to return to his village, Mempon, in order to recover abandoned food stocks that he had left behind. As he approached the village, he observed nine individuals surrounding it. Panicked, he hid and contacted the chief of the refugee village in Gadibian, who immediately informed the security forces. After a few minutes, the nine individuals headed for Bendjabo where they allegedly killed three men they met along the way.

According to the same witness, while accompanying the security forces at around 10:30 a.m. in the vicinity of Bendjabo, exchanges of fire took place between the police and the nine individuals. According to this witness, three alleged looters were killed during the shooting, one was apprehended and detained in Doba, and one soldier was injured. Still according to this witness, a victim of the Dangdah attack met by Amnesty International, and the CAMOL report, the person arrested by the army that day claimed that the sponsors of the series of attacks were three men living in Bessao, and the supplier of arms was someone living in Goré. The witness to the second Mempon attack concluded: “They are members of the Hausa community, they are there and they are not worried.”¹⁰⁶

⁹⁴ In-person interview with a resident of Mempon, October 2024, in Moundou.

⁹⁵ In-person interview with a resident of Mempon, October 2024, in Moundou.

⁹⁶ In-person interview with a resident of Mempon, October 2024, in Moundou.

⁹⁷ In-person interview with a resident of Mempon, October 2024, in Moundou.

⁹⁸ In-person interview with a resident of Mempon, October 2024, in Moundou.

⁹⁹ In-person interview with a resident of Mempon, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹⁰⁰ CAMOL, *Rapport de mission suite aux massacres des populations des cantons de Ngadjibian et Bessao*, April 2023, copy with Amnesty International.

¹⁰¹ Ligue tchadienne des droits de l'homme, *Razzia dans les Monts de Lam*, 28 April 2023, (copy with Amnesty International) and Association pour la Réinsertion des Enfants et la Défense des Droits de l'Homme, *Rapport de mission d'enquête suite aux conflits sanglants dans les provinces du Logone Oriental et du Mandoul*, May 2023 (copy with Amnesty International).

¹⁰² In-person interview with a resident of Dangdah, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹⁰³ In-person interview with a resident of Dangdah, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹⁰⁴ In-person interview with a resident of Dangdah, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹⁰⁵ In-person interview with a resident of Mempon, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹⁰⁶ In-person interview with a resident of Dangdah, October 2024, in Moundou.

According to the Governor of Logone Oriental,¹⁰⁷ the security forces were mobilized as early as 19 April 2023 to seek out the attackers, whom he likened to “Kodo” rebels¹⁰⁸ from the CAR, ruling out the hypothesis of a conflict between farmers and herders or between communities. These statements of the governor are in contradiction with the statements made by victims and witnesses of the attacks in Mempon, Bendjabo, Dogoro and Dangdah as well as the reports of the LTDH, the Association pour la Réinsertion des Enfants et la Défense des Droits Humains (ARED)¹⁰⁹ and CAMOL, which all tend to agree that the attackers were men, cattle owners from the Fulani or Hausa community, identified and residing in Bessao with good knowledge of the area and its inhabitants. This series of violent episodes followed the attack on the Gourbedje *ferick*.

On 20 April 2023, the Ministers of Defence and Internal Security visited the villages under attack, announcing the establishment of a security post to strengthen the protection of the population.¹¹⁰ Amnesty International met with the Minister of Security and Immigration on 03 May 2023, who stated that the government had taken several measures to enhance security in these areas, including deciding to install additional security posts. These positions were to be occupied by military personnel equipped with vehicles and motorcycles who could respond quickly in the event of attacks.¹¹¹ In October 2024, when Amnesty International spoke to witnesses and victims, they confirmed that the post had been operational in Gadibian since the delegation's visit.

As far as Amnesty International is aware, no judicial investigation has been opened into these attacks.



☺ → Visit of the Minister of Public Security and the Minister of Defence to Gadibian on 20 April 2023 © Toumai web media

MAY 2023 ATTACKS

Violence in the province continued throughout the month of May 2023 in the department of Nya Pende, despite government announcements regarding the strengthening of security following the attacks of April 2023.

On 06 May 2023, several village chiefs in Bekan canton were arrested by the authorities following the assassination of a herder named Al Hadj Beine in the Central African Republic. According to several witnesses and victims interviewed by Amnesty International, the events of May started with this murder.¹¹²

On 08 May 2023, armed individuals attacked the village of **Don** at 5 a.m.¹¹³ A 30-year-old woman present in the village at the time of the attack told Amnesty International **“They surprised us on 08 May 2023, very early. My**

¹⁰⁷ Alwihda Infos, Tchad: *le récit du gouverneur du Logone Oriental sur les violences dans le département des Monts de Lam*, 19 April 2023, available at https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-le-recit-du-gouverneur-du-Logone-Oriental-sur-les-violences-dans-le-departement-des-Monts-de-Lam_a122741.html

¹⁰⁸ The term Kodos is an abbreviation of the word commando and refers to a rebel movement that existed between 1982 and 1986 in the southern regions of the country with the advent of former President Hissène Habré. See Souleymane, A. A, *Communication et violences au Tchad: le cas du Moyen Chari et du Guéra (1900-2010)*, July 2017, available at <https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2941457/view>, page 101.

¹⁰⁹ Association pour la Réinsertion des Enfants et la Défense des Droits de l'Homme, *Rapport de mission d'enquête suite aux conflits sanglants dans les provinces du Logone Oriental et du Mandoul*, May 2023 (copy with Amnesty International).

¹¹⁰ Alwihda Infos, Tchad: *les ministres de la Sécurité et de la Défense à Bessao pour rassurer la population*, 20 April 2023, available at https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-les-ministres-de-la-Securite-et-de-la-Defense-a-Bessao-pour-rassurer-la-population_a122785.html

¹¹¹ In-person interview with the Minister of Security and Immigration, May 2023 in N'Djamena.

¹¹² In-person interview with residents of Don in July 2023 in Goré and, Fact-finding mission report following the bloody conflicts in the provinces of Logone Oriental and Mandoul, May 2023 (copy with Amnesty International).

¹¹³ In-person interview with a resident of Don in July 2023 in Goré and, Fact-finding mission report following the bloody conflicts in the provinces of Logone Oriental and Mandoul, May 2023 (copy with Amnesty International).

husband was shot in the shin while trying to flee. He had to have his leg amputated.¹¹⁴ According to several witnesses interviewed by Amnesty International, attackers on motorcycles and horses began by surrounding the village. They had guns, machetes, knives and spears. Another woman in the village added: “They came and surrounded the village before attacking us. They went door to door. They killed¹¹⁵ my little brother and broke my mother’s arm.” The attack on Don, according to the Public Prosecutor of Goré in a 2023 statement, left 17 dead and three wounded.¹¹⁶ Yokes of oxen were also stolen. The Public Prosecutor’s Office has opened a judicial investigation.¹¹⁷ This assessment was confirmed by community leaders in the area.¹¹⁸

On 12 May 2023, the village of **Kamkoutou**, 10 km from Bessao, was attacked. An eyewitness told Amnesty International: **“On 12 May 2023, at 6 p.m., I was with some other men under the mango tree talking when I heard a shot, then more. The women came running towards us. The attackers were attacking the whole village on both sides of the road”**¹¹⁹. According to this man, there were at least 12 assailants, armed with arrows, machetes and firearms. They started by stealing oxen and the villagers who were aware of the April 2023 attacks tried to resist with knives in order to protect their property. According to the witness and the LTDH report, the attack resulted in the deaths of one woman and five men, with a further four people injured, including a 6-year-old girl. In his escape, the same witness called the authorities in Bessao to warn them of the incident that had just taken place. Security forces arrived at the village the next day, 13 May, to observe the incidents and request that the victims be buried.¹²⁰

On 17 May 2023, another attack took place in the village of **Mankate**, 5 km North of Andoum. A witness told Amnesty International: “On 17 May 2023, at 4 a.m., as it was raining, we were attacked by a group of people who came on foot armed with guns.”¹²¹ Residents of the village interviewed in July 2023 claimed that the attackers came on motorcycles and on foot, that they were armed with arrows and firearms and started firing.¹²² A woman present at the time of the attack said: **“They came into the house with guns and fired. We tried to escape. That’s how my sister was shot in the stomach. We took her to the hospital but she died a few weeks later.”**¹²³

The attackers reportedly remained in the village for several hours. 18 people were killed and 11 injured. Residents interviewed by Amnesty International in July 2023 said that, following the attack, villagers decided to lay the bodies of the victims on the road in protest at the authorities’ inaction.¹²⁴ Chadian media reported this information and videos and photos of this protest spread on social media.¹²⁵ The local authorities then intervened to call for calm and ask the inhabitants of Mankate to proceed with the burial of those killed in the attack.¹²⁶

¹¹⁴ In-person interview with a resident of Don, July 2023, in Goré.

¹¹⁵ In-person interview with a resident of Don, July 2023, in Goré.

¹¹⁷ Public Prosecutor’s Office of Goré on 08 May (copy with Amnesty International) and Report of a fact-finding mission following the bloody conflicts in the provinces of Logone Oriental and Mandoul, May 2023 (copy with Amnesty International) and Press briefing by the Public Prosecutor, at the Tribunal de Grandes Instances de Goré, 11 May 2023, <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=793901255304648>

¹¹⁸ Kabba community press release, 08 May 2023 (copy with Amnesty International).

¹¹⁹ In-person interview with a resident of Kamkoutou, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹²⁰ In-person interview with a resident of Kamkoutou, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹²¹ In-person interview with a resident of Mankate, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹²² In-person interview with several Mankate residents, July 2023, in Goré.

¹²³ In-person interview with a resident of Mankate, July 2023, in Goré.

¹²⁴ In-person interview, July 2023 and October 2024, in Goré and Moundou.

¹²⁵ Infos+235, La population désespérée de Mankade expose ses victimes sur le Goudron devant le chef de Canton en ce moment, 17 May 2023, <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/168M2xuCaC/> (consulted in April 2025) and Tribune Echos, Tchad: Le gouvernement déplore les crimes survenus à Mankade dans le Logone Oriental, 18 May 2023, available at https://tribuneechos.com/tchad-le-gouvernement-deplores-les-crimes-survenus-a-mankade-dans-le-logone-oriental/?fbclid=IwY2xjawJrW-RleHRuA2FibQlxMQABHvCvFNydG2j4NsXGCVqgRsEOUF5sqDZoVuQ1rhLnR-izN4L9-JEms5Cgul3_aem_q56mTU0I2z-FRz0uswt8LA

¹²⁶ In-person interview with a resident of Mankate, October 2024 in Moundou and video received via email.



© → Photo of the victims of the Mankate attack placed on the road by the inhabitants of the village in protest on 17 May 2023 © Facebook page info +235

On the same day, an attack targeted the village of **Bedoli 2** located 15 km North of Mankate. A village official interviewed by Amnesty International explained that he was in Andoum when he was warned by villagers of the attackers' arrival.¹²⁷ According to the people he spoke to, there were at least 30 attackers, on foot. The village official further recalled: "I called the Canton Chief of Andoum and the Larmaney Gendarmerie. The attackers spent three hours in the village; the gendarmes surprised them in the village. Eight were arrested and six killed."¹²⁸

A woman in her 40s who was present in the village at the time of the attack told Amnesty International: "**I didn't think I'd survive. I was with my husband and others in the house when the attackers opened fire. They then set fire to the house while continuing to shoot. I don't have the resources to take care of the children anymore.**"¹²⁹

According to a report by the LTDH, one person from the village was killed and two others injured during this attack. 307 houses, two churches and a cultural centre were set on fire, according to a toll provided by village officials. The whole population moved to Larmaney and Andoum.¹³⁰

On 17 May 2023, the Transitional President spoke about the Mankate attack, calling the attackers "armed bandits".¹³¹ On 24 May 2023, he met with executives from Logone Oriental Province and challenged the hate speech and division that appeared to have led to this situation.¹³²

In addition, on 18 May 2023, the Chadian government announced that these attacks were the work of "armed bandits composed of Chadians who have withdrawn to Central African territory" and announced a stronger military presence at the border. According to this statement, six people were arrested on 17 May and brought before the courts for investigation.¹³³ On 18 May 2023, the Governor of Logone Oriental announced the arrest of some 30 suspected bandits at the Central African border, and the recovery of eight motorcycles and a hundred oxen.¹³⁴

According to a judicial source at the High Court of Goré, the investigation opened into the killings committed in May 2023 in Began canton focused on a total of seven people. The files of the first three defendants were closed and sent to the Public Prosecutor's Office at Moundou so that they could appear before the

¹²⁷ In-person interview with a resident of the village, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹²⁸ In-person interview with a resident of the village, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹²⁹ In-person interview with a Bedoli resident, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹³⁰ Ligue tchadienne des droits de l'homme, *Razzia dans les Monts de Lam*, 28 April 2023, (copy with Amnesty International).

¹³¹ Presidency of the Republic of Chad, <https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1B8fQoi6Z1/>, 17 May 2023.

¹³² Presidency of the Republic of Chad, <https://www.facebook.com/share/v/19qNxNzeej/>, 24 May 2023.

¹³³ Press Release from the Ministry of Communication, 18 May 2023 (copy with Amnesty International).

¹³⁴ Tchad Infos, *Goré: une trentaine de présumés bandits de grand chemin arrêtés*, 18 May 2023, available at <https://tchadinfos.com/gore-une-trentaine-de-presumes-bandits-de-grand-chemin-arretes/>

Indictment Division. A fourth person was exonerated, the alleged facts not being proven. The last three suspects remain under investigation before Goré's investigating judge.¹³⁵

These attacks have had an impact on the civilian population, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and generating mass displacement. According to International Organisation for Migration 's Displacement Tracking Matrix, with data collected between 09 and 24 August 2023, these clashes resulted in the displacement of 38,764 individuals or 6,619 households.¹³⁶ The destruction of fields and the delays caused to agricultural work have compromised the livelihoods of the inhabitants, whose economy is largely based on agriculture. According to an official working in the humanitarian community, the authorities rejected the intervention of humanitarian organizations on the basis that the situation was under control.¹³⁷

4.3 MANDOUL

BARA VILLAGE 2



© → Photo taken during the visit of a delegation composed of members of the government, national advisors and local elected officials on 28 May 2023 in Bara 2 © Tchadinfos

¹³⁵ Email exchanges with a member of the judiciary at the High Court of Goré, June 2025.

¹³⁶ IOM, *Dashboard de déplacement, 09 October 2023*, available at <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/report-product-series/tchad-%E2%80%94-logone-oriental%E2%80%94-d%C3%A9placement>

¹³⁷ In-person interview with an official from a humanitarian agency in N'Djamena in May 2023.

The village of Bara 2 is in the canton of Bengora, in the province of Mandoul, on the border with the Central African Republic. Bordering the province of Moyen-Chari, where the Sandana attacks took place, this region is rich in natural resources¹³⁸ and also the scene of recurrent clashes between herders settled in *fericks* and farmers.

It appears from the decision of the Sarh Court of Appeal dated 02 May 2024¹³⁹, the testimony collected by Amnesty International from the victims' lawyers, and the report drawn up by a bailiff,¹⁴⁰ that on 25 May 2023, a herd of cattle belonging to a sedentary herder settled in the Dar Salam *ferick* 3 km away, devastated the field of a farmer in Bara 2. The herd was being led by several herdsman. When the owner of the field complained to the herdsman, one of them drew a bow and shot arrows at him. During the altercation, another 13-year-old herdsman pulled out a knife and stabbed the farmer. The latter, in self-defence, grabbed the knife and struck the child, who died as a result of this injury.¹⁴¹

According to the decision of the Criminal Court, the other herdsman fled and, once back at the *ferick*, alerted the father of the victim as well as the owner of the herd. The latter quickly informed several people from the neighbouring *fericks* located around Bara 2. In less than 30 minutes, a group of men armed with weapons of war, machetes and bows and arrows, travelling by motorcycle, horseback and on foot, launched an attack against the village.¹⁴²

The attack started at around 11 a.m. and ended at 2 p.m.¹⁴³ It resulted in the deaths of 12 people, all adults, leaving 47 orphans. In addition to those killed, the assailants furthermore stole a hundred oxen and motorcycles. 32 houses were also burned. According to the lawyers of the residents of Bara, it was around 4 p.m. when the defence and security forces arrived in the village from Bouna and Moissala some 24 and 42 kilometres from Bara 2.¹⁴⁴

On 26 May 2023¹⁴⁵, the authorities of Mandoul province announced the arrest of 10 alleged assailants and their handover to the Moissala Prosecutor's Office (see 5.2.3). Two stolen motorcycles together with 90 oxen were also recovered and handed over to the Bengoro Canton Chief.¹⁴⁶

¹³⁸ Household economy approach, *Profil des moyens d'existence des ménages ruraux de la zone agricole départements Mandoul oriental et occidental Région de Mandoul au Tchad*, August 2017, <https://hea-sahel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Rapport-HEA-zone-agricole-MANDOUL-TCHAD.pdf> (consulted December 2024).

¹³⁹ Sarh Court of Appeal, Decision No.020/2024, 25 May 2024 (copy with Amnesty International).

¹⁴⁰ Copy with Amnesty International.

¹⁴¹ In-person interview with victims' lawyers, September 2024, in N'Djamena.

¹⁴² In-person interview with victims' lawyers, September 2024, in N'Djamena and Sarh Court of Appeal, Judgement No. 020/2024 dated 21 May 2024, copy with Amnesty International.

¹⁴³ In-person interview with victims' lawyers, September 2024, in N'Djamena.

¹⁴⁴ In-person interview with victims' lawyers, September 2024, in N'Djamena.

¹⁴⁵ Tchadinfos, *attaque de Bara, les autorités locales annoncent l'arrestation de présumés tueurs*, 27 May 2023, https://tchadinfos.com/attaque-de-bara-2-les-autorites-locales-annoncent-larrestation-des-presumes-tueurs/?fbclid=IwY2xiawHM8dVieHRuA2FibQixMAABHV-onOrFm0iA4JtAeonkEslcsL9QJFB08x2aAQTwlaHuPyB5p5KAowf2Q_aem_S7HTyT4JcPgF1Leenr48jA,

¹⁴⁶ Governorate of Mandoul Province, 01 June 2023, <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Ap3bqfxi7/>,



© → Publication of the Facebook page of the Governorate of Mandoul Province © Governorate of Mandoul Province

In terms of the profile of the perpetrators of the Bara 2 attack, when interviewed by Amnesty International, the victims' lawyers stated that “the perpetrators of Bara 2 were sedentary herders. The father of the herdsman, who was about 45 years old, was born there, they weren't nomadic.”¹⁴⁷ This profile illustrates the rise in tensions between sedentary farmers and herders, exacerbated by issues related to access to natural resources.¹⁴⁸ This situation also highlights the role of arms trafficking and porous borders, two factors that facilitate the acquisition of weapons of war. According to the victims' lawyers, several attackers admitted to having obtained these weapons in the Central African Republic.¹⁴⁹

4.4 LOGONE OCCIDENTAL

VILLAGES OF KOUTOUMARE 1 AND 2

Clashes between herders and farmers took place in November 2022 in the villages of Koutoumare 1 and 2 in Logone Occidental. Amnesty International was able to collect numerous testimonies from people present at the time of the events, NGOs and the authorities.

¹⁴⁷ In-person interview with victims' lawyers, September 2024 in N'Djamena.

In-person ¹⁴⁸ interview with a mediator, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹⁴⁹ In-person interview with Bara victims' lawyers, September 2024, in Ndjamen.

On the morning of 18 November 2022, an altercation broke out between farmers residing in Koutoumare 1 and 2 and cattle herders who, according to the people interviewed by Amnesty International, were tasked with transporting the cattle of a trader based in the village of Laoukassi some 10 km to the West, because the animals had devastated a field and grazed on the millet crop.¹⁵⁰ According to one person present at the time of the incidents: “ **On Friday 18 November 2022, the millet was being harvested in Koutoumare villages 1 and 2. In the morning, herders came to graze their animals on the millet piles. An altercation ensued. One herder was stabbed. I was there when it happened. The herders withdrew to the neighbouring *ferick*.** ”¹⁵¹

Following this altercation, the herders initially withdrew before returning at around 2 p.m. According to a 25-year-old farmer interviewed by Amnesty International: “There were around 20 of them, on seven motorcycles, and they arrived at the village of Koutoumare 1 armed with knives, bows and at least one firearm.” He added: “On the way to the village, they came across a villager who was cycling along with a bag of sesame. He was physically assaulted and stripped of his bag.”¹⁵²

At the entrance to the village, the attackers reportedly opened fire on one resident although they did not hit him. The clashes, mainly conducted with knives, lasted several minutes. According to a 42-year-old man present at the time: “We defended ourselves with sticks.”¹⁵³ Another 22-year-old said: “We clashed with sticks and arrows.”¹⁵⁴ Faced with resistance from the villagers, the attackers finally fled with several head of cattle, according to witnesses interviewed by Amnesty International.¹⁵⁵ Three people were wounded, including one herder and two farmers, according to a report by the LTDH.¹⁵⁶

According to testimonies collected by Amnesty International, villagers decided to entrust the abandoned motorcycle to the village’s “guardian of tradition”.¹⁵⁷ Villagers wanted to return it to the attackers in exchange for the stolen bag of sesame. The 25-year-old farmer interviewed by Amnesty International said: “They ran away leaving one of the motorcycles behind. We wanted to return the bike in exchange for the millet and bag of sesame.”

Tension remained high between 18 and 22 November 2022, although no clashes were reported during this period. A member of civil society who was interviewed by Amnesty International and who was monitoring this conflict said: “We attempted reconciliation but the authorities refused. On 20 November, the canton chief issued threats against the village chief demanding the return of the motorcycle.”¹⁵⁸ Indeed, according to several testimonies collected, the chief of Kab canton asked for the return of the confiscated motorcycle and the villagers’ refusal to comply was interpreted by the local authorities as an act of rebellion.¹⁵⁹

On 22 November 2022, at around 3 p.m., the Kab canton chief, the prefect of Guéni department and some gendarmes based in Krim-Krim visited the village. According to the testimony of a person present at the scene: “On 22 November, the canton chief came to the village with gendarmes from Krim-Krim. Most of the villagers, including me, were in the fields. The gendarmes fired into the air. The canton chief broke down several doors to retrieve the motorcycle. They apprehended a villager and tied him to the back of a car. They put the motorcycle on top of him and left for Krim-Krim.”¹⁶⁰

According to testimonies collected by Amnesty International, several residents who were in the fields were alerted by the unusual movements and began to make their way to the village. Once there, angered by the arrest of the owner of the house, they decided to march to the Krim-Krim gendarmerie to challenge this and demand his release.¹⁶¹ During the protest, eight people, all men, were killed by law enforcement officials and 37 others, including two women, were injured.¹⁶² The person initially arrested by security forces was released four months later, after being transferred to Moundou prison.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁰ In-person interview with a resident of Koutoumare, October 2024, in Moundou and the Ligue tchadienne des Droits de l’homme, *Rapport sur les événements de Krim-Krim*, 30 November 2022 (copy with Amnesty International).

¹⁵¹ In-person interview with a resident of Koutoumare, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹⁵² In-person interview with a resident of Koutoumare, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹⁵³ In-person interview with a resident of Koutoumare, July 2023, in Krim-Krim.

¹⁵⁴ In-person interview with a resident of Koutoumare, July 2023, in Krim-Krim.

¹⁵⁵ In-person interview with residents of Koutoumare, July 2023 and October 2024, in Krim-Krim and Moundou.

¹⁵⁶ In-person interview with a representative of the LTDH, September 2024, in Moundou.

¹⁵⁷ In Chad, a guardian of tradition is a customary authority or traditional leader responsible for the preservation, transmission and respect of a community’s cultural norms, practices and values.

¹⁵⁸ In-person interview with a member of civil society, September 2024, in Moundou.

¹⁵⁹ In-person interview with residents of Koutoumare, July 2023 and October 2024, in Moundou and in Krim-Krim and *Rapport sur les événements de Krim-Krim*, Ligue tchadienne des Droits de l’homme, 30 November 2022 (copy with Amnesty International).

¹⁶⁰ In-person interview with a resident of Koutoumare, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹⁶¹ In-person interview with witness, October 2024, in Moundou.

¹⁶² In-person interview with residents of Koutoumare, July 2023 and October 2024, in Moundou and in Krim-Krim and *Rapport sur les événements de Krim-Krim*, Ligue tchadienne des Droits de l’homme, 30 November 2022 (copy with Amnesty International).

¹⁶³ In-person interview with a resident of Koutoumare, October 2024, in Moundou.

PALA KOUDJA VILLAGE

The village of Pala Koudja is situated 12 kilometres East of Beinamar in the department of Dodjé. It is a village composed of sedentary farmers and herders who, according to one of its inhabitants, lived in harmony for many years before the incidents of 30 August 2024.¹⁶⁴

A 40-year-old witness interviewed by Amnesty International recounted: “On 30 August, a herder took his sheep to graze in a potato field. This wasn’t the first time he’d done it.”¹⁶⁵ This action led to protests from the owners of the plot. This was followed by an altercation that led the herder to flee.

On the same day, several men arrived from the surrounding *fericks* and a violent altercation took place between the young people of the village and those of the *fericks*, all armed with knives and machetes. The clash left three dead and seven injured, including four women. Amnesty International has seen proof of the death certificates and medical certificates.¹⁶⁶ On the same day, the police were dispatched to the scene and arrested 23 people, both herders and farmers. Later that night, individuals returned to Pala Koudja and set fire to 53 huts, according to the testimony of a victim that Amnesty International spoke to.¹⁶⁷ Amnesty International also had access to and analysed videos posted on social media showing the extent of the damage in the village after the houses were set on fire.¹⁶⁸



📸 → Screenshot of a video posted on Facebook by a resident of the area. © Facebook

¹⁶⁴ In-person interview with a resident of Pala Koudja, October 2024, in N'Djamena.

¹⁶⁵ In-person interview with a resident of Pala Koudja, October 2024, in N'Djamena.

¹⁶⁶ Medical certificates of the injured and death certificates (copy with Amnesty International).

¹⁶⁷ In-person interview with a resident of Pala Koudja, October 2024, in N'Djamena.

¹⁶⁸ Formalité Ngonn kilang, *conflit de Palakoundja*, September 2024, <https://www.facebook.com/100071502306827/videos/1797262747347865/> (accessed February 2025)

On 05 September 2024, local authorities organized a reconciliation ceremony between the communities that resulted in the signing of a reconciliation act¹⁶⁹ and, on 02 October 2024, the President of the Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme visited the site.¹⁷⁰ All stakeholders in the conflict participated in this ceremony. According to the document seen by Amnesty International, a sum of 400,000 FCFA (USD 685) was paid to the families of the victims.¹⁷¹



© → Community reconciliation at Pala Koudja on 05 September 2024 © Facebook Charles Djemgombaye

Despite the reconciliation initiated by authorities, at least 74 inhabitants of the village chose to take the legal route by hiring a lawyer.¹⁷² They felt that a court case was the only way to repair the damage suffered, despite the reservations they may have about the legal system.¹⁷³

As far as Amnesty International is aware, no legal proceedings have been opened to date. The civil parties have not been able to raise the necessary money for the court costs, and the complaint has still not been filed. According to the victims' lawyer, most of those arrested have been released.¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁹ Formalité Ngong Kilang, *La photo de famille à la signature du procès-verbal de réconciliation entre les Ngambaye et peuls du village Palakoundja*, September 2024, <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1HTA691FVW/> (viewed in February 2025)

¹⁷⁰ Alwihda Infos, *Tchad: la CNDH poursuit sa mission dans la province du Logone Occidental*, 02 October 2024, available at https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-la-CNDH-poursuit-sa-mission-dans-la-province-du-Logone-Occidental_a135804.html

¹⁷¹ Report of reconciliation act of 05 September 2024 received by e-mail (copy with Amnesty International).

¹⁷² In-person interview with victims' lawyer, October 2024, in N'Djamena and complaints (seen by Amnesty International).

¹⁷³ In-person interview with victims' lawyer, October 2024, in N'Djamena.

¹⁷⁴ Exchanges by e-mail with the victims' lawyer in May 2025.

5. FAILURE TO PROTECT POPULATIONS AND THEIR RIGHT TO JUSTICE

5.1 FAILURE TO PROTECT THE RIGHT TO LIFE

5.1.1 STATE OBLIGATIONS

Chad acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1995,¹⁷⁵ Article 6 of which stipulates that: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights ratified by Chad in 1986 provides that: “Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right.”

According to General Comment No. 36 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, concerning the right to life, the obligation of States is twofold: States Parties have a “duty to refrain from engaging in conduct resulting in arbitrary deprivation of life”. They “must also ensure the right to life and exercise due diligence to protect the lives of individuals against deprivations caused by persons or entities whose conduct is not attributable to the State”.¹⁷⁶

With regard to the obligation of States to refrain from any conduct that would result in arbitrary deprivation of life, the Human Rights Committee specifies in particular that “States parties are expected to take all necessary measures to prevent arbitrary deprivation of life by their law enforcement officials, including soldiers charged with law enforcement missions”.

The Human Rights Committee also stresses that States must take special preventive and protective measures to improve certain contexts that may impede the right to life, such as situations of violence or circulation of firearms: “The duty to protect life also implies that States parties should take appropriate measures to address the general conditions in society that may eventually give rise to direct threats to life or prevent individuals from enjoying their right to life with dignity. These general conditions may include high levels of criminal and gun violence”.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, available at <https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx>

¹⁷⁶ Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, concerning the right to life, [CCPR/C/GC/R.36/Rev.7](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/GC/Article6/GC/Article6_EN.pdf), available at www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/GC/Article6/GC/Article6_EN.pdf

¹⁷⁷ Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, concerning the right to life, [CCPR/C/GC/R.36/Rev.7](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/GC/Article6/GC/Article6_EN.pdf), Para 30, Available at www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/GC/Article6/GC/Article6_EN.pdf

With regard to Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, recurrent situations of violence between herders and farmers, exacerbated by issues of access to land and natural resources, thus require the Chadian State to take specific preventive and protective measures to guarantee respect for the right to life. As part of its duties, the State should, for example, promote mediation and dialogue between groups in conflict, ensure the safety of populations by guaranteeing an adequate presence of law enforcement in areas at high risk of violence, ensure that any violence is effectively and comprehensively investigated, and ensure that anyone suspected of committing violence is brought to justice.

BAMAKO DECLARATION¹⁷⁸ ON AN AFRICAN COMMON POSITION ON THE ILLICIT PROLIFERATION, CIRCULATION AND TRAFFICKING OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS, DECEMBER 2000

[EXCERPTS]

WE EXPRESS OUR GRAVE CONCERN that the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons continues to have devastating consequences for stability and development in Africa. We recognize that this problem: i) sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement of innocent populations and threatens international humanitarian law, as well as fuels crime and encourages terrorism; ii) promotes a culture of violence and destabilizes societies by creating a propitious environment for criminal and contraband activities.

WE THEREFORE AGREE that, in order to promote peace, security, stability and sustainable development on the continent, it is vital to address the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons in a comprehensive, integrated, sustainable and efficient manner through: ii) the promotion of measures aimed at restoring peace, security and confidence among and between Member States with a view to reduce the resort to arms; iii) the promotion of structures and processes to strengthen democracy, the observance of human rights, the rule of law and good governance, as well as economic recovery and growth; vi) the enhancement of the capacity of Member States to identify, seize and destroy illicit weapons and to put in place measures to control the circulation, possession, transfer and use of small arms and light weapons.

5.1.2 CONSULTATION AND CONFLICT PREVENTION MECHANISMS PERCEIVED AS BIASED

“In the 1990s, liaison committees were set up that included herders, farmers and the clergy, but this initiative floundered”¹⁷⁹

Traditional mechanisms for consultation and conflict management in Chad are based mainly on traditional chiefdoms, councils of elders and inter-community alliances. These structures have long made it possible to arbitrate conflicts over land and the use of natural resources by promoting negotiated solutions between farmers and herders.¹⁸⁰ Their legitimacy is based on their anchoring in local social structures and their ability to prevent an escalation of tensions through mutual arrangements.

However, these mechanisms have now been weakened by several factors. On the one hand, the increasing politicization of chiefdoms has altered their neutrality, with some chiefs accused of favouring certain groups based on their political or economic interests.¹⁸¹ On the other, the weakening of inter-community solidarity

¹⁷⁸ OAU, Conference on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation, and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 01 December 2000, available at <https://au.int/en/documents/20200903/bamako-declaration-african-common-position-illicit-proliferation-circulation-and>. This document is not legally binding per se; however, it demonstrates the commitment of the signatory states in this regard.

¹⁷⁹ In-person interview with a member of civil society, September 2024, in N'Djamena.

¹⁸⁰ SOUGNABE Pabamé, REOUNODJI Frédéric, Mécanismes de Prévention et de Gestion des Conflits dans les Zones d'Intervention du Projet ACCEPT, March 2021 (copy with Amnesty International), pp 35-38.

¹⁸¹ BRYA Elisabeth Grâce, Rapport de l'analyse des dynamiques des conflits au Tchad, March 2024, (copy with Amnesty International) p 28.

and the increasing pressure on land and resources calls into question the effectiveness of these mediation systems.¹⁸² According to an NGO official based in Moundou: “Despite the existence of spaces for consultation, the herders do not come.”¹⁸³ This fact was confirmed by another actor in the Moundou area who noted the difficulties in holding the consultation meetings.¹⁸⁴ The gradual erosion of the role of traditional mechanisms may lead some groups to adopt confrontational strategies to resolve disputes.

The State, which is supposed to play a central role in the regulation and management of conflicts, intervenes largely through the regional administration and law enforcement. The national legal framework provides little support for consultation and conflict management. The country does not have a pastoral code. A draft pastoral code adopted by the National Assembly in 2014 was banned by the Constitutional Council.¹⁸⁵ However, in 2018, the country adopted an Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral and Fisheries Guidance Law¹⁸⁶ the purpose of which is to frame the development of these activities. Law No. 4 of 31 October 1959, which governs nomadism and transhumance, is acknowledged by many actors as obsolete, preceding the phenomena of climate change, population growth, scarcity of arable land and pasture, and increases in livestock.¹⁸⁷

The Chadian authorities have nevertheless subsidized programmes to support transhumant populations and mark out transhumance corridors, with the help of international partners. In 2011, Chad launched the Rural, Pastoral and Transhumance Infrastructure Project (PIRPT)¹⁸⁸ for a five-year period, with 11.5 million euros of funding from the African Development Bank (AfDB). Its aim was to improve the living conditions of pastoral and agricultural communities by facilitating livestock mobility and reducing conflicts related to accessing natural resources.

In 2017, the PASTOR project¹⁸⁹ received funding of 28 million euros over six years, in the form of a grant from the French Development Agency (AFD), with the support of the European Union. This project included a specific component on transhumance and the management of pastoral corridors in order to secure the mobility of herders and reduce conflicts related to access to natural resources.

According to the Minister of Security and Immigration, whom Amnesty International met: “For three, four, five years now, transhumance corridors have been there with resting areas.” But by the minister’s own admission, these corridors are not respected.

The Chadian authorities have also encouraged the creation of joint committees to establish a dialogue between the various stakeholders. The joint committee is a mechanism set up in the 2000s¹⁹⁰ that brings together representatives of both communities to manage conflicts related to the use of natural resources between farmers and herders. These committees were formed as part of inter-community conflict prevention initiatives.

The governor of Logone Occidental, whom Amnesty International met, also noted the preventive measures put in place by authorities during periods of transhumance. These include publishing press releases to facilitate the movement of animals as well as tours organized by the governorate to meet all stakeholders and identify potentially conflicting areas. He also highlighted the Laoukassi Convention, a text adopted in May 2010 in the Province of Logone Occidental (see box) and which, according to him, has made it possible to drastically reduce conflicts in the area.¹⁹¹

All these initiatives, put in place with the support of NGOs and international donors, have – according to several witnesses met by Amnesty International as well as studies consulted – shown a certain effectiveness

¹⁸² SOUGNABE Pabamé, REOUNODJI Frédéric, Mécanismes de Prévention et de Gestion des Conflits dans les Zones d’Intervention du Projet ACCEPT, March 2021 (copy with Amnesty International), p. 48.

¹⁸³ Interview with a member of an NGO in October 2024 in Moundou.

¹⁸⁴ Interviews in October 2024 and May 2023 in Moundou and N’Djamena.

¹⁸⁵ RFI, *Tchad: le projet de loi sur le code pastoral inconstitutionnel*, 27 December 2014, available at <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20141227-tchad-projet-loi-code-pastoral-inconstitutionnel-eleveurs-agriculteurs>.

¹⁸⁶ Government of Chad, *Ordonnance No.043/PR/2018 Guidance on Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral and Fisheries*, 31 August 2018, available at <http://www.pplateforme-pastorale-tchad.org/classified/LOAH - Loi d Orientation Agro-sylvo-pastorale et Halieutique. Ordonnance du 31 Aout 2018 signee copie.pdf>

¹⁸⁷ Interviews in May 2023 and September and October 2024 in N’Djamena and Moundou.

¹⁸⁸ Ministry of Livestock and Animal Production, *L’approche de mise en œuvre du PIRPT et la construction des centres de services*, December 2017, available at http://www.pplateforme-pastorale-tchad.org/classified/Rapport_final_de_capitalisation_PiRPT_%281%29.pdf

¹⁸⁹ AFD, *Projet PASTOR: structurer le Développement pastoral*, July 2015, available at <https://www.afd.fr/sites/afd/files/pdfs/projet-pastor-structurer-le-developpement-pastoral-8686-fr.pdf>

¹⁹⁰ Véronique Barraud, Sékou Béréte, Diane Intartaglia (VSF), *Des instances paritaires pour gérer des ressources communes? Deux expériences de gestion paritaire des ressources pastorales (Tchad oriental, Guinée maritime)*, October 2000, available at <https://www.avsf.org/app/uploads/2023/12/des-instances-paritaires-pour-ge-rer-des-ressources-communes-en-zone-pastorale.pdf>, p.4

¹⁹¹ In-person interview with the governor of Logone Occidental, October 2024, in Moundou.

in resolving local disputes by promoting consultation and negotiation.¹⁹² However, these mechanisms suffer from several structural limitations.

First, their functioning is often hampered by a lack of resources. This makes them dependent on external funding, which limits their sustainability. Second, the absence of a solid institutional framework and a genuine commitment by the State to follow up on decisions taken in these bodies reduces their long-term impact.¹⁹³

Moreover, the state itself is sometimes perceived as an actor in the conflict rather than an impartial mediator.¹⁹⁴ According to some observers, clientelist practices, corruption in land allocation and opportunistic interventions by some local authorities contribute to fueling tensions rather than resolving them sustainably.¹⁹⁵ The perception of state bias in conflict management is reinforced by the fact that many state administrators are themselves neo-herders. As confirmed by the Minister of Security and Immigration: **“The sub-prefects, gendarmerie brigade commanders and members of the army all own livestock. And yet their official status is incompatible with commercial activities.”**¹⁹⁶

Numerous witnesses and victims of violence, together with several civil society actors met by Amnesty International, stressed the lack of impartiality of local administrators.¹⁹⁷ A representative of the Centre de Recherches en Anthropologie said: “If you want to complain, you have to go to the civil or military authorities, who are themselves herders.”¹⁹⁸ As a result, demands made by the communities following attacks often include the removal of these authorities. Such was the case of Sandana¹⁹⁹ where, in their grievances, populations demanded the removal not only of the military and administrative authorities, whom they considered partial, but also of those in Logone Oriental and Moyen Chari. These demands are also being made by members of these communities based in N'Djamena.²⁰⁰ The President of the CNDH thus advised: “We must prevent governors and prefects from becoming cattle owners.”²⁰¹

Finally, despite the diversity of existing conflict prevention and management mechanisms, their lack of coordination, structural inefficiency, possible political instrumentalization or lack of impartiality limit their ability to prevent and sustainably resolve conflicts related to natural resources and intercommunal cohabitation in Chad. In this regard, some actors in conflict tend to choose the forum that is most favourable to their interests rather than the one that would ensure a fair resolution.²⁰²

¹⁹² SOUGNABE Pabamé, REOUNODJI Frédéric, *Mécanismes de Prévention et de Gestion des Conflits dans les Zones d'Intervention du Projet ACCEPT*, March 2021 (copy with Amnesty International) P 61-64 and Bernard Bonnet, *Renforcer le capital social de la gestion des ressources naturelles pour réduire les conflits d'accès aux ressources naturelles*, 02 January 2017, p. 13, copy with Amnesty International.

¹⁹³ SOUGNABE Pabamé, REOUNODJI Frédéric, *Mécanismes de Prévention et de Gestion des Conflits dans les Zones d'Intervention du Projet ACCEPT*, March 2021 (copy with Amnesty International) p. 68.

¹⁹⁴ In-person interviews, May and July 2023 and September 2024, in N'Djamena and Moundou.

¹⁹⁵ BRYA Elisabeth Grâce, *Rapport de l'analyse des dynamiques des conflits au Tchad*, March 2024, copy with Amnesty International p. 28

¹⁹⁶ In-person interview with the Minister of Security and Immigration, May 2023, in N'Djamena.

¹⁹⁷ Interviews in May 2023 and October 2024 in N'Djamena and Moundou.

¹⁹⁸ In-person interview with the Minister of Security and Immigration, May 2023, in N'Djamena.

¹⁹⁹ Commission of Inquiry into the Sandana Events instituted by Decision No.001/PCMT/PMT/2022, Report of Inquiry into the Sandana Events, September 2022, copy obtained by Amnesty International, P36.

²⁰⁰ Kabba Community, Press Release of 08 May 2023 (copy with Amnesty International).

²⁰¹ In-person interview with the President of the CNDH, May 2023, N'Djamena.

²⁰² SOUGNABE Pabamé, REOUNODJI Frédéric, *Mécanismes de Prévention et de Gestion des Conflits dans les Zones d'Intervention du Projet ACCEPT*, March 2021 (copy with Amnesty International) p. 39.

LAOUKASSI CONVENTION²⁰³

The Laoukassi Convention, adopted in May 2010 in the Logone Occidental region, aims to regulate access to natural resources and prevent conflicts between farmers and herders. This text is the result of a joint initiative of local communities, with the support of authorities, aimed at responding to the rise in tensions caused by the scarcity of resources and “the exploitation of their difference by politicians, civil, military and other authorities”. It is based on the principle of peaceful cohabitation, by putting in place clear rules on the use of land and transhumance corridors, as well as on the behaviours expected of both groups.

It condemns all forms of ethnic or political division (**Article 2**) and insists on mutual respect (**Article 3**), while defining concrete measures to limit sources of conflict, such as by demarcating specific areas for breeding and cultivation (**Article 6**).

To ensure the application of these principles, the convention establishes several conflict management mechanisms, including the Village Land Management Committees (**Article 16**) and the Herders-Farmers Conflict Settlement and Understanding Committees (**Article 21**).

These local structures are tasked with managing disputes through mediation and conciliation (**Article 22**), without resorting directly to the administrative or judicial authorities (**Article 20**). In the event of a failure in these proceedings, the dispute may be brought before the heads of cantons, and then, as a last resort, before the courts (**Article 25**). The convention also provides for sanctions against offenders (**Articles 28 and 29**) and a monitoring committee to evaluate its effectiveness (**Articles 30 to 33**).

The **Laoukassi Convention** is a local agreement limited to a specific geographical area. However, some actors hold it up as a model that could be extended to provide an early response to agro-pastoral conflicts. Its participatory approach and dispute resolution mechanisms are envisaged as tools that could be adapted to other regions facing the same tensions.

5.1.3 INACTION AND EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE

Lack of resources and the reaction of the security forces

According to the Ministry of Security,²⁰⁴ police and gendarme units intervene during community conflicts in order to contain the threat and make arrests. Yet when asked about law enforcement interventions, many victims of attacks who were interviewed by Amnesty International pointed to delays in their response. During an interview with Amnesty International in May 2023, the Minister of Security and Immigration acknowledged these shortcomings: “There have been delays in responding when villages are attacked.” He justified this with the size of the country and the lack of resources allocated to the police. **“The country is very large and it is difficult to cover it fully despite the presence of the Internal Security Forces. Staffing is limited. We have also seen a growth in population but the resources have not followed. The army has sometimes been given priority due to border crises.”**²⁰⁵

An analysis of the cases of violence documented in this report reveals that the interventions of the defence and security forces have sometimes been delayed, despite the alerts issued by the population and the proximity of some units, located only a few kilometres from the site of the clashes.

Case in point: the attack on the village of Kamkoutou on 12 May 2023 in Logone Oriental. A witness to the attack on the village, which took place at 6 p.m., told Amnesty International, denouncing the lack of response from the authorities: **“I called the canton chief that night, who advised me to contact the Bessao brigade chief. The brigade chief’s phone was not ringing. I also called the sub-prefect who did not answer. Some parents gave me the**

²⁰³ Laoukassi Convention, May 2010, copy with Amnesty International.

²⁰⁴ In-person interview with the Minister of Security and Immigration, May 2023, in N'Djamena.

²⁰⁵ In-person interview with the Minister of Security and Immigration, May 2023, in N'Djamena.

prefect's number but he didn't answer either. I was finally able to get hold of the sub-prefect to explain the situation to him.²⁰⁶ He added: "It was on 13 May that the Brigade Commander came and asked us to bury the bodies."

Amnesty International also met with victims of the attack on the village of Don in Logone Oriental. This village was attacked on 08 May 2023 at 5 a.m. A man in his forties who was present at the time of the incident said: "**We informed the commander of the Bekan Brigade by phone. His response was positive but delayed. They came 5 hours later. The Bekan Brigade is located 7 km from the village.**"²⁰⁷ A woman also present at the time of the incident said "We notified the authorities at Bekan but got no response."²⁰⁸ The attack reportedly killed 17 people.²⁰⁹

In another example, on 18 April 2023, the villages of Dogoro, Bendjabo (5 km North of Dogoro), Mempon (800 m from Bendjabo) and Dangdah (6 km East of Dogoro and 4 km South of Bendjabo) were targeted, with attacks starting at 4 a.m. for Dogoro, 5 a.m. for Bendjabo and Mempon, and 8 a.m. for Dangdah. According to the Governor of Logone Oriental,²¹⁰ security forces were mobilized on 19 April 2023 to pursue the attackers, the day after the attacks. The attackers were in the villages long enough to be able to loot and kill. According to witnesses to the attacks interviewed by Amnesty International, there is a security post in Bessao some 30 km from the attacked villages.²¹¹

Representatives of NGOs working with the populations in these provinces also complained about the lack of response from defence and security forces.²¹² A CAMOL representative said: "For the security forces to come, they require authorization. When we call the brigade, they tell us that the prefect will need to authorize the intervention."²¹³

Asked about this, the Minister of Security and Immigration said that "people are right to say that the defence and security forces do not react in time when they are asked". He highlighted the mobility difficulties for the security forces, especially during the rainy season. According to him "in some sub-prefectures, there are 50 or 60 villages, some of which are virtually inaccessible by vehicle. There are also problems with means of transport, fuel and communication. That's the reality." He explained that the government had worked to improve the mobility of security forces by equipping them with motorcycles.²¹⁴

The Minister of Security and Immigration insisted that he wanted to strengthen the number of police stations with mobile units and several vehicles. He further stated: "We allocated reinforcements two weeks ago to several selected localities, including Bessao, Bekan, Andoum, Oudoumian and Laramanaye. The focus is on mobility, with 5-6 motorcycles and 2-3 vehicles each time. As a preventive measure, the men go to the villages and meet with the chiefs."²¹⁵ Amnesty International has not been able to determine the reality of the reinforcement of gendarmeries or police stations in the indicated localities. Nevertheless, people interviewed by Amnesty International claimed that new security posts had been installed or reinforced, particularly in Gadibian since the 2023 attacks, and that these posts were still effective.²¹⁶

These facts were qualified by a representative of a national NGO who told Amnesty International: "After the clashes [of April 2023 in the Lam Mountains] they set up a unit in Gadibian. But they don't patrol. They don't come when there are attacks."²¹⁷

Between 2022 and 2025, the national budget allocated to the Ministry of Public Security and Immigration saw a steady increase. It rose from 24 billion FCFA (USD 43,173,950) in 2022²¹⁸ to 81 billion (USD 134,503,458)²¹⁹ in 2024. The forecast for 2025 is some 91 billion FCFA (USD 151,108,823).²²⁰ Authorities have issued recruitment announcements to strengthen the police force.²²¹ In total, over the period 2022-2025, the budget increased by 279.17%, illustrating the willingness of the authorities to invest more in

²⁰⁶ In-person interview with a resident of Kamkoutou, October 2024, in Moundou.

²⁰⁷ In-person interview with the victims of Don, July 2023, in Goré.

²⁰⁸ In-person interview with a Don victim, July 2023, in Goré.

²⁰⁹ In-person interview with the victims of Don, July 2023, in Goré.

²¹⁰ Alwihda Infos, *Tchad: le récit du gouverneur du Logone Oriental sur les violences dans le département des Monts de Lam*, 19 April 2023, available from https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-le-recit-du-gouverneur-du-Logone-Oriental-sur-les-violences-dans-le-departement-des-Monts-de-Lam_a122741.html

²¹¹ In-person interview with several residents of Monts de Lam, July 2023, in Goré.

In-person ²¹² interview with NGO representatives, October 2024 in Moundou.

²¹³ Interview with a CAMOL member in May 2023 in N'Djamena.

²¹⁵ In-person interview with the Minister of Security and Immigration, May 2023, in N'Djamena.

²¹⁶ In-person interviews with several residents of the area, October 2024, in Moundou.

²¹⁷ Interview with a CAMOL representative in May 2023 in N'Djamena.

²¹⁸ National Transitional Council, *Rapport sur le projet de loi de finance 2023*, available at <http://185.52.150.32/upload/publications/2023/Projet%20de%20Loi%20des%20Finances%202023.pdf>, December 2022

²¹⁹ Directorate General of Taxes, 19 November 2024, available at <https://dgi.td/docs/lf/LF2025.pdf>

²²⁰ Directorate General of Taxes (op.cit.)

²²¹ Tchad: le gouvernement prévoit un recrutement de 8.000 agents des forces de l'ordre et de sécurité - Le N'Djam Post, 18 January 2024 available at <https://lendjampost.com/tchad-le-gouvernement-prevoit-un-recrutement-de-8-000-agentes-des-forces-de-lordre-et-de-securite/>

public security. Despite this budget increase, it appears from the testimonies and incidents that were recorded in 2025 that delays still persist for the intervention of security forces when incidents occur.

Use of firearms and right to life

Security forces have also been implicated in cases of excessive use of force and illegal use of firearms in conflicts between herders and farmers. The use of firearms, i.e. any device designed to kill, by law enforcement is permitted only in self-defence or to defend third parties against an imminent threat of death or serious injury, and only when less extreme measures are insufficient to achieve these objectives.²²² The cases documented in this section raise serious concerns regarding respect for the right to life given the use of firearms by law enforcement against persons who did not pose a threat of death or serious injury to the lives of others.

Amnesty International documented a case that took place in the town of Krim-Krim (Logone Occidental Province) four days after the clashes between herders and farmers in the villages of Koutoumare 1 and 2 on 18 November 2022, presented in this report (see Section 4.4). On 22 November, the canton chief and gendarmes from Krim-Krim went to Koutoumare to retrieve the motorcycle that the attackers had left when they fled, and arrested the person with whom the motorcycle was parked. Angry, the villagers decided to march to Krim-Krim to demand his release. According to the testimony of those present at the events, when the demonstrators arrived near the gendarmerie, the police fired live ammunition, without warning. Eight people were killed and 37 injured, including two women.²²³

A 25-year-old man present at the protest and wounded by a firearm told Amnesty International: “There were around 1,000 of us, men, women and children. We had slingshots, cutters and bows. We arrived at about 6 p.m. We passed in front of the prefect’s office in the direction of the gendarmerie (some 2 km away).”²²⁴ He added: “As we arrived a few metres from the gendarmerie, they began firing on the crowd. I was in the front line. They didn’t shoot in the air but in the direction of the crowd, with arms. People were killed instantly. I was shot in the left leg, above the knee. I was taken to Moundou hospital. I stayed there for a week. People from the village raised money to pay for my care. I can walk now but it still hurts.”

A woman at the scene also told Amnesty International:²²⁵ “I was part of the crowd in Krim-Krim. I was shot in the hip and thigh. I was taken to the hospital. I stayed there for three weeks. I haven’t worked for three years. I go to the hospital every week for treatment. Women have lost their husbands. They can’t take care of their children anymore.”

The government authorities have not publicly taken a position on this incident. The prefect of Guéni responded to several Chadian media sources to confirm the death toll and state that nearly 400 people had “attacked” the gendarmerie to obtain the “release” of the detained person.²²⁶ Amnesty International was unable to obtain the government’s version. The public prosecutor in Moundou did not respond to our requests.

According to the residents of the villages and the Ligue Tchadienne des Droits de l’Homme, no investigation or legal action has been initiated to shed light on this incident. The detainee spent four months in Moundou prison before being released without charge.²²⁷ According to witnesses interviewed by Amnesty International, no villagers were questioned by the courts.²²⁸

Another case where the use of firearms appears to have violated the right to life took place on 14 January 2025 in Laramanaye, in the department of Monts de Lam, province of Logone Oriental, during clashes between herders and farmers. Several episodes of violence broke out in early 2025 in that region. These incidents were documented by several media outlets and a CAMOL report.²²⁹ On the night of 4-5 January

²²² United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Principle 9. Amnesty International, The Use of Force, Chapter 2, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/use_of_force.pdf

²²³ In-person interviews, July 2023 and October 2024, in Moundou and Krim-Krim and the Ligue tchadienne des Droits de l’homme, *Rapport sur les événements de Krim-Krim*, 30 November 2022 (copy with Amnesty International).

²²⁴ In-person interview with a resident of Koutoumare, October 2024, in Moundou.

²²⁵ In-person interview with a resident of Koutoumare, October 2024, in Moundou.

²²⁶ Tchad: huit morts et plusieurs blessés en marge de nouvelles violences intercommunautaires, AA, 23 November 2022, available at <https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/tchad-huit-morts-et-plusieurs-bless%C3%A9s-en-marge-de-nouvelles-violences-intercommunautaires/2746557>

²²⁷ In-person interview in Moundou on 01 October 2024.

²²⁸ In-person interview in Moundou on 01 October 2024 and in Krim-Krim on 05 July 2023.

²²⁹ Tchadinfos, Logone Oriental: *des inconnus enlèvent une femme et réclament une rançon de 50 millions*, 09 January 2025, available at <https://tchadinfos.com/logone-oriental-des-inconnus-enlèvent-une-femme-et-reclament-une-rancon-de-50->

2025, a woman was abducted from the village of Ngaram Tapol. On 10 January, three young people from the village of Bedara were attacked. One of them was killed and a motorcycle was stolen. In response, on the same day, residents of Béyon kidnapped and killed a herder.²³⁰ Three village chiefs, including that of Béyon, were arrested by security forces.²³¹ According to the CAMOL report, which interviewed various authorities and stakeholders, and the LTDH, on 12 January, a young man from Seh was found with his throat slit. Angered, locals took his body to the sub-prefecture of Laramanaye before placing it on the road, stopping all traffic. Authorities then tried to defuse the situation by asking the young people to put their demands in writing.²³²



© → Women's demonstration on 14 January 2025 in Tapol in the sub-prefecture of Laramanaye © Facebook page L'âme du Tchad

On 14 January, women demonstrated in front of the sub-prefecture with the child of the abducted woman,²³³ while young people demonstrated at the gendarmerie. They were demanding the release of the village chiefs arrested following the murder of the herder. According to press reports²³⁴ and the CAMOL report, the gendarmes responded by opening fire, killing four youths and wounding three others.²³⁵ As far as Amnesty International is aware, no investigation has been opened into this incident.

https://www.lepaystchad.com/39711/?fbclid=IwY2xjawlapndleHRuA2FibQlxMQABHTq1ud2y_g9KXc9CGegIQGDmRYbuASXR1JLLo-L2yvwUGUR5GgqwKHEXChQ_aem_bs79auGiZbPVXcuejFRtxg and CAMOL, Rapport sur les tueries dans le département de Laramanaye du 17 au 19 janvier 2025, copy with Amnesty International.

²³¹ CAMOL, Rapport sur les tueries dans le département de Laramanaye du 17 au 19 janvier 2025, copy with Amnesty International.

²³² CAMOL, Rapport sur les tueries dans le département de Laramanaye du 17 au 19 janvier 2025, copy with Amnesty International; p. 6

²³³ Le pays Tchad, Logone Oriental: des femmes du village Laramanaye manifestent torses nus pour protester contre l'insécurité croissante, 14 January 2025 available at

https://www.lepaystchad.com/39711/?fbclid=IwY2xjawlapnxleHRuA2FibQlxMQABHZvhvUZH4qqpphlwQgP6UkHxzp2OiWGTmpt8hqyXJQiJ56TK-M1Q5W4xQ_aem_sIAE5ac50amemHejsQT4VA

²³⁴ Tchadinfos, Logone Oriental: quatre morts et plusieurs blessés dans une manifestation à Laramanaye, 16 January 2025, available at <https://tchadinfos.com/logone-oriental-quatre-morts-et-plusieurs-blesses-dans-une-manifestation-a-larmanaye/>

²³⁵ CAMOL, Rapport sur les tueries dans le département de Laramanaye du 17 au 19 janvier 2025, copy with Amnesty International, p. 6.

5.1.4 DIFFICULT DISARMAMENT

“Above all, we wonder why the army does not stop the massacres and why weapons are able to circulate so freely. It has been difficult to remove them despite the commissions established.”²³⁶

Under international human rights law, the Chadian authorities have a duty to exercise due diligence by taking reasonable positive measures to respond to reasonably foreseeable threats to life from individuals. Authorities are thus obliged to take adequate preventive measures, in the face of reasonably foreseeable threats, to protect people from murders or homicides committed by individuals, including by curbing the proliferation of potentially lethal weapons in the hands of individuals who are not authorized to possess them.²³⁷

Under the principle of due diligence, authorities should apply a minimum licensing requirement designed to prevent small arms and light weapons from falling into the hands of people who may misuse them.²³⁸ The Bamako Declaration on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons calls on African States to adopt strict legislation to control the acquisition, possession, use and transfer of small arms and light weapons, to strengthen stockpile traceability and security mechanisms, and to combat corruption facilitating illicit trafficking. It underlines the importance of regional cooperation, exchange of information and harmonization of laws to effectively combat cross-border proliferation. States are also encouraged to raise awareness on the dangers of arms, promote voluntary disarmament, integrate arms concerns into reintegration programmes for ex-combatants, and work closely with civil society to build a culture of peace and human security.²³⁹

Chad regulates the circulation of firearms among individuals through Ordinance No. 26/PG-INT of 28 October 1968, which requires prior authorization from the relevant government authority for any acquisition (import, purchase, donation, inheritance, loan) and involves issuing an individual holder’s permit, accompanied by a regular check of morality and skills of the holder. To carry a weapon in public, an individual must also obtain, from the district head of their place of residence, an annual carrier’s permit subject to a tax, under penalty of dissuasive criminal penalties in the event of unauthorized detention or use.²⁴⁰

The wide circulation of arms in Chad is one of the factors fuelling conflicts between herders and farmers. Initially used by herdsmen as a means of protection from groups of bandits, they are now also used in clashes between communities.²⁴¹ In all the cases studied in this report, the presence of weapons of war and other firearms is mentioned by the witnesses of the incidents.

Possession of weapons of war is illegal. According to Article 301 of the Criminal Code, “Those who engage (...) in the possession of firearms (...) shall be punished by imprisonment of five to ten years and a fine of 500,000 to 15,000,000 FCFA or one of these penalties alone.”²⁴²

Determining the number of weapons in circulation in Chad is complex due to the clandestine nature of gun ownership and the lack of official data. Their movement is facilitated by the presence of armed conflicts on the Cameroonian, Sudanese and Central African borders and the porosity of these borders. Asked about the circulation of arms, the Minister of Security and Immigration said that “to end the conflict, we also need to control the circulation of arms but Chad is surrounded by countries in conflict and weapons circulate”. Together with the disarmament commission, we are trying to recover as many weapons as possible.”²⁴³ He added: “Everyone is armed to defend themselves as the population is losing confidence in the security and public services.”

²³⁶ In-person interview with a member of civil society, May 2023, in N'Djamena.

²³⁷ HRC, GC 36, para 21.

²³⁸ A/HRC/Sub.1/58/27 *, para. 16, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g06/131/37/pdf/g0613137.pdf>

²³⁹ <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/bamako-declaration-fr.pdf>

²⁴⁰ Ordinance No.26/PG-INT of 28 October 1968, regulating the import, transport, sale and possession of firearms and ammunition in the Republic of Chad available at <https://unmondeforimidable.over-blog.com/article-tchad-armes-et-munitions-et-si-on-appliquait-la-reglementation-87849398.html>

²⁴¹ BRYA Elisabeth Grâce, *Rapport de l'analyse des dynamiques des conflits au Tchad*, March 2024, copy with Amnesty International, p. 19

²⁴² Chad, *Penal Code 2017 Law No.2017-01 of 8 May 2017* available at <https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/cha213367.pdf>

²⁴³ In-person interview with the Minister of Security and Immigration, May 2023, in N'Djamena.

The price of weapons, especially AK47s, seems to have fallen sharply on the black market in the region. Although there is no exact data, weapons are likely traded, for example, for around USD 830 in Sudan.²⁴⁴ Several witnesses, members of civil society and experts that Amnesty International met stressed the role of neo-herders, often administrators, in terms of the circulation of weapons and the origin of the arming of herdsmen. According to a member of civil society met in N'Djamena who works on these issues, herdsmen who receive a weapon from an administrator to transport livestock do not hesitate to use it because they enjoy a level of protection that confers impunity. A canton-level cooperative advisor met by Amnesty International said: "I am not talking about farmer/herder conflict but about administrator/farmer conflicts, because the cattle belong to the administrators who move with their cattle."²⁴⁵ The role of neo-herders was also mentioned by the Ministry of Justice, which stated that: "Wealthy people have got into cattle rearing and use herdsmen who are armed"²⁴⁶ and by the Ministry of Security, which recalled that: "The question of neo-herders is real and this is something that Marshal Idriss Déby Itno has opposed. He said at the time that administrators should keep their mind focused on their work and not other things."²⁴⁷

In 2021, the transitional government issued a decree establishing a joint disarmament commission²⁴⁸ for a two-month renewable period, whose mission was to recover all illegally held weapons.²⁴⁹ On 27 October 2022, during a press conference, the commission announced that it had recovered more than 6,000 weapons from civilians since its creation.²⁵⁰ On 19 July 2024, the commission presented 3,094 seized weapons during a new press conference.²⁵¹ However, on 22 July 2024, the Chadian government dissolved the commission.²⁵² The precise reasons for its dissolution have not been clearly communicated by Chadian authorities and Amnesty International has not been able to obtain information in this regard.

During interviews with witnesses to the various attacks documented in this report, they all stated that they had not had a visit from the Disarmament Commission in their area and stated that weapons were circulating freely. According to them, the herdsmen are armed by the neo-herders, while others have bought theirs from armed groups in the CAR or traffickers present at the border.²⁵³

According to an expert from CRASH, the disarmament commission did not have the resources to carry out large-scale monitoring. It did visit a few villages and retrieve weapons but was unable to carry out excavations throughout the territory.²⁵⁴

The insufficient number of police stations and gendarmerie in areas of clashes between herders and farmers, the lack of resources allocated to the defence and security forces for rapid interventions despite an increasing budget, the lack of sustainable structuring of the committees for consultation and conflict resolution, the lack of diversity among local administrators and the presence of herders among them, leading to criticism of bias in conflict management, the potentially illegal use of force by the defence and security forces as well as the ineffectiveness of the fight to combat the circulation of arms are thus all breaches of the Chadian State's duty to protect the right to life under international human rights law and national law.

²⁴⁴ BBC News Africa, Les AK-47 vendus au marché noir inondent la capitale Soudanaise, 24 August 2023, available at <https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/c51rpyl6qdyo>

²⁴⁵ In-person interview in Moundou in October 2024.

²⁴⁶ In-person interview in N'Djamena in September 2024.

²⁴⁷ In-person interview in N'Djamena in May 2023.

²⁴⁸ SGG Chad, Order No.028/CMT/PCMT/2021 of 15 June 2021 available at <https://www.facebook.com/share/15hSBaRWWj/>

²⁴⁹ Article 2

²⁵⁰ Alwihda info, Tchad: la commission mixte de désarmement présente 1913 armes de guerre, 27 October 2022, available at https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-la-commission-mixte-de-desarmement-presente-1913-armes-de-guerre_a118536.html

²⁵¹ Alwihda Info, Tchad - Lutte contre les armes illégales: Succès significatif de la Commission Mixte de Désarmement, 19 July 2024, available at https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-Lutte-contre-les-armes-illegales-Succes-significatif-de-la-Commission-Mixte-de-Desarmement_a133986.html

²⁵² SGG Chad, Decree No.0113/PR/2024 of 22 July 2024, available at <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/15cCxxENnp/>

²⁵³ In-person interviews in N'Djamena and Moundou in May 2023, September and October 2024.

²⁵⁴ In-person interview with a CRASH expert, May 2023, in N'Djamena.

5.2 FAILURE TO PROTECT THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE

5.2.1 STATE'S DUTIES

A State's duty to respect and protect human rights includes an obligation to investigate cases of human rights violations, so that perpetrators of violations are prosecuted and tried, and that victims of violations receive justice and reparations, and to guarantee the non-repetition of such violations. The right to an effective remedy therefore represents a pillar of international human rights law, anchored in legal instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.²⁵⁵ These provisions highlight the duty of States to ensure effective access to justice, thereby ensuring that victims can obtain truth, justice and reparation for the violations they have suffered.

Access to a competent, impartial and independent tribunal²⁵⁶ is an essential element of a victim's right to justice. Article 26 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which Chad ratified in 1986, in particular imposes a requirement to guarantee the independence of the courts. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights' "Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa" also specifies the duties of States in guaranteeing the independence of the courts and the right to a fair trial.²⁵⁷ In addition, the right of victims to obtain reparation refers to the duty of States to provide victims of human rights violations with prompt, adequate and effective measures to redress the suffering endured. The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law specify that reparation must be comprehensive, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.²⁵⁸

5.2.2 FAILURES OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Lack of judicial resources

Amnesty International met with Ministry of Justice officials, who acknowledged that the justice system faces many challenges. In particular, they highlighted the lack of resources allocated to the institution, in particular "in the interior of the country", which limits its ability to carry out its missions.²⁵⁹ The General Secretary of the Ministry clarified that "there are courts of first instance in all sub-prefectures, but they lack resources". In particular, he mentioned the lack of transportation (vehicles and fuel), thus limiting the ability of justice system officials to travel. According to him, "Some [judicial staff] are forced to take money out of their own pockets to travel." Moreover, the lack of computers and trained staff likely aggravates the daily difficulties the judicial sector faces. Forensic analysis in cases of deadly clashes between herders and farmers is non-existent. On this last point, by way of illustration, a lawyer involved in the Bara 2 case testified that he found that victims of the attack on the village had been buried before any forensic analyses could be carried out.²⁶⁰

Moreover, according to the General, Secretary: "The budgets of the judiciary are being squeezed and we do not always receive the budgeted amounts."²⁶¹ The Justice Sector Policy (PSJ) 2018-2027 also²⁶² identified several bottlenecks in the administration of justice, including "judicial power, which suffers interference from

²⁵⁵ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 8; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 2; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 7; United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 14; among other examples.

²⁵⁶ African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 26; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14.

²⁵⁷ Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, <https://achpr.au.int/en/node/879>, 2003.

²⁵⁸ United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Principle 18, Available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-and-guidelines-right-remedy-and-reparation>

²⁵⁹ In-person interview with several officials of the Ministry of Justice, September 2024, in N'Djamena.

²⁶⁰ In-person interview in N'Djamena in September 2024.

²⁶¹ In-person interview with the General Secretary of the Ministry of Justice, September 2024, in N'Djamena.

²⁶² Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, Justice Sector Policy 2018-2027, July 2018, copy with Amnesty International.

other powers, religious, traditional / customary, legislative or executive” and “the justice sector’s impoverishment”.²⁶³

It should be noted, however, that the total budget of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights did increase significantly between 2023 and 2024. In 2023, it was 13.86 billion FCFA (USD 23.10 million)²⁶⁴ and by 2024 it had reached 18.73 billion FCFA (USD 31.22 million), an increase of 35%. In 2025, a draft budget was proposed to an amount of 23.18 billion FCFA (USD 38.63 million),²⁶⁵ representing an increase of some 24% on the previous year. Since 2011, a Justice Reform Support Programme (PRAJUST) has been supported by the European Union and implemented by the Chadian government. It finances the PSJ.²⁶⁶ Its main objective is to strengthen the efficiency, independence and accessibility of the justice system in Chad.

The resource shortfalls noted by the Ministry (despite recent budget increases) may be down to corruption. A lawyer²⁶⁷ interviewed by Amnesty International said: “There are very few honest magistrates. Justice has become a business. The highest bidder wins. People are asking lawyers to pay the judges. People can pay for detainees to be released.”

In 2024, the Universal Periodic Review of Chad highlighted several concerns regarding the judiciary, including its lack of independence, the pressures that judges may be subjected to and the lack of resources.²⁶⁸ In addition, the²⁶⁹ parallel civil society report on the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption in Chad, published in 2024 by the Organisation Tchadienne Anti-Corruption and the Coalition pour la Convention highlights the low trust citizens place in the judicial system. Written in the context of the Tenth Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, the document highlights the persistent political influence exerted over the justice system and the trivialization of corrupt practices, despite a legal framework supposed to guarantee its independence.

Populations lack of resources and a lack of trust in the justice sector

A 2018 Chad security perception study conducted by Coginta and CRASH revealed significant public distrust in the justice system. Of those surveyed, 56% believed that the courts were corrupt, and 46% said they did not trust court institutions. The main criticisms concerned the delays in proceedings, the lack of access to judicial services, especially in rural areas, and the perceived interference of administrative and military authorities in court cases.²⁷⁰

Many witnesses to episodes of violence met by Amnesty International to investigate the cases presented in this report expressed a lack of trust in judicial institutions. Among others, a 35-year-old man who was the victim of the attack on the village of Mempon told Amnesty International: “We did not file complaints because we do not believe in the justice system.”²⁷¹ A man from Bendjabo whose village was attacked echoed this sentiment, saying, “We have no trust in the justice system.”²⁷²

Several victims of violence encountered by Amnesty International also stressed that they did not have the financial means to hire lawyers and take legal action.²⁷³

Lawyers who have worked or are working on the cases of Sandana 1 and 2, Bara 2, Pala Koudja or cases of violence in Logone Oriental have explained to Amnesty International that the legal aid provided by Law No.

²⁶³ Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, Justice Sector Policy 2018-2027, July 2018, copy with Amnesty International, p. 17.

²⁶⁴ Draft Finance Act 2023, available at http://185.52.150.32/upload/publications/2023/Projet_%20de%20Loi%20des%20Finances%202023.pdf, p. 122.

²⁶⁵ Finance Bill 2025 available at <https://dgi.td/docs/lf/LF2025.pdf>, p. 93.

²⁶⁶ Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, Justice Sector Policy 2018-2027, July 2018, copy with Amnesty International.

²⁶⁷ Interview with Palakoudja's lawyers in October 2025 in N'Djamena.

²⁶⁸ Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Forty-fifth session, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 22 January–2 February 2024, available at https://upr-info.org/sites/default/files/country-document/2024-01/A_HRC_WG.6_45_TCD_3_EN.pdf, P 3.

²⁶⁹ Organisation Tchadienne Anticorruption, Rapport de la société civile sur la mise en oeuvre du chapitre 2 et du chapitre 4 de la convention des Nations-Unies contre la corruption, 2024, available at <https://uncaccoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/Rapport-parallele-OTAC-UNCAC-Coalition-fevrier-2024-FR.pdf>

²⁷⁰ Coginta, Rapport d'enquete sur la perception et les attentes de la population en matière de sécurité dans les localités couvertes par SECUTCHAD, 2018, available at <https://coginta.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/2018-COGINTA-Etude-de-perception-sur-la-securite-au-Tchad.pdf>

²⁷¹ In-person interview with a resident of Mempon, October 2024, in Moundou.

²⁷² In-person interview with a resident of Bendjabo, July 2023, in Andoum.

²⁷³ Interviews in July 2023 and October 2024 in Goré and Moundou.

021/PR/2019²⁷⁴ is insufficient for the victims and this discourages them because the legal costs have to be borne by the civil parties. According to a lawyer²⁷⁵ interviewed by Amnesty International: “Legal and judicial assistance is slow and even sometimes not working. The victims do not have the means to pay a lawyer or a bailiff to establish the facts.”

The Law provides for the payment of costs related to the proceedings, in particular lawyers' fees, expert opinions and court documents, and establishes a National Commission responsible for the allocation of this aid (Articles 3). Assistance is not *de jure* but may be requested by any person meeting vulnerability criteria or by the judge hearing the case (Article 5). However, despite this favourable legal framework, several barriers hinder its effective implementation: a lack of knowledge of the law by the people concerned, administrative delays, limited financial resources and the unequal distribution of services across the territory.

The lawyers for the victims of Bara 2, Pala Koudja and Sandana stated that most of them do not wish to defend this type of case for lack of remuneration. They told Amnesty International that they had worked at their own expense with minimal financial support from the communities or elites based in N'Djamena. One of the lawyers that worked on the Bara 2 case told Amnesty International: “The lawyers worked *pro bono*, we had to pay for the travel costs of the judicial police officers out of our own pocket, and for the monitoring of the procedure.”²⁷⁶ Those in Sandana said: “We worked *pro bono*. The victims do not financially support our work. There is no association supporting us financially.”²⁷⁷

According to lawyers interviewed by Amnesty International, the financial costs associated with legal proceedings are often prohibitive for victims and, as a result, they may have to prioritize the use of out-of-court settlements or decide to take justice into their own hands.²⁷⁸

According to the lawyer for the victims of the violence that took place in the village of Pala Koudja (Logone Occidental) on 30 August 2024, no complaint has yet been filed because the court fees are too high for the victims.

One lawyer involved in the cases of clashes between herders and farmers in Sandana said: “Customary justice (*dya*) takes over. But money is insufficient reparation for a dead man.”²⁷⁹ According to one representative of an NGO working on agro-pastoralism,²⁸⁰ “In Chad, the traditional chieftdom reaches over and above the justice system. We settle amicably.”

5.2.3 IMPUNITY FOR MANY CASES OF VIOLENCE

“The enforcement of court decisions is a serious problem”²⁸¹

While several of the cases of violence between herders and farmers studied in this report have been the subject of legal proceedings, impunity remains a strong marker of these cases, fueling the cycle of violence, victims' distrust of the justice system and a spirit of revenge.

According to the judgement of the Sarh Court of Appeal of 21 May 2024 in the case of the violence that took place on 25 May 2023 in the village of Bara 2 (Mandoul), eight men were arrested on the day of the attack, in possession of eight Kalashnikovs and a pistol. At the end of the investigation, a total of 18 people, including a farmer, were tried before the Sarh Court of Appeal. They were prosecuted for assault and battery, murder, illegal possession of weapons of war, aggravated theft, destruction and extortion of property. At the end of the trial, which included 44 civil parties, the farmer was sentenced to three years in prison. Two

²⁷⁴ Chad, Law No. 021/PR/2019 Governing Legal Aid and Legal Assistance, available at <https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/2019/fr/123755>

²⁷⁵ In-person interview with the Palakoudja victims' lawyer, October 2024, in N'Djamena.

²⁷⁶ In-person interview with the lawyers of the victims of Bara, September 2024, in N'Djamena.

²⁷⁷ In-person interview with the lawyers of the victims of Bara, September 2024, in N'Djamena.

²⁷⁸ SOUGNABE Pabamé, REOUNODJI Frédéric, *Mécanismes de Prévention et de Gestion des Conflits dans les Zones d'Intervention du Projet ACCEPT*, March 2021 (copy with Amnesty International) pp. 41-46.

²⁷⁹ In-person interview with victims' lawyer, September 2024, in N'Djamena.

²⁸⁰ In-person interview with a representative of an NGO working in the agri-livestock sector, May 2023, in N'Djamena.

²⁸¹ In-person interview with the lawyer of the victims of Pala Koudja, October 2024, in N'Djamena.

people were acquitted, while 15 others were sentenced to life imprisonment and ordered to pay 215 million FCFA in damages.²⁸² They did not appeal.²⁸³

While the cases of violence in **Sandana** in 2019 and 2022 gave rise to legal proceedings and court decisions, interference in the exercise of justice and impunity was highlighted by the authorities themselves, and some actors in the case.

Indeed, the Commission of Inquiry into the Sandana incidents, along with members of civil society and human rights NGOs, have highlighted the role of local authorities and security forces in perpetuating impunity. In particular, the commission revealed that, in 2019, the prefect of Barh-Kôh deliberately prevented the arrest of an individual wanted for the attack on Sandana in 2019 and whose accidental death in 2022 was at the origin of the attack on the same village in that year.²⁸⁴ According to the Commission of Inquiry: **“A major player in the August 2019 conflict, Al Hadj Mahamat Bichir Chiguéfate, should have been arrested as part of the investigation opened by the Sarh investigating judge. However, while the Sarh District Prosecutor's Office was trying to arrest him, the prefect of Barh-Kôh at the time, Fidèle Banat, obstructed them. In reality, the impunity resulting from the lack of suppression following the August 2019 conflict, due to the interference of the prefect of Barh-Kôh, made it easy for the killers to pull the trigger.”**²⁸⁵

A letter from the public prosecutor of the Sarh Court of Appeal of 21 November 2019 addressed to the prefect of Barh-Koh notes the latter's obstruction of the implementation of several arrest warrants as part of the judicial proceedings opened following the killings in Sandana in 2019.²⁸⁶ A lawyer who worked on the Sandana case also claimed that people named in the case were not questioned, despite the fact that they could be located. He said: “People on the run continue to circulate in Moyen-Chari and they are armed.”²⁸⁷ According to him, **“Not everyone can obtain justice. Some people are protected.” A civil society member from Sarh told Amnesty International that “some actors are still on the loose, the perpetrator of the journalist's murder was arrested and then he fled. In February, he returned to the Dembo area on the border with the CAR, seemingly unworried.”**²⁸⁸

The commission also highlighted the behaviour of some members of the security forces who obstructed its work. Thus, according to the Commission: “Some security service officials have remained in contact with alleged perpetrators of the Sandana massacre to inform them of all the movements of the Commission of Inquiry, to the point of providing cover for wanted individuals, who have managed to travel to Sarh several times since.” By way of illustration, an officer who was ensuring the safety of the Commission of Inquiry in Sandana exchanged 104 phone calls with Garam Chaï [one of the suspects of the killing]. Field missions to apprehend suspects failed due to collusion between these wanted persons and certain gendarmes in the area covering localities spread over the provinces of Moyen Chari and Mandoul.²⁸⁹

Elements of the security forces also facilitated the escape of one of the suspects in the Sandana killings, according to the Commission of Inquiry: “The lack of frank collaboration was at the origin of the escape of Abdelkarim Aya, suspected torturer and murderer of the Radio Lotiko journalist, from the Sarh gendarmerie, who managed to flee without any gendarme firing warning shots to stop him.”

Finally, two decisions were passed on the Sandana killings. First, concerning the incidents of 2019, the Sarh Court of Appeal issued a decision on 04 April 2023, handing down convictions for murder against three farmers and five herders, and aggravated robbery against one herder. Of the convicted herders, four were tried *in absentia*, including those convicted of the murder of three religious leaders. The convicted individuals were also ordered to pay 300,000,000 FCFA (approximately USD 48,407) in damages.²⁹⁰

The Sarh Court of Appeal passed a subsequent decision on the 2022 attacks on 15 May 2024.²⁹¹ Ten people were sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, aggravated theft and illegal possession of weapons of war, four of whom were still at large (convicted *in absentia*). One defendant was fined 5,000,000 FCFA

²⁸² Sarh Court of Appeal, Criminal Judgment; Directory No.020/2024, 21 May 2024, copy with Amnesty International.

²⁸³ In-person and telephone interview with Bara victims' lawyers in September and December 2024.

²⁸⁴ Commission of Inquiry into the Sandana events instituted by Decision No.001/PCMT/PMT/2022, *Rapport d'enquête sur les événements de Sandana*, September 2022, copy obtained by Amnesty International.

²⁸⁵ Commission of Inquiry into the Sandana events instituted by Decision No.001/PCMT/PMT/2022, *Rapport d'enquête sur les événements de Sandana*, September 2022, copy obtained by Amnesty International.

²⁸⁶ Commission of Inquiry into the Sandana events instituted by Decision No.001/PCMT/PMT/2022, *Rapport d'enquête sur les événements de Sandana*, September 2022, copy obtained by Amnesty International.

²⁸⁷ In-person interview in N'Djamena in October 2024.

²⁸⁸ Telephone interview with a member of civil society in Sarh in June 2025.

²⁸⁹ Commission of Inquiry into the Sandana Events instituted by Decision No.001/PCMT/PMT/2022, *Rapport d'enquête sur les événements de Sandana*, September 2022, copy obtained by Amnesty International.

²⁹¹ Sarh Court of Appeal, Criminal Order No. 010/2024, 15 May 2024, copy with Amnesty International.

(USD 8,333) for illegal possession of a firearm, and another was sentenced to five years imprisonment for concealment. Seven individuals remain the subject of arrest warrants without prior conviction. Two defendants were acquitted due to benefit of the doubt. The civil parties were awarded a total compensation of 200,000,000 FCFA (USD 333,333) for material, physical and moral damages.²⁹²

As for the case of the clashes in Pala Koudja, which left three dead and seven injured, the victims' lawyer claimed that they were unable to file complaints due to financial difficulties and because no legal proceedings had been opened by the authorities.²⁹³ Finally, with regard to the attacks on villages in Logone Oriental in April and May 2023, legal proceedings were opened for those of May 2023, involving six people.

Province	Case	Judicial situation
Moyen-Chari	Sandana (2019)	Judgment Court of Appeal of Sarh (04 April 2023): 3 sentences of 10 years in prison for murder; 5 of life for murder (4 in absentia); 1 sentence of 10 years in prison for aggravated theft; and FCFA 300 000 in damages for the victims.
Moyen-Chari	Sandana (2022)	Judgment Court of Appeal of Sarh (15 May 2024): 10 life sentences (4 in absentia); 1 sentence of 5 years in prison for concealment; 1 sentence of a fine for illegal possession of a weapon, 2 acquitted; FCFA 200 000 in damages for the victims.
Mandoul	Bara 2 (2023)	Judgment Sarh Court of Appeal (21 May 2024): 15 life sentences; 1 sentence of 3 years in prison, 2 acquittals; FCFA 215 000 in damages for the victims.
Logone Oriental	Case April 2023 (Bendjabo, Mempon, Dangdah, Dogoro)	No proceedings initiated. No complaint filed
	Case of May 2023 (Don, Kamkoutou, Mankat, Bedoli 2)	Court of First Instance of Goré: Legal proceedings against 6 individuals.
	Laramanaye (January 2025)	No proceedings initiated.
Logone Occidental	Krim-Krim (November 2022)	No proceedings initiated.
	Pala Koudja (August 2024)	No proceedings initiated.

☞ Table of judicial positions concerning the cases presented in the report.

²⁹² Sarh Court of Appeal, Criminal Order No. 010/2024, 15 May 2024, copy with Amnesty International.

²⁹³ In-person interview with the lawyer of the victims of Pala Koudja, October 2024, in N'Djamena and complaints (viewed by Amnesty International) and email exchanges in May and June 2025.

Barriers to the payment of damages to victims

“The court fees are high, the families had to pay 7 million FCFA (USD 11,137) for enforcement of the decision, equivalent to 3% of the total amount recorded.”²⁹⁴

In the context of payment of damages, court costs relate to the costs of the legal proceedings that a party must bear to enforce a court decision. This means that when a person obtains a court decision in their favour and the other party is ordered to pay them damages, they may have to incur additional costs to get that decision enforced, such as bailiff fees or court costs.

In the Sandana and Bara 2 cases, where the court awarded damages to the civil parties, the victims are currently unable to pay the amount of costs that would allow them to obtain the sums due. The State must take measures to remedy this barrier to the victims' right to reparation. According to the lawyers, discussions are underway, particularly in Sandana, to ensure that decisions are enforced and that court costs are deducted once the damages have been paid. In the case of Bara 2, contributions are apparently underway to support the victims.²⁹⁵

The meagre resources allocated to the justice sector, despite an increasing budget, which hinder its proper functioning and independence, the financial barriers that prevent the victims of clashes between herders and farmers from bearing the costs of a lawyer and the costs of justice, the obstruction by state officials in the execution of arrest warrants and other attacks on the independence of the Chadian courts, all contribute to the lack of court cases in many incidents of violence, the impunity of many responsible for this violence and the lack of justice and reparations for the victims. These are all failures, by the Chadian State, to fulfill its obligations to protect the victims' right to truth, justice and reparation under international human rights law and national law.

²⁹⁴ In-person interview with the lawyers of the Sandana victims, October 2024, in N'Djamena and Article 436 of the General Tax Code, available at <https://dgi.td/docs/cgi/CGI2016.pdf>

²⁹⁵ Email interview with Sandana and Bara victims' lawyers in February 2025.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The violence that occurred between 2022 and 2024 in the provinces of Mandoul, Logone Oriental, Logone Occidental and Moyen-Chari illustrates the ongoing tensions between herders and farmers in Chad, exacerbated by factors such as climate change, demographic pressure and problems of access to natural resources. Despite the recurrent nature of these crises, authorities' responses remain insufficient.

An analysis of the facts reveals a double failure on the part of the Chadian State: on the one hand, a difficulty in preventing violence and intervening diligently to protect populations, despite prior alerts; on the other hand, a lack of legal proceedings against the alleged perpetrators, apart from rare cases such as those of Sandana and Bara 2. This situation fuels a sense of impunity and marginalization within the affected communities.

Under regional and international human rights standards, the Chadian state has a duty to ensure the safety of all citizens, investigate crimes committed, bring those responsible to justice, and ensure effective access to redress mechanisms.

In order to stop such conflicts from recurring, structural, sustainable and human rights-based responses are needed. This includes strengthening conflict prevention mechanisms, providing independent and accessible justice, and ensuring better governance of natural resources.

Amnesty International thus recommends:

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CHAD:

- Develop a coherent legal framework on transhumance, in consultation with representatives of herding communities, farmers and civil society organizations, that defines the periods, corridors, resting points and rules for the use of natural resources, taking into account climatic and demographic realities.
- Revive joint committees composed of herders, farmers, local authorities and state representatives in order to prevent conflicts and locally manage incidents related to the passage of herds.
- Make the implementation of the national climate change adaptation plan a government priority, particularly with regard to climate impacts on the agriculture and livestock sectors, by calling on international partners to provide adequate technical and financial support to implement prevention, adaptation and remediation policies, and to invest in strengthening data collection on climate change and its impacts.
- Adopt measures to prevent conflicts of interest related to the phenomenon of administrator-herders and ensure their impartiality when handling agro-pastoral disputes.
- Adopt and implement measures to control the use of weapons by individuals, by establishing an effective licensing system, promoting regular disarmament operations and establishing an effective control system.

- Invite the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change and Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence of the UN Human Rights Council to visit Chad.
- Submit the declaration under Article 34.6 of the Additional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights to enable individuals and NGOs to bring cases before the Court.

TO THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION:

- Create, as needed, police stations near areas identified as having a high potential for conflict and strengthen existing ones; ensure that these stations are sufficiently staffed and provided with adequate means of communication and transport, so that they can interact regularly with the surrounding villages, carry out prevention patrols, respond to alerts and reach the locations as quickly as possible in the event of an incident.
- Include modules on human rights, mediation, community conflict management and violence prevention in the training of security officers.
- Apply clear guidelines prohibiting the unlawful use of force by security forces during demonstrations or interventions, in accordance with international principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials, including the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Guidelines for the Policing of Assemblies by Law Enforcement Officials in Africa.
- Guarantee the support of security forces in the proper administration of justice and, in particular, in the execution of arrest warrants; sanction security service personnel who obstruct the smooth running of justice.
- Take all other necessary measures to prevent violence and protect people's right to life.

TO THE COMPETENT JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES:

- Ensure effective, independent and impartial judicial investigations into all cases of violence between farmers and herders; if there is sufficient evidence, prosecute and try those suspected of murder, serious injury, looting/destruction of livestock, houses, fields and other essential livelihoods through fair trials before competent, independent and impartial courts.
- In particular, ensure that legal proceedings are opened and promptly initiated on the cases of violence that took place in the village of Pala Koudja as well as in the villages of Monts de Lam and Nya Pende documented in this report.
- Ensure that victims of the violence between farmers and herders are able to participate in legal proceedings, by being able to lodge a complaint within or outside any existing proceedings, to be heard by judges, and to benefit from prompt and effective legal aid.
- Ensure that victims of violence between farmers and herders can obtain, where necessary, appropriate reparations, including taking the necessary measures to ensure the effective enforcement of court decisions, granting damages to victims and waiving the costs imposed on victims to ensure the enforcement of decisions, so that they can receive their compensation.
- Ensure effective, independent and impartial judicial investigations into all alleged cases of unlawful use of force by defence and security forces during demonstrations; if there is sufficient evidence, prosecute and try persons suspected of murder and other human rights violations through fair trials before competent, independent and impartial courts.
- Ensure respect for the right of victims and families of victims of human rights violations by defence and security forces to participate in judicial proceedings, and to obtain justice and adequate compensation for the harm suffered.
- Provide the provinces with functioning courts, competent judicial personnel, and sufficient logistical means to effectively deal with land and agropastoral disputes and human rights violations.
- Take all other necessary measures to respect and guarantee the rights to truth, justice and reparation of those affected by the violence.

TO CHAD'S INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS:

- Provide financial support for regional programmes to regulate transhumance and reduce conflicts between herders and farmers.
- Support the revision of Chad's legislative and institutional framework to strengthen the management of agro-pastoral violence and improve the effectiveness of the criminal justice system.
- Support Chadian authorities in the implementation of policies to adapt to the effects of climate change, particularly in areas of high agro-pastoral vulnerability, and to provide redress for victims of human rights violations related to the effects of climate change.
- Commit to a complete, rapid, equitable and funded phase-out of fossil fuels.
- Provide support for loss and damage to communities caused by climate change, including through increased funding for the Loss and Damage Response Fund.



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LIVE OFF THE LAND AND DIE FOR IT

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CONFLICTS BETWEEN HERDERS AND FARMERS IN CHAD

This report analyses the context and causes of these conflicts, highlighting climate change and its effects on livestock growth in a part of the country that is conducive to livestock breeding, population growth and the expansion of crops, the problem of access to land, as well as proximity to the Central African Republic in the grip of armed conflict.

It documents several cases of violence that occurred between 2022 and 2024 in the provinces of Mandoul, Logone Oriental, Logone Occidental and Moyen-Chari, which resulted in numerous deaths, destruction of homes and property, looting and displacement of populations.

It highlights the State's shortcomings in protecting the right to life in relation to the lack of effective conflict prevention mechanisms, delays in the intervention of security forces, the excessive use of force by the police and an unfinished disarmament process. This report also documents the lack of justice for many cases of violence, interference in legal proceedings and the lack of reparation for victims.

This research is based in particular on three documentation missions carried out in 2023 and 2024 and the testimonies of 110 people, including 70 victims and direct witnesses of violence between farmers and herders. Amnesty International met with members of civil society, lawyers, representatives of development organizations and State representatives at national and provincial level.