



Security Council

Distr.: General
18 September 2025

Original: English

Assessment of progress achieved on the key benchmarks pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#)

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#), the Security Council renewed for one year the territorial arms embargo on Haiti and the travel ban and assets freeze on designated individuals and entities responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti. The Council also decided to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in the resolution and requested the Secretary-General to conduct an assessment of progress achieved on key benchmarks by 1 October 2025, in close coordination with the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#). The present report provides an assessment of progress on key benchmarks covering the period since the second benchmark assessment report of the Secretary-General ([S/2024/711](#)), dated 1 October 2024.

2. In preparation for the report, the Secretariat team visited Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien in Haiti from 27 to 30 July 2025 to assess the situation on the ground. The team met with key stakeholders, including the seven voting members of the Transitional Presidential Council, at the time chaired by Fritz Alphonse Jean; the Prime Minister, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé; the Minister of Justice and Public Security, Patrick Péliissier; and the Police Commissioner for the North Department of the Haitian National Police. The Secretariat team held virtual and in-person consultations with the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the United Nations country team, representatives of Haitian civil society and women's groups, and representatives of the diplomatic community present in Port-au-Prince. The team also visited Port of Spain on 11 August to meet with the Executive Director of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, the Senior Adviser on Haiti to the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Community and representatives of the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security of the Caribbean Community.

II. Context

3. During the reporting period, the multidimensional crisis in Haiti deteriorated further, with gangs expanding their territorial control amid the inability of State institutions to respond effectively. Political instability and persistent political divisions, including within the Transitional Presidential Council, undermined the

* Reissued for technical reasons on 25 September 2025.



work of the transitional authorities and their ability to confront the gangs. Tensions between the Government, then led by Garry Conille, and the Transitional Presidential Council culminated in the Council's decision to replace Mr. Conille with Mr. Fils-Aimé as Prime Minister in November 2024.

4. Armed gangs consolidated control over an estimated 85 per cent of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, including all access routes to the capital, while further expanding into the Artibonite and Centre departments. Throughout the year, armed gangs also enhanced their coordination against the State and the Haitian security forces. The Viv Ansanm alliance (HTe.002), which was listed by the Security Council on 8 July 2025, demonstrated resilience and adaptability. Despite internal tensions and occasional clashes among gangs, the alliance remained unified in confronting the national security forces, supported by the Multinational Security Support Mission. The alliance's spokesperson, Jimmy Chérizier, alias "Barbecue" (HTi.001), increasingly adopted a political narrative to justify gang violence. At the same time, individual gangs perpetrated a wide array of human rights violations and other criminal activities, including trafficking weapons and drugs in cooperation with international criminal networks, kidnapping for ransom, illegal taxation, and extortion. Economic actors were both victims of gang extortion and violence as well as complicit partners, cooperating with gangs to secure their operations or illegal activities.

5. The economic and humanitarian situation in the country continued to deteriorate as a result of the crisis. In January, the International Monetary Fund reported that Haiti has experienced its sixth consecutive year of economic contraction, including by 4 per cent in the 2024 fiscal year, reflecting disruptions in production, exports and the flow of goods and services in local markets. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, approximately 6 million Haitians, more than half the population, now require humanitarian assistance, while a record 1.3 million people are internally displaced.

6. Against this background, the Government decided to contract private military and private security companies to support the national security forces in combating gangs, primarily in Port-au-Prince. The Prime Minister informed the assessment team about the creation of a new anti-gang task force, comprising private military and private security companies, and reported progress in improving the security situation in Port-au-Prince. The expectation from the Government is to see further results in the medium term as security operations focused on retaking control of the central areas of the capital, where government institutions and commercial activities are located.

III. Progress achieved on the key benchmarks established in paragraph 13 of resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#)

7. Consistent with previous resolutions, the key benchmarks established in paragraph 13 of resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#) relate to the development of adequate judicial and rule of law capacity to handle armed groups and criminal-related activities; the progressive reduction in the amount of violence committed by armed groups and criminal networks; and the progressive decrease in the number of incidents of illicit trafficking.

Benchmark (a): adequate judicial and rule of law capacity to address armed groups and criminal-related activities

8. Justice and security institutions remained unable to perform their constitutional functions, overwhelmed by unprecedented levels of gang violence, a lack of resources and continued political instability. In this context of extreme institutional fragility, the Government is increasingly relying on the use of irregular forces, such as private military and private security companies and vigilante or so-called “self-defence” groups, to support the national security forces, contributing to the fragmentation of the security landscape. There is a need for a coherent, government-led strategy and mechanism to effectively manage the multiplicity of actors.

9. The capacity of judicial institutions responsible for the rule of law in the country remained severely constrained and impunity continued to prevail. Several indicators confirmed this negative assessment. No jury trials have been convened in Port-au-Prince for the last seven years, with only occasional jury proceedings in other jurisdictions. Judicial infrastructure and facilities remained severely compromised as gangs deliberately targeted judicial premises, rendering multiple courts non-operational. Due to insecurity, the Court of Cassation is temporarily operating in the premises of the Superior Council of the Judiciary. The national quota system, created in 2023 to expedite the consideration of pending cases, remained largely unimplemented. The process of vetting judges also stalled, with no new certifications conducted in the past year, as compared with 83 certifications in the year prior. Progress was further delayed as the Superior Council of the Judiciary sought to address criticism about the absence of an appeal mechanism for magistrates who failed the vetting process. In March 2025, the Superior Council adopted a resolution allowing for such appeals.

10. During the reporting period, only limited progress was achieved in advancing high-profile cases. The investigation into the assassination of the then President, Jovenel Moïse, moved forward with the indictments of several individuals, which are currently being reviewed by the Court of Appeal. The investigation into the La Saline massacre (2018) concluded in June 2024 and resulted in the indictment of 30 individuals, including political figures and gang leaders, but no progress was made in the cases related to the massacres in Grand Ravine (2017) and Bel Air (2019). In January 2025, Prophane Victor, a former Member of Parliament and listed individual (HTi.006), was arrested on charges including criminal association, murder, complicity in murder, and arms and ammunition trafficking.

11. Despite efforts to enhance accountability, corruption remained pervasive and affected the highest levels of the political system. In October 2024, the Anti-Corruption Unit requested the judiciary to initiate criminal proceedings against three members of the Transitional Presidential Council suspected of abuse of office, bribery and corruption. The members did not respond to the judicial summons and, on 19 February 2025, the Court of Appeal ruled that they were immune from prosecution due to their role as members of the Transitional Presidential Council. According to civil society representatives, the high-profile nature of this case further eroded public confidence in national institutions and the transitional authorities, including the Transitional Presidential Council.

12. Several initiatives were undertaken to strengthen the legal framework. In April 2025, specialized judicial units were established to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate complex financial crimes and mass crimes, including sexual violence cases. In June, two decrees were adopted to publish the new Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, in May 2025, the Minister of Justice instructed the Chief Prosecutor (commissaire du gouvernement) to freeze the bank accounts of individuals listed by the United Nations. In another positive development, in March

2025, the Court of First Instance resumed operations in newly established premises in Port-au-Prince.

13. The Haitian National Police remained at the forefront of the fight against criminal gangs. For the fiscal year 2024/25, the Police was allocated \$249.50 million (32.93 billion Haitian gourdes), accounting for 10.18 per cent of the State's revised budget. However, the police workforce continued to shrink due to resignations, dismissals, retirements and fatalities in the line of duty. As of June 2025, the workforce stood at 12,788 officers, including 1,563 women, a decrease of 143 officers compared with the previous year. Recruitment and training efforts continued, and the thirty-fourth class of police cadets, comprising 739 cadets, of whom 213 were women (29 per cent) graduated in January 2025.

14. During the reporting period, the Multinational Security Support Mission mandated to support the Haitian National Police received additional personnel and equipment, increasing its size to 998 officers, or 40 per cent of its planned capacity of 2,500 personnel. Interlocutors have regretted that the implementation of its mandate was hampered by the limited number of personnel deployed, well below the total authorized number.

15. The Armed Forces of Haiti have also played an increasingly important role in supporting the police in restoring security in Port-au-Prince, including by maintaining a presence following anti-gang operations. A recruitment campaign began in August 2024 to onboard 1,500 new cadets, which would significantly expand the Armed Forces from its current strength of approximately 2,000 troops. The results of the recruitment campaign have yet to be reported.

16. In March 2025, the Prime Minister announced that a new specialized task force that included foreign consultants from private military and private security companies had joined national security forces in conducting anti-gang operations. The Government sought the assistance of specialized security consultants to address the unprecedented violence perpetrated by the gangs. The Panel of Experts has also reported the use of new tactics, including employing loitering munitions (kamikaze drones) to target gangs.

17. In April, the Transitional Presidential Council authorized the involvement of the Protected Areas Security Brigade in the fight against the gangs, despite the Brigade's strained relationship with the police in certain areas and concerns regarding its structure and training. The Brigade was originally established in 2018 to protect environmentally sensitive areas under the direction of the Ministry of the Environment. According to the Panel of Experts, the Brigade has now evolved into a powerful armed entity outside direct government control with several thousand members, 95 per cent of whom are not on any formal payroll.

18. The situation in the correctional system remained dire, with severe overcrowding, malnutrition and deteriorating medical conditions reported in prisons across Haiti. The three main prisons – the national penitentiary in Port-au-Prince, Croix-des-Bouquets prison and Cabaret women's prison – remained non-operational. In March 2025, gangs attacked the prison in Mirebalais and freed 516 inmates.

19. According to data from the BINUH Police and Corrections Unit, as at 30 June 2025, the prison population stood at 7,154 inmates, including 405 women, 237 boys and 23 girls. The cell occupancy rate is estimated at 296 per cent, with approximately 0.34 m² per inmate, representing no improvement compared with the previous reporting period. Persistent food insecurity and severe malnutrition continued to affect detainees, resulting in the death of at least 83 inmates, primarily from malnutrition-related illnesses, between September 2024 and June 2025.

Benchmark (b): progressive reduction in the amount of violence committed by armed groups and criminal networks

20. Violence perpetrated by armed gangs and criminal networks increased and intensified compared with the previous reporting period. The Viv Ansanm alliance demonstrated unprecedented strategic coordination in pursuing its objectives to expand territorial control to new departments and roads, and towards land crossings with the Dominican Republic. The Panel of Experts reported that certain political and economic figures continued to finance gang activity to advance and protect their own interests. During a peak of violence between November 2024 and January 2025, gangs perpetrated coordinated massacres resulting in over 500 deaths. In November 2024, gangs shot at four commercial aircraft flying over Toussaint Louverture International Airport, which resulted in a three-month closure of the airport and a continued suspension of international flights into and out of Port-au-Prince.

21. As a result of the escalation in violence, the number of intentional homicides significantly increased during the reporting period, with 8,690 cases reported (7,525 men, 151 boys, 936 women and 78 girls), compared with 6,390 the previous year. On average, 724 killings were reported each month. The main perpetrators continued to be gang members operating primarily in Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite Department, while the number of homicides attributed to vigilante or so-called self-defence groups also increased significantly.

22. Continued fear of gang attacks coupled with low trust in the ability of the police to protect the population resulted in the proliferation of vigilante or so-called self-defence groups and a substantial increase in mob justice incidents against individuals accused of being affiliated with gangs. According to BINUH data, since July 2024, self-defence groups have killed at least 859 persons and injured 40 others. While these groups reportedly serve as community security mechanisms in areas with limited police capacity, their activities raise significant human rights concerns.

23. Gangs continued to control the main roads in and around the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, using illegal checkpoints to carry out extortion and kidnappings. Since July 2024, BINUH and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) have documented 1,004 kidnappings. Of these, 594 victims were men (59 per cent), 374 were women (37 per cent) and 26 were minors (12 boys and 14 girls). These figures amount to a total average of 84 abductions per month, compared with 218 per month in the 2024 assessment and 164 in the 2023 assessment. Most kidnappings were recorded in the Artibonite Department.

24. Armed gangs reportedly weaponized sexual violence systematically as a deliberate strategy to consolidate territorial control and terrorize communities. In August 2024, BINUH and OHCHR established a new mechanism for the monitoring, analysis and reporting of conflict-related sexual violence, with a view to strengthening data collection and analysis capabilities. According to data from the new mechanism, from August 2024 to June 2025, 1,147 incidents of sexual violence by armed actors were documented, with collective rape comprising an overwhelming 73 per cent of violations. In 10 incidents, 19 victims were killed following their rape. The actual scale of sexual violence is believed to be significantly higher, as cases are widely underreported owing to fear of retaliation, social stigma, and lack of trust in the police and justice system.

25. Haiti remained designated as a situation of concern in the most recent annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict ([A/79/878-S/2025/247](#)), the third consecutive year it has been included in the report, and it ranked among the top five countries for grave violations against children in 2024. The United Nations verified 2,269 grave violations against 1,373 children (699 girls, 618

boys, 56 of unknown sex), representing a substantial increase from the previous reporting period, when 383 grave violations were verified. Sexual violence including rape and gang rape was verified against 566 children (523 girls, 43 boys), attributed primarily to Viv Ansanm and other armed gangs. A total of 302 children (256 boys, 46 girls) were recruited and used by at least 18 identified armed gangs as well as by vigilante or so-called self-defence groups. In January 2025, the United Nations Children's Fund reported a 70 per cent increase in child recruitment by gangs compared with the previous year.

Benchmark (c): progressive decrease in the number of incidents of illicit trafficking and diversion of arms, as well as illicit financial flows there from, including by increasing the number and volume of arms seizures

26. Despite the strengthening of the territorial arms embargo by Security Council resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#), the illicit procurement of weapons and ammunition by gangs and other actors continued unabated during the reporting period. The implementation of the embargo remained challenging as gangs controlled access to and the surrounding areas of all ports in Port-au-Prince, including roads towards key land crossings, such as Belladère in the Centre Department and Malpasse in the West Department.

27. From July 2024 to June 2025, the Haitian National Police and the General Customs Administration seized 360 weapons. While this represented an increase from the previous year, when 231 weapons were seized, the number of seizures remained extremely low in relation to the estimated 270,000–500,000 weapons present in the country, most of which are believed to be held illegally. According to the Panel of Experts, there have been no official seizures of arms or related materiel at ports of entry since June 2024 (see [S/2025/356](#)).

28. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), corruption in customs administration was a critical concern, with Haitian authorities reportedly losing up to \$650 million annually due to underreported revenue, fraudulent reporting and manipulated performance metrics (see [S/2024/554](#), para. 44). For example, the Panel of Experts documented a case of corruption in Cap-Haïtien involving a trafficking network where customs officers were paid to facilitate the passage of illicit weapons.

29. International seizures of weapons and ammunition documented in the reporting period illustrated the transnational nature of firearms and ammunition flows into Haiti. For example, as documented by the Dominican General Directorate of Customs, in February 2025, the Dominican authorities seized 23 firearms and 36,000 rounds of ammunition of various calibres in a container shipped from Florida destined for Haiti. According to the Panel of Experts, both the Dominican Republic and the United States of America have demonstrated increased commitment to enforcing the arms embargo through interceptions, ongoing prosecutions of identified traffickers, and seizures of weapons and ammunition destined for Haiti. However, enforcement of the arms embargo remains limited.

30. Illicit financial flows remained of concern as gangs expanded their illegal activities, which further fuelled the trafficking of arms. Haiti remains on the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring (“grey list”) of the Financial Action Task Force, which leads global action to tackle money-laundering and terrorist financing. During the meeting with the assessment team, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force noted that Haiti remained committed to strengthening its financial frameworks despite an extremely degraded security situation and was working to address deficiencies in areas such money-laundering investigations, beneficial ownership transparency and targeted financial sanctions.

31. In addition to the illicit trafficking of weapons, the Panel of Experts and UNODC have also reported that drug trafficking remains one of the root causes of criminality and violence in Haiti. Compared with the previous reporting period, it has become more apparent that drug trafficking involves wider international criminal networks, as confirmed by a major counter-narcotics operation conducted in July 2025 by the Haitian National Police near Île de la Tortue, which resulted in the seizure of more than one ton of cocaine. This was the largest drug seizure in Haiti in over three decades. The drug traffickers included nationals from Haiti and other countries in the region. The Panel of Experts also documented developments in the trafficking of natural resources, particularly the trade in elvers (juvenile American eels), which has become a lucrative activity for gangs and criminal networks (see [S/2025/356](#)).

32. Protracted instability has also created opportunities for criminal organizations to engage in human trafficking and smuggling of migrants. For example, the Panel of Experts documented a large-scale migrant smuggling operation to facilitate the travel of more than 3,500 people through 52 chartered flights from Haiti to Nicaragua for onward illegal movement towards North America (see [S/2024/704](#)). In this context, several interlocutors mentioned that trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ harvesting constituted a growing concern.

IV. Observations

33. The situation in Haiti further deteriorated during the reporting period in relation to the three key benchmarks. Gang violence escalated to unprecedented levels, with armed gangs expanding territorial control to an estimated 85 per cent of Port-au-Prince and extending their criminal activities to the Artibonite and Centre departments. Armed gangs consolidated their control over strategic areas and critical infrastructure, including the main roads in and around Port-au-Prince and access roads leading to key land crossings. Their collective coordination under the Viv Ansanm alliance strengthened, while the alliance's spokesperson, Mr. Chérizier, increasingly used political rhetoric to justify gang violence, including by calling for a revolution against the existing political system.

34. As reported by the Panel of Experts, gangs remained associated with political and economic actors (see [S/2024/704](#)). The sanctions regime, including the arms embargo, continued to have a limited impact, with ongoing violations of its measures. The trafficking of weapons and other illicit goods continued unabated, with gangs having developed increasingly sophisticated criminal operations in collaboration with international criminal networks. Political and economic life in Haiti remains severely constrained by gang violence and illicit activities, while the Haitian population continues to bear the devastating consequences of ongoing violence and insecurity.

35. The Government continues to struggle to respond effectively to the crisis and remains unable to alter the trajectory of violence. Political divisions, allegations of corruption within transitional governing bodies, pervasive impunity, frequent changes in government, insufficient coordination among security actors and a lack of resources and capacity of State security actors have hindered the development of coherent strategies and the implementation of critical action to address the crisis and reestablish the rule of law. As the Haitian State faces existential threats across security, governance and territorial integrity, I urge all national stakeholders to cooperate in confronting the gangs and advancing the transition process. In this regard, I commend the efforts by the Caribbean Community, including its Eminent Persons Group, in promoting dialogue to address Haiti's political crisis.

36. With the Multinational Security Support Mission yet to fully achieve its objectives, the decision of the transitional authorities to deploy private military and

private security companies and call upon the Protected Areas Security Brigade has increased the proliferation of State and non-State armed actors further fragmenting the security landscape and increasing the risk of human rights violations. It is essential that a coherent strategy and operational mechanism be established urgently and implemented effectively in order to coordinate the expanding array of security actors supporting the Government's efforts to counter gang activity.

37. The international response in support of the Multinational Security Support mission also fell short of expectations. In this context, I outlined strategic options for enhanced United Nations support to Haiti in my letter dated 24 February 2025 addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2025/122](#)). I express my appreciation to Member States that have supported the Multinational Security Support Mission, led by Kenya with personnel, logistics and funding. The Mission must be resourced as soon as possible to deploy to its full authorized capacity in order to fulfil its mandate. I urge Member States, in particular Haiti and countries in the region, to ensure the full implementation of the arms embargo, and for the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti, supported by the Panel of Experts, to consider the expansion of the sanctions list to include the political and economic actors who support the gangs and continue to profit from their illegal activities.

38. Haiti is entering a crucial phase of its political transition if elections are to take place by February 2026 in accordance with the April 2024 Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition. It remains essential for national stakeholders to achieve consensus and take immediate and decisive action to counter the existential threat that gangs pose to the State and the people of Haiti. The window to prevent a complete breakdown of the State is closing. It is imperative to break the cycle of insecurity, instability and gang violence that continues to cause immense suffering to the Haitian people and threaten regional security.
