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Forty-second semi-annual report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)

I. Background

1. The present report is the forty-second semi-annual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). It provides a review and an assessment of the implementation of the resolution since the issuance of the previous report on the subject, on 25 April (S/2025/254), and covers developments until 11 September.

II. Implementation of resolution 1559 (2004)

A. Sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon

2. In its resolution 1559 (2004), the Security Council reaffirmed its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout the country, in accordance with the Taif Accords of 1989, to which all the political parties in Lebanon had committed themselves. That objective has remained the priority of United Nations efforts.

3. In several instances during the reporting period, Lebanese leaders reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring a State monopoly over the maintenance of weapons. On 15 and 16 July, the Government held a general policy debate. At that session, the Government overcame a no-confidence motion by 69 votes against 9, with 4 abstentions. In his response to parliamentarians, the Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, affirmed his Government's resolve to ensure Israel's withdrawal from the five positions and the two "buffer zones, halt Israeli attacks against the country, and extend the authority of the State both north and south of the Litani River". He also reiterated that "what was stated in the oath letter and the ministerial statement is an obligation and an unequivocal and irreversible decision. The extension of the sovereignty of the State over all its territories and its own powers, the limitation of arms, the decision of war and peace in its own hands, and respect for international resolutions, especially Resolution 1701…are responsibilities…in the common interest of Lebanon". He added that "arrangements for the cessation of hostilities stipulate 'starting' from the south of the Litani. The completion of this is only hindered by the Israeli occupation of the five hills and other Lebanese territories".

4. The Ambassador of the United States of America to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria, Thomas Barrack, conducted five visits to Lebanon, on 19 June, 7 July, 25 and 26 July, 18 August and 26 and 27 August. During those visits, he reportedly presented American proposals for Hizbullah's disarmament, among other issues.

5. In a speech at the Ministry of Defence on 31 July, the President of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, set out Lebanese demands in response to the American proposals, including an "immediate cessation of Israeli hostilities, Israel's withdrawal from beyond the internationally recognized borders, the release of prisoners, the extension of the authority of the Lebanese State over all its territory, the withdrawal of the weapons of all armed forces, including Hizbullah, and handing [these] over to the Lebanese Army, and the provision of one billion US dollars annually for a period of ten years from friendly countries to support the Lebanese army and security forces and enhance their capabilities", as well as "the establishment of an international conference of donors for the reconstruction of Lebanon next fall".

6. At a Cabinet meeting held on 5 August that was dedicated to addressing the monopoly of the State over weapons, the Cabinet tasked the Lebanese Armed Forces with preparing an implementation plan to establish exclusive State control over arms by 31 August. At a follow-up Cabinet session on 7 August, from which Shiite Ministers walked out, the Government "approved the objectives [of the United States proposal] concerning the extension and stabilization of the cessation of hostilities agreement, in light of the amendments introduced by Lebanese officials". These objectives include "the gradual end of the presence of non-State armed groups in the country, including Hizbullah, both north and south of the Litani River", as well as "ensuring Israel's withdrawal from Lebanese territory and the cessation of all hostilities, including ground, aerial, and maritime violations".

7. Hizbullah, after the 7 August session, reportedly stated that it would treat the Cabinet decision as "as if it does not exist" and called it "a clear violation of the National Pact". It further stated that the withdrawal of Hizbullah and Amal ministers from the session was an expression of rejection of that decision. In a media interview on 8 August, the head of Hizbullah's parliamentary bloc and member of Parliament, Mohammad Raad, stated that, "while we are keen on civil peace, we do not know what the guarantee for preserving civil peace will be after this decision".

8. The Secretary-General of the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Larijani, in a visit to Lebanon on 13 August, reportedly noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran did not support "orders through which a timetable is set" and believed that "countries should not issue orders to Lebanon", while stressing that the Islamic Republic of Iran did not intend to interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs and respected any agreements coordinated by the Government of Lebanon with local factions. The Office of the President of Lebanon, in a statement following President Aoun's meeting with Mr. Larijani that day, emphasized that "Lebanon is willing to cooperate with Iran within the boundaries of sovereignty and friendship based on mutual respect, pointing out that the language that Lebanon has heard recently from some Iranian officials is not helpful". He further stressed that relations between both countries "should not be through one sect or one Lebanese component, but with all Lebanese" and that "the Lebanese State is responsible, through its constitutional and security institutions, for the protection of all Lebanese components". Similarly, Prime Minister Salam, in a post on social media, stated that, "in my meeting with Dr. Ali Larijani, I expressed to him with complete frankness that the recent statements by some Iranian officials are unacceptable in both form and content. These positions, which included direct criticism of Lebanese decisions made by the country's constitutional authorities, particularly those statements that carried explicit threats [contradict diplomatic norms and Lebanese sovereignty]". He added

that “our sovereign decisions stem from our national interest, including any plans or timelines”.

9. Following his meeting with President Aoun on 18 August, Mr. Barrack stated that “the Lebanese Government has done its part with a first step” and urged Israel to “comply with an equal handshake”. According to statements from their offices, President Aoun, Prime Minister Salam and the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, all urged the United States to exert pressure on Israel to halt its attacks on Lebanese territory and withdraw from the five positions and the two “buffer zones”, deeming such measures critical for the extension of State authority in Lebanon. In a statement on social media on 25 August, the Office of the Prime Minister of Israel stated that, “If the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) take the necessary steps to implement the disarmament of [Hizbullah], Israel will engage in reciprocal measures, including a phased reduction of IDF presence in coordination with the US-led security mechanism”.

10. On 5 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces presented to the Cabinet the implementation plan to establish exclusive State control over arms by 31 August, in response to the 5 August Cabinet request. The ministers affiliated with Hizbullah and Amal walked out of the session. In a statement following the session, the Council of Ministers “welcomed the plan developed by the Army Command and its consecutive phases, aimed at ensuring the implementation of the decision on extending the authority of the State exclusively through its own forces, and to monopolize weapons in the hands of the legitimate authorities. The Cabinet took note of the plan in accordance with the provisions of the Taif Agreement, UN Resolution 1701, the presidential oath of office, and the ministerial statement of the current government, all of which was clearly and explicitly affirmed in the cessation of hostilities declaration by both parties. The Council of Ministers decided to keep the details of the plan and the discussions surrounding it confidential and requested that the Army Command submit a monthly report on the matter to the Council of Ministers”.

11. Against the backdrop of the military escalation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel in June 2025, Lebanon’s foreign ministry, on 13 June, condemned Israel’s attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran and warned of “the repercussions of this dangerous escalation to regional and international security and peace”, adding that it is “continuing its contacts to spare Lebanon any negative repercussions from this aggression”. President Aoun chaired a session of the Council of Ministers on 16 June in which he stressed that it was imperative “to distance Lebanon from the conflicts that are taking place in which we have no role or connection”. Similarly, Prime Minister Salam, at that session, condemned the Israeli “aggression” against the Islamic Republic of Iran and emphasized “the need to continue working to consolidate stability, particularly in the south, and to prevent Lebanon from being dragged or implicated in any way in the ongoing regional war”. Hizbullah expressed solidarity with the Islamic Republic of Iran and condemned Israel’s “aggression”, while refraining from engaging in the hostilities.

12. Israel continued to strike Lebanon’s territory almost daily during the reporting period, causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. The Israel Defense Forces continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of Lebanese sovereignty and Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). It stated that it was targeting infrastructure, operatives or capabilities of Hizbullah primarily, as well as those of other non-State armed groups. On 27 April, the Israel Defense Forces carried out its most extensive air strikes on the southern suburbs of Beirut since the cessation of hostilities went into effect. That day, Israel stated that it had “struck and dismantled a storage facility, in the Dahiyah area of Beirut, where precision missiles belonging to [Hizbullah] were stored”. The same day, the Prime

Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu and the Minister of Defence, Israel Katz, issued a joint statement in which they stated that "Israel will not allow Hizbullah to grow stronger and pose any threat to it – anywhere in Lebanon".

13. President Aoun condemned the Israeli air strikes on Beirut, stating that "the United States and France, as guarantors of the cessation of hostilities agreement, must assume their responsibilities and compel Israel to immediately cease its attacks". Prime Minister Salam and the foreign ministry both echoed those messages. President Aoun added that "Israel's continued undermining of stability will exacerbate tensions and expose the region to real dangers that threaten its security and stability", calling the attacks "unacceptable under any pretext". Condemning the attack, the Lebanese Armed Forces cautioned that Israel's "persistence in violating the agreement and its refusal to cooperate with the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee…will lead the military institution to suspend cooperation with the…Mechanism with regard to inspecting the sites".

14. On 8 July, the Israel Defense Forces conducted air strikes near Tripoli, in northern Lebanon, which resulted in two fatalities and three injuries, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health. The Israel Defense Forces spokesperson to the Arabic media claimed responsibility for the attack that same day, stating that the target had been a member of Hamas. On 15 July, the Israel Defense Forces conducted air strikes in the Biqa', reportedly resulting in 12 killed and 12 injured, according to the Ministry of Public Health. These were the deadliest strikes since the cessation of hostilities. The Israel Defense Forces claimed responsibility for the strikes, which it said targeted "military compounds used to train [Hizbullah] in gunfire combat and weapons use [and] are a clear violation of past understandings between Israel and Lebanon and a direct threat to Israel's security". The Israel Defense Forces also repeatedly conducted strikes in southern Lebanon, stating that these were targeting Hizbullah infrastructure, weapons and targets, as reported in detail in the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2025/153).

15. There was no progress with respect to the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Lebanese territory pursuant to the 27 November 2024 cessation of hostilities agreement, which retained a presence at five positions and the two "buffer zones" north of the Blue Line. Lebanese authorities repeatedly denounced Israel's violations of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the occasion of Resistance and Liberation Day, on 25 May, Prime Minister Salam reaffirmed the Government's commitment to "take all the necessary measures to liberate all occupied Lebanese territories and extend the State's sovereignty over all its lands", highlighting Lebanon's "right to defend itself in case of aggression". On 6 July, he emphasized that "achieving stability requires the full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory and respect for its sovereignty, which implies that decisions of war and peace, as well as the possession of arms, are solely within the purview of the State". Hizbullah repeatedly urged the Lebanese State to take a stronger stance against Israeli violations.

16. Israel also continued to occupy the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line, in violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). Lebanon has repeatedly condemned Israeli activities in those areas as violations of its sovereignty and international law.

17. There was no progress in relation to the issue of the Shab'a Farms area. Furthermore, neither the Syrian Arab Republic nor Israel has responded to the provisional definition of the area contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) dated 30 October 2007 (S/2007/641, annex).

B. Extension of control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory

18. The Government of Lebanon continued its efforts to extend the authority of the State over all Lebanese territory, as called for in the Taif Accords and in resolution 1559 (2004).

19. The Government continued to recruit and train soldiers to strengthen the presence of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon, in line with the Cabinet decision in March. A first batch of 1,500 soldiers, which began its training in January 2025, has now been deployed to operations in southern Lebanon. A second batch, also of roughly 1,500 recruits, is in the final stages of its advanced training. A third batch of 1,115 recruits, which began basic training in July, is expected to complete it by 18 September. Planning for the recruitment of a fourth batch is ongoing. According to the Lebanese Armed Forces, approximately 9,000 of their troops have now been deployed to southern Lebanon.

20. Several incidents occurred during the reporting period in which soldiers from the Lebanese Armed Forces were killed or wounded in the conduct of their duties. In a serious incident on 9 August, according to a statement by the army command, "during the discovery of an army unit on a weapons depot and its work to dismantle its contents in Wadi Zibqin-Tyre, an explosion occurred inside it, which led to the death of 6 soldiers and the wounding of others". An investigation is ongoing. In another incident on 28 August, two members of the Lebanese Armed Forces were killed and two others wounded "during the inspection of a drone belonging to [Israel]".

21. On 4 May, Hamas handed over to the Lebanese Armed Forces a suspect accused of involvement in rocket attacks on Israel launched from Lebanese territory on 22 and 28 March. The Lebanese Armed Forces stated that it had taken custody of the suspect "based on the recommendation of the Supreme Defense Council and the decision of the Lebanese Government regarding the warning against using Lebanese territory to carry out any actions that affect Lebanese national security".

22. Lebanese officials reaffirmed their willingness to prevent smuggling between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic in several instances. On 29 April, President Aoun pointed out that "the situation on the Lebanese-Syrian border is constantly being monitored and the army is present on this border to prevent smuggling and to control the freedom of movement between the two countries". In speaking about the Government's efforts to prevent and end smuggling in the country, in particular through the airport, Prime Minister Salam reportedly stated on 10 May that "we are doing better on smuggling for the first time in the contemporary history of Lebanon". During an address to Lebanon's Economic, Social and Environmental Council, on 2 July Prime Minister Salam noted tightened security measures at the Beirut airport and growing cooperation with the Syrian Arab Republic to control borders and facilitate refugee returns.

23. In its resolution 1680 (2006), the Security Council strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request made by the Government of Lebanon to delineate their common border. This remains critical to enable proper border control and management, including the movement of people and the potential movement of arms. The delineation and demarcation of the boundaries of Lebanon also remain essential to guaranteeing national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

24. In response to a Lebanese request, on 8 May the Ambassador of France to Lebanon, Hervé Magro, delivered a set of historical documents and maps from the

French archives related to the Lebanese-Syrian border to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Youssef Raggi. According to a post on social media by the Lebanese foreign ministry, the handover was intended to "assist in the process of demarcating [Lebanon] land borders with Syria". In an interview on 1 July, Mr. Raggi stressed the need for a joint Lebanese-Syrian technical committee to address the complex border issue and confirmed that the Syrian interim authorities had shown a readiness to cooperate on border delineation. In his aforementioned 31 July speech at the Ministry of Defence, President Aoun stated that some of points discussed by Lebanon with the United States in response to the latter's proposals included "the delimitation, demarcation and stabilization of the land and sea borders with the Syrian Arab Republic with the assistance of the United States, France, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the specialized teams of the United Nations, the resolution of the issue of displaced Syrians, the fight against smuggling and drugs, and the support of alternative agriculture and industries".

25. Following the official visit by Prime Minister Salam to the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 April, on 15 July Mr. Raggi met his Syrian counterpart, Assaad al-Shaibani, on the margins of the fifth European Union-southern neighbourhood ministerial meeting, in Brussels. Following the meeting, Mr. Raggi announced that Mr. al-Shaibani had been invited to visit Beirut to address outstanding bilateral issues. On 1 September, the Deputy Prime Minister of Lebanon, Tarek Mitri, received a Syrian delegation, including senior officials and experts, to discuss bilateral cooperation. The meeting touched on issues such as missing persons, detainees, border control, smuggling prevention and the return of Syrian refugees. Both sides agreed to form two specialized committees to draft agreements on judicial cooperation and border management, ahead of a planned Syrian ministerial visit to Beirut.

C. Disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias

26. In its resolution 1559 (2004), the Security Council called for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, a key provision of the resolution that has yet to be fully implemented. The provision reflects and reaffirms a decision to which all Lebanese committed themselves in the Taif Accords.

27. While several groups across the political spectrum in Lebanon possess weapons outside government control, Hizbullah is the most heavily armed militia in the country. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups continued to pose a serious challenge to the State's ability to exercise full sovereignty and sole and exclusive authority over all its territory.

28. During the reporting period, Lebanese leaders repeatedly committed themselves to addressing the maintenance of weapons by Palestinian militias and initiated steps towards that goal. On 21 May, the President of the State of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, visited Lebanon for the first time since 2017. A joint statement was issued following his meeting with President Aoun, in which they stated that "both sides affirm their commitment to the principle of the exclusive possession of weapons by the Lebanese State and ending any manifestations outside the logic of the Lebanese State". They voiced their belief that the era of weapons outside the authority of the Lebanese State was over, "especially since the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples have paid a heavy price for decades, with huge losses and significant sacrifices. The Palestinian side affirms its commitment not to use Lebanese territory as a launching pad for any military operations, while respecting Lebanon's declared policy of non-interference in the affairs of other countries and staying away from regional conflicts". The statement also confirmed that "the two sides agreed to form a joint Lebanese-Palestinian committee to follow up on the situation in Palestinian camps in

Lebanon". In a post on social media following his meeting with President Abbas, Prime Minister Salam, on 22 May, stated that "these weapons no longer contribute to achieving the rights of the Palestinian people; rather, the danger is that they may turn into weapons of Palestinian-Palestinian discord and Palestinian-Lebanese discord".

29. On 23 May, the first meeting of the joint committee to follow up on the situation of Palestinian camps in Lebanon was held in the presence of Prime Minister Salam. The attendees agreed to launch a process for arms handover, accompanied by practical steps to enhance the economic and social rights of Palestinian refugees. On 16 June, President Aoun chaired a session of the Council of Ministers at which he addressed the matter of Palestinian weapons in Lebanon, stating: "We have not issued any official announcement regarding the start of the weapons handover or the location from which this process will begin. I, the Palestinian leadership, Ambassador Ramez Dimashqieh and the relevant Lebanese agencies are in constant contact with the Palestinian parties to translate these commitments into practical action without delay."

30. On 21 August, Prime Minister Salam's office "welcome[d] the launch of the Palestinian arms handover operation that began today in the Burj al-Barajinah camp in Beirut, where a first batch of weapons was handed over and placed in the custody of the Lebanese Army, and this process will be complemented by the delivery of other batches in the coming weeks from the Burj al-Barajinah camp and the rest of the camps". On the same day, a spokesperson for Hamas issued a statement on behalf of "the Palestinian factions in Lebanon" that called the handover "an internal organizational matter concerning the Fatah movement, [which] has nothing to do, directly or indirectly, with the issue of Palestinian weapons in the camps".

31. On 28 August, the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee stated on social media that "[today], the process of handing over weapons from within the Palestinian camps south of the Litani River was completed, where batches of heavy weapons belonging to the factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization were handed over in the Rashidieh, El Buss and Northern Burj camps, and all of them were placed under the custody of the Lebanese Army". On 29 August, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that it had received a new batch of weapons from the refugee camps of Burj al-Barajinah, Mar Elias and Shatila in Beirut. That day, Prime Minister Salam announced that he had called Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, "appreciating the progress made over the past two days regarding the handover of heavy weapons from Palestinian camps to the Lebanese Army. President Abbas assured me that additional batches will be delivered in the coming weeks from the remaining camps, as previously agreed".

32. During the reporting period, one group stated that it had voluntarily disarmed. On 26 June, the former head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, held a press conference in which he stated that he had "asked President Aoun for the army to take possession of weapons [held by the Progressive Socialist Party]. [President Aoun] made the necessary contacts with the relevant agencies, and the transfer was completed more than three weeks ago". He added that "the weapons [were acquired] after the 7 May 2008 events, during the tension between Hizbullah and the Progressive Socialist Party, which led to casualties on both sides…But the weapons [subsequently] remained". He also stated that he "worked to collect these weapons centrally – they were light and medium arms, in addition to some heavy machine guns, and all were handed over to the State".

33. In the meantime, the former Lebanese minister and head of the Arab Tawhid Party, Wiam Wahhab, announced on a social media on 15 July the launch of a new armed group called the "Army of Tawhid". He further appealed "to the Lebanese resistance to stand by the Druze who are facing extermination [in Suwayda', Syrian Arab Republic]. We formally request your support in providing the people with weapons and expertise".

34. Hizbullah has repeatedly said that any dialogue about its weapons is conditional upon the development of a "national defence strategy" and upon Israel having implemented its obligations under the cessation of hostilities arrangement. In a speech on 28 June, the Hizbullah Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, stated that Hizbullah had fully implemented its obligations under the cessation of hostilities. He questioned, "who in their right mind believes that now is the time to hand over weapons while we are still in the midst of battle, and the Israeli enemy has yet to respect the ceasefire agreement?". In a statement on 29 June, the Deputy Head of Hizbullah's Political Council, Mahmoud Qomati, listed conditions that needed addressing: Israel's continued presence in the five positions and the two so-called "buffer zones"; the release of Lebanese prisoners; halting Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty; and the start of the reconstruction process.

35. On 6 July, Mr. Qassem stated, "once the terms of the agreement…are fulfilled, we are ready to move to the second phase – ready to discuss a national security and a defensive strategy…We are prepared for both paths: we are ready for peace…At the same time, we are fully ready for confrontation and defense". In a speech on 18 July, Mr. Qassem stated that "we see ourselves facing an existential threat to the resistance…only after the Israeli threat is lifted will we be ready to discuss a national defence strategy…there will be no surrender or handover of the resistance's weapons". In a speech on 30 July, Mr. Qassem stated that "we will not accept handing over weapons to Israel – and today, anyone calling for the disarmament is essentially calling for surrendering arms to Israel". Following the Cabinet request that the Lebanese Armed Forces develop, by 31 August, an implementation plan to ensure a monopoly over arms, Mr. Qassem stated that "[Mr.] Barrack's memo to the Lebanese Government includes a clause [that] involves disarmament…[of] all military capabilities…within 45 days…Any timeline proposed for implementation under the shadow of Israeli aggression is unacceptable…Resistance…must be discussed by consensus. Let's discuss a national security strategy and a defensive strategy".

36. In a televised address on 15 August, Mr. Qassem stated that "the Lebanese Government bears full responsibility for any internal strife and for abandoning its duty to defend the land of Lebanon", warning "either Lebanon survives and we remain united, or it will be our demise, and you alone will bear the responsibility". In a post on social media on 18 August, Prime Minister Salam stated that "the words of…Naim Qassem carry a veiled threat of civil war, and no one in Lebanon today wants a civil war, and threatening or hinting at it is completely unacceptable".

37. On 17 August, Mr. Berri, in a televised interview, stated that "there is no fear of a civil war nor any threat to internal peace". However, he also noted that "no decision regarding Hizbullah's arsenal can be implemented as long as Israel refuses to implement its commitments". In another speech on 31 August, Mr. Berri stated that "we reiterate that we are open to discussing the fate of this weapon, which is our pride and honour as Lebanon, within the framework of a calm consensual dialogue under the ceiling of the constitution, the oath speech, the ministerial statement, and international laws and conventions, leading to the formulation of a national security strategy that protects Lebanon, liberates its land and safeguards its internationally recognized borders".

38. In a speech on 10 September, Mr. Qassem stated, "do not stab the resistance in the back. If you do not support it, then do not stand at Israel's side so it takes what it wants from the resistance with your support. [Drop the issue] of the monopoly over weapons".

39. In identical letters dated 29 May addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council (S/2025/337), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated "since my previous letter dated 20 February 2025,

Israel has continued to report to the [Mechanism], detailing approximately 250 additional violations by [Hizbullah], in breach of Security Council resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1559 (2004) and contrary to the Ceasefire Understandings". He added that "all of these violations point to the continued military activity of the Iranian-backed terrorist organization [Hizbullah] both south and north of the Litani River" and "underscore the strategic objective of Iran and [Hizbullah] to rearm and re-establish [Hizbullah]'s military presence across Lebanon". He urged the Security Council to "adopt measures to deter Iran from continuing its transfer of weapons and financial support to [Hizbullah] and to hold it accountable for its destabilizing actions". In a letter dated 21 April addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General (S/2025/242), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations responded "to the letter dated 20 February from the representative of the Israeli regime to the United Nations (S/2025/107). The letter baselessly and unjustifiably references Iran, falsely alleging the transfer of weapons and funds to [Hizbullah]. The Islamic Republic of Iran, once more, categorically rejects this unfounded accusation".

40. In identical letters dated 25 June addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council (S/2025/416), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations denounced "flagrant and ongoing breaches of Security Council resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1559 (2004)", which he said "reflect a deliberate strategy by Iran and [Hizbullah] to rearm and rebuild its military capabilities across Lebanon", including "the reconstruction and restoration of military infrastructure and the repurposing of existing facilities", the "storage and stockpiling of weaponry", "intelligence-gathering operations", "attempts to reactivate smuggling routes along the Lebanese-Syrian border" and "concerted efforts to restore its military capabilities through the transfer of funds".

III. Observations

41. I welcome the commitment expressed and the steps taken by Lebanese leaders at the highest levels to advance the disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, in line with Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). The Cabinet's decisions of 5 and 7 August tasking the Lebanese Armed Forces with preparing an implementation plan, which was presented on 5 September, reflect Lebanon's vision and commitment to exclusive State control over arms. Continued inclusive dialogue and consensus-building will be essential to translating Lebanon's vision into action, which would represent significant progress towards the full implementation of resolution 1559 (2004). I express my full support to the Lebanese Armed Forces in these efforts and call upon all stakeholders to support this objective.

42. I welcome the joint commitment by President Aoun and President Abbas to exclusive possession of weapons by the Lebanese State. The start of the handover of weapons and ammunition from Palestinian camps across Lebanon is a testimony to this commitment. I encourage relevant actors to support the Government of Lebanon as it seeks to maintain momentum towards that goal.

43. The continued presence of the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line and their continued use of force not only threatens stability along the Blue Line, but also undermines the efforts of the Lebanese authorities to extend the authority of the State, including those that aim to achieve a State monopoly on arms. I urge Israel to withdraw south of the Blue Line. Reciprocal measures are essential to ensuring progress towards the full implementation of resolution 1559 (2004), and I encourage both parties to demonstrate equal commitment through actions that foster trust, uphold sovereignty and advance regional stability.

44. Calls from sections of the Lebanese population for the full implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) and rejecting the possession of arms outside State authority, while other communities assert the necessity of an armed resistance, indicate that the question of the maintenance of weapons by Hizbullah and other groups remains highly sensitive. I continue to encourage relevant Lebanese actors to continue political discussions to address the outstanding issues.

45. Maintaining weapons outside of State authority continues to pose challenges to Lebanese sovereignty. It demonstrates the failure of Hizbullah to disarm and its refusal to be accountable to the very State institutions that the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) was intended to strengthen. I reiterate my call upon all parties concerned not to engage in any military activity inside or outside Lebanon, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Accords and resolution 1559 (2004). The Accords must be preserved and implemented by all to avoid the spectre of a renewed confrontation among Lebanese citizens and to strengthen the institutions of the State. All parties concerned must contribute to efforts to reinforce the institutions of the Lebanese State. Countries in the region that maintain close ties with Hizbullah should encourage its disarmament and its transformation into a solely civilian political party in accordance with the requirements of the Taif Accords and resolution 1559 (2004), and in the best interests of Lebanon and of regional peace and security.

46. The Lebanese Armed Forces holds an increasingly pivotal role in asserting and extending State authority. Moving forward, continued political backing for this national force will be vital. To ensure that it is sufficiently resourced and operationally capable, I urge support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and all other Lebanese security institutions. The extension of State authority must encompass not only the security sector, but also broader governance, institutional and socioeconomic dimensions.

47. I strongly condemn all violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, including the conduct of air strikes in Lebanon and alleged air strikes in the Syrian Arab Republic. I renew my urgent calls upon Israel to adhere to its obligations under international law and relevant Security Council resolutions and to withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory, including the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line. I also urge Israel to immediately cease its flights in Lebanese airspace, in violation of Lebanese sovereignty. I also urge the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms contained in my report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) dated 30 October 2007 (S/2007/641, annex).

48. I welcome the Lebanese willingness to delineate and demarcate its border with the Syrian Arab Republic and its efforts to prevent smuggling. The reaffirmation of the strategic importance of border demarcation is significant, and I encourage concrete steps towards that goal. I welcome the recent efforts to address other outstanding issues between both countries and encourage that these be pursued.

49. It is vital that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East receive adequate and predictable funding to meet the protection needs of Palestine refugees. The indispensable role of the Agency in maintaining stability in the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon remains critical.

50. I count on the continued commitment of the Government of Lebanon to its international obligations and call upon all parties and actors to fully abide by resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), and 1701 (2006). The United Nations will continue its efforts towards the full implementation of those and all other resolutions pertaining to Lebanon.