



Security Council

Distr.: General
17 October 2025

Original: English

Letter dated 15 October 2025 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts on Yemen* have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel, prepared in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution [2758 \(2024\)](#).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#) on 3 September 2025 and was considered by the Committee on 3 October 2025.

We would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Lipika Majumdar Roy **Choudhury**
Coordinator

(Signed) Ramadan **Moussa**
Expert

(Signed) Patrícia **Pinto**
Expert

(Signed) Miriam **Zampatti**
Expert

* The fifth member of the Panel, Alberic Botella, was appointed by the Secretary-General on 9 September 2025 (see [S/2025/571](#)) and took up his functions on 3 October 2025.



Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)

Summary

During the reporting period, the situation in Yemen continued to deteriorate amid the prolonged effects of more than a decade of conflict, perpetuating one of the world's gravest humanitarian crises in history. Domestic developments remained inextricably linked to broader regional and international dynamics, in particular the ongoing conflict in Gaza. The Houthis continued to pose a significant threat to peace, security and stability in Yemen and across the region. Their deadly attacks against vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden undermined maritime security and the freedom of international trade. Internally, the Houthis endeavoured to consolidate power while resisting meaningful engagement with the Government of Yemen, resulting in a stalemate in the peace process.

The Houthis' armed forces increased their combat readiness and preparedness. Mobilization and recruitment efforts continued unabated. Along the front lines, the population is exposed to the risk of sniper attacks and shelling. In areas under Houthi control, the group intensified repressive measures and surveillance activities. With the conflict in Gaza persisting, the direct conflict between the Houthis and Israel intensified in the light of the Houthis' proclaimed support for the Palestinian cause. The United States of America and Israel conducted intense air strikes on Houthi positions and essential infrastructure, with the aim of degrading or eliminating the Houthi's capabilities. Despite those attacks, the Houthis maintained their missile and drone launch capabilities and continued attacks against Israel and vessels in the Red Sea. Maintaining those capabilities helps them to expand their influence in the region and consolidate their power. This includes training and increased smuggling activities in the region. There was continued procurement and supply of weapons to the Houthis, strengthening their combat capabilities.

Analysis of smuggling trends revealed continued violation of the arms embargo, including through concealment or misdeclarations. Detections have increased owing to the diversion of vessels to Aden port after air strikes affected the infrastructure and capacity of Hudaydah port. The June 2025 seizure of 750 tons of illicit materiel and weapons by the Government proves that violations of the arms embargo continue to occur.

Given the definition and scope of the assets freeze, the implementation of the financial sanctions has been limited. The Houthis have access to several sources of revenue through imposition of taxes and illegal measures to generate revenue. The latter takes many forms, including the seizure of companies, the imposition of illegal levies, extortion and smuggling. The Houthis have full control of the telecommunications sector, which yields sizeable revenue, some of which is directed to funding their military activities.

Widespread and systematic violations of international humanitarian and human rights law continue in Yemen, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects, arbitrary killings and detentions, conflict-related sexual violence, child recruitment and obstruction of humanitarian assistance.

Most verified violations were attributed to the Houthis, who are currently focusing on the so-called internal front, which is a phased strategy aimed at restricting civic space, suppressing dissent and restructuring institutions to enable long-term indoctrination. Landmines and sniper attacks have caused significant civilian harm. Arbitrary detentions, reinforced by the instrumentalization of the judiciary, are used

to systematically repress dissent. The Zaynabiyat are actively involved in conflict-related sexual violence. Instances of male rape have been documented. The Houthis' child recruitment strategy combines ideological indoctrination, militarized education and selective access to aid, with a view to reshaping the society of Yemen and producing a generation of loyal, uneducated fighters. This well-thought-out strategy exploits poverty and weakens traditional family structures in order to entrench long-term control.

Assessment of the implementation of the sanctions regime reveals persistent challenges, leading to ineffective implementation. Major issues are non-implementation of procedures under Security Council resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#) and lack of timely information-sharing among Member States and with the Panel. Addressing those issues would help to ensure effective implementation of the sanctions regime.

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Introduction	5
II. Acts affecting peace, security and stability in Yemen	6
A. Regional dynamics	6
B. Domestic dynamics	9
III. Activities of armed groups threatening peace, security and stability	11
A. Houthi mobilization activities	11
B. Attacks targeting Houthi capabilities	12
C. Houthi attacks and conflict on the domestic front lines	15
D. Houthi attacks against merchant vessels	16
E. Houthi cooperation with other armed groups	17
IV. Arms and implementation of the targeted arms embargo	19
V. Implementation of financial sanctions	23
A. Violations of asset freeze provisions	23
B. Update on designated individuals	26
VI. Acts that violate international humanitarian law and international human rights law	26
A. Indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects and arbitrary killings	26
B. Arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance	27
C. Sexual and gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence	29
D. Child recruitment and use	29
E. Obstacles to humanitarian access and delivery	30
F. The “internal front”	31
VII. Assessment of actions taken for effective implementation of all sanctions measures	33
A. General issues	33
B. Implementation of the arms embargo	34
C. Asset freeze and travel ban	35
VIII. Recommendations	36
Annexes*	38

* Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

1. The present report, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 2758 (2024), covers the period from 1 August 2024 to 31 July 2025¹ and includes information relating to earlier periods not covered in previous reports and updated findings from some of the cases investigated in the framework of the Panel's final report of 2 November 2024 (S/2024/731).

2. In its resolution 2758 (2024), adopted on 13 November 2024, the Security Council renewed, until 15 November 2025, the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014), reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 16 of resolution 2140 (2014) and further reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 14 to 17 of resolution 2216 (2015). The sanctions regime established in resolution 2140 (2014) consists of a travel ban and an asset freeze that apply to individuals or entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) as engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen. In addition, in resolution 2216 (2015), a targeted arms embargo was imposed on designated individuals and entities. In its resolution 2758 (2024), the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as set out in paragraph 21 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 21 of resolution 2216 (2015), until 15 December 2025.

3. The Security Council, in paragraph 3 of resolution 2758 (2024), requested the Panel to provide a final report to the Council no later than 15 October 2025. Following consideration by the Committee of the nominations of five proposed candidates received on 3 February 2025 from the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, four members of the Panel were appointed by the Secretary-General on 17 March 2025 (see S/2025/170). The contracts of the four experts started from 1 April 2025, a delay of three and a half months after the mandate established in resolution 2707 (2023) had expired. The appointment of the fifth expert, the arms expert, is still pending. The Panel is therefore submitting to the Security Council the present report with detailed contributions from the experts in each expert's area of expertise, in line with the Panel's established standards and methodology. Given that an arms expert has not yet been appointed, the present report does not include a detailed analysis of that domain. To the extent that smuggling of arms and dual-use items contributed to the sustaining the capabilities of armed groups and their financing, the Panel analysed and reported on relevant cases.

4. The Panel adopted the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). It placed emphasis on adherence to standards relating to transparency, objectivity and sources, documentary evidence, corroboration of independent verifiable sources, and providing the opportunity to reply.² The Panel maintained cooperation with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004). The Panel was unable to interact with the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), because the members of the latter had not been appointed at the time of writing of the present report.

5. With regard to its workplan, the Panel had scheduled several visits in June 2025, including to Yemen. Those visits did not occur owing to the conflict in the region.

¹ The period covered in the final report of the Panel (S/2024/731) ended on 31 July 2024; the present report therefore covers the period from 1 August 2024 to 31 July 2025. The last date for consideration of responses from Member States and entities to the Panel's questions was on 15 August 2025.

² Additional information on the Panel's methodology and the opportunity to reply is provided in annex 1.

Subsequently, in July, Panel members travelled to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen (Aden and Ta'izz).³ The Panel conducted physical inspections of materiel, including dual use items, seized by the Government of Yemen. It held in-person meetings and remotely engaged with a wide array of interlocutors, including Member States. The Panel also met with officials of the Government of Yemen during its visits to Aden and Ta'izz in July 2025. The Panel, despite its best efforts, could not establish official contact with the Houthi authorities, nor was it granted access to areas under their control.

6. The Panel sent 87 official letters, of which 77 were addressed to 29 Member States and 10 to organizations, entities and companies, to which 55 replies were still pending as at 15 August 2025. The non-response rate corresponds to 63 per cent of the correspondences sent (see annex 3).⁴

II. Acts affecting peace, security and stability in Yemen

A. Regional dynamics

7. During the reporting period, political, security and humanitarian conditions in Yemen further deteriorated, owing to the lingering consequences of over a decade of conflict. Internal developments in Yemen remain closely intertwined with broader regional dynamics, in particular the ongoing crisis in Gaza, and international dynamics. It is therefore difficult to assess them in isolation. In the northern governorates, the Houthis further strengthened their administrative and military control and took measures that restricted political and civil freedoms. That aligns with the Houthis' long-term strategy to perpetuate their authority, which is an ongoing threat to peace, security and stability in Yemen and the region.

8. The Houthis continue to exploit the conflict in Gaza and their proclaimed solidarity with the Palestinians to justify escalating regional tensions, in particular in the Red Sea.⁵ Since late 2023, the Houthis have launched drone and missile attacks against vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, claiming to target Israeli-linked ships and those associated with countries supporting the military campaign of Israel in Gaza.⁶

9. On 24 July 2025, Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004) announced that the Houthis had launched more than 1,679 attacks using missiles, drones and boats since they had begun their campaign in support of Gaza in November 2023.⁷ In the same context, senior Houthi leaders have publicly warned "some countries in the region" against cooperating with Israel in any form of aggression against Yemen. They cautioned that such involvement would lead to serious consequences and that those involved will pay a heavy and significant price.

10. There was a brief sense of optimism for regional peace following the announcement by the Houthis that they would halt the attacks in the Red Sea in the light of the temporary ceasefire in Gaza in May 2024. The Houthis indeed ceased

³ All major locations in Yemen are spelled in accordance with the United Nations geographic information system map in annex 2.

⁴ The list of acronyms can be found in annex 4.

⁵ See the speech of Abdulmalik al-Houthi, in which he called for jihad against Israel and announced his pledge to continue attacking Israel; available at https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/1663301-في-كلمة-نارية-حول-غزة-عبدالمك-الحوثي-يدعو-ل-الجهاد-ضد-إسرائيل (in Arabic).

⁶ Platform Tracking Organized Crime and Money Laundering in Yemen, "What are the limits of the Houthi threat to navigation in the Red Sea?", 31 October 2024. Available at <https://ptocym.net/en/reports/7.html>.

⁷ See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rfzU8yfYJeM> (in Arabic).

attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and targets in Israel following that announcement. In addition, the Houthis released the 25 crew members of the MV *Galaxy Leader* on 22 January 2025. Oman played a key role in facilitating the release process through diplomatic efforts and mediation with the Houthis.⁸ The optimism quickly dissipated when Israel resumed its military campaign in Gaza in July 2024. In response, the Houthis resumed their attacks against vessels in the Red Sea.

11. Since September 2024, the Houthis have conducted at least 25 verified attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, using missiles, drones and rocket-propelled grenades with increasing frequency and sophistication. The most recent and deadliest of those attacks were the two high-impact maritime attacks that occurred in early July 2025, marking a new phase in the group's campaign against international shipping. The Liberian-flagged and Greek-managed carriers MV *Magic Seas* and MV *Eternity C* were attacked and sunk in separate incidents. Those two attacks, the most severe and coordinated maritime incidents to date, resulted in multiple fatalities and injuries, the detention of 10 crew members and the release of suspected ecological hazards.⁹ In addition, such attacks continue to disturb international shipping routes and negatively affect the economies of many countries around the world.

12. Apart from direct attacks, the Houthis regularly threatened vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. On 24 May 2025, they warned the *Dark Ocean*, a Belize-flagged container feeder, not to enter the port of Aden; the vessel complied and diverted to Djibouti. A similar warning was issued on 27 June 2025 to the *Kota Naluri*, a Singapore-flagged container feeder that ignored the warning and discharged its cargo as planned. The Panel reviewed and verified recordings of the radio communications between the Houthis and the two ships.

13. The Houthis' strategy has had profound economic repercussions. Rising insecurity in the Red Sea has taken a toll on the world economy, especially in international shipping. Traffic through the Suez Canal, a crucial route that handles roughly 15 per cent of all global trade and nearly a third of container shipping, has plunged by 70 per cent. As a result, many shipping companies are rerouting their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa, with traffic on that longer route increasing by more than 400 per cent. That detour adds approximately two extra weeks and around 6,000 additional nautical miles to each voyage. The consequences have been severe. Container transport prices have surged, with the average cost of transporting a container rising from \$1,660 in 2023 to nearly \$6,000 in 2024. Those logistical costs are pushing up prices for consumers worldwide. For Egypt, the drop in Suez Canal usage has been especially damaging, slashing what was once about \$10 billion in annual revenue by more than 70 per cent, equating to a loss of around \$800 million each month.¹⁰

14. The escalation of attacks involving the Houthis, Israel and the United States has further destabilized regional dynamics and undermined peace and security in Yemen.

15. The Houthis and Israel conducted reciprocal strikes in the form of drone, missile and air attacks of increasing frequency and intensity. The first major escalation occurred in late September 2024, when the Houthis launched multiple ballistic missiles and drones at targets near Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion Airport, causing injuries and damage. In retaliation, the Israel Defense Forces conducted a series of strikes targeting key infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas, including airfields, such as Sana'a International Airport, power stations and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif, and

⁸ See www.fm.gov.om/oman-secures-release-of-crew-of-the-ship-galaxy-leader/.

⁹ See www.mmy.ye/346884/.

¹⁰ Panel discussions with government authorities and representatives of major shipping companies.

Ra's Isa, resulting in significant casualties and destruction to infrastructure. The cycle of tit-for-tat strikes, which continued in December 2024 and January 2025, culminated in Operation White City, during which Israel targeted other strategic facilities.¹¹

16. The conflict escalated further in May 2025 when the Houthis launched a ballistic missile and struck Ben Gurion Airport, injuring civilians and disrupting air travel. Israel retaliated with a series of intense strikes against the ports of Ra's Isa, Salif and Hudaydah. On May 6, Israel conducted a significant air strike on Sana'a International Airport in response to a Houthi missile strike that hit areas near Ben Gurion Airport, Tel Aviv. The Israeli strike targeted the runway, departure terminal, Al-Daylami Airbase, power plants and infrastructure around the airport. The strike also destroyed three civilian aircraft on the ground, two belonging to Yemenia Airways and the other to Felix Airways.¹² A subsequent strike on May 28 destroyed the last remaining Yemenia aircraft at the airport, leaving Yemenia with no operational aircraft in Sana'a.¹³

17. That escalation culminated in July 2025 with Operation Black Flag, during which Israel Defense Forces jets and naval forces struck Houthi-controlled ports, power infrastructure and even the *Galaxy Leader* vessel, which the Houthis had seized in November 2023. During the reporting period, the Houthis conducted more than 220 attacks against Israel, using missiles and drones.

18. On 28 July 2025, the Houthi military spokesperson, Yahya Saree, announced the launch of the fourth phase of the naval blockade against Israel. In that phase, according to Saree, the Houthis would target any vessel owned by companies dealing with Israeli ports, regardless of their nationality or destination. He urged companies and countries to pressure Israel to end its military operations in Gaza and lift the blockade on the territory, stating that the Houthi's attacks were driven by moral and humanitarian obligations to support the Palestinian people. The Houthis threatened the possible closure of Bab al-Mandab strait, should Israel continue its military operations in Gaza.

19. The security, humanitarian and regional impact of these tit-for-tat strikes has been severe. In addition, the Houthis' constant engagement in regional conflicts continues to threaten peace, security and stability in Yemen. The Israeli strikes resulted in the destruction of port facilities and energy infrastructure in the Houthi-controlled areas, which had a compounded effect on aid delivery, civilian suffering and the stability of Red Sea shipping lanes. Strategically, the clashes between the Houthis and Israel have further drawn Yemen into the wider regional conflict, advancing the Houthis' bid to position themselves as a central actor in the Middle East.

20. During the reporting period, the United States and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland coalition conducted successive strikes against Houthi targets, concentrating on destroying Houthi missile launch sites, drone facilities and radar systems. The campaign escalated in March 2025 with the launch of Operation Rough Rider, which involved more than 1,000 coordinated strikes. Despite the scale of destruction inflicted by those strikes, the Houthis demonstrated resilience and continued undeterred with their counter-attacks.

21. Diplomatic efforts by Oman led to an "understanding of a ceasefire" that was reached on 6 May 2025.¹⁴ Under the terms of the understanding, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to suspend all offensive operations against Houthi

¹¹ Ynet Global, "The Houthis 'will learn the hard way', Netanyahu warns", 19 December 2024. Available at www.ynetnews.com/article/sjqu00szs1g.

¹² A subsidiary of Yemenia Airways that is based in Sana'a.

¹³ Yemenia still has three aircraft in Aden.

¹⁴ See www.fm.gov.om/oman-announces-ceasefire-agreement-between-washington-and-sanaa/.

targets, while the Houthis pledged to suspend all attacks on United States and the United Kingdom assets. The understanding, however, did not extend to vessels with direct or indirect relations to Israel, nor was there any agreement to halt attacks against Israel itself. The refusal to suspend attacks against vessels with direct or indirect relations to Israel or against Israel itself was, allegedly, a manifestation of the Houthis' declared solidarity with the Palestinian cause and their refusal to disengage from that front.¹⁵

B. Domestic dynamics

22. While there was a decline in large-scale, direct military confrontations between the Houthis and the Government during the reporting period, internal tensions and skirmishes continued. Ongoing United Nations efforts, led by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, and regional efforts by Oman and Saudi Arabia have not yet led to a breakthrough in the peace process in Yemen.¹⁶

23. The Houthis continued to consolidate power through systematic repression, cracking down on civil society organizations and international non-government organizations (NGOs) while threatening those delivering humanitarian aid and assistance. The Houthis also continued to detain personnel of the United Nations, national and international NGOs, civil society organizations and diplomatic missions. Notably, one staff member of the World Food Programme (WFP) died on 10 February 2025 in Houthi captivity (see para. 136). The continued detention of United Nations staff serves Houthi interests, inasmuch as their detention could be a critical bargaining tool, including in peace process negotiations. The inability of the international community to robustly respond to this unprecedented move reinforces the Houthis' perception of themselves as being an intractable force.

24. The economic crisis of Yemen continued to deepen, exacerbating the already dire humanitarian situation across the country.¹⁷ The Yemeni rial has plummeted to more than 2,800 rials per United States dollar on the black market in government-controlled areas.¹⁸ Pervasive inflation has made essential goods, such as food, medicine and fuel, unattainable for millions of Yemenis. Government officials reported that salaries in government-controlled areas remain unpaid or that payment of payment continued to be severely delayed, while civil servants in Houthi-controlled areas have gone without full wages since 2018. Meanwhile, widespread electricity blackouts continue to worsen the lives of civilians. Most blackouts last more than 15 hours in Aden and exceed two weeks in other areas, such as Lahj and Abyan. Gross domestic product per capita has more than halved since the conflict began in 2015. Public frustration has consequently intensified; protests erupted in several governorates, with demonstrators demanding basic services and payment of salaries.

25. Crude oil and petroleum product exports accounted for at least 70 per cent of State revenue. Resuming exportation of those commodities could greatly assist the Government of Yemen in alleviating the current economic and financial crisis, because doing so would facilitate improved access to services, restore infrastructure, increase household income and strengthen governance.

¹⁵ See <https://ansarollah.com.ye/archives/799851> (in Arabic).

¹⁶ See S/PV.9954.

¹⁷ World Bank, "Yemen economic monitor: persistent fragility amid rising risks", spring 2025 (Washington, D.C., 2025).

¹⁸ The Houthis enforce an artificial, fixed exchange rate of 500 Yemini rials per United States dollar in areas under their control.

26. In that same context, the Houthis are endeavouring to control the country's banking sector and the flow of foreign currency. A notable move was the announcement by the Houthi-controlled Central Bank of Yemen, Sana'a, that it would start printing 200-rial banknotes from 16 July 2025. That announcement came a few days after an announcement concerning the minting of a 50-rial coin. The decisions to print the banknote and mint the coin could negatively impact the already stalled peace process, deepen monetary fragmentation within Yemen and further worsen the economic situation.

27. Low-intensity fighting and skirmishes between the Houthis and the Government persisted in several regions, including Hudaydah, Ta'izz, Ma'rib, Lahj, Dali', Jawf, Sa'dah and Shabwah Governorates, claiming civilian lives. Credible sources indicated that the Houthis moved reinforcements and equipment towards the front lines, conducted shelling and drone and sniper attacks and engaged in infiltration attempts. In addition, Houthi forces engaged in armed conflicts with tribal opposition groups in Houthi-controlled areas. A series of tribal demonstrations were held in governorates in the Houthi-controlled areas of the country, including in Sana'a, Ibb and Jawf, with the protesters demanding the release of hundreds of detainees and the cessation of the arbitrary detention of civilians.

28. The lack of trust between the Houthis and the Government is demonstrated by the prolonged stalemate over the release of conflict-related detainees. Since the prisoner exchanges of September 2020 and April 2023, little progress has been made in that regard. Trust between the two parties remains fragile, and the situation continues to be largely at a standstill. The last meeting between the two parties, which was held in Oman and came to a close on 7 July 2024, did not result in any progress. In June 2025, the Houthis renewed calls for a comprehensive "all-for-all" exchange and pledged that they stood ready to ensure the release all remaining detainees from both sides without preconditions. The issue of the exchange of prisoners is widely viewed as a test of the commitment of both the Houthis and the Government to achieving a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

29. In a positive development, in May 2025, the Houthis and Government agreed to reopen the international highway connecting Sana'a and Aden that runs through Dali' Governorate, ending nearly seven years of closure. That breakthrough was achieved through local tribal mediation efforts led by the members of the White Flags¹⁹ campaign, as well as mediation efforts by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen. The reopening of the highway is expected to enhance freedom of movement between northern and southern Yemen and boost economic activities, and is indicative of progress in the peace process. Two weeks later, another milestone was reached when, again with the mediation of the White Flags, both sides agreed to reopen the Aqabat Thirah road, which links the Houthi-controlled Governorate of Bayda' with the Government-held Governorate of Abyan. That route had been closed for nearly a decade. The agreement, however, has not yet been put into effect. The conclusion of those agreements exemplifies the evolving role of civil society in achieving peace, security and stability in Yemen.

¹⁹ The White Flags campaign is an independent, civilian-led initiative the objective of which is to pressure both the Houthis and the Government of Yemen to reopen main roads throughout the country. The members of this initiative have no declared political affiliation.

III. Activities of armed groups threatening peace, security and stability

30. The Houthis continue to be a decisive player in Yemen. In addition to their continued efforts to enhance their capabilities and consolidate power, they are reinforcing their alliances and expanding their influence, both inside and outside Yemen.

A. Houthi mobilization activities

31. The Houthis continued to mobilize, recruit and train fighters as part of the “Aqsa flood” campaign, which began in October 2023. Launched in support of Gaza, the campaign is aimed at preparing for the “Battle of the Promised Conquest and Holy Jihad” and includes measures directed at the Houthi armed forces and the population in the areas under Houthi control.

32. Houthi military media carried reports of military manoeuvres in order to maintain operational readiness and develop military capabilities. Videos posted on social media show manoeuvres and live-fire exercises. Such videos are used to propagate hatred and violence. The head of the missile section and de facto Minister of Defence and Military Production, Major General Mohammed al-Atifi, confirmed the Houthi armed forces’ readiness and intent to strike Israel and their engagement in the war against the United States, United Kingdom and Israel in support of Gaza. Major General Qassem al-Hamran plays a prominent role in the Houthis’ mobilization and recruitment efforts (see annexes 5–11).

33. In preparation for military escalation, the population was mobilized and underwent short training courses, which were supported by the Supreme Committee for the Support of Al-Aqsa and by tribal chiefs. Participants included tribesmen, students, journalists and employees from various ministries staff. Mobilization events are held weekly. In a speech delivered on 12 January 2025, Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004) recognized the tribes’ loyalty, military readiness and combat skills (see annexes 12–19).

34. The mobilization and training courses are an indication of systematic and increased efforts to indoctrinate and recruit in support of the Houthis’ military capabilities and current force structure (see annex 20).

35. The ideology of the Houthis is spread through systematic propaganda. Houthi control of the media and Internet access prevent the people from gaining access to impartial information. Their ideological penetration of society is based on long-term strategic planning, including targets, indicators and reports. Houthi propaganda activities include compulsory ideology, culture and jihad courses.

36. The group’s recruitment practices cover schools, summer schools, graduation ceremonies, workshops, courses, reading circles and mosques, in addition to propaganda (see para. 153). According to a confidential source, girls are also recruited and learn to search homes, disperse crowds and use small arms. University students are made to participate in the “Aqsa flood” programme and workshops (see annexes 21 and 22).

37. There are harsh consequences for not participating in courses or mobilization marches, or not sending children to summer camps. For example, families are prevented from obtaining subsidized cooking gas or other services or are removed from the humanitarian aid list (see para. 152).

38. In addition, the Houthis used a range of repressive measures and heightened surveillance of people to prevent any opposition. The creation of a new police intelligence unit is proof of the intensification of such measures. Ali Hussein al-Houthi, nephew of Abdulmalik al-Houthi, is the head of this new unit (see annex 23).

39. There is a women's unit, known as the Zaynabiyat, in both the Security and Intelligence Service and the police security and intelligence sector in the de facto Ministry of the Interior. The Zaynabiyat unit supports policing and intelligence operations, prison management and child recruitment efforts. The members of the Zaynabiyat are trained to carry out intelligence and surveillance activities. They use electric shock devices against women during demonstrations or protests and in places of detention. Fatima al-Houthi, sister of Ali Hussein al-Houthi, and Fatima al-Hamran are reportedly associated with this unit and are leading its operations.

40. According to a confidential source, the Houthis possess advanced surveillance mechanisms and technology. Control of the telecommunications networks in areas under their control enables the Houthis to intercept communications through Yemeni telephone numbers, engage in telephone hacking and read and copy messages. The ability to engage in such surveillance has recently led to several arrests within their own ranks.

B. Attacks targeting Houthi capabilities

41. The Houthis have developed missile and drone technologies through manufacturing and technical assistance. Such military equipment, capable of reaching targets 800 km to 2,000 km away, was displayed in past military parades.²⁰ The Houthis have since improved targeting accuracy, allowing them to strike vessels and make progress with their missile programme, including the Palestine 2 hypersonic ballistic missile, which has a range of 2,150 km. Houthi leaders made public claims regarding these advancements in missile and drone striking power. The continued development of these capabilities has been to the strategic advantage of the Houthis (see annexes 24–26).

42. The United States-United Kingdom coalition sought to end attacks in the Red Sea, degrade Houthi capabilities and deprive the group of resources and leadership.

43. Operation Poseidon Archer, a campaign of air strikes by the United Kingdom and the United States, was aimed at degrading the military capability of the Houthis to attack vessels. The air strikes involved use of air and naval assets, including B-2 Spirit long-range stealth bombers. The air strikes intensified in November and December 2024, with weapons, missiles and drone storage facilities targeted. Two command and control facilities, a radar site and missile and uncrewed aerial vehicle production facilities were also struck (see annexes 27–32).

44. A subsequent United States-United Kingdom air and naval campaign, known as Operation Rough Rider, involved more than 800 strikes in a span of two months against command-and-control facilities, air defence systems and weapon manufacturing and storage facilities. United States estimates indicate that the strikes resulted in a major drop in ballistic missile launches and a decrease in the launching of one-way attack drones (see annexes 33–35).

²⁰ The Panel reported on military parades that the Houthis held in Sana'a in September 2023 (see [S/2024/731](#), "Case study 4: large-scale display of military materiel by the Houthis", and annexes 84–94 thereto). The Panel also reported on the display of materiel in the previous parade, held on 21 September 2022 (see [S/2023/833](#), paras. 101–103).

45. Houthi sources reported that although the number of air and naval strikes conducted by the United States as part of Operation Rough Rider exceeded 1,712, they had not succeeded in weakening military capabilities or halting operations. Moreover, the Houthis claim that they downed 22 United States MQ-9 drones in eight governorates from October 2023, when operations began, up to 22 April 2025 (see annexes 36–38).

46. In parallel to United States operations, Israel carried out air strikes against critical energy, port and industrial facilities used by the Houthis for military purposes, with a view to disrupting weapon supply lines and revenues. The Israeli attacks involved F-15 and F-16 fighter jets, refuelling aircraft and missile ships. The Israel Defense Forces issued statements after the attacks (see annexes 39–41).

47. Port infrastructure in Hudaydah Governorate was severely affected by Israeli strikes. Frequent attacks from September 2024 to July 2025 caused extensive damage and reduced port capacity. Damage to electricity infrastructure in Sana'a and Hudaydah disrupted power supply in Houthi-controlled areas. Sana'a International Airport, including buildings, and all four planes belonging to Yemenia Airways were significantly damaged. A confidential source indicated that a cement factory had been used as a drone factory. The Panel was unable to independently assess the damage caused to infrastructure (see annexes 42–47).

48. Confidential sources conveyed that the destruction of weapon storage facilities had had the most impact. Production and technical capabilities were affected by the deaths of manufacturing and assembly personnel and drone operators. Nonetheless, the knowledge and ability to manufacture weapons systems domestically remains in place, making it challenging to eliminate the Houthis' capabilities. Military experts from different countries conveyed to the Panel that the strikes had had a limited impact on the Houthis' military capabilities. In addition, the availability of financial resources play a major role in maintaining supply lines and manufacturing capabilities, taking into account the Panel's assessment that the asset freeze has had limited effect (see annex 48).

49. United States air strikes disrupted Houthi command structures in Sa'dah,²¹ but not the top echelons. The strikes heightened suspicions about the source of leaked information, prompting further tensions within the group. According to a source, the most significant consequence of the air strikes has been the erosion of trust among Houthi leaders. The erosion of trust resulted in arrests and increased surveillance. The Houthis continue to pose a significant threat despite the strikes.

Houthis strikes against Israel


50. The conflict between the Houthis and Israel intensified (see paras. 14 and 15). In support of Gaza, the Houthis stepped up attacks and targeted Israeli territory with ballistic missiles and one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles. The group's leader, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, vowed that operations would continue in coordination with the "brothers of the resistance". In a statement on 2 January 2025, he mentioned the Houthis' drone and missile capabilities and declared an open war with Israel (see annex 49).

51. The Government of Israel informed the Panel that 101 ballistic missiles were fired at Israel from Houthi-controlled areas between September 2024 and 7 July 2025. Out of the 101 ballistic missiles that were fired, 57 were intercepted and 38 failed. Most were launched from Sa'dah and Amran Governorates. Four ballistic missiles

²¹ Research of Houthi-controlled media indicates that casualties may have reached 101 between March 2025 and 6 April 2025. See <https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1908903337782632932>.


struck: one hit the area of Tel Aviv, two hit the centre of Israel and one hit Ben Gurion International Airport.

Figure I
Ballistic missiles fired at Israel, by target



Source: Panel.

Figure II
Ballistic missiles fired at Israel, by launch area



Source: Panel.

52. The Houthis' rhetoric and statements misleadingly suggest that they carried out successful attacks that, in reality, did not occur (see annex 54). The commander who was responsible for carrying out the attacks is Major General Yusuf al-Madani (YEi.009), Commander of the Fifth Military Region, who oversees Houthi military and maritime operations.

53. On 9 December 2024, a residential building was struck and three people were wounded when a drone attack succeeded in evading the air defence capability of Israel. Attacks intensified that month, hitting populated areas and causing damage to civilian objects, including an elementary school and a playground, which were struck on 20 and 21 December 2024, respectively. A total of 16 people were injured, including a 3-year-old child.

54. On 19 December 2024, Israeli territory was the target of a coordinated attack by the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, both part of the axis of resistance. Israel retaliated with air strikes against port and energy infrastructure in Yemen, in order

to curb the Houthis' profits and procurement of weapons. On 21 December 2024, the Houthis' armed forces reaffirmed their support for the Palestinian people. In support of military operations, fundraising campaigns were launched in the wake of attacks (see annexes 50–55).

55. Throughout late 2024, Israel faced repeated missile threats. Official Israeli sources reported the interception of 12 ballistic missiles targeted at Ben Gurion International Airport and three failed attacks. On 28 September 2024, the Houthis launched an attack against the airport using a Palestine 2 ballistic missile, which was intercepted by the Israel Defense Forces. Debris from the attack fell in the community of Tzur Hadassah. On 30 December 2024, a missile was intercepted, causing delays to take-offs and landings at the airport. Debris from that attack fell on a road in Bet Shemesh near Jerusalem (see annexes 56 and 57).

56. The conflict escalated further in May 2025. On 4 May 2025, a Houthi hypersonic ballistic missile hit Ben Gurion International Airport, halting air traffic. Attacks on military targets, including the Nevatim airbase, also occurred. Official Israeli sources confirmed that the base had been targeted four times. Three missiles were intercepted and one failed. On 5 May 2025, Israel carried out retaliatory strikes against Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen. On 6 May 2025, the United States and the Houthis agreed on a ceasefire. The Houthis' confrontations with the United States and Israel and their proclaimed support for the Palestinian cause have boosted their support and popularity.

C. Houthi attacks and conflict on the domestic front lines

57. The Panel notes that the Houthis use three methods of warfare: infiltration, drone attacks and shelling along the front line, and mines and improvised explosive devices against Government forces.

58. Attacks on civilians in villages near the front line were reported, including direct sniper attacks²² and attacks using improvised explosive devices. These villages are attacked with drones and shelled. Furthermore, such tactics as encirclement²³ are employed to enforce measures or coerce surrender. Encirclement involves shelling, sniper fire, restriction of movement and cutting off of basic goods or services, such as water and medical care. The excessive use of mines and explosive ordnance contamination further tightens the siege.

59. Houthi and Government forces engaged in fighting in different locations on the 317-km long Ta'izz axis front line. The siege of Ta'izz has been in place since 2015. Houthi camps are located in the hills and forests of Maqbanah District. They prepare for attacks with intensive training. New camps and tunnels have been built.

60. From 1 January to 22 July 2025, the Houthis targeted civilians and civilian objects on 35 occasions, killing 8 civilians and wounding 29 others and destroying property. There were 1,037 attacks against Government forces and military objects, including 169 military offensives involving shelling and drone strikes and the use of other weapons. Drones were used 425 times for attacks or reconnaissance flights, and 106 raids and infiltration attempts occurred at the front line. Government forces were

²² According to Government sources, Houthi snipers are stationed at strategic locations overlooking residential neighbourhoods and deliberately target civilians, including women and children, daily as they go about their normal lives.

²³ Panel interviews on the encirclement or shelling and attacks of the villages of Hafrah, Hanakat al-Mas'ud, Hamat Sarar (Bayda' Governorate), Haymah, Tuhayta' District (Hudaydah Governorate), Maqbanah District (Ta'izz Governorate) and Shawkan and Qurayn (Lahj Governorate).

targeted 93 times with improvised explosive devices, resulting in 68 killed, 171 wounded and 9 disabled.²⁴

61. The opening of a single road in Ta'izz has eased movement and access. The Houthis have, however, intensified attacks around the eastern entry point into the city, targeting Government forces positions on 215 occasions.

62. Collectively, these actions reflect a systematic technique consisting of encirclement and shelling to exercise military pressure with the aim of forcing surrender.

D. Houthi attacks against merchant vessels

63. Attacks on vessels between 2023 and 2025 significantly affected countries in the region and global trade. The sinking of two vessels, the killing of seafarers and the environmental hazards caused were major concerns (see annex 58).

64. Drawing on data provided by the International Maritime Organization, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations and the United States Central Command, the Panel noted that at least 25 attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden were carried out between 1 August 2024 and 31 July 2025 (see annex 59).

65. Following a pause in attacks on vessels in January 2025, the Gaza ceasefire signalled the possibility of the de-escalation of maritime attacks. Houthi and Hamas representatives in Sana'a reported that their groups had carried out a coordinated release of hostages in support of the Gaza ceasefire agreement (see para. 70). During this period, the Houthis announced that they would stop attacking vessels, except for those linked to Israel (see annex 60).

66. In March 2025, the Houthis threatened to resume attacks on Israel if the crossings into Gaza were not reopened within four days. On 11 March, the Houthis banned Israeli ships from passing through the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab strait. Attacks resumed on 22 March after the deadline to reopen the crossings and allow aid to be brought into Gaza had expired (see annex 61).

67. Attacks on vessels involved the use of different types of missiles and attack drones. Debris in various locations and pictures displayed of the weaponry held by the Houthis are clear indicators of the variety and scale of the military equipment in their arsenal. Large seizures of weapons are evidence that the Houthis are replenishing their supplies (see paras. 103–108 and annexes 62 and 63).

68. A total of 25 attacks occurred in the reporting period, 9 of which were directed against merchant vessels. Eight of those vessels were oil, liquid petroleum gas or chemical tankers, three of which were struck. Vessels are often attacked by small craft (fishing skiffs and purpose-built attack boats) using rockets, small arms and grenades. One-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles are used to target vessels as they are encircled or approached by the small craft; they are then struck using anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles or other projectiles. Waterborne improvised explosive devices were also used in the attack on the *Cordelia Moon* (see annex 64).

69. In the reporting period, two vessels (MV *Eternity C* and MV *Magic Seas*) were hit and sunk, bringing the number of vessels sunk since the start of the attacks to four. The *Sounion* and MV *Magic Seas* were both attacked twice and both vessels were abandoned after the first attack. On 21 August 2024, the *Sounion* was attacked. The MV *Magic Seas* was hit in July 2025. In both cases, the Houthis followed a pattern of carrying out a primary attack followed by a secondary attack (see annex 65).

²⁴ Government of Yemen sources.

E. Houthi cooperation with other armed groups

Axis of resistance

70. Contrary to reports that the axis of resistance had weakened, members continued to refer to the alliance. In public statements, Abdulmalik al-Houthi referred to the mutual support between the Houthis and Hamas. Yahya Sinwar of Hamas hailed a Houthi attack on Israel. The release of the *Galaxy Leader* crew in January 2025 coincided with the release of hostages in Gaza by Hamas (see annex 60).

71. Foreign operatives remained active in Houthis controlled areas. General Abdulreza Shalai of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has reportedly left Sana'a, but according to confidential sources, Hizbullah missile and drone operatives remain and advise the Houthis on missile and drone operations, in violation of the targeted arms embargo.

72. Regional spillover persisted. With regard to the 17 September 2024 pager attacks by Israel on Hizbullah in Lebanon, a confidential source informed the Panel that Houthi fighters in Lebanon had been killed in those attacks. According to reports that have not been independently verified, people of different nationalities have come from the Syrian Arab Republic to join the ranks of the Houthis. Such movements involving axis' operatives underscore the ongoing coordination between the armed groups that belong to the axis.

73. Asserting the unity of the axis, Hizbullah, Hamas and commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps issued statements backing the Houthis, condemning the actions of Israel in Yemen and praising Houthi missile attacks on Israel (see annexes 68–71).

Houthis and Al-Shabaab

74. The Panel continued its investigations into the evolving relationship between the Houthis and Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab, SOe.001), building on the findings in S/2024/731 (see S/2024/731, paras. 39, 40 and 42). The Panel gathered and analysed information from both official and confidential sources that collectively indicate that cooperation between the two groups has intensified. That cooperation involves weapons smuggling, technical training, including in relation to operational tactics, and exchange of logistical support.

75. The Panel notes that the strengthening of ties between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab could pose a growing threat to peace, security and stability not only in Yemen, but in the region as a whole. Arms trafficking is a significant source of revenue for the Houthis. Generation of revenue through this avenue is a violation of the assets freeze, because the Houthis are an entity acting on behalf or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, designated individuals. The cooperation with Al-Shabaab is not simply for transactional benefits; it is also part of a Houthi strategy to wield increasing influence in the region.

76. Somali officials have expressed heightened concern over the growing cooperation between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab, in particular with regard to weapons trafficking and exchange of military expertise. Sources at the highest level in Somalia reported that the country's intelligence services recently detected communications between the Houthis in Yemen and both Da'esh and Al-Shabaab in Somalia.²⁵ In addition, the Somali security apparatus succeeded in intercepting and

²⁵ The President of Somalia has publicly acknowledged the increasing cooperation between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab. See <https://english.aawsat.com/opinion/5137571-protecting-red-sea-and-gulf-aden-our-shared-responsibility>.

seizing shipments of explosives and drones en route from Yemen to Somalia and arrested individuals involved in an arms trafficking network. The above substantiate that the relationship between Houthis and Al-Shabaab has evolved.

77. In the same context, in May 2025, Somali media carried reports of an official telephone call between the Ministers of Defence of Yemen and Somalia.²⁶ The two officials reportedly discussed strengthening intelligence-sharing, joint counter-terrorism operations and mutual support in tackling transnational extremist groups. The emerging links between Al-Shabaab and the Houthis was a particular point of discussion.

78. There has been an increase in smuggling and cooperation activities between Al-Shabaab and the Houthis. Several seizures of weapons and explosives by the Somali security forces have revealed that the Houthis are transferring weapons to Al-Shabaab. Official sources informed the Panel about an extensive investigation into around 70 Somali nationals affiliated with Al-Shabaab who are allegedly involved in smuggling arms from the Houthis in Yemen to Somalia. Confidential sources have confirmed reports about training activities conducted by the Houthis for Al-Shabaab members in Yemen in the manufacture of sophisticated improvised explosive devices and drone technology. Al-Shabaab currently possesses knowledge of how to use drones for surveillance purposes. The group is endeavouring, with the assistance of Houthis, to develop capabilities for conducting drone attacks.

79. Official sources have provided detailed information about the *modus operandi*, supported by documentary evidence, revealing the growing relationship between the two groups. The Panel reviewed the case of a Somali national affiliated with Al-Shabaab who had confessed to acting as a liaison between the two parties. The depth of information he provided suggests that he was well-informed and closely involved. In addition to his confession, incriminating evidence was found in his possession that corroborated his statements. This individual identified the names of two particular Houthis (military engineers) who reportedly travelled to Jilib, Somalia, where they provided Al-Shabaab elements with training in manufacturing improvised explosive devices, drone adaptation and weapon maintenance. He also provided details of how he facilitated the travel of nearly 400 Somalis to receive military and ideological training in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen. This case serves to illustrate the ability of the Houthis to conduct intricate operations inside and outside Yemen and establish a web of relations with armed groups in other countries.

80. Official sources have also provided the Panel with a list of 13 individuals currently under surveillance or arrest who are reportedly implicated in weapons smuggling activities between Yemen and Somalia. The smuggling activities are not limited to transfers of weapons from Houthis to Al-Shabaab; rather, Somalia is increasingly being used as a transit hub for weapons destined for the Houthis. The Panel investigated several smuggling routes running through Somalia to Yemeni ports and ascertained that weapons are smuggled in small boats (dhows) from various coastal locations in Somalia, including Qandala, Dardala, Alula, Ras al-Mawj, Ras Asir and Khora.

81. The Panel also received information from official sources indicating that Al-Shabaab maintains an operational presence in Hadramawt Governorate, Yemen. The cells, composed predominantly of Somali nationals, are reportedly tasked with purchasing weapons from Houthi-affiliated actors and subsequently smuggling them into Somalia. According to the same sources, O.A.S. has been identified as a key facilitator in these operations. He is working closely with several Houthi smugglers, including J.A.N., who reside in Houthi-controlled areas.

²⁶ See www.ftl-somalia.com/somalia-and-yemen-deepen-defense-cooperation-amid-rising-regional-threats/.

82. The Panel was also informed about I.A.M., who is involved in smuggling weapons from Somalia to Houthi-controlled areas. He is reportedly working closely with several Houthi-linked weapons smugglers, including J.A.N., who reside in Houthi-controlled areas. In addition, official sources informed the Panel of the involvement of I.A.M. in smuggling from the Houthi-controlled area to Somalia. He is reported to be a major player in a smuggling network that uses Somalia as a transit point for smuggling weapons to the Houthis, in violation of the targeted arms embargo established in resolution 2216 (2015). The weapons are transferred by dhows to Hadramawt and Shabwah Governorates for transfer into Houthi-controlled areas.

Activities of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula

83. Since Sa'ad bin 'Atef al-Awlaki took over leadership of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129), Abyan and Shabwah Governorates have seen intensified military operations. On 16 August 2024, AQAP attacked a military base in Mudiyah District with a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, killing 16 soldiers and wounding another 18. Additional attacks involved the use of improvised explosive devices, snipers and weaponized drones. Since the beginning of 2025, 39 attacks have been carried out. The group's capability to plan and execute major attacks is indicated by the impact of its attacks and the number of casualties. No other suicide attack has been reported since 2022 (see annexes 72–75).

84. AQAP is actively using social media to issue appeals and messages, including calls for jihad and attacks against the West in support of Gaza. A confidential source conveyed that mechanisms were activated for funding campaigns. The group uses digital wallets and cryptocurrency to collect donations, and recruitment continues. Sources informed the Panel that there has been an increase in the number of foreign fighters joining the group (see annex 76).

85. The Houthis' involvement with AQAP continues. Leaders of both groups have coordinated their activities, as evidenced by intercepted communications. Two individuals belonging to AQAP coordinated activities with the Security and Intelligence Service of the Houthis, to their mutual benefit. Several sources (confidential and official) have confirmed that there has been increased collaboration between the Houthis and AQAP, including training for AQAP operatives and medical treatment for AQAP members in Houthi controlled areas. This points to the Houthis' strategy of maintaining control through alliances.

86. Arms trafficking and smuggling has expanded in scope, with the Houthis being the main suppliers and in control of smuggling activities with Al-Shabaab and AQAP and smuggling networks. On 14 April 2025, the United States conducted an attack on the smuggling network, killing the network's leader and several others.²⁷

87. The agreement between the Houthis and AQAP to cease hostilities and wage a war of attrition against Government forces remains in place. The Houthis and AQAP exchanged of prisoners on 31 March 2025.

IV. Arms and implementation of the targeted arms embargo

88. Although an arms expert was not appointed, that did not prevent the Panel from analysing smuggling activities, which reflect widespread violation of the arms embargo.

89. Smuggling provides the Houthis with a combination of economic benefits, serving as both a source of finance for the group and a means of circumventing the

²⁷ Government of Yemen sources.

arms embargo. It has a direct impact on the economy and security in Yemen and the region. In the present section of the report, the Panel provides information on some major seizures, which occurred in 2024 and 2025, that have a direct bearing on financing for the Houthis and violations of the arms embargo. An illustrative chart of routes, modus operandi and countries can be found in annex 80.

90. The continued procurement of weapons by and the supply thereof to the Houthis strengthens and supports their combat capabilities. The Panel’s investigations revealed that the Houthis have diversified their supply chains at the regional and international levels. These findings demonstrate ongoing external support to sustain the flow of weapons, materiel and dual-use items.

91. Seizures conducted by the Government of Yemen indicate ongoing smuggling activities. Illustrative cases are provided below.

Land route seizures

92. Land border crossings are reportedly the primary smuggling routes currently in use. The land border crossings of Shahn and Sarfayt, between Oman and Yemen, are regularly used to bring in items intended for military use. Such items, which are invariably concealed in other shipments or in vehicles, include uncrewed aerial vehicle control devices, uncrewed aerial vehicle servo motors, Global Positioning System devices for uncrewed aerial vehicles and walkie-talkies. On 5 September 2024, Government forces in Mahrah Governorate seized a consignment of carbon fibre that could be used in the composition of the external structure of one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles, land-attack cruise missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles.

93. The Omani authorities categorically asserted that the land borders are strictly guarded, including by close circuit television systems, fencing and patrols. They also indicated that there is both risk-based and physical inspection and control on the number of items permitted in the same consignment. The Omani authorities have X-ray machines for screening exports, which is not the norm in most countries. In addition, they provided information regarding enhanced due diligence measures and investigations that they had initiated. Seizures have also been documented at the Wadiyah crossing with Saudi Arabia.

Seaport seizures

94. There were seizures in the Aden Free Zone port. More seizures were reported by the Yemeni customs authorities once vessels began to be redirected to Aden after the air strikes on Hudaydah port.

Increase in vessels calling at Aden port

<i>Period</i>	<i>No. of vessels</i>	<i>Cargo carried (tons)</i>
January to June 2024	187	920 394
January to June 2025	265	1 266 896

95. The number of seizures at Aden port increased. One modus operandi is to conceal contraband among declared packages of miscellaneous items. The customs broker is merely responsible for clearing containers for any importer after filing shipping documents with the customs authorities, while the documented consignee, who is often not the owner of the declared goods, acts on behalf of the owners. Once the goods are cleared, the consignee arranges for delivery to customers. It is therefore difficult to identify to whom the contraband belongs.

96. This modus operandi is best illustrated by a seizure on 25 November 2024 from a container that originated from China. It had been declared to contain 592 cartons of school supplies, belonging to approximately 50 different companies.

97. The following undeclared items were recovered:

(a) One carton containing 10 units of AMEC automatic identification system devices, designed to receive navigational data from ships equipped with automatic identification systems;

(b) One carton containing five units of spectrum analyser devices (Signal Hound BB60c, model M200B);

(c) One carton containing 10 units of voltage converters.

98. Such dual-use telecommunications equipment is of particular importance for the launching of attacks against vessels. These items could contribute to Houthi military operations at sea and their capability to target and attack vessels, posing a potential and continued threat to maritime security in the region and the safety of civilians and civilian objects.

99. The consignee, a Yemeni national, explained in the course of investigations that he had a shipping office and warehouse in China. He stated that he had been in business for about six months. The three undeclared cartons were received through his shipping office goods and were loaded into the container. Under those circumstances, the shipping office had been unable to verify the packages or the sender's identity. The owner of the items has been identified but not yet apprehended.

100. The above likely means that the owner of the devices had knowledge of shipping procedures. He delivered the cartons to the shipping office at the last minute, taking advantage of the fact that all documents and detailed packing lists are submitted two days before loading. No further checks are done after that. The items were not concealed in the rear of the container, where smuggled goods are commonly concealed to avoid detection; they were in the front of the container.

101. On 17 January 2025, Yemeni customs officials seized five uncrewed aerial vehicle engines (model DLE), five uncrewed aerial vehicle control devices (CUAV Drone Pixhawk V5+ flight controller) and 10 walkie-talkies. Those items were in a consignment, declared as fabrics, shipped from China.

102. There were several instances of the seizure of items from vessels that had been rerouted from Hudaydah where no effort had been made to conceal the contraband. On 23 July 2025, Yemeni customs officials effected a major seizure. Panel members visited Aden port on 28 July 2025 and inspected the seized items and containers. The goods declared were aluminium pipes for building construction, steel rolls and aluminium sheets. The containers were destined for Hudaydah, but the vessel had been rerouted to Aden. The goods had been shipped from Shanghai, China. The consignee was based in Sana'a and reportedly a known Houthi operative.

103. In two containers, the officers found one thermal camera, several cartons of sensor connectors and rolls of carbon fibre fabric. The sensor connectors can be used for drones, while the fabric is used for drone wings. The Panel inspected the containers and noted that the aluminium pipes and sheets were in small quantities at the rear of the containers; the majority of the container was filled with undeclared items. There was no attempt at concealment, as the vessel had originally been destined for Hudaydah.

Figure III
Photographs of the inside of the container taken on 28 July 2025



Source: Panel.

Maritime seizures

104. In August 2024, a shipment of missile components and hydrogen cylinders was seized. In October 2024, the Yemeni armed forces interdicted two shipments of missile components, weapons, radars and communication equipment.

105. A seizure in January 2025 in the Bab al-Mandab strait by Yemeni forces revealed large quantities of bags containing explosives, detonators and detonating cords. Those items are used in the manufacturing of drones, missiles and explosive devices. The Panel observed that the detonating cords were in boxes labelled as explosives, and that they had been shipped through Djibouti.

106. In May 2025, in Djibouti, the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen conducted an inspection of a vessel bound for Hudaydah and detected concealed military materiel in two out of four containers originating from China. The items were drones, drone components, full drone kits, remote control units, high frequency and small drone antennas, Global Positioning System modules, propellers and surveillance equipment.

107. In June 2025, the Yemeni armed forces seized more than 750 tons of ammunition and hardware intended for use by the Houthis. The seizure included several advanced cruise, anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles that displayed characteristics similar to those of weapons produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran, such as the Ghadir anti-ship cruise missile, Shahed uncrewed aerial vehicle, AM-50 Sayyad anti-materiel rifle and the Misagh series man-portable air defence system. The shipment also included

manuals in Farsi and Iranian police DNA kits. The weapons and materiel were interdicted from a dhow that had been sailing from Djibouti to Houthi-controlled ports. The Panel is scheduled to inspect the consignment in September 2025.

108. The above underscores the need for strengthened vigilance and enhanced capacity at these entry, departure and transit points. The status of developments following the seizures remains unknown to the Panel, which underlines the necessity of mechanisms to investigate actual or potential arms embargo violations, identify the individuals or entities involved and pursue accountability.²⁸ Procedures for sharing of information among Government agencies should be streamlined to support effective investigations. A mechanism for sharing information on a regular basis between the Panel and relevant Member States would be helpful in that regard. Expanding the provisions of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#) to cover inspections on the high seas would be a valuable addition to the regime for monitoring violations of the arms embargo (see annexes 77–80).

V. Implementation of financial sanctions

109. The Houthis exercise de facto control of and administrative authority over part of Yemen. This includes collection of taxes and other revenues, as well as the provision of services to people and other administrative functions. The scope of the asset freeze is extensive. It covers all funds, other financial assets and economic resources owned or controlled not only by the designated individuals but also by entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them. The Houthis are, therefore, subject to the asset freeze. No funds, financial assets or economic resources should be made available to them. Accordingly, the application of the asset freeze fails ab initio.²⁹

110. The main source of revenue for the Houthis are taxes, including on the income of both individuals and companies, real estate, a sales tax on fuel and cigarettes and on all imports. Those taxes are in addition to customs duties. The Houthis, as the de facto authority, collect a major share of surplus profits from all sectors, mainly from the financial and banking sector.

111. A major development is the planned relocation of several banks from Sana'a to Aden. Officials of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, attribute that development to the designation by the United States of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization. This designation has had an effect on transactions processed through the systems of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). The relocation of those banks would be a blow to the Houthis' ability to gain access to the international banking system and the resources held in those banks. The Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, is reviewing the transactions of those banks, through third party monitoring, before giving them permission to operate. At the end of June 2025, three banks had received certificates and four are being inspected.

A. Violations of asset freeze provisions

112. Violations of the asset freeze continued unabated. The designated individuals, those acting on their behalf and the entities owned or controlled by them continued to use the same avenues to violate the asset freeze.³⁰

²⁸ The Panel intends to reach out to authorities in Member States, as required, to assist in supply chain investigations.

²⁹ [S/2023/130](#), para. 69; and [S/2024/731](#), paras. 101 and 102.

³⁰ [S/2024/731](#), paras. 101–130.

Printing of currency notes

113. Officials of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, highlighted the poor condition of the old 1,000-rial banknotes. The Houthis have prohibited circulation of the new banknotes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, in territories under their control,³¹ forcing continued use of the old banknotes, which are often traded by weight owing to their tattered condition. As a result, Saudi Arabian riyals and United States dollars are increasingly used for transactions in Houthi-controlled areas, leading to substantial foreign currency inflows given that economic activities are conducted using those currencies. The use of foreign currency has had a significant effect on the country's financial and economic stability, in particular in Government-controlled areas. The Central Bank of Yemen, Sana'a, issued 200-rial notes that entered circulation on 16 July 2025 (see annexes 81 and 82).³² This situation highlights the financial divide and impedes the effective implementation of monetary and regulatory banking policies.

Avenues for raising funds

Extortion under the guise of taxes

114. The Panel investigated one case involving “nis” (stone) material quarried in various districts of Sana'a governorate for the construction industry.³³ M.A.J., on behalf of the Houthi leadership, runs an extortion scheme by monopolizing the gravel market and imposing such fees as a “mineral royalty” and “road improvement and maintenance fees”. In response, quarry owners and truck drivers went on strike, which was ongoing as at 29 July 2025. The Panel has confirmed the above through interviews. In one district, an agreement was reached on 25 June 2025 between leaders of the Ans tribe³⁴ and M.A.J. that was witnessed by senior Houthi leaders, including Al-Sayyid Ibrahim Abdulkareem al-Houthi, and the Governor and Deputy Governor of Dhamar Governorate. The agreement includes, inter alia, a provision that establishes a price of 100 Yemeni rials per cubic metre of sand for district projects (see annex 83). Unrest continues in other districts.

Control of critical sectors

Telecommunications

115. The Houthis maintain full control over the telecommunications sector, granting them access to resources and sizeable revenue, which they use in an effective manner for military communications and surveillance. Reports indicate that new infrastructure is being established for this purpose in governorates bordering areas controlled by the Government.

116. Although several telecommunications companies have relocated to Aden, their infrastructure remains in Houthi-controlled areas and is operated by identically named entities under new, Houthi-appointed management. The Houthis control the “.ye” country code top-level domain. While the Government of Yemen is attempting to reclaim ownership of the domain, the change needs the approval of the current user.³⁵

117. All official structures in Sana'a, such as the Ministry of Communications and the Public Telecommunications Corporation, are led by Houthi loyalists, ensuring the group's operational and financial control. These structures, in turn, control private

³¹ S/2023/130, para. 64.

³² See <https://south24.net/news/news.php?nid=4813>.

³³ Districts of Dhamar, Nihm, Bani Hushaysh and Bani al-Harith. Dhamar is situated 100 km to the south of Sana'a, north of Ibb and west of Bayda'.

³⁴ District of Mayfa'at Ans, Dhamar Governorate.

³⁵ Panel interviews.

operators. For instance, the Public Telecommunications Corporation holds a 59 per cent stake in the Yemen Mobile company.

118. Smuggling of telecommunications equipment is a major issue. Apart from smuggling through various border points (land and seaports) in Government-controlled areas, the Houthis are now reportedly receiving such equipment through Hudaydah port.

119. The use of text messages to raise funds continues.³⁶ The Panel has seen recent messages seeking 100-rial contributions for the missile force and drone air force. There are brochures actively promoting the campaign on social media platforms (see annex 84).

120. Revenue from roaming and international calls, including from usage by subscribers in Government-controlled areas, is collected by Houthi-controlled telecommunications companies. Conservative estimates place monthly international call revenues received from regional telecommunications companies at approximately \$20 million.³⁷

121. The 2024 annual report of the Yemen Mobile company shows that the total amount of tax paid (zakat and income tax) was 26 billion rials (approximately \$16 million). The estimated revenue from the telecom sector (public and private) is approximately 150 billion rials (approximately \$92 million).³⁸

Civil aviation sector

122. The Houthis collect revenues from the following sources:

- (a) Overflight fees, the collection of which been suspended since April 2025, likely because of the fact that the Houthis have been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States;
- (b) Landing and take-off fees at Sana'a International Airport;
- (c) Passenger excess baggage fees and freight charges.

123. As at 1 August 2024, \$120 million belonging to Yemenia Airways remained frozen by the Houthis. The company has no information regarding the status of those funds, because access to its financial and administrative systems in Sana'a has been blocked.

Seizure of commercial enterprises and financial institutions

124. This activity, which the Panel reported on in previous reports, continued.³⁹ Recent developments include the following:

- (a) The seizure of Yemen Gulf Bank in July 2025. Raed Al-Shaer, nephew of the former judicial custodian, Saleh Mesfer Saleh Al Shaer (YEi.007), was appointed judicial custodian;⁴⁰
- (b) The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour absorbed Al-Amal Microfinance Bank (see annex 85);
- (c) An external individual was appointed to the Board of Directors of Kamaran Company for Industry and Investment, in a move that is contrary to the company's rules and aimed at controlling the company's assets (see annex 86).

³⁶ S/2024/731, paras. 104 and 105 and annex 173.

³⁷ Panel interviews.

³⁸ Exchange rate as at 20 August 2025 (Central Bank of Yemen, Aden).

³⁹ S/2023/130, paras. 69–84; and S/2024/731, para. 114.

⁴⁰ See <https://yemenonline.info/public/Economy/9684>.

Import of tobacco

125. The Panel learned of the import of a large consignment of raw tobacco from Jabal Ali, United Arab Emirates, in late June 2025. The vessel carrying the tobacco, which was bound for Hudaydah, was rerouted from Djibouti to Aden. That consignment was reportedly part of a larger consignment intended for the manufacture and illicit trade of cigarettes to fund the Houthis. Further details cannot be shared because the case is under investigation by the Government.

B. Update on designated individuals

126. The Panel learned that two designated individuals had died, namely, Sultan Saleh Aida Aida Zabin (YEi.006) and Ahmad Al-Hamzi (YEi.012). The Panel had previously reported on the case of the former (S/2022/50, para. 95). It was announced that the latter had died on 6 August 2023.⁴¹ The Panel has not received official confirmation.

VI. Acts that violate international humanitarian law and international human rights law

127. Panel investigations revealed ongoing, widespread and systematic violations of international humanitarian and human rights law,⁴² in particular in Ibb, Amanat al-Asimah, Bayda', Dhamar and Ta'izz Governorates. Most violations verified by the Panel were attributed to the Houthis.

A. Indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects and arbitrary killings

128. Government sources reported that at least 164 civilians were killed (including 71 children and 18 women) and 239 were injured (including 91 children and 25 women), and 63 homes were destroyed or damaged in Houthi-controlled areas.⁴³ Violations undermining the rights to health, education and freedom of religion included the occupation of 19 places of worship and three schools. Six sites of worship and one school were used by Houthis as military bases. At least three sites of worship and one school were damaged or destroyed. Confidential sources reported 24 deaths and 126 injuries from Israeli air strikes and 96 deaths and 170 injuries from United States air strikes in Hudaydah (see annexes 87, 88 and 90).

Civilian casualties from landmines, improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance

129. Civilian casualties from landmines, improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance remained high, with women and children constituting the majority of those affected. The most affected Governorates were Ma'rib, Ta'izz and Jawf. While anti-personnel devices are typically, and to a significant extent, used to demoralize opposing forces, Houthi mines are designed to kill. Anti-personnel devices are placed in civilian areas, near schools, footpaths and farms, and are often disguised as everyday objects (e.g., rocks, toys). Modified anti-tank mines with pressure thresholds as low as

⁴¹ See <https://south24.net/news/newse.php?nid=3476>; and <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3256647.htm>.

⁴² In 2024 and 2025, the Government of Yemen documented 3,633 violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Houthi-controlled areas.

⁴³ An independent official source documented two schools and one medical facility as being occupied by the Houthis.

2 kg are used. Devices are laid in anticipation of Government counteroffensives or to punish communities that resists Houthi rule. Independent sources documented 51 casualties in the reporting period, including 17 dead (see annex 89).

Attacks on civilians and civilian objects

130. The Houthis continued to mount heavy weapon attacks on and besiege residential areas and to repeatedly target civilians with sniper fire (see annexes 87 and 88).

131. Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea continued in violation of international humanitarian law, as illustrated by the attacks on MV *Magic Sea* and MV *Eternity C*. The sunken tankers, carrying fuel and cargo, pose significant environmental risks.⁴⁴

132. Official and civil society sources have deemed that United States air strikes in Houthi-controlled areas were mostly targeted at military objects, while Israeli strikes, which were sometimes preceded by warnings, had significantly damaged civilian infrastructure that is vital to Yemenis. In Hudaydah, port workers were forced to work despite the ongoing attacks. The Houthis restricted vessel movements in order to use civilians and ships as shields or, at a minimum, cause reputational damage to the attacker (see annex 90).

133. On 28 April 2025, air strikes by the United States hit a migrant detention centre in Sa'dah, killing at least 68 detainees and injuring 47. The victims were identified as East African migrants. Although the Houthis may have shielded military targets with civilians, the principles of distinction, proportionality, precaution and military necessity continue to apply. The attacker bears the burden of proving that the site was a military object. The United States informed the Panel that it was assessing or investigating related allegations of civilian casualties (see annex 91).

B. Arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance

134. Official sources reported 403 arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances, 306 of which were attributed to the Houthis and 97 to entities affiliated with the Government.

135. The Houthis intensified efforts to suppress dissent through widespread detentions. Large-scale incarcerations occurred during the celebrations that occurred on 26 September 2024 to mark Revolution Day, with the Zaynabiyat involved in key surveillance roles. The “Midri” (I don’t know) campaign, which is aimed at suppressing the sharing of information on such issues as air strike impacts, led to more detentions, in particular in Hudaydah, Ibb and Dhamar Governorates. Many detainees remain forcibly disappeared. Individuals from Tihama have been held incommunicado for extended periods. The primary targets of the detentions have been journalists, educators, activists and religious figures who are critical of the Houthis (see annex 92).

136. A total of 23 United Nations personnel remain in detention, denied due process and with minimal contact with family. More than 50 other humanitarian workers remain detained. There is a systematic pattern of targeting individuals perceived as threats to the Houthis’ political or financial control, in particular individuals who are involved in financial oversight or donor fund disbursement. Abdul Hakim Hashem Ali al-Khaiwani (also known as Al-Karrar), the head of the Houthi Security and

⁴⁴ There is a risk of oil spills from full tankers causing extensive harm, while empty tankers retain flammable gases that increase the risk of explosion. For further information, see [S/2024/731](#), para. 139.

Intelligence Service, operationalized those detentions. According to government and other political sources, detentions have become increasingly transactional and used to extract concessions from international actors (see para. 23). To date, limited releases have occurred through tribal mediation or discrete diplomacy. Some detainees continue to face asset freezes. Following the reporting period, the Houthis continued to engage in the arbitrary detention of United Nations personnel in an intransigent and brazen manner, in clear violation of international humanitarian law.⁴⁵ These actions have serious implications for United Nations operations and the humanitarian situation in Yemen. The Panel is currently collecting information and will submit a special report to the Committee on the matter (see annex 92.1)

137. The Panel also documented arbitrary detentions, including of children, in Government-controlled areas. Individuals from northern regions are detained on suspicion of being affiliated with the Houthis, notably in Aden, Shabwah and Lahj. The Government denies any breaches of the rule of law (see annex 92.2).

Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

138. The Panel continued to document cases of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees. Witness testimony included references to the use of the “barbecue hold”, electric shocks, removal of fingernails, drilling with nail guns, waterboarding and deprivation of food and medical care. Particularly brutal methods (e.g., flaying)⁴⁶ were used on women. Victims were blindfolded and coerced into signing documents (e.g., confessions, no-contact pledges).⁴⁷ A witness with privileged access to detention facilities observed men who showed visible signs of torture. Some victims of torture died in detention (see annex 92.3).

139. One former detainee reported that a male cellmate had been raped, while he himself had been threatened with sexual violence. A legal system source reported an additional case of male rape. A witness with first-hand knowledge of Houthi detention procedures confirmed that female detainees continued to be subjected to sexual violence as a form of torture or punishment (see annex 93).

Violations of the right to a fair trial

140. The judiciary has been weaponized to suppress dissent and free expression. The Specialized Criminal Prosecution Office in Sana’a has charged hundreds of individuals with treason and espionage (see annex 94).

141. Detainees are often not shown arrest warrants, not presented with formal charges and denied legal counsel and access to evidence. Many are held for prolonged periods without trial or judicial oversight.

142. Business owners who resist Houthi demands face detention, freezing of assets, death sentences and confiscation of property by the Specialized Criminal Court in Sana’a. Those measures have become a significant source of revenue for the group (see annex 95).

143. The judiciary has been instrumental in targeting minorities and restricting religious freedom. For example, court rulings against Baha’is have reinforced ongoing hate speech and threats as part of a broader pattern of discrimination. Very old, yet still

⁴⁵ On 31 August 2025, the Houthis arbitrarily detained at least 11 United Nations staff and looted and confiscated property from the office of the World Food Programme in Sana’a. Credible sources informed the Panel of the arbitrary detentions of other civilians, including activists.

⁴⁶ Deliberate removal of skin tissue as a method of torture.

⁴⁷ The Government of Yemen documented 98 cases of torture (5 women, 90 men and 3 children).

open, legal proceedings continue to impede their ability to return to their areas of origin and reclaim property (see annex 96).

144. In Government-controlled areas, there are also detainees who have been held beyond legal time limits without judicial review (see annex 92.2).

C. Sexual and gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence

145. Sexual violence remains widespread but underreported in Yemen because of severe stigma and the risk of honour-based violence. Child, early and forced marriage persist, exacerbated by poverty. There have been reports of Houthi “supervisors” encouraging or coercing women and girls into marriage. Sexual violence is also used strategically to demoralize dissidents (e.g., undressing female relatives in front of male detainees).

146. The Zaynabiyat play a key role in furthering conflict-related sexual violence. Confidential sources described members of the Zaynabiyat bathing, dressing and delivering women and girls in detention to Houthi affiliates to be raped. Victims were told this would “cleanse” their souls or that being “married” to a member of the Prophet’s lineage would restore their honour. One witness observed about 25 rapes through a hole in a detention cell wall. The Zaynabiyat beat and tortured women who failed to satisfy their rapists. Victims often face family rejection and may subsequently be recruited as informants or spies. Military, government and civil society sources confirmed that some have been involved in “honey trap” operations. Multiple witnesses, in their testimonies, have given accounts of sexual exploitation in detention, on-site or off-site. The Panel documented a case involving the sexual enslavement of a woman who was detained in Sana’a in 2025. Similarly, in 2022, a female doctor was raped by various Houthi combatants, after she had been taken to treat fighters on the front line. Former detainees and human rights activists indicated that children have been born in detention as a result of rape. In some cases, the children were separated from their mothers after one year, with the children remaining under Houthi care (see annex 97.1).

147. Fabricated accusations of “immorality” are used against regime opponents, fostering stigma that facilitates recruitment for and by the Zaynabiyat. In order to coerce collaboration, women are the targets of cybercrime, including telephone hacking, image theft and manipulation using artificial intelligence tools. Men can be charged with and convicted of similar crimes. The Panel reviewed judicial rulings containing highly explicit descriptions that, in the deeply conservative society of Yemen, may effectively result in severe reputational damage and social ostracism for the accused.

148. Women activists face systematic targeting, including death threats and public shaming using real or doctored images. Their families have faced threats, violence and asset freezes for years. Some activists are now being labelled as Israeli or Mossad spies, an especially dangerous charge in view of the Gaza conflict (see annex 97.2).

149. A witness reported the rape of detained male children during the reporting period in Houthi-controlled areas. The perpetrators were low-ranking soldiers, mainly gate guards, acting without their superiors’ knowledge. Military sources have confirmed cases of sexual violence against detained boys.

D. Child recruitment and use

150. Independent official sources documented 214 cases of children being recruited and used by parties to the conflict in the reporting period. Of those children, 140 were killed and 74 remain deployed. The recruitment of children has surged since 7 October 2023.

That surge has been accompanied by a shift in recruitment tactics, which now include not only financial incentives but also coercion. Fatalities, however, decreased after the 2022 ceasefire agreement between the Houthis and the Government. The Governorates most affected include Sana'a, Hajjah, Dhamar, Amran, Sa'dah and Bayda', where children have been taken by force, among other methods (see annex 98).

151. The Houthis' recruitment of children is systematic and carried out by means of a structured and multilayered system under the leadership of the General Mobilization Authority of the Ministry of Defence. The system, which uses official and informal channels, includes the Ministry of Education, which organizes summer camps and Qur'anic schools to indoctrinate children as young as 7 years. Changes to curricula developed by the Curricula Department of the Ministry of Education are aimed at ensuring that children internalize the Houthis' ideological goals (see annexes 99 and 100).

152. Children who avoid summer courses risk being denied primary or high school diplomas, while participants receive such benefits as free university education. Families that refuse to enlist their children are often denied essential supplies, such as food baskets and cooking gas. Local tribal or neighbourhood leaders, a foundational layer in the recruitment system, maintain strict oversight to enforce these measures. The Zaynabiyat pressure mothers to support recruitment in exchange for educational or financial incentives. Cultural events, zawamil (traditional Yemeni chant) and visual propaganda glorify jihad and martyrdom.

153. Children as young as 10 undergo a 40-day ideological training, which is followed by 45 days of military instruction for children between 15 and 18 years of age. They are then deployed in combat or used in domestic roles, as drivers and close protection, to operate checkpoints, plant landmines, smuggle drugs or film front-line propaganda. In order to ensure obedience, it is common to supply children with drugs (e.g., sedatives, khat). Since the launch of the "Aqsa flood" operation, eight batches of approximately 7,000 children have graduated (a total of approximately 56,000 children). Some children voluntarily go to the front lines owing to necessity or effective indoctrination (see annex 101).

154. Girls are recruited by the Zaynabiyat for espionage, surveillance and logistics, including transporting explosive materials and Global Position System trackers. Recruitment often occurs in schools and at religious events.

155. The Houthi child recruitment strategy is designed to reshape Yemeni society through ideological indoctrination, militarized education and the diversion of humanitarian aid. This long-term plan aims to produce a generation of loyal fighters who are uneducated and indoctrinated and with no viable alternatives. The system thrives on the breakdown of traditional family structures and the exploitation of poverty. With the family unit effectively dismantled, the Houthis face no meaningful counterbalance.

E. Obstacles to humanitarian access and delivery

156. Humanitarian access remains restricted in Houthi-controlled areas. Attacks in the Red Sea have increased commodity prices because of trade rerouting, while Israeli strikes on Hudaydah have disrupted food supply routes. The designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States has contributed to reduced fuel imports, affecting food supplies. Although goods can be redirected through the ports of Mukalla or Aden, the Houthis have rejected those alternatives in order to avoid receiving goods that have been taxed by the Government and being dependent on the Government.

157. Diversion of aid, including medical supplies, occurs repeatedly. Official sources informed the Panel of at least four cases documented during the reporting period.

158. Government, academic and civil society sources report that humanitarian aid is diverted both directly and indirectly. In April 2025, Houthi forces looted a WFP warehouse in Sa'dah containing food stocks for distribution. With regard to indirect diversion, humanitarian actors are often forced to contract with Houthi-linked companies owing to lack of alternatives; many workers have fled and businesses have relocated to Government-controlled areas to avoid threats, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance or property confiscation.

159. Testimonies from current and former staff of humanitarian agencies and entities indicate that humanitarian entities are pressured to hire individuals nominated by the Houthis, who ensure that beneficiary lists and fund disbursements are aligned with Houthi interests. These sources also report that the Houthis often demand a portion of project funds.

160. The Houthis exploit humanitarian assistance to generate income and support the war effort. Aid is sold, food baskets are redirected to combatants and tribal leaders are pressured to provide recruits in exchange for aid. The Government has confirmed that beneficiary lists are manipulated and food baskets are used as incentives for child recruitment.

F. The “internal front”

161. Following the 2022 ceasefire and reduction in front-line hostilities, the Houthis shifted their focus to the so-called internal front, a strategy that is aimed at consolidating control over society. This strategy involves concerted, phased action to restrict civic space, suppress dissent and restructure societal institutions to enable long-term indoctrination and curb resistance.

162. Key components include limitations on freedom of expression, population movement and the operation of NGOs. Restrictions are enforced through, inter alia, widespread arbitrary detentions, torture and extrajudicial killings. Journalists, academics and activists face increasing repression, including enforced disappearance. This has created a chilling effect on independent reporting, allowing the Houthis to maintain narrative dominance. Former detainees often face lasting trauma, social stigma, displacement, unemployment and physical disabilities, with minimal support from State or humanitarian actors.

163. In education, curricula have been overhauled by the Houthis in order to bring them into alignment with the group's ideology, promoting hatred, glorifying jihad and reinforcing loyalty to the group. Educational and religious institutions have been repurposed as propaganda hubs. Resistance has led to school closures. Infrastructure destruction and the non-payment of teachers' salaries have severely destabilized the education sector. An estimated 2.5 million to 4 million children are now out of school.

164. The recruitment of children, some as young as 7, is central to the Houthis' long-term control. Poverty and hunger are exploited as coercive tools in that regard. Humanitarian aid is diverted to support child recruitment, deepening the cycle of exploitation.

165. Ideological training is mandated across all sectors of the Houthi administration, including police and prison personnel. Strategic monitoring ensures ideological saturation across institutions and communities.

166. The indiscriminate planting of landmines has caused widespread fear and restricted access to farmland and essential resources, thereby helping to worsen

poverty and food insecurity. The deployment of snipers to deliberately target civilians, including children, is another tactic of psychological warfare that further reinforces civilian helplessness.

167. Cumulatively, these strategies are dismantling the social fabric of the country. By controlling information, weaponizing poverty, militarizing education and targeting children, the Houthis aim to build a new generation of ideologically bound individuals who will continue their legacy. Traditional structures, such as the family, the educational system and civil society, are being systematically eroded to pave the way for long-term Houthi dominance.

Case study: conflict-induced deprivation and systemic civilian harm in Ta‘izz

Ta‘izz faces an acute humanitarian crisis that is driven by a combination of military, psychological, economic and social pressures. The region’s infrastructure, essential services and social fabric are being degraded continuously, creating conditions that significantly threaten internal stability.

(a) The region’s primary water infrastructure lies in Houthi-controlled areas. The main pumping system has been deliberately blocked since 2015. Of the 91 wells in the region, only 21 are located in Government-controlled territory, and those meet a small portion of daily water needs. Water trucking, which is often prohibitively expensive, meets no more than 15 per cent of demand. This acute shortage has led to the resurgence of such waterborne diseases as cholera and dengue fever, placing additional strain on an already fragile healthcare system.

(b) In the absence of access to functioning sewage treatment facilities, which are also situated in Houthi-held areas, the authorities have been forced to adopt makeshift waste disposal solutions, including disposing of waste near agricultural areas. The release of toxic gases and contamination associated with these sites has been linked to an increase in cancer cases, further compounding the region’s public health crisis.

(c) The main power station is in a Houthi-held area, and the electricity supply is unstable.

(d) Landmines remain a major threat. The Maqbanah district is among the most affected, with the Houthis planting disguised mines in areas frequented by civilians, including children. Despite ongoing clearance efforts, mines continue to be deployed, especially in remote border areas, such as Muzaq, often using local recruits. Fatalities and permanent injuries are high.

(e) The healthcare system is critically overstretched. The reopening of the eastern entry point (Karsh) has led to increased movement from Houthi-controlled areas, where vaccination coverage is limited. This has led to outbreaks of polio, diphtheria and measles. The seizure by the Houthis of licensed pharmaceutical companies has allowed the group to continue importing such drugs as morphine and fentanyl, which then enter Ta‘izz through smuggling schemes. The displacement of healthcare personnel and destruction of medical facilities as a result of the war have further hampered healthcare provision.

(f) The rate of psychological trauma is rising sharply. Prolonged violence and displacement have led to increased cases of mental health disorders, with minimal services available for diagnosis or treatment.

(g) Economically, Ta'izz is experiencing a severe downturn. The war-induced suspension of trade and industry has triggered widespread unemployment and deepened poverty. Agricultural destruction and loss of livestock have forced families to rely on child labour. School dropout rates are rising. With its key economic resources, including oil, controlled by the Houthis, the Government of Ta'izz faces significant challenges in restoring services or rebuilding critical infrastructure (see annex 102).

By deliberately and systematically disrupting essential services and exploiting humanitarian vulnerabilities, the Houthis are undermining Ta'izz from within. The cumulative impact on civilian life is severe, eroding resilience and obstructing recovery across sectors. These patterns raise concerns under international humanitarian law. It is possible that the prohibition on collective punishment may also be applicable.

VII. Assessment of actions taken for effective implementation of all sanctions measures

A. General issues

168. The Panel undertook an assessment of the implementation of the measures imposed in paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015). It addressed communication to several Member States requesting detailed information on the actions taken to effectively implement the measures.

169. At the time of writing, only 12 written responses had been received to the 26 communications sent. This issue was addressed in bilateral discussions with some Member States.

170. All Member States that responded have legal frameworks in place to implement Security Council resolutions. Some treat breaches of the sanctions regime as criminal offences. Nevertheless, timely identification of potential violations remains challenging. While monitoring systems may exist, trigger mechanisms do not always operate effectively to support consistent detection and response.

171. There is an observable gap between Member States' responsibilities, which are clearly articulated in the relevant resolutions, and the practical implementation of those responsibilities: notably, an asset freeze must be implemented "without delay" and the "necessary measures" must be adopted "to prevent" breaches.⁴⁸

172. Key implementation challenges include the following:

- (a) Failure or inability of the country of residence or nationality of the listed individuals to implement asset freezes and travel bans;
- (b) Reliance on self-declaration, without independent government monitoring;
- (c) A perception that compliance lies primarily with private actors;

⁴⁸ Security Council resolution 2140 (2014), paras. 11 and 15.

- (d) Absence of provisions to initiate investigations into direct or indirect control of designated individuals or entities;
- (e) Insufficient identifying data, hindering travel ban enforcement;
- (f) Lack of inspection of cargo bound for Yemen;
- (g) Limited proactive investigations into potential breaches triggered by a State's own intelligence or follow-up reports;
- (h) Issues of due process, data protection laws and confidentiality obligations may require laws to be reviewed to accommodate the specificities of sanctions regimes, while respecting fundamental rights;
- (i) Inadequate coordination and information-sharing among government agencies and between Member States.

B. Implementation of the arms embargo

173. Without effective implementation by Member States, the arms embargo established in resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#) is totally ineffective and has made no significant dent in the capabilities of the Houthis. Certain major seizures, as documented above, are evidence of the ongoing ability of the Houthis to ensure the continued flow of weapons, military materiel and dual-use items.

174. The Panel studied the procedures that Member States have put in place in order to fulfil the requirements of paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#). It considered evidence widely available, including cases reported by the Panel, regarding the point of origin of items the supply, sale, or transfer of which is prohibited by paragraph 14 of the resolution. Responses to queries on the monitoring of the arms embargo indicate that Member States have mechanisms in place to detect and prevent illicit transfers. Neither the Panel nor the Committee, however, have received information regarding investigations initiated following reports of actual or potential arms embargo violations. This contrasts with documented instances of violations in which the country of origin, manufacture or shipment was often indicated. In addition, it may denote limitations in mechanisms for following up on such cases, especially when the Panel seeks information from Member States and other stakeholders and reports on violations.

175. The Panel also notes that no reports have been submitted to the Committee in accordance with paragraph 17 of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), although Member States are required to do so in relation to inspections carried out in accordance with paragraph 15 of the resolution.

176. The Panel ascertained that, in the past 12 months, the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism, based in Djibouti, conducted regular inspections with the technical assistance of Member States. According to reports from several sources, including the Mechanism, there were at least four seizures during inspections in Djibouti, triggering the provisions of the arms embargo. The inspections were conducted in the territory of Djibouti. The goods remain in the custody of Djibouti, making Djibouti the Member State responsible for notifying the Committee under paragraph 17 of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#). The Committee has received no reports regarding inspections carried out by Member States and the outcome thereof as required under paragraph 17. The Panel finds that, in this regard, Djibouti has failed to comply with the provisions of paragraph 17.

177. Such instances of non-compliance undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the arms embargo. Violations are not systematically brought to the attention of the

Committee. No action has been taken to identify and name individuals, entities or Member States that may have violated the arms embargo. There is no record of whether action was initiated under national law to hold the perpetrators accountable. In the absence of visible deterrence measures, the implementation of the arms embargo remains wanting.

178. Despite repeated requests, the Panel has received detailed information about only one of the shipments mentioned above, nor has it received information regarding any investigations initiated following the seizures. Accordingly, it has been unable to conduct independent investigations to identify the origin of those items and the perpetrators of violations. The case for which information was received is currently under investigation.

179. Given the extent of the violations of the arms embargo and the major cases detected in recent months in Yemen, such incidents, as well as information regarding the detailed inspections conducted, should be communicated promptly to the Committee and the Panel. The wording of paragraphs 15 and 17 of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#) does not provide for such reporting by Yemen. Failure to promptly communicate information may affect subsequent investigations.

180. The Panel stresses the need to provide Member States with guidance on compliance with resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#) that clarifies, in particular, how paragraphs 15 to 17 of the resolution apply to inspections conducted by the Mechanism in Djibouti.

C. Asset freeze and travel ban

181. The major issue affecting implementation of the asset freeze and travel ban, including in Yemen, is that sanctioned individuals are based in Houthi-controlled areas and hold important positions in the hierarchy. There is lack of visibility regarding their movements and assets, and insufficient identifying information. Implementation is especially complex given the long and porous land borders.

182. The Panel notes that being designated has no effect on the conduct and activities of the sanctioned individuals.

183. The Houthis issue passports, often with fake identities, for individuals residing in areas under their control that are used for travel to neighbouring countries.⁴⁹

184. Some Member States reported that they require entities to declare that they have no association with designated individuals or entities. While such a measure is useful, it may be insufficient on its own, given the broad scope of the asset freeze and the high potential for violations.

185. Relevantly, although most Member States have legal frameworks, whether administrative or judicial, for implementing United Nations sanctions, this does not necessarily include the conduct of the investigations required to locate, for example, indirectly controlled assets. In most cases, the assets are not held directly by the listed individuals.

186. It would therefore follow that, in addition to legal measures, other measures, such as border management, supply of equipment and capacity-building and awareness-raising at the cutting edge are also needed. The effective dissemination of information, coordination between agencies and regular monitoring cannot be overemphasized. These require robust administrative mechanisms and, eventually, legal reforms. Constructive discussions on the challenges faced in national

⁴⁹ [S/2023/833](#), paras. 175 and 176; and [S/2024/731](#), para. 14 and annex 9.

implementation could help identify practical solutions and pave the way for remedial action.

VIII. Recommendations

187. The Panel recommends that the Security Council expand the scope of the provisions of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#) to include inspections of cargo conducted in Government of Yemen-controlled areas and on the high seas (see para. 108).

188. The Panel recommends that the Committee:

(a) Support the efforts of the Government of Yemen to resume the export of crude oil and petroleum products, in order to generate State revenue to advance recovery efforts, which include addressing the ongoing economic and humanitarian crisis, thereby promoting lasting peace, security and stability in Yemen (see para. 25);

(b) Hold discussions with regional and international organizations on prevention and response mechanisms to environmental hazards resulting from attacks on vessels in the Red Sea, with the view to strengthening monitoring, preparedness and response capacity (see para. 63);

(c) Urge the Government to strengthen vigilance and enhance capacity at all sea, land and air entry points and to establish mechanisms for systematically sharing information in a timely manner among all relevant national agencies and with the Panel, with a view to ensuring effective implementation of the arms embargo (see para. 108);

(d) Call upon Member States to enhance international technical assistance and monitoring, including through the Mine Action Service, to support clearance operations, risk education and victim assistance; and urge armed groups in Yemen to cease and prohibit the use of anti-personnel mines and ensure full, safe and unhindered access for humanitarian demining organizations to affected areas, with a view to enabling comprehensive clearance and risk reduction activities that are essential to the protection of civilians (see para. 129);

(e) Urge Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations to discuss ways to intensify efforts to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence in Yemen (see paras. 145–149), including by:

(i) Strengthening protection mechanisms, including by ensuring safe reporting channels and access to medical, psychological and legal support and survivor-centred programmes that prioritize confidentiality, empowerment and long-term rehabilitation;

(ii) Implementing stigma reduction campaigns that engage communities, survivors and local leaders to foster an environment of support and reintegration;

(f) Urge Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations to discuss ways to strengthen coordinated efforts to effectively counter the Houthi policy of systematic indoctrination of children (see paras. 150–155). Priorities should include the following:

(i) Supporting community-based initiatives that address the long-term effects of child involvement in armed conflict and promote locally led social change;

- (ii) Enhancing livelihood support for families of children at heightened risk of recruitment and use;**
- (iii) Implementing sustainable reintegration programmes for demobilized children that are aimed at preventing rerecruitment and ensuring their full return to civilian life;**
- (iv) Monitoring and addressing the militarization and politicization of education, including by upholding children's right to quality, impartial education;**
- (g) Urge international donors to strengthen and rigorously implement robust monitoring and accountability mechanisms for humanitarian aid disbursement, with a view to preventing the diversion of aid in ways that may inadvertently sustain conflict (see paras. 159 and 160);**
- (h) Encourage the Government of Yemen and countries in the region to hold regular, formal meetings focused on law enforcement coordination and information-sharing for the purpose of effective implementation of the sanctions regime (see para. 174);**
- (i) Urge Member States to comply with reporting obligations to the Committee under resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), including paragraphs 15 to 17 (see para. 180);**
- (j) Provide guidance to Member States on the inspections conducted by the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism, including in the territory of Djibouti, with a view to ensuring compliance with paragraphs 15 to 17 of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#) (see para. 180);**
- (k) Consider addressing communications to Member States highlighting the importance of controlling the international travel of listed individuals and the relevance of biometric information to identifying those travelling with stolen, forged or altered travel documents (see para. 183).**

Annexes to the final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)

Table of Contents

Annex 1: Methodology	43
Annex 2: UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Map	48
Annex 3: Summary of Panel correspondence (up to 15 August 2025)	49
Annex 4. List of Acronyms	51
Annex 5: Video released by the Houthis military media and on their social media account on 16 October 2024	53
Annex 6: Article published on 25 August 2024 by the Yemeni Houthi media Saba on the meeting chaired by the Houthi de-facto Minister of Defense and Military Production Mohammed al-Atifi affirming readiness of the Houthi armed forces to strike Israel in retaliation against strikes in Hudaydah	54
Annex 7: Article published on the social media platform “X” on 4 January 2025 on the meeting chaired by Major General Youssef al-Madani (YEi.009), commander of the Houthi’s fifth Military Region and discussing mobilization efforts and preparation	56
Annex 8: The march of the al-Mansour Billah Brigades Forces released by Houthis military media on 11 January 2025	58
Annex 9: The march of the Support and Reinforcement Battalions in Sana’a released by Houthis military media on 2 November 2024	59
Annex 10: The military parade of the reserve forces in the sixth Military Region aired on Houthis Al Masirah TV on 31 December 2024	61
Annex 11: The march of the Rapid Intervention Force of the Ministry of Interior from Sana’a to Sa’dah aired on Houthis’ Al Masirah TV on 5 November 2024	62
Annex 12: Meeting of the Supreme Committee for the Support of Al-Aqsa on 15 January 2025 chaired by the de-facto First Deputy Prime Minister Allama Mohammed Miftah	63
Annex 13: Article published on Houthi media Saba on tribes joining the general mobilization campaign	64
Annex 14: Mobilization and military training of staff of the Health and Environment office of Hajja Governorate	65
Annex 15: Article published on 21 December 2024 by Al Masdar Online on the Houthi recruitment campaign targeting employees of ministries	66
Annex 16: Statement posted by Houthi media TV Almasirah on a million-man march on Sabeen square in Sanaa on 9 August 2025	70
Annex 17: Statement by Abdulmalik al-Houthi published by Houthis military media on 12 January 2025 referring to the general mobilization and combat readiness of the tribes	71

Annex 18: Article published on 15 October 2024 on Ansarollah's (Houthi) website and referring to the general mobilization achievements	73
Annex 19: Statement by Abdulmalik al-Houthi aired by Houthis military media on 12 December 2024 referring to the general mobilization training activities	74
Annex 20: Organization chart of the Houthi armed forces	75
Annex 21: Al-Aqsa program workshops at University Sanaa held on 4 January 2025	76
Annex 22: Parade of the graduates of the Al-Aqsa Flood courses for staff and students at Sanaa University aired on Al-Masirah TV on 4 December 2024 TV	77
Annex 23: Creation of a new police intelligence unit under the lead of Ali Hussein al-Houthi to counter espionage and surveillance	78
Annex 24: Interview conducted on 9 April 2024 by Al Mayadeen with the commander of the Iranian Navy Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, during which he refers to the Houthis domestic missile and drone manufacturing capability and their growing capability in targeting vessels	79
Annex 25: Houthi attack launched on 15 September 2024 against Israel	80
Annex 26: Statements by Mohammed al-Houthi, member of the Houthis' Supreme Political Council, on the social media platform "X" on 24 December 2024 referring to the Houthis readiness to fight against the United States military presence in the Red Sea, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Israel with the missile, naval and drone forces	81
Annex 27: Statement by the United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III published by the Department of Defense regarding airstrikes launched on 16 October 2024 against Yemen	83
Annex 28: United States attack launched on 9-10 November 2024 against Yemen	84
Annex 29: United States attack launched on 21 December 2024 against Yemen	85
Annex 30: Preparation of United States attacks against Yemen on 23 December 2024	86
Annex 31: United States attacks on 30-31 December 2024 against Yemen	87
Annex 32: United States attacks on 31 December 2024 against Yemen	88
Annex 33: Statement published on 27 April 2025 by US Centcom and reporting on the achievements of the military campaign against the Houthis	89
Annex 34: Preparation of United States attack on 7 April 2025 against Yemen	90
Annex 35: United States attack launched against Ra's Isa port on 17 April 2025	92
Annex 36: Speech of Abdulmalik al-Houthi published by Houthi media Saba on 8 May 2025	93
Annex 37: Downing of MQ-9 drones by the Houthis	94
Annex 38: Downing of MQ-9 drones by the Houthis	95

Annex 39: Israel attack launched on 26 December 2024 against Yemen	96
Annex 40: Video footage presented by the Israel Defense Force regarding the remarks of the Commanding Officer of the Israeli Air Force Major General Tomer Bar on 26 December 2024 following the strike on Houthi targets in Yemen	97
Annex 41: Video footage presented by the Israel Defense Forces on 26 December 2024 on Israeli Air Force fighter jets taking off for the strikes on Houthi military targets in Yemen	98
Annex 42: Israel Air Force attack launched on 26 December 2024 against Sana'a International Airport	99
Annex 43: Israel Air Force attack launched on 26 December 2024 against Ra's Khatib power station in Hudaydah governorate.	100
Annex 44: Israel attack launched on 5 and 6 May 2025 against Yemen	101
Annex 45: Israel attack launched on 6 May 2025 against Yemen	102
Annex 46: Israel attack launched on 28 May 2025 against Yemen	103
Annex 47: Israel attack launched on 10 June 2025 against Yemen	105
Annex 48: Damage to Ra's Isa port facilities and unloading of fuel from tankers onto trucks following attacks	106
Annex 49: Speech of Abdulmalik al-Houthi aired on Houthis military media website on 2 January 2025 in which he refers to the Houthis drone capabilities	108
Annex 50: Houthi attack launched on 9 December 2024 against Israel	109
Annex 51: Announcement by the Israel Defense Forces on the Houthi attack launched on 19 December 2024 against Israel	111
Annex 52: Military cooperation between the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and a coordinated attack launched on 19 December 2024 against Israel.	112
Annex 53: Houthis attack launched on 20 December 2024 against Israel.	113
Annex 54: Houthis attack launched on 21 December 2024 against Israel.	114
Annex 55: Fundraising campaign "be a partner in making victory" in support of the missile forces	118
Annex 56: Houthi attack launched on 28 September 2024 against Israel	119
Annex 57: Houthi attack launched on 30 December 2024 against Israel	121
Annex 58: Attack by the Houthis on the vessel Sounion on 21 August 2024 and attack on the vessel Cordelia Moon on 1 October 2024.	122
Annex 59: Information on Houthi attacks and suspicious activities towards merchant vessels from 1 August 2024 to 31 July 2025	125
Annex 60: Article published on 22 January 2025 by Houthi media Al Masirah on the release by the Houthis of the Galaxy Leader crew and on the coordination with Hamas.	127

Annex 61: Statement posted by the Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree on 11 March 2025 on the resumption of Houthi attacks against vessels	128
Annex 62: Article published on 6 December 2024 by Al Awal on missile debris found in the governorate of Abyan	129
Annex 63: Report posted on the social media platform 'X' on 8 December 2024 on missile debris found in the governorate of Abyan	131
Annex 64: Attack by the Houthis on the Cordelia Moon on 1 October 2024	132
Annex 65: Houthi secondary attacks on the vessel Sounion on 21 August 2024 and on the vessel Magic Sea on 6 July 2025	133
Annex 66: Speech of Abdulmalik al-Houthi published on 15 September 2024 by Houthi media Al Masirah TV on the Occasion of the Blessed Birth Anniversary of the Prophet on 15 September 2024	136
Annex 67: Letter from Hamas political leader Yahia Sinwar dated 15 September 2024 addressed to the Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi following the launch of a ballistic missile against Israel	137
Annex 68: Article published by Houthi media Saba on 25 January 2025 informing on the meeting between the Houthi de-facto Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Hamas representative in Sana'a held in Sana'a on 20 January 2025	140
Annex 69: Interview by Major General Hossein Salami Commander in Chief of Iran's Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) published by Tehrantimes on 28 December 2024 in which he is praising Houthi attacks on Israel and refuting claims that the resistance has lost strength	141
Annex 70: Article published on 26 December 2024 by Houthi media Al-Masirah in which Hamas and Hezbollah condemn Israeli attack on Yemen	142
Annex 71: Statement of Hezbollah Central Council member Sheikh Hassan al-Baghdadi on 29 December 2024 reaffirming the strength and unity of the resistance led by Iran and referring to missile attacks by Houthis	143
Annex 72: Article published by the Yemeni media outlet South24 on the attack by AQAP carried out against Government affiliated forces on 16 August 2024.	144
Annex 73: AQAP report on military operations carried out against Government affiliated forces	145
Annex 74: AQAP sniper attack on 21 November 2024 against Government affiliated forces	147
Annex 75: AQAP weaponized drone attack in April 2025 against Government affiliated forces	149
Annex 76: Article published by the Counter-Extremist Project on 6 May 2025 reporting on AQAP propaganda and incitement to violence via social media	150
Annex 77: Seized detonators, explosives and detonating fuses	151
Annex 78: Seizure of vessel tracking items	152
Annex 79: Seizure of dhow carrying a significant quantity of weapons interdicted in Bab al-Mandab.	153

Annex 80: Smuggling details from Customs Seizures	155
Annex 81: Analysis of the features and security marks in the 200 Rial banknote issued in 2025 by the Central Bank of Yemen, Sana'a.	156
Annex 82: Currency 200 rial note issued by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden in 2018	157
Annex 83: Copy of agreement between Ans' tribal leaders and M.A.J from Facebook.	158
Annex 84: Screenshots of messages and social media for collection of funds from the public for the Houthi Forces	161
Annex 85: Decree on the takeover of Al Amal Microfinance Bank.	164
Annex 86: Important Statement Issued by the Board of Directors of Kamaran Industry and Investment Company / Aden	170
Annex 87: Examples of documented civilians' casualties of indiscriminate attacks and extra-judicial killings	172
Annex 88: Examples of documented attacks against civilian objects (schools and health facilities).	176
Annex 89: Landmines, IEDs and UXOS detected in the reporting period in GoY areas	177
Annex 90: Airstrikes on Civilian Objects in Hudaydah governorate, in the reporting period	193
Annex 91: Airstrike on Sa'dah's migrant Detention Centre, April 2025	194
Annex 92: Widespread and systematic arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearance in Yemen	197
Annex 93: Sexual violence against women in detention	205
Annex 94: Accusation by the Specialised Criminal Prosecution Office in Sana'a against Houthi opponents	206
Annex 95: Private business overtaken by the Houthis after a judgement by the Specialised Criminal Court in Sana'a	207
Annex 96: Violation of freedom of religion: The case of the Baha'I Community	213
Annex 97: Conflict -related sexual violence	215
Annex 98: Children recruited and killed.	217
Annex 99: Involvement of Houthi Ministry of Education on a widespread policy of child recruitment and use	218
Annex 100: Examples of alteration in academic curricula.	222
Annex 101: Statement of child recruited by the Houthis and captured by GoY	225
Annex 102: Humanitarian Situation in Ta'izz	226

Annex 1: Methodology

The Panel uses satellite imagery of Yemen procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations. It also uses commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data and mobile phone records. Public statements by officials through their official media channels are accepted as factual unless contrary facts are established. While it has been as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would expose these sources or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel does not include identifying information.

The Panel reviews social media, but no information gathered is used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.

The spelling of toponyms within Yemen often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update.

The Panel places importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agrees that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions, and recommendations by a majority of the members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.

The Panel has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in most incidents that are covered in this report. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix A.

Appendix A 'The opportunity to reply' methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity⁵⁰ in a Panel's public report, could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the 'opportunity to reply'.

2. The Panel's methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:

- (a) Providing an individual with an 'opportunity to reply' should be the norm;
- (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
 - (i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - (ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;
 - (iii) Endanger Panel sources or their relatives or Panel members;
 - (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field;
 - (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.

3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.

4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.

5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.

6. In no circumstances the third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, can determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.

7. The individuals, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or their government) to communicate on their behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

⁵⁰ Hereinafter, the term individual will be used to reflect both individuals and entities.

Appendix B: Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses

1. The Panel adopts the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations meet the highest possible evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from visiting places in Yemen. In doing so it pays particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, (S/2006/997), on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as per paragraph 14 of resolution 2564 (2021).

2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning alleged IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is as set out below:

(a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.

(b) In carrying out its investigations on the use of explosive ordnance, the Panel relies on at least three or more of the following sources of information:

- (i) At least two eyewitnesses or victims;
- (ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
- (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel will endeavour to obtain copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations;
- (iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eyewitnesses or by checking for pixilation distortion:
 - a. In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and
 - b. The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other sources of information.
- (v) The utilization of open source or purchased satellite imagery, wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident;
- (vi) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;
- (vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced;

(viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area;

(ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident;

(x) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.

(c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations, the Panel relies on the following sources of information:

(i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview;

(ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody;

(iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;

(iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates;

(v) Documentation issued by prison authorities;

(vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible;

(vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim;

(viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates;

(ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident;

(x) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings;

(xi) Detainees do not have always access to medical care, nor is it always possible to obtain medical reports, especially in cases of prolonged detention. Therefore, the Panel accepts testimonies received from detainees alleging that violence was used against them during detention by the detaining parties as prima facie evidence of torture;

(xii) For the same reasons, medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place.

(d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, including forced displacement human rights violations and abuses against migrants, or threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:

(i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview;

(ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;

- (iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained;
- (iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident;
- (v) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.

(e) In carrying out its investigation in respect to the recruitment of children by parties to the conflict, the Panel is particularly mindful of the risk posed by its investigations for the children and their family. The Panel also refrains from interviewing directly the victim, unless it is sure that this will not have a negative impact on them. Therefore, the Panel often relies on sources such as:

- (i) Investigations and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;
- (ii) Interviews with people and organizations providing assistance to these children;
- (iii) Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.

(f) The standard of proof is met when the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the incidents had occurred as described and, based on multiple corroboratory sources, that the responsibility for the incident lies with the identified perpetrator. The standard of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt".


(g) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel's findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. This is undertaken in accordance with the Panel's standard methodology on the opportunity to reply. Generally, the Panel would provide detailed information in any opportunity to respond, including geo-locations. However, detailed information on incidents are not provided when there is a credible threat that it would threaten Panel's sources, for example, in violations related to deprivation of liberty, violations associated with ground strikes on a civilian home, or in violations associated with children.

(h) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, the Panel will consider whether this is of sufficient gravity to be considered as non-compliance with paragraph 18 of resolution 2624 (2022) and thus consideration for reporting to the Committee.

3. The Panel does not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel deposits such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.

4. The Panel does not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result of such disclosure of information. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to support the Panel's findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will, however, be taken to protect the anonymity of its sources.

Annex 2: UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Map



Annex 3: Summary of Panel correspondence (up to 15 August 2025)

Table 3.1

Correspondence with Member States

Member States	Number of letters sent by the Panel	Number of unanswered letters by Member State	Number of letters where the deadline is after 15 August 2025
Algeria	1	1	
China	2	2	
Denmark	1		
Djibouti	5	5	
Egypt	2		
Eritrea	2	2	
France	2	2	
Greece	1		
Guyana	1	1	
India	1	1	
Indonesia	4	1	
Iraq	2	2	
Iran	2		
Israel	3	1	
Jordan	2		
KSA	5	4	
Lebanon	2	2	
Oman	4	3	
Pakistan	1		
Panama	1		
Republic of Korea	1	1	
Russia	2		
Sierra Leone	1	1	
Slovenia	1		
Somalia	3	3	
UAE	5	4	
UK	1		
USA	4	2	
Yemen	15	10	
Total	77	48	

Table 3.2

Correspondence with armed groups and other non-governmental entities

Entity	Number of letters sent by the Panel	Number of unanswered letters by armed group/ non-governmental entity	Number of letters where the deadline is after 15 August 2025
Sana'a-based Ministry of Foreign Affairs	6	6	
Total	6	6	

Table 3.3

Correspondence with commercial companies

Commercial Company/Government Entity	Number of letters sent by the Panel	Number of unanswered letters by Commercial Company	Number of letters where the deadline is after 15 August 2025
Timeless Trade	1		
Tanker Expert	1		
Blue Temujin	1		
Total	3		

Table 3.4

Correspondence with UN Agencies/Entities

Agency/Entity	Number of letters sent by the Panel	Number of unanswered letters by UN Agency/Entity	Number of letters where the deadline is after 15 August 2025
OCHA	1	1	
Total	1	1	

Annex 4. List of Acronyms

List of Acronyms

AIS	Automatic Identification Signal
Al-Shabaab	Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen
AP	Anti-personnel mine
AQAP	Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
ASBM	Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
ASCM	Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
AT	Anti-Tank mine
CAR	Conflict Armament Research
CBY	Central Bank of Yemen
CBY-A	Central Bank of Yemen, Aden
CBY-S	Central Bank of Yemen, Sana'a
CENTCOM	Central Command (US)
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Device
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organisation
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GoY	Government of Yemen
HRL	Human Rights Law
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IRGC	Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
LACM	Land Attack Cruise Missile

MANPADS	Man-Portable Air Defence System
MV	Maritime Vessel
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OWA-UAV	One-Way Attack-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
PoEY	Panel of Experts on Yemen
RPG	Rocket-propelled Grenade
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SESGY	Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SWIFT	Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
SVBIED	Suicide Vehicle-born Improvised Explosive Device
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UKMTO	United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations
UN	United Nations
UNVIM	United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism
US	United States of America
USD	United States Dollars
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VHF	Very High Frequency (radio)
WBIED	Water-borne improvised explosive device
WFP	World Food Programme
YER	Yemeni Riyal

Annex 5: Video released by the Houthis military media and on their social media account on 16 October 2024

Social media is being used to propagate hatred and violence. The video features armed Houthi fighters conveying solidarity, threats and ideological messages after the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Referring to the Zionists, the following text is extracted from the video: "We will make shoes from your skin for the children of Palestine. The good end is for the righteous".

Figure 5.1

Social media post on “X” and release of the video entitled “Jihad Fields – A special episode from the West Coast on the latest developments in the region”



Sources:

<https://www.mmy.ye/327109/>

<https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1846640303102468412>

Annex 6: Article published on 25 August 2024 by the Yemeni Houthi media Saba on the meeting chaired by the Houthi de-facto Minister of Defense and Military Production Mohammed al-Atifi affirming readiness of the Houthi armed forces to strike Israel in retaliation against strikes in Hudaydah

Excerpts of the article referring to the meeting chaired by the Houthi de-facto Minister of Defense and Military Production Major General Mohammed al-Atifi, in presence of the Chief of the General Staff Major General Mohammed al-Ghamari (YEi.008), the Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Ali al-Moshki, the Inspector General, heads of agencies and the commanders of the military forces and regions:

Unofficial translation:

Major General al-Atifi stressed that the Yemeni armed forces, with all their branches and formations, the missile force and the drones, are at the highest levels of combat, moral and logistical readiness and are awaiting directives to deliver painful strikes deep inside the usurping Zionist entity and to sensitive and dangerous sites that it never expects.

He added, "We also confirm to everyone that we in the armed forces have received strict and strict directives in order to determine the appropriate and effective methods for the challenges imposed by the Zionist enemy on the region and Yemen."

He reiterated that "the Zionist entity will find nothing from us but all strength, toughness and toughness and will pay a heavy price in response to its persistence in violating the sovereignty of the homeland and targeting civilian objects in the city of Hudaydah, and making it realize that it has rushed into an ill-considered adventure and it is time for it to bear the heavy burdens of the confrontation. It and those who support it must understand that this aggression is not only a blatant violation of international laws and conventions but also reflects a blatant disregard for the values of humanity."

He pointed out that the military combat decision had studied all the military determinants, and had carefully read the elements of weakness of the Zionist enemy and had come out with a comprehensive conclusion confirming that the most important points of the Zionist target bank had been carefully and accurately monitored and identified and had undergone a deep information and intelligence analysis process and in accordance with the rules of engagement with Yemeni specificity that do not take into account the ceilings of confrontation or any red lines and in a way that ensures the achievement of the desired goal. He stressed that the missile force, the drone force and the naval forces possess the capabilities and potential that provide them with precise and accurate implementation in targeting and in a way that guarantees this system the power of influence and causing the greatest damage to the sensitive sites and targets that have been identified.

Figures 6.1 (up) and 6.2 (below)

Meeting chaired by the Houthi de-facto Minister of Defense and Military Production, Major General Mohammed al-Atifi



Source: <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3362785.htm>

Annex 7: Article published on the social media platform “X” on 4 January 2025 on the meeting chaired by Major General Youssef al-Madani (YEi.009), commander of the Houthi’s fifth Military Region and discussing mobilization efforts and preparation

A meeting in the Fifth Military Region discusses mobilization efforts and preparations to confront any movements of the aggression forces
January 4, 2025

Sana'a - Saba: An expanded meeting was held in the Fifth Military Region, headed by the region commander, Major General Youssef Al-Madani, and included the governors of Hodeidah, Hajjah, Al-Mahwit, and Raymah, as well as security and military leaders. The meeting discussed the service and development conditions in the four governorates, and the mobilization and military and security arrangements to confront any movements by the forces of American, Zionist and British aggression. The meeting, which was attended by the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior for the Security and Intelligence Sector, Major General Ali Hussein Al-Houthi, the Mobilization Officer at the Ministry of Defense, Major General Nasser Al-Lakomi, the Head of the Joint Operations Room, Major General Sadiq Al-Maqrani, the Deputy Director of the Military Intelligence Department, Brigadier General Hussein Al-Daif, and the Directors of Security, Intelligence and Intelligence in the governorates, addressed aspects related to enhancing mobilization efforts to confront any escalation by the enemies.

Figure 7.1

Meeting chaired by General Youssef al-Madani (YEi.009), commander of the Houthis fifth Military Region



In the meeting, the commander of the Fifth Military Region stressed the importance of concerted efforts to improve overall performance in the governorates and directorates and to pay attention to the concerns and needs of their people. He blessed the operations carried out by the armed forces against the American-British enemy and the vital targets of the Zionist enemy in the occupied Palestinian territories in support of the Palestinian people and in response to the American-Zionist aggression against Yemen. Major General Al-Madani praised the community's interaction and wide participation in popular activities, marches and solidarity stands with our brothers in Palestine, within the framework of Yemen's firm and principled position supporting the nation's issues, foremost of which is the Palestinian issue.

He stressed the readiness of the members of the armed forces and the mobilization forces in the Fifth Military Region and their readiness to confront any escalation by the enemy and its tools. He pointed out that the Zionist enemy and the American and British behind it, who failed to break and stop the Yemeni operations supporting Gaza, are counting on mobilizing their tools that failed during 10 years in occupying Yemen, and the failure has become seeking help from those who are more failure than him. The commander of the Fifth Military Region stated that all the plans of the Zionist-American enemy will fail in the face of the awareness and steadfastness of the Yemeni people, their wise leadership, and their valiant armed forces. Meanwhile, the governors of Hodeidah, Abdullah Atifi, Hajjah Hilal Al-Sufi, Al-Mahwit, Hanin Qatina, and Rima Faris Al-Habari, discussed the service conditions and the efforts made in this regard, as well as aspects of coordination with the security services to establish security and stability.

They pointed out the activities witnessed in the governorates in the field of mobilization, recruitment and enrollment in the "Al-Aqsa Flood" courses within the framework of preparations and enhancing readiness to confront any escalation by the American-Zionist-British enemy and their tools. For his part, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior for the Security and Intelligence Sector, addressed the plans of the security services to consolidate security and stability and deal with any developments or movements through which the enemies attempt to undermine the security of the homeland. He pointed out the importance of everyone's cooperation with the security services, sensing the importance of the role they play in promoting public tranquility. In turn, the official in charge of general mobilization at the Ministry of Defense pointed out the progress of implementing mobilization, training and rehabilitation plans on a broad level to ensure enhancing combat readiness and preparedness to confront any escalation.

Figure 7.2

Major General Youssef Al Madani (YEi.009), commander of the Houthis fifth Military Region



Source: https://x.com/Nasr_Amer1/status/1875532256875360697

Annex 8: The march of the al-Mansour Billah Brigades Forces released by Houthis military media on 11 January 2025

Figure 8.1

Fighter in camouflage



Source: <https://www.mmy.ye/335573/>

Annex 9: The march of the Support and Reinforcement Battalions in Sana'a released by Houthis military media on 2 November 2024

Figures 9.1 (up) and 9.2 (below)

March of the Support and Reinforcement Battalions in Sanaa





Appendix A

Unofficial translation:

1,500 graduates of the Support and Reinforcement Forces battalions march in Sana'a under the slogan 'On the Covenant, O Aqsa'

The capital Sana'a witnessed a large military march under the slogan "On the Covenant, O Al-Aqsa", on the occasion of the graduation of a symbolic unit from the "Team Command" course of the Support and Backup Forces Battalions, with the participation of 1,500 fighters.

In a statement by the Commander of the Support and Backup Battalions during the march, Major General Qassim Al-Hamran stressed that this march reflects the commitment of the armed forces to defend Jerusalem and the Palestinian cause.

Al-Hamran stressed the importance of enhancing the combat readiness of the Support and Backup Forces, noting that this new batch of fighters will be able to confront challenges and threats.

The event witnessed a large public presence along the streets of the capital Sana'a, where the attendees interacted with the military march of the Support and Backup Forces, reflecting the great popular support for the forces in their efforts to protect the homeland and the Palestinian cause.

It is worth noting that this march comes within the framework of a series of military activities organized by the Yemeni Armed Forces to enhance their capabilities in the battle of the promised conquest and the holy jihad

Source: <https://www.mmy.ye/328136/>

Annex 10: The military parade of the reserve forces in the sixth Military Region aired on Houthi Al Masirah TV on 31 December 2024

Figure 10.1

Military parade of fighters of the reserve forces following military training



Source: <https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1874171002508496906>

Annex 11: The march of the Rapid Intervention Force of the Ministry of Interior from Sana'a to Sa'dda aired on Houthi's Al Masirah TV on 5 November 2024

Figure 11.1

Fighter during the march



Source: <https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1853774818862076190>

Annex 12: Meeting of the Supreme Committee for the Support of Al-Aqsa on 15 January 2025 chaired by the de-facto First Deputy Prime Minister Allama Mohammed Miftah

Figure 12.1

Mohammed Ahmed Ahmed Miftah, the current de-facto First Deputy Prime Minister, supports the mobilization efforts as chair of the Central Committee of the National Campaign for the Support of Al-Aqsa.



لجنة نصره الأقصى تستعرض النتائج المحققة بمسارات التعبئة والاستنفار والمقاطعة نصره لغزة

الأربعاء، 15 رجب 1446هـ الموافق 15 يناير 2025

ناقشت اللجنة العليا لنصرة الأقصى في اجتماعها الأسبوعي اليوم، برئاسة النائب الأول لرئيس الوزراء - رئيس اللجنة العلامة محمد مفتاح، عددا من المواضيع المتصلة بمسارات التوعية والتعبئة والاستنفار والمقاطعة الاقتصادية

لمزيد من التفاصيل اضغط هنا

Appendix A

Unofficial translation:

Al-Aqsa Committee reviews the results achieved through mobilisation, mobilisation and boycott in support of Gaza

Wednesday, 15 January 2025

The Supreme Committee for the Support of Al-Aqsa discussed a number of issues related to awareness, mobilisation, mobilisation and economic boycott at its weekly meeting today, chaired by First Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Committee, Allama Mohammed Muftah.

Source: <https://www.saba.ye/ar/gallery35574.htm>

Annex 13: Article published on Houthi media Saba on tribes joining the general mobilization campaign

Figures 13. 1 (up) and 13.2 (below)


People of the Al-Shahil and Qafil Shammar tribe in Hajjah declare general mobilization in support of Gaza



Source: <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3422456.htm>

Annex 14: Mobilization and military training of staff of the Health and Environment office of Hajja Governorate

Figure 14.1

Maneuver of health sector staff graduated from the “Al-Aqsa Flood” courses in Hajjah

23 January 2025

The General Mobilization in Hajjah Governorate and the Health and Environment Office in the Governorate carried out a maneuver for health sector members who graduated from the open military courses “Al-Aqsa Flood – Level Two”. The participants in the maneuver, with the participation of 250 health cadres, reflected the skills acquired in the military courses.

The maneuver, using light and medium weapons, aimed to identify combat skills, accuracy of targeting, simulation, and practical applications for carrying out emergency operations on the battlefield and attack, storming virtual enemy sites, confrontation, and camouflage.

The graduates confirmed in the maneuver their full readiness to confront the enemies of the nation, in defense of land, honour and national sovereignty.

Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com.ye/archives/762097>

Annex 15: Article published on 21 December 2024 by Al Masdar Online on the Houthi recruitment campaign targeting employees of ministries

Unofficial translation of the article published on 21 December by Al Masdar Online on the Houthi recruitment campaign targeting employees of ministries

The Houthi militia carried out training courses for a number of employees of the Ministry of Transport under their control in Sana'a, focusing on military training and the use of weapons, as part of the training campaigns targeting employees in the areas under their control.

According to informed sources, during the training courses, the employees were urged to allocate part of their salaries to buy personal weapons (rifles), while the employees expressed their dissatisfaction with this request, stressing that they have not received their salaries for a long time.

The sources said that the militia promised the participants a training camp in al-Sabahah area, west of Sanaa, where they would be trained in combat skills and the use of weapons more extensively.

The militia members told them that these trainings are part of enhancing the group's combat capabilities as part of what they described as 'preparing to confront the aggression', noting that 'America will review its calculations when it finds that we have 2 million recruits.'

The sources said the Houthis asked the employees to fill out forms containing detailed personal information, which raised the surprise of the participants. When asked about the reason for collecting this data, Houthi officials said the aim was to issue certificates to the participants in the training courses.

The Iran-backed militia is taking advantage of the war waged by the Zionist entity in Gaza, Palestine, to mobilise and recruit fighters in the areas under its control, for which it has exploited various state institutions located in the areas under its control in the north of the country.

Figure 15.1

Template used by Houthi to register participants in the recruitment campaign targeting employees of ministries




رقم الاستمارة: []
 اسم الجهة:
 اسم المركز:
 التاريخ: ١٤٤٥ / ١ / ١٤٤٥

حملة طوفان الأقصى للتعبئة والاستنفار

الاسم الخماسي		الكنية		الدرجة والمسمى الوظيفي	
الإدارة العامة		القطاع/الدائرة		جهة العمل	
التاريخ		المحافظة		تاريخ ومكان الميلاد	
رقم البطاقة الشخصية		فصلية الدم		الحالة الاجتماعية	
عدد الإبناء		عدد من يعمل		عدد الإخوة	
عدد الإخوة الذكور		عدد الإخوة الإناث		عدد الإخوة المتزوجين	
رقم هفك الأب/الأخ		رقم هفك الأب/الأخ		رقم هفك الأب/الأخ	
اسم قريب شخص		رقم هفك قريب شخص		اسم قريب شخص	

الحالة الصحية:

أحد مؤهل علمي	تخصص المؤهل	المعدل % ١٠٠	مكان التخرج أو الدراسة	تاريخ التخرج	الحالة الصحية	أمراض مزمنة / إعاقة

الخبرات والمهارات المكتسبة:

الخبرات والمهارات	مدة الممارسة	نسبة الإتقان	هل ترغب بالعمل فيها	نوع الدورة	مكان إقامتها	متنها	تاريخها

بيانات السلاح:

نوعه	رقمه	مملوكة	نسبة الاستعداد في أي عمل وفي أي مكان خارج الجهة

اسم المتدرب:
التوقيع:

خاصة بالمركز:

ت.ج	ت.ث	ت.د	ت.ر	ت.م	ت.ع

خاصة بالتشكيل:

م	م	م	م	م	م

مسؤول مركز التعبئة

المدرب العسكري

أون لاين

المصدر
 ALMSADAR ONLINE

Figure 15.2

Questions to participants of the recruitment campaign targeting employees of ministries

اسئلة الدورة التدريبية طوفان الأقصى وزارة النقل والأشغال العامة

الاسم : اسم الجهة : وزارة النقل والأشغال العامة

التاريخ : ٨ / جماد الآخر ١٤٤٦ هـ

الصفحة : الأولى

س١: الجهاد في سبيل فريضة بل من أهم الفرائض الإسلامية التي ذكرها القرآن؟
أكثر خمس آيات تتحدث عن الجهاد في القرآن الكريم؟

س٢: كان رسول الله صلوات الله عليه وآله رجلاً مجاهداً في سبيل الله وأبى كما صورته الثقافات المخالفة رجل ضعيف من بيته لتجنب؟
من خلال استماعت المحاضرات قلل القوة ووضح تلك مسدداً بآيات قرآنية؟

س٣: أطلق السيد القائد شعاراً إسلامياً وحديثاً؟
مبدأ تعني الجهاد لا يتم لوجدهم؟ وما لآلهما على أبناء فلسطين؟

س٤: ما هو المعيار الحقيقي للإلتزام الإسلامي الصادق للإنسان؟ على ضوء ثقافتك القرآنية أذكرها؟

س٥: فرض الله الجهاد لمحكمة كبيرة وفائدة عديدة آمن خلال محاضرات السيد القائد... أذكر خمس منها؟

س٦: الجهاد في سبيل الله أهم حافز لإنشاء الأمة وتنهضتها؟ حسب فهمك ووضح ذلك؟

س٧: ذكر الله في القرآن الكريم (يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا خُذُوا زِينَتَكُمْ لِكُلِّ مَسْجِدٍ وَكُلِّ مَوْضِعٍ يُذَكَّرُ فِيهِ) ما معنى هذه الآية الكريم؟

س٨: معنى الجهاد الحقيقي الذي نشر ثقافة الدين في أوساط الأمة العربية والإسلامية؟
حسب فهمك ووضح ذلك؟ ماذا تعني ثقافة الدين أرامداً الأمريكي والاسرائيلي حرم على نشرها؟

س٩: أطلق السيد القائد شعاراً أن تعني الساعات التي يفرج فيها الميادين في العاصمة متعباً وبقية المحافظات والتم الفلسطيني بسلك؟
من خلال متابعتك للأحداث وقراءتك لتشيده... ما فائدة الخروج في الساعات كل جمعة؟

س١٠: في طرفان الأقصى أطلق السيد القائد اسماً لمعركة الميادين مع الأمريكي والاسرائيلي اسمها معركة الفتح الموعود والجهاد المقدس؟
من خلال فهمك ماذا تعني هذه المعركة؟

س١١: (لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ / مُحَمَّدٌ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ) ما معنى هذه العبارة؟ (العبارة المذكورة في القرآن الكريم)

ملاحظة الإجابة في ورقي أخرى كبحث.

أون كات
ALMAHDIAR ONLINE

ونفكم الله

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the training course questions for participants in the recruitment campaign targeting employees of ministries

Ministry of Transport and Public Works

Questions on Operation Al-Aqsa Storm Training Course

First Batch - Date: Jumada al-Thani 1446 AH

Jihad in the cause of God is an obligation; rather, it is one of the most important religious obligations mentioned in the Qur'an. Mention five Qur'anic verses related to Jihad.

The Messenger of God, peace be upon him, was a man who struggled in the cause of God (meaning he was a brave person who participated in Jihad), and not a weak figure who limited himself from his house to the mosque (meaning he did not limit himself to religious rituals and worship only) as portrayed by the misleading cultures. Explain this in light of the lectures of the Leader of the Revolution's lectures, and substantiate it by Qur'anic verses.

The Leader of the Revolution launched the slogan "*You are not alone*", addressing the people of Palestine in the Operation Al-Aqsa Storm against the Israeli enemy. What does the slogan "*You are not alone*" mean? And what does it mean for the people of Palestine?

What is the true standard for a person's sincere faith? Mention it in light of the Qur'anic culture (meaning Qur'anic teachings).

God obligated Jihad for with a great underlying wisdom and numerous benefits. Mention five of them, i.e. benefits in the light of lectures of the Leader of the Revolution.

Jihad is the most important incentive for building and reviving the Muslim Umma (Umma is a classical Islamic term that refers to the unity of Muslims that transcends geographical boundaries and which is not just a unity of people by coincidence but rather for a great divine cause)? Explain it according to your understanding.

God mentioned in the Holy Quran a verse which if Muslims had followed in true letter and spirit, they would not have reached the level of weakness and humiliation they are in today. What is that verse?

The real enemy sought to spread the culture of subordination (i.e. internally, not to express their views freely, not to question or challenge what their rulers say or do etc. and externally, to the dictates of the West, Israel, USA etc.) among the Arab and Islamic nations? Explain it according to your understanding. What does the culture of subordination mean? And why were the Americans and Israelis keen to spread it?

The Leader launched the slogan "*We will not evacuate the squares where the Yemenis gather in the capital of Sana'a, and the rest of the governorates, while Palestinian blood is being shed*"? Based on your understanding of the events and what is happening, what is the benefit of gathering in the streets every Friday?

In the Operation Al-Aqsa Storm, the Leader has named the conflict of the Yemeni people with the Americans and Israelis as the "Battle of the Promised Conquest and the Holy Jihad". Based on your understanding, what does this battle mean?

Cultural question: What was the first lecture delivered by the martyred leader, Sayyed Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi?

Note: Comments/Analysis of the answers is on another piece of paper as research.

Source: <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/307794?s=09>

Annex 16: Statement posted by Houthi media TV Almasirah on a million-man march on Sabeen square in Sanaa on 9 August 2025

Figure 16.1

March on Sabeen square on 9 August 2025

← Post

قناة المسيرة
@TvAlmasirah

● من على أرض ميدان السبعين، ترتفع قامات الرجال وتسمو الأرواح، كأنهم حراس على بوابة القدس يحمونها بالهتاف كما يحمونها بالبندقية.

مليونية "ثابتون مع غزة.. وجهوزيتنا عالية لمواجهة كل مؤامرات الأعداء" #صنعاء
#ميدان_السبعين

#يمن_الواقفين_بالله
#لستم_وحدكم

Translated from Arabic by Google

● From the ground of Al-Sab'een Square, the stature of men rises and the spirits soar, as if they were guards at the gate of Jerusalem, protecting it with chants as they protect it with rifles.

Million-man march: "We stand with Gaza... and our readiness is high to confront all enemy conspiracies" #صنعاء
#ميدان_السبعين

#يمن_الواقفين_بالله
#لستم_وحدكم

Rate this translation: 🇲🇪 🇲🇪



3:20 PM · Aug 9, 2025 · 1,699 Views

Source: <https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1954170906718220569>

Annex 17: Statement by Abdulmalik al-Houthi published by Houthis military media on 12 January 2025 referring to the general mobilization and combat readiness of the tribes

Excerpt of the speech:

فيما يتعلّق بالأنشطة الشعبية: هناك أنشطة متنوعة

في مقدّمة هذه الأنشطة ومن أهمها: الوقفات القبلية على نطاق واسع، وتميزت بالحضور القوي، تخرج قبائل اليمن العزيزة، الأبيّة، الوفيّة، بسلاحها، وهي تمتلك أنواع من السلاح، من السلاح المهم، قبائل اليمن مسلّحة بأكملها، تخرج بسلاحها، برجالها، تعبّر عن الموقف الجاد والصادق، في الثبات على نصرّة الشعب الفلسطيني، والموقف تجاه أي مستوى من التصعيد يستهدف بلدنا، ويّضحّ قوة الموقف

، سواء في مستوى هذه الوقفات وزخمها في مختلف المحافظات، وما يحمله أبناء شعبنا العزيز في قبائله الخرة، العزيزة، الوفيّة، الأبيّة، من قيم إيمانية وشجاعة، وصمود، وثبات، وعزّة، وإباء، وإمكانات قتالية، ومهارة قتالية

تبرز أيضاً الكلمات القوية، البيانات القوية، الصريحة، الواضحة، وبحمد الله تعالى قبائل اليمن هي قوة عسكرية جاهزة، قوة عسكرية جاهزة، تمتلك المهارة القتالية، الخبرة القتالية، وهي العمود الفقري للمجتمع اليمني، تمثل النواة الصلبة المتماسكة في كل الظروف والمراحل

هناك أيضاً أنشطة التعبئة في التدريب، وبلغت مخرجاته أكثر من (ثمانمائة ألف متدرب)، وإذا أضفنا إلى هذا الرقم القوة النظامية، التي حظيت بتدريب بمستويات أكبر، ومن حظوا بالتدريب، فهذا يفوق عدد المليون بكثير، بكثير

هناك أيضاً الندوات، الوقفات، الأمسيات، التي هي بمثابة الآلاف، في إطار نشاط مكثف توعوي وتعبوي؛ ولذلك فشعبنا على مستوى الوعي، والبصيرة، وقوة الموقف، والروح المعنوية الإيمانية، على مستوى عالٍ، وفي جهوزية عالية وكبيرة بحمد الله تعالى

، فيما يتعلّق بالمظاهرات والخروج المليوني الأسبوعي: قبل أن نتحدث عن خروج شعبنا، نوجز الحديث عن التظاهرات التي خرجت في بلدان كثيرة من العالم في خمسة عشرة دولة، لكن على مستوى العالم العربي حالات نادرة جداً، لكن في شعبنا العزيز خروج الشعب اليمني بزخم هائل جداً، خروج مليوني بكل ما تعنيه الكلمة، وبشكل مستمر في كل أسبوع بتوفيق الله تعالى، في الأسبوع الماضي في المناسبة المباركة والمقدّسة: (جمعة رجب)، كان الخروج هائلاً، وعظيماً ومشرفاً، وكبيراً، يرفع الرأس، ويبيض الوجه لهذا الشعب يوم يلقي رسول الله ﷺ صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم في يوم القيامة، كان الخروج في (سبعمئة وسبع وخمسين ساحة)، خروجاً لا مثيل له أبداً، خروجاً عظيماً ومشرفاً

، في جمعة رجب جدّد شعبنا العزيز العهد لرسول الله ﷺ صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم، بالثبات والاستمرار في حمل راية الإسلام والجهاد، امتداداً للنهج الإيماني والموقف الإيماني، الذي كان عليه الأباء والأجداد الأوائل، الذين نصروا رسول الله، وحملوا معه راية الإسلام، يوم تنصّلت عن ذلك كل القبائل والبلدان العربية

Appendix A

Unofficial translation:

There are various activities regarding grassroots activities: At the forefront of these activities, the most important of which are: tribal stands on a large scale, and characterized by a strong presence, the tribes of Yemen come out dear, proud, loyal, with their weapons, and they possess types of weapons, from the important weapon, the tribes of Yemen are all armed, they come out with their weapons, with their men, expressing the serious and sincere position, in steadfastness in support of the Palestinian people, and the position towards any level of escalation targeting our country, and the strength of the position is clear:

Whether in the level of these stands and their momentum in the various governorates, and the values of faith, courage, steadfastness, steadfastness, pride, fatherhood, fighting potential, and combat skill carried by our dear people in their free, dear, loyal and proud tribes.

Strong words, strong, frank, and clear statements also stand out, and praise be to God Almighty, the tribes of Yemen are a ready-made military force, a ready military force, possessing combat skill, combat experience, and is the backbone of Yemeni society, representing the solid nucleus cohesive in all circumstances and stages.

There are also mobilization activities in training, and its outputs amounted to more than (eight hundred thousand trainees), and if we add to this figure the regular force, which has received training at greater levels, and those who have been trained, this far exceeds the number of one million.

There are also seminars, vigils, evenings, which are in the hundreds of thousands, within the framework of an intensive awareness and mobilization activity, and therefore our people are at the level of awareness, insight, strength of attitude, and morale of faith, at a high level, and in high and great readiness, praise be to God Almighty.

With regard to the demonstrations and the weekly two-millionth exit: Before we talk about the exit of our people, we summarize the talk about the demonstrations that took place in many countries of the world, in fifteen countries, but at the level of the Arab world very rare cases, but in our dear people, the Yemeni people came out with a very huge momentum, the exit of two million in every sense of the word, and continuously every week, with the help of God Almighty, last week on the blessed and holy occasion: (Juma Rajab), the exit was tremendous, great, honorable, and large, raises the head, and whitens the face of this people on the day the Messenger of Allah "peace be upon him and his family" on the Day of Resurrection, the exit was in (seven hundred and fifty-seven square), exit unparalleled never, a great and honorable exit.

On the Friday of Rajab, our dear people renewed the pledge to the Messenger of Allah, "may God's prayers and blessings be upon him and his family", to remain steadfast and continue to carry the banner of Islam and jihad, as an extension of the faith approach, and the faith position, which was the first fathers and grandfathers, who supported the Messenger of God, and carried with him the banner of Islam, on the day all Arab tribes and countries disavowed that.

Source: <https://www.mmy.ye/335514/>

Annex 18: Article published on 15 October 2024 on Ansarollah's (Houthi) website and referring to the general mobilization achievements

Figure 18.1

The graph reports on the various activities that were carried out last year during the general mobilization campaign in support of the Palestinian and the 'battle of the promised conquest and holy jihad'



Appendix A

Unofficial translation:

Popular activities during the year of the "Promised Conquest and the Holy Jihad" battle supporting the Palestinian people

Military

931 maneuvers
661 military parades
1,259 military marches
508,353 trainee graduation

Popular

536 Evening
245,354 Symposium
502,231 Event
9,047 march and demonstrations

Vigils

1,811 officials
169,054 communities
2,250 students of universities
211,879 students of schools

Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com.ye/archives/726398>

Annex 19: Statement by Abdulmalik al-Houthi aired by Houthis military media on 12 December 2024 referring to the general mobilization training activities

Excerpt of the speech:

ناك أيضاً أنشطة التعبئة في التدريب، وبلغت مخرجاته أكثر من (ثمانمائة ألف متدرب)، وإذا أضفنا إلى هذا الرقم القوة النظامية ، التي حظيت بتدريب بمستويات أكبر، ومن حظوا بالتدريب، فهذا يفوق عدد المليون بكثير .
هناك أيضاً الندوات، الوقفات، المسيرات، التي هي بمئات الآلاف، في إطار نشاط مكثف توعوي وتعبوي ؛
ولذلك فشعبنا على مستوى الوعي ، والبصيرة، وقوة الموقف، والروح المعنوية الإيمانية، على مستوى عال وفي جهوزية عالية وكبيرة بحمد هلالا تعالى.

Unofficial translation:


There are also **mobilization activities in training, and its outputs amounted to more than (eight hundred thousand trainees)**, and if we **add to this number the regular force**, which received training at higher levels, and those who received training, **this exceeds the number of a million by a lot**. There are also seminars, stands, and evenings, which are in the hundreds of thousands, within the framework of intensive awareness-raising and mobilization activity. Therefore, our people are at a high level of awareness, insight, strength of position, and faith-based morale, and in high and great readiness, praise be to God Almighty.

Source: <https://www.mmy.ye/334267/>

Annex 20: Organization chart of the Houthi armed forces

Figure 20.1

Structure of the Houthi armed forces.



Sources: confidential

Annex 21: Al-Aqsa program workshops at University Sanaa held on 4 January 2025

Propaganda – The Al-Aqsa Flood programs at University

The Houthi group has disrupted education in private universities within its controlled areas, forcing students to attend cultural programs called "The Al-Aqsa Flood." These programs feature sectarian lectures and discriminatory rhetoric aimed at dismantling the values of coexistence and tolerance. Students are compelled to attend sessions centered on "jihad" and other extremist concepts designed to indoctrinate them. Houthi supervisors are dispatched to universities to deliver these lectures, using them as tools to incite hatred and deepen divisions. These efforts extend beyond students, involving the forced recruitment of children and adults, as well as pressuring the unemployed to participate in these programs, which leads to systematic brainwashing.

These cultural programs are neither temporary nor isolated. They are part of a long-term strategy by the Houthi group to reshape the cultural identity of future generations in universities and schools, forcibly imposing its ideology on society. #Yemen

Figure 21.1

Poster inviting the students to participate in the Tufan Al-Aqsa course



Appendix A

Unofficial translation:

Dear male and female students

We would like to notify you that the University will organize and hold the course of Tufan Al-Aqsa. The course is scheduled to last for a week starting from 04/7/1446 Hijriya, Corresponding to 4 January 2025 from 08:00am to 12:00 pm. The course is for all students, knowing that, studies will be suspended during the course period. Therefore, all students must attend the course according to the dates mentioned above. Alam al-Huda suspends studies at universities

Source: <https://x.com/RiyadhAldubai/status/1874765929243963853>

Annex 22: Parade of the graduates of the Al-Aqsa Flood courses for staff and students at Sanaa University aired on Al-Masirah TV on 4 December 2024 TV

Figures 22.1 (up) and 22.2 (below)

The participants walk over the flags of the US, UK and Israel during the graduation ceremony



Appendix A

Unofficial translation:

March for graduates of the Al-Aqsa Flood courses at Sanaa University

Source: <https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1864300510464950713>

Annex 23: Creation of a new police intelligence unit under the lead of Ali Hussein al-Houthi to counter espionage and surveillance

Figure 23.1

Abdul Hakim Hashem Ali al-Khaiwani (Al-Karrar) Head of the Security and Intelligence Services meets with Ali Hussein al-Houthi (Abu Gaza), Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior and head of the new police intelligence unit



Security officials discuss implementing President's directives on countering espionage

[Mon, 21 Apr 2025 16:16:20 +0300]

Sana'a - Saba:

Head of the Security and Intelligence Service Major General Abdulhakim al-Khaiwani and Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior Major General Ali Hussein al-Houthi convened on Monday to discuss the implementation of directives issued by the President of the Supreme Political Council to the security apparatus during his recent meeting with the National Defense Council.

The meeting highlighted the reported successes of the security services in countering espionage and surveillance networks allegedly affiliated with the intelligence agencies of global arrogant powers. Discussions focused on the importance of legally processing these individuals and referring them to the judiciary, in accordance with the law and the President's directives.

Both Major General al-Khaiwani and Major General al-Houthi commended the role of citizens in reporting suspicious activities of alleged agents and traitors serving what they described as the forces of global arrogance, represented by the United States, Britain, and Israeli Occupation, as well as their regional affiliates.


They urged all citizens to continue contributing to national security by reporting any movements of individuals suspected of acting as agents for these entities.

Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3468917.htm>

Annex 24: Interview conducted on 9 April 2024 by Al Mayadeen with the commander of the Iranian Navy Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, during which he refers to the Houthis domestic missile and drone manufacturing capability and their growing capability in targeting vessels

Figure 24.1

Social media post on the platform “X” by Al Mayadeen on the interview with the commander of the Iranian Navy Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri



Appendix A

Unofficial translation of a segment of the interview

"After eight years of a harsh and imposed war on Yemen, Ansar Allah and the Yemeni army have reached a point where they can confront a global power such as the United States. Ansar Allah is now producing missiles and drones domestically. Despite being under siege and sanctions, they have established a naval force. Sayyed Abdulmalik, may God protect him, declared: "We are capable of targeting their ships even in the southern part of the African continent." Today, they are striking vessels at a distance of 600, 700, and even 1,000 kilometers – and their capabilities are growing day by day. Thanks be to God, there are brave men who have taken charge and are defending their country."

Source: <https://x.com/AlMayadeenNews/status/1777665344175325207>

Annex 25: Houthi attack launched on 15 September 2024 against Israel

Figure 25.1

Presentation of video footage by the Houthis on their military website on 16 September 2024 illustrating the launch of a “Palestine 2” hypersonic missile towards the territory of Israel.



Appendix A

Unofficial translation: Scenes of the launch of the “Palestine 2” hypersonic ballistic missile at a military target in occupied Jaffa Tel Aviv with its characteristics as presented by the Houthis

Palestine 2 “HYPERSONIC”

Hypersonic missile

Range of 2150 km

Operated by solid fuel in two stages

Features stealth technology

Speed reaches Mach 18

Has high maneuverability that exceeds the most modern and powerful air defense system in the world, including the Iron Dome

Specifications of the ‘Palestine 2’ missile

Hypersonic missile

Range: 2150 km

Solid-fuelled 2-stage rocket

Stealthy technology

Speed up to Mach 16

Possesses a high maneuverability that exceeds the latest and most powerful air defence systems in the world, including the Iron Dome

Source: <https://www.mmy.ye/324114/>

Annex 26: Statements by Mohammed al-Houthi, member of the Houthis' Supreme Political Council, on the social media platform "X" on 24 December 2024 referring to the Houthis readiness to fight against the United States military presence in the Red Sea, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Israel with the missile, naval and drone forces

Comment: In his speech on 24 December 2024, Mohammad Ali al-Houthi stated that missile, naval and drone forces are not subject to limitations in the fight against the United States, Israel and "those who orbit around them". He declared an intention to attack American interests in the Middle East if the United States were to target Yemen and called on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to use its influence with the United States to avert attacks against Yemen.

Figure 26.1

Social media post on "X" by Mohammad al-Houthi on 24 December 2024



Source: https://x.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1871652551130743292

Figure 26.2

Social media post on “X” by Mohammad al-Houthi on 24 December 2024



Source: https://x.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1871655107609477311

Annex 27: Statement by the United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III published by the Department of Defense regarding airstrikes launched on 16 October 2024 against Yemen

Figure 27.1

Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on US airstrikes in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen

RELEASE
IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on U.S. Airstrikes in Houthi-Controlled Areas of Yemen

Oct. 16, 2024 |   

Today, U.S. military forces, including U.S. Air Force B-2 bombers, conducted precision strikes against five hardened underground weapons storage locations in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. U.S. forces targeted several of the Houthis' underground facilities housing various weapons components of types that the Houthis have used to target civilian and military vessels throughout the region. This was a unique demonstration of the United States' ability to target facilities that our adversaries seek to keep out of reach, no matter how deeply buried underground, hardened, or fortified. The employment of U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit long-range stealth bombers demonstrate U.S. global strike capabilities to take action against these targets when necessary, anytime, anywhere.

For over a year, the Iran-backed Houthis, Specially Designated Global Terrorists, have recklessly and unlawfully attacked U.S. and international vessels transiting the Red Sea, the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden. The Houthis' illegal attacks continue to disrupt the free flow of international commerce, threaten environmental catastrophe, and put innocent civilian lives and U.S. and partner forces' lives at risk. At the direction of President Biden, I authorized these targeted strikes to further degrade the Houthis' capability to continue their destabilizing behavior and to protect and defend U.S. forces and personnel in one of the world's most critical waterways.

Again, the United States will not hesitate to take action to defend American lives and assets; to deter attacks against civilians and our regional partners; and to protect freedom of navigation and increase the safety and security in these waterways for U.S., coalition, and merchant vessels. We will continue to make clear to the Houthis that there will be consequences for their illegal and reckless attacks. I am grateful for the professionalism and skill of the brave American troops who took part in today's actions and who continue to stand guard in defense of our Nation.

Source: <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3937640/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-us-airstrikes-in-houthi/>

Source: <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3937643/us-central-command-conducts-multiple-strikes-on-underground-iran-backed-houthi/>

Annex 28: United States attack launched on 9-10 November 2024 against Yemen

Figure 28.1

Statement posted on 13 November 2024 by US Centcom regarding US airstrikes on 9-10 November 2024 targeting multiple weapons storage facilities in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen. According to the statement, eight one-way attack uncrewed aerial systems (OWA-UAS), five anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and four anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) were intercepted.

← Post

 U.S. Central Command 
@CENTCOM

U.S. Central Command Strikes Houthi Facilities and Weapons Systems

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces executed a series of precise airstrikes on multiple Houthi weapons storage facilities situated within Houthi-controlled territories in Yemen, Nov. 9-10. These facilities housed a variety of advanced conventional weapons used by the Iran-backed Houthis to target U.S. and international military and civilian vessels navigating international waters in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The operation involved U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy assets to include the F-35C.

This targeted operation was conducted in response to the Houthi's repeated and unlawful attacks on international commercial shipping, as well as U.S., coalition, and merchant vessels in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden. It also aimed to degrade the Houthi's ability to threaten regional partners.

Additionally, U.S. Navy destroyers USS Stockdale (DDG 106), USS Spruance (DDG 111), along with U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy aircraft successfully defeated a range of Houthi-launched weapons while transiting the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. These forces successfully engaged and defeated eight one-way attack uncrewed aerial systems (OWA-UAS), five anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), and four anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), ensuring the safety of the ships and their personnel.

There were no injuries or damage to U.S. personnel or equipment. These actions reflect the ongoing commitment of CENTCOM forces to protect U.S. personnel, regional partners, and international shipping, while maintaining security and stability in the region.

CENTCOM remains vigilant in its efforts to safeguard maritime traffic in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and will continue to take appropriate steps to address any threats to regional stability.



8:23 PM · Nov 13, 2024 · 387.7K Views

Source: <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1856780067231469739>

Annex 29: United States attack launched on 21 December 2024 against Yemen

Figure 29.1

Statement posted on 21 December by US Centcom regarding US airstrikes on 21 December 2024 targeting a missile storage facility and a command-and-control facility operated by the Houthis. According to the statement, multiple Houthi one way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAV) and an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) were shot down over the Red Sea.

← Post



U.S. Central Command
@CENTCOM



CENTCOM Conducts Airstrikes Against Iran-Backed Houthi Missile Storage and Command/Control Facilities in Yemen

TAMPA, Fla. - U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces conducted precision airstrikes against a missile storage facility and a command-and-control facility operated by Iran-backed Houthis within Houthi-controlled territory in Sana'a, Yemen, on Dec. 21 Yemen time.

CENTCOM forces conducted the deliberate strikes to disrupt and degrade Houthi operations, such as attacks against U.S. Navy warships and merchant vessels in the Southern Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden.

During the operation, CENTCOM forces also shot down multiple Houthi one way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA UAV) and an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) over the Red Sea.

The operation involved U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy assets, including F/A-18s.

The strike reflects CENTCOM's ongoing commitment to protect U.S. and coalition personnel, regional partners, and international shipping.



10:04 PM · Dec 21, 2024 · 760K Views

Source: <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1870576182934323203>

Annex 30: Preparation of United States attacks against Yemen on 23 December 2024

Figure 30.1

Statement posted on 23 December 2024 by US Centcom showing sailors aboard the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) of the US Navy. According to the statement, they prepare munitions for strikes against selected Houthi targets in Yemen.

← Post



U.S. Central Command  
@CENTCOMArabic

...

بحارة على متن السفينة يو إس إس هاري إس. ترومان (CVN 75) التابعة للبحرية الأمريكية يجهزون الذخيرة لشن ضربات ضد أهداف منتخبة للحوثيين في اليمن.

Translated from Arabic by Google

Sailors aboard the U.S. Navy's USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) prepare munitions for strikes against selected Houthi targets in Yemen.

Rate this translation:  



 U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/U.S. 5th Fleet

5:41 PM · Dec 23, 2024 · 743.2K Views

Source: <https://x.com/CENTCOMArabic/status/1871234771386249532>

Annex 31: United States attacks on 30-31 December 2024 against Yemen

Figure 31.1

Statement posted on 31 December 2024 by US Centcom regarding US airstrikes on 30-31 December 2024 Houthi targets on the coast such as a command-and-control facility, production and storage facilities that included missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV) and a coastal radar site. According to the statement seven cruise missiles and one-way attack UAVs were destroyed over the Red Sea.

←

Post



U.S. Central Command

@CENTCOM

...

CENTCOM Forces Strike Multiple Houthi Targets in Yemen

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces conducted multiple precision strikes against Iran-backed Houthi targets in Sana'a and coastal locations within Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, Dec. 30 and 31.

On Dec. 30 and 31, U.S. Navy ships and aircraft targeted a Houthi command and control facility and advanced conventional weapon (ACW) production and storage facilities that included missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV). These facilities were used in Houthi operations, such as attacks against U.S. Navy warships and merchant vessels in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. In addition, U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force aircraft destroyed a Houthi coastal radar site and seven cruise missiles and one-way attack UAVs over the Red Sea.

There were no injuries or damage to U.S. personnel or equipment in either incident.

The strikes are a part of CENTCOM's effort to degrade Iran-backed Houthi efforts to threaten regional partners and military and merchant vessels in the region.




2:44 PM · Dec 31, 2024 · 694.1K Views

Source: <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1874089194030567561>

Annex 32: United States attacks on 31 December 2024 against Yemen

Figure 32.1

Statement published on 3 January 2025 by US Centcom and reporting on the launch of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) from US Navy guided-missile destroyers from the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group operating in the Red Sea targeting Houthi command and control and weapon and storage facilities.



Source: <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1875303124929298702>

Annex 33: Statement published on 27 April 2025 by US Centcom and reporting on the achievements of the military campaign against the Houthis**USCENTCOM Forces Continue to Target Houthi Terrorists**

Since March 15, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) forces have conducted an intense and sustained campaign targeting the Houthi terrorist organization in Yemen to restore freedom of navigation and American deterrence. These operations have been executed using detailed and comprehensive intelligence ensuring lethal effects against the Houthis while minimizing risk to civilians.

To preserve operational security, we have intentionally limited disclosing details of our ongoing or future operations. We are very deliberate in our operational approach but will not reveal specifics about what we've done or what we will do.

We will continue to increase the pressure and further disintegrate Houthi capabilities as long as they continue to impede freedom of navigation.

Since the start of Operation Rough Rider, USCENTCOM has struck over 800 targets. These strikes have killed hundreds of Houthi fighters and numerous Houthi leaders, including senior Houthi missile and UAV officials.

The strikes have destroyed multiple command-and-control facilities, air defense systems, advanced weapons manufacturing facilities, and advanced weapons storage locations. These storage facilities housed advanced conventional weapons, including anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and uncrewed surface vessels, which were employed in Houthi terrorist attacks on international shipping lanes.

While the Houthis have continued to attack our vessels, our operations have degraded the pace and effectiveness of their attacks. Ballistic missile launches have dropped by 69%. Additionally, attacks from one way attack drones have decreased by 55%.

U.S. strikes destroyed the ability of Ras Isa Port to accept fuel which will begin to impact Houthi ability to not only conduct operations, but also to generate millions of dollars in revenue for their terror activities.

The operation has been conducted by a robust assembly of forces to include two Carrier Strike Groups, the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group and the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group. We are extremely proud of our well-trained and professional forces as they have effectively delivered precise and lethal strikes against Houthi military capabilities.

Iran undoubtedly continues to provide support to the Houthis. The Houthis can only continue to attack our forces with the backing of the Iranian regime.

We will continue to ratchet up the pressure until the objective is met, which remains the restoration of freedom of navigation and American deterrence in the region.

Source: <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1916599885698138615>

Annex 34: Preparation of United States attack on 7 April 2025 against Yemen

Figure 34.1

Statement and pictures posted by US Centcom on 7 April 2025 and reporting on arming aircraft in preparations for attacks against Houthi positions



Figure 34.2

Statement and pictures posted by US Centcom on 7 April 2025 and reporting on arming aircraft in preparations for attacks against Houthi positions



Source: <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1909273979656736898>

Annex 35: United States attack launched against Ra's Isa port on 17 April 2025

Figure 35.1

Statement posted by US Centcom on 17 April 2025 and reporting on the attacks carried out against Ra's Isa fuel port aiming at its destruction and degrading Houthis' capacity to fuel imports.

← Post

U.S. Central Command
@CENTCOM

...

Destruction of Houthis Controlled Ras Isa Fuel Port

The Houthis have continued to benefit economically and militarily from countries and companies that provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. The Iran-backed Houthis use fuel to sustain their military operations, as a weapon of control, and to benefit economically from embezzling the profits from the import. This fuel should be legitimately supplied to the people of Yemen. Despite the Foreign Terrorist Designation that went into effect on 05 April, ships have continued to supply fuel via the port of Ras Isa. Profits from these illegal sales are directly funding and sustaining Houthi terrorist efforts.

Today, US forces took action to eliminate this source of fuel for the Iran-backed Houthi terrorists and deprive them of illegal revenue that has funded Houthi efforts to terrorize the entire region for over 10 years. The objective of these strikes was to degrade the economic source of power of the Houthis, who continue to exploit and bring great pain upon their fellow countrymen. This strike was not intended to harm the people of Yemen, who rightly want to throw off the yoke of Houthi subjugation and live peacefully.

The Houthis, their Iranian masters, and those who knowingly aid and abet their terrorist actions should be put on notice that the world will not accept illicit smuggling of fuel and war material to a terrorist organization.



8:31 PM · Apr 17, 2025 · 1M Views

Source: <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1912937032059330962>

Annex 36: Speech of Abdulmalik al-Houthi published by Houthi media Saba on 8 May 2025

Excerpt of Abdulmalik al-Houthi speech published on 8 May 2025:


“During the second round of escalation in their aggression against our country, from the 15th of Ramadan until the 9th of Dhu Al-Qadah, the Americans conducted continuous bombing operations against our country for over a month and a half. The number of air and naval strikes exceeded **1,712**. This clearly indicates an escalation in the second round. In fact, it is evident to our dear people and all media observers that when the Americans entered this second round of aggression in support of the Israeli enemy, they did so with intense escalation, both in air strikes and naval attacks. However, despite their efforts, they suffered a resounding failure: They did not succeed in weakening our military capabilities, halting our operations, or breaking the will of our people.”

Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3478208.htm>

Annex 37: Downing of MQ-9 drones by the Houthis

Figure 37.1

Graphic display of locations where MQ9 drones were shot down published on Houthis military media website between October 2023 and April 2025



Appendix A

Unofficial translation:

26 MQ9 drones shot down in 8 governorates, 22 of them during the Battle of the promised Conquest and the Holy Jihad in support of the Al-Aqsa Flood: two in Dhamar, five in Hudaydah, four in Sada, two in Hajjah, three in Sanaa, two in Al Jawf, six in Marib and two in Al Bayda Governorate

Source: <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1914766061251055787>

Annex 38: Downing of MQ-9 drones by the Houthis

Figures 38.1 (up) and 38.2 (below)

Scenes of the wreckage of the US MQ9 drone, shot down on 31 March 2025 with a locally made surface-to-air missile as presented on the Houthis military website on 1 April 2025



Sources:


<https://www.mmy.ye/341116/>

<https://www.saba.ye/en/news3459464.htm>

Annex 39: Israel attack launched on 26 December 2024 against Yemen

Figure 39.1

Statement posted on 26 December 2024 by the Israel Defense Forces on the strikes carried out by the Israel Air Force fighter jets targeting Sana'a International Airport, Hezyaz and Ra's Khatib power station, and striking infrastructure in the ports of Hudaydah, Saleef and Ra's Khatib.



Source: <https://x.com/IDF/status/1872301407052718151>

Annex 40: Video footage presented by the Israel Defense Force regarding the remarks of the Commanding Officer of the Israeli Air Force Major General Tomer Bar on 26 December 2024 following the strike on Houthi targets in Yemen

Figure 40.1

Video statement posted on YouTube on 26 December 2024 by the Israel Defense Forces following the strike on Houthi military targets in Yemen and in which the Commanding Officer of the Israeli Air Force Major General Tomer Bar states that “This is our fourth strike in Yemen, and we are not finished yet. I want to start with the defensive effort we have been engaged in night after night for some time now, essentially throughout the past several days. It is a commendable effort, but it is not enough against the enemy we face here. Ultimately, the answer is to reach the enemy. We have just seen a tangible demonstration of what we are capable of, and we are capable of much more each time. I see the level of detail being achieved in the planning, and it is commendable and important. It is a commendable effort, but it is not enough against the enemy we face here.”



Source: <https://youtu.be/Kev6G4vixtM>

Annex 41: Video footage presented by the Israel Defense Forces on 26 December 2024 on Israeli Air Force fighter jets taking off for the strikes on Houthi military targets in Yemen

Figure 41.1 (up) and Figure 41.2 (below)

Footage of the Israel Air Forces fighter jets taking off for the strikes on Houthi military targets in Yemen.



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dcRFZDrq038&t=7s>

Annex 42: Israel Air Force attack launched on 26 December 2024 against Sana'a International Airport

Figure 42.1 (up) and 42.2 (middle) and 42.3 (below)

The airstrike targeted and damaged the air traffic control tower, the waiting hall and the front facade at Sana'a International Airport.



Sources:

<https://x.com/Sanaaairport/status/1872342603766898893>

<https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1872337378628751585>

Annex 43: Israel Air Force attack launched on 26 December 2024 against Ra's Khatib power station in Hudaydah governorate

Figure 43.1

Screenshot showing the damage caused on Ra's Khatib power station in Hudaydah



Source: <https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1872332675782246798>

Annex 44: Israel attack launched on 5 and 6 May 2025 against Yemen

Figure 44.1

Statement posted on 5 May by the Israel Defense Forces on the airstrike carried by the Israeli Air Forces targeting the port of Hudaydah and the Bajil concrete plant.

← Post



Israel Defense Forces
@IDF



🕒 IAF fighter jets struck Houthi terror targets, along Yemen's coastline.

The strike was conducted in response to the repeated attacks by the Houthis against Israel, during which surface-to-surface missiles and UAVs were launched toward Israeli civilians.

The terrorist infrastructure sites struck in the Hudaydah Port serve as a central supply source for the Houthis, and is used for the transfer of Iranian weapons.

The "Bajil" Concrete Plant, east of the city of al-Hudaydah, was also struck, which functions as a significant economic resource and is used for the construction of underground tunnels and terrorist infrastructure for the Houthis.

The strike on the terrorist infrastructure sites was conducted precisely, with measures taken to mitigate harm to vessels docked at the port.

The Houthi terrorist regime has been operating under Iranian direction and funding, in order to target Israel and its allies, undermine regional stability and disrupt global freedom of navigation.

The IDF is determined to continue operating, at any distance, against all threats posed to the State of Israel.




8:14 PM · May 5, 2025 · 222.2K Views

Source: <https://x.com/IDF/status/1919455623348908199>

Annex 45: Israel attack launched on 6 May 2025 against Yemen

Figure 45.1

Statement posted on 6 May by the Israel Defense Forces on the retaliatory airstrike carried out by the Israel Defense Forces against Sana'a International Airport and power plants in the area of Sana'a. During the attack, three Yemenia airways planes were destroyed.



Source: <https://x.com/IDF/status/1919747610685931890>

Annex 46: Israel attack launched on 28 May 2025 against Yemen

Figure 46.1

Statement posted on 28 May 2025 by the Israel Defense Forces on the airstrike carried out by the Israel Defense Forces against Sana'a International Airport destroying the fourth Yemenia airways plane

← Post



Israel Defense Forces
@IDF

...

🔴 The IDF struck at the main airport in Sana'a a short while ago. Aircraft used by the Houthi terrorist organization for the transfer of terrorists, who planned terrorist attacks against Israel, were also struck.

The main airport of Sana'a is continuously operated by the Houthi terrorist regime for terror purposes.

The IDF is determined to continue to operate against any threat to Israeli civilians, wherever necessary.



9:52 AM · May 28, 2025 · 108.7K Views

Source: <https://x.com/IDF/status/1927633984348921908>

Figure 46.2

Picture published by Houthi media Saba showing the destroyed Yemenia aircraft on the tarmac at Sanaa International Airport



Appendix A

Unofficial translation:

the Israeli entity escalates its aggression against civilian facilities and Sanaa threatens a painful response

Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3477488.htm>

Figure 46.3

Picture published by Houthi media Saba on 8 May 2025 showing the destroyed buildings at Sanaa International Airport



Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3478144.htm>

Annex 47: Israel attack launched on 10 June 2025 against Yemen

Figure 47.1

Statement posted on 10 June 2025 by the Israel Defense Forces on the strike carried by the Israeli Navy on Houthi targets in the port of Hudaydah and on advanced warning of the strikes to the population.

← Post

**Israel Defense Forces**
@IDF

○ Israeli Navy Missile Ships struck terror targets belonging to the Houthi terrorist regime in the Hudaydah Port in Yemen.

These strikes were conducted in response to repeated missile and UAV attacks on Israeli territory. The Hudaydah Port is used to transfer weapons and to exploit civilian infrastructure in order to advance terrorist activities.

The IDF issued advanced warnings to the population in the area in order to mitigate the risk of harm to uninvolved civilians in the area.

The IDF is committed to continue operating against those who pose a threat to Israelis.


8:03 AM · Jun 10, 2025 · **109.8K** Views

Source: <https://x.com/IDF/status/1932317740112417188>

Annex 48: Damage to Ra's Isa port facilities and unloading of fuel from tankers onto trucks following attacks

Figure 48.1


The satellite imagery on 8 of April 2025 shows the port of Hudaydah. Three fuel tanks are visible.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 48.2

The satellite imagery on 18 April 2025 after the attack of 17 April 2025. The fuel tanks are destroyed.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 48.3

Satellite imagery on 11 July 2025. The unloading of fuel from tankers directly to trucks is visible.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Annex 49: Speech of Abdulmalik al-Houthi aired on Houthis military media website on 2 January 2025 in which he refers to the Houthis drone capabilities

Figure 48.1

Excerpt of Abdulmalik al-Houthi's speech on 2 January 2025. He refers to the drone and missile capabilities of the Houthis and asserts the existence of a war between the Houthis and Israel

Translation as provided on the Houthi military media website:

“We are in fact in an open war between us and the Israeli enemy, and we - as I said in the last speech - are targeting the Israeli enemy, and striking it, and we targeted it with a very large number of missiles and drones, and our operations...Continuous and intensive targeting of him; In support of the Palestinian people and their fighters. Dear all, we are We do this out of religious, faith-based, humanitarian, and moral responsibility, by virtue of our authentic faith, human honor, morals, and values. We can never stand idly by and watch what is happening in the Gaza Strip, what the Israeli enemy is committing of horrific crimes of genocide in the Gaza Strip. If some people find it acceptable to remain silent, then that is a deficiency in their faith, in their humanity, and a very great deficiency even in their courage, in their awareness of the dangerous consequences of their silence. As for us, we are continuing...To perform this role, which is based on faith, in supporting the Palestinian people and their dear Mujahideen, and the Israeli aggression will not affect us, we will never retreat from our principled, faith-based, humanitarian, and moral position, and it will not even affect the level of this position.

When the American began his aggression against our country, I said in a televised and public speech, I said: That the matter will contribute to his aggression against us in developing our capabilities, and he certainly does not want that. This is a problem for him, and indeed when he attacked our country, entered the battle, and employed its advanced capabilities and technologies in aggression, interception, and trying to defend the Israeli, he and this has contributed greatly to the development of our military capabilities, because we are in a battle at this level between us and the Americans, with their capabilities, their potential, their technologies, between us and the Israelis. What the Americans and those who are with them possess, and what they support them with, a battle of this level, of this kind, necessarily pushes us to strive to develop our military capabilities, and this is what happened with the help of God Almighty.

It may be a very rare case, or only found in a few countries of our nation, for a country to possess such a level of military capabilities with regard to missiles: hypersonic missiles, ballistic and winged missiles, drones, capabilities that have reached this level of progress that the Americans, with all their capabilities and advanced technologies, and the Israelis, with all that they possess, face great difficulty in hindering or confronting them, and in many cases they fail in that, they fail clearly, and this is a very important issue, as the American is a complete failure”.

Source: <https://www.mmy.ye/335253/>

Annex 50: Houthi attack launched on 9 December 2024 against Israel

Figures 50.1 (up) and 50.2 (below)

Debris of an OWA-UAV which hit a penthouse in the city of Yavneh



Source: <https://x.com/VleckieHond/status/1878171365464764549>

Figure 50.3

Statement by the Israel Defense Forces on the UAV launched from Yemen on 9 December 2024.



Source: <https://x.com/IDF/status/1866036916317032850>

Annex 51: Announcement by the Israel Defense Forces on the Houthi attack launched on 19 December 2024 against Israel**Announcement by the Israel Defense Forces on 19 December 2024**

Transcript of the English statement by the IDF Spokesperson, Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari

Over the last 14 months, the Iran-backed Houthi terror regime in Yemen has launched hundreds of missile and UAV attacks against the State of Israel.

This happened again tonight. The Houthi terror regime fired a missile towards central Israel forcing millions of civilians to take cover in bomb shelters.

In the last two weeks only - the Houthis fired a drone that hit an apartment block in southern Israel, and on Sunday, they fired a long-range missile towards central Israel.

The Houthis have been carrying out attacks against Israel in violation of international law, and the Houthi regime is a threat to peace and security in the region.

Today, the IDF conducted precise strikes on Houthi military targets in Yemen - including ports and energy infrastructure in Sana'a, which the Houthis have been using in ways that effectively contributed to their military actions. Israel will not hesitate to act in order to defend itself and its citizens from the Houthi attacks.

The Houthis are also targeting other countries- in the Middle East, the United States and other countries in the world.

With their attacks on international shipping vessels and roots in the Red Sea and other places, the Houthis have become a global threat.

Who is behind the Houthis? Iran.

The regime in Iran funds, arms and directs the Houthi's terror activities.

As we have shown against other enemies in other arenas, we will continue to act against anyone- anyone in the Middle East that threatens the State of Israel, and we will defend the people of Israel

Source: <https://idfanc.activetrail.biz/ANC1912202485932405435>

Annex 52: Military cooperation between the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and a coordinated attack launched on 19 December 2024 against Israel

Figures 52.1

Statement posted on 19 December 2024 by the Houthis armed forces on the military media social account on “X” claiming that there was a coordinated joint bombing operation by the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq against the territory of Israel



في جبهة العراق كان هناك عملية مشتركة بالقصف
على العدو الإسرائيلي، ما بين المقاومة الإسلامية
في العراق، وما بين القوات المسلحة اليمنية

WWW.MMY.YE

السيد القائد/ عبد الملك بدر الدين الحوثي "يحفظه الله"
حول آخر التطورات والمستجدات الأسبوعية
18 جمادى الآخرة 1446 هـ 19 ديسمبر 2024 م

Appendix A

Unofficial translation:

On the Iraqi front, there was a joint bombing operation against the Israeli enemy, between the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Yemeni Armed Forces.

The Leader Abdulmalik Badr al-Din al-Houthi “may God protect him” on the latest developments and weekly updates on 19 December 2024 (18 Jumada al-Akhirah 1446 AH December 19, 2024)

Source: <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1869833902451462620>

Annex 53: Houthis attack launched on 20 December 2024 against Israel

Figure 53.1

A Houthi ballistic missile attack which was partially intercepted destroyed an elementary school on 20 December 2024 in the city of Ramat Gan, suburb of Tel Aviv, wounding 3 people



Sources:

<https://www.timesofisrael.com/lucky-there-were-no-children-school-near-tel-aviv-ravaged-by-houthi-missile-attack/>

Annex 54: Houthis attack launched on 21 December 2024 against Israel

Figure 54.1

Statement by the Houthis armed forces posted on their military media website on 21 December 2024 on the launch of a “Palestine 2” hypersonic ballistic missile. According to the statement, the attack successfully hit a military target and evaded the Israeli air defense system.



The image shows a screenshot of a statement from the Yemeni Armed Forces. At the top left is a logo for 'الإعلام الحربي اليمني' (Yemeni Military Media). At the top center is the title 'بيانٌ صادرٌ عن القوات المسلحة اليمنية' (Statement issued by the Yemeni Armed Forces) with a date 'صنعاء 20 من جمادى الآخرة 1446 للهجرة | الموافق 21 ديسمبر 2024م' (Sana'a 20 of Jumada al-Akhirah 1446 AH | Corresponding to December 21, 2024 AD). At the top right is the emblem of the Yemeni Armed Forces. The main text is in Arabic, starting with a Basmala and a quote from the Quran. It describes the launch of a 'Palestine 2' hypersonic ballistic missile against an Israeli military target in Gaza, claiming it evaded the Israeli air defense system. The statement concludes with a call to continue the struggle for the liberation of Palestine and the unification of Yemen.

الإعلام الحربي اليمني

بيانٌ صادرٌ عن القوات المسلحة اليمنية

صنعاء 20 من جمادى الآخرة 1446 للهجرة | الموافق 21 ديسمبر 2024م

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
قال تعالى { وَلَيَنْتَظِرَنَّ اللَّهُ مَن يَنْتَظِرُهُ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَقَوِيٌّ عَزِيزٌ }
صدق الله العظيم

■ انتصاراً لمظلومية الشعب الفلسطيني ومجاهديه ورداً على المجازر بحق إخواننا في غزة، وضمن المرحلة الخامسة من مراحل الإسناد في معركة الفتح الموعود والجهاد المقدس وفي إطار الرد على العدوان الإسرائيلي على بلدينا

■ استهدفت القوة الصاروخية في القوات المسلحة اليمنية بعون الله تعالى هدفاً عسكرياً للعدو الإسرائيلي في منطقة يافا المحتلة وذلك بصاروخ باليستي فرط صوتي نوع فلسطين 2.

■ وقد أصاب الصاروخ هدفه بدقة ولم تنجح الدفاعات والمنظومات الاعتراضية في التصدي له.

■ وبهذه العملية النوعية تحيي القوات المسلحة اليمنية كافة أبناء شعبنا اليمني العظيم الذين خرجوا إلى الساحات والميادين مؤكدين على المواجهة والتحدي للعدو الإسرائيلي المجرم.

■ وتحيي كذلك المجاهدين في قطاع غزة وعملياتهم البطولية المستمرة ضد العدو الإسرائيلي وتؤكد أنها بعون الله تعالى مستمرة في إسنادهم حتى وقف العدوان ورفع الحصار عن قطاع غزة.

والله حسبنا ونعم الوكيل، نعم المولى ونعم النصير
عاش اليمن حراً عزيزاً مستقلاً والنصر لليمن ولكل أحرار الأمة

WWW.MMY.YE

Unofficial translation:

Yemeni Armed Forces

Statement issued by the Yemeni Armed Forces

Sana'a, 21 December 2024 20 Jumada al-Akhirah 1446 AH | Corresponding to December 21, 2024 AD

Yemeni Military Media

In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. God Almighty said And God will surely support those who support Him. Indeed, God is Powerful and Exalted in Might. God Almighty's truth.

In victory for the oppressed Palestinian people and their mujahideen, and in response to the massacres against our brothers in Gaza, and within the fifth phase of support in the Battle of the Promised Victory and Holy Jihad, and within the framework of responding to the Israeli aggression against our country.

The missile force of the Yemeni Armed Forces, with the help of God Almighty, targeted a military target of the Israeli enemy in the occupied Jaffa area with a Palestine 2 hypersonic ballistic missile.

The missile accurately hit its target, and the defenses and interception systems were unable to intercept it.

With this qualitative operation, the Yemeni Armed Forces salute all the sons of our great Yemeni people who took to the squares and fields, affirming their confrontation and defiance of the criminal Israeli enemy.

They also salute the mujahideen in the Gaza Strip and their ongoing heroic operations against the Israeli enemy, and affirm that, with the help of God Almighty, they will continue to support them until the aggression stops and the siege on the Gaza Strip is lifted.

And God is sufficient for us, and He is the best Disposer of affairs. The best Master and the best Supporter. Long live free, honorable, and independent Yemen. Victory to Yemen and to all the free people of the nation.

Source: <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1870349957280014557>

Figure 54.2

A Houthi ballistic missile attack hit a children's playground in a residential neighbourhood of Jaffa on 21 December 2024, injuring 16 people, including a three-year-old child.



Sources:

<https://x.com/MenchOsint/status/1874153087956639955>

Figure 54.3

Statement posted on the social media platform “X” by the Israel Defense Forces on 21 December 2024 on the missile attack launched from Yemen by the Houthis and hitting a children’s playground and houses.



Source: <https://x.com/IDF/status/1870392834584383580>

Annex 55: Fundraising campaign “be a partner in making victory” in support of the missile forces

Figure 55.1

Appeal for donations to their missile forces via mobile phone call “180” posted on the social media platform “X” on 21 December 2024. The campaign aims to reach out to 50,000 contacts, at 100 Riyals for each call. The post designates specific accounts at the Central Bank of Yemen (account No. 11261-10262), in Yemeni Riyals and United States Dollar, and at the Yemeni Post (account No. 1126) and at Yamer Wallet (No. 782444447) to collect donations (see figure).



Appendix A:

Unofficial translation: important is generalized to the widest extent. Be a partner in making victory, especially for Yemeni activists. Is it possible to achieve fifty thousand contacts through this tweet? And call 180 to support the missile force with an amount of 100 riyals each. Whoever calls and supports the missile force, share the tweet and comment, “Contact 180”

Source: posted by Qasim al-Hamran (qasim_alhamran) whose account has been suspended. See <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/05/07/the-houthi-challenge/>

Annex 56: Houthi attack launched on 28 September 2024 against Israel

Figure 56.1 (up) and Figure 56.2 (below)

Screenshot extracted from a statement presented by the military spokesperson of the Houthis Yahya Saree issued on 28 September 2024 claiming the attack on Israel with a “Palestine-2” ballistic missile and targeting of Ben Gurion International Airport.



Source: https://x.com/Ahmed_hassan_za/status/1840093054797267081

Figure 56.3

Debris of a ballistic missile fired from Yemen that landed near the Jerusalem area community of Tzur Hadassah on 28 September 2024. According to Israeli media quoting the Israeli Police, the missile launched from Yemen was shot down by the Israeli Air Defense.



Source: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-strikes-port-power-plants-in-yemen-after-recent-houthi-missile-attacks/>

Annex 57: Houthi attack launched on 30 December 2024 against Israel

Figure 57.1

On 30 December 2024 a ballistic missile was intercepted by Israel Defense Force and the debris landed on a road in Beit Shemesh near Jerusalem. The interception caused delays at Ben Gurion International Airport.



Source: <https://x.com/MenchOsint/status/1873849161394897035>

Annex 58: Attack by the Houthis on the vessel Sounion on 21 August 2024 and attack on the vessel Cordelia Moon on 1 October 2024

The Red Sea scraped past an environmental disaster on a large-scale following the Houthi attacks on the oil tanker Sounion carrying 150,000 tonnes of crude oil. Despite the awareness of the potential threat to life and the environment, the risk of long-term and severe damage to the environment increased by a succession of deliberate attacks intended to target and damage the ship.

On 21 August the vessel Sounion was attacked by small boats. The vessel was hit by projectiles causing a fire on board and loss of engine power. Days later, the Houthis returned and boarded the anchored vessel. They planted and detonated several explosives charges on the deck in a secondary attack thereby setting the vessel on fire. The group released footage of the attack.

To avert an environmental disaster the burning vessel required to be towed to a safe area, the fire on deck be put out and its cargo discharged (see below urgent notice). Ansarullah's spokesperson Mohammed Abdul Salam referred to the burning vessel and confirmed the group's intent to continue attacks and targeting of any ship violating the ban on entering Israeli ports, apparently regardless of whether dangerous goods are being transported.

During a speech, the group's leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004) praised the attack.

Cordelia Moon

After a lull in attacks on 1 October the empty oil tanker Cordelia Moon was struck and damaged by a water-born improvised explosive device (WBIED) loaded with explosives. Maritime experts conveyed to the Panel that empty tankers are more likely to explode rather than catch fire. When a tanker is empty, flammable gas remains inside. The presence of gas and air in the mixture makes it flammable and contact with fire could cause the tanker to explode. Therefore, the attack carried the risk of causing a very large explosion and endangering the lives of the crew. Furthermore, the tanker still had fuel on board for its own propulsion. If it had sunk, it could have caused environmental damage. Houthis released footage from the attack.

Urgent notice by Greece addressed to the International Maritime Organization, Intergovernmental organizations, United Nations and specialized agencies, Non-governmental organizations in consultative status with IMO requesting to disseminate the notice to all IMO Member States

Figure 58.1

Notice by Greece concerning the attack by projectiles on the vessel Sounion on 21 August 2025 and the second attack on 23 August 2024 and the condition of the tanker carrying 150,000 tons of crude oil, which poses a serious environmental threat to the marine environment of the Red Sea, and urging all actors involved to assist, prevent and resolve the situation as soon as possible.

Circular Letter No.4916
Annex, page 1

ANNEX



HELLENIC REPUBLIC
MINISTRY OF MARITIME AFFAIRS AND INSULAR POLICY
HELLENIC COAST GUARD

Piraeus, 29th August 2024
Ref. No.: 2060.0/ 61470 /2024

URGENT NOTICE BY GREECE

SUBJECT: M/T "SOUNION", IMO 9312145

The Greek-flagged Oil Tanker "SOUNION", IMO 9312145, was attacked on 21 August 2024 by projectiles, while sailing 72 n.m. west of Yemen's port of Hodeidah in the Red Sea, resulting to loss of engine power.

After the first attack, on 22 August 2024, the ship was evacuated by its crew (25 seafarers) and anchored between Yemen and Eritrea. No death or injury of the crew was reported. The crew was transferred safely to Djibouti by a naval asset of the EU operation "EUNAVFOR ASPIDES".

Following a second attack, the vessel has been on fire in at least five locations on the main deck since 23 August. The continuing fire on board has been confirmed on 28 August by EUNAVFOR ASPIDES.

According to a satellite image obtained evening hours of 29 August 2024 by the Satellite Services of European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), a potential spill of about 2.2 n.m. length has been detected. The position of the oil spill matches with the location of the ship.

Under the said circumstances, the condition of the tanker, which carries 150,000 tons of crude oil, poses a serious environmental hazard for the Red Sea marine environment.

Greece urges all nations and all actors involved to assist in preventing the environmental hazard and resolving the situation the soonest possible.

This information is submitted pursuant to Article 198 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

It is kindly requested to disseminate the present notice to all IMO Member States.



THE DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR SHIPPING

REAR ADMIRAL H.C.G.
LAGADIANOS NIKOLAOS


CL.4916.docx

Source: [https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/MediaCentre/Documents/Circular Letter No.4916 - MT Sounion - Urgent Notice \(Secretariat\).pdf](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/MediaCentre/Documents/Circular%20Letter%20No.4916%20-%20MT%20Sounion%20-%20Urgent%20Notice%20(Secretariat).pdf)

Statement on “X” by Muhammad Abdul Salam, Ansar Allah’s official spokesperson, and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Al Masirah Media Network, and Head of the National Delegation on 28 August 2024

Figure 58.2

Muhammad Abdul Salam’s statement referring to the burning vessel Sounion and the group’s consent to tow the burning oil tanker away and exemplifying their intention to target any vessel linked to Israeli companies and violating the ban on entering Israeli ports



Source: <https://x.com/abdusalamsalah/status/1828878937453408377>

Speech of Abdulmalik al-Houthi televised on 29 August 2024 on the Houthi military website

Excerpt of Abdulmalik al-Houthi's televised speech on 29 August 2024. He refers to the Sounion operation carried out by the naval forces, the growing economic impact on the enemy's economy and the rising cost of shipping, and vows to continue attacks on vessels, without considerations that could limit their operations.

Transcript of part of the speech which refers to the vessel Sounion:

“When it comes to the supporting front in Yemen of the faith in the battle of the holy jihad, there are unique or there were unique operations this week that were very important that were carried out by the naval forces, including the raid on the **Sounion** ship. This ship violated the embargo and was carrying products to the Israeli enemy. This is a brave and courageous operation, a brave and courageous jihadist operation, it was very important, a group or two groups from the naval forces, they boarded this ship in two phases in two operations, and they destroyed what was on board, the products, and then they booby-trapped and bombed the ship, it was documented”...

Source: <https://www.mmy.ye/322422/>

Annex 59: Information on Houthi attacks and suspicious activities towards merchant vessels from 1 August 2024 to 31 July 2025

Nature/impact	Number
Attack on merchant vessels	25
Attack on oil/chemical tankers	8
Vessels hit	9
Tankers hit	3
Vessels abandoned	1
Vessels sunken	2
Seafarer killed	4

Reported date of attack	Targeted merchant and military vessel	Information on the attack	Gulf of Aden
			Red sea
			Indian ocean
24/07/25	Name of targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Vessel approached by single small craft and report of gunfire.	
07/07/25	Eternity C , bulk carrier with Liberia flag	Attacked with five rocket-propelled grenades by multiple small craft. The vessel was hit and damaged then lost propulsion and sunk . Four reportedly killed. Rescue of crew members by Houthis. Crew members reported missing.	
06/07/25	Magic Seas , bulk carrier with Liberia flag	Vessel attacked by multiple small vessels who opened fire with small arms and self-propelled grenades. Armed security team returned fire. The vessel was hit by unknown projectiles, resulting in a fire. The crew abandoned ship and was rescued. Vessel sunk following secondary attack with explosive charges.	
15/04/25	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Vessel reports being followed by armed persons in multiple small craft with shots being fired. Craft tried to gain access to the vessel by falsely stating they were from the Yemeni Coast Guard (location East of Aden).	
25/01/25	Liberty Power , merchant vessel with US flag	Suspicious approach by one military craft shining a green laser light towards the bridge maneuvering in an aggressive manner (transiting Northern Arabian Gulf)	
09/12/24	3 supply vessels with US flag US Navy USS Stockdale (DDG 106) US Navy USS O'Kane (DDG 77)	Attacked by multiple OWA-UAS, one ASCM while escorting three merchant vessels, no damage reported	
01/12/24	3 supply vessels with US flag US Navy USS Stockdale (DDG 106) US Navy USS O'Kane (DDG 77)	Attacked by three ASBMs, three OWA-UAS and one ASCM while escorting three merchant vessels, no damage reported	
01/12/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	An unidentified aerial object splashed in the water near to the vessel	
18/11/24	Anadolu S , bulk carrier with Panama flag	2 nd attack: missile splashed in close proximity to the vessel	
17/11/24	Anadolu S , bulk carrier with Panama flag	1 st attack: missile splashed in close proximity to the vessel	

28/10/24	<i>Motaro, bulk carrier with Liberia flag</i>	3 rd attack: one explosion in close proximity to the vessel 2 nd attack: one explosion in close proximity to the vessel 1 st attack: one explosion in close proximity to the vessel
10/10/24	<i>Olympic Spirit, chemical tanker with Liberia flag</i>	3 rd attack: one explosion at close vicinity 2 nd attack: two explosions at close vicinity 1 st attack: vessel hit by an unidentified projectile
01/10/24	<i>Minoan Courage, bulk carrier with Liberia flag</i>	Vessel hit by a missile
01/10/24	<i>MV Cordelia Moon, oil tanker with Panama flag</i>	Four splashes sighted in close proximity to the vessel; vessel hit by WBIED, and damage reported (6 port ballast tank punctured)
02/09/24	<i>Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO</i>	Vessel struck by a UAV, minimal damage reported
02/09/24	<i>MV Blue Lagoon I, oil tanker with Panama flag</i>	Vessel hit by two ballistic missiles on its port side ; a third missile splashed in proximity of the vessel
02/09/24	<i>MV Amjad, oil tanker with Saudi flag</i>	Vessel hit by one OWA-UAV
30/08/24	<i>MV Groton, container ship with Liberia flag</i>	Explosion of two missiles observed at close vicinity, vessel already under attack on 04/08/24
23/08/24	<i>Sounion, oil tanker with Greek flag</i>	Secondary attack on anchored vessel, detonation of several explosives' charges on the deck of the vessel
21/08/24	<i>SW North Wind I, bulk carrier with Panama flag</i>	Vessel subjected to multiple attacks, three explosions at close vicinity of the vessel, causing minor damage
21/08/24	<i>Sounion, oil tanker with Greek flag</i>	2 nd attack: hit by a third projectile which causes the fire onboard 1 st attack: attack by small boats, unknown airborne projectiles and a USV; initially hit by two projectiles and then subsequently hit by a third projectile. All projectiles impacted on the starboard quarter, damaging the engine compartment and starting a fire
13/08/24	<i>MV ON Phoenix, oil tanker with Panama flag</i>	Explosion at vicinity
13/08/24	<i>MV Delta Atlantica, oil tanker with Liberia flag</i>	3 rd attack: USV (which was disabled) 1 st and 2 nd attacks: explosion at distance
09/08/24	<i>Delta Blue, oil tanker with Liberia flag</i>	4 th attack: missile exploded at distance of the vessel 3 rd attack: attack by USV, which exploded at distance of the vessel
08/08/24		2 nd attack: later the explosion of a missile at close vicinity of the vessel reported 1 st attack: missed attack by RPG from two small crafts
03/08/24	<i>MV Groton, container ship with Liberia flag</i>	Explosion observed at close vicinity. Later on, the vessel was hit by a missile , causing a fire

Source: CENTCOM and UKMTO

Annex 60: Article published on 22 January 2025 by Houthi media Al Masirah on the release by the Houthis of the Galaxy Leader crew and on the coordination with Hamas

News - Middle East: Under the directive of Sayyed Abdulmalik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, in coordination with Hamas and with mediation by the Sultanate of Oman, the crew of the ship Galaxy Leader had been released.

A private source informed Almasirah Channel that the crew of the Galaxy Leader ship was handed over to Omani authorities on Wednesday as part of arrangements related to the Gaza ceasefire.

In a statement, the Supreme Political Council clarified that, through coordination with the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas and with the efforts of Oman, the Yemeni government in Sana'a facilitated the release of the ship's crew, which had been detained as part of efforts to support Gaza.

The statement emphasized that this action was taken in support of the Gaza ceasefire agreement.

During the release process, a joint press conference was held between the Yemeni government and representatives of Palestinian factions. It was announced that Omani mediation had successfully secured the release of the Galaxy Leader crew. "Our stance is to support the Palestinian people, and we remain committed to this position," Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs Major General Jalal Al-Rowaishan said. He reaffirmed the Yemeni government's dedication to advocating for Palestinian rights in various forums.

The representative of Hamas in Yemen, Moath Abushamala, highlighted the ongoing coordination between Yemen and Palestinian factions on various issues. He stated, "The release of the Galaxy Leader crew is a clear example of this coordination. He added, "Today, in Sana'a, we witness a manifestation of Palestinian victory in the face of the genocide endured by the Gaza Strip," while praising the Yemeni government's continued efforts to support the Palestinian cause. He also expressed gratitude to Oman for its effective mediation in the case of the Galaxy Leader detainees and expressed hope for continued collaboration among all parties to support the rights of the Palestinian people.

Yemen has consistently declared its unwavering support for Palestine's struggle against the Israeli occupation, especially since the escalation of violence in Gaza. The crisis began on October 7, 2023, when Palestinian resistance movements launched Operation Al-Aqsa Storm against the Israeli regime. In response, Israel initiated a devastating war on Gaza, prompting Yemen to openly back the Palestinian cause.

In the midst of this regional tension, the Yemeni Armed Forces have demonstrated their military capabilities by achieving significant victories against naval forces linked to the US, the UK, and Israel. These operations have had a profound impact on strategic maritime zones, including the effective shutdown of the Port of Eilat (Um Rashrash) and forcing US aircraft carriers to withdraw from the Red Sea. Additionally, Yemeni forces succeeded in sinking or damaging dozens of Israeli-linked vessels.


One of the most notable events occurred on November 19, 2023, when the Yemeni Naval Forces conducted a military operation in the Red Sea, resulting in the seizure of the Israeli-linked vessel Galaxy Leader. The ship was escorted to the Yemeni coast, drawing significant international attention and highlighting Yemen's active role in opposing Israeli actions in Gaza. The release of the Galaxy Leader crew, facilitated by Yemeni authorities in coordination with Hamas and mediated by the Sultanate of Oman, is part of Yemen's broader efforts to support the Palestinian people and strengthen regional solidarity against Israeli aggression.

Source: <https://english.masirahtv.net/post/45243/Yemen-Releases-Crew-of-Galaxy-Leader-Ship-Amid-Gaza-Ceasefire-Efforts>

Annex 61: Statement posted by the Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree on 11 March 2025 on the resumption of Houthi attacks against vessels

Figure 61.1

On 11 March 2025, the Yemeni armed forces issued a statement announcing a ban on the passage of all Israeli ships in certain operational zones in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, as well as in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Gulf of Aden. This declaration came after a deadline set by Abdulmalik al-Houthi for mediators to persuade Israel to reopen border crossings and allow aid into the Gaza Strip had expired.



Source: https://x.com/Nasr_Amer1/status/1899566416296050992

Annex 62: Article published on 6 December 2024 by Al Awal on missile debris found in the governorate of Abyan

Figure 62.1

Social media accounts and Yemeni media outlets reported on missiles debris found in Abyan. The missiles were likely fired from Houthi controlled areas in Al Bayda towards targets in the Gulf of Aden.



لثانية من نوعها.. سقوط صاروخ

باليستي حوثي في أبين

.الثانية من نوعها.. سقوط صاروخ باليستي حوثي في أبين(الأول)خاص

شهدت محافظة أبين حادثة سقوط صاروخ باليستي في منطقة نائية بمديرية لودر، في ثاني واقعة مشابهة تشهدها المحافظة خلال أقل من أسبوع.

يأتي ذلك وسط تصاعد العمليات العسكرية التي تنفذها مليشيا الحوثي في البحرين الأحمر والعربي ضد السفن التجارية

وأكدت مصادر محلية، أن صاروخاً باليستي سقط في وقت متأخر من مساء الخميس في منطقة نائية بمديرية لودر، مرجحة أن المليشيا الحوثية أطلقتها من مناطق خاضعة لسيطرتها، مستهدفة على الأرجح البحر الأحمر

وحسب إفادات السكان، سُمع دوي انفجار قوي في أنحاء متفرقة من المديرية، دون توفر معلومات مؤكدة حتى الآن عن وقوع خسائر بشرية أو أضرار مادية جراء الحادث

ويأتي هذا الحادث بعد أيام قليلة من سقوط صاروخ باليستي آخر بين مديرتي لودر ومودية في المحافظة ذاتها أطلقته مليشيا الحوثي من مناطق سيطرتها مساء الأحد الماضي

وكانت أعلنت القيادة المركزية الأمريكية “سنتكوم” في بيان لها يوم الإثنين أن المدمرتين الأمريكيتين “يو إس إس ستوكديل” و”يو إس إس أوكين” تمكنتا من اعتراض مجموعة صواريخ أطلقتها مليشيا الحوثي أثناء عبورهما خليج عدن

وأوضحت القيادة أن المدمرتين كانتا ترافقان ثلاث سفن تجارية أمريكية ترفع العلم الأمريكي، لتأمينها خلال مرورها بالممرات المائية الاستراتيجية

وفي 19 نوفمبر 2023، دشنت مليشيا الحوثي هجماتها بالصواريخ والمسيرات على السفن التجارية والممرات الدولية في البحرين الأحمر والعربي، ما يهدد أمن الملاحة الدولية

وكتفت المليشيا من هجمات البحرىة باستخدام زوارق مفخرة وصواريخ بعيدة المدى وطائرات مسيرة تحت إشراف مباشر من الحرس الثوري الايراني، ما دفع الدول الكبرى، وعلى رأسها الولايات المتحدة، إلى تعزيز وجودها العسكري في المنطقة لضمان سلامة السفن والممرات البحرىة الحيوية.

: اقرأ المزيد من الأول

Appendix A

Unofficial translation:

Second of its kind... A missile landed

Houthi ballistic missile in Abyan

Abyan governorate witnessed an incident in which a ballistic missile landed in a remote area in Lawder district, the second such incident in the governorate in less than a week.

This comes amid the escalation of military operations carried out by the Houthi militia in the Red and Arabian Seas against commercial ships. Local sources confirmed that a ballistic missile landed late Thursday evening in a remote area in Lawder district, suggesting that the Houthi militia launched it from areas under its control, likely targeting the Red Sea.

According to residents, a strong explosion was heard in different parts of the district, without any confirmed information about human casualties or material damage as a result of the incident.

This incident comes a few days after another ballistic missile landed between Lawder and Mudiya districts in the same governorate, launched by the Houthi militia from areas under its control last Sunday evening.

The US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced in a statement on Monday that the US destroyers USS Stockdale and USS O'Kane were able to intercept a group of missiles fired by the Houthi militia while crossing the Gulf of Aden.

The two destroyers were escorting three US-flagged merchant ships to secure them as they passed through strategic waterways, the command said.

On 19 November 2023, the Houthi militia launched missile attacks and marches on commercial ships and international corridors in the Red and Arabian Seas, threatening the security of international navigation.

The militia has intensified its maritime attacks using booby-trapped boats, long-range missiles and drones under the direct supervision of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, prompting major countries, led by the United States, to strengthen their military presence in the region to ensure the safety of ships and vital waterways.

Source: <https://al-awal.net/16420>

Annex 63: Report posted on the social media platform ‘X’ on 8 December 2024 on missile debris found in the governorate of Abyan

Figure 63.1

Fallen missile debris in Abyan



Source: <https://x.com/VleckieHond/status/1865780279266230764>

Annex 64: Attack by the Houthis on the Cordelia Moon on 1 October 2024

Video of the water-borne improvised explosive device attack on the Cordelia Moon posted on YouTube on 3 October 2024

Figure 64.1

Screenshot of the water-borne improvised explosive device (WBIED) shortly before striking the vessel Cordelia Moon



Source: <https://youtu.be/BCH9FDts8XU>

Video of the WBIED attack on the oil tanker Cordelia Moon posted on the Houthis military media on 3 October 2024

Figure 64.2

Screenshot showing the explosion next to the vessel Cordelia Moon after purportedly being struck by the WBIED



Source: <https://www.mmy.ye/326067/>

Annex 65: Houthi secondary attacks on the vessel Sounion on 21 August 2024 and on the vessel Magic Sea on 6 July 2025

On 21 August 2024 the vessel Sounion was attacked by Houthis. Two small boats approached the vessel. The vessel was hit by projectiles which caused a fire onboard and the loss of engine power. On 23 August 2024 the Houthis detonated several explosives charges on the deck of the anchored vessel. The vessel has been successfully towed away, the fire on deck extinguished and its cargo discharged.

Figure 65.1

Video of the explosion on the deck of the Sounion posted on the Houthis military media website on 29 August 2024. Impact of projectiles on the vessel Sounion are visible on the screenshot:



Figures 65.2 (up), 65.3 (middle), and 65.4, and 65.5 (below)

Screenshots are showing the vessel, and an armed Houthi member on the vessel. A person on the vessel holding an explosive device followed by the remotely controlled detonation of several explosives' charges on the deck. Posted on the Houthis military media website on 29 August 2024.





Source: <https://www.mmy.ye/322432/>

Figures 65.6 (up), 65.7 (middle), and 65.8 (below)

On July 8, 2025, Houthi posted a video on the social media platform "X" showing the targeting of the vessel Magic Sea. The vessel was attacked by multiple small vessels who opened fire with small arms and self-propelled grenades. It was hit by unknown projectiles, resulting in a fire. The crew abandoned ship and was rescued. In a secondary attack the Houthi returned, boarded the vessel and detonated explosive charges on the deck. The vessel sunk thereafter.



Source : <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1942622377411768402>

Annex 66: Speech of Abdulmalik al-Houthi published on 15 September 2024 by Houthi media Al Masirah TV on the Occasion of the Blessed Birth Anniversary of the Prophet on 15 September 2024

Excerpt of Abdulmalik al-Houthi's speech. He refers to an attack against Israel and Houthis missile capacities, and on the coordination among the axis of resistance

In his speech, on 15 September 2024, Abdulmalik Al-Houthi made reference to the long-range defense capacity of the Houthis, in connection with the latest attack on Israel, and on the coordination among the axis of resistance and stated:

“Today's operation that was carried out by the Missile Force with a new ballistic missile of advanced technology—a missile that surpassed and penetrated all defence lines that protect the Israeli enemy, including various and multiple air defence systems, travelling a long distance estimated at 2,040 km in just 11 1/2 minutes—falls within the fifth stage of escalation against the Israeli enemy, in support of the oppressed Palestinian people. Our operations continue as long as aggression and blockade persist against Gaza. Our position remains firm until occupied Palestine is cleansed from the clutches of the Zionist occupation. **We escalate at each stage, coordinate with our mujahid brothers in Palestine and in the axis of Al-Quds, jihad, and resistance**, and we seek to do what is greater than this. Allah willing, what lies ahead is greater. Our Armed Forces continue their operations at sea, targeting the maritime activities associated with the Israeli enemy, as well as its American and British partners. These operations, by the grace and support of Allah, are successful and highly impactful.”

Source: <https://english.masirahtv.net/post/42592/Leader-of-the-Revolution-Sayyed-Abdulmalik-Al-Houthi-Speaks-on-the-Occasion-of-the-Blessed>

Annex 67: Letter from Hamas political leader Yahia Sinwar dated 15 September 2024 addressed to the Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi following the launch of a ballistic missile against Israel

Figure 67.1

The letter from the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas



خُطط الاحتواء والتحييد قد فشلت، وأن تأثير جبهات الإسناد بدأ يأخذ منحى أكثر فعالية، وأعظم تأثيراً على طريق حسم المعركة لصالح شعوبنا الأبية الحرة.

وإنني بهذا الصدد أرسل تحياتي لقيادة اليمن الشقيق، وقيادة أنصار الله، ولأبطال الجيش اليمني العزيز الذين أبدعوا في تطوير قدراتهم العسكرية حتى وصلت إلى عمق الكيان الغاصب، كما أبرق بالتحية للشعب اليمني العظيم، الذي ما فتئ عبر تاريخه عن نصره شعبنا الفلسطيني وقضيته العادلة، ولا تزال ميادين اليمن العزيز تشهد على ذلك أسبوعياً منذ بدأت معركة طوفان الأقصى.

أخي العزيز/

يعيش شعبنا في قطاع غزة بين حالتين، حالة الألم والمعاناة الشديدة جراء العدوان النازي والإبادة الجماعية والحصار والتجوع وهو ما يتطلب من كل أبناء الأمة اسناده والوقوف معه، وحالة المقاومة الباسلة التي تقودها كتائب القسام التي خاضت هجوم 7 أكتوبر باقتدار قلّ نظيره، وخاضت معركة دفاعية على مدار عام كامل أرهقت العدو وأثخنّت فيه، وإنني بهذا الصدد أطمئنكم بأن المقاومة بخير، وأن ما يعلنه العدو محض أكاذيب وحرب نفسية، وإننا قد أعدنا أنفسنا لخوض معركة استنزاف طويلة تكسر إرادة العدو السياسية، كما كسر طوفان الأقصى إرادته العسكرية، وإنّ تضافر جهودنا معكم ومع إخواننا في المقاومة الباسلة في لبنان، والمقاومة الإسلامية في العراق، سيكسر هذا العدو وسيُلحق به الهزيمة على طريق دحره عن أرضنا بإذن الله ﴿وَيُفْلِحُونَ مَتَى هُوَ قُلْ عَسَى أَنْ يَكُونَ قَرِيبًا﴾.

أخوكم/ يحيى السنوار

رئيس المكتب السياسي

لحركة المقاومة الإسلامية - حماس



الإثنين

12 ربيع الأول 1446 هجرية

15 أيلول - سبتمبر 2024 ميلادية

Unofficial translation:

In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds, the supporter of His faithful and pious soldiers, and prayers and peace be upon the leader of the mujahideen, the commander of the radiant ones, and upon his pure family and companions, and his auspicious companions, and upon the mujahideen and the defenders until the Day of Judgment. And after that My dear brother / His Eminence Sayyid Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, may God protect you May the peace, blessings, and mercy of God be upon you, I am pleased to write you this letter on the anniversary of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, as we fight together the blessed battle of the Flood of Al-Aqsa, which came to deal a strong blow to the Zionist project in the region in general, and in Palestine in particular, and to write with it the first pages of God's holy promise to liberate Palestine in implementation of His Almighty saying: (So when the promise of the Hereafter comes to pass, they will disfigure your faces and enter the mosque as they entered it the first time and destroy what they have exalted with utter destruction).

I am pleased to thank you for the sincere emotion, overflowing feelings and strong will that we saw from you in the Battle of the Flood of Al-Aqsa, whether in the field of resistance, or in the correspondence you send to us and the messages your esteemed delegations carry.

My dear brother / His Eminence Sayyid Abdul Malik Palestine woke up today to the news of your launching of the fifth stage of your participation in the Battle of the Flood of Al-Aqsa, and in this regard I congratulate you on your success in having your missiles reach the depths of the enemy entity, bypassing all layers and systems of defense and interception, and to restore the glow of the Battle of the Flood of Al-Aqsa and its impact on the heart of "Tel Aviv" once again. The Zionist enemy believed that the war of genocide it is waging against our Palestinian people, and the steps to contain and neutralize the resistance fronts, supervised by the United States of America and its allies, would make it victorious in its Nazi battle against our Palestinian people. Your qualitative operation came this morning to send the enemy a message that the plans for containment and neutralization have failed and that the influence of the support fronts has begun to take a more effective direction and has a greater impact on the path to resolving the battle in favor of our free and proud peoples. In this regard, I send my greetings to the leadership of brotherly Yemen, the leadership of Ansar Allah, and to the heroes of the dear Yemeni army who have excelled in developing their military capabilities until they reached the depths of the usurping entity. I also send my greetings to the great Yemeni people, who have not ceased throughout their history to support our Palestinian people and their just cause, and the squares of dear Yemen continue to bear witness to that weekly since the Battle of the Flood of Al-Aqsa began.

My dear brother Our people in the Gaza Strip are living between two states: the state of pain and severe suffering due to the Nazi aggression, genocide, siege and starvation, which requires all the sons of the nation to support and stand with them, and the state of the valiant resistance led by the Al-Qassam Brigades, which fought the October 7 attack with unparalleled competence, and fought a defensive battle throughout an entire year that exhausted and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. In this regard, I assure you that the resistance is fine, and that what the enemy is announcing is nothing but lies and psychological warfare. We have prepared ourselves to fight a long battle of attrition that will break the enemy's political will, just as the Al-Aqsa flood broke its military will. **The combination of our efforts with you and our brothers in the valiant resistance in Lebanon and the Islamic resistance in Iraq** will break this enemy and inflict defeat on it on the path to expelling it from our land, God willing. "And they say, 'When will it be?' Say, 'Perhaps it will be soon.'"

May the peace, mercy, and blessings of God be upon you.

Your brother Yahya Sinwar

Head of the Political Bureau

Islamic Resistance Movement - Hamas

15 September 2024

Source: https://x.com/Nasr_Amer1/status/1835697164049170477

Annex 68: Article published by Houthi media Saba on 25 January 2025 informing on the meeting between the Houthi de-facto Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Hamas representative in Sana'a held in Sana'a on 20 January 2025

Figure 68.1

Hamas representative in Sanaa, Moaz Abu Shamala and Houthi de-facto Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jamal Amer, issuing statements emphasizing the groups' mutual support.



Foreign Minister meets with Hamas representative in Sana'a [Mon, 20 Jan 2025 21:00:06 +0300]
Sana'a - Saba:

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Jamal Ahmed Amer, met with the representative of the Islamic Resistance Movement "Hamas" in Sana'a, Moaz Abu Shamala, to discuss the developments of the Palestinian cause and the victory achieved by the resistance in Gaza. Minister Amer congratulated the Palestinian people and resistance for forcing the Israeli occupation and America to sign the truce agreement and considered it an honorable victory that thwarted the goals of the Zionist entity.

The minister stressed that the Yemeni leadership, led by Sayyed Abdulmalik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, rejected any discussion or mediation regarding the Yemeni operations supporting Gaza except by stopping the aggression and crimes of genocide in the Strip. He pointed out that the unity of the Yemeni people with the leadership, government, and armed forces sent a firm message that confused the Israeli occupation and its allies while stressing the readiness of the armed forces to respond to any violations of the truce.


Moaz Abu Shamala expressed the Hamas leadership's thanks to Sayyed Abdulmalik al-Houthi and the Yemeni leadership for their strong support. He praised the message of the Leader, "You are not alone," which turned into a practical military, popular, and political reality, and had a global impact, especially on the Zionist entity and America.

Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3426619.htm>

Annex 69: Interview by Major General Hossein Salami Commander in Chief of Iran's Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) published by Tehrantimes on 28 December 2024 in which he is praising Houthi attacks on Israel and refuting claims that the resistance has lost strength

Figure 69.1

Major General Hossein Salami commander in chief of Iran's Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC)



IRGC chief lauds Yemeni Resistance, anticipates their victory

During an interview with Yemen's Al-Masirah TV on Saturday, Salami emphasized the resilience and strength of the Yemeni people, saying, "Today, the motivations of the Resistance are stronger than ever."

He refuted claims from adversaries that the Resistance Front has lost strength, insisting that Ansarullah's power is as strong as ever. "Ansarullah has so far performed brilliantly, and no particular incident has occurred that would change this," he stated.

Salami also highlighted the massive gatherings of the Yemeni people in support of Gaza, affirming, "Today, Yemen is strong and victorious, thanks to the will and faith of the Yemeni people."

Further praising the Yemeni nation for their courageous defense of the Palestinian people amid the Israeli onslaught in Gaza, Salami said, "The Yemenis will continue their Resistance and will ultimately emerge victorious."

In a recent military advancement, the Yemeni Armed Forces have successfully initiated a hypersonic ballistic missile strike on an airport in Tel Aviv.

Yemen's Military Spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Saree announced that the operation led to casualties and disrupted air traffic.

Moreover, Ansarullah has targeted vessels associated with the Israeli regime, the United States, or the United Kingdom, as part of efforts to compel Tel Aviv to cease its brutal actions in Gaza.

Source: <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/508027/IRGC-chief-lauds-Yemeni-Resistance-anticipates-their-victory>

Annex 70: Article published on 26 December 2024 by Houthi media Al-Masirah in which Hamas and Hezbollah condemn Israeli attack on Yemen**Hezbollah and Hamas Condemn Israeli Aggression on Yemen**

News - Middle East: Hezbollah and Hamas have issued strong statements condemning the recent Israeli airstrikes on Yemen, which targeted civilian infrastructure, including Sana'a International Airport and the port of Hodeidah. In a statement, Hezbollah denounced the attack, calling it a continuation of Israel's broader aggression against the Arab and Islamic nations. "We strongly condemn the Israeli aggression on Yemen and consider it an extension of the Zionist war against the peoples of our Arab and Islamic region," the statement read. Hezbollah described the strikes as a blatant violation of international laws and an act of arrogance and brutality. "This aggression comes as a result of the enemy's failure to counter Yemen's military strikes and the steadfast Yemeni stance in supporting Palestine." The party reaffirmed its solidarity with the Yemeni people, praising their resilience and steadfastness in facing such aggression. "We stand with the Yemeni people who continue their determination and resistance against this aggression," Hezbollah emphasized. Hezbollah also called on free nations worldwide to unite against Zionist aggression, declaring, "There is no option for our nations but resistance and steadfastness."

For its part, Hamas echoed similar sentiments, condemning the strikes as "brutal and terrorist aggression" against Yemen. "We denounce the Zionist enemy's attack on Yemen, which targeted civilian sites, including Sana'a Airport and the port of Hodeidah," Hamas stated. The movement described the aggression as "a flagrant violation of Yemeni sovereignty and an act of terrorism."

Hamas also expressed appreciation for Yemen's unwavering support for Palestine, particularly the positions articulated by Ansar Allah. "We value the principled Yemeni stances, as expressed by our brothers in Ansar Allah, and their commitment that Zionist and Western aggression on Yemen will not deter them from supporting our people." The group called on Arab and Islamic countries to take action against Israel's violations. "We urge Arab and Islamic nations to deter the enemy and stand in solidarity against its violations of the region's peoples," the statement concluded.

On Thursday, three citizens were martyred, 16 others were injured in airstrikes by the American-Israeli aggression on the capital, Sana'a, and Hodeidah Governorate. The US-British coalition continues its aggression on Yemen in support of the Israeli occupation, attempting to deter Yemen from supporting the Palestinian people, who have been facing a Zionist genocidal war for over a year. Meanwhile, Sana'a has reaffirmed its commitment to the Al-Aqsa Flood campaign and its ongoing naval blockade on the Israeli occupation until the aggression on Gaza and Lebanon ceases.

Source : <https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/44736/Hezbollah-and-Hamas-Condemn-Israeli-Aggression-on-Yemen>

Annex 71: Statement of Hezbollah Central Council member Sheikh Hassan al-Baghdadi on 29 December 2024 reaffirming the strength and unity of the resistance led by Iran and referring to missile attacks by Houthis

Hezbollah Member: Iranian-led Resistance Axis is Still Strong, Cohesive

Sunday, 29 December 2024 13:00 [Last Update: Monday, 06 January 2025 14:46]

Mashhad (IP)- A member of Hezbollah's Central Council, Sheikh Hassan al-Baghdadi, stated at an international conference in Mashhad that the United States and the Zionist regime are under the illusion of victory due to some martyrdoms among individuals and civilians. He insisted that Hezbollah remains resolute in its mission.

Iran Press/ Iran news: Al-Baghdadi explained that despite their perceptions of success, the US and Israel have failed to disarm the resistance. He noted that after attacking Lebanese Hezbollah, which resulted in casualties, they prematurely declared victory.

He pointed out that the Zionist regime deployed 70,000 commandos, various aircraft, and missiles, backed by full support from the US. Nevertheless, Hezbollah successfully defended its territory in Jabal Amel, forcing the Israeli army to retreat.

He emphasized that thousands of rockets targeted the Zionist regime, reaching Tel Aviv and forcing four million Israelis into shelters, with many fleeing their communities. "Is this what you call victory?" he asked.

He concluded by reaffirming the strength and unity of the resistance axis led by Iran, asserting that the enemy's claims of victory are unfounded amid their defeats and ongoing missile attacks from Yemen.

Figure 71.1

Picture of Sheikh Hassan al-Baghdadi during the interview with Iranpress



Source: <https://iranpress.com/hezbollah-member--iranian-led-resistance-axis-is-still-strong--cohesive>

Annex 72: Article published by the Yemeni media outlet South24 on the attack by AQAP carried out against Government affiliated forces on 16 August 2024

Abyan (South24) – A suicide car bomb attack targeted a military site of the Southern Forces' 3rd Back and Support Brigade in the Mudiya district of Abyan province on Friday morning, killing Nine soldiers and injuring at least 13 others, according to military and security sources speaking to South24 Center.

Later, AIC TV, affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council, reported that the death toll had risen to 16 people. The sources confirmed that the attack occurred at 07:05 AM Aden time when the explosive-laden vehicle detonated near Al-Fareedh School, igniting a fire in one of the rear buildings of the brigade's site. The Southern Forces have accused elements of the terrorist group AQAP of orchestrating the attack, describing it as a suicide bombing. A military source from the Southern Forces stated, "The terrorist bombing targeted a military barracks of the 3rd Back and Support Brigade, resulting in the martyrdom of several soldiers and injuries to others." He added that "Our forces deployed in the surrounding area after the explosion, and the evacuation of the wounded to nearby hospitals is ongoing."

This attack is one of the most severe terrorist incidents the region has witnessed recently, occurring amid an escalation of terrorist activities targeting Southern Forces in South Yemen. The Southern Forces, including the 3rd Brigade, are leading Operation "Arrows of the East" to combat terrorism in Abyan province since August 23, 2022, aimed at rooting out al-Qaeda strongholds. Southern Forces have killed several key al-Qaeda leaders and cleared large areas of the province from the group's elements. The spokesperson for the Southern Armed Forces described the terrorist attack in Abyan as a direct consequence of heightened political tensions and incitement against both the forces and the STC. Speaking on AIC TV, Mohammed al-Naqeeb revealed that the suicide bomber's vehicle was loaded with hundreds of kilograms of explosives. Al-Naqeeb also pointed fingers at certain "media outlets" and "political mony" for deliberately fueling insecurity and instability in South. He highlighted that this attack coincides with the second anniversary of the "Arrows of the East" operation and reaffirmed the Southern forces' commitment to "rooting out terrorism."

Since May 2023, AQAP has increasingly used drones in its attacks against Southern military forces in the Abyan and Shabwa provinces. The American Conflict Analysis Project (ACLED) reported that al-Qaeda's drone attacks in South Yemen appear to have been facilitated by training and logistical support from the Houthis.

[...]

Source: <https://south24.org/news/newse.php?nid=4138>

Annex 73: AQAP report on military operations carried out against Government affiliated forces

Comment: In their 19th issue of the Sada Al-Malahem magazine, the group published the results of their military operations “Arrows of Truth” against Government affiliated forces from 28 August 2022 to 5 August 2024. The use of improvised explosive devices is prominently and reported 139 times, in addition to one suicide attack. The use of armed drones is reported 15 times. Overall, the infographic claims that past operations resulted in over 234 deaths and 379 injuries.

Figure 73.1

Infographic posted by AQAP and reporting on operations between 28 August 2022 and 5 August 2024



Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the infographic published in the 19th issue of the Sada Al-Malahem magazine and claiming on achieved results and losses of AQAP operations “Arrows of Truth” against Government affiliated forces between 28 August 2022 and 5 August 2024:

Harvest of the Arrows of Truth

Results of the operations of the Mujahideen of Al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula

139 IED detonations, 15 drone strikes, 1 martyrdom operation, 5 attacks, 7 ambushes, 16 mortar attacks, 4 rocket launches, 18 sniper attacks, 10 skirmishes

Resulting in enemy losses: 21 leaders killed, 4 planes shut down, 7 broken motorbikes, over 379 wounded, more than 100 damaged vehicles, over 234 killed, 13 armoured vehicles damaged or destroyed, inflicted financial losses estimated at more than \$2,000,000

Source: <https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1864267978042167341>

Annex 74: AQAP sniper attack on 21 November 2024 against Government affiliated forces

Figure 74.1

Statement of AQAP on a sniper attack carried out in Abyan Mudyiah district on 20 November 2024. In the statement on the sniper attack against a drone control center, AQAP reports on the killing of a wounded soldier while being evacuated.

← Post



عاصم الصبري
@AsemTahaAlSabr

...

#تنظيم_القاعدة في #اليمن يعلن عن تنفيذ عملية استهدفت مركز تحكم بالطائرات المسييرة امس الأربعاء في مديرية مودية بمحافظة #أبين ، و ينشر صور للعناصر اثر تحركهم لتنفيذ العملية.

#AQAP

#AlQaeda

Translated from Arabic by Google

#تنظيم_القاعدة in #اليمن announces the implementation of an operation targeting a drone control center yesterday, Wednesday, in Mudiyah District, #أبين Governorate, and publishes photos of the elements as they move to carry out the operation.

#AQAP

#AlQaeda

Rate this translation: ⬆ ⬇ ⬇ ⬆



11:00 PM · Nov 21, 2024 · 3,684 Views

Appendix A

Unofficial translation:

Targeting the control center of the UAE mercenaries, spy planes, killing and wounding people

Abyan Mudyah Wednesday 18 Jumada Al-Ula 1446 AH

After several reports reached the Mujahideen about spy planes belonging to the UAE mercenaries spying on the private parts of Muslims in the Mudiyah area without regard for the sanctity of homes and their inhabitants and after monitoring the site when the UAE mercenaries were fortified, the administration controlled the spy planes. Allah guided the Mujahideen to target the control center with Steyr snipers, which led to the injury of a man believed to have been working in the administration of the spy planes belonging to the UAE mercenaries in the Mudiyah area.

A quarter of an hour after the sniper operation while the wounded man was being transported to the hospital in an ambulance belonging to the UAE mercenaries, another group of Mujahideen ambushed the ambulance in the Serrat Al-Mashaikh area, and the Mujahideen clashed with them from zero distance, which led to the damage of the ambulance, the killing of the wounded man and his companion, and the injury of another mercenary, praise be to God.

After recent operations of the Mujahideen stirred public opinion and exposed the crimes of the UAE mercenaries in Abyan this operation came to shed light on what the Zionist state of the UAE is doing in the Mudiyah region through the mercenaries of the Transitional Council. The Mujahideen monitored some of the reactions on social media, stating that what is happening in the Mudiyah region is a one-sided war in which the UAE mercenaries are being drained. Others stated that the war in which the mercenaries are involved in a 100% losing war, praise be to God.

Source: <https://x.com/AsemTahaAlSabr/status/1859718584232292370>

Annex 75: AQAP weaponized drone attack in April 2025 against Government affiliated forces

Figure 75.1

Statement posted on social media containing a video showing a weaponized drone attack by AQAP against Government affiliated forces

← Post



عاصم الصبري
@AsemTahaAlSabr

...

خلال الأيام الماضية، عادت عمليات تنظيم القاعدة في اليمن مستهدفة قوات المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي في أبين، وتنوعت العمليات ما بين قصف بطائرات مسيرة، وإغارات عسكرية، وهجمات بعبوات ناسفة.

#AQAP

#تنظيم_القاعدة

#اليمن

Translated from Arabic by Google

In recent days, Al-Qaeda in Yemen has resumed operations targeting Southern Transitional Council forces in Abyan. Operations have ranged from drone strikes to military raids and IED attacks.

#AQAP

#تنظيم_القاعدة

#اليمن

Rate this translation: 🇸🇦 🇬🇧



11:10 PM · Apr 14, 2025 · 2,353 Views

Source: <https://x.com/AsemTahaAlSabr/status/1911889826850238865>

Annex 76: Article published by the Counter-Extremist Project on 6 May 2025 reporting on AQAP propaganda and incitement to violence via social media

Extremist Content Online: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Encourages Lone-Actor Attacks [...]

(New York, N.Y.) — The Counter Extremism Project (CEP) reports weekly on the methods used by extremists and terrorist groups on the Internet to spread propaganda and incite violence. Last week, CEP researchers located posts by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Al-Malahem Media that promoted lone-actor attacks in the U.S., Europe, and Israel.

[...]

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Encourages Lone-Actor Attacks

In a post on April 30, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Al-Malahem Media encouraged lone-actor terrorism in the United States and Europe, portraying it as necessary to support Gaza. Two days before the anniversary of the killing of Osama bin Laden, the group praised the former al-Qaeda leader for noting that the U.S. should be the primary target because of its position as the “head of the snake.” Posts encouraged using vehicles, knives, firearms, or committing arson and stated that individuals should also travel to Israel to execute attacks. In an attempt to inspire violence, a post noted that the perpetrator of the July 13 attempted assassination of President Donald Trump had more courage than most of AQAP’s audience.

Source: <https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-content-online-al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-encourages-lone-actor-attacks-extreme>

Annex 77: Seized detonators, explosives and detonating fuses

Figures 77.1 (up), and 77.2 (middle), and 77.3 (below)

Seizure on 11 January 2025 of a shipment of smuggled detonators, explosives and detonating fuses, which are used in the manufacturing of drones, missiles and explosive devices. The shipment was seized on board of a smuggling boat near the Bab Al-Mandab Strait.



Annex 78: Seizure of vessel tracking items

Figures 78.1 (up) and 78.2 (below)

On 2 December 2024, seizure of ship receivers (Cypho-150 Automatic Identification System, AIS) for tracking ships and analyzing navigation data and seizure of a device (Signal Hound SM200B Spectrum Analyzer) for monitoring the wireless spectrum to detect signals. The receivers and the device could be used to track and locate the position of vessels.



Source: Government of Yemen

Annex 79: Seizure of dhow carrying a significant quantity of weapons interdicted in Bab al-Mandab

Figures 79.1 (up), and 79.2 (middle), and 79.3 (below)

Materiel intercepted by the Government of Yemen on 27 June 2025 included over 750 tons of munitions and hardware to include hundreds of advanced cruise, anti-ship, and anti-aircraft missiles, warheads and seekers, components as well as hundreds of drone engines, air defense equipment, radar systems, and communication equipment. Several materiel intercepted display characteristics similar to those produced in Iran.



Intercepted materiel: Ghadir anti-ship cruise missile⁵¹



⁵¹ References in previous reports: S/2024/731, figure 57.2

Intercepted materiel: Shahed-101/107 UAV




Figure 79.4

Intercepted materiel: AM-50 Sayyad anti-materiel rifle



Sources:

<https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/VIDEO-AND-IMAGERY/VIDEOS/video/970340/dvpcc/false/#DVIDSVideoPlayer37619>

<https://x.com/tarikeyemen/status/1945323830970290500>

Yemeni authorities input based on Conflict Armament Research data

Annex 80: Smuggling details from Customs Seizures


Table 80.1

Illustrative for routes and items

Date	Location	Route	Description and Quantity	Mode of Smuggling
17.01.24	Shahen	UAE -Oman - Yemen	9 UAVs jammings (?)	Concealed in welding m/c boxes
21.01.24	„	UAE -Yemen	8 cartons marine motors spare parts, 20 UAV Batteries	Concealed in parcel sent by mail
3.02.24	„	UAE -Yemen	40 parcels - marine motors spare parts	Concealed in Volvo truck
1.03.24	„	Oman-Yemen	40 UAV servo motors; 1357 spare parts of servo motors	Concealed in coach
5.03.24	„	UAE/Yemen	1 carton m. engine spare parts	Concealed in parcel sent by mail
5.03.24	“	Oman-Yemen	600 walkie talkies, 15133 spare parts communication devices	Concealed in shredding machines
29.04.24	Sarfeet	Oman- Yemen	78 UAV control devices	Concealed in a small truck
3.05.24	Shahen	UAE-Yemen	1 UAV servo motor	Concealed in a coach
30.05.24	Sarfeet	China-Oman-Yemen	44 GPS of UAVs, 100 approx UAV connectors of different models, 30 Electronic sensors for drones, 14 UAV inverters	Concealed in DHL parcel
13.08.24	Shahen	USA-Oman-Yemen	4 Electronic shock devices, 4 weapons scope	Concealed in a car
29.08.24	“	Oman-Yemen	Diagnostic X-Ray machine, 2 Portable parts Model 6622B designed for military use	Concealed in a small truck
8.09.24	“	UAE-Oman-Yemen	Military electronic night vision scopes, military boots	Concealed in a coach
16.10.24	“	UAE-Oman-Yemen	3975 Spare parts Kalashnikov	Concealed in a shipment
23.11.24	Sarfeet	Oman-Yemen	24 Servo motors with military standards	Concealed in a parcel containing used clothes
27.11.24	Aden Free Port Zone	China-Yemen	10 VHF, AIS receivers, 1 device SM200B, USA and Taiwan, Province of China origin	Concealed in a container
3.12.24	Al Wadiyah	KSA-Yemen	50 Walkie Talkies TXQ	Not concealed
8.12.24	Aden Free Port Zone	China-Yemen	10 sniper scopes	Concealed in a shipment
24.12.24	Sarfeet	Oman-Yemen	2 Units optical Fibre for drones	
26.12.24	Aden Free Port Zone	China-Yemen	100 Walkie Talkies (Motorola MT-777)	Concealed in a shipment
27.12.24	Sarfeet	Oman-Yemen	1 TOKNAV Station for GPS	Concealed in a small truck

Annex 81: Analysis of the features and security marks in the 200 Rial banknote issued in 2025 by the Central Bank of Yemen, Sana'a.

Figure 81.1



Source: Official/CBY Aden

Annex 82: Currency 200 rial note issued by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden in 2018

The official 200 Riyals banknote that was issued by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, back in 2018.

Figure 82.1

One Side of the banknote






Figure 82.2

The other side of the banknote



Source: Official/CBY Aden

Figure 83.2



Appendix A: Unofficial summary:

Date 25/6/2025

The dispute that arose between the members of the Ans tribe in the Mayfa'ah Ans district.. Dhamar... and M.A.J was amicably resolved regarding the Al-Nais quarries in Qa'a Samah.

Al- Jamal stated that he was a member of the Ans tribe and had rights over them and was responsible for what they owed.

Afterwards, the dispute was resolved and many points were agreed upon, most importantly;

Determining a percentage for the district's interests and projects.

Beginning maintenance of the Samah Koman road at the beginning of the following month and other matters which were documented in a written report.

Each party also fully waived all arguments they had, including the uprooting and burning of the tanks and other things.

Thus, the dispute was finally resolved, the hostages were released, and the judgment was handed down.

And God is the Grantor of success.

Source Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=695030810113078&id=100088184951102&_rdr

Annex 84: Screenshots of messages and social media for collection of funds from the public for the Houthi Forces

Figure 84.1

Confirmation message of receiving 100 riyal in support of UAVs



Source: Confidential


Figure 84.2

Confirmation of multiple donations from one individual in support of UAVs

Source: Confidential

Figure 84.3

A social media post requesting donations for the UAVs, missiles, navy forces.



Source: Social Media

Annex 85: Decree on the takeover of Al Amal Microfinance Bank

Relevant Excerpt in English (unofficial translation)

Republic of Yemen

Office of the Prime Minister

State Legal Office

Republican Decree No. 12 of 1446 AH

**On Defining the Objectives, Duties, General Mandates, and Main Organizational Divisions of the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Labor**

Article No. 4

The organizational structure of the Ministry shall consist of the following main divisions:

1. The Minister, to whom the following administrative units report directly:

- a. The Yemeni Center for Social and Labor Studies
- b. The National Social Solidarity Network

2. The following sectors:

- The Sector for Economic Empowerment, Development, and Production Marketing, which supervises the General Authority for Planning and Community Project Development (formed by the merger of the General Authority for the Development of Small and Micro Enterprises and the Fund for the Financing of Small Industries and Establishments)
- The Social Fund for Development (SFD)
- Al-Amal Microfinance Bank

Figure 85.1

Original presidential (Houthi) decree of the takeover




Figure 85.2

The second page of the decree




Figure 85.4

The fourth page of the decree




Figure 85.5

The fifth page of the decree



Source: confidential

Annex 86: Important Statement Issued by the Board of Directors of Kamaran Industry and Investment Company / Aden

Annex 86.1: Unofficial English translation

1 October 2024

The Board of Directors of Kamaran Industry and Investment Company has been following the illegal meeting of what is called the Ordinary General Assembly, which was held in Sana'a on Monday, 30 September 2024, as part of the attempts by some to hijack the company's decision-making and seize its assets and funds.

The Board of Directors of Kamaran Company affirms the illegality of the meeting, as it lacked the legal quorum and the absence of representatives of the majority of the capital, in accordance with Article 45 of the Company's Articles of Association and its amendments in 2014. Representatives of the government, Tabouh International Company (BAT), and the Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development were absent from the meeting. Furthermore, it was held unilaterally without an invitation from the Board of Directors, with the aim of dragging the company into separation and embroiling it in political bickering, in violation of presidential directives and the minutes of the senior ministerial committees of the legitimate government, which have been keen on maintaining the continuity of the company's operations across the Republic, and have preserved over the past seven years its value as a leading national company in the field of cigarette manufacturing. Therefore, the Sana'a meeting has no legality whatsoever, nor do its outcomes.

It has come to the attention of the Board of Directors what transpired in the Sana'a meeting, when it turned into a carnival in terms of escalation procedures and the appointment of members to the Board of Directors from outside the list of shareholders, in an illegal and haphazard manner, with the aim of seizing the decision-making, assets, and funds of the company and its shareholders, in violation of the law and the Company's Articles of Association, particularly Article (18), paragraph (1), and Article (39), which explicitly stipulate that election to the Board of Directors shall be for members representing the shareholders, and shall be conducted by ballot — not by pressure, deception, or appointment as happened in the alleged meeting.

- In addition, the company affirms the deviation of the meeting to discuss topics outside the agenda specified in the announced meeting invitation, which was originally intended to hear the report of the Board of Directors on the company's activities, its financial position, the budget, the profit and loss account, and the auditor's report, and to approve them for each year separately.
- The Ordinary General Assembly is not permitted to deliberate or discuss any subject outside the announced agenda, in accordance with Article (46) of the Company's Articles of Association.
- The legal accountant for the year 2023 was not selected or approved by the company's Board of Directors.
- Individuals were chosen for membership in the Board of Directors in violation of the Articles of Association, which stipulate that only shareholders may be elected to the Board of Directors under conditions that include:
 - The elected Board member representing the shareholders may not combine membership with any other public office.
 - The member must own no less than 1% of the company's shares.
- This must be done through election. What took place in this illegal meeting held in Sana'a on Monday, 30 September 2024 — namely the discussion and approval of accounts for seven years all at once within three hours — constitutes a violation, and a premeditated plan to pass irregularities and corruption by those who have seized the company's assets, funds, and decision-making in areas outside the control of the legitimate government over the past seven years. The Board of Directors reiterates its non-recognition of the outcomes of this illegal meeting and affirms its right to prosecute anyone who seeks to destroy the company, its assets, and its standing and reputation in the local and foreign markets, in favor of smuggling and counterfeiting tycoons. The Board of Directors affirms its legal and constitutional right to take all measures to ensure that such opportunistic and illegitimate attempts — which threaten the rights of shareholders, the state, and employees alike — are not repeated. An emergency bilateral meeting of the Board of Directors will be called to stop this tampering and restore matters to their proper course in accordance with legal responsibility.

Abdul Hafiz Saji

Chairman of the Board of Directors

Annex 86.2: Original statement in Arabic by the Board of Directors of Kamaran Industry and Investment Company / Aden

Kamaran Industry & Investment Co.

Head Office



شركة كمران للصناعة والاستثمار
الإدارة العامة

بيان هام

صادر عن مجلس إدارة شركة كمران للصناعة والاستثمار / عدن ١ أكتوبر ٢٠٢٤ م

تابع مجلس إدارة شركة كمران للصناعة والاستثمار الاجتماع غير القانوني لما يسمى بالجمعية العمومية العادية، الذي عقد في صنعاء يوم الاثنين، 30 سبتمبر 2024م، في إطار مساعي البعض لاختطاف قرار الشركة والسيطرة على أصولها وأرصنتها.

إن مجلس إدارة شركة كمران يؤكد عدم قانونية الاجتماع كونه فاقد النصاب القانوني وغياب ممثلي أغلبية رأس المال بحسب ما جاء في المادة 45 من النظام الأساسي للشركة وتعديلاته في العام 2014م، حيث تغيب عن الاجتماع ممثلين الحكومة، وشركة التنوع العالمية (BAT) والبنك اليمني للإنشاء والتعمير، كما أنه عقد بشكل أحادي وبدون دعوة من مجلس الإدارة بهدف جر الشركة إلى الانفصال وإحباطها في المهقرات السياسية وبالمخالفة للتوجيهات الرئاسية ومحاضر اللجان الوزارية العليا للحكومة الشرعية التي حرصت على ديمومة نشاط الشركة على مستوى الجمهورية، وحفظت خلال السبع السنوات الماضية على قيمتها كشركة وطنية ورائدة في مجال تصنيع السجائر وبالتالي فإن اجتماع صنعاء لا قانونية له ولا لمخرجاته على الإطلاق.

لقد نما إلى علم مجلس الإدارة ما آل إليه الاجتماع المنعقد في صنعاء عندما تحول إلى كرفال من حيث إجراءات التصعيد والتزكية لأعضاء في مجلس الإدارة من خارج قائمة المساهمين بشكل غير قانوني وارتجالي بهدف السيطرة على قرار وأصول وأموال الشركة والمساهمين وبالمخالفة للقانون والنظام الأساسي للشركة في موادة رقم (18) الفقرة (أ) ورقم (39) التي تنص صراحة أن الانتخاب يتم للأعضاء الممثلين للمساهمين في مجلس الإدارة بالاقتراع وليس بالضغط والتكليس أو التزكية كما حصل في الاجتماع المزعوم. إضافة إلى ذلك تؤكد الشركة:-

❖ انحراف الاجتماع لمناقشة مواضيع خارج جدول الأعمال المحدد بالدعوة للاجتماع المعن الذي كان في الأساس مخصص لسماع تقرير مجلس الإدارة عن نشاط الشركة ومركزها المالي والميزانية وحساب الأرباح والخسائر وتقرير مراقب الحسابات والتصديق عليها عن كل سنة على حدة.

❖ لا يجوز للجمعية العمومية العادية المتداولة أو مناقشة أي موضوع من خارج جدول الأعمال المعن وفقاً للمادة (46) من النظام الأساسي للشركة.

❖ عدم اختيار المحاسب القانوني للعام 2023 والموافقة عليه من قبل مجلس إدارة الشركة.

❖ تم اختيار أشخاص لعضوية مجلس الإدارة بشكل مخالف للنظام الأساسي والذي ينص على اختيار المساهمين فقط لعضوية مجلس الإدارة بشروط منها:

• أن لا يجمع عضو مجلس الإدارة المنتخب عن المساهمين بين العضوية وأي وظيفة عامة أخرى.

• أن يمتلك العضو ما لا يقل عن 1٪ من أسهم الشركة.

• أن يتم ذلك عن طريق الانتخاب.

إن ما تم في هذا الاجتماع الغير القانوني المنعقد في صنعاء يوم الاثنين الموافق 30 سبتمبر 2024 من مناقشة وإقرار حسابات سبع سنوات دفعة واحدة خلال 3 ساعات تعد عمالية مخالفة، ومخطط لها لتمرير مخالفات وفساد من اختطفوا أصول وأموال الشركة وقراراتها في المناطق الخارجة عن سيطرة الحكومة الشرعية خلال السبع السنوات الماضية.

إن مجلس الإدارة يجدد تأكيده على عدم اعترافه بمخرجات هذا الاجتماع غير القانوني، كما يؤكد احتفاظه بحقه في مقاضاة كل من يسعى لتدمير الشركة وأصولها والتأثير على مكانتها وسمعتها في السوق المحلية والخارجية لصالح هوامير التهريب والتزوير.

إن مجلس الإدارة يؤكد على حقه القانوني والنسبوري في اتخاذ كافة الإجراءات لضمان عدم تكرار مثل هذه المساعي الأثمة والانتهازية التي تهدد حقوق المساهمين والدولة والموظفين على حد سوي، وسوف يتم الدعوة إلى اجتماع استثنائي ومعلن لمجلس الإدارة لإيقاف هذا العبث وإعادة الأمور إلى نصابها وفقاً للمسؤولية القانونية.

والله الموفق،
عبد الحافظ سامي السبيعه
رئيس مجلس الإدارة



P.O Box 14 Šana'a, Republic of Yemen Tel: +967 1 440034/440044 - Fax: +967 1 440043 E-mail: info@kamaran.com

Annex 87: Examples of documented civilians' casualties of indiscriminate attacks and extra-judicial killings

- a) **Ta'izz Governorate, Sale District** – On 26 June 2025, a 55-year-old male, civilian, was shot by a sniper while picking up fruit from a tree. Sustained injuries to the arm, leg, and back. Multiple surgeries required. Unable to move independently.

Figure 87.1

Exposed injury of victim



Source: Confidential

- b) **Raymah Governorate, Al-Salafiya District** – On 1 July 2025, Sheikh Saleh Hantouz, over 70 years old, was the victim of an extra-judicial killing after his home was surrounded by several Houthi armed men and vehicles. Despite asking for peace and highlighting his vulnerable state due to advanced age and poor health, the Houthis opened fire. He was struck by gunfire and RPG shrapnel and died on site. Houthi forces continued firing after his death. His wife, as well as the wife's mother, nephew's wife, and two children, were present. The wife was shot on the foot. Her nephew and 12 others, ten of whom were relatives, forcibly disappeared. The Sheikh's body was taken and buried in an unknown location. The attack followed his refusal to propagate Houthi ideology in his mosque. The mosque and his home were later confiscated. The mosque has been reassigned to a pro-Houthi cleric. Family members were coerced into supplying food for the mosque. Individuals who helped relocate the Sheikh's relatives to Ta'izz are reportedly threatened.
- c) **Ta'izz Governorate, near Taizz Airport** – On 27 April 2025, a 13-year-old boy was shot by a sniper while playing on a water truck. He sustained serious leg injuries requiring multiple surgeries. A 12-year-old friend was also injured in the same incident.

Figure 87.2

Exposed injury of victim

Source: Confidential

- d) **Ta'izz Governorate, Makbana District** – On 1 March 2025, a 51-year-old man was severely injured by an explosive device while walking on the road to fetch food. He lost both legs, his right hand, right eye, and hearing in one ear. Makbana, a mountainous livestock-reliant area near the frontlines, undergoes frequent sniper attacks and repeated school shelling. On 10 July, a mortar attack hit Ajial Mazanida School during preparations for students' registration; no injuries occurred. Civilian presence, including children, is often interpreted as hostile or suspicious.

Figure 87.3

Injuries of victim

Source: Panel

- e) **Tai'zz Governorate, Osaifera Area** - On 16 June 2025, a 28-year-old male was severely injured by an explosive device, likely remotely-detonated, while fetching water from a well. The victim lost both legs and his left eye. Locals report ongoing mine-laying despite clearance efforts.

Figure 87.4

Exposed injury of victim

Source: Panel

- f) **Lahj Governorate, Korayn Village, Al-Musamyr District** - In September 2024, Houthis attacked the village, abducted four young men, and shelled residential areas. One body was returned in exchange for a captured Houthi. Residents fled to the lower village; the local school was occupied by government forces. On 5 May 2025, a 20-year-old woman was killed by mortar shrapnel at home. On 27 May, another mortar strike killed a mother and injured seven others, including girls aged 5, 13, 16, and 17. One underwent amputation. Family members have since been displaced; frontline clashes continue.

Figure 87.5

Injured child

Figure 87.6

Injured child*Source:* Confidential

- g) **Bayda Governorate, Rada'a District, Hankat Al-Masoud Village** – Bayda, largely resistant to Houthi ideological **control**, **has** suffered several assaults in the period January-July 2025. These included mosques' takeovers and pressure on education facilities to adopt Houthi ideology. In January 2025, local opposition escalated to armed confrontation. Hundreds of troops besieged the village for two weeks, killing civilians and reportedly detaining over 600 individuals; some remain missing. Access to communications and medicine was denied. In late July 2025, following the killing of a Houthi member, the village was again besieged. One civilian is confirmed dead, one is suspected to be dead, and six arbitrary detentions were reported. Snipers were placed on rooftops. At the time of writing of this report, movement in the area remained heavily restricted.

Sources: Confidential

Annex 88: Examples of documented attacks against civilian objects (schools and health facilities)

Schools Used for Military Purposes

Al-Furqan School, located in Hawamrah area, Mawiyah District, Tai'zz Governorate (primary level) - This school is currently occupied by the Houthis. As a result, students are forced to walk approximately 5 Kms to study at Al-Haqb School.

- a) Al-Baraa bin Malik School and Zayd bin Thabit School – Located in Baher area, Mawiyah District, near Al-Maseemir. These schools are reportedly under the control of the Houthi group.
- b) Educational Complex in Akboush Village, Ahkoum Subdistrict, Hayfan District - This facility was previously targeted by coalition airstrikes in 2017, during which it was being used as a Houthi military base. It remains under the control of the Houthi group. The complex has been converted into a military barracks and weapons depot, The site originally comprised two schools and served over 100 students from villages in the Ahkoum Subdistrict of Hayfan District (Tai'zz Governorate) and neighbouring areas of Al-Muqatirah District in Lahj Governorate.

Health Facilities Used for Military Purposes.

- a) Dhabi Clinic, located in Al-Aboos area - The facility is currently occupied by the Houthi group, under the command of Jalal Al-Subaihi, who leads the Hayfan frontline affiliated with the group.

School destroyed

- a) Khalid bin Al-Waleed School, in Al-Sabbad area, Al-Aboos Subdistrict, Hayfan District, Tai'zz Governorate - Used by the Houthis as a weapons storage site and was later detonated upon their withdrawal.

Source: Official

Annex 89: Landmines, IEDs and UXOS detected in the reporting period in GoY areas

Annex 89.1: Casualties

Table 89.1.1

Casualties caused by landmines, IEDs and UXOs in the reporting period

Ser.	Date	Location	Gender	Age	Device Type	Victim Status
1	28 Jul '24	Hays, Hudaydah.	Male	35	UXO	Injured
2	28 Jul '24	Nihm, Sana'a	Male	Child	AT	Deceased
3	28 Jul '24	Beit Maghari, Hudaydah.	Female	Unknown	AT	Limb amputation
*4	28 Jul '24	Midi, Hajjah.	Male	Child	AT	Injured
	28 Jul '24	Midi, Hajjah.	Female	Unknown	AT	Injured
5	30 Jul '24	Al-Habaj, Al-Bayda.	Male	14	IED	Deceased
6	5 Aug '24	Hudaydah City.	Male	23	UXO	Limb Amputation
*7	7 Aug '24	Rayhan, Hudaydah.	Male	28	AT	Deceased
	7 Aug '24	Rayhan, Hudaydah.	Male	26	AT	Deceased
*8	9 Aug '24	Shu'ub, Hudaydah.	Male	Elderly	AT	Injured
	9 Aug '24	Shu'ub, Hudaydah.	Male	Child	AT	Injured
9	12 Aug '24	Hays, Hudaydah.	Male	28	UXO	Injured
10	23 Aug '24	Qadbah, Hudaydah.	Male	29	AT	Deceased
11	14 Sep '24	Az-Zaher, Al-Bayda.	Male	40	IED	Deceased
12	18 Sep '24	Mawza'a, Taiz.	Male	62	IED	Deceased
13	18 Oct '24	Maghari, Hudaydah.	Male	13	AP	Injured
14	9 Nov '24	Al-Jahari, Hudaydah.	Male	32	UXO	Injured
15	18 Nov '24	Al-Durayhimi, Hudaydah.	Female	13	UXO	Injured
*16	27 Nov '24	Maris, Al-Dhale.	Male	20	Drone	Injured
	27 Nov '24	Maris, Al-Dhale.	Male	23	Drone	Injured
17	14 Dec '24	Bani Hassan, Hajjah.	Male	14	IED	Limb amputation
18	17 Dec '24	Al-Ja'dah, Hajjah.	Male	Elderly	AP	Double amputation
19	19 Dec '24	Al-Sha'af, Al-Jawf.	Male	54	AT	Injured
*20	3 Feb '25	Al-Yatmah, Al-Jawf.	Male	Unknown	AT	Injured
	3 Feb '25	Al-Yatmah, Al-Jawf.	Male	Unknown	AT	Injured
	3 Feb '25	Al-Yatmah, Al-Jawf.	Male	Unknown	AT	Injured
*21	3 Feb '25	Al-Suwaydiyah, Hudaydah.	Male	52	AT	Injured
	3 Feb '25	Al-Suwaydiyah, Hudaydah.	Male	10	AT	Double amputation
22	20 Feb '25	Beit Al Faqih, Hudaydah.	Female	9	IED	Deceased
*23	6 Mar '25	Koud Anbah, Hudaydah.	Male	30	AT	Deceased
	6 Mar '25	Koud Anbah, Hudaydah.	Male	37	AT	Deceased
	6 Mar '25	Koud Anbah, Hudaydah.	Male	28	AT	Injured
	6 Mar '25	Koud Anbah, Hudaydah.	Male	32	AT	Injured
24	11 Mar '25	Al-Kharif, Taiz.	Female	61	UXO	Injured
25	31 Mar '25	Al-Shajan, Hudaydah.	Male	46	IED	Deceased
*26	4 Apr '25	Al-Tariis, Taiz.	Male	9	Drone	Injured
	4 Apr '25	Al-Tariis, Taiz.	Male	10	Drone	Injured
*27	20 Apr '25	Al-Daihami, Hudaydah.	Male	25	UXO	Injured
	20 Apr '25	Al-Daihami, Hudaydah.	Male	24	UXO	Injured
28	6 May '25	Hadiyah, Hudaydah.	Male	Unknown	AT	Injured
29	6 May '25	Ashmala, Taiz.	Male	Early 30's	UXO	Injured
30	7 May '25	Maghbanah, Taiz.	Male	35	AT	Injured
31	15 May '25	Al-Aqida, Taiz.	Female	12	Drone	Injured
32	15 May '25	Kalbah Mountains, Al-Bayda.	Male	Unknown	AT	Deceased
33	3 Jun '25	Hays, Hudaydah.	Male	55	AT	Injured
34	7 Jul '25	A'bar area, Taiz.	Female	60	UXO	Injured

*35	13 Jul '25	Al-Muhashamah, Taiz.	Male	14	UXO	Deceased
	13 Jul '25	Al-Muhashamah, Taiz.	Male	12	UXO	Deceased
	13 Jul '25	Al-Muhashamah, Taiz.	Male	13	UXO	Deceased
	13 Jul '25	Al-Muhashamah, Taiz.	Male	14	UXO	Deceased
	13 Jul '25	Al-Muhashamah, Taiz.	Male	12	UXO	Deceased

*Rows with merged serial number indicate multiple victims during one single explosion.

Abbreviations:

EO – Explosive Ordnance.

UXO – Unexploded Ordnance.

AT / AV – Anti Tank / Anti Vehicle Mine.


AP – Anti Personnel Mine.

IED – Improvised Explosive Device.

Source: Masam Project, Yemen


Graph 89.1.1

Landmines and explosive devices casualties in reporting period (killed v. injured)




Source: Panel, on the basis of data provided by Mayyun NGO, Yemen.

Graph 89.1.2

Landmines and explosive devices casualties in reporting period (adults v. children)

Source: Panel, on the basis of data provided by Mayyun NGO, Yemen

Graph 89.1.3

Landmines and explosive devices casualties in reporting period (2020 - 2025)

Source: Panel, on the basis of data provided by Mayyun NGO, Yemen.

Note: The NGO Mayyun documented, between August 2024 to July 2025, in Yemen, 89 civilian casualties in landmines and explosive devices: 39 dead and 50 injured. Of these, 79 were male (37 killed and 42 injured), ten were female (two killed and eight injured), and 31 were children (12 killed and 19 injured).

In the period 2020-2025, Mayyun documented 1632 civilian victims, 716 killed and 916 injured. Of these, 1446 were male (641 killed and 805 injured), 186 were female (75 killed and 111 injured), and 523 were children (216 killed and 307 injured).

Annex 89.2: IEDs found and dismantled in the reporting period

Figure 89.2.1

HME filled CO2 cylinder




Figure 89.2.2

UVIED's dismantled in Khormakser, Aden




Figure 89.2.3

Homemade Blast Charge




Figure 89.2.4

RCIED dismantled in Dar Saad




Figures 89.2.5, 89.2.6, 89.2.7, 89.2.8, 89.2.9

Cosmetic case used to conceal omni-directional explosive device, dismantled in Taiz




Figures 89.2.10 and 89.2.11

Houthi produced – Fiber Glass molds simulating natural rock. (Rock-mine)



Figures 89.2.12 and 89.2.13

Various types of explosive devices concealed within the molds



Figures 89.2.14 and 89.2.15

Houthi produced - Fiber Glass molds simulating concrete bricks



Figure 89.2.16
Improvised anti-tamper switch.



Figure 89.2.17
Improvised anti-lift switch.



Figures 89.2.18 and 89.2.19
Houthi produced - Homemade directional fragmentation mine





Figure 89.2.20
Tuna can IED with cantilever pressure plate.




Source: Masam Project, Yemen

Annex 89.3: Other means of IED types used by Houthi prior to August 2024.


Figures 89.3.1 and 89.3.2

Small metal tin filled with explosives and fitted with conventional fuse.




Figures 89.3.3 and 89.3.4

Plastic container filled with HME, conventional fuse with hand basin plug to seal the fuse




Figures 89.3.5 and 89.3.6

Standard size AT mine (left) - Enhanced variant of Houthi produced AT mine (right).



Figures 89.3.7 and 89.3.8

Traffic Barrier IED – Concealed explosive charge that results in concrete being fragmented



Figures 89.3.9 and 89.3.10

Truck Tire IED – inner rim filled with High Explosives



Figures 89.3.11 and 89.3.12

Fiber Glass mold of Palm Tree stump – filled with HME and PIR fitted.



Figure 89.3.13

Artillery munitions used as IED / roadside explosive devices.



Annex 89.4: Other methods of concealment

Figures 89.4.1, 89.4.2, 89.4.3

Concealment of improvised blast charges and Detonating Cord beneath flooring



Note: The above items were removed from a School in Ta'izz governorate

Source: Masam Project, Yemen

Annex 89.5: Information on the methods and means used to plant landmines

Laying landmines involves a variety of **methods and means**, depending on the type of mine, the intended target (personnel vs. vehicle), and tactical objectives. There are 3 methods of mine laying:

a) Manual Mine Laying.

Mines laid by hand are usually small scale operations in areas that require precise placements (bridge heads, foot paths, roads, choke points between hills / mountains, and approach routes towards military positions).

b) Mechanical Mine laying machines.

Rapid minefield deployment over large areas by means of mechanical mine-laying vehicles, ploughs, and mine scattering systems.

c) Air dispersed mines.

Random dispersing of mines across vast areas (helicopters, aircraft, drones, artillery).

Houthis, to the extent known, have only used manual mine laying methods as the other more technological methods are not available in country. It is also known that Houthi sympathizers have replanted mines in areas that have previously been searched and cleared, these areas are not currently occupied by Houthi forces.

Known locations of Houthi laying mines and IED's (other than frontline defenses):

- Farms, which restricts agriculture and livestock movement;
- Wells and reservoirs, which denies communities access to water sources;
- Public infrastructure, such as schools, clinics, markets, which denies community safe access to basic needs;
- Roads, which denies freedom of movement.

Source: Masam Project, Yemen.

Note: The Panel confirmed the information on the location of mine laying and the impact thereof with the civilian population during its visit to Yemen, especially in Ta'izz, a governorate particularly affected by mine laying and with a significant number of resulting victims.

Annex 89.6: Information on ATs modified to be triggered with less weight

An AT normally requires direct downwards pressure of 120 – 180kg, and is intended to detonate under, and destroy, armoured vehicles and heavy trucks. Insurgents and irregular forces add homemade / improvised switches to bypass or modify the original firing mechanism, reducing the activation threshold to as low as 2kg+, which converts an AT into an AP.

The **use of pressure plates and crush wires to reduce the activation pressure** of AT is a well-documented tactic in asymmetric warfare and insurgent mine warfare. This tactic, used by Houthis in Yemen, turns AT mines, normally designed to be triggered by the heavy weight of vehicles, into deadly threats for **personnel, livestock, or lighter vehicles**.

Source: Masam Project, Yemen

Annex 89.7: Information on trigger mechanisms mostly employed in explosive devices


There are three basic methods of initiation: (i) victim operated (VO) – tripwire, pressure plate, crush wires; (ii) Remote initiation – electrical initiation when the target is in close range; (iii) Time initiation – timer devices where a charge is set to initiate at a certain time.

VO switches: Crush Wire:

This device is a multi-contact pressure switch. Individual switches are spaced at approximately 10cm intervals, creating a crush-wire containing 58 parallel pressure switches along a 6m string length. Each switch consists of a 1cm non-conductive rubber hose containing 2 sheet metal contacts fitted to opposing sides of the rubber hose. Alternator wire is soldered into a series circuit to the outer surface of each metal contact ensuring electrical continuity. Each individual switch is sealed with approximately 7cm length heat shrink tubing with hot melt adhesive to ensure weather proofing. At one end, the power source is connected in series and an LED wired in parallel across the detonator.

Figures 89.7.1 and 89.7.2

Pressure activated electrical circuit – approximately 2kg+ pressure required




VO Switches: Pressure Plate

This device comprises of two steel plates cut from 1,6mm/4mm sheet steel. Each plate is wrapped with a 0.8mm thick aluminium disk creating a corrosion resistant contact. Each disc has slits cut for the attachment of electrical switch wires. The two plates are separated at the ends by wooden blocks or foam strips and is weather sealed with duct tape or plastic cling wrap. The assembled switch is then concealed within a length of collapsible water-pump discharge hose, and the ends sealed with duct tape. The power source is normally a 9V battery concealed within the weather proofing material containing the switch.

Figures 89.7.3 and 89.7.4

Pressure activated electrical circuit – approximately 5kg+ pressure required



Figures 89.7.5 and 89.7.6

AT / AV mine connected to pressure plate



VO Switches: Passive Infra-Red (PIR)

Commonly found in household motion detection security systems such as outdoor security lights or alarms. They detect infrared (heat-emitting) radiation from moving objects such as people or vehicles.

PIR switches are a type of motion-activated triggering mechanism used in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and can trigger an explosive charge when someone enters the detection range.

Most PIRs used in IEDs have a detection range of 5 to 20 meters and within a 30-degree angle from the sensor.


Figure 89.7.7

Rear view of Rock mine.



Figure 89.7.8

Front view with PIR sensor



Booby-trapped explosives aimed at targeting demining personnel have also been identified.

Source: Masam Project, Yemen

Annex 89.8: Victims of landmines and UXOs

Figures 89.8.1 and 89.8.2



Figures 89.8.3 and 89.8.4



Figures 89.8.5 and 89.8.6



Source: Masam Project, Yemen

Annex 90: Airstrikes on Civilian Objects in Hudaydah governorate, in the reporting period

Table 90.1

IDF

Location	Attacks
Hudaydah Port	9
Ras Issa Port	5
Al Saleef Port	3
Ras Khateeb Power Station	3
Bajil Cement Factory	1
Al Hali Power Station	1

Table 90.2

United States

Location	Attacks
Ras Issa Port	8
Hudaydah Port	1
Cotton Factory Warehouse in Zabid	1
Al Habashi Iron Factory in Bajil	1
Water Cooperation HQ in As Saneef Village	1

Source: Confidential

Annex 91: Airstrike on Sa'dah's migrant Detention Centre, April 2025

On the morning of 28 April 2025, Sa'dah's Remand Detention Centre was targeted in an airstrike reportedly carried out by US Forces. At least 68 civilians housed in the location were killed and at least 47 were injured. Reliable reports indicate that the victims were East African irregular migrants. All were Ethiopian, with the exception of one Eritrean. The facility is reported to have held approximately 115 detainees at the time of the attack.

Almashhad News reported that the strike *"targeted a centre officially used as a correctional facility"* but claimed that *"field reports indicate that the Houthis have converted it into a security operations headquarters, keeping the migrants inside despite calls for their evacuation"*. The people held inside were detained *"for months in inhumane conditions, without being able to communicate with their families or international organizations"*. ICRC stated that its *"delegates regularly visited detainees held in this facility as part of its ongoing work to ensure humane treatment and detention conditions"*. According to Amnesty International, *"The U.S. should have known Sa'ada prison was a detention facility, that has been used for years by the Houthis to detain migrants and that it was regularly visited by ICRC"*.

Sources: <https://airwars.org/civilian-casualties/usyem250428a-april-28-2025/>

<https://www.iom.int/news/statement-iom-spokesperson-situation-yemen>

<https://www.icrc.org/en/news-release/yemen-icrc-responds-deadly-attack-saada-prison-urges-protection-civilians-amidst>

<https://www.almashhad.news/316304>


<https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/yemen-us-air-strike-that-has-left-dozens-of-migrants-dead-must-be-investigated/>

In response to an official communication of the Panel, the US informed that allegations of civilian casualties are assessed and/or investigated as appropriate and that it was currently reviewing reports of civilian harm associated with the above referenced strikes.

In addition to the information publicly available mentioned above, official sources detailed as follows:

- a) The ammunition used (GBU 39) is typically used to target reinforced and heavily fortified concrete installations including underground shelters.

Figure 91.1
Ammunition used in the airstrike



Source: Image provided to the Panel by official source.

- b) The building (hangar) hit was first built in 2009.

Figure 91.2

Image of the building in 2009



Source: Image provided to the Panel by official source.

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

- c) Since 2015, the building was the target of several attacks. It was progressively rebuilt. Some structures were added in the vicinities of the building. In later 2021, the reconstruction work had been completed.

Figure 91.3

Evolution of the building until 2019



Source: Images provided to the Panel by official source.

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Credit to google maps: Map data: Google, ©2025 The development of the facility targeted during the US Airstrikes in April 2025. Imagery Date: 18/06/2025

Annex 92: Widespread and systematic arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearance in Yemen

The Panel received, from various civil society organisations, lists of dozens of identified individuals who were subjected to arbitrary detention during the reporting period. Many of them remain forcefully disappeared. The Panel also received detailed information on individuals arbitrarily detained as long as 10 years ago and who remain under enforced disappearance.

Dozens of journalists were arbitrarily detained in Ibb and Hudaydah (including from Tahima region), especially between May and July 2025. The detentions appear to be significantly related to the Houthis effort to prevent the flow of information regarding the impact of US and Israeli airstrikes on Houthi capabilities. A significant number of victims remains incommunicado. The information has been confirmed by lawyers who attempted to find the fate of these detainees. Often, courts have no knowledge of the cases because the detention was carried out by the Security and Intelligence Service. Individuals remain detained without benefiting from due process rights.

The Panel also received information from CSOs and official sources on arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances by STC. Journalist Nasseh Shaker detained in 2023, is an emblematic case in this regard.

Figure 92.1

Joint statement on Violations to Freedom of Press, 3 May 2025

Yemen: Press freedom hampered by systematic repression and widespread impunity

On the occasion of World Press Freedom Day, the undersigned Yemeni, regional, and international human rights organizations express grave concern about the ongoing deterioration of press and media freedoms in Yemen. Journalists and media workers continue to face systematic repression in areas controlled by both the Houthi group and the internationally-recognised government. These violations include arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and unfair trials – punishment for people simply exercising their right to freedom of expression and for criticizing local issues. Yemen remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists, and violations are routinely carried out with nearly total impunity. We urge all authorities in Yemen to fulfill their obligations under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Yemen is a state party.

Judiciary as a tool of repression

Over more than a decade of conflict, Yemen's judicial system has increasingly been used to restrict press freedom and silence independent and critical voices. In January 2024, the Primary Court in Alaq sentenced journalist Aziz Al-Ahmadi to four months in prison, suspended, over a social media post that

criticised local authorities. Similarly, Awad Kashmiri, head of the Freedoms Committee at the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate in Hadramawt, was arbitrarily detained.

In 2024 alone, at least 40 cases of journalists being summoned and interrogated – often based on fabricated charges – were documented. The targeted journalists were referred to courts lacking legal jurisdiction, such as the Specialized Criminal Court in Sana'a, which is normally reserved for terrorism-related cases. Despite the existence of dedicated press and publication courts, many journalists continue to be prosecuted before criminal courts.

In late September 2024, the Houthi-controlled Specialized Criminal Court in Sana'a sentenced journalist Taha Ahmed Rashid Al-Maamari, owner of Yemen Digital Media and Yemen Live for Media Production and Satellite Broadcasting, to death. Human rights lawyers, including Abdulmajid Sabra and Sami Yassin, were also subjected to threats, arbitrary arrests, and unfounded charges of treason.

Since 2022, judicial harassment of journalists has escalated significantly, with an increase in prosecutions for those who criticise public officials. In several cases, courts sentenced three journalists to prison for charges such as "insulting a public employee" and "threatening to disclose confidential

information." In September 2024, coinciding with the 62nd anniversary of the 26 September Revolution, the Houthi group launched a wide-scale campaign of arrests, detaining hundreds, including journalist Mohammed Al-Meyathi, for expressing dissenting views online.

Ongoing impunity

Journalists in Yemen face serious threats and grave violations from all parties in the ongoing conflict, including the internationally-recognised government, the Houthis, and other armed groups. Violations include killings, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and torture, all in the absence of effective accountability mechanisms.

Various factions have monopolised media outlets, severely reducing access to independent information sources, criminalising journalism, and creating an environment of fear and self-censorship. Repeated attacks have rendered journalism in Yemen an extremely dangerous profession. Women journalists face additional threats, including online harassment and organised smear campaigns aimed at silencing their voices and excluding them from the media sphere.

Over the past decade, more than 2,600 violations against journalists have been documented, with the Houthis responsible for the vast majority. At least

five journalists remain in arbitrary detention, including Wahid Al-Sufi, forcibly disappeared since 2015, and both Mohammed Al-Meyahi and Naseh Shakir, who remain in conditions amounting to enforced disappearance.

Since 2020, targeted assassinations of journalists have increased. Many have been silenced through murder. The most recent case is the killing of television cameraman Musab AL-Hattami, who was targeted by Houthi forces on Saturday, 26 April, 2025 in Marib while on assignment to produce media content about the ongoing conflict. Other assassinated journalists include Saber Al-Haidari, a correspondent for Japanese TV, killed by an explosive device planted in his car in Aden in June 2022; photojournalist Fawaz Al-Wafi, shot dead in his car in Taiz in March 2022; journalist Rasha Al-Harazi, killed in November 2021; and AFP photographer Nabil Al-Quaety, who was gunned down by unidentified assailants in Aden in June 2020. These crimes persist in the absence of impartial investigations, and with no accountability from any party in Yemen.

The undersigned organisations call on Yemeni authorities to:

- Immediately release all journalists who have completed their sentences and all those arbitrarily detained in violation of their rights to due process and a fair trial.
- Ensure that journalists are tried exclusively before press and publication courts in accordance with Yemen's international legal obligations.

- Support comprehensive legal reforms to align national laws with international human rights standards and guarantee full protection of freedom of expression and journalists' safety.
- Launch transparent, independent investigations into all incidents involving the targeting and deliberate killing of journalists.
- Reform the justice system to ensure judicial independence and end the use of the judiciary as a tool to suppress dissenting voices.
- End the judicial harassment of journalists and human rights defenders, and restore the independence of the judiciary.

The Undersigned Organizations:

1. ARTICLE 19
2. Studies and Economic Media Center (SEMC)
3. Yemeni Media Freedom Observatory – Marsadak (YMFO)
4. Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
5. Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR)
6. SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties
7. European Arab Center for Human Rights and International Law
8. American Center for Justice (ACJ)
9. Rights Radar for Human Rights
10. Alkarama – Geneva
11. Watch for Human Rights (Watch4HR)
12. Foundation for the Defense of Rights and Freedoms
13. Abductees' Mothers Association
14. Shohood Organization for Human Rights – Yemen
15. Center of My Right for Supporting Rights and Freedoms
16. Yemen Future for Culture and Media Development
17. Sama Southern Media League
18. Qarar Foundation for Media and Development
19. Dameer Foundation for Human Rights
20. Mansa Foundation for Media and Development Studies
21. Media Sac for Media and Development
22. The Electronic Foundation for Humanitarian Media (EOHM)
23. Marib Youth Footprint Initiative
24. Media Village for Development and Information
25. Abjad Center for Studies and Development
26. Free Media Center for Investigative Journalism
27. Yemeni Coalition for Monitoring Human Rights Violations (Rasd Coalition)
28. Sawasia Organization for Human Rights
29. Monitoring Journalist Network
30. Al-Amal Women's and Sociocultural Foundation
31. Musaala Organization for Human Rights
32. Center for Strategic Studies to Support Women and Children (CSWC)
33. Musawah Organization for Rights and Freedoms
34. Rescue Foundation for Development
35. HOCO Civil Orientation Protection Organization
36. Masar Foundation for Development and Human Rights
37. Baheth Foundation for Development and Human Rights
38. Marib Dam Foundation for Social Development (MDF)
39. Albelaad Center for Studies and Media
40. League of Women for Peace
41. The Independent Civil Rights Movement

Source: Provided to the Panel by a confidential source. Document publicly available.

Annex 92.1: Detentions of UN Personnel, humanitarian and embassies' staff in 2024 and 2025

Some individuals who escaped prior to the wave of detentions informed the Panel that detentions were often anticipated by 'invitations' to the Intelligence and Security Service (direct witnesses). Houthis tried to ensure 'collaboration' of humanitarian workers so as to (i) receive updated information regularly on the activities of the organization, and (ii) guarantee income-generation through the organisations. Sources of funding may be indirect. For instance, ensuring that Houthi members are employed by international and national organisations. The Panel heard first-hand accounts of food baskets appropriated by the Houthis, and delivered to combatants or sold for profit. Staff opposing these practices were 'blacklisted'.

Staff supporting the Houthis provided information on colleagues who refused to collaborate with the Houthis. Some of the detained individuals were outspoken against the Houthis.

Sources: Confidential

Annex 92.2: Cases of unlawful detention in GoY-controlled areas

- a) A man reported that his 26-year-old brother was detained at Al-Nasr military camp in Aden, under the command of Jalal Al-Rabie, around January or February 2025. The family was unaware of the detention until approximately two months later, when a soldier acquaintance disclosed the information in secrecy. On 19 June 2025, the brother was informed that the detainee had died. The victim had reportedly been accused of "*membership in an armed group*"; however, no arrest warrant was issued, and the grounds for his detention remain unclear. The family first learned of the death through a Facebook post published under a reportedly fake profile. Upon recovering the body, the family observed marks consistent with electric shocks and beatings. When the family requested clarification regarding the circumstances of the death, they received no response. A military report later claimed the death was due to "*natural causes*", a conclusion disputed by the family based on the condition of the body.
- b) A man was detained in January 2025 by the 5th Brigade under the command of Muhttar Anobyi in Radfan District, Lahj Governorate. He was held without a warrant or documentation and was reportedly targeted due to his brother's political opposition to the STC. After approximately four months, he was transferred to Al-Nasr military camp in Aden, under the command of Jalal Al-Rabie. He was eventually referred to criminal prosecution, and released on 3 July 2025. He witnessed the death of two individuals in custody. One cellmate, aged 22–23, and the other approximately 40 years old. The victim reported on different methods of torture, including being placed in the "*pressure cell*" (2m x 1m), used also for isolation, with no sanitation—detainees were forced to urinate and defecate in the same space. Repeated beatings, including being struck on the back with a chain of keys, as well as waterboarding. Dogs were brought into his cell as a method of intimidation. Detainees were sometimes placed on an intravenous drip, which made them weak. According to the account, individuals from northern Yemen were regularly detained and submitted to torture or other CIDT. Some died as a result and were buried at the facility. After denouncing the violence online, the victim received threats and fled from his area of residence.
- c) In July 2023, at least 22 individuals were detained by Commander Aboubakre Al-Gabourni of the 4th Infantry Brigade in Tawr al-Bahah, Lahj Governorate, on suspicion of involvement in an attack against a military vehicle. Among the detainees were three boys, aged 12, 13, and 14 at the time of the events. Despite subsequent reported confessions to the attack by other individuals, the detainees, including the children, remained in custody. Following repeated efforts by the families, the Military Prosecutor intervened in the case. However, the detainees were denied meaningful access to legal representation and had only minimal contact with their families. No formal charges were brought against them, and no arrest warrants or judicial orders were issued. The defence was refused access to a copy of the case-file. On 30 June 2025, the Head of the Military District Attorney Office sent a memo to the Military Prosecutor indicating that the detained children must be transferred to Aden. A lawyer accompanied the Military Prosecutor during a questioning session and observed visible signs of physical injury. However, these signs were reportedly not documented in the official records of the interrogation. The three boys remain in detention alongside adults, at least until late July 2025, having been held for over two years without trial or due process. Following an official communication by the Panel, GoY informed it had not breached the rule of law.

Figure 92.2.1

Memo dated 30 June 2025 sent by the Head of the Military District Attorney to the Military Prosecutor of the 4th Military Region



Sources: Confidential

Note: Memo dated 30 June 2025 sent by the Head of the Military District Attorney to the Military Prosecutor of the 4th Military Region indicating that the detainees held in Tawr al-Bahah had not been sent for trial and had not been allowed family visits. It requests the detainees to be sent to Aden for trial (case 92.2.c above).

Figures 92.2.2 and 92.2.3

Families and other civilians demonstrating and requesting the release of the minors from the custody of the Fourth Military Region (case 92.2.c above)





Source: Confidential

The Panel notes other instances in which detainees were maintained in arbitrary detention for periods considerably beyond the time limits determined by law. The documents below refer to an individual detained for approximately one year and half, without access to fair trial rights.

Figures 92.2.4, 92.2.5, 92.2.6

Documents sent by the District Attorney Office to Military Prosecutor requesting release of detainee





Source: Confidential

Annex 92.3: Examples of documented cases of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

- a) Woman detained by the Houthis in Sana'a. Submitted to faying and nail extraction, among others. She was ultimately sentenced to death. Received treatment for her injuries.

Figures 92.3.1 and 92.3.2

Documents from District Attorney and physician supporting the victim's account



Source: Confidential

Note: District Attorney Document referring to injuries caused by “tools”.

Excerpt of medical report referring to “two round injuries on the left and right sides of the back”, consistent to the account of the victim.

- b) 27-year old man, detained by the Houthis in Many District, Ta'izz, in Oct-Nov 2022. Escaped on 17 September 2024. Treatment in detention included de-nailing, nail gun-drilling (photo X-ray) into injured arm (one of the nails is still in the arm of the victim). Scars observed by the Panel. Electric shocks on stomach, which makes him vomit blood until present. Relative came to visit him and was detained. Interrogation for days in a row from 9 pm to 4 am. Detained in cell with 10-15 people, many with psychological problems. During the escape, one detainee was killed, another was shot on the back.

Figures 92.3.3, 92.3.4


Marks of injuries caused by pounding nails into the victim's flesh



Source: Panel

Figures 92.3.5

Photo of x-ray of victim's arm, with visible nail through the arm




Source: Panel

Annex 93: Sexual violence against women in detention

Figure 93.1

Location of a female detention facility where women were subjected to sexual violence



Source: Confidential

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Credit to google maps: Map data: Google, ©2025 Women's detention facility in Sana'a. Imagery Date: 13/07/2025

Note: Adjacent/close by to criminal investigation department, court of appeal, Al-Adl street, Sana'a. Capacity of 150 detainees; up to 250 actually detained.

Annex 94: Accusation by the Specialised Criminal Prosecution Office in Sana'a against Houthi opponents

Figure 94.1

Accusation by the Specialised Criminal Prosecution Office in Sana'a against 24 journalists and media professionals, dated 2 January 2025

عدن وهم في حالة حرب مع الجمهورية اليمنية وإذاعة الأخبار والبيانات والإشاعات الكاذبة والمغرضة والمثيرة المؤيدة والمساندة لجرائم العدوان السعودي وحلفائه ضد الجمهورية اليمنية قاصدين من ذلك إلحاق الضرر بالاستعدادات الحربية للدفاع عن البلاد والعمليات الحربية للقوات المسلحة وإضعاف قوة الدفاع عن الوطن وإضعاف الروح المعنوية في الشعب وتكدير الأمن العام وإلقاء الرعب بين الناس وإلحاق الضرر بالمصلحة العامة، وما زالوا مستمرين حتى هذه اللحظة، وعلى النحو المبين تفصيلاً في الأوراق. الأمر المعاقب عليه بالمواد (١٦، ٢١، ٢/١٢٦، ١٢٧، ١٢٨، ١٣٦) من القرار الجمهوري بالقانون رقم ١٢ لسنة ١٩٩٤م بشأن الجرائم والعقوبات.

ولذلك

وعملأً بأحكام المادة (٢٢١) إجراءات جزائية ترفع النيابة العامة الدعوى الجزائية ضد المتهمين سالف الذكر أمام المحكمة الجزائية الابتدائية المتخصصة بأمانة العاصمة للسير في إجراءات محاكمتهم ونطلب الحكم عليهم بأقصى العقوبات المقررة قانوناً والحجز التحفظي على أموالهم وتعيين حارساً قضائياً عليها والحكم بمصادرتها.

والله الموفق،،،

عبد الله محمد زهارة
رئيس النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة بالإمارة

الصفحة 4 من 4

Source: Official

Note: Excerpt of the indictment, charging the accused of collaboration with the enemy. The indictment is signed by the Head of the Specialised Criminal Prosecution Office in Sana'a, Mr Abdullah Muhammad Zahara.

Annex 95: Private business overtaken by the Houthis after a judgement by the Specialised Criminal Court in Sana'a

The Houthis have undertaken the coercive takeover of various private companies, in a pattern that involves arbitrary detentions, confiscation of property, assets freeze, judicial action against staff and leadership, and continued threats, especially against business owners' family in Houthi-controlled areas. These measures form part of a broader trend of targeted repression against the private sector, namely those perceived as politically independent or insufficiently cooperative with the Houthis. The Specialised Criminal Court in Sana'a is currently led by Abdullah Muhammad Zahara.

a) Pharmaceutical companies in Sana'a: *Modern Pharma* and *Global Pharma*⁵²

The leadership of the companies had agreed to share profits with the Houthis but refused to relinquish operational management. The Houthis, however, pursued full control. Due to the technical complexity of the pharmaceutical sector, immediate replacement of management was delayed.

On 29 May 2024, an IT staff member was detained in an attempt to recover cloud-based data, which had already been removed. Subsequently, on 9 June 2024, Houthi forces entered the company's factory and assumed total control. Eight senior personnel—including the HR director, and a female manager—were detained. While seven of these individuals were later released after signing coercive pledges to cooperate with the Houthis and promises not to leave Sana'a (under threat of property confiscation), the HR director remained in detention.

The Houthis conditioned his release on the owner's agreement to transfer raw materials to Sana'a, which he refused. Despite this, he did not resist the Houthi seizure of his assets, citing concerns for his family's safety. Some leadership remain with their accounts frozen and property confiscated.

On the same day as the factory takeover, the Houthis submitted documentation to the Central Bank declaring that the original owner was no longer the company's manager. The takeover reportedly generates between USD 300–400 million annually for the Houthis.

⁵² S/2024/731, para 120 and Annex 181.

On 5 December 2024, the director was sentenced to death, with authorities reportedly offering a pardon on the condition that he and his family leave the country. He refused the offer, insisting on full acquittal. His sentence was commuted on appeal to 15 years in prison, on 12 May 2025, with all confiscated property transferred to the state.

His assets, including reported millions of USD held in bank accounts and pending donor payments, were seized. The company remains closed, except for limited operations continuing from its Aden branch. The Houthis' animosity appears to stem from *Prodigy's* role in exposing the diversion of humanitarian funds, which reportedly led to a decline in external funding. He was accused of espionage and collaboration with foreign intelligence services, including those of the United States and Israel. Some of his relatives—including brothers and a cousin—were temporarily detained.

Figures 95.3 and 95.4

Documents from Houthi authorities relating to the takeover of *Prodigy*



Source: Confidential

Note: District Attorney Decision addressed to the Security and Intelligence Service determining the takeover of *Prodigy* on accusations that his owner 'supports the enemy'.

District Attorney Decision appointing an interim Director to *Prodigy*, bound to consult the District Attorney prior to decisions relating, among others, to financial matters.

Figure 95.6
Accusation



Source Confidential

Note: Indictment of *Prodigy's* owner and confirmation of charges, i.e. “*supporting the enemy*” and espionage, by the Specialised Criminal Court, Sana’a.

c) Media Company: *Yemen Digital Media Company*

In August 2024, a privately owned media company was forcibly seized by Houthi authorities. The takeover involved the confiscation of company assets, including real estate, and the freezing of accounts totalling approximately USD 815,000.

Attempts by third parties to support the owner were met with threats by the Houthi Preventive Security Service. One of the owner's brothers was detained, and coerced into signing pledges relinquishing any association with his brother. Sentenced to death on 24 September 2024. The appeal was rejected.

Figure 95.7

Excerpt of judgement against the owner of *Yemen Digital Media Company*

Source: Confidential

Note: Excerpt of the judgement convicting the owner of *Yemen Digital Media Company* to death and determining the confiscation of his and the company's assets in favour of Houthi authorities.

Annex 96: Violation of freedom of religion: The case of the Baha'I Community

The Houthis have systematically discriminated against the Bahá'í community in Yemen. There have been serious violations to their freedom of religion, expression, conscience, and belief.

Following the 2016 wave of detentions, Houthi judicial authorities opened a case against 24 individuals, with 19 having left the country meanwhile. Individuals will be detained if they return to Yemen. They were detained and prosecuted on charges linked to their religious affiliation, with the authorities using pledges to renounce their faith as a condition for release. Many detainees are forbidden from engaging in any activity related to their religion, with ongoing restrictions on their movements, communication, and personal autonomy. These restrictions include being barred from changing phone numbers, traveling without official permission, or communicating with human rights organizations. Victims of the 2023 wave of detentions have equally been subjected to confiscation of property, coerced pledges and signature of documents.

Official curricula have referred to the Bahá'í faith in discriminatory terms, reinforcing a climate of hatred and suspicion. This is accompanied by online hate speech and public messaging that labels Bahá'ís as foreign agents or threats to national security.

Economically, the Bahá'ís continue to face constraints. Bank accounts have been frozen and properties confiscated, cutting off many from basic financial services. Due to blacklisting, many Bahá'ís are unable to receive salaries or payments, as employers are discouraged or forbidden from dealing with them. This financial marginalization deepens their social exclusion and limits their ability to survive or support their families.

Discrimination extends into the private and cultural spheres. Bahá'í families are afraid to teach their children about their identity, fearing that a child's innocent reference to Bahá'í teachings could lead to detention or retaliation. This climate of fear has led to self-censorship that hampers Bahá'í cultural life from public and even domestic spaces. Such conditions reflect a broader attempt to eliminate the Bahá'í identity from Yemeni society.

The Ba'hai have been targeted for their support of education, women and youth empowerment, and peace, which stand in contrast with the Houthis manifested policies.

Figure 96.1

Excerpt of indictment against 24 Baha'I in 2018 (case still open)





Source: Confidential

Note: Excerpt of the indictment of 24 Baha'is (dated 12 August 2018), requesting that they may be convicted to the maximum penalty under the law and that all their property be confiscated. The case remains open.

Figures 96.2, 96.3, 96.4

Excerpts of academic book entailing religious discrimination



Note: Excerpts of *Islamic Culture* textbook, used at Sana'a University, Sharia & Law, 2nd year. It states, *inter alia*, that:

- "It is the time to attack non-Muslims";
- "We are under threat from the Jews and Baha'i";
- Their "beliefs are flawed. They came with the support of Russia, then the Soviet Union and finally the English to destroy and tear apart Islam".

Source: Confidential

Annex 97: Conflict -related sexual violence**Annex 97.1: Examples of documented cases on conflict-related sexual violence**

- a) On 25 February 2025, a family in Ibb was displaced. A Houthi leader wanted to marry a 21 -yar old woman. The family refused. Houthis raided the house and killed the father on the street.
- b) Woman detained in the Central Prison in Sana'a. Repeatedly raped from February to April 2025. Her house was looted. She was beaten. Houthi officers took turns raping her even when she was menstruating. Not submitted to any interrogation. Raped by at least five different men. She became pregnant in prison. The Zainabiyat assisted in preparing her for the rapes. When the victim had her period, she said so but was not believed. When the man realised it was true, he beat her up. Then, the Zainabiyat also beat her. They prepared her for the rapist. While washing her when she was menstruating, they said "*Why are you not prepared for him?*" and beat her again.

Earlier cases of sexual slavery in detention, by the Houthis, were documented by independent sources in the reporting period.

Source: Confidential

Annex 97.2: Examples of threats received by female activists in 2025

Figure 97.2.1

Threats against activist's son sent via WhatsApp



Figure 97.2.2

Accusations of belonging to Mossad published in X




Source: Confidential

Note: In the messages depicted in Figure 98.2.1, the sender states to have first “*broken* [the activist’s son] *teeth*”, and next they would “*break his head*” if the activist were to continue with her criticism against the Houthis. The Panel had access to medical records confirming a serious aggression to the son of the activist in question, including various injuries to his jaw and teeth.

Annex 98: Children recruited and killed

Graph 98.1

Killed recruited children (2015-July 2025)

Source: Mayyun NGO, Yemen

Note: While the number of children recruited increased significantly following the 7 October 2023, the number of children killed decreased since 2022 given the ceasefire agreement.

Figure 99.3

الجمهورية العربية السورية
وزارة التربية والتعليم والبحث العلمي
مديرية التربية والتعليم بدمشق

الرقم: (٨) الترخيص: ٢٠٢٤/١٢/٢٨ الموافق: ٢٠٢٤/١٢/٢٨ المرفقات: ()

جدول فعاليات الذكرى السنوية لجمعة رجب والهوية الإسلامية وحملة التوعية والاستقرار لاسناد الشعب الفلسطيني والناخوة المجاهدين في غزة بمدارس مديرية شرس للعام ١٤٤٦ هـ

المرحلة	الوقت	المكان
١	١٤٤٦/١٢/٢٨	جميع المدارس بمدارس مديرية شرس
٢	١٤٤٦/١٢/٢٩	المدارس
٣	١٤٤٦/١٢/٣٠	المدارس
٤	١٤٤٦/١٢/٣١	المدارس
٥	١٤٤٦/١/١	المدارس
٦	١٤٤٦/١/٢	المدارس
٧	١٤٤٦/١/٣	المدارس
٨	١٤٤٦/١/٤	المدارس

الأهداف: تعزيز الهوية الإسلامية والوطنية لدى الطلاب، وتوعيةهم بأهمية القيم الدينية والوطنية، وتعزيز الانتماء للشعب الفلسطيني والناخوة المجاهدين في غزة.

الوسائل: محاضرات، ورش عمل، عروض مسرحية، مسابقات، ندوات.

الملاحظات: يجب أن تكون الفعاليات موجهة لجميع المراحل الدراسية، وأن تكون ذات طابع توعوي وتثقيفي.

مديرية التربية والتعليم بدمشق

Figure 99.4

الجمهورية العربية السورية
وزارة التربية والتعليم والبحث العلمي
مديرية التربية والتعليم بدمشق

الرقم: (٨) الترخيص: ٢٠٢٤/١٢/٢٨ الموافق: ٢٠٢٤/١٢/٢٨ المرفقات: ()

جدول فعاليات الذكرى السنوية لجمعة رجب والهوية الإسلامية وحملة التوعية والاستقرار لاسناد الشعب الفلسطيني والناخوة المجاهدين في غزة بمدارس مديرية شرس للعام ١٤٤٦ هـ

المرحلة	الوقت	المكان
١	١٤٤٦/١٢/٢٨	جميع المدارس بمدارس مديرية شرس
٢	١٤٤٦/١٢/٢٩	المدارس
٣	١٤٤٦/١٢/٣٠	المدارس
٤	١٤٤٦/١٢/٣١	المدارس
٥	١٤٤٦/١/١	المدارس
٦	١٤٤٦/١/٢	المدارس
٧	١٤٤٦/١/٣	المدارس
٨	١٤٤٦/١/٤	المدارس

الأهداف: تعزيز الهوية الإسلامية والوطنية لدى الطلاب، وتوعيةهم بأهمية القيم الدينية والوطنية، وتعزيز الانتماء للشعب الفلسطيني والناخوة المجاهدين في غزة.

الوسائل: محاضرات، ورش عمل، عروض مسرحية، مسابقات، ندوات.

الملاحظات: يجب أن تكون الفعاليات موجهة لجميع المراحل الدراسية، وأن تكون ذات طابع توعوي وتثقيفي.

مديرية التربية والتعليم بدمشق

Note: Letter issued by the Houthi Ministry of Education, dated 7 December 2024. It originates from the Training and Qualification Sector – National Trainer Project, and is stamped with the logo of the General Mobilization Authority. It contains instructions to begin implementing the “*Missionary Teacher*” and “*Missionary Student*”. It targets secondary level students. It covers: (i) Ideological/Religious indoctrination by promoting Houthi views(ii) ; Cognitive/Skills-based, including basic combat training; (iii) Military Mobilization is supervised directly by the General Mobilization Authority (Ministry of Defence). The program embodies a dangerous merger of civil education structures with military-security entities.

Note: Document issued by the Director of the Education Office in Sharis District, Hajjah Governorate, on 28 December 2024. Addressed to the principals of 25 schools in the district. It includes instructions to implement an intensive program from 28 December 2024 to 8 January 2025. It employs the term ‘Faith Identity’ as a tool of mobilisation. It encapsulates, among others, (i) exclusion of political and ideological opponents, (ii) monopolizing power under the guise of ‘protecting religion’ and ‘faith-based superiority’. It has been used for recruiting and using children through curricular and extra-curricular activities. Importantly, ‘*Faith Identity*’ does not appear in any Yemeni constitutional or legal text.

Figure 99.5



Note: Circular issued by the Education Office in Houthi-controlled Tai'zz, on 9 February 2025. It is addressed to directors of district education offices and school principals, calling for the implementation of expanded activities during the month of Ramadan. The events are developed under the banners 'Faith Identity' and 'Al-Aqsa Campaign'. CSOs operating on the basis of field sources indicate that these gatherings are used to (i) influence parents and psychologically prepare them to send their children to summer schools and indoctrination courses, (ii) disseminate cultural and sectarian narratives aligned with the group's ideology, (iii) prepare children for potential recruitment into military activities after Ramadan

Figure 99.6



Note: Circular from Houthi Ministry of Education, dated 12 April 2025.

It instructs schools, universities and institutes to host and allocate their human and material resources to the “*Higher Committee for Summer Activities and Camps*” a body known for its direct affiliation with the Houthis and its role in implementing ideological indoctrination and child recruitment programs. Academic staff is called to participate and ‘encouraged’ to take roles in training.

Figure 99.7



Note: Document issued by the Supreme Committee for Summer Activities and Courses, under the Houthi Prime Minister's Office, dated 13 April 2025. It is titled "No Summer School Without a Permit", and it was passed under the official slogan for summer courses "Knowledge and Jihad". It is addressed to the heads and members of subcommittees for summer centers in governorates and districts. The document warns against organizing any summer course outside of Houthi oversight and claims that those breaching the directive may be affiliated with the "Aggression Coalition". It explicitly bans any summer school not under Houthi control – including Sunni- and Salafi-affiliated Quran memorization centers.

Source: Confidential

The documents above highlight the role of the General Mobilisation Authority and Ministry of Education in leading systematic programs that ideologically indoctrinate children and facilitate their recruitment, instrumentalizing academic institutions (and coercing their staff) to that purpose.

While the General Mobilisation Authority is formally integrated under the Ministry of Defence, it is reported that it is managed and overseen by the office of Abdulmalik Al-Houthi. The General Mobilisation Authority is a centralised structure with branches in all governorates.

The Curricula Department is officially affiliated with the Ministry of Education, which was recently merged with the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. This gave rise to the Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, led by Minister Hassan Abdullah Yahya Al-Saadi. The so-called Supreme Committee for Summer Activities and Courses organises, in partnership with the General Mobilisation Authority, summer courses during school vacation.


It is noted that the Training and Qualification Sector reportedly benefits from considerable donor funding. Sources and interlocutors of the Panel highlighted the importance of effective monitoring mechanisms to prevent the use of donor funding to activities related to child recruitment and use.

Annex 100: Examples of alteration in academic curricula

Figure 100.1

After Curricula Alteration

جهاد أم (عنوان درس)



Before Curricula Alteration

كفاح أم (عنوان درس)


*Note: "The resilience of Jihad"**Note: "The resilience of a mother"*

Figure 100.2


*Note: "Mother's Jihad"*

The new picture emphasises hostility aiming to liken the 'resilient' Palestinian mother to a concept of redemption and sacrifice, whereas children should raise up to liberate the mothers.

Figure 100.3

After Curricula Alteration


فهي المدرسة التي يتعلمون
منها التضحية والفداء



Note: "The mother is the school from which they learn the meanings of sacrifice and redemption"

Before Curricula Alteration

فهي المدرسة التي
يتعلمون منها كل امور
الدنيا والدين




Note: "It is the school from which they learn all things about the world and religion"

Figure 100.4


After Curricula Alteration

Before Curricula Alteration

في حكاية أم فلسطينية مجاهدة في حكاية أم فلسطينية شجاعة



Note: "In the story of a Jihadi Palestinian mother"



Note: "In the story of a brave Palestinian mother"

Source: Government of Yemen

Annex 101: Statement of child recruited by the Houthis and captured by GoY

The Panel interviewed a 17-year old child who was recruited by the Houthis when he was 15 years old. The recruitment relied on the extreme poverty in which the child and his family were living. He was lured by a relative associated with the Houthis with false financial promises. He accepted hoping to alleviate the struggle of the family. In particular, he hoped to help his sister who suffered from kidney failure.

He was tasked with surveillance and reconnaissance of military and civilian targets, photographing sites, planting landmines and ultimately carrying out a bombing operation. He was paid very little (1000 Yemeni riyals and 100 Saudi riyals) and falsely promised a promotion.

Source: Confidential

Annex 102: Humanitarian Situation in Ta'izz

Figure 102.1

Prevention of water supply to civilians





Figure 102.2

Indiscriminate attacks against civilians, arbitrary killings, arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances



Figures 102.3 and 102.4

Data on arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances during the reporting period

الرقم	الملاحظات	التاريخ
The detainees are held either in the illegal Al-Saleh Prison or in unknown detention locations, and they are denied their rights to visitation, communication with their families, or legal representation. Additionally, there has been an unusual wave of arrests at the Houthis' military checkpoint at the Al-Qasr roundabout (eastern passage), but documentation of all detainees remains difficult because families are afraid to report the cases out of concern for their children's safety inside Houthi prisons. We affirm that the available statistics reflect only the cases we have been able to document, and that the actual number is much higher, though unreachable due to various factors, including the Houthis' intimidation of families and warnings not to report or publicize cases in the media. 35 cases of arbitrary arrest were recorded during the period 2024–2025, most of whom were men, though the arrests also included children.		

2024 – June 2025:									
General Table:									
Type of violation	2024			2025			Grand Total		
Arbitrary detention	25			10			35		
Child recruitment	3						3		
Injury Cases	77			33			110		
Cases of Killing	30			15			45		
Damage to private property	12			10			22		
Damage to public property				1			1		
Grand Total	147			69			216		

Grand Total	2024				2025				Type of violation
	children	Men	forgetful	2024 Total	children	Men	forgetful	2025 Total	
Arbitrary detention		23		25		10		10	35
Child recruitment	3			3					3
Injury Cases	27	42	8	77	14	15	4	33	110
Cases of Killing	10	16	4	30	2	12	1	15	45
Grand Total	42	81	12	135	16	37	5	58	148

Figure 102.5

Data on killing of civilians

Killings:				
Method type	children	Men	Women	Grand Total
Killing by Torture		1		1
Killing by Shelling	7	6	2	15
Killing by Sniping	2	3		5
Killing by Landmine	1	7		8
Grand Total	10	17	2	29

Cases:				
Method type	children	Men	Women	Grand Total
Injury by Shelling	18	20	4	42
Injury by Sniping	13	9	3	25
Injury by Landmine	9	20	2	31
Grand Total	40	49	9	98

Figure 102.6

Damage to public and private property

Damage to public and private property:				
Type of property / type of damage	vehicles	Educational Facilities	Residential Facilities	Grand Total
Partial destruction	1		5	6
Total destruction			2	2
Bombing			1	1
Raid and storming		1	12	13
Confiscation and seizure			1	1
Grand Total	1	1	21	23

Figures 102.7, 102.8 and 102.9

Non-exhaustive list of victims of landmines during the reporting period

Annex No. (2): A List of Information on Some Civilian Victims in Taiz Governorate During the Period January 2024 – June 2025

M	Name	Age	Governorate	District	Type of violation	Violator	Date of violation	Phone Number
1		28 years old	Taiz	Hayfen	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	14/02/2024	
2		1968	Taiz	Hayfen	Landmine Planting	Houthi group	25/11/2024	
3		18 years old	Taiz	Saber Al-Mawaden	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	02/03/2024	
4		1981	Taiz	Al-Mudhaffa	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	10/03/2024	
5		50 years	Taiz	Al-Mudhaffa	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	12/03/2024	
6		17 years old	Taiz	Al-Mudhaffa	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	12/03/2024	
7		25 years	Taiz	Al-Mudhaffa	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	11/03/2024	
8		40 years	Taiz	Al-Qahirah	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	16/03/2024	
9		11 years old	Taiz	Al-Qahirah	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	16/03/2024	
10		27 years old	Taiz	Al-Qahirah	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	16/03/2024	
11		12 years	Taiz	Al-Qahirah	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	16/03/2024	
12			Taiz	Al-Ta'ayyah	Seizure of private property and looting of a vehicle	Houthi group	21/03/2024	

14	7 years	Taiz	Salah	Al-Sha'ab District	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	05/04/2024	
15	55 years old	Taiz	Salah	Al-Ajrin District	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	12/04/2024	
16	1952	Taiz	Saber Al-Mawaden	Al-Sha'ab	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	17/04/2024	
17	35 years	Taiz	Salah	Al-Sha'ab District	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	25/04/2024	
18	45 years	Taiz	Saber Al-Mawaden	The hill of the righteous	Forced displacement and house bombing with IEDs	Houthi group	28/04/2024	
19	7 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
20	20 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
21	11 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
22	2007	Taiz	Hayfen	Athar	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
23	35 years old	Taiz	Salah	Kalaba	Targeting of civilians	Houthi group	10/06/2024	
24	1991	Taiz	Hayfen	Mutah	Mine Planting	Houthi group	13/07/2024	
25	1970	Taiz	Hayfen	Jabal Ad-Dubaa	Mine Planting	Houthi group	09/08/2024	

31	22 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
32	22 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
33	27 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
34	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
35	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
36	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
37	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
38	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
39	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
40	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
41	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
42	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
43	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
44	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
45	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
46	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
47	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
48	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
49	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
50	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
51	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
52	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
53	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
54	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
55	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
56	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
57	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
58	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
59	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
60	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
61	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
62	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
63	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
64	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
65	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
66	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
67	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
68	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
69	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
70	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
71	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
72	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
73	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
74	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
75	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
76	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
77	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
78	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
79	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
80	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
81	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
82	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
83	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
84	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
85	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
86	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
87	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
88	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
89	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
90	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
91	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
92	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
93	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
94	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
95	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
96	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
97	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
98	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
99	27 years	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	
100	28 years old	Taiz	Al-Ma'afir	Manisra Village	Remnants of war	Houthi group	20/05/2024	

Source: GoY

Note: Excerpts of GoY report on factors undermining the humanitarian situation in Ta'izz.