



# Briefing Notes Summary

Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration

Syria – January to June 2025.

30 June 2025

## 13 January 2025

### **Ongoing fighting between SDF and SNA in East Aleppo**

Turkish airstrikes and fighting between the Turkish-backed militia coalition, the so-called Syrian National Army (SNA), and the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continue unabated in northern Syria.

Following the capture of Manbij and Tall Rif'at by the SNA (cf. BN of 23.12.24), the Tishreen Dam is the main focus of Turkish attacks. On 08.01.25, over 1,000 protesters gathered to demonstrate against the ongoing shelling at the request of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES). According to media reports, targets in the vicinity were bombed during the protest march. The health authority in Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) reported that five civilians had been killed and 15 others wounded. Turkish authorities denied Turkish responsibility for this and accused the DAANES and SDF of abusing the civilian population as human shields. According to reports issued by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), 37 people were killed the following day. These reportedly included mainly SNA fighters, but also six members of the SDF. This brings the total death toll for the past month to 332. According to SDF reports, three civilians were also killed by Turkish airstrikes on 11.01.25.<sup>1</sup>

### **Protests by the Alawite population; reports of deaths in riots and acts of retaliation**

On 25.12.24, protests by the Alawite population broke out in several cities across the country after a video circulated online showing the destruction of an Alawite shrine in Aleppo. The authorities later stated that it was an older video. The newly appointed police chief of Homs reported peaceful protests in Homs city that had been abused by groups linked to the ousted Assad government. Individuals are said to have opened fire on protesters and security forces present, killing one person and injuring several others. Security forces imposed temporary curfews and set up checkpoints to bring the situation under control. The SOHR initially reported that the protests had been suppressed by HTS fighters.

Further protests broke out in Damascus after a video showing the burning of a Christmas tree was made public. The following day, the interim government's Ministry of Information announced that it was banning the distribution of videos with a "sectarian character aimed at spreading division".

Since Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized power, dozens of Syrians are said to have been killed in acts of revenge, particularly members of the Alawite population. Concerns about retaliatory attacks among Alawites remain high. No concrete figures on the number of victims are available.<sup>2</sup>

### **Action against militias loyal to Assad**

Armed groups of the transitional government are carrying out arrest campaigns in various places in order to drive forward the dissolution of militias loyal to Assad. On 30.12.24, for example, an arrest campaign took place in the town of Adra near Damascus, in the course of which several leaders of such militias are said to have been arrested.

On 25.12.24, fighting broke out between HTS fighters and supporters of the ousted government in the coastal town of Tartous after a high-ranking official of the former government was to be arrested, according to media reports. In the process, 14 HTS fighters were allegedly killed and others wounded.

Following the protests in Homs city, which escalated into fighting (see above), on 02.01.25, the new Syrian security forces used tanks to carry out a further arrest campaign against former militia members and soldiers in Homs city who had refused to disarm and are suspected of involvement in war crimes. More than 100 people are said to have been arrested on the very first day of the campaign, which lasted several days.

The crackdown on members and officials of the former government also led to criticism. Human rights organisations accused the transitional government of arbitrary arrests and non-transparent action against suspected Assad supporters. The transitional authorities denied this and pointed out that they were taking action against armed Assad loyalists who were prepared to use violence, but not against mere sympathisers.

A few days later, on 12.01.25, reports were received that around 360 people who had been taken into custody in the course of the arrest campaigns had been released by the General Security Department. It had reportedly been confirmed that the persons concerned would not oppose disarmament and the transitional government and had not been guilty of any war crimes. It was not initially known how many of the detainees from Homs remained in custody.<sup>3</sup>

### **Economic situation and easing of sanctions**

The desolate economic situation continues to pose challenges when it comes to supplying the Syrian population. While aid organisations assume that around 90 percent of the population is still living below the poverty line and around 13.1 million people in Syria do not have enough food, the transitional government is endeavouring to obtain further aid and reconstruction assistance.

Most recently, on 10.01.25, at least three people were killed in a stampede in front of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. According to reports, numerous people had congregated at the mosque and the forecourt for Friday prayers, but also to receive food aid.

Following the recent five-year extension of US sanctions under the Caesar Act, which is one of several sanction packages, the US government eased some restrictions for the next six months on 06.01.25 to enable investors to work with Syrian authorities. The easing of sanctions is expected to have a particular impact in areas that contribute to supplying the population, such as humanitarian aid, but also electricity, energy, water and sanitary facilities.

In a further step towards opening up Syria, international commercial flights resumed at Damascus International Airport on 07.01.25.

The reunification of the Syrian economy after several years of de facto division poses challenges for the transitional government. Due to a desired equalisation of public salaries between the former areas of the HTS-led administration in Idlib and the areas formerly controlled by the Assad government, the transitional government temporarily cut salaries in Idlib by half of the total amount (these were previously around USD 100-170/month). At the same time, public salaries in the former Assad government areas were increased as part of emergency measures, as these were previously only around USD 17/month. Teachers in Idlib then announced they would go on strike in protest against the temporary cuts, claiming they are also under great financial pressure despite the relatively higher salaries.<sup>4</sup>

## **20 January 2025**

### **Acts of retaliation and vigilante justice**

Reports of acts of retaliation and vigilante justice in Syria following the end of Bashar al-Assad's rule continue. There are repeated reports of individual cases in which the local population, neighbours and acquaintances resort to violence and retaliate against (actual or alleged) supporters of the Assad government. On 16.01.25, an international daily newspaper reported an incident in which an affected family stated that one of their members had been murdered, even though the victim was a simple soldier on military service who had allegedly tried to defect twice. However, the local population, from which the perpetrators who reportedly killed the man after his return home are said to have come, accused him of passing on to the then government information which had

allegedly led to the imprisonment and killing of others. A member of the police investigating the case also stated that the family of the murdered man was known to be working with the government. Initially, no one was arrested for the alleged extrajudicial killing.

According to the newspaper report, even ordinary conscripts who returned home after the fall of Assad were met with suspicion. They are reportedly accused of having facilitated the government's crimes.

There are also frequent reports of extrajudicial killings of former officials under the Assad government and killings for unclear reasons.<sup>5</sup>

#### **Israeli airstrike on HTS members in Quneitra**

Three people were killed and five others were wounded in an Israeli airstrike carried out against targets in the village of Ghadir al-Bustan in the southern governorate of Quneitra. Two of those killed were reportedly members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), while the third was a municipal official who was also affiliated with the HTS transitional government. The Israeli military stated that vehicles transporting weapons were the target of the airstrikes.

Following the fall of Assad, Israel carried out hundreds of airstrikes against state military targets and equipment (cf. BN of 23.12.24). The Syrian transitional government had previously signalled that it was not seeking conflict with Israel and had condemned the airstrikes and ground operations, but had not taken any military action. However, this is the first airstrike involving victims who were directly linked to the HTS transitional government.<sup>6</sup>

### **27 January 2025**

#### **Numerous deaths from war remnants**

According to media reports, people are frequently being killed and wounded by the explosion of unexploded ordnance and war remnants found in large parts of the country.

The Syrian Civil Defence, also known as the White Helmets, recorded a total of 40 people killed and 65 wounded by explosive device remnants between 27.11.24 and 19.01.25. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), on the other hand, published figures from its partner organisations stating that in the first two weeks of January alone at least 45 people were killed and 60 others wounded by unexploded ordnance and landmines. Areas where there has been intense fighting over the past 13 years have been particularly affected. The White Helmets have already been able to remove more than 1,060 remnants of war since 26.11.24, but have so far also identified 134 minefields and individual mined areas.<sup>7</sup>

#### **DAANES launches voluntary return from al-Hol camp**

For the first time, Syrian nationals are leaving the al-Hol camp in northeast Syria to return to their home regions (outside the control of DAANES). The camp management announced that preparations were underway for the voluntary return of a total of 66 families.

The camp has a population of around 40,000 people, a large proportion of whom are said to be linked to ISIS and have been living in the camp since its military defeat in 2019. It is considered to be a security risk and a breeding ground for extremist ideology. For years, the so-called Democratic Autonomous Administration for North and East Syria (DAANES) has been calling on third countries to repatriate their nationals from the camp. It says most of the residents are foreign nationals, with only around 16,000 Syrians living in the camp. According to DAANES, it would have been possible to leave the camp voluntarily as early as October 2020, but due to Bashar al-Assad's rule, the people affected did not do so.<sup>8</sup>

#### **Ongoing fighting between SDF and SNA in East Aleppo**

The fighting between the Turkish-backed militias of the so-called Syrian National Army (SNA), with military air support from Türkiye, and the Kurdish-dominated so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the east of Aleppo governorate continues (cf. BN of 13.01.25).

The Tishreen Dam, on which the fighting and airstrikes continue to focus, is in a strategically important location, generates electricity and provides a supply of water for a large part of the SDF-controlled areas. The dam therefore represents valuable leverage should the SNA gain control of it. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) has recorded a total of 483 people who have been killed in the fighting and airstrikes since the beginning of the

clashes on 12.12.24. These are said to include 51 civilians, 363 SNA fighters and 76 SDF members. According to media reports, the HTS-led Department of Military Operations has sent a convoy to Manbij near the dam, however, there has initially been no involvement in the fighting.<sup>9</sup>

### **Armed clashes with SDF in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor**

Media reported on 25.01.25 that three SDF fighters had been killed in rural Deir ez-Zor in a clash with armed tribesmen who were reportedly loyal to the transitional government in Damascus after the fall of Assad.

Several posts on social media also reported that on 25.01.25 there were exchanges of fire between SDF troops and the HTS-led Department of Military Operations along the border with the areas controlled by the two actors in Raqqa governorate. However, the exact background and potential casualty figures initially remained unclear.<sup>10</sup>

## **03 February 2025**

### **Ahmed al-Shara declared president**

Syrian state media announced on 29.01.25 that the rebel coalition led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) had declared its leader Ahmed al-Shara, formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, interim president of the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, the constitution from 2012 was cancelled and the previous legislative bodies and armed forces were dissolved. Accordingly, all armed groups are to be dissolved and transferred to state structures.

The decisions were not based on a public procedure. It therefore remained unclear which actors were involved and to what extent they supported them. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which control northeast Syria, were not represented in Damascus at the time of the announcement. It also remains unclear how long the transitional period will last until a new government is appointed. According to the state news agency SANA, al-Shara will next appoint a legislative council to govern the country during the transitional period. In December 2024, HTS announced that it would hold a conference with representatives from society, academia, various denominations and other areas by 01.03.25 in order to create a representative new government. At the present time, however, it is still unclear whether such a conference will still be held.<sup>11</sup>

### **Manbij: 15 killed in bomb attack**

According to local rescue workers, four women and one man were killed when a car exploded in Manbij in northeast Syria on 03.02.25. A further 15 women were reportedly injured. This was the second attack of this kind to be carried out in three days, after four civilians were killed and nine others were injured in a car explosion in the centre of the city on 01.02.25.

So far, no one has claimed responsibility for the crimes. Manbij was under the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) until it was captured by the Turkish-backed rebel militia Syrian National Army (SNA) in December 2024 (cf. BN of 16.12.24).<sup>12</sup>

## **10 February 2025**

### **Northwest: ongoing fighting between SDF and SNA in East Aleppo; integration of SNA into new security forces**

Airstrikes carried out by the Turkish military and the Turkish-backed militia alliance, the so-called Syrian National Army (SNA), on targets of the Kurdish-dominated so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) near the Tishreen Dam and the Qaraquzak Bridge are continuing. Battles are continually being fought on the ground between the two sides. Turkish airstrikes are also targeting SDF positions in the governorates of Hasaka and Raqqa. In a post on social media on 09.01.25, the leader of the Suleiman Shah Brigade, a faction within the SNA, who was recently appointed brigadier general as part of the integration into the new Syrian military and was given command of the Hama Brigade, stated that his fighters had captured the Tishreen Dam in the meantime. More detailed information on the background and the involvement of the new administration in the fighting was not available initially. The brigadier general announced that he would resume activities once further instructions had been received from decision-makers.

As part of the integration of armed groups into a new unified Syrian army, troops from the transitional government

in Damascus were reportedly deployed to areas in Afrin and Jinderes that were previously controlled by the SNA. The so-called Syrian Interim Government, which carried out the administrative tasks in the areas controlled by the SNA and Türkiye, announced in an internal letter on 30.01.25 that it was transferring its own areas, authorities and armed groups to the transitional government in Damascus.

However, it is not yet clear at what pace the dissolution of the factions will progress or has already progressed and how the members of the SNA militias will actually be integrated into the new military. The SDF and other armed groups, particularly from the south, have not yet been integrated into the new military.

Troops of the transitional government are also reported to have been positioned further east, near Manbij, where the seventh bomb attack since the fall of Assad took place last week. The perpetrators and the exact target are still unknown (cf. BN of 03.02.25).<sup>13</sup>

### **Humanitarian aid: far-reaching consequences after US aid is frozen**

According to media reports, the already precarious humanitarian situation in Syria has been further exacerbated by the freezing of aid funding. Numerous organisations in Syria have been affected by US President Donald Trump's freeze on US foreign aid and are reported to have already had to stop or reduce their work. In 2024, the US provided a total of 25.3 percent of humanitarian aid for Syria, followed by Germany with 12.5 percent and the EU Commission with 11.4 percent. Due to the loss of these sums, numerous organisations have now been forced to discontinue services and lay off staff. For example, the Turkish NGO Doctors of the World Turkey, which operates in northern Syria, has had to close 12 field hospitals and lay off more than 300 employees in Syria.

The al-Hol camp in northeast Syria is also reported to have been affected by such cuts. According to media reports, food aid was briefly halted in the largely sealed-off camp, which is mainly home to people who are believed to have links to ISIS. Following a two-week postponement of the payment freeze, the organisation responsible received funding from the US again to continue its work in the short term. However, follow-up funding remains uncertain, and the camp management is warning of possible uprisings and the instrumentalisation of the situation by ISIS.<sup>14</sup>

## **17 February 2025**

### **South: Israeli troops expand presence**

According to news reports published on 14.02.25, Israeli troops have entered the villages of Kudna, Saidna al-Golan and al-Rafid in the west of the Quneitra governorate. Media reports say three Israeli military brigades are to remain in Syria indefinitely. According to these reports, the military will build nine posts on the Golan Heights and operate checkpoints at the entrances to some villages in order to control the movements of the population. According to one source, the military will engage in unofficial dialogue and coordination with local security forces and the Jordanian border guard.<sup>15</sup>

### **Security operations in Homs**

Since the beginning of January 2025, the General Security Department of the transitional government has been carrying out military operations throughout Syria targeting former members of the Assad government or its security services. A number of security incidents have occurred in this context, particularly in Homs. As part of the operations, large quantities of weapons have so far been confiscated and numerous people have been arrested. However, several organisations have accused the security forces of the transitional government of violating the law and mistreating Syrians during these campaigns. For example, the Syrian Justice and Accountability Centre has recorded six deaths of people who were being held in custody and two cases of relatives of wanted individuals being arrested in order to pressure the latter into surrendering to the authorities. In such cases, the authorities of the transitional government claim not to have been involved in the alleged crimes, or to have been aware of the violations but to have neither ordered nor authorised them. An investigation has been initiated in at least one of the cases mentioned, but no results have yet been forthcoming.<sup>16</sup>

### **Committee to prepare the National Dialogue Conference**

The transitional government has announced the establishment of a preparatory committee to take over the planning of the long-announced National Dialogue Conference. The seven committee members comprise five men

and two women, including one Christian woman. The majority of the members come from circles close to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, the currently dominant group in the transitional government. However, individuals and organisations loyal to Assad as well as armed groups that refuse to disarm and integrate into the new Syrian military are to be excluded from participating in the conference. This restriction would primarily affect the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) of the Self-Administration in northeast Syria. Although negotiations between the SDF and the transitional government are still taking place, it is not clear when and how such integration could take place. A date for the conference has not yet been set.<sup>17</sup>

## **24 February 2025**

### **Ongoing fighting and airstrikes in East Aleppo and northeast Syria**

Fighting between the militias of the so-called Syrian National Army (SNA) and the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in East Aleppo continues. The Turkish military is also continuing to bomb targets in the areas that are under SDF control. The focus of the fighting is on the Tishreen Dam and the Qaraqzak Bridge. According to various reports, there have only been a few casualties. Most of those killed are said to have been members of the respective armed parties.<sup>18</sup>

### **National Dialogue Conference announced**

Although a member of the preparatory committee for the long-announced National Dialogue Conference confirmed two days before the invitations were sent out that the schedule had not yet been set and that it was unclear whether the dialogue conference would take place before or after the announced restructuring of the transitional government on 01.03.25, invitations were apparently sent out to numerous Syrians at short notice on 23.02.25, inviting them to come to Damascus the following day to take part in the conference.

Photos of the agenda, which indicates the conference would be held on 25.02.25, circulated on social media. As part of the conference, the future of Syria and pressing challenges are to be discussed with representatives of civil society. The agenda is also to include a so-called constitutional declaration, which is intended to provide a legal framework for government activities until a proper constitution can be drawn up and adopted.

In the run-up to the conference, the preparatory committee held dozens of meetings with a total of around 4,000 Syrians from various governorates. However, the group of participants at the conference initially remained unclear.<sup>19</sup>

### **Israeli Prime Minister calls for demilitarisation of southern Syria**

In a speech delivered to graduates of an Israeli military academy on 23.02.25, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that Israel would not accept any military presence by the Syrian transitional government south of Damascus. In this context, he called for the demilitarisation of the three governorates of Quneitra, Dar'a and Suweida.

Most recently, the Israeli defence minister announced that the army would remain stationed on the summit of Mount Hermon and in the buffer zone along the Syrian-Israeli border for an indefinite period in order to protect Israeli communities and take action against possible threats.<sup>20</sup>

## **03 March 2025**

### **Ongoing fighting and airstrikes in East Aleppo and northeast Syria**

Even after Öcalan's call (cf. the section on Türkiye) for the PKK to lay down its arms, fighting continued between the fighters of the Turkish-backed militias of the so-called Syrian National Army (SNA) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in East Aleppo, especially in the Manbij district. Mazloum Abdi, commander of the SDF, stated that Öcalan's call did not concern the SDF. While Türkiye considers the People's Defence Units (YPG), the most

influential faction within the SDF, to be synonymous with the PKK, the SDF leadership has for years emphasised its distance from the PKK.<sup>21</sup>

### **Fighting between the transitional government and groups loyal to Assad**

There are repeated attacks by militias loyal to Assad on relevant targets within Syria, including security forces of the transitional government, but also Israeli military personnel. For example, on 26.02.25, when, according to media reports, suspected supporters of the former Assad government attacked a local police station in Qardaha and demanded the withdrawal of the transitional government's internal security forces. This was followed by a security campaign carried out by the internal security forces in the town.<sup>22</sup>

### **National Dialogue Conference**

Just two days after the invitations were sent out (cf. BN of 24.02.25), hundreds of Syrians came together on 24.02.25 and 25.02.25 for the National Dialogue Conference in Damascus. In workshops, they developed proposals and objectives in the areas of transitional justice, the constitution, the establishment of state institutions and personal freedoms, as well as Syria's future economic model and the role of civil society. The specific content remained under wraps. The 18-point final declaration of the one-and-a-half-day conference spoke in favour of establishing a committee that was to be tasked with drafting a constitution and rejected the establishment of ethnic or religious quotas within public institutions. It also emphasised Syria's territorial integrity and condemned the presence of Israeli troops in the south of the country.

The hasty organisation and short duration of the conference, the lack of representation of minorities and women, the lack of transparency in the selection of participants and the open question of the extent to which the results of the conference would be binding for the transitional government led to widespread criticism. Those not invited included representatives of the SDF, which controls large parts of northeast Syria. Due to the last-minute organisation, some people who were abroad, in particular, were unable to attend.

A few days later, on 02.03.25, the transitional government announced the convening of a committee tasked with drafting a constitution. One of the seven members, all of whom have completed legal training, is a woman. The government reshuffle announced for 01.03.25 is still pending.<sup>23</sup>

### **Fighting in Jaramana and threats of military intervention by Israel**

On 28.02.25, fighting broke out between security forces of the HTS-led transitional government and Druze factions in the Damascus suburb of Jaramana. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), one member of the security forces was killed and nine other people were wounded. Influential Druze figures affirm that the Druze factions were an "undisciplined mob" that did not represent the Druze population of Jaramana. The reporting on the events and on the trigger for the fighting is ambiguous, and different narratives about the events are being presented. Syrian security forces were deployed to the town. Tensions on the ground were able to be contained through the mediation of influential Druze figures, including members of armed groups from the majority-Druze governorate of Suweida.

However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the following day that if the Druze population were harmed, Israel would intervene. He said that the Israeli military had been instructed to prepare for an intervention.

Netanyahu's announcement was rejected by Druze leaders and the Syrian transitional government. A week earlier, calls by the Israeli government for the demilitarisation of southern Syria had already caused a stir and led to protests within Syria (cf. BN of 24.02.25).<sup>24</sup>

## **10 March 2025**

### **Reports of several hundred dead in fighting and massacres in the Alawite heartland**

According to media reports, after more than a dozen security forces of the transitional government were killed in an ambush by armed Assad loyalists in Jableh (Latakia) on 06.03.25, the heaviest fighting since the fall of the Assad government broke out in the coastal region, in the governorates of Tartus and Latakia.

Groups loyal to Assad reportedly fought fierce battles with troops and supporters of the transitional government.

This was followed by organised and coordinated attacks on transitional government troops across the country, but particularly in the coastal region. The security forces then increased their presence, imposed curfews in Tartus and Latakia as well as elsewhere and began operations against armed insurgents.

Acts of retaliation against the civilian population in Tartus and Latakia, the majority of whom are Alawites, are said to have taken place as part of the actions of the transitional government's security forces. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that several villages in the coastal region had allegedly been stormed and in some cases looted by the security forces of the transitional government. Civilians, including children, had reportedly been killed indiscriminately. According to the SOHR, a total of 231 security forces, 250 insurgents and around 830 civilians had been killed by 09.03.25. It said that the majority of those killed belonged to the Alawite denomination, but other population groups were also among those killed. The governorate of Latakia was particularly affected, followed by Tartus. However, attacks on the civilian population carried out by security forces or armed supporters of the transitional government are also said to have occurred in Hama and Homs.

The news situation is currently still unclear. For example, the news outlet Enab Baladi quoted information provided by the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), according to which a total of 311 fatalities had been recorded up to 08.03.25. Pro-former government gangs are said to have killed 121 members of the security forces and 26 civilians, while 164 civilians, including women and children, are said to have been killed by "undisciplined factions" as part of the security forces' actions. These were reportedly mainly groups from the north (presumably fighters from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)) as well as troops who were not yet adequately trained and individual armed men who had joined the security forces on the spur of the moment. It is not possible to independently verify who committed the killings and how high the number of casualties actually is.

According to the SOHR, some of the ground operations are said to have been supported by attacks from the Syrian air force. A number of Syrians are also said to have requested protection from the Russian military at the Russian military base in Hmeimim.<sup>25</sup>

### **Ongoing fighting and airstrikes in East Aleppo and northeast Syria**

In the northeast, fighting is continuing between the Turkish-backed militias of the so-called Syrian National Army (SNA) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the east of Aleppo governorate, particularly in the Manbij district. According to the Etana platform, Turkish airstrikes on targets in the governorates of Aleppo and Raqqa have increased and have led to a rise in casualties. Exact figures are not available.<sup>26</sup>

## **17 March 2025**

### **Hundreds of civilians killed after fighting and massacres in Syria's coastal region**

Following several coordinated attacks on Syrian security forces on 06.03.25, the transitional government mobilised its officially affiliated security forces and armed groups. The ensuing fighting led to numerous extrajudicial executions and massacres of the civilian population, particularly in the coastal region (cf. BN of 10.03.25).

The fighting took place between armed groups loyal to Assad and official security forces as well as supporters of the transitional government. According to media reports, local armed groups, militias from the Turkish-backed SNA alliance from the north and foreign Islamist groups also fought alongside the official troops on the side of the transitional government.

Although these are nominally considered to be integrated into the new Syrian security apparatus, they are de facto still subject to the same organisational, personnel and command structures as before, as no, or no full, integration processes have taken place to date.

According to various reports, civilians also armed themselves and joined the armed parties. The initial fighting then turned into attacks on the civilian population. Acts of revenge carried out by the troops and supporters of the transitional government are said to have occurred along sectarian lines. The Alawite population, in particular, which is seen by large parts of the Syrian population, if not as supporters, then at least as beneficiaries of the toppled Assad government, was therefore affected by executions and mass killings.

According to its own sources, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) was able to verify the killing and execution of at least 1,034 civilians by 15.03.25. It reports that 439 were killed by supporters of the Assad government, while 595 killings are attributed to the security forces and their supporters. The organisation stated

that it was still verifying events in this context, so these are preliminary results for the time being. Among the groups of the security forces, factions of the Syrian National Army (SNA), in particular, as well as foreign militias, are said to have been involved in the massacres. However, some of the official security forces that emerged from the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) fighters under the General Security Department also took part in the killings. In addition to the high number of civilian victims, hundreds of fighters are also said to have been killed.

Since the fall of the Assad government and the takeover of power by the HTS, Alawites have been increasingly exposed to acts of revenge in the form of attacks and threats. Meanwhile, high-ranking military and intelligence officers of the toppled Assad government have evaded the reconciliation processes set up by the transitional government and founded or joined armed groups. These include the Syrian Popular Resistance, the Syrian Islamic Resistance Front, the Military Council for the Liberation of Syria and remnants of the National Defence Forces (NDF) militia group. These groups were involved in the attacks on the troops of the transitional government on 06.03.25. Although the transitional government claimed to have regained control on 10.03.25, attacks by armed groups on security forces continued until at least 14.03.25. Several members of the armed forces were killed, but there were initially no reports of civilians being killed.

Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced wide-ranging investigations and criminal consequences for those responsible for the killings of civilians, including allies. To this end, he set up a committee which is to report its findings to him within 30 days.<sup>27</sup>

### **Agreement on integration into state apparatus between SDF and transitional government**

On 10.03.25, interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement to facilitate a ceasefire and pave the way for a political agreement between the two political entities.

The declaration of intent covers several points, including the central aim of integrating the military and civilian components of the SDF into the transitional government by the end of 2025, although details of this process have not yet been included. Despite the agreement, Turkish airstrikes and fighting between factions of the SNA and SDF continued in East Aleppo, raising questions about the transitional government's ability to control the SNA factions. A Turkish Ministry of Defence source told a news agency that the agreement would not affect Türkiye's actions against terrorist organisations in Syria. Türkiye considers the YPG, the strongest group within the SDF, to be a terrorist organisation and continues to demand its disarmament and dissolution.

On 10.03.25, Druze militias and the Syrian transitional government also signed an agreement which, among other things, provides for the recruitment of security forces from Suweida and the establishment of military units from Suweida under the umbrella of the Ministry of the Interior. However, an influential Druze leader, Sheikh al-Hijri, stated shortly afterwards that no agreement had been reached. It is not known to what extent this statement has an impact on the signed agreement.<sup>28</sup>

### **Temporary constitutional declaration signed**

On 13.03.25, interim President al-Sharaa signed a constitutional declaration that will be valid for a transitional period of five years and is to be replaced by a permanent constitution at the end of this period, accompanied by parliamentary and presidential elections.

This provisional constitution grants al-Sharaa far-reaching powers and influence over appointments to both the legislature and the judiciary, although it also provides for a separation of powers. Under this constitution, one-third of the members of the future parliament would be appointed by the interim president.

In addition, a committee would be formed, which in turn would appoint a further committee to appoint the usual two-thirds. Al-Sharaa would also appoint the judges of the Supreme Constitutional Court. A reading of a summary of the declaration listed Sharia as "the main source" of future legislation, whereas it had previously been considered only one of the main sources. Fundamental rights, including freedom of opinion and belief, are to be preserved for all Syrians during the five-year transitional period. The declaration states that restrictions on rights are only possible in cases of national security. It adds that the president has the power to declare a state of national emergency. It also states that the glorification of the Assad regime is exempt from freedom of expression. The declaration was drawn up by the Constitutional Committee on the basis of the results of the National Dialogue Conference.

Al-Sharaa also announced the establishment of a National Security Council, which includes the current ministers of defence, the interior and foreign affairs, and the head of the intelligence service. They have so far been considered

loyal to al-Sharaa. In addition, two advisors are to be appointed who will also be members of the council.

However, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the political arm of the SDF, and the opposition Kurdish National Council (KNC) criticised the constitutional declaration in no uncertain terms. They said it would grant absolute power to the executive and make political plurality impossible.

Only a few days earlier, the transitional government and the SDF had succeeded in signing an agreement that paved the way for the integration of the Kurdish-dominated groups and administration in northeast Syria into the transitional government. There were protests by the local population in the northeast.<sup>29</sup>

## **24 March 2025**

### **Ceasefire after several days of fighting on the Syrian-Lebanese border**

Heavy fighting broke out between Lebanese and Syrian security forces along the Syrian-Lebanese border near the Lebanese town of Hermel and the Syrian village of al-Qusayr on 16.03.25 and 17.03.25 (cf. the section on Lebanon in the BN of 17.03.25).

On 17.03.25, the Lebanese and Syrian leaders reached a ceasefire and agreed to intensify coordination and cooperation between the two countries.<sup>30</sup>

### **Aid pledges for the Syrian population at donor conference**

As part of the first donor conference on Syria organised by the EU since the change of power, aid of more than EUR 5.8 billion was pledged on 17.03.25 to support the transitional government in humanitarian and security matters.

EUR 2.5 billion is to be provided by the EU in 2025 and 2026. Germany intends to contribute an additional EUR 300 million through the UN and partner organisations. Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Türkiye are also to be supported by these funds.

Not least due to the lack of US aid, the total amount remained below the level of the previous year's conference of EUR 7.5 billion. According to the head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), Syria's development has been set back by 40 years as a result of the long-standing conflict and will need at least 10 years to return to pre-war levels.<sup>31</sup>

### **Israeli airstrikes on targets in Syria**

According to media reports, three people were killed and 19 others wounded, including civilians, in Israeli airstrikes on targets in Dar'a city on 17.03.25. The Israeli military claimed to have targeted military sites and weapons and equipment depots that the new Syrian military is trying to utilise. Since the fall of the Assad regime, Israel has repeatedly bombed targets on Syrian territory.

The Israeli military is occupying areas in southern Syria along the Golan Heights, is demanding the demilitarisation of the entire south of Syria and has recently presented itself publicly as the protector of Syria's Druze minority.<sup>32</sup>

## **31 March 2025**

### **Border security deal**

Following repeated clashes along the border (cf. BN of 24.03.25), Syria and Lebanon have signed a joint border agreement in Riyadh. Among other things, the agreement announces the establishment of joint committees to demarcate the border and to settle conflicts peacefully.<sup>33</sup>

### **Fighting continues in eastern Aleppo despite agreement**

Despite the agreement signed between the transitional government and the commander of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on the integration of the SDF into the Syrian state apparatus and a ceasefire, shelling and fighting continued in the east of Aleppo governorate last week.

The fighting factions are, on the one hand, the SDF and, on the other, the so-called Syrian National Army (SNA), which is significantly supported and influenced by Türkiye. In addition, Turkish airstrikes are regularly carried out against SDF targets. The SNA is already nominally considered to be integrated into the Syrian military, but de facto

its command structure, loyalty and leadership remain unchanged. The salaries of its fighters, at least in part, are reportedly also not yet being paid by the transitional government. The Syrian transitional government has not officially commented on the ongoing fighting.

Neither side has recorded any significant losses or gains in the fighting in recent weeks. Both sides are repeatedly accused of attacks that have also caused civilian casualties, but both deny being responsible for such incidents. However, the Institute for the Study of War reported a four-day pause before fighting and attacks resumed on 22.03.25. It stated that there had also been no fighting or attacks between the two sides on 27.03.25 and 28.03.25.<sup>34</sup>

### **President al-Sharaa announces new transitional government**

On 29.03.25, Syria's interim President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, announced the personnel of the new transitional government, which will include 23 ministries.

While key ministries, including the foreign, interior, defence and justice ministries, will continue to be occupied by figures close to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), political activists and a Christian woman have been included in the government alongside representatives of the Druze, Kurdish and Alawite minorities. A total of seven ministers come from the former HTS-dominated government in Idlib.<sup>35</sup>

## **07 April 2025**

### **Prisoner exchange between SDF and the transitional government**

As part of an agreement which had been previously concluded, there was an exchange of prisoners on 03.04.25 between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government in Damascus. Both sides were to hand over roughly 250 prisoners each. According to reports, the SDF initially handed over 97 prisoners, and the transitional government another 110. Further exchanges are to follow.

On the next day, SDF fighters left the enclave in Aleppo City which had been under their control until then. Sheikh Maksoud and Ashrafiyyeh neighbourhoods had both remained under SDF control in recent years, although large parts of the Aleppo Governorate had been under the control of other forces or of the Assad government. Individual reports stated that former members of the internal security forces of the SDF (also known as Asayish) had been integrated into the local police forces.

Media further reported that the fighting between the militias of the Türkiye-backed so-called Syrian National Army (SNA) and the SDF had become less frequent since the agreement had been reached. Moreover, on 31.03.25 there were once more Turkish airstrikes on targets of the SDF, following a pause of several days that had commenced on 23.03.25. Shortly thereafter, the SDF is said to have withdrawn from strategically-contested positions close to the Tishreen dam and the Qaraqouzak bridge. Other sources however stated that SDF troops continued to maintain a presence.<sup>36</sup>

### **Continual killings and acts of retaliation against Alawites**

On 31.03.25, at least four civilians were killed, including a 12-year-old boy, in attacks carried out by members of armed groups acting as part of the new security forces, in the Tartous Governorate.

The Department for General Security in Tartous announced that there would be investigations, and according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) shortly thereafter arrested two members who are alleged to belong to groups under the patronage of the Department for Military Operations. Accordingly, the shooters are said to have driven from a military base into the locality, where they had opened fire on a village chief. SOHR reports of six casualties and more injuries from the Alawite community. Several families are said to have fled because of the events.

Alawites have continued to be exposed to increased acts of revenge and extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad government, after there were massacres among the Alawite population in the coastal governorates in March with more than 1,000 dead (cf. BN of 10.03. and 17.03.25).<sup>37</sup>

### **Ongoing fighting between Assad loyalists and security forces**

Fighting goes on in various parts of the country between groups which were loyal to the Assad government and are

frequently referred to as “remnants of the regime”, and the troops of the transitional government.

In many cases, the groups attack the units of the transitional government, whereupon search and arrest campaigns are instigated against them. There are however also attacks on the population in this context. After on 30.03.25 two soldiers were killed in Talkalakh, near to Homs, individuals from the civilian population are said to have been mistreated and even killed in the subsequent reconnaissance operation.

A US think-tank furthermore reports that in western areas of Syria the actions of security forces at checkpoints, including the extrajudicial as well as unintentional killing of people, is widening the gulf between the local population and the troops of the transitional government, and that this is enabling armed groups previously loyal to Assad to present themselves as a protective force for the population.<sup>38</sup>

### **Israeli airstrikes and military presence**

A total of nine people were killed in Israeli airstrikes on targets in southwestern Syria on 03.04.25. The state news agency SANA stated that they had been civilians, whilst SOHR reported of armed residents.

According to reports, an Israeli military convoy is said to have been attacked when travelling near to Nawa, a place in the Dar'a Governorate. This led to fighting on the ground with air support by the Israeli military. An anti-Israel militia announced shortly thereafter that its combatants had been involved in the fighting. Protests against the Israeli actions were held in many places all over the country.

According to information provided by the Syrian Foreign Minister, Hama Airport had already been almost completely destroyed in airstrikes carried out on several cities on the previous day. Dozens of civilian and military employees are said to have been injured in this operation.

The Israeli military continues to occupy territories in the southwest of the country, holding at least nine outposts from where it carries out ground operations.<sup>39</sup>

### **Nationwide power outage**

On 01.04.25, there was a nationwide blackout because of malfunctions in several places in the grid. The Syrian transitional government is experiencing difficulties when it comes to generating sufficient electricity for the population and distributing it via the dilapidated infrastructure.

Because of the electricity grid and equipment, which have suffered considerably and been neglected over the years, most households in any case only have two to three hours of electricity per day. Most of this was supplied by Iran prior to the toppling of the Assad government. These deliveries however ceased after the toppling and the seizure of power by the Islamist Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham.<sup>40</sup>

## **14 April 2025**

### **Dar'a: Eighth Brigade to be disbanded and integrated into state security apparatus; unstable security situation**

In the Dar'a Governorate, the spokesman of the “Eighth Brigade” announced on 13.04.25 the dissolution of the militia under the command of Ahmad al-Awda and the handing over of all its resources to the Syrian Ministry of Defence.

On 12.04.25, a well-known former militia leader and native of Bosra al-Sham succumbed to wounds he had sustained two days earlier after being shot in armed fighting by members of the “Eighth Brigade”. He had recently joined the security forces of the Ministry of Defence, sparking tensions with members of the “Eighth Brigade” led by Ahmad al-Awda. Ahmad al-Awda was critical of the transitional government under Ahmed al-Sharaa, and was regarded as one of the most influential personalities among armed groups in the Dar'a Governorate. After fighting the Assad government in the Free Syrian Army, he engaged in Russian-mediated negotiations in 2018 for the integration of armed groups into the military under Assad, involving a maximum of autonomy whilst remaining close with Russia. The agreement also permitted the Assad government to maintain a moderate presence in the Dar'a Governorate.

On 11.04.25, the General Security Administration of the transitional government's Ministry of the Interior reached an agreement with the Eighth Brigade to surrender its weapons in Bosra al-Sham. Transitional government security

forces were thereupon sent to Dar'a, where they stepped up the presence of the state security apparatus and assumed control in multiple localities.

The security situation in the Governorate as a whole is fundamentally regarded as tense. Large numbers of abductions and killings are ongoing in the Dar'a Governorate. These are committed by unknown offenders, and go unsolved in most cases. These developments, which have been observed for years, decreased for a time after the Assad government was toppled, but have since increased once more to a comparable level. In particular members of the Central Committee, which was formed for the purpose of negotiating with Russia and the Assad government on clarification of status and reconciliation agreements and was made up of various representatives of civil society, are said to have been the target of attempted killings. The increased presence of transitional-government security forces in recent months has so far also not been able to put a stop to this.<sup>41</sup>

#### **Deadline for probe into massacres extended**

Syria's transitional President Ahmad al-Shar'a announced by decree on 10.04.25 a three-month deadline extension for the Committee for Investigation of the three-day massacre of the (primarily Alawite) civilian population in March 2025 (cf. BN of 10.03. and 17.03.25).

According to the Commission's spokesperson, the investigation would take longer than the 30 days which had been planned and had now expired. The scenes of 41 killings had been covered so far, but more time was needed to collect evidence in order to visit further areas. It was said that the civilian population had been largely cooperative so far, although groups loyal to Assad had issued threats. No further deadline extension was to be permitted.

An estimated 30,000 people are said to have fled to northern Lebanon as a result of the killing of more than 1,000 people, most of whom belonged to the Alawite community.<sup>42</sup>

#### **Marked increase in IS attacks in 2024**

The US Department of Defense stated in a briefing submitted to congress that the activities of the so-called Islamic State in Syria had increased considerably year-on-year in 2024.

According to an anonymous Department of Defense official, the group had claimed responsibility for a total of 121 attacks in 2023, as against a total of 294 in 2024. According to an article in an international newspaper, the UN had recorded more than 400 attacks carried out by the IS, whilst human rights observers presume that the figure is higher still. According to human rights experts, the number of attacks is said to have fallen in 2025.

Syria's security instability and the plans for the transitional government to take over the camps with IS members and their families causes observers concern with regard to a fresh strengthening of the group. Between 9,000 and 10,000 IS members and roughly 40,000 of their relatives are said to live in these camps. These have previously been monitored by the US-backed, Kurd-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), but are intended to be handed to the transitional government as part of the integration of the armed groups into a new state security apparatus.<sup>43</sup>

#### **Aleppo: Transitional government troops take over Tishrin dam**

As part of an agreement between the Kurd-dominated Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) and the transitional government in Damascus, on 12.04.25 troops of the transitional government and representatives of the international alliance against the IS were sent to the Tishrin dam in the east of the Aleppo Governorate.

The dam had been contested since December 2024 because of its strategic position, its potential to supply water for agricultural use, and for electricity generation with a power plant located there. The Turkish-backed armed groups under the umbrella of the so-called Syrian National Army (SNA) had taken neighbouring parts of the Manbij district (cf. BN of 16.12.24), and were wrestling with the SDF for control over the dam, supported by Turkish airstrikes.

On 10.04.25, an agreement was reached between DAANES and the transitional government according to which the dam is to be taken over by the new state security forces and the SDF troops are to withdraw, whilst according to media reports the dam is to remain under Kurdish civilian administration. The latest agreement was reached as part of an accord reached on 10.03.25 providing for negotiations on the integration of DAANES and the affiliated SDF

into the Syrian state apparatus. Control of security in the Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhoods in Aleppo was already handed over last week in this context (cf. BN of 07.04.25).<sup>44</sup>

## **28 April 2025**

### **Retaliatory murders committed on the Alawite population**

Deadly attacks are still being carried out on Alawites, who have been alleged for decades of sympathising with the former Assad government merely as a result of their religion, and who sections of Syrian society regard as supporters or beneficiaries of corruption and human rights violations.

Latakia, Tartous and Homs governorates, which have a larger share of Alawites among the population, are particularly affected. Large numbers of individuals who were critical of the Assad government or who are said to have suffered repression at their hands have also been victims of killings, according to anecdotal reports. Between 30.03. and 15.04.25, according to information from the Director of the Syrian Observatory For Human Rights (SOHR), at least 42 persons are said to have been killed because of their religion. According to a press article of 27.04.25, 14 Alawites were abducted and killed in Homs city in the space of three days. An activist stated that security forces of the transitional government had attempted to seal off the Alawite neighbourhoods, but that the attackers had nonetheless managed to abduct Alawites whose bodies were found later.

The UNHCR estimates that some 30,000 Alawites have fled to Lebanon since the Assad government was toppled and the massacres among the Alawite population took place in early March 2025 (cf. BN of 17.04.25).

Individual offenders have been detained, but there are as yet no results in the criminal proceedings.<sup>45</sup>

### **Continuing clashes between security forces and militias sympathetic to Assad**

Especially in the coastal region, isolated incidents of fighting continue between the security forces of the transitional government and militias sympathetic to Assad. Most recently on 21.04.2025, militias attacked security forces of the transitional government in al-Muntar in Tartous governorate. This was the first such attack in Tartous in three weeks.

Ramy Makhoulouf, a cousin of toppled President Bashar al-Assad, announced via social media that he would be forming troops with former senior commander Suhail al-Hasan in order to provide protection against the rights violations which the transitional government was unable to deliver. Several days later, on 27.04.25, it was alleged via one of his social media profiles that 15 military divisions had been founded in Syria's coastal region alleged to number a total of 150,000 fighters. It was not initially possible to verify the information.<sup>46</sup>

### **USA announce partial withdrawal of their troops**

According to media reports, the USA will be withdrawing some of their troops from Syria. According to an article from an international newspaper, the partial withdrawal is said to have already begun on 17.04.2025 and to include a total of 600 members of the military. 1,400 troops would remain in Syria, according to the report. This is said to primarily affect three out of eight smaller military bases in Deir ez-Zor, in the northeast of Syria.

International observers fear that a smaller US presence will enable ISIS, which was initially less active after the toppling of the Assad government, but according to one expert was now however carrying out several attacks per month, to regain strength.<sup>47</sup>

## **5 May 2025**

### **Fighting in Damascus suburbs and Suwayda**

Subsequent to the online posting of a recording alleged to have insulted the Prophet Mohammed that was initially attributed to a Druse cleric, fighting broke out in the night of 27.-28.04.25 in Jaramana, which borders on the capital Damascus, in the course of which several people were killed. The recording triggered protests in other cities.

Attacks by extremist Sunni groups on Jaramana were followed by local fighting with Druse militias. On the morning after the fighting broke out, troops of the transitional government set up a security cordon around the town in order to prevent further fighting and stop other groups becoming involved. According to official sources, the attackers had primarily been groups not connected with the government, but media reports stated that they were

groups sympathising with the government. In the subsequent days, fighting broke out in the Damascus suburbs of Jaramana and Sahnaya and Ashrafiyat Sahnaya between security forces of the transitional government and groups said to sympathise with the government, and local Druze militias. The neighbourhoods have a large Druze population. There were however also individual media reports of the security forces and Druze militias fighting together against extremist Sunni groups.

Attacks were also carried out by fighters from Bedouin tribes along the highway which leads to Damascus from the Druze-majority Suwayda governorate, as well as in the southwest of Suwayda governorate. The transitional government stepped up its presence along the highway in order to pacify the situation.

According to reports, the transitional government is said to have taken individual steps to protect the Druze population and to stop the violence broadening, including for example by accompanying Druze students from Latakia, Tartous and Homs to Jaramana and Suwayda. There were however voices within the Druze community accusing the transitional government of not having taken adequate measures for their protection.

On 30.04.25, the Israeli military bombed security forces in Sahnaya which it accused of having been involved in the attacks, and threatened to carry out further strikes on government targets should the attacks on the Druze population continue. According to the governor, one member of the security forces and a civilian were killed in the airstrikes. Two days later, jet fighters attacked targets near the presidential palace in Damascus as a warning to the transitional government. Four people were killed in another airstrike in Suwayda while attempting to shoot down an Israeli drone.

According to media reports, an agreement was reached on the evening of 01.05.25 between the transitional government and Druze leaders in order to resolve the violence. This is said to have involved direct cooperation between the security forces of the transitional government and Druze militias, and the integration of 700 local fighters into the transitional government's General Security Services. The transitional government promised in return to investigate and punish rights violations committed in the context of the fighting, and to release 32 Druze who had been detained.

According to information from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), the violence had led to the killings of more than 100 persons, including at least 20 members of the security forces and ten fighters affiliated with them, as well as of 15 Druze fighters and a civilian. 27 Druze are said to have been killed in Suwayda governorate, 23 of them in an ambush on the road to Damascus.<sup>48</sup>

### **Saudi Arabia and Qatar pay off Syria's debt to the World Bank**

Saudi Arabia stated on 14.04.25 that it was willing to pay off Syria's debt to the World Bank amounting to 15 million USD. The Qatar government joined in the scheme. Making the outstanding repayments makes it possible to access millions in renewed support from the World Bank which can help rebuild the public sector and the economy. The Syrian government has been denied access to funding and technical support from the World Bank for more than 14 years.<sup>49</sup>

## **12 May 2025**

### **After fighting in Damascus suburbs and Suwayda**

A tense calm returned to neighbourhoods in the wake of fighting in Jaramana and Sahnaya neighbourhoods, close to Damascus city, in the previous week (cf. BN of 05.05.25).

It was initially agreed in an agreement reached between the transitional government and Druze leadership that no external security personnel would be sent to Suwayda governorate. In fact, local forces are to be nominally affiliated with the General Security Forces and to continue to be responsible for security. Only a police chief appointed by the transitional government was not himself from Suwayda. Druze groups had previously refused to hand over their weapons and integrate into the security apparatus like other groups. This symbolic affiliation with the transitional government could build bridges of trust towards further integration of the Druze forces into the security apparatus. Suwayda initially continued to see isolated fighting between factions collaborating with the transitional government and groups loyal to Assad. Roughly four persons are said to have been killed in the al-Dour neighbourhood, near the Daraa-Suwayda governorate border.

Fears remain high among the Druze population, as well as in other minorities in Syria. Large amounts of sectarian

content have been circulating online, partly stemming from falsified depictions of the circumstances portrayed. Because of open hostility in Homs, large numbers of Druze students have left their dormitories in various towns in the past weeks and returned to their families or been accommodated in separate, secure dormitories. The ministry of higher education prohibited the sharing of content that harms national unity or civil peace by students and staff at the universities.<sup>50</sup>

### **Retaliatory killings and attacks on Alawites continue**

There have been ongoing attacks on persons because of their Alawite beliefs, as well as retaliatory killings of persons (allegedly) working with or for the Assad government. According to reports, an Alawite sheikh and journalist was for instance killed on 04.05.25 in the village of al Zafarana, Homs governorate, by the Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah. The group believes that Alawites are apostates. A senior member of the military under Assad had been abducted and killed on 03.05.25 in the Najih neighbourhood, in Dar'a governorate.

According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), at least 361 civilians are said to have been extrajudicially killed in Homs and Hama governorates between January and the end of April 2025. Most of the deadly attacks are said to have taken place in areas inhabited by Alawites. The number of retaliatory killings and attacks on the Alawite population also remains high in other parts of the country, especially in the coastal region.

According to reports, the general security service banned the use of motorcycles after 7 p.m. in Homs City, presumably in an attempt to stop the killings, as many attacks were carried out by armed motorcyclists. Armed riding of a motorcycle was reportedly prohibited during the day.<sup>51</sup>

### **Public sector salaries increased thanks to Qatari financial support**

According to media reports of 08.05.2025, Qatar will be providing financial support to the Syrian transitional government so that it can increase public sector salaries.

The Qatari government had agreed to provide the support several months ago, but had not yet been willing to risk breaching US sanctions. A news agency has now reported that the USA had approved the payments of 29 million USD per month for the coming three months, and pledged to exempt the payments from sanctions. There was an option to renew the payments. The financial support was however earmarked exclusively for salary increases for civilian public sector workers. The interior and defence ministries, to which both the general security service and the department for military operation belong, are excluded from the funding. Whilst the news agency article reports of a 400 % raise in salaries from the following month onwards, other media outlets cite increases of only 20 % beginning next month.<sup>52</sup>

### **First international flight lands at Aleppo; direct flights to the EU announced**

A plane of Royal Jordanian Airlines touched down at Aleppo International Airport on 06.05.2025, after a hiatus of 14 years. This was also the first international flight to Aleppo since the toppling of the Assad government in December 2024. There are plans to operate three flights per week in future.

Romanian airline DAN Air furthermore announced plans to offer direct flights between Damascus and the cities of Bucharest, Frankfurt, Berlin and Stockholm from mid-June 2025. According to their website, two flights per destination per week are planned.<sup>53</sup>

## **19 May 2025**

### **USA announce lifting of sanctions**

US president Donald Trump announced on 13.05.25, during his visit to Saudi Arabia, that he would be lifting sanctions on Syria. This is said to particularly relate to three packages of sanctions, one of which was imposed back in 1979 against the Syrian government of Hafez al-Assad, when the country was declared a “state sponsor of terrorism”. A further package followed in 2003 which also sought to prevent state-sponsored terrorism. A third package from 2019, the so-called “Caesar Act”, targeted Syrian players considered to be responsible for human rights violations during the civil war.

The US administration named as preconditions for the lifting of the sanctions amongst other things guarantees on

the limitation of the Iranian influence in Syria, the destruction of chemical weapons, the barring of foreign fighters from official posts, protection of ethnic and religious minorities, as well as support in the search for US nationals in Syria.

International sanctions have a major impact on the economic situation and on the everyday life of the Syrian population. Imports and investments were made impossible in many sectors, which led to shortages of many goods, a rise in smuggling activities, and restrictions on humanitarian organisations. The complete lifting of US sanctions could allow Syrian banks to return to the international banking system, and hence financial remittances to be made to Syria.

Although the lifting is only an announcement at present (and still needs to be partly approved by the US congress), Syrians in several major Syrian cities celebrated the US president's decision. More than 90 % of them live below the poverty line and are suffering from the country's inadequate infrastructure. The exchange rate of the Syrian lira to the US dollar leapt up by 60 %.

After the US administration had maintained a considerable distance to the Syrian transitional government for months, the first meeting between the two governments for 25 years took place on the day after the announcement of the lifting of sanctions in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.<sup>54</sup>

### **IS in Syria**

On 17.05.25, the General Intelligence Service carried out a military operation against an IS cell in Aleppo city. One member of the General Security Forces is said to have been killed in the fighting which subsequently broke out.

According to reports, the extremist group is said to be making efforts to recruit new members within Syria, and particularly in the areas under the control of the transitional government, following the rapprochement between the USA and the Syrian transitional government. They accused transitional president al-Shar'a of being obsessed with power, and called on members of the security forces, and foreign fighters in particular, to join its cells in more rural areas.<sup>55</sup>

### **Ongoing extrajudicial killings, abductions**

Reports continue to be regularly received of extrajudicial killings, abductions and attacks in several regions of Syria. On 14.05.25, for instance, an Alawite man was kidnapped near Jableh in Latakia governorate. The precise background to the abduction was not initially known.

Many of the deadly attacks are said to be carried out by armed individuals on motorcycles, so that the General Intelligence Service in Latakia has announced a ban on the use of motorcycles at night. Such a ban had already been imposed in Homs City. According to reports, the killings are frequently carried out on staff or alleged collaborators of the Assad government. In other cases, they however also target Syria's Alawite population, which large sections of society regard as having benefited from the former government.<sup>56</sup>

## **26 May 2025**

### **USA suspends several sanctions; EU announces suspension**

Ten days after the announcement of the suspension of sanctions against the Syrian Arab Republic (cf. BN of 29.05.25), the US administration lifted on 23.05.25 some of the sanctions which made it impossible for US nationals and companies to enter into transactions with entities in Syria such as the Central Bank, public authorities, as well as individuals such as transitional president al-Shar'a and interior minister Khattab. The state department furthermore announced its intention to suspend further sanctions under the so-called Caesar Act for six months. It is therefore possible to put the sanctions back in place once this period has passed. The US administration however announced that it would be completely lifting the sanctions in the medium term, but that this would take place in several stages due to regulations and necessary processes. Potential investors might however delay the implementation of projects within Syria due to concerns that the sanctions could be reinstated.

The EU also announced on 20.05.25 that it was lifting all sanctions against the Syrian economy, whilst those targeting the Assad regime were to remain in place.<sup>57</sup>

### **Impending drought**

One of the driest winters in decades has badly affected Syria's water supply and agricultural yields. Rainfall during the first quarter of 2025 totalled just 94.9 mm. The figure is hence well below the long-term average for 1989–2015 of 165.4 mm, and hence places major sections of agriculture at a disadvantage. According to information from the Central Bureau of Statistics, roughly 78 % of cultivated land was rainfed in 2022, whilst irrigated farmland along the Euphrates River is also impacted by the fact that river levels have been falling.

The Ayn al-Fijeh spring near Damascus and the Barada River, which feeds it, together supply water to roughly five million people, thus providing 70 % of water needs within Damascus. A reduction in rainfall in the past winter has however caused the spring to only provide a fraction of the usual volume of water. The Damascus population hence increasingly relies on purchasing water from tankers, thus placing an additional financial burden on those affected. According to reports, parts of the city only have running water for 90 minutes per day if no additional water is bought in from tankers. The authorities are warning that the situation will become worse still over the summer.<sup>58</sup>

### **Interior ministry restructuring announced**

The Syrian interior ministry announced on 24.05.2025 comprehensive restructuring of its own authority which is intended to help secure Syria and its borders. The changes had already been approved by the transitional president, and would now be gradually implemented. The restructuring is to include incorporating the forces of the General Security agency and the police into an Internal Security command. Together with the defence ministry, regulations would be implemented to reduce the further spread of arms within the country. A border security body is to be established to protect Syria's land and sea frontiers and combat smuggling and criminal activities. Another department would be entrusted with handling the protection of government facilities and foreign missions within Syria.

Data collection and administrative processes are to be digitalised as far as possible and reorganised. At the same time, the introduction of new identity cards would be prepared. Citizens' complaints departments were to be set up in order to enhance control and supervision. A new prison administration would furthermore place a stronger focus on the rehabilitative aspect and compliance with human rights in prisons.

More than 8 million Syrians were wanted by the toppled government and its various intelligence services. This corresponds to almost one-third of the total population. These cases now need to be reopened and the status of these individuals clarified and settled so that their civil rights can be restored to them.<sup>59</sup>

### **Latakia: several deaths in attack on Russian military base**

Two armed individuals launched an attack on 21.05.25 on the Russian Hmeimim airbase in Latakia governorate. Three individuals were killed according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The identity of the two attackers has so far remained unclear. According to individual reports, it was however presumed that they were members of groups connected with the transitional government. According to an unnamed Syrian official, they are said to have been foreigners working as trainers for the new Syrian security forces. They are said to have acted alone and independently, and not to belong to any armed faction.<sup>60</sup>

### **Hama: three killed in attack on Syrian civil defence**

On 22.05.25, three people were killed in Hama governorate in an attack on employees of the Syrian civil defence, also known as "White helmets". The three persons killed had been called in to defuse a bomb or explosive war remnants. The explosive detonated on the spot, killing the three people. According to a report, it is said to have been a deliberate attack, and the explosive to have been set off by remote.<sup>61</sup>

### **Deir ez-Zor: first deadly IS attack on forces of the transitional government**

Four people, including a civilian, were killed in a car bomb attack on a checkpoint near the town of Mayadin, in Deir ez-Zor governorate, on 19.05.25. The attack is being attributed to IS. This was the first deadly attack on security forces of the transitional government. IS has been primarily active in Deir ez-Zor governorate since the toppling of

the Assad government, where it carried out attacks on SDF forces. Three members of the group had been killed in Aleppo on the previous day in an operation against an IS cell; four others were arrested and explosives were seized (cf. BN of 19.05.25).<sup>62</sup>

#### **As-Suwayda: governor submits his resignation following attack**

According to reports, on 21.05.25 an armed group stormed the office of the governor of As-Suwayda, Mustafa al-Bakour, and threatened him. They called for the release of a prisoner accused of theft and other offences. The convicted person was thereupon released. After news of the incident had surfaced, other armed factions from the governorate intervened, including Liwa al-Jabal and Harakat Rijjal al-Karama, and secured the governor's release. Two days later, al-Bakour submitted his request for resignation without stating reasons.

The security situation in As-Suwayda is different than in other parts of Syria. In order to settle unrest and fighting, an agreement was reached with influential local personalities and the transitional government on 01.05.25 whereby local forces would assume responsibility for internal security affairs under the supervision of the state. It had been announced only days before that the judicial police in As-Suwayda had begun operations. A total of more than 2,200 people from As-Suwayda had joined the local security forces under the supervision of the ministry of the interior.<sup>63</sup>

## **2 June 2025**

#### **Agreement reached regarding further action on the prison camp in al-Hol**

Agreement was reached on 27.05.25 between the Kurdish-dominated Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the government in Damascus regarding the future of the prison camp in al-Hol.

One of the declared goals was said to be the reintegration of the inmates, the majority of whom are reported to be the wives and children of IS group members, and above all the return of the Syrian detainees to their original areas. The government is not to take over the management of the camp, but this is to remain with the local authorities in northeastern Syria. A joint committee is to review the inmates' files and decide on an ad hoc basis what action is to be taken.<sup>64</sup>

#### **Financial support from Saudi Arabia and Qatar**

On 31.05.25, Saudi Arabia announced that it would be helping to fund Syria's public sector, together with Qatar. The two Gulf monarchies will be helping to fund an unpublished share of the payments for Syrian public-sector salaries for a period of three months. This announcement was made in the context of the announcement of greater Saudi economic commitment in Syria as a consequence of the lifting of EU and US sanction regimes.<sup>65</sup>

#### **IS claims first attack on forces of the Syrian transitional government**

On 28.05.25, an attack was carried out on a Syrian Army patrol in As-Suwayda province. On 29.05.25, IS claimed responsibility for this attack.

This is the first attack on forces of the new government for which IS has officially claimed responsibility, as its activities had previously been mainly aimed at the Kurdish-led security forces of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This means that IS is escalating its current campaign in Syria. There had previously been attacks which had been attributed to IS, but IS had never claimed responsibility for them.<sup>66</sup>

#### **Relationship with Israel**

On 29.05.25, an interview with president Sharaa was published in which he once more confirmed indirect contacts with Israel, and indicated that he was seeking a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflicts. This was however contingent on the Israeli airstrikes on Syrian territory ceasing, albeit he also stated for the record that Israel and Syria had common enemies and that cooperation could lead to greater stability and security in the region.

On 30.05.25, in the first such attack in several weeks, Israel once more flew an airstrike, hitting a target close to the village of Zama in Latakia province. One person is said to have been killed in the attack, the target of which was initially unclear.<sup>67</sup>

## **16 June 2025**

### **Idlib: targeted killings by drone fire**

On 10.06.25, a man was killed and three other persons were wounded according to media reports when their car was attacked by a missile from an unidentified drone in Idlib governorate.

On the same day, two men were killed on a motorcycle in the same way near al-Dana al-Bardakli. Nothing was initially known regarding the identities of those killed. A local news outlet reported that it was a MQ-9 combat drone, which would point to an airstrike by the US-led international coalition against IS.<sup>68</sup>

### **Foreign fighters integrated into the army**

According to a report by an international news agency of 02.06.25, the USA are said to have recently given up their diplomatic resistance to the integration of foreign fighters into the Syrian national army if the Syrian interim government ensures transparent implementation. According to members of the Syrian defence ministry, a new unit known as the 84th army division, consisting of some 3,500 foreign fighters (mainly from China) and an undetermined number of Syrian soldiers was thus to be formed. The fate of foreign fighters in the country has so far been one of the most fraught issues hindering a rapprochement with western countries. Interim president al-Shar'a has said that foreign fighters and their families may be granted Syrian citizenship due to their support in fighting the Assad government.

During the Syria conflict, the Uyghurs, who came from China and central Asian countries, formed a Syrian branch of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), an Islamist party established in Pakistan in 1988 which is designated as a terrorist organisation by the EU and China, amongst others.

According to estimates from diplomatic circles and experts, there may be as many as 5,000 foreign fighters still in Syria at present. The several thousands of foreign fighters who are in prisons are not included in this estimate. Roughly half of the estimated 9,000 to 10,000 IS fighters who are currently in detention are said to come from abroad.<sup>69</sup>

### **Situation developments**

Trading resumed on Syria's securities exchange on 02.06.25 after a six-month closure

Also on 02.06.25, a prisoner exchange was completed between the interim government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). According to media reports, this involved more than 400 persons being released. The exchange formed part of a deal reached on 10.03.25 (cf. BN of 17.03.25), and is to be a step in the process of confidence-building measures between the former enemies.

Syrians were exempted from a recently-introduced travel ban to the USA issued by the Trump administration on 04.06.25 for nationals of a number of countries. The list of countries whose nationals are banned from entering is almost identical to the previous order from 2017 (which then US president Biden rescinded in 2021). In comparison, the countries Iraq, North Korea and Nigeria have been exempted, along with Syria.

On 05.06.25, Turkish Airlines subsidiary AJet also announced that it would be starting direct flights to Damascus from Ankara and Istanbul from 16.06.25. There are to be daily flights from July 2025 onwards. The parent group resumed flights to Damascus in January 2025 after a 13-year suspension. The planned resumption of flight operations is however subject to the proviso of the current war situation between Israel and Iran.

On 14.06.25, Iraq officially opened the al-Qaim border crossing with Syria for passenger traffic and trade, a spokesman for the Iraqi border authorities said on the same day. The opening was said to have taken place following a joint security assessment by the Syrian and Iraqi authorities.<sup>70</sup>

### **USA: military presence to be scaled down to Hasakah**

In a television interview with Turkish news broadcaster NTV on 03.06.25, Thomas Barrack, US ambassador in

Türkiye and at the same time special envoy for Syria, announced that the previous eight US military bases in Syria would be reduced to one in future.

There were already reports in April 2025 that military equipment had been withdrawn from Deir ez-Zor. Staff across Syria had also been reduced from approx. 2,000 to 1,400.<sup>71</sup>

#### **Türkiye: military presence to be maintained until further notice**

The Turkish defence minister said to an international news agency on 04.06.25 that there were no plans to reduce the current presence of approx. 20,000 Turkish military on Syrian territory in the foreseeable future. Türkiye was training and advising Syrian security forces. It was also providing support in rebuilding and facilitating the return of millions of civil war refugees to Syria.

The military presence could only be re-evaluated when Syria had achieved peace and stability, when the threat of terrorism in the region had been fully removed, when Turkish border security was fully ensured, and when the return of people who had had to flee was done.<sup>72</sup>

#### **Tension with Israel: firing on the Golan Heights; Israeli raid on Syrian locality**

According to media reports, rockets were fired on Israel from Syrian territory on 03.06.25 for the first time since the toppling of the Assad government. These fell on an uninhabited area in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

A Syrian government representative blamed a remnant of pro-Iranian militias from the Assad era for the attack who are said to be located in Quneitra. Arab and Palestinian media however reported that a Hamas-inspired faction by the name of “Martyr Mohammed Deif Brigades” had claimed responsibility for the attack.

The Israeli air force is said, according to media reports, to have fired on arms depots of the Syrian forces in Rif Dimashq, Quneitra and Dar’a governorates on the same day. No information was provided on any fatalities or casualties.

On 08.06.25, the Israeli military reported that it had flown an airstrike against a member of Hamas in Mazraat Beit Jin (Rif Dimashq) in Syria. On 12.06.25, Israeli commandos had entered the locality and arrested several people who Syria’s interior ministry later claimed were civilians. According to the interior ministry, one person had been killed as a result of shooting in the Israeli military operation and seven others abducted. Syrian media reported that roughly 100 Israeli military had been involved.

Israel identified the persons as Hamas members, and claims to have confiscated arms and ammunition and transferred the detainees to Israel for questioning. Mazraat Beit Jin is located roughly 50 km southwest of the capital Damascus.<sup>73</sup>

### **23 June 2025**

#### **Attack on church in Damascus**

On the evening of 22.06.25, a suicide bomber carried out an attack in the Greek Orthodox Church of the Prophet Elias in Damascus’ Dweila neighbourhood. Syria’s health ministry has so far confirmed that at least 22 people have been killed and 63 others wounded. The local authorities blamed IS for the attack, albeit the group itself has yet to claim responsibility. It is presumed that IS currently has between 1,500 and 3,000 fighters in Syria. According to interior minister Anas Khattab, investigations have been ordered. The attack was unanimously condemned by political and societal players. It would be the first IS attack on this scale since the transitional government came to power, and the first such attack in Damascus itself.<sup>74</sup>

#### **Further sanctions lifted**

On 20.06.25, Switzerland lifted its remaining economic sanctions against Syria. On the same day, the central bank announced that a bank transfer had been carried out using the SWIFT system for the first time since the sanctions were lifted. This meant that a first bank in Syria was able to be reconnected to the international payments system.<sup>75</sup>

#### **USA pull out of two bases in northeastern Syria**

On 17.06.25, it became known that the USA have pulled out of two more bases in northeastern Syria. The

concentration of the USA on the base in Hasaka, and the reduction of its overall troop numbers, is generally regarded in the region as destabilising, as there is concern that this would give IS further opportunities to recover and attain greater freedom of movement.<sup>76</sup>

### **Tensions with Israel: Israeli raids on Syrian villages**

According to various reports, there were repeated raids and patrols by Israeli forces, particularly between 19.06. and 22.06.25, also outside of the area currently controlled by Israel. The precise motivation for this is unclear. Several residents of the Israeli-occupied areas in Al-Qunaitrah stated that the Israelis had repeatedly destroyed homes and agricultural infrastructure.<sup>77</sup>

## **30 June 2025**

### **Attack on church in Damascus**

The death toll from the deadly attack on the Mar Elias church in Damascus (cf. BN of 23.06.25) has risen to more than 25. According to individual sources, further attacks on a Shiite shrine and a crowded public square in the ensuing days were reportedly prevented. According to information from the transitional government, two members of IS were killed in raids on hideouts used by IS, including one who is said to have been involved in the planning of the attack on Mar Elias.

On 23.06.25, the Saraya Ansar al-Sunna group claimed responsibility for the attack. This is a group which first surfaced in February 2025 and claims responsibility for multiple attacks on Alawites, as well as also on targets of the transitional government, and on Druze targets.

Experts are however sceptical with regard to the group's actual capacities and presence on the ground. Some primarily regard the group, which is Salafist by ideology, as an online phenomenon, and doubt that a member of the group actually carried out the attack. Its members are said to allegedly include deserters from the HTS, but also from IS.<sup>78</sup>

### **World Bank approves grant financing**

The World Bank approved on 25.06.25 146 million USD in grant financing to the Syrian state. The money is to be used to restore reliable electricity supplies and support the country's economic recovery. Damaged transmission lines and transformer substations are said to have constituted the focus of the financing, along with technical assistance for the electricity sector.

This, according to the minister of finance, first World Bank project in Syria in four decades was only made possible by Qatar and Saudi Arabia clearing Syria's remaining World Bank debt of 15 million USD in May 2025. The Syrian state, which is in bad economic shape, did not have sufficient financial resources to do so, according to reports.<sup>79</sup>

### **Alawite women abducted**

An international news agency reported on 27.06.25 of the disappearance of at least 33 Alawite women aged between 16 and 39 in the Tartous, Latakia and Hama governorates since the HTS assumed power in December 2024.

According to the news agency article, only Alawite women had been targeted. In 16 of the cases, the families are assuming that the women had been kidnapped. Eight of the missing women are still under the age of 18. In three of the 16 cases, the women sent messages to their families saying that they had been taken out of the country. There has been no word on the whereabouts of the abductees in nine other cases.

Nearly half of the 33 women concerned have since returned home. The families were however unwilling to comment about the precise circumstances of the return, citing security fears.

According to the article, the families felt that the police of the transitional government had not taken them seriously. The central authorities did not respond to a request for an official statement. A media officer for the governor of Tartous stated that Alawite women were not being targeted, and that such cases were frequently down to family disputes or personal reasons. He claimed that women were running away from the prospect of marrying someone they did not want to marry, or in order to attract attention. A media officer from Latakia echoed these

comments, saying that women eloped with non-marital partners, and families fabricated such abduction stories in order to avoid the associated social stigma.<sup>80</sup>

Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration  
Briefing Notes  
[BN-Redaktion@bamf.bund.de](mailto:BN-Redaktion@bamf.bund.de)

- 
- 1 Associated Press, Conflict between Turkey and Kurdish groups rises around key dam in northern Syria, last update 09.01.25; Institute for the Study of War, Iran Update, last update 12.01.2025; France24, 37 killed in north Syria clashes between pro-Turkey, Kurdish forces: monitor, last update 09.01.2025; Middle East Eye, Dozens of pro-Turkey and Kurdish forces killed in fighting in northern Syria, last update 05.01.2025; Syria Direct, 'To send a message': What happened to the Tishreen Dam protest convoy?, last update 10.01.2025.
  - 2 Associated Press, Syrian government forces carry out arrests of suspected militia who worked with Assad, last update 31.12.2024; Associated Press, AP PHOTOS: Syria's new security forces conduct sweeps in Homs, looking for ousted Assad's loyalists, last update 02.01.2025; NYT, Syrian Government Forces Hunt for a Senior Assad Official, last update 26.12.2014; Associated Press, Clashes between Islamists now in power in Syria and Assad's supporters kill 6 fighters, last update 26.12.2024; Associated Press, An uneasy calm settles over Syrian city of Homs after outbreak of sectarian violence, last update 27.12.2024; NYT, Syria's Alawite Minority, Favored by the Assads, Looks Nervously to the Future, last update 27.12.2024; NYT, Syria's New Government Steps Up Pursuit of Assad Loyalists, last update 28.12.2024.
  - 3 Associated Press, Syrian government forces carry out arrests of suspected militia who worked with Assad, last update 31.12.2024; Associated Press, AP PHOTOS: Syria's new security forces conduct sweeps in Homs, looking for ousted Assad's loyalists, last update 02.01.2025; NYT, Syrian Government Forces Hunt for a Senior Assad Official, last update 26.12.2014; Associated Press, Clashes between Islamists now in power in Syria and Assad's supporters kill 6 fighters, last update 26.12.2024; Enab Baladi, Details of security campaign against "war criminals" in Homs, last update 06.01.25; Institute for the Study of War, Iran Update, last update 12.01.2025.
  - 4 Associated Press, US eases restrictions on Syria while keeping sanctions in place, last update 06.01.2025; Enab Baladi, Caesar Act prevents economic recovery in Syria, last update 31.12.2024; Associated Press, First international commercial flight since Assad's ouster lands at Syria's main airport, last update 08.01.2025; DLF, US-Regierung kündigt vorübergehende Lockerung von Syrien-Sanktionen an, last update 07.01.2024; Al Jazeera, Rebuilding Syria's economy: Can stability return after war?, last update 08.01.2024; Reuters, Stampede kills four people, injures 16 in Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, last update 10.01.2025; Associated Press, Stampede outside mosque in Damascus kills at least three, last update 10.01.2025; VOA, US eases restrictions on Syria while keeping sanctions in place, last update 06.01.24; Enab Baladi, Idlib teachers go on strike due to half-salary payments, last update 06.01.2024.
  - 5 NYT, Many Syrians Want Justice for Regime Crimes. Others Want Revenge, The New York Times, last update 16.01.2025. The Washington Post, Syria's new leaders struggle to contain revenge killings after Assad, last update 18.12.2024; Asharq Al Awsat, Revenge Attacks in Rural Damascus Raise Human Rights Concerns, 11.01.2025; Associated Press, A massacre, a rumored hanging and Syrians' thirst for justice and revenge, last update 19.12.2024; Charles Lister Syria Weekly Substack (7-14 Jan), last update 14.01.2025; Gregory Waters Syria Revisited (Week 5), last update 13.01.2025.
  - 6 Associated Press, Syria's new administration condemns Israeli incursions after strike in southern Syria killed three, last update 16.01.2025; MEE, Israeli attack kills mayor and two others in southern Syria, says media, last update 15.01.2025; The Jerusalem Post, Israeli strike kills three, including Golan border village leader – report, last update 16.01.2025.
  - 7 UN OCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Flash Update No. 12 on the Recent Developments in Syria (as of 21 January 2025), last update 22.01.2025; Enab Baladi, War remnants kill 40 Syrians in less than two months, last update 20.01.2025.
  - 8 Reuters, Syria's al-Hol camp readies first return of Syrian detainees, director says, last update 24.01.2025; Enab Baladi, AANES allows residents of al-Hol camp to depart, 23.01.2025.
  - 9 Institute for the Study of War, Iran Update, January 26, 2025, last update 26.01.2025; Enab Baladi, Battles of Tishrin Dam: A pressure tool in negotiations with SDF, last update 20.01.2025; SOHR, Amid renewal of Turkish airstrikes on eastern Aleppo | 17 people, including female leader of SDF, killed and injured, last update 25.01.2025; The New Arab, Tensions in northeast Syria rise amid Damascus-SDF negotiations, last update 20.10.2025; Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Kurdish-Led Syrian Democratic Forces Battle Turkish Proxies Amid Calls for Their Dissolution, last update 21.01.2025; The New Arab, Several Turkey-backed fighters killed as fierce Tishrin dam clashes continue, last update 21.01.2025; UN OCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Flash Update No. 12 on the Recent Developments in Syria (as of 21 January 2025), last update 22.01.2025.
  - 10 Institute for the Study of War, Iran Update, January 26, 2025, last update 26.01.2025; The New Arab, Tensions in northeast Syria rise amid Damascus-SDF negotiations, last update 20.10.2025; Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Kurdish-Led Syrian Democratic Forces Battle Turkish Proxies Amid Calls for Their Dissolution, last update 21.01.2025.

- 
- 11 The New York Times, Rebel Leader Who Overthrew al-Assad Is Declared Syria's President, last update 29.12.2025; Associated Press, Leader of rebels who toppled Syrian President Bashar Assad is named country's interim president, last update 29.01.2025.
  - 12 Reuters, Car bomb blast near Syria's Manbij kills 15, civil defense says, last update 03.02.2025.
  - 13 ISW, Iran Update, February 4, 2025, last update 04.02.2025; ISW, Iran Update, February 5, 2025, last update 05.02.2025; ISW, Iran Update, February 6, 2025, last update 06.02.2025; ISW, Iran Update, February 7, 2025, last update 07.02.2025; ISW, Iran Update, February 8, 2025, last update 08.02.2025; ISW, Iran Update, February 9, 2025, last update 09.02.2025; NPA, Syrian Government Forces Enter Afrin, Take Control from Turkey-Backed Factions, last update 06.02.2025; Enab Baladi, Syrian Defense Ministry appoints "Abu Amsha" as Hama Brigade commander, last update 03.02.2025; Enab Baladi, "الموقتة" تصرف تحت كوادرها تضع "الموقتة" دمشق حكومة [Interim puts its cadres at the disposal of the Damascus government], last update 04.02.2025; Syria Direct, Can Suwayda's factions enforce security and stop the spread of weapons?, last update 06.02.2025.
  - 14 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic 2024, o.D.; NYT, Trump's Foreign Aid Freeze Has Created Chaos. Here Is What to Know, last update 09.02.2025; Associated Press, Head of Turkish NGO: future uncertain as USAID cuts support to humanitarian projects, last update 06.02.2025; Associated Press, Life deteriorates for displaced in camp in northeastern Syria after Trump's foreign aid freeze, last update 03.02.2025; Associated Press, Trump's aid freeze shocks a Syria camp holding families linked to the Islamic State group, last update 04.02.2025.
  - 15 Etana, Syria Update #18: 15 February 2025, last update 14.02.2025; DPA, Bericht: Israels Armee dringt in syrische Dörfer ein, last update 14.02.2025; ISW, Iran Update, February 11, 2025, last update 11.02.2025.
  - 16 SJAC, Two Months After Assad's Fall, Assad-Like Violations Are Still Being Committed in Syria, last update 13.02.2025; Etana, Syria Update #18: 15 February 2025, last update 14.02.2025; SNHR, A Number of Violations, Including Torture and Violations of Human Dignity and Religious Symbols, Took Place in a Security Crackdown in Homs Governorate, last update 31.01.2025.
  - 17 Associated Press, France's Macron urges Syria's interim government to join a US-led coalition fighting extremists, last update 13.02.2025; Associated Press, The talks shaping Syria's new constitution will exclude Kurdish forces, organizers say, last update 14.02.2025; The New Arab, Syria's transitional government forms national dialogue committee, last update 12.02.2025; ISW, Iran Update, February 13, 2025, last update 13.02.2025 ISW, Iran Update, February 12, 2025, last update 12.02.2025.
  - 18 ISW, Iran Update, February 18, 2025, last update 18.02.2025; Etana, Syria Update #19: 22 February 2025, last update 20.02.2025; ISW, Iran Update, February 19, 2025, last update 19.02.2025.
  - 19 Enab Baladi, الوطني للمؤتمر دعوات توجيه تعلن التحضيرية اللجنة [Preparatory Committee announces invitations to the National Conference] last update 23.02.2025; Associated Press, Syria's national dialogue conference is in flux amid pressure for a political transition, last update 21.02.2025; Charles Lister @Charles\_Lister, (X), last update 23.02.2025; George Sabra @GerorgSabra\_sy, (X), last update 23.02.2025; SANA, Preparatory Committee for National Dialogue Conference: invitations to participants to begin Sunday, last update 23.02.2025; Reuters, Syrian national dialogue to begin on February 25, last update 23.02.2025.
  - 20 Associated Press, Netanyahu says Israel won't allow Syrian forces 'south of Damascus', last update 24.02.2025; NYT, In Syria, Joy at a Dictator's Demise Turns Into Fear of Israeli Raids, last update 22.02.2025; Enab Baladi, محافظات ثلاث من السلاح بنزع يطالب نتنياهو [Netanyahu calls for disarmament of three Syrian provinces], last update 23.02.2025.
  - 21 Reuters, SDF chief says PKK disarmament call 'not related to us in Syria', last update 27.02.2025; ISW, Iran Update, February 27, 2025, last update 27.02.2025; ISW, Iran Update, February 23, 2025, last update 28.02.2025; Enab Baladi, Abdi supports Öcalan's call, disassociates from its implementation, last update 28.02.2025.
  - 22 ISW, Iran Update, February 24, 2025, last update 24.02.2025; ISW, Iran Update, February 27, 2025, last update 27.02.2025; Enab Baladi, حماة في مدنيين يقتلون مسلحون [Gunmen kill two civilians in Hama], last update 02.03.2025.
  - 23 Reuters, Members of leading Syrian Kurdish authorities not asked to national dialogue, last update 24.02.2025; Reuters, Syria to hold dialogue conference amid criticism over inclusivity, last update 24.02.2025; Reuters, Syrians back freedoms, constitutional process at landmark dialogue, last update 25.02.2025; France24, Syria forms committee to draft transitional constitutional charter, letzte Aktualisierung 02.03.2025; السوري الوطني الحوار مؤتمر @syrilandc, (X), last update 25.02.2025; Syria Direct, Women delegates weigh in on Syria's national dialogue conference, last update 27.02.2025; Enab Baladi, National Dialogue Conference: Criticisms surround Syria's national entitlement, last update 25.02.2025; Enab Baladi, With 18 points... National Dialogue Conference concludes its work, last update 26.02.2025; Enab Baladi, سوريا في الدستوري الإعلان مسودة لصياغة لجنة تشكيل [Formation of a committee to draft the constitutional declaration in Syria], last update 02.03.2025; NYT, Talks on Syria's Future Fall Short of Promises, Participants Say, last update 26.02.2025.
  - 24 NYT, Syrian Forces Deployed in Majority-Druze Town After Clash, last update 02.03.2025; Enab Baladi, جرمانا داخل ينتشر العام الأمن [General Security deployed inside Jaramana], last update 02.03.2025; Enab Baladi, Israel threatens Damascus via Jaramana, last update 01.03.2025; Associated Press, Israel's military is told to prepare to defend a Druze community outside Syria's capital, 01.03.2025.

- 
- 25 Associated Press, Assad loyalists kill at least 13 police officers in ambush on Syrian forces in coastal town, last update 10.03.2025; SOHR, إعدام تصفية 830 وإعداد الانتقام في مواطن 830 ووجياله الساحل في الأكبر الجماعي الانتقام في مواطن 830 وإعداد تصفية, last update 09.03.2025; Associated Press, UN urges an end to fighting in Syria, last update 07.03.2025; Associated Press, Clashes in Syria between government forces and Assad loyalists kill more than 200, last update 08.03.2025; SOHR, Amid distress calls by civilians | Areas in Tartus and Latakia countryside come under attack by drones and artillery shells, last update 09.03.2025; dpa, Aktivisten prangern «Massaker» an Alawiten in Syrien an, last update 09.03.2025; Etana, Syria Update #21: 8 March 2025, last update 08.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 7, 2025, last update 07.03.2025; Enab Baladi, 311 casualties among government forces and civilians in Syrian coast, last update 08.03.2025; Enab Baladi, Rights organization documents government and civilian deaths in Syrian coast, last update 08.03.2025; Reuters, Scores killed as Syrian forces seek to crush Alawite insurgency, last update 07.03.2025; Reuters, Syria's Sharaa scrambles to contain deadliest violence in years, last update 10.03.2025.
- 26 Etana, Syria Update #21: 8 March 2025, last update 08.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 7, 2025, last update 07.03.2025; NYT, While Calm Reigns in Damascus, Battles in Syria's Northeast Rage On, last update 05.03.2025.
- 27 SNHR, 803 Individuals Extrajudicially Killed Between March 6-10, 2025, last update 11.03.2025; Reuters, 'Pray for us. They've arrived': How Syria descended into revenge bloodshed, last update 16.03.2025; Zenith, Die gefährliche Lage von Syriens Alawiten, last update 05.03.2025; The Washington Institute, Syria's Transitional Honeymoon Is Over After Massacres and Disinformation, last update 10.03.2025; SNHR, Daily Update: Extrajudicial Killings on the Syrian Coast (March 6–March 15, 2025), last update 15.03.2025; The National, 'Are you Alawite?': Killings in Syrian village of Arza raise fears of endless sectarian violence, last update 14.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 12, 2025, last update 12.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 13, 2025, last update 13.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 14, 2025, last update 14.02.2025; Enab Baladi, Syrian Defense Ministry announces end of operations in coastal region, last update 10.03.2025.
- 28 ISW, Iran Update, March 10, 2025, last update 10.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 11, 2025, last update 11.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 12, 2025, last update 12.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 13, 2025, last update 13.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 14, 2025, last update 14.02.2025; Enab Baladi, Al-Hijri escalates against Damascus: A "radical" government, last update 13.03.2025; Reuters, Turkey says forces killed 24 Kurdish militants in Syria, Iraq in a week, last update 13.03.2025; Enab Baladi, Details of Damascus-As-Suwayda agreement, last update 12.03.2025; NYT, Syrian Government Signs Breakthrough Deal With Kurdish-Led Forces, last update 10.02.2025.
- 29 ISW, Iran Update, March 13, 2025, last update 13.03.2025; tagesschau.de, Kurden in Syrien lehnen Verfassungsentwurf ab, last update 15.03.2025; DW, Verfassungsentwurf für Syrien löst Empörung aus, last update 15.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 14, 2025, last update 14.02.2025; NYT, Syria Has a New Temporary Constitution. Here Are the Highlights, last update 14.02.2025; Enab Baladi, Kurdish rejection and international welcome for Syria's constitutional declaration, last update 14.03.2025; Reuters, Syria keeps role for Islamic law in 5-year transition, last update 13.03.2025; Enab Baladi, Al-Sharaa signs draft constitutional declaration, last update 13.03.2025; Enab Baladi, Al-Sharaa forms National Security Council in Syria, last update 13.03.2025; SANA, السوربة العربية للجمهوربة الدستوري الإعلان, [Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic], last update 13.03.2025.
- 30 Associated Press, Lebanon and Syria agree to ceasefire after 2 days of border clashes, Syrian defense ministry says, last update 17.03.2025; Enab Baladi, Defense Ministry vows to respond to execution of Syrian soldiers by Hezbollah, last update 17.03.2025; Enab Baladi, Syria and Lebanon reach ceasefire agreement after two days of clashes, last update 18.03.2025; Enab Baladi, Syrian-Lebanese agreement aims to end military presence in border village, last update 20.03.2025.
- 31 Reuters, EU conference pledges \$6.3 billion for Syria's recovery, last update 18.03.2025; Reuters, Germany pledges 300 mln euros in aid for Syrians at EU conference, last update 17.03.2025; AA, Gemeinsame Pressemitteilung des AA und BMZ zur IX. Brüsseler Syrien-Konferenz, last update 17.03.2025; tagesschau.de, Syrien erhält Hilfen in Milliardenhöhe, last update 17.03.2025.
- 32 Reuters, Syria condemns Israeli strikes on southwestern city of Daraa, last update 18.03.2025; Associated Press, Lebanon and Syria agree to ceasefire after 2 days of border clashes, Syrian defense ministry says, last update 17.03.2025; Associated Press, Mourners attend funeral of man killed in Israeli airstrikes on Syrian city of Daraa, last update 18.03.2025; Enab Baladi, Israeli army conducts maneuvers in Syrian Golan, last update 20.03.2025.
- 33 Naharnet: Syria, Lebanon sign border security deal in Saudi Arabia, Last update: 28.03.2025.
- 34 Enab Baladi, Al-Sharaa and Abdi reach agreement on merger of SDF into Syrian state, last update 10.03.2025; Enab Baladi, Al-Sharaa-Abdi agreement fails to establish ceasefire in eastern Aleppo, last update 20.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 17, 2025, last update 17.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 18, 2025, last update 18.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 20, 2025, last update 20.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 21, 2025, last update 21.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 24, 2025, last update 24.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 27, 2025, last update 27.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 28, 2025, last update 28.03.2025.
- 35 NYT, Syria's Leader Announces New Government After Ousting Dictator, last update 29.03.2025; Associated Press, Syria swears in new transitional government 4 months after Assad's removal, last update 29.03.2025; Enab Baladi, Al-Sharaa names new Syrian government, last update 30.03.2025.
- 36 Associated Press, Israeli strikes kill 9 in southwestern Syria, last update 04.04.2025; Associated Press, Kurdish fighters leave northern city in Syria as part of deal with central government, last update 04.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 31, 2025, last update 31.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 1, 2025, last update 01.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 3, 2025, last update 03.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 4, 2025, last update 04.04.2025; Enab Baladi, SDF to withdraw from Aleppo neighborhoods following agreement with Damascus, last update 02.04.2025; Enab Baladi, Details of prisoner exchange deal between Damascus and SDF, last update 04.04.2025; Enab Baladi, SDF withdraws from Aleppo in implementation of agreement with Damascus, last update 03.04.2025.

- 
- 37 Associated Press, 12-year-old boy among 4 killed in Syria's Tartous province, last update 31.03.2025; SOHR, The attackers set off from military base | Six civilians executed in Baniyas countryside, last update 31.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, March 31, 2025, last update 31.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 2, 2025, last update 02.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 3, 2025, last update 03.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 4, 2025, last update 04.04.2025.
- 38 ISW, Iran Update, March 31, 2025, last update 31.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 1, 2025, last update 01.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 2, 2025, last update 02.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 3, 2025, last update 03.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 4, 2025, last update 04.04.2025.
- 39 Associated Press, Israeli strikes kill 9 in southwestern Syria, last update 04.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 1, 2025, last update 01.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 2, 2025, last update 02.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 3, 2025, last update 03.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 4, 2025, last update 04.04.2025; Reuters, Israel steps up Syria strikes, says Turkey aims for 'protectorate', last update 03.04.2025; Enab Baladi, Intentions for popular resistance amid Israeli escalation in southern Syria, last update 31.03.2025; NYT, Israel Digs In Beyond Its Northern Border, letzte Aktualisierung 31.02.2025.
- 40 Reuters, Nationwide power outage in Syria due to malfunctions, energy minister's spokesperson says, last update 01.04.2025; Al Jazeera, Syria hit with nationwide power outage amid grid failures, last update 01.04.2025.
- 41 The New Arab, Syria faction leader killed by Eighth Brigade in Daraa security forces clash, last update 12.04.2025; Enab Baladi, Assassinations: A continuing phenomenon in Daraa, last update 13.04.2025; Enab Baladi, Eighth Brigade in Daraa dissolves itself, last update 13.04.2025; Horan Free League, حوران أحرار تجمع - Horan Free, Facebook, last update 13.04.2025.
- 42 Associated Press, Syria extends the deadline for a probe into coastal killings of Alawites, last update 11.04.2025; Reuters, Syria's Sharaa grants three-month extension to committee probing coastal killings, last update 11.04.2025; The New Arab, Syria presidential decree extends investigation into sectarian massacres, last update 11.04.2025.
- 43 The New York Times, Islamic State Regains Strength in Syria, 09.04.2025; Kurdistan24, Syria's Defense Ministry: SDF to Hand Over Al-Hol Camp, last update 11.03.2025.
- 44 The New Arab, Syrian forces deploy at key dam under deal with Kurds: media, last update 12.04.2025; The New Arab, Syria Kurds say struck deal with Damascus on battleground dam, last update 11.04.2025; Enab Baladi, Syrian army enters Tishrin Dam in Aleppo countryside, last update 12.04.2025.
- 45 Associated Press, Syria's Alawites still face targeted attacks a month after brutal counteroffensive, last update 15.04.2025; The National, Syrian tribesmen kill 14 Alawites in latest sectarian violence, last update 27.04.2025; The New York Times, How Violence Erupted On Syria's Coast, last update 20.04.2025; The New Arab, 21,000 Syrian Alawites 'flee to Lebanon' from coastal regions after sectarian violence, last update 18.04.2025.
- 46 The National, Syrian tribesmen kill 14 Alawites in latest sectarian violence, last update 27.04.2025 ISW, Iran Update, April 22, 2025, last update 22.04.2025; The New Arab, Assad's cousin Makhoul claims new army to defend Syria's coastal region, last update 27.04.2025.
- 47 ISW, Iran Update, April 25, 2025, last update 15.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 16, 2025, last update 16.04.2025; The New York Times, U.S. Is Withdrawing Hundreds of Troops From Syria, last update 17.04.2025.
- 48 The New York Times, Clashes Erupt on Outskirts of Syria's Capital, Killing 12, last update 29.04.2025; The New York Times, Israel Strikes in Syria, Intervening in Sectarian Violence, last update 30.04.2025; The New York Times, Armed Syrians Take Defense of a Besieged Druze City Into Their Own Hands, last update 01.05.2025; The New York Times, Death Toll Rises Sharply in a Wave of Sectarian Violence in Syria, last update 01.05.2025; The New York Times, 'We're All in One Ship': Druze in Syrian Town Rocked by Violence Agree to Disarm Militias, last update 03.03.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 29, 2025, last update 29.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, April 30, 2025, last update 30.04.2025; ISW, Iran Update, May 2, 2025, last update 02.05.2025; Associated Press, What is behind the latest round of clashes in Syria between Druze and pro-government gunmen, last update 02.05.2025; Enab Baladi, As-Suwayda Agreement: Internal security activated, Damascus road secured, last update 02.05.2025; Enab Baladi, Assassinations reported in Sahnaya after entry of General Security Service, last update 01.05.2025; Asharq al-Awsat, Damascus Says Security Operation Ends in Ashrafiyat Sahnaya, last update 01.05.2025; The New Arab, Syrian security forces restore order after communal Druze-Sunni violence in Damascus, last update 01.05.2025; Levant24, Damascus and Suwayda Druze Reach Security Agreement Amid Tensions, last update 04.05.2025; France24, Syria monitor says more than 100 people killed in two days of sectarian violence, last update 01.05.2025.
- 49 ISW, Iran Update, April 14, 2025, last update 14.04.2025; The New York Times, Saudi Arabia and Qatar to Pay Off Syria's Debt to the World Bank, last update 28.04.2025.
- 50 ISW, Iran Update, May 6, 2025, last update 06.05.2025; Syria Direct, As tensions run high, will Suwayda's security agreement hold?, last update 07.05.2025; Enab Baladi, Jaramana sectarian fuse reveals fragility of new balances, last update 08.05.2025; The New Arab, Viral video sparks outcry over alleged Syrian Druze student evictions, last update 09.05.2025; The New Arab, Syria government clamps down on sectarian incitement at universities, 11.05.2025.
- 51 Syria Direct, Extrajudicial killings of Alawites plague Homs city, last update 09.05.2025; ISW, Iran Update, May 5, 2025, last update 05.05.2025; ISW, Iran Update, May 6, 2025, last update 06.05.2025; ISW, Iran Update, May 7, 2025, last update 07.05.2025; ISW, Iran Update, May 9, 2025, last update 09.05.2025.
- 52 Reuters, Exclusive: Qatari financing of Syrian salaries gets US go-ahead, sources say, last update 08.05.2025; North Press Agency, Syria's Finance Ministry: 20% Salary Increase to Follow Qatari Grant, last update 08.05.2025; ISW, Iran Update, May 8, 2025, last update 08.05.2025.
- 53 Enab Baladi, First international flight lands at Aleppo Airport, last update 12.05.2025; DAN AIR, LinkedIn, last update 09.05.2025; Enab Baladi, European airline plans to operate flights to Syria, last update 09.05.2025.

- 
- 54 Associated Press, What would lifting US sanctions on Syria mean to the war-torn country?, last update 15.05.2025; The New York Times, Trump Says U.S. Will Lift Sanctions on Syria Under New Government, last update 13.05.2025; The New York Times, Trump Meets Former Militant Who Now Leads Syria, last update 14.05.2025; The New York Times, Syrian Business Owners Energized by U.S. Promise to Lift Sanctions, last update 15.05.2025; ISW, Iran Update, May 13, 2025, last update 13.05.2025.
- 55 Enab Baladi, Security operation targets Islamic State cell in Aleppo, 17.05.2025; ISW, Iran Update, May 16, 2025, last update 16.05.2025.
- 56 ISW, Iran Update, May 14, 2025, last update 14.05.2025; ISW, Iran Update, May 15, 2025, last update 15.05.2025.
- 57 The New York Times, U.S. Lifts Some Sanctions on Syria, Fulfilling a Trump Pledge, last update 25.05.2025; Associated Press, The EU says it will lift sanctions on Syria but leave those on the former Assad regime, last update 20.05.2025; Associated Press, Trump administration takes first steps in easing sanctions on Syria, last update 24.05.2025; Associated Press, Syria welcomes US decision to ease Assad-era sanctions as a 'positive step', 25.05.2025.
- 58 Associated Press, Syria's driest winter in nearly 7 decades triggers a severe water crisis in Damascus, last update 20.05.2025; Syria in Figures, Ringing the Alarm Bells: Syria May Be Facing Its Worst Drought in Decades, last update 08.05.2025.
- 59 Syria TV, الجبهات جميع على سوريا لتأمين الداخلية وزارة هيكلية إعادة..متخصصة جديدة إدارات [New specialized departments... Restructuring the Ministry of Interior to secure Syria on all fronts.], last update 24.05.2025; The New Arab, Syria reboots interior ministry as Damascus seeks to reassure West, last update 25.05.2025; The New Arab, Syria: Over 8 million were wanted by Assad intelligence, security services, last update 24.05.2025.
- 60 SOHR, For "refusing to cut electricity" | Gunmen attack employee in Hamimim Airport following death threats, last update 25.05.2025; SOHR, Following armed attack and shooting down drone | Clashes erupt nearby Hmeimim Russian airbase in Jableh countryside, last update 20.05.2025; Associated Press, Militants kill 2 soldiers in attack on Russian air base in Syria, last update 21.05.2025; Enab Baladi, Latakia: What is the story behind the clashes in Hmeimim?, last update 23.05.2025.
- 61 Syria TV, المتورطين لملاحقة الداخلية مع ينسق المدني الدفاع..ممتطوعين 3 مقتل بعد [After the killing of three volunteers, the Civil Defense coordinates with the Ministry of Interior to pursue those involved.], last update 23.05.2025.
- 62 The New Arab, Deadly car bomb attack kills three policemen in eastern Syria, last update 19.05.2025; The Washington Institute, The Islamic State Attacks the New Syrian Government, last update 19.05.2025.
- 63 Enab Baladi, Governor of As-Suwayda Mustafa Bakour resigns following recent attack, last update 24.05.2025; Enab Baladi, As-Suwayda: Armed group storms Governor's office, last update 22.05.2025; Enab Baladi, As-Suwayda governorate activates judicial police and police force, last update 19.05.2025.
- 64 Associated Press: Syria's government and Kurds reach agreement on returning families from notorious camp, Last update: 27.05.2025; Enab al-Baladi: Damascus reaches agreement with AANES regarding al-Hol camp, last update: 27.05.2025.
- 65 Reuters: Saudi Arabia, Qatar to provide financial support to Syria's state employees, Saudi foreign minister says, Last update: 31.05.2025; Al Jazeera: Saudi Arabia says it will jointly fund Syria state salaries with Qatar, Last update: 31.05.2025.
- 66 France24: Islamic State group claims first attack on new Syria forces since fall of Assad regime, Last update: 30.05.2025; Al Jazeera: ISIL (ISIS) launches first attacks against new Syrian government, Last update: 30.05.2025.
- 67 The Guardian: Israeli airstrikes target sites in western Syria, reportedly killing one, Last update: 30.05.2025; YNet: Syria's new president signals openness to Israel: 'We have common enemies', Last update: 31.05.2025.
- 68 The Associated Press, Unidentified drones have killed several people in two different strikes in Idlib countryside, last update 10.06.2025; Enab Baladi, Drone strike targets a person north of Idlib, last update 10.06.2025; North Press Agency, Suspected Coalition drone strike targets motorcycle Idlib, last update 10.06.2025.
- 69 Reuters, Exclusive: US gives nod to Syria to bring foreign jihadist ex-rebels into army, last update 02.06.2025; The New York Times, They Went to Syria to Fight With Rebels. Now Some Are Joining the New Army, last update 08.06.2025; European Council, Press Release, sanctions against terrorism: Council renews the EU Terrorist List and related humanitarian exceptions, last update 30.01.2025.
- 70 The Associated Press, Trading resumes on Syria's Damascus Securities Exchange after six month closure, last update 02.06.2025; The Associated Press, Syrian government and Kurdish-led force exchange prisoners in a step toward easing tensions, last update 02.06.2025; The New York Times, Syrians Rejoice at Being Exempted From Trump Travel Ban, last update 05.06.2025; Reuters, Turkey's Ajet to start flights to Damascus, last update 05.06.2025; Reuters, Iraq reopens Syria crossing for trade and passenger traffic, last update 14.06.2025.
- 71 Reuters, US to scale down its military bases in Syria, envoy says, last update 03.06.2025; The New York Times, U.S. Is Withdrawing Hundreds of Troops From Syria, last update 17.04.2025.
- 72 Reuters, Exclusive: Turkey backing Syria's military and has no immediate withdrawal plans, defence minister says, last update 04.06.2025.
- 73 Reuters, Israel strikes Syria after projectiles fired, holds Sharaa responsible, last update 04.06.2025; The Associated Press, Israel says rockets fired from Syria for the first time since Bashar Assad's fall, last update 04.06.2025; Reuters Israeli military says it struck Hamas member in southern Syria, 08.06.2025; Reuters, Israeli military says it arrested Hamas members in Syria, last update 12.06.2025.
- 74 BBC: Suicide bombing at Damascus church kills 22, Syrian authorities say, last update 22.06.2025.
- 75 Admin.ch: Syria – lifting of economic sanctions, last update 20.06.2025; The New York Times: Bank Transfer Signals Syria Is Making Strides in Ending Economic Isolation, last update 19.06.2025.
- 76 Arab News: US pulls out of two more bases in Syria, worrying Kurdish forces, last update 17.06.2025.

- 
- 77 SOHR: Ongoing violations | New Israeli military patrol advance into village in Al-Qunaitrah countryside and launch search campaign, last update 22.06.2025; Middle East Eye: Israeli forces push deeper into Syria as strikes with Iran enter second week, last update 22.06.2025.
- 78 Associated Press, Mideast governments condemn suicide bombing of Syrian church as death toll rises to 25, last update 23.06.2025; Associated Press, Syria says the Islamic State group was behind the deadly attack on a Damascus church, last update 25.06.2025; Reuters, Syrian Christian leader chides president over deadly church bombing, last update 24.06.2025; The New Arab, Who is the new shadowy Syrian armed group claiming the Damascus church attack?, last update 24.06.2026.
- 79 Reuters, World Bank to give Syria \$146 million to improve electricity supply, last update 25.06.2025; Weltbank, Syria: World Bank US\$146 Million Grant to Improve Electricity Supply and Support Sector Development, last update 25.06.2025; The New York Times, Gulf States Pay Off \$15.5 Million Syrian Debt to World Bank, last update 16.05.2025.
- 80 Reuters, 'She's not coming back': Alawite women snatched from streets of Syria, last update 27.06.2025.

# Imprint

**Published by**

Federal Office for Migration and Refugees  
90461 Nuremberg

**ISSN**

2943-176X

**Valid as of**

06/2025

**Printed by**

Federal Office for Migration and Refugees

**Design**

Federal Office for Migration and Refugees

**Reference source**

Publications Centre, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees

[www.bamf.de/publikationen](http://www.bamf.de/publikationen)

You can also download this publication as an accessible PDF document.

This publication is issued by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees as part of its public relations work. The publication is distributed free of charge and is not intended for sale. It may not be used by political parties or by election campaigners or election workers during an election campaign for the purpose of election advertising. This applies to federal, state and local elections as well as to elections to the European Parliament.

[www.bamf.de](http://www.bamf.de)