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Letter dated 15 June 2025 from the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 2745 (2024) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 2745 (2024) have the honour to transmit herewith the final report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 2745 (2024).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024) on 6 May 2025 and was considered by the Committee on 11 June 2025.

The Panel of Experts would appreciate it if the present letter and the final report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)

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Summary

Over the reporting period, the security situation in the Central African region has remained tense and volatile. In the Central African Republic, armed group activities and the regional spillover of political and armed actions continue to undermine stability in multiple parts of the country and to impact the domestic political environment.

The Central African Republic has entered a critical electoral phase amid persistent security challenges. In this context, the Government of the Central African Republic has resumed dialogue with exiled leaders of the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC) and the Coalition pour le changement fondamental (CPC-F), such as Mahamat Al-Khatim, Ali Darassa and Sembé Bobbo, with the aim of securing a ceasefire conducive to peaceful electoral processes.

At the regional level, the Central African Republic has made progress in advancing bilateral cooperation with Chad and Cameroon. These positive developments coexist with persistent cross-border threats across the region. Armed group activities and the influx of arms from neighbouring countries continue to undermine security, in particular in the north-eastern prefectures of the Central African Republic, where the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#) has observed a further deterioration in the security environment. This instability is compounded by the limited presence of the State authorities and the porous nature of the borders.

Trafficking in the natural resource sector, in particular gold and diamonds, continued with the involvement of armed groups and criminal networks. Despite a rebound in official gold exports in early 2025 and the full readmission of the Central African Republic to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, the Panel remains concerned over poor traceability and the continued risk of conflict minerals entering the legitimate supply chain.

Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights remain of grave concern. The Panel documented serious abuses committed by elements of the Azande Ani Kpi Gbé (AAKG) militia who have since been integrated into the Central African Armed Forces (FACA). These included extrajudicial killings and targeted violence against civilians in Dembia and Mboki. The lack of clarity regarding the legal status and command structures of integrated militia members complicates accountability under international human rights and international humanitarian law. In addition, two attacks on United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) patrols underscore the continuing threats to United Nations personnel and the broader security landscape.

I. Background

A. Introduction

1. The present report, provided to the Security Council Committee pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#), covers the period from the submission of the final report of the Panel of Experts ([S/2024/444](#)) on 1 September 2024 until 15 April 2025. It includes updates on ongoing investigations detailed therein.

Methodology

2. In conducting its investigations, the Panel complied with the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see [S/2006/997](#)). The Panel maintained the highest achievable standard of proof.

3. The Panel relied on corroborated evidence and adhered to its standards in respect of the opportunity to reply. Further details on methodology can be found in annex 1. The Panel has maintained transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence in its investigations.

B. Cooperation with stakeholders and institutions

4. The Panel conducted multiple visits to the Central African Republic, encompassing travel to Bangui and north-west, north-east and south-eastern regions in the country. The Panel also travelled to Brussels.

5. The Panel thanks the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) for its support and collaboration.

6. The Panel has continued to exchange information with other panels or groups of experts established by the Security Council, pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#), in particular the Panels of Experts on the Sudan, South Sudan and Libya, and the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

II. Peace and security around elections in the Central African Republic

7. In 2025, the Central African Republic is set to hold local, municipal, legislative and presidential elections. Initially planned for October 2024, local and municipal elections were postponed, first to April 2025, then to 30 August 2025. Presidential and legislative elections are expected to be held in December 2025, with second rounds anticipated for January 2026. Following the latest postponement, the revision of the voter register began in November 2024.

8. Electoral periods in the Central African Republic have often coincided with an increase in armed group attacks, as seen during the 2020 presidential and legislative elections which led to the formation of the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC).

9. Operations for revising the voter register have already undergone some disruption in certain areas, as in December 2024 in Bokoté, between Benzembé and Batangafo, Ouham-Pendé Prefecture, where armed group elements attacked workers from the electoral body (Autorité Nationale des Elections – ANE), preventing them from carrying out their duties.¹

¹ Confidential sources: Batangafo.

Negotiations between the Government of the Central African Republic and leaders of armed groups in Chad shift to focus on creating conditions for upcoming elections

10. Since the exile of CPC leaders to N'Djamena, Chad, there have been several attempts at brokering a peace implementation plan between the Government of the Central African Republic and CPC leaders. The panel previously reported on negotiations between Mahamat Al-Khatim of the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) and the Government of the Central African Republic (S/2024/444, para. 15), as well as talks between the Government of the Central African Republic and Ali Darassa of Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC), which became inconclusive in the face of continued armed activities of the group.²

11. The Panel was informed that the focus of these negotiations has now shifted to the upcoming electoral period. In this context, confidential sources observed that, during the week of 14 April 2025, the Government of the Central African Republic sent a delegation of officials to N'Djamena to conduct negotiations with Darassa of UPC, and Sembé Bobbo of Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation (3R), with the aim of moving towards a truce that would ultimately allow peaceful elections in the country in 2025. As part of these discussions, the Panel received a copy of the list of demands issued by the 3R armed group (see annex 2).

The political opposition and possible dialogue

12. On 4 April 2025, the Bloc républicain pour la défense de la Constitution du 30 mars 2016 (BRDC), a coalition of opposition parties,³ organized a march in Bangui. While the march was initially banned by the Ministry of the Interior, the decision was reversed to allow the event to proceed.

13. Multiple sources informed the Panel that the Government is said to be amenable to opening and carrying out a dialogue with the political opposition to ease tensions as the elections near. One of the advisers to the President of the Central African Republic, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, was quoted in the media as stating that the President had given his go-ahead for a dialogue with BRDC.⁴

III. Regional peace and security

14. The regional security situation surrounding the Central African Republic remains characterized by both cooperation frameworks and enduring transnational threats. During the current mandate period, the Government of the Central African Republic undertook renewed diplomatic and security engagements with neighbouring States, notably Cameroon and Chad. These efforts resulted in the signing of bilateral and tripartite agreements addressing border security, joint military operations and the voluntary repatriation of refugees.

² Midterm report (S/2025/384), paras. 16 and 17.

³ The Republican Bloc for the Defence of the Constitution (BRDC) is a coalition of opposition parties and civil society organizations in the Central African Republic, formed in 2022 to oppose the efforts of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to amend the constitution and remove presidential term limits. BRDC continues to advocate for constitutional order, democratic principles and improved governance in the Central African Republic, in the context of upcoming elections scheduled for 2025.

⁴ Radio France Internationale, Centrafrique: “Le président Touadéra marque son accord pour un dialogue politique avec le BRDC”, 21 April 2025, available at www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/le-grand-invite-C3%A9-afrique/20250421-centrafrique-le-pr%C3%A9sident-touad%C3%A9ra-marque-son-accord-pour-un-dialogue-politique-avec-le-brdc-%C3%A0-l-opposition.

15. However, these positive developments have taken place in parallel with destabilizing dynamics, including the cross-border operations of armed groups, increased illicit arms trafficking and the regional repercussions of the ongoing conflict in the Sudan. Notably, the mobilization of armed group elements for external engagements underscores the vulnerability of the region and the fluidity of armed actor allegiances.

A. Central African Republic-Cameroon

Trade and security dynamics at the Central African Republic–Cameroon border

16. Flows of goods through the Central African Republic-Cameroon border remain vital to the economic security of the Central African Republic. According to data provided by the Ministry of Finance and Budget, more than 80 per cent of imported goods into the Central African Republic transit through the port of Douala, Cameroon.⁵ This strategic trade artery, comprising the Douala-Garoua Boulai-Cantonnier-Beloko corridor, supports the monthly transit of an estimated 1,200 commercial lorries.⁶ In 2024, customs duties collected at the Cantonnier-Beloko border post amounted to 67,500,000 CFA francs (approximately \$118,000). This represents approximately one quarter of the country's State revenue, highlighting the economic significance of this border crossing.⁷

Security incidents and impact on cross-border trade

17. As documented in the Panel's midterm report,⁸ freight transport along the corridor was suspended for a period of two weeks in November 2024, following the killing of a Cameroonian lorry driver near Boali on 18 November 2024. The incident involved elements of the bilateral security forces, tasked with escorting convoys between the border and Bangui.⁹

18. Bilateral consultations between the respective Ministers of Transport of the Central African Republic and Cameroon were held at the border post of Garoua Boulai, Cameroon, in December 2024. Subsequent security assurances provided to transport operators enabled the resumption of traffic along the affected corridor towards the end of December 2024.

19. Military escorts for cargo vehicles have remained a routine measure since the 2020–2021 security crisis, during which attacks by elements of CPC resulted in a two-month closure of the Beloko-Bangui road, constricting supply lines and economic activity within the Central African Republic.¹⁰

20. Despite the bilateral agreement, significant concerns persist among transport operators regarding the reliability of and accountability for current security arrangements. On 5 February 2025, the Panel received credible testimony from witnesses in Bouar regarding an additional incident in which a Cameroonian lorry driver was physically assaulted by security personnel while participating in an escorted convoy. The victim was unable to continue the journey and returned to Garoua Boulai. The Panel continues to closely follow developments along this road and border.

⁵ See www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241204-corridor-strat%C3%A9gique-douala-bangui-rassur%C3%A9s-les-camionneurs-reprennent-la-route.

⁶ Panel sources: community and economic actor sources from Beloko to Bangui.

⁷ See footnote 5. See also World Bank, *The World Bank in Central African Republic – Overview*, 2024, available at: www.worldbank.org/en/country/centralafricanrepublic/overview.

⁸ Midterm report (S/2025/384), para. 33.

⁹ Confidential sources: transporters, local community members, security sector actors.

¹⁰ 2023 midterm report (S/2023/87), paras. 17 and 22.

B. Central African Republic-Chad

Increased political and security cooperation

21. The Central African Republic and Chad have long shared a complex border relationship. Moreover, the Panel has documented the presence of Chadian armed groups operating within Central African Republic territory, further emphasizing the porous nature of the border and the necessity for joint security initiatives.¹¹ In this context, the revitalization of the High-level Joint Commission on Cooperation between the Central African Republic and Chad in October 2024 represents a significant step towards strengthening bilateral ties and addressing shared security concerns.¹²

22. From 21 to 23 October 2024, the fifteenth session of the High-level Joint Commission on Cooperation between the Central African Republic and Chad was convened in Bangui – the first session since December 2019. The meeting resulted in the signing of four agreements to strengthen bilateral cooperation: two agreements on regular political consultations and security matters; a protocol for the creation of a joint border security force; and a tripartite agreement between the Central African Republic, Chad and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) concerning the voluntary repatriation of Central African refugees in Chad.

23. On 23 January 2025, the Central African Republic and Chad signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement in N'Djamena, covering bilateral military collaboration, intelligence sharing and joint operations against cross-border insurgencies. The Minister of Defence of the Central African Republic, Claude Rameaux Bireau, conducted an official visit to Grande Sido and Sarh, Moyen-Chari region in Chad.¹³ The Panel has since been informed by community leaders in the area of an uptick in cross-border military patrols, in particular near Moyenne-Sido and Sarh.¹⁴ The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has been requested to support this initiative through regional stability initiatives.¹⁵

24. The 3R armed group continues to represent a persistent destabilizing force along the Central African Republic–Chad border. The Panel received community testimonies which indicate that 3R elements remain deeply embedded within seasonal transhumance routes, leveraging them for mobility, cover and influence (see paras. 57–60).¹⁶

C. Impact of the Sudan conflict in the Central African Republic

Sudan spillover

25. The influx of refugees, cross-border movements of armed groups and increased arms flows have exacerbated instability in the Vakaga and Haute-Kotto prefectures in north-eastern Central African Republic. The Panel continues to investigate the spillover effects of the Sudanese armed conflict on the Central African Republic, with a focus on the supply networks of arms for armed groups, the recruitment of fighters and potential material support provided to sanctioned individuals.¹⁷

26. The President of the Central African Republic, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, has conducted at least two recent official visits to Khartoum, one in December 2024 and

¹¹ This dynamic has a long history in the Central African Republic; see [S/2014/452](#), para. 11, and [S/2024/444](#), paras. 29–31.

¹² Confidential sources: government officials.

¹³ The Panel had requested travel to Sarh during the Panel's visit to Chad in 2024 but were denied access.

¹⁴ Confidential meetings with community and official sources, February 2024.

¹⁵ Meeting with ECCAS officials, 3 April 2024.

¹⁶ Confidential meetings with 3R elements and community leaders.

¹⁷ Midterm report ([S/2025/384](#)), paras. 16–28.

another in March 2025. While Central African Republic authorities informed the Panel of their desire to remain neutral in the Sudan,¹⁸ the spillover from the Sudan conflict in areas bordering the Central African Republic has raised security concerns in Bangui.

27. On 17 January 2025, a direct confrontation occurred between Rapid Support Forces (RSF) elements under the command of Anamoya Ahmed and the Chadian rebel group Rassemblement populaire pour la justice et l'égalité au Tchad (RPJET) near Am-Sissia (close to Hadjar Fatna),¹⁹ approximately 35 km east of Birao on Central African Republic territory. The clash resulted in the deaths of two Chadian rebel commanders, Ali Massar and Abakar, and injuries to three other individuals. This incident highlights the operational footprint of RSF within Central African Republic territory and the complex regional entanglements between Sudanese and Chadian armed actors.²⁰

28. The Panel also obtained and reviewed a video recording of Djazouli dated 20–21 February 2025, addressing approximately 30 armed combatants.²¹ Djazouli is a known arms trafficker based in the Sudan with strong links to north-eastern Central African Republic, including by marriage. He is currently working as an RSF-linked commander. In the video, Djazouli issues a direct verbal threat against President Touadéra, warning of retaliatory actions (see annex 4). The Panel is analysing the footage to ascertain the exact location and the identity of the other individuals present. This public threat, combined with Djazouli's apparent leadership role, underscores the vulnerabilities of the region.

29. The Panel continues to investigate the spillover effects of the activities of all parties to the conflict in the Sudan with a view to their impact on the situation in the Central African Republic and on peace and stability in the region.

Armed group elements recruited for local force in Boromata, Vakaga

30. In early February 2025, the Panel received credible reports confirming the recruitment of 97 individuals by FACA and Russian instructors in Boromata, Vakaga Prefecture, approximately 95 km south-west of Birao, to be used in local security provision. Several of the recruits were identified as former members of the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC), and many were of Goula origin. The Panel continues to investigate the mechanisms and terms of recruitment.²²

31. The Panel is also investigating whether there is a continuation of RSF operational expansion into the Central African Republic (see para. 75).

D. Central African Republic-South Sudan

32. The Panel notes the escalating tensions among parties to the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. The ongoing security and political crisis intensified at the end of March 2025, with the house arrest of the Vice-President, Riek Machar, creating further instability and threatening to affect neighbouring countries.²³

33. The Panel was informed that clashes near the Sudanese border in the Abyei region of South Sudan have further strained the security environment. These developments are unfolding amid broader regional turmoil, as the Sudanese Armed

¹⁸ Confidential government meetings.

¹⁹ 2024 final report (S/2024/444), para. 31.

²⁰ Panel confidential update of August 2023, annex 3.

²¹ 2019 final report (S/2019/930), para. 75.

²² Confidential sources: security sector.

²³ Confidential sources: civil society leaders in South Sudan.

Forces accuse South Sudan of providing logistical support to RSF. In response, South Sudanese authorities have condemned threats of military reprisal by the Sudanese Armed Forces and emphasized the importance of diplomatic engagement to de-escalate tensions.

34. The security situation along the Central African Republic–South Sudan border remains volatile and poses risks for spillover effects into the Central African Republic. At the end of 2024, simmering and recurring violence flared up once again between Balanda and Azande communities in Western Equatoria State, South Sudan, which borders the Haut-Mbomou prefecture in the Central African Republic.²⁴

35. The Panel was informed that Central African Republic delegations visited the capital of South Sudan, Juba, in June and October 2024. In June 2024, the recently appointed sub-prefect of Zemio, Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, Central African Republic, Parfait Achille Romaric Sangou-Zirani, travelled to Juba and met with the second Vice-President of South Sudan, James Wani Igga, and the Minister of Presidential Affairs, Joseph Bakosoro.²⁵ Mr. Bakosoro was dismissed by the President, Salva Kiir, in August 2024, after serving just eight months in office.²⁶

36. On 20 August 2024, the Minister of Public Works and Road Maintenance of the Central African Republic, Eric Rokosse Kamot, met with the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, and other senior officials. Kamot was joined by the Director General of the Road Maintenance Fund (Fonds d'entretien routier), Martial Dindy-Bamongo, and the sub-prefect of Zemio, Mr. Sangou-Zirani. The discussions on both visits were focused on cross-border relations and infrastructure projects, in particular roads linking the two countries.

37. On 16 January 2025, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) expressed deep concern over the deteriorating security situation in Western Equatoria and clashes between armed forces there resulting in civilian casualties and displacement.²⁷

38. The Panel continues to monitor Azande community tensions and rivalries in South Sudan and their ramifications in the Central African Republic, including through border meetings. The Panel reported on earlier border meetings in 2023 and continues to examine the evolving relations between the Central African Republic and South Sudan.²⁸

E. Central African Republic-Uganda

39. In October 2024, President Touadéra paid a three-day State visit to Uganda and participated in the country's sixty-second independence anniversary. Among the topics discussed with the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, was the repatriation process for former members of the sanctioned entity the Lord's Resistance Army (CFE.002).²⁹

²⁴ Confidential sources: community, political and armed group-affiliated in the Central African Republic and South Sudan.

²⁵ Confidential official meetings, April 2025.

²⁶ "Bakosoro: my removal was linked to Azande internal differences", Radio Tamazuj, 10 February 2025, see www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/bakosoro-my-removal-was-linked-to-azande-internal-differences.

²⁷ See UNMISS press release 16 January 2025: [pr_-_unmiss_calls_for_urgent_resolution_of_tensions_between_armed_forces_in_western_equatoria.pdf](#).

²⁸ 2024 final report (S/2024/444), paras. 34–37.

²⁹ "Central African Republic President Touadéra visits Uganda," *The East African*, 8 October 2024, available at www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/central-african-republic-president-touadera-visits-uganda-4789104.

40. In March 2025, during another visit to Uganda, President Touadéra met with the Minister for Works and Transport of Uganda (General Edward Katumba Wamala) to discuss trade and connectivity between the two countries, including a road rehabilitation project from the northern Ugandan city of Arua via Yambio in South Sudan and further to Obo and Zemio in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture.³⁰

F. Border management policy advances

41. The Government of the Central African Republic continued to advance the implementation of its new border policy (see annex 5).³¹ In accordance with a presidential decree issued in 2023, the Central African Republic established a National Border Management Commission (Commission nationale en charge de la gestion des frontières). The Commission was formally launched on 16 April 2024, with the most recent session convened on 17 April 2025 in Bangui. During the session, the Secretary-General of the Commission, Rémy Zoungalani, presented the Commission's strategic action plan and appealed for international and regional support to implement its core objectives.

IV. Armed group updates

42. This reporting period has been marked by evolving dynamics among Central African Republic armed groups, underscoring persistent security threats and the fluidity of regional alliances. The release and subsequent political re-engagement of prominent figures such as Mahamat Al-Khatim, Ali Darassa and Sembé Bobbo, the reactivation of previously disparate or dormant armed factions and the emergence of new military coalitions illustrate the shifting landscape of armed groups and armed elements operating across the Central African Republic and neighbouring territories. These developments not only challenge the stability of fragile peace efforts but also reflect broader geopolitical undercurrents shaping armed mobilization in the Central African Republic and across the region.

43. The Panel's observations further highlight how armed groups continue to adapt strategically to external pressures, through transnational movements, illicit resource exploitation and opportunistic alliances. Incidents such as the coordinated attacks claimed by the Coalition militaire de salut du peuple et de redressement (CMSPR), the restructuring of the 3R networks and the consolidation of CPC control in resource-rich northern zones point to a deliberate recalibration of tactics, driven by access to arms, funding and terrain. The intersection of armed group activity with extractive economies and cross-border trafficking routes remains a central concern, in particular given the involvement of foreign actors and networks that enable and benefit from these activities.

A. Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC)

Mahamat Al-Khatim and Abakar Sabone freed from custody in Ndjamena

44. In the first week of March 2025, Mahamat Al-Khatim, leader of the MPC armed group, who had been in exile and detained in N'Djamena,³² was released from house arrest. Alongside him, Abakar Sabone, former spokesperson of CPC and leader of the Mouvement des libérateurs centrafricains pour la justice (MLCJ) armed group, was

³⁰ Social media post on X by Ugandan Ministry of Works and Transport, 27 March 2025, see https://x.com/MoWT_Uganda/status/1905241135473361195.

³¹ Midterm report (S/2025/384), paras. 40 and 41.

³² Midterm report (S/2025/384), paras. 16 and 17.

also released. Both had been in custody since April 2024 and were held for more than 11 months.

45. Al-Khatim's initial arrest occurred in the context of long-standing tripartite coordination between the Governments of Chad, the Central African Republic and Angola, which began during the 2020 hostilities between CPC, led by the former President and sanctioned individual François Bozizé (Cfi.001), and the Government of the Central African Republic under President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. At the time, the Government of the Central African Republic formally requested that the Government of Chad engage with CPC to facilitate a ceasefire. Chad, through its intelligence and internal security service (Agence nationale de sécurité), subsequently coordinated with Angola to establish a mechanism to host, house and support CPC leaders – including Bozizé – near the Chad-Central African Republic border.³³

46. The Government of Angola committed to financially supporting this effort, covering costs related to food, lodging, healthcare and security for CPC members. Management of the funds was entrusted to the intelligence and internal security service, which oversaw disbursements in tranches under joint direction from the three Governments. However, by 2024, the disbursement of additional funding had stalled, reportedly owing to unmet procedural conditions or shifting political priorities.³⁴

47. During this financial impasse, Mahamat Al-Khatim and Sabone began making public accusations against the former intelligence and internal security service leadership, including media statements aired on Radio France Internationale.³⁵ Their remarks were perceived as hostile by Chadian security services, leading to their summons and subsequent detention. According to official sources, the detainees were informed that Angola had not released further funding and that their actions were viewed as unjustified agitation against cooperating with State authorities.

48. Upon his release in March 2025, Al-Khatim resumed political outreach to Bangui and N'Djamena, seeking to revive the dialogue process initiated prior to his detention. He submitted a formal request for a meeting with the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, with the aim of exploring possible avenues for engagement with the Central African authorities. The objective was to facilitate discussions regarding Al-Khatim's potential integration into the Government of the Central African Republic, in line with the provisions of the Luanda Agreement. The Minister was unavailable, and Al-Khatim was received by one of the Minister's advisers.³⁶

Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) seeks support from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

49. Alongside political outreach efforts, immediately following his release, Al-Khatim began seeking support from RSF for the revival of the MPC faction in the Central African Republic. Idriss Al Bachar (or El Bachar), serving as Al-Khatim's political adviser,³⁷ travelled from N'Djamena to Nairobi, transiting through South Sudan to reach Nyala, the Sudan, by 16 March. In Nyala, he was accommodated by Adam Abou Okkaz, an RSF associate, who facilitated attempts to arrange a meeting

³³ 2024 final report (S/2024/444), para. 15.

³⁴ 2024 final report (S/2024/444), paras. 13–15.

³⁵ CPC leaders' statements on Radio France Internationale, "Centrafrique: les chefs rebelles basés au Tchad réclament l'argent prévu par les négociations de Luanda," 20 March 2024, available at www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240319-centrafrique-les-chefs-rebelles-bases-au-tchad-reclament-l-argent-prevu-par-les-negociations-de-luanda.

³⁶ Confidential sources: armed group-affiliated, security sector, political in March and April 2025.

³⁷ Idriss El Bachar was previously mentioned in a Panel of Experts final report (S/2016/1032, para. 158), as the executive president of MPC at the time.

with RSF leadership. During these discussions, Al Bachar actively sought RSF support, specifically in terms of arms and ammunition, to reactivate MPC operations in the Central African Republic.³⁸

50. This episode underscores ongoing challenges in managing the reintegration of armed actors and the fragility of multi-stakeholder peace arrangements involving funds management, potentially differing mandates and political agendas. It further highlights the necessity of clarifying responsibilities among regional stakeholders when dealing with the demobilization and housing of armed parties to a conflict.

B. Coalition Militaire de Salut du Peuple et de Redressement (CMSPR)

Armél Sayo arrested in Cameroon

51. The Panel reported in its midterm report that it was looking into an emerging armed entity, the Coalition militaire de salut du peuple et de redressement (CMSPR). The group was led by Armél Mingatoloum Sayo, former leader of the dissolved Renewal and Justice (RJ) armed group and former minister under the interim governments of president Catherine Samba-Panza and president Faustin-Archange Touadéra.³⁹

52. On 17 January 2025, Sayo was arrested in Douala, Cameroon.⁴⁰ The Panel is seeking clarity on the circumstances and details of Sayo's arrest and the motives for his continued detention, as well as the activities conducted by the CMSPR armed group. To that effect, the Panel sent an official communication to the Cameroonian authorities in March 2025. The Panel has yet to receive a response to its request for information.

53. Following Sayo's arrest in Cameroon, the Panel was informed that his brother and sister had both been arrested and have been detained by the authorities in Bangui.⁴¹ The Panel is also seeking further clarity on the arrest of Sayo's siblings.

Attack in Bodjomo

54. On 3 February 2025, armed men attacked the Bodjomo FACA post (45 km south of Markounda, Ouham Prefecture) in the early hours of the morning (see annex 6). A few hours later, FACA and Russian instructors arriving from Kouki as reinforcements were ambushed. Ten FACA elements and two armed group elements were reportedly killed and two were wounded. Several pieces of military equipment were also reportedly taken by the armed attackers.⁴²

55. Following reports of the attack, several videos emerged in which Florent Kema, "chief of staff" of CMSPR, claimed responsibility for the attack while displaying the military equipment supposedly recovered during the attack and filming several wounded FACA soldiers. Other videos show elements of Florent Kema's group burning loincloths bearing the image of the President of the Central African Republic and threatening to derail the electoral process and to march onto Bangui (see annex 6).

56. Other videos relating to the same incident show CMSPR "brigadier general" Gali Tago, surrounded by some fighters, stating their hostility towards the governance of the President of the Central African Republic, oppose a third term in office for the incumbent and finally demand the immediate release of Armél Sayo, leader of

³⁸ Confidential sources: armed group-affiliated, security sector, political.

³⁹ Midterm report (S/2025/384), paras. 18 and 19.

⁴⁰ Confidential sources: officials of the Government of the Central African Republic.

⁴¹ Confidential sources: government officials, community sources.

⁴² The Panel received and reviewed footage from the incident. Confidential sources: armed group-affiliated and community sources.

CMSPR. Tago also states that CMSPR is growing and that, thanks to Kema, the group will continue its march from Bossangoa to Bangui (see annex 6).

57. The ability of armed groups to cross the border back into Chad swiftly after the assault limits the capacity of government forces and their allies to effectively respond. This vulnerability underscores existing gaps in border surveillance, a recurrent challenge in the region. The operation was conducted along three main axes, requiring coordination and an in-depth understanding of the terrain.

58. Sources expressed the view that the integration of ex-combatants and demobilized personnel into the ranks of FACA from various armed group factions countrywide has contributed to improved operational intelligence structures and has strengthened their surveillance capabilities. The same sources noted that this has enabled better tracking of suspicious movements. Security partners informed the Panel that progress in intelligence gathering, combined with improved coordination on the ground, has contributed to the disruption of clandestine arms and ammunition supply routes. They believe that this has motivated armed groups to conduct more offensives against State armed forces as targets to recover military equipment.⁴³

C. Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation (3R)

3R adaptation to the changing context and continued activities

Structure and capacity to mobilize

59. Despite ongoing changes, the presence and spread of armed elements affiliated with the 3R armed group continues to wield substantial influence in the north-west, with negotiations and alliances with CPC and other armed factions in the broader context of the political and military dynamics of the Central African Republic. While the group's cohesion has weakened, it remains an important actor, navigating through internal divisions and external pressures while attempting to maintain its relevance in the power struggle.

60. Following the death of the 3R founding leader, sanctioned individual Bi Sidi Souleman (CFi.014), also known as Sidiki Abass, in December 2020,⁴⁴ the group's structure and internal cohesion have undergone changes. Since 2021, 3R has been led by Ramadhane Abdelkader, also known as "general" Sembé Bobbo, who also serves as deputy to François Bozizé in the CPC structure.⁴⁵ Bobbo currently moves between N'Djamena and southern Chad (since his exile at the end of 2021), where he has strong familial ties and links to security services, as a relative of former rebel leader and former intelligence director and current Chadian Police Inspector General Mahamat Abdoul Kader Oumar, also known as Baba Laddé.⁴⁶ On the ground in north-western Central African Republic, "chief of staff" Doborodjé Goska, oversees 3R operations and serves as military chief of staff for the overall CPC coalition.⁴⁷ See annex 7 for an approximate organizational chart for 3R.

61. While a tiered command structure exists with capacity to mobilize upon receipt of orders, in practice the group functions as a series of splintered cells of varying size and levels of organization, with groups and their commanders often also pursuing

⁴³ Confidential sources: security sector actors.

⁴⁴ According to confidential armed group, ex-armed group, political, Fulani community and security sector sources, Sidiki was killed in December 2020. See also 2021 final report [S/2021/569](#), para. 23.

⁴⁵ Midterm report ([S/2025/384](#)), para. 8.

⁴⁶ 2019 midterm report ([S/2019/608](#)), annex 5.4; [S/2018/1119](#), paras. 131–133; [S/2016/694](#), para. 99.

⁴⁷ Midterm report ([S/2025/384](#)), para. 8.

their own personal agendas. This has rendered taxation more chaotic and unpredictable for herders and Fulani community members.⁴⁸

Bases and transnational supply network

62. In the wake of targeted military operations by FACA and Russian instructors from 2021 onward, 3R have abandoned many of their key logistical bases, for example in Kouï, Borodoul, Kowone and Nzakoundou (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture), and Idéré (Nana-Mambéré Prefecture). Communities along the axes north and south of Bocaranga (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture), however, informed the Panel that 3R continued to maintain a network of smaller bases and camps dotted across the region, but that they are now located deeper in the bush and have pulled back from village centres and main roads. These include bases at Ngoukala, 7km north-east of Assana (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture). Bases and camps in the area receive the bulk of their basic food and logistics supplies via small paths from Cameroon and Chad, and to a lesser extent either purchase or demand petrol and other essentials in the villages.⁴⁹ For details of 3R weapons and ammunition supply lines, see paragraphs 78 and 79, and an example of the continued involvement of 3R in illicit mining operations is outlined in paragraphs 110–116.

D. Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC) elements' hold over northern Ouham and Nana-Grébizi Prefecture

63. Since 2021, CPC armed groups, including elements from UPC, MPC and FPRC, as well as some anti-balaka factions, have repositioned themselves within the strategic zone between Batangafo, Kabo, Bossangoa and Markounda, specifically in localities such as Bede, Bakassa and Hama, close to the border with Chad.⁵⁰ These groups have been actively involved in extortion, kidnapping and attacks on civilians and local authorities, exploiting the instability for opportunistic gains, including during transhumance periods from November to May.⁵¹ FACA and Russian instructors have conducted several security operations aimed at countering the threats posed by these groups, but the effectiveness of these operations is often limited by logistical and operational constraints.⁵² Nonetheless, following military pressure, the armed groups withdrew across the Ouham River, which serves as a natural barrier starting west of Batangafo and extending towards the Chadian border. The retreat by armed groups, however, was not merely defensive; it allowed them to consolidate control over the lucrative mining areas of Para, Mbali, Bodé, Pama and Ouogo – creating an enclaved zone with limited State presence and weakening any enforcement capabilities from the State.⁵³ To further isolate their new stronghold and prevent government or rival access, the armed groups systematically destroyed key infrastructure, including the ferry connecting Batangafo to Ouassi and other towns over the Ouham River, as well as the main bridges along the Batangafo-Kouki roadway. This calculated destruction has effectively restricted movement, making it difficult to reach these areas.⁵⁴

64. The extent of influence of these CPC armed groups now stretches towards Markounda and covers the entire Nana Barya reserve, an area that is a hub for illicit

⁴⁸ Confidential sources: community members of Bocaranga, Kouï, Mbotoga, Doko (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture); midterm report (S/2025/384), para. 30.

⁴⁹ Confidential sources: community members, Bocaranga, Kouï, Mbotoga, Doko (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture); local Fulani community analyst.

⁵⁰ Confidential sources: community, security sector, government officials, February 2025.

⁵¹ Information gathering in the Ouham-Pendé Prefecture, February 2025.

⁵² Confidential sources: security sector.

⁵³ Confidential sources: security sector, community and economic actors.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

mineral exploitation.⁵⁵ The armed groups' entrenchment in these territories suggests a strategy of resource control, as the wealth of natural resources' in these zones provides them with sustainable financing for their survival and operations. By creating and leveraging the inaccessibility of the region, these groups have created a de facto autonomous zone where they operate with impunity, trafficking gold and other minerals through informal networks that often extend into Chad. The destruction of infrastructure not only isolates the area but also serves as a defensive measure against potential military incursions, reinforcing their hold over the area.⁵⁶

65. Armed groups exploit mineral resources, and foreign traders, including Chadians, are involved in buying gold and diamonds. The Panel has received the names of two key Chadian figures, described as well-known gold and diamond smugglers from Sarh, as major buyers of natural resources from armed groups operating in these areas. These individuals have a significant role in the illicit trade network that sustains the financing of armed groups, in particular through the purchase of gold extracted from conflict zones such as Para, Mbali, Bodé, Pama and Ouogo. The Panel continues its investigation of these individuals.

E. Targeting of Fulani community by anti-balaka-affiliated groups

66. During the reporting period, the Panel received information about escalating and increasingly coordinated attacks on Fulani community members across the country. The following section provides an account of one such incident in north-west Central African Republic. The Panel continues to monitor this trend and investigate relevant incidents.

Attack on Fulani in Bozoum

67. On 17 February 2025, an attack was committed by members of an Anti-balaka-affiliated so-called "self-defence" group against the inhabitants of a Fulani camp located in Bouforo on the Bozoum-Baoro roadway (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture). Multiple sources informed the Panel that the attack followed the murder of a young gold collector from the local community on 14 February 2025, during a robbery perpetrated by armed men identified as Fulani, at PK22 on the Bozoum-Bouar roadway (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture). The same sources indicated that four people were killed and four injured on the Fulani side and that there were no deaths or injuries on the side of the anti-balaka-affiliated group.

68. On 19 February 2025, the 3R political coordinator, "colonel" Hammadou Rawandou, issued a press release, accusing Geneviève Chour Gbadin, prefect of Ouham-Pendé Prefecture, of being the instigator of a broader operation dubbed by herself "Cleanse Mbororo" (Mbororo is a term used to describe nomadic Fulani) against the Fulani camps in the sub-prefecture of Bozoum (see annex 8).

69. On 20 February 2025, CPC-F issued a communiqué condemning the attack while also stating that the "militias" that perpetrated the act are linked to the Prefect of Bozoum (see annex 9). CPC-F claimed that 50 people, including women and children, had been killed in the villages of Bouforo, Beltoum, Bomboro, Yao and Bogali, in the sub-prefecture of Bozoum (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture). The Panel was not able to verify this figure, and Panel sources indicated that it likely represents some inflation of numbers.

70. The Panel continues to investigate ongoing incidents and attacks. The Panel notes the risk of escalation of violence or targeting on the basis of ethnicity.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

V. Arms

A. Monitoring the supply of arms and related materiel to armed groups and associated individuals operating in the Central African Republic

71. Following the adoption of resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#), the Security Council lifted the arms embargo on the Central African Republic. In the resolution the Council further decided that, until 31 July 2025, all Member States should take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel of all types to armed groups and associated individuals operating in the country. The Panel of Experts continues to monitor arms flows and illicit trafficking of arms, reflecting ongoing concerns about regional proliferation.

72. The Central African Republic hosted the fifty-eighth meeting of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, from 25 to 29 November 2024. The meeting resulted in the Bangui Declaration, in which the participants recognized progress in the national peace process and addressed continued violence by armed groups. In the declaration, they called on regional Member States to prevent the supply of arms to these factions and emphasized enforcement.⁵⁷

73. The lifting of the arms embargo has provided the national security apparatus – in particular FACA – with greater latitude to procure and deploy arms and ammunition. The Panel observed, however, that operational deployment and weapons and ammunition management practices both in Bangui and field operations, require attention in order to preserve the integrity of stocks.

B. Arms trafficking dynamics continued to intensify in Vakaga Prefecture

74. Birao, the capital of Vakaga Prefecture, in the far north-east of the country, continued to serve as a critical node in transnational arms trafficking dynamics for the Sudanese conflict. Bordering both South Darfur in the Sudan and south-eastern Chad, the location of Birao has meant that it has a long history as a strategic corridor for armed groups, arms traffickers and foreign-backed mercenary logistics networks. During the reporting period, the region remained largely outside of government control, with weak State presence and persistent insecurity, making it fertile ground for activities that violate the existing arms embargo on armed groups.

75. In February 2025, RSF-aligned Central African fighters were confirmed to be operating just 50 km north of Birao,⁵⁸ preparing to cross South Darfur and onward to Nyala. RSF recruitment efforts have continued to include partnerships with FPRC and Ali Darassa's UPC, and have expanded to include Mahamat al-Khatim's MPC and 3R. These figures have long-established control over the northern Central African Republic border areas and have coordinated logistics, fighters and weapons movements to support RSF operations.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ See <https://unoau.unmissions.org/unoau-attends-58th-unsac-meeting>. It should also be noted that the African Union Peace and Security Council held a meeting for its sanctions committee in August 2024. This marked an operationalization towards subregional processes.

⁵⁸ Confidential sources: armed groups, local community, traditional leaders and security sector actors.

⁵⁹ See also midterm report (S/2025/384), paras. 35–39.

C. Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) re-establishes access to transnational arms trafficking networks

76. Ali Al-Habib Jeddo (or Djedo) coordinated the transfer of approximately 170 AK-pattern assault rifles and accompanying ammunition from the Sudan, along with a group of 37 fighters for MPC.⁶⁰ In April 2025 the group initially departed from El Fasher in the Sudan, where Jeddo had been deployed, and moved towards the Central African Republic. On 12 April 2025, the arms and fighters transited through Um Dukhun, where Jeddo arrived with two Toyota Hilux vehicles, commonly referred to in the Sudan as “box” vehicles. These vehicles were sold in Um Dukhun, and the proceeds were used to acquire six motorcycles, which were subsequently loaded to carry the AK-pattern assault rifles. The 37 fighters continued on foot through north-east Central African Republic to Kouki, where the arms were delivered to a Kouki mine site – a location under MPC control.⁶¹

77. Jeddo left Um Dukhun two days before his elements, travelling first to Haraze, Chad, and then on to N’Djamena. Before his departure, he placed the fighters under the command of an individual identified as Hamid.⁶² The Panel is seeking additional information on this individual. As at the latest reporting, Ali Habib Jeddo is staying at the residence of Mahamat Al-Khatim in N’Djamena.

78. As outlined in paragraphs 42–46 above, following his release from house arrest on 3 March, Al-Khatim has sought to deepen his relationship with RSF, via Idriss Al Bachar, who is serving as his political adviser. Al Bachar travelled to Nyala, the Sudan, where he was accommodated by Adam Abou Okkaz, an RSF associate, who facilitated attempts to arrange a meeting with RSF leadership. During these discussions, Al Bachar actively sought RSF support, specifically in terms of arms and ammunition for MPC activities in the Central African Republic. Flowing from this, from 14 to 15 April 2025, Adam Abou Okkaz led a group of 120 fighters through Vakaga Prefecture, to the Omkourmaya area (7 km from Birao), with 62 motorcycles.

D. Coalition militaire de salut du peuple et de redressement (CMSPR) in Bodjomo reveals some disruption to arms supply chain for certain armed groups via the Chadian and Sudanese borders

79. The attack on Bodjomo (Ouham Prefecture) in north-western Central African Republic highlights several strategic aspects that warrant in-depth analysis from an arms acquisition and arms flow disruption perspective (for an outline of the attack details see paras. 52–55). The choice to target and the advanced coordination of these attacks demonstrate a clear intent by CMSPR elements to strike strategic positions in order to maximize their gains in weaponry and ammunition (see annex 6). A crucial element that emerged from discussion of the attack with Panel sources was confirmation of disruption to the supply chain of weapons and ammunition for CMSPR via the Chad and Sudan borders.

80. This situation can be attributed to two main factors. First, the departure of several operational armed group leaders to participate in the Sudanese conflict, motivated by financial interests, has had a significant impact. The trusted relationships that these commanders maintained with contacts in the Sudan and Chad capable of accessing transnational arms trafficking networks were vital to ensuring

⁶⁰ See midterm report (S/2025/384), para. 36.

⁶¹ Confidential sources: MPC affiliated source, Sudanese source based in Um Dukhun, security sector sources.

⁶² Ibid.

the logistical supply of arms and ammunition. Panel sources indicated that their absence has weakened the effectiveness of the usual resupply networks for armed groups in the Central African Republic, compelling those who remained in Central African Republic territory to seek alternative means of replenishment through direct combat engagements and ambushes aimed at looting weapons and ammunition from government forces.⁶³

E. Retour, réclamation et rehabilitation (3R) rely on transnational weapons and ammunition supply lines and hidden weapons caches

81. 3R weapons and ammunition supply lines remain active but have altered in content and scale. While the group still has the network capacity to purchase higher calibre weapons and equipment – including 14.5mm and 12.7mm heavy machine guns, military-grade or dual-use explosive materials, including landmines, improvised explosive device components and other ordnance-related materiel – and to acquire 4x4 vehicles – the changing nature of operations on the ground has shifted 3R operational and equipment needs, scaling down to weapons that can be carried by foot or on motorcycle through small bush paths. This includes assault rifles, under-barrel grenade launcher attachments, grenade launchers and associated ammunition. While a very limited quantity of weapons and ammunition enters from Cameroon, it is an important source of uniforms, boots, etc.⁶⁴ The majority of 3R weapons and ammunition are received through an established transnational supply network of interlocutors in Chad.⁶⁵ A number of collection points are concealed in scrubland near Ngoye and Kogui just over the Central African Republic-Chad border, less than 10 km from Bang and Ngaoundal (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture). Weapons are then moved via small paths used by herders. These paths zigzag across the region, connecting villages such as Bolélé, Ngaoundal, Kollo, Kowone, Létélé, Nzoro, Zoulde, Mann, Bezéré, Borodoul, Nzakoundou and Kouï, allowing 3R to ferry supplies and move between camps with limited detection. Sources observed that, more recently, these movements have often occurred at night or in the early evening hours.⁶⁶

82. While supply and logistics lines continue to function, they have become more unstable owing to the operational presence of FACA and Russian instructors spread across north-western Central African Republic, making the flow of materiel less regular and vulnerable to disruption. To mitigate this risk, 3R has developed a network of underground weapons caches, located at secret sites controlled by their chief of staff, Doborodjé Goska.⁶⁷ One such cache was discovered on 13 November 2024 by the local population in a village called Bouyay-Yade on the road between Boukaya and Kouï, located south-west of Bocaranga (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture). They discovered, buried underground, six PG-7 rockets and three anti-tank landmine pressure plates (see image in annex 10) confirming the group's use of clandestine storage methods and its intent to maintain buffer stockpiles in the event of logistical disruptions. In this instance, when 3R returned and discovered that the weapons had been found and removed, they burned much of the village to punish locals for their

⁶³ Confidential sources: CMSPR-affiliated sources, security sector, local community and officials from the area.

⁶⁴ Confidential sources: local community, 3R-affiliated armed group, security sector sources in the Central African Republic and Cameroon.

⁶⁵ Confidential sources: local community members, armed group, demobilized armed group, local Central African Republic analysts, local authorities, security actors.

⁶⁶ Confidential sources: local community members, armed group, demobilized armed group, local Central African Republic analysts, local authorities, security actors.

⁶⁷ Ibid.; also see 2023 midterm report (S/2023/87), para. 28, and annexes 9 and 10.

actions.⁶⁸ The Panel stopped at the village during a visit to Kouï in February 2025 and observed the damage sustained.

F. Tracing for weapons cache discovered in Bangui

83. On 18 November 2024, a weapons cache was discovered near Bangui M'Poko Airport in Bangui. Among the items recovered, a set of 60mm mortar rounds, type M802A4 of Bulgarian manufacture, was identified (see images in annex 11). The ammunition found was noted to be in very good condition. On 10 February 2025, the Panel of Experts was granted access to the recovered ammunition for examination. During the assessment, the Panel conducted a visual inspection and documented the findings. Upon inspection, the 60mm M802A4 illuminating mortar rounds were noted as produced by two manufacturers:

- (a) Arsenal JSC.: a Bulgarian company specializing in military equipment, including the 60mm ILL60C illuminating mortar bomb;
- (b) Arcon Partners Ltd.: also a Bulgarian company specializing in military equipment; this company offers a range of mortar bombs compatible with 60mm smooth-bore mortars, such as the M2, M19, M224 and Hirtenberger models.

84. In March 2025, the Panel initiated several tracing requests; however, the Panel could not gain conclusive information to confirm the origin of the weapons or the end users. The Panel continues to trace the origin of these weapons, details of their potential users in Central African Republic and the supply networks for all the weapons recovered from armed groups in the Central African Republic.

85. As stated in its midterm report,⁶⁹ the Panel is continuing its investigation and tracing of improvised explosive device components used by armed groups in the Central African Republic and plans to submit an update to the Committee before the end of its mandate.

VI. Natural resources

86. The Panel continued to monitor both illicit and legal trade in the natural resources sector, aiming to better understand the extent of illegal trafficking in gold and diamonds, as well as the potential contamination of legal supply chains with resources sourced from areas controlled by armed groups or where they remain actively involved in illegal mining operations.

87. Armed group incursions and violence in and around mine sites continued across the country. Annex 12 provides a list of incidents, compiled from confidential reports from Panel sources and confirmed through further investigation by the Panel. One detailed case study of armed group involvement in illicit exploitation and trafficking of natural resources is provided below.

88. The Panel's findings align with the analysis of mining officials and local authorities who caution that widespread fraud and smuggling continue to plague the sector. They believe that, as a result, official export statistics provide only a partial picture of the scale of the gold and diamond trade, with the vast majority of the country's gold and diamond production not officially declared and exported through

⁶⁸ Confidential sources: local community members, armed group, demobilized armed group, local Central African Republic analysts, local authorities, security actors.

⁶⁹ Midterm report (S/2025/384), paras. 52–54.

informal or illicit channels. Illicit exploitation and trade remain a major concern, as they not only undermine State revenue, oversight and transparency efforts but also serve as an ongoing source of funding for armed actors and criminal networks and contribute to instability and violence in the region, posing serious risks to peacebuilding efforts and the integrity of lawful economic activity.

A. Armed group incursions and violence in and around mine sites

3R role in “securing” illicit mining activities in Baboua

89. While an overall contraction in the comprehensive control and taxation by 3R of mine sites continued to play out across the north-west,⁷⁰ the group continued to be involved in the sector opportunistically, where vulnerabilities arise. During the reporting period, the Panel was informed of 3R involvement in illicit mining and trafficking operations in the Zamboye area of Baboua sub-prefecture (Nana-Mambéré Prefecture) close to the border with Cameroon.⁷¹

90. From about September 2024 to early April 2025, approximately 13 elements from 3R, armed with AK-pattern assault rifles, were involved in providing perimeter security for illicit mining activities financed by collectors from Burkina Faso.⁷² Burkina Faso financiers had direct contact with 3R elements, led by 3R “General” Sangalisé and “Colonel” Koya. Artisanal miners at the sites were also predominantly of Burkina Faso origin, coordinated by a Burkina Faso delegate named Abdelaziz, producing an estimated 15 kg of gold per week. Chemical-assisted extraction methods were used at the site, risking contamination of surrounding land and the water table and presenting health risks for artisanal miners.⁷³

91. None of the gold extracted was legally declared for official export from the Central African Republic. Instead, gold was transported across the border to Cameroon by motorbike. Makeshift paths have been created (see photographs and map in annex 13) to reach the border, which is proximate to both mine sites. From there, gold passes through Zamboï village, Cameroon, and onward to Garoua Boulai, Cameroon, which serves as a hub for gold trafficked from the Central African Republic.⁷⁴ The name of a buyer, also a national of Burkina Faso, has been identified and is being verified by the Panel. He has been described as a key figure in illicit trafficking of gold from sites in the Central African Republic and Cameroon. Based in Garoua Boulai, he collects, weighs and transfers gold for export (see annex 14 for photographs of gold collected). The Panel will continue to investigate the details of this individual with a view to providing detailed information before the end of its mandate.

92. A semi-mechanized artisanal exploitation permit for two sites was awarded to Cooperative Minière Douagouzou Fils (CMDF) in October 2024 for the duration of three years (see annex 15 for decree establishing CMDF).⁷⁵

93. In early April 2025, CMDF informed the Panel that FACA and Russian instructors had carried out a mission at the mine sites in the Zamboye area to push out armed group elements and miners involved in illicit exploitation. On 3 April, the

⁷⁰ 2023 midterm report (S/2023/87), para. 55.

⁷¹ Confidential sources: local mining cooperatives; officials from the Ministry of Mines and Geology.

⁷² Confidential sources: community members, analysts, local mining cooperatives; officials from the Ministry of Mines and Geology.

⁷³ Confidential sources: local mining cooperatives; officials from the Ministry of Mines and Geology, community sources, regional mining sector analyst.

⁷⁴ 2021 final report (S/2021/569), paras. 154–165.

⁷⁵ Sources: local mining cooperative Cooperative Minière Douagouzou Fils (CMDF) representative; and officials from the Ministry of Mines and Geology.

sub-prefecture of Garoua Boulāï, Cameroon, issued a communiqué indicating that a joint operation involving local residents and Cameroonian Defence and Security Forces on 31 March had led to the arrest and interrogation of a suspected member of 3R in the village of Zamboï, Cameroon, accused of extorting large sums of money from gold miners operating in Cameroonian territory (see annex 16).

94. The Panel continues to follow this incident and other cases involving armed group involvement in illicit exploitation and trafficking of natural resources.

B. Gold

Legal export figures rebound

95. Following a 50 per cent decline in official gold export figures from 2023 to 2024, first-quarter figures for 2025 indicate that export levels have rebounded, with almost 1.2 tons of gold exported.⁷⁶ Government officials attributed the increase to the start of operations by new refineries and purchasing offices. The Panel continues to explore the reasons behind the drop in official exports in 2024.⁷⁷

Gold refineries and traceability concerns

96. Export statistics and Panel engagement with mining cooperatives and buyers revealed a marked increase in the number of gold refining companies (*fonderies*) active in Bangui in recent years. While no refineries existed in the capital in 2016, 11 declared official exports by 2022, and 10 declared exports in 2024. In 2024, exports by gold refining companies amounted to more than 80 per cent of all official exports (see annex 17).

97. Refineries visited by the Panel in the Central African Republic were small-scale smelters, melting gold powder or nuggets into bars and assessing purity prior to export (see annex 18). They do not have the capacity to refine to high purity, nor do they issue any official assay marking. The Panel had the opportunity to review several export certificates issued to refining companies, including an example in annex 19. The export certificate lists the provenance of gold purchased as Abba (Nana-Mambéré Prefecture), Berbérati (Mambéré-Kadéï Prefecture), Yaloké and Boali (Ombella-M'Poko Prefecture). The Panel notes that these are the names of towns across three prefectures and the export certificate does not provide mining permit or site-specific information. Without site-specific information, it is difficult to ensure traceability of the gold produced and to certify that it emanates from legal mining operations, absent armed group involvement.⁷⁸ It also represents a vulnerability for illegally mined gold to be laundered, alongside legally traded gold.

98. The Panel notes provisions in the new mining code, adopted in August 2024, that may serve to improve oversight over gold refining companies, pending entry into force of all provisions of the new code.⁷⁹ Articles 188–190 define the role and commitments of refining plants, and provide for the creation of a State-owned refinery, pending the adoption of a decree adopted by the Council of Ministers. The Panel will continue to monitor these developments and engage with authorities, gold smelters and buying houses to discuss the implementation of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Regional Initiative against Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources as

⁷⁶ Official government trade statistics from the Ministry of Mines and Geology, on file with the United Nations Secretariat.

⁷⁷ Midterm report (S/2025/384), para. 47.

⁷⁸ This issue was also highlighted in the 2023 midterm report (S/2023/87, para. 59 and 60).

⁷⁹ Midterm report (S/2025/384), para. 42, and annex 11; Mining Code of the Central African Republic, August 2024, on file with the United Nations Secretariat.

endorsed in the 2010 Lusaka Declaration, including promoting the use by economic actors of due diligence frameworks such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.⁸⁰

C. Diamonds

99. Official diamond export figures for the first quarter of 2025 increased, with 28,875.99 carats exported, compared with 18,178.86 carats during the same period in 2024.⁸¹ The CCO buying house has dominated the diamond market in the Central African Republic since 2020, as the sole exporter to date in 2025 and is responsible for 95 per cent of all exports in 2024.

100. The Panel continued to monitor the resumption of the diamond trade and any risk of destabilizing the Central African Republic or benefiting armed groups, as mandated in paragraph 32 (h) of resolution 2399 (2018) and extended in paragraph 6 of resolution 2745 (2024).

Next steps following readmission to Kimberley Process Certification Scheme

101. Following the full readmission of the Central African Republic to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in November 2024, rough diamond exports from all parts of the country have resumed under a one-year period of “enhanced vigilance.”⁸² Within this framework, the Central African Republic will provide a series of detailed reports to the Kimberley Process Monitoring Team, including a progress update presentation during an upcoming Kimberley Process intercessional meeting in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in May 2025. Officials noted that, despite the lifting of the ban on rough diamond exports, they do not expect an overwhelming increase in sales owing to the overall collapse of diamond prices on international markets.

Government of the Central African Republic seeks permission to sell sealed stockpiles of “conflict diamonds” for the benefit of the State

102. The Panel was informed that the Government is keen to explore options for selling stones stockpiled by buying houses during the period when exports of Central African Republic diamonds were suspended. In the wake of the full readmission of the Central African Republic to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, the Government notified the Chair of the Kimberley Process that it believes that the stones purchased during that period constitute so-called “blood diamonds.”⁸³ It believes that, as such, the State has the right to seize the stones and to arrange their sale for the benefit of the State. In 2018, the Kimberley Process Monitoring Team had ordered that all diamonds stockpiled by buying houses during the suspension period must be audited and sealed, pursuant to the Operational Framework of June 2015.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Security Council resolution 2399 (2018), para. 23.

⁸¹ Official government trade statistics from the Ministry of Mines and Geology, on file with the United Nations Secretariat.

⁸² See Kimberley Process website (<https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/news/uae-concludes-kimberley-process-plenary-in-dubai>); midterm report (S/2025/384), para. 45; discussion with Member State participants present at the Kimberley Process Plenary in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, November 2024.

⁸³ Confidential sources with expert knowledge of the Kimberley Process and its application in the Central African Republic, senior government sources.

⁸⁴ Available at <https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents?search=2019%20Revised%20Operational%20Framework%20for%20the%20Monitoring%20Team%20on%20the%20Central%20African%20Republic>; also see 2018 midterm report (S/2018/729), para. 110, annex 8.4; S/2017/639, para. 124.

Three buying houses – Sodiam, Sud Azur and Badica – continued to hold significant stockpiles of stones from that period under seal.

103. In a letter dated 14 March 2025, the current Chair of the Kimberley Process, Ahmed Bin Sulayem of the United Arab Emirates, responded to the enquiry by the Central African Republic regarding the management of these diamond stockpiles (see annex 20). In the letter, he advised that the diamonds be treated as sovereign assets, and any proceeds from their sale are to be regarded as revenue belonging to the State. Following consultation with the Kimberley Process Working Group on Monitoring and the Working Group of Diamond Experts, the Chair expressed the view that the diamonds, being tied to criminal activity by armed groups during peak crisis years in the Central African Republic, should be considered government property and should not be returned to the individuals or entities from whom they were seized. Officials from the Ministry of Mines and Geology and mining sector representatives noted that this may be the subject of legal action by the respective buying houses before a final decision is taken.

D. New cryptocurrency announced by Ministry of Mines and Geology

104. On 9 February 2025, President Touadéra announced the launch of the \$CAR memecoin (see annex 21 for social media posts on X launching and tracking the coin). The President has described it as an experiment to unite people, support national development and elevate the country's global profile. The initiative follows the earlier adoption by the Central African Republic of Bitcoin as legal tender in 2022, a decision that was later reversed when the Governor of the Bank of Central African States argued that it violated the commitments of the Central African Republic as a member of the Monetary Union of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC).⁸⁵

105. In a document dated 10 February 2025, the Ministry of Mines and Geology of the Central African Republic announced that \$CAR was the country's official memecoin (see annex 22). It goes on to state that the project is a joint venture between the Government and a company, BARNSELEY Ltd. While the project was introduced by the President, there has been some uncertainty regarding its management. The official website for \$CAR states that it is managed by COMIGEM, a State-owned mineral buying office in the Central African Republic which is scheduled to be replaced by GEMINICA, according to the new mining code promulgated in August 2024.⁸⁶

106. The \$CAR memecoin briefly gained attention on 10 February 2025, with a high trading volume in its first 24 hours and listings on major international exchanges. However, a combination of regulatory scrutiny, technical issues and credibility concerns led to a decline in the coin's value, which dropped by more than 95 per cent shortly after its launch. The project's official website was taken down for "abusive service," and its associated social media account was suspended and later reissued, raising concerns about its legitimacy.⁸⁷ In addition, deepfake detection tools flagged the President's announcement video as potentially inauthentic.⁸⁸ Although the

⁸⁵ 2022 final report (S/2022/527), paras. 11–14.

⁸⁶ Midterm report (S/2025/384), para. 42, and annex 11.

⁸⁷ Aanu Adeoye and Nikou Asgari, "Central African Republic's Trump-style memecoin crashes after launch: '\$CAR' crypto token plunges in value amid concerns over project's authenticity", Financial Times, 11 February 2025, available at www.ft.com/content/d36700a4-023a-493e-85cf-2840d8b3ff78.

⁸⁸ TF1, "Le compte du président de la Centrafrique a-t-il vraiment été piraté pour lancer une cryptomonnaie ?", 11 February 2025, available at www.tf1info.fr/international/verif-le-compte-du-president-de-la-centrafrique-a-t-il-vraiment-ete-pirate-pour-lancer-une-cryptomonnaie-faustin-archange-touadera-video-piratage-arnaque-2350086.html.

President reassured followers through social media that he had not been the victim of any hack or deepfake (see annex 21), the value of the coin has not recovered. The \$CAR memecoin was valued at \$0.01692, as at 15 April 2025 (see annex 23).

107. The Panel had exchanges with officials at the Ministry of Mines and Geology, most of whom were not aware of the details or status of the coin. However, an adviser to the President explained that the memecoin is considered a legacy initiative intended to commemorate President Touadéra's tenure. He also noted that the project involves distributing one coin to every child born in the Central African Republic, with a broader goal of eventually stabilizing the coin's value. The memecoin was presented as a symbolic yet potentially strategic effort to tie national identity and future economic participation to a digital asset, backed by high-level government involvement.⁸⁹

108. The Panel sought to reach out to representatives of BARNSELEY Ltd. regarding their involvement in the cryptocurrency or memecoin sector in the Central African Republic. However, the company's website is non-functional and no public information could be found regarding background, previous projects or its specific role in the development and management of \$CAR. An official from the Government of the Central African Republic informed the Panel that details regarding the creation and technical launch of the coin are confidential.

109. The \$CAR memecoin presents several potential risks, in particular in the context of financial transparency, regulatory oversight and the implications of linking it to the natural resources sector. As a State-backed digital asset with limited publicly available information about its governance, technical infrastructure and compliance protocols, there are associated vulnerabilities that can be misused. In the absence of clear know-your-customer and anti-money-laundering measures, such assets may be exploited for illicit financial activities, including money-laundering.⁹⁰ In addition, the rapid fluctuation in the coin's value raises red flags regarding "pump-and-dump" behaviour, and the opaque nature of its operational partners contributes to the uncertainty surrounding its long-term viability and trustworthiness.

E. Armed group financing from transhumance

3R role in taxation of transhumance in the north-west

110. 3R continues to actively tax or demand a *sofal* from cattle herders in return for "protection" during their passage through 3R zones in the north-west.⁹¹ The group enforces a proportional tribute system, demanding one head of cattle for every 50 owned each month. For smaller herds, cash is demanded. This has allowed 3R to amass large herds of cattle, which the group transports to Ngaoui, Cameroon, just beyond the Central African Republic border, to resell through an established network of buyers. At market in Cameroon, prices range from 100,000 CFA francs to 700,000 CFA francs (\$175–\$1,210) per head, generating a significant income for the group.⁹²

111. Conversely, tax demands weigh heavily on Fulani herders and cattle owners and have, over time, served to strain the role of traditional authorities of the Fulani

⁸⁹ Confidential sources: Ministry of Mines and Geology; senior adviser to the president.

⁹⁰ Financial Action Task Force *Opportunities and Challenges of New Technologies for AML/CFT*, (Paris, France, 2021), available at <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/Opportunities-Challenges-of-New-Technologies-for-AML-CFT.pdf.coredownload.pdf>.

⁹¹ *Sofal* means "to regroup" in the Fulani language. The *sofal* obliges Fulanis to provide armed groups with one head of cattle each time they consider it necessary for "the Fulani struggle".

⁹² Confidential sources: 3R armed group elements, demobilized armed group elements, Fulani elders and community members, local authorities, local officials involved in transhumance.

community. For example, taxes demanded by 3R come on top of the traditional Islamic donation called the *zakat*, which in the Fulani community in the Central African Republic has traditionally manifested as a requirement for all cattle owners to donate one head of cattle each year to traditional leaders for redistribution to those in need within the community. Armed groups have mimicked the traditional manner of *zakat* giving but have forced contributions with greater frequency, with a view to financing Fulani armed movements in the region.⁹³

Shifting dynamics around transhumance and livestock markets in the centre north

112. During its visit to the centre north of the country, the Panel noted that transhumance continued to be a critical aspect of the local economy, in particular for herds moving through Batangafo and Kabo (Ouham Prefecture) and livestock markets in Kaga Bandoro, Mbrès (both Nana-Grèbizi) and Dekoua (Kèmo Prefecture), which are vital sources of economic well-being in the region. Herders continued to face insecurity along transhumance routes and the illegal taxation imposed by a combination of different armed groups. Local communities and Fulani herders alike noted the need for better-defined transhumance corridors to prevent frequent violent incidents surrounding conflicts between farmers and herders and settled and nomadic communities.

113. As observed in previous Panel reports,⁹⁴ the Government had some success in disrupting and reducing control exerted by armed groups over cattle markets in the centre north. Since 2021, the State has gradually increased its level of control in this region, undercutting the reality of peak crisis years when MPC and FPRC armed groups took the larger share of taxes from transhumance and cattle markets in the centre north of the country, with only a small amount of tax going to the municipality.⁹⁵ The Panel found that the herders departing from Chad into the Central African Republic must follow a specific administrative process on both sides of the border.

114. On the Central African Republic side, each sub-prefecture hosts an office in charge of transhumance where travel documents are issued specifying the itinerary and length of stay for each herder. The following documents and official fees are required: a pass issued by the Ministry of Livestock and Animal Health for 6,000 CFA (approximately \$10); a card from the National Federation of Livestock Breeders (Fédération nationale des éleveurs centrafricains – FNEC) costing 10,000 CFA (\$17) for Chadian herders and 8,000 CFA (\$14) for Central African Republic nationals; a card known as “Tchizam” from the National Livestock Agency (Agence nationale pour le développement de l’élevage) for 1,000 CFA (\$2) per head of cattle.

115. While the return of official State institutions has enabled the collection of legal taxes and the issuance of official documents and receipts, some herders informed the Panel that predation by internal security forces and FACA has, in some instances replaced that of armed groups, wherein they are often also illegally taxed from 2,000 CFA francs to 5,000 CFA francs (\$3.50–\$8.70), on top of legitimate fees.

116. On the Chadian side of the border, the Panel obtained evidence of CPC involvement in taxing herders for the right of passage into the Central African Republic. Annex 24 contains a document issued to one herder permitting his passage into the Central African Republic with 85 head of cattle. The document was drafted on the CPC letterhead and signed by two CPC “generals”, both with the title of military chief of staff, “general” Mahamat Ahmat and “general” Mahamat Idjel. The laissez-passer document is dated 29 November 2024 (see annex 24).

⁹³ Confidential sources: Fulani elders and community members, local authorities, Fulani analyst; also see 2018 final report (S/2018/1119), paras. 128–130.

⁹⁴ 2023 final report (S/2023/360), paras. 134–138.

⁹⁵ 2018 final report (S/2018/1119), paras. 105–126.

117. The Panel will continue to monitor developments regarding transhumance into and through the Central African Republic and the associated local and regional implications.

VII. Humanitarian affairs

A. Concerns stemming from varying status of Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) militia in south-east Central African Republic following partial integration into the Central African Armed Forces (FACA)

118. Following the training in March 2024 and the subsequent integration of AAKG elements into FACA from May 2024 onward, the Panel has observed the inconsistent use of terminology to describe the evolving status of these individuals. This inconsistency creates significant challenges in accurately assessing their role, function and conduct. Clarifying their legal status is essential in order to determine their rights and responsibilities under international human rights and international humanitarian law, and for appropriately addressing violations committed by current or former members of the group (see paras. 123–127).

119. See annex 25 for a detailed chronology of events leading to the decision to extend training and opportunities for integration into FACA to the AAKG elements, as well as the challenges encountered during and after the training process.

120. In conversations over the course of the current mandate, and during the Panel's visit to Zemio in February 2025, community members, local authorities and defence and security forces primarily used the French term *AAKG formés* to describe the AAKG elements that had been trained and integrated into FACA. All other AAKG elements, including armed Azande youth and other troublemakers, were described as *AAKG non-formés* or AAKG who have not undergone formal training. A FACA commander, meanwhile, referred to non-Azande FACA as "FACA-Bangui", and used the term "FACA-Azande" to describe AAKG elements who had been trained and integrated into FACA, also referring to them as "my soldiers" (see annex 26 for a picture of a banner bearing the words *FACA Ti Azande* used during a demonstration in Zemio in November 2024). Yet another term, *Wagner Ti Azande* emerged in 2024 after pictures of AAKG participants wearing shoulder sleeve insignia with the term and an image similar to that associated with the private military company Wagner Group circulated on social media (*ti* is used to signal possession or attribution in Sango).⁹⁶ Since then, *Wagner Ti Azande* has often been described as a separate unit within FACA in media, United Nations and other reports.⁹⁷

121. The discussion of these evolving terms and the training and integration process proved an effective way to clarify their varying chains of command and to distinguish between former AAKG armed elements who had come under FACA command from those who perceived that they received their orders from Russian instructors who had trained them, to AAKG militia members who acted independently of any State chain of command.

⁹⁶ Panel of Experts confidential progress update report, August 2024.

⁹⁷ See, for example, "Central African Republic: UN expert acknowledges efforts to respect human rights, highlights overreliance on external aid, urges economic and governance reforms", press release, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on behalf of Yao Agbetse, Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Central African Republic, 10 March 2025, available at: www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/03/central-african-republic-un-expert-acknowledges-efforts-respect-human-rights.

122. The Panel considers that AAKG elements who have undergone training and have been integrated into the ranks of FACA, assigned a FACA matriculation number, issued arms and uniforms and enrolled on the FACA payroll – pursuant to the Ministry of Defence decision dated 6 May 2024 (see annex 27) – can be legally considered as members of FACA. Their FACA commanders may therefore be held responsible, in accordance with international human rights and humanitarian law, for violations committed by any subordinates under their effective command and control.

B. Human rights and humanitarian law violations in Haut-Mbomou and Mbomou Prefectures from August 2024 to March 2025

123. The Panel documented several concerning incidents impacting peace and security in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture over the course of its mandate. The details of two serious attacks documented by the Panel are outlined below, while annex 28 contains two additional cases that exemplify targeted human rights abuses and violations.

Attack on civilians in Dembia, Mbomou Prefecture, October 2024

124. From 1 to 7 October, a series of grave human rights and humanitarian law violations were perpetrated against civilians in Dembia, a small locality west of Zemio, which also hosts refugees from the Sudan living a few kilometres west of the village centre. On 1 October, a large group of AAKG militia and former AAKG members who had been integrated into FACA arrived by motorcycle, led by Elie Gomengue, Célestin Bakayogo-Leman and Leman's deputy commander, Marcelin Kangoyessi (also known as "Maxon"). Multiple sources informed the Panel that they were heard to express the view that "from Bambouti to Rafaï is the land of the Azande."

125. In March 2025, MINUSCA and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published a report documenting 147 human rights and humanitarian law violations affecting 110 individual victims (59 men, 21 women, 20 boys and 10 girls).⁹⁸ They concluded in their investigation that abuses and violations perpetrated in Dembia from 1 to 7 October included "summary and extrajudicial executions, sexual violence, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment", "targeting in particular the Muslim population and Sudanese asylum-seekers".⁹⁹

126. While in Zemio, the Panel met with survivors of and witnesses to the attacks perpetrated in Dembia (see annex 30 for extracts from testimonies). They had witnessed torture and executions in the centre of Dembia village, had themselves been threatened and, in at least one instance, had made payments under duress in order for their lives to be spared. Evidence and detailed testimonies gathered by the Panel indicate that the integrated FACA soldiers Elie Gomengue and Célestin Bakayogo-Leman exercised effective command and control authority over subordinate trained and/or non-trained AAKG members for actions carried out in Dembia.

⁹⁸ "Public report on serious human rights violations and abuses committed by the Wagner TI Azande and the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe from October 1 to 7, 2024, in Dembia and Rafaï, Mbomou Prefecture, para. 28, published by MINUSCA and the Office of the High Commission on Human Rights (OHCHR) on 5 March 2025 (French only): [20250304-minusca-ohchr-dembia-report.pdf](https://www.minusca.org/fr/publications/20250304-minusca-ohchr-dembia-report.pdf). Press release and report summary in English available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/03/central-african-republic-un-report-calls-accountability-attacks-armed-groups>.

⁹⁹ Since the outbreak of armed conflict in the Sudan in April 2023, Sudanese refugees have sought refuge in the Central African Republic, including in a refugee site a few kilometres west of Dembia village centre.

*Killing of Fulani civilians, Mboki, 22 January 2025*¹⁰⁰

127. On 21 January during a community security meeting in Mboki, with local authorities, FACA and MINUSCA present, community members reported that a group of “rebels” had been observed on the Mbomou axis road near Mboki. Multiple sources informed the Panel that a former AAKG militia leader, known as “Tabane”, who had been integrated into FACA following training, decided that his group should go after the suspected rebels, as they knew from experience that FACA would rarely venture more than 5 km out of Mboki town and would therefore not be able to pursue the suspected rebels.¹⁰¹ That afternoon Tabane and nine subordinate elements were witnessed departing from Mboki on the Mbomou road. Armed group sources informed the Panel that the next day, at about 6 a.m., approximately 25 km from Mboki, Tabane’s group either fired or were fired upon. Documentation following the incident revealed that 13 Fulani civilians had been killed, with no casualties on the side of Tabane and his elements.¹⁰²

128. Multiple sources informed the Panel that this attack on civilians was perceived as a turning point in the relations between the trained and integrated AAKG and their trainers and commanding officers. On 23 January, FACA officers and Russian instructors were witnessed arriving by air to Mboki, where they apprehended Tabane and his nine elements and transferred them to Bangui (see paras. 130–132).

C. Steps towards accountability for human rights and humanitarian law violations linked to Azande Ani Kpi Gbé (AAKG): advances and concerns

Preliminary statement issued on the findings of the August 2024 commission of inquiry into human rights violations in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture

129. In August 2024, in response to an escalation of violent incidents impacting civilians in south-eastern Central African Republic, the Minister of Justice established a judicial commission of inquiry to investigate allegations of human rights violations and abuses perpetrated in the Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, notably in Zemio, Mboki and Obo.¹⁰³ On 11 February 2025, the Minister made a statement (see annex 29) regarding the Commission’s forthcoming report, which had not been made public, concerning the “events that took place in Zemio in August 2024 and which may constitute serious human rights violations.” In the statement, he notes the creation of AAKG as a response to UPC atrocities since 2017, including attacks targeting civilians based on ethnic and religious affiliation, observing that “these recurring confrontations with ethnic and religious undertones keep happening between the rival groups and the atrocities constituting grave human rights violations have allegedly been committed against civilians”. He goes on to note that the Prosecutor General of the Bambari Court of Appeal has been instructed to initiate legal action with a view to bringing the perpetrators and their accomplices before a competent court and that, on the instruction of President Touadéra, a High Court would be established in Zemio to

¹⁰⁰ Confidential sources: community members in Mboki, local security sector actors, armed group and FACA.

¹⁰¹ Confidential sources: community members from Mboki.

¹⁰² See report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 14 February 2025 (S/2025/97), para. 34.

¹⁰³ The Commission of Inquiry was established partly in response to advocacy by MINUSCA with the Minister for Justice seeking urgent action by the Government on human rights concerns in the Haut-Mbomou Prefecture. See MINUSCA Human Rights Division Quarterly report July–September 2024, available at: https://minusca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/hrd_quarterly_report_-_july_-_sept_2024.pdf.

guarantee access to justice and to end impunity for possible human rights violations in the future. He also noted that several perpetrators from the two “rival groups” had already been identified and apprehended.

Arrest and detention of AAKG leaders who had been integrated into FACA

130. On 24 January, four AAKG leaders, including Célestin Bakayogo-Leman and Elie Gomengue, were arrested in Bangui and detained at the Investigation and Intelligence Service (Section de Recherches et d’Investigation – SRI).¹⁰⁴ Bakayogo-Leman, Gomengue and two other “commanders” or group leaders had been transported to Bangui with logistical assistance from Russian instructors to open bank accounts to facilitate receipt of their FACA salaries following integration.

131. The Panel was informed by multiple credible sources that, on 25 January at 1 p.m., Russian instructors arrived at SRI and took custody of Elie Gomengue. At 1.30 p.m., Russian instructors returned and took custody of Célestin Bakayogo-Leman. At the time of writing the present report, the Panel had not been able to establish the whereabouts of either individual.

132. Following the killing of Fulani civilians in Mboki on 22 January (see paras. 127 and 128), the integrated FACA soldier and former AAKG group leader, “Tabane”, and nine elements under his command were apprehended in Mboki. Multiple sources informed the Panel that their apprehension, detention and subsequent transfer to Bangui were handled by Russian instructors. They were briefly held at the central anti-banditry office (Office central de répression du banditisme – OCRB) before being transferred to SRI on 29 January on remand. At the end of March 2025, they were transferred to Ngaragba prison, where they remained in detention at the time of writing.¹⁰⁵

D. Attacks on Mission patrols

133. Two significant attacks on Mission patrols occurred during the reporting period. The Panel notes that involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring or conducting attacks against United Nations missions constitute a designation criterion for sanctions under paragraph 21 (g) of resolution 2399 (2018), as renewed in paragraph 5 of resolution 2745 (2024). The Panel continues to investigate the details of these attacks and awaits the outcome of several ongoing investigations by local authorities and the United Nations.

Attack on a Mission patrol near Ndélé in the north-east

134. On 11 February 2025, at approximately 9.05 p.m., between Nzokotounyala or Lokotoumala Nzokotoumala (31 km north of Ndélé) and Zobossinda or Djabossinda (35 km north-east of Ndélé), on the Ndélé-Akoursoulbak (62 km north of Ndélé) roadway, Bamingui-Bangoran Prefecture, armed elements opened fire on a MINUSCA Force long-range patrol conducted by a quick reaction force. One peacekeeper was shot and seriously injured and died from his injuries two hours later.

¹⁰⁴ The other four arrested were Lemane’s deputy, Marcelin Kangoyassi, and Elie Dimanche (who had both attended the first training with Célestin Bakayogo-Leman and Elie Gomengue), and Aimé Donatien Mbolimbakadie and Desiré Iko, whom the Panel was told were based in Bangui and working for FACA and Russian instructors as translators and facilitators for the contact between FACA, Russian instructors and AAKG.

¹⁰⁵ Confidential sources: Azande community members in Bangui and Haut-Mbomou, local officials, security sector sources and civil society.

The Panel was present in Ndélé on the day of the attack, working on separate lines of investigation.

135. From the information gathered following the incident, the attack had the markers of an ambush. The quick reaction force unit was taken by surprise after having set up camp. There was an absence of communication networks in the area.

136. Local sources informed the Panel that the area where the attack was conducted, stretching from Chari, Garba to Akoursoulbak (north of Ndélé in northern Central African Republic) is currently under the control of armed groups and/or armed elements. FACA had previously deployed elements in Garba but, following an attack on their position in October 2024, they had retreated to Nzokotounyala (25 km north of Ndélé), where they have an advance post. The Panel also notes that there are gold and diamond mines and a camp for displaced Sudanese refugees in the vicinity of the site where the attack was carried out.

137. There has been a drone flight ban in place in the Central African Republic since February 2023;¹⁰⁶ therefore no aerial reconnaissance was available prior to, during or following the attack.

Attack on Mission patrol near Zemio in the south-east

138. On 28 March 2025, a MINUSCA patrol was ambushed by unidentified armed elements near the village of Tabane, approximately 24 km north-west of Zemio, Haut-Mbomou Prefecture. One MINUSCA peacekeeper was killed in the attack. MINUSCA condemned the incident, describing it as “extremely violent,”¹⁰⁷ and dispatched a team from Bangui to investigate.

139. A spokesperson for the Government of the Central African Republic stated that the Government and law enforcement authorities would do everything in their power to bring the perpetrators of the attack to justice.¹⁰⁸

VIII. Update on designated individuals and entities

Update on sanctioned entity Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (Cfe.002) and sanctioned individual Joseph Kony (Cfi.009)

140. The war in the Sudan and the subsequent movement of armed groups in the border areas between the Sudan and north-eastern Central African Republic disrupted a base and settlement of the sanctioned entity, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (Cfe.002) in the Haute-Kotto Prefecture, near the border with the Sudan. This disruption has, since the start of 2024, triggered a wave of defections from LRA bases

¹⁰⁶ 2024 final report (S/2024/444), para. 93.

¹⁰⁷ MINUSCA press release, 29 March 2025: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/central-african-republic/20250304-minusca-ohchr-dembia-report.pdf>

¹⁰⁸ Associated Press, 29 March 2025: <https://apnews.com/article/central-african-republic-un-peacekeeper-ambush-98bba8c5e218e3f3e77861fbf4157121>; see also extract from MINUSCA Justice and Corrections Section weekly report 27 March–4 April: “On 31 March, the MINUSCA Justice and Corrections Section met with the Prosecutor of the Bambari Court of Appeal to discuss the initiation of a judicial investigation into the incident. While informed of the incident by judicial police officers on the ground, the Prosecutor had not yet issued directives on the investigation. He expressed interest in establishing a joint investigative team composed of national judicial police officers, however, citing the lack of logistical capacity and forensic expertise among officers based in Zemio, the Prosecutor highlighted the need for support by MINUSCA experts. MINUSCA will continue to engage with the judicial authorities to monitor progress and will provide technical support in coordination with UNPOL.”

in the border areas between the Central African Republic and the Sudan.¹⁰⁹ Multiple sources with deep knowledge of the group, including defectors, have informed the Panel that, since 2023, the number of elements loyal to the LRA leader, sanctioned individual Joseph Kony (Cfi.009), has diminished significantly.¹¹⁰

New abductions by LRA in the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

141. In February 2025, six LRA defectors, four boys and two men, who had escaped from the group, were later transferred to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for family reunification. The four boys claimed to be Congolese and to have been abducted by LRA in Digba, Bas-Uélé province, Democratic Republic of the Congo, in March 2024. That same month, a group of LRA elements travelled through Haut-Mbomou and, in the village of Koumonoungo, 65 km north-east of Zemio, abducted two children, a boy and a girl, before continuing north, presumably back towards an LRA base. Initial Panel investigations indicate that the children were abducted by a group of LRA elements led by Joseph Kony's son, Candit Joseph, also known as Yahya Ousman.

142. The Panel continue to monitor the activities and strength of LRA and the two sanctioned individuals who are still active in the group, Joseph Kony (CFi.009) and Salim Kony (Cfi.011).

IX. Recommendations

143. The Panel makes the following recommendations:

To the Security Council:

- Recommendation 1 To encourage Member States to enhance regional and multilateral collaboration on border security, with a specific focus on: (a) monitoring and addressing activities of sanctioned individuals; and (b) combating cross-border criminal activities in the region (see confidential annex and paras. 74–78 and 81–96)].
- Recommendation 2 To support the Government of the Central African Republic and regional Member States in their increased cooperation for the revitalization of the Central African Republic peace process (Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and Luanda road map), by emphasizing the need for clearly defined roles among stakeholders involved in the process (see paras. 10 and 11).
- Recommendation 3 To support the Government of the Central African Republic in deepening its efforts to investigate and ensure accountability for humanitarian law and human rights violations, in particular those committed by armed elements, including former AAKG elements integrated into the FACA, in the south-east of the country (Haut-Mbomou and Mbomou Prefectures) (see paras. 129–132)
- Recommendation 4 To encourage the Government of the Central African Republic and FACA to continue to strengthen command and control structures, as well as accountability mechanisms for former

¹⁰⁹ Midterm report (S/2025/384), paras. 68–71.

¹¹⁰ Confidential sources: Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) defectors, community, LRA analysts.

armed group elements integrated into the ranks of the FACA and internal security forces (see para. 121).

To the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024) concerning the Central African Republic:

Recommendation 5 To update the sanctions list entry for sanctioned individual Bi Sidi Souleman (CFi.014, also known as Sidiki Abass) to reflect his death (see para. 60 and confidential annex).

To Member States:

Recommendation 6 To take action to counteract arms trafficking to armed groups and associated individuals, with a particular focus on key border crossings and known trafficking hubs (see paras. 71–82).

Recommendation 7 To improve transparency and traceability over the natural resources sector in order to reduce the risk of contamination of legal supply chains with resources sourced from areas controlled by armed groups or where they remain actively involved in illegal mining operations in the Central African Republic, in particular in the context of: (a) continued growth of the gold market in the Central African Republic; and (b) the full readmission of the Central African Republic to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for diamonds (see paras. 96–99).

Annexes

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Annex 1: Methodology

1. The Panel ensured compliance with the methodological standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). These standards call for reliance on verified, genuine documents and concrete evidence and on-site observations by the experts, including taking photographs, wherever possible. When physical inspection is not possible, the Panel will seek to corroborate information using multiple, independent sources to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard, placing a higher value on statements by principal actors and first-hand witnesses to events.
2. The Panel uses satellite imagery of CAR procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations, as well as open-source imagery, where relevant. Commercial databases recording aviation and maritime data will be referenced as required. Public statements by officials and armed group representatives issued as press releases (communiqués), audio clips or media appearances were verified by the Panel. Any mobile phone records, where relevant, from service providers are also accepted as factual. While the Panel wishes to be as transparent as possible, in situations where identifying sources would risk exposing them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel has not included identifying information in the Panel report, but has placed the relevant evidence in United Nations secure archives.
3. The Panel reviewed and included reference to social media posts, where relevant to its investigations. However, evidence and information gleaned from social media was only used in Panel report where it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to meet the appropriate evidentiary standard.
4. The spelling of toponyms within the Central African Republic and broader region often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in reports. All major locations in CAR and other regional countries are spelled or referenced as per the UN Geographical Information System (GIS) map.
5. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of four out of the five members including the coordinator. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
6. The Panel is committed to impartiality in investigating incidents of non-compliance by any party.
7. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and will endeavour to provide the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in the majority of incidents that are currently in investigation. Their response will be taken into consideration in the Panel's findings for the final report.

Annex 2: List of Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation (3R) demands

POINTS DES REVENDICATIONS DU MOUVEMENT 3R

1. Amnésie des membres du mouvement démobilisés dans le cadre du présent accord
2. Libération des membres du mouvement 3R arrêtés
3. Grace présidentielle pour les éléments condamnés
4. Intégration des éléments du mouvement 3R actifs dans les FDS et les FSI
5. Reconnaissance des grades des officiers du mouvement 3R selon les quotas suivants : 15 au grade de Général, 30 au grade de Colonel, 45 au grades de Commandant, 50 au grade de capitaine, 60 au grade de Lieutenant.
6. La nomination des officiers de 3R dans les postes de responsabilité dans le haut commandement de l'armée nationale
7. Soutiens financiers aux éléments et officiers qui souhaitent réintégrer la vie civile
8. Attribution des postes de responsabilité au mouvement 3R selon les quotas suivants : quatre (04) Ministres pleins, deux (02) poste d'ambassadeurs, quatre (04) conseillers consulaires, un ministre conseiller à la présidence, un ministre conseiller à la primature, un conseiller à l'assemblée nationale, un chargé de mission au Ministère de la défense nationale, un chargé de mission au Ministère chargé de la sécurité publique, un poste de Gouverneur, deux postes des préfets, quatre sous-préfets ;
9. La réactivation des USMS pour garantir la sécurité des éleveurs transhumants
10. Construction et réhabilitation des infrastructures socioéconomiques de base dans toutes les communes d'élevage : écoles, hôpitaux, points et retenus d'eau, piste rurale, pharmacies vétérinaires et humaine
11. Viabilisation des couloirs de transhumance par la construction des infrastructures agropastorales dans les couloirs de transhumances ;
12. Mise en œuvre des projets intégrateurs de cohésion sociales et de haute intensité à main d'œuvre dans les communes d'élevage au profit des ex-combattants démobilisés
13. Garanties de sécurité et de libre circulation pour les ex-combattants reconvertis dans la vie civile par la mise à disposition des documents de voyages et des cartes d'identité nationales
14. L'organisation des audiences foraines pour la délivrance des jugements supplétifs et des campagnes d'identification des éleveurs et fils d'éleveurs centrafricains ;
15. La création d'un fond d'indemnisation des éleveurs victimes des pillages
16. Dédommagements et indemnisation des victimes de la crise de 2013 à 2025
17. La reconstruction des mosquées détruites et la réhabilitation des sept mosquées dans les communes d'élevage de la RCA ;
18. La restitution des terres, logements et biens de la communauté musulmane confisqués pendant la crise de 2013 à 2020.
19. L'application de principe de discrimination positive au profit des minorités peules dans le processus des élections locales et législatives en octroyant les postes des députés aux fils d'éleveurs dans les communes les circonscriptions administratives où se trouvent les communes d'élevage ;
20. Maintenir la disposition du code électorale en ce qui dispense les communes d'élevage d'élection municipale et nommer les membres des conseils municipaux composés uniquement des éleveurs
21. L'octroi des bourses d'études aux étudiants peuls ayant obtenus leurs diplômes d'accès aux études supérieurs
22. L'intégration des jeunes diplômés fils d'éleveurs peuls centrafricains dans la fonction publique et dans les corps en uniformes (gendarmerie, polices, douane

23. Prise en charge des veuves et orphelins de la crise
24. Rapatriement, réinstallation, et réinsertion des réfugiés
25. Accélération du processus de réhabilitation des chefferies traditionnelles en RCA
26. La création des collèges d'enseignement technique et général dans les communes d'élevage
27. La création d'un cadre formel de suivi-évaluation de l'accord conclu entre le gouvernement et les 3R à l'issue du processus de réintégration du mouvement dans l'APPR.

Source: Confidential

Annex 3: RPJET presence in CAR in 2023

GROUPES ARMÉES TCHADIENS
(RPJET / MDR)

A Am-Drafoek RCA

Contacts: +249116482834
+249813362551

Am-Drafoek le 19/04/2023

à
à Monsieur le Préfet
de la Vakaga (RCA)

Objet: Demande d'audience.

Monsieur le Préfet,

Nous avons l'honneur de solliciter auprès de votre haute bienveillance une audience.

En effet, nous sommes une coalition de groupes armés tchadiens basés à Am-Drafoek sous autorité de Ali AHMAT, Chef d'Etat Major, et deuxième adjoint DJIBRINE Hachil-Kaib avec un effectif de 100 (cent) éléments soit 3 (trois) bataillons. Située à 28 kilomètres de Birao vers l'Est, à 32 kilomètres d'Am-Drafoek vers l'Ouest, à 30 kilomètres de Terfel vers le Nord et à 7 kilomètres de Amtissia vers le Sud.

(Coordonnées géographiques 10:20, 21:3.) 23, 34, 188.
Q GPS.

(1)

Nous aimerions vous rencontrer afin de vous faire part de nos inquiétudes suites aux multiples problèmes que nous rencontrons sur le terrain.

Monsieur Le Chef, aimerions-nous avoir auprès des autorités centrafricaines un lieu qui nous servira de base dans la localité. Sans vous mentir, notre position nous permettra de sécuriser la arakaga (Am-Dafock, Saraiivo, Nda, Bouk et Boulkoutou...). Si vous acceptez nous placer à Am-Dafock, nous acceptons, même s'il s'agit d'aller devant, nous irons toujours. De ce faire, nous aimerions que les forces russes et la MINUSCA soient informés de notre situation. S'ils veulent venir de vers nous ou à nous d'aller vers eux, nous sommes prêts. Par ailleurs, nous sollicitons auprès du Gouvernement des moyens roulants et matériels armés.

Monsieur Le Chef, permettez-nous de vous parler d'un groupe armé tchadien contre la RCA qui est à Kouboul-Moro à 3 Km de la colline Adial-Fatna. Leur chef d'Etat Major est Abib Ali REGUE. Il était en Egypte puis

(P)

est descendu au Fatah signé un accord avec les Français qui lui cède des matériels de combat pour déstabiliser la R.C.A. C'est son adjoint Adam CHERIFF DENGUEH qui est sur place avec la troupe. Déjà 100 (cent) véhicules tchadiens sont à Mangaye pour entrer en Centrafrique par Birao puis à Am-Dafet dans un délai de 3 (trois) jours après la fête de Ramadan.

En outre Monsieur le Préfet, la guerre actuelle au Soudan c'est à cause de la RCA car les Français veulent utiliser les Damassiri pour aller combattre les Russes en R.C.A. et que le Président soudanais actuel s'est opposé. Alors notre souci est d'avoir une réponse fiable. Si oui, nous restons. Si non, nous quittons et seul l'avenir nous dira.


En cas de doute, veuillez nous contacter sur les numéros suivants: +249 922 42 94 84 / +249 12 29 75 34 1 de la part du Coordinateur Monsieur Abrahamat OUMAR.

(3)

Dans l'espoir que vous répondriez
favorablement à notre demande, veuillez
agréer Monsieur Le Préfet, l'expression
de notre profond respect.

Pour La Coordination


1- Ali ADAM


2- Djibrine KALIL

(17)

Annex 4: Djazouli video screen shot



Source: Video received by the Panel in February 2025 from multiple confidential sources.

Annex 5: CAR border policy, contents page, version of 16 May 2023. Full copy on file with UN Secretariat.



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité – Dignité – Travail

POLITIQUE NATIONALE DE GESTION DES ESPACES FRONTALIERS DE LA REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE (PNGEF-RCA)

POLITIQUE NATIONALE DE GESTION DES ESPACES FRONTALIERS DE LA REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE (PNGEF-RCA)

Sommaire


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Annex 6: Attack on Bodjomo



Source: Screenshots from a video shared by CMSPR on social media of the attack on Bodjomo.

Annex 7: 3R armed group basic organisational chart



Source material: confidential report, updated by engagement with confidential 3R-affiliated sources, security sector, community and local analyst sources.

Annex 8: Letter by the Political Coordinator of 3R regarding attack in Bozoum

**Communiqué N° 32 du Mouvement 3R**

**SUITE AUX MASSACRE DES CAMPEMENTS DES ELEVEURS
PEULS PAR UNE MILICE ARMEE DANS LES VILLAGES
BEFORO, BELTOUM, BOMBORO, YAO, ET BOGALI DANS LA
SOUS-PREFECTURE DE BOZOUUM, OUHAM-PENDE.
REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE.**

Dans la journée de lundi 17 février 2025, une milice armée sous commandement de **Madame la préfète de l'Ouham-Pende, Madame GENEVIEVE CHOUR GBADIN** a lancé une vaste opération baptisée par elle-même « Nettoyer Mbororo » contre les campements des paisibles éleveurs peuls Mbororo autours des villages Beforo, Beltoum, Bomboro, Yao, et Bogali dans la sous-préfecture de Bozoum, Préfecture de Ouham-Pende en République Centrafricaine. Cette opération criminelle a fait plus de cinquante (50) personnes tuées dont les femmes et les enfants ; des campements des victimes pillés et brûlés et les bétails emportés.

Cet acte criminel odieux ne restera pas impuni. Les auteurs doivent répondre de leurs actes.

Malheureusement, cet acte crapuleux n'a fait l'objet d'aucune condamnation du Gouvernement et des organisations chargées de la défense et de protection des droits humains en RCA. Ce silence complice et coupable démontre à suffisance la volonté du Gouvernement d'encourager ce projet génocidaire savamment préparé, planifié et exécuté par la milice baptisée « Nettoyer Mbororo » dont le projet de création avait été annoncé dans un mémorandum adressé au Gouvernement avec copie au Chef de l'Etat rédigé par un groupes des personnes malintentionnées soutenues par certaines personnalités politiques notamment le Député de Bouar 4 en fonction Monsieur Dono Jonas du PAD et l'ex-député de Kouï Boua Barthélemy du MLPC.

1

Le mouvement 3R prend à témoins l'opinion nationale et internationale et demande aux Gouvernement de sanctionner les responsables politiques et administratifs impliqués cités et de traduire en justice tous les auteurs et les commanditaires de ce massacre odieux qui sape les efforts du Président de la République dans sa dynamique de dialogue avec les groupes armés pour ramener la paix et restaurer la cohésion sociale et la réconciliation nationale.

Fait à Markounda, le 19 Février 2025

Le Coordinateur Politique des 3R



Le colonel Hammadou Rawandou

Annex 9: Press release from CPC-F regarding Bozoum attack

Coalition des Patriotes
Pour le Changement
Fondamentale (CPC-F)
Coordination-Générale
Coordination-Militaire
Porte-Parole-Particulier
Prêt de l'Etat-Major-Général
N-02/CPC-F/CG/CM/P-PP/EMG/S.G-25



République-Centrafricaine
Unité-Dignité-Travail

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

Condamnation des agressions commises par les milices du Préfet de Bozoum en coopération avec les Forces Armées Centrafricaines FACA et le groupe Wagner contres la population civile peule dans les villages Beforo, Beltoum, Bomboro, Yao et Bogali dans la sous-préfecture de Bozoum, OUHAM-PENDE.

Le 17 février 2025, des milices liées au Préfet de Bozoum ont mené une attaque meurtrière contre les campements de la population civile peule dans la sous-préfecture de Bozoum, OUHAM-PENDE, faisant entre 50 et 60 victimes. Cette attaque violente a non seulement pris la vie de dizaines de civils innocents, mais elle a également exacerbé les souffrances d'une population déjà éprouvée par les nombreuses difficultés rencontrées au quotidien.


Nous condamnons fermement ces actes de violence, qui constituent des violations flagrantes des droits humains et vont à l'encontre des engagements internationaux en matière de protection des civils. Le comportement des milices du gouvernement, en coopération avec les forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) et les mercenaires du groupe Wagner, est inacceptable. Il a plongé la population civile dans un climat de terreur constante, privant les habitants de leur droit fondamental à la dignité humaine.

Face à ces atrocités, la coalition des patriotes pour le changement fondamental (CPC-F) appelle à une action immédiate de la part de la communauté internationale. Il est impératif que des mesures

urgentes soient prises pour mettre fin à ces actes de violence et garantir la protection des civils sans exception. Nous appelons également à un soutien renforcé aux organisations humanitaires, qui doivent pouvoir intervenir sans entrave pour fournir l'aide indispensable à ces populations dévastées par la violence. La protection des civils et la fin des exactions doivent être une priorité absolue pour la République-Centrafricaine, et pour la communauté internationale, dans le but de garantir la paix, la justice et la dignité humaine pour tous.

Fait à Ndele, 20/20/2025


Le Porte-Parole-Particulier prêt de l'état-major, général de la CPC-F



AMIR Faissal

Annex 10: Landmine pressure plate found in Bouyay-Yade, Kouï

November 13, 2024 – the local population in a village called Bouyay-Yade on the road axis between Boukaya and Kouï, southwest of Bocaranga (Ouham-Pendé prefecture), discovered six PG-7 rockets and three pressure plates.



Source: Confidential.

Note: The panel is verifying images received.

Annex 11: Set of 60mm mortar rounds, type M802A4 found in M’Poko Bangui on 18 November 2024



Photos: Fadhel Bouzidi- Arms Expert-2745

Annex 12: List of incidents of violence reported in and around mine sites over the course of the mandate


Source material: confidential reports, engagement with confidential armed group, security sector, community and local analyst sources. List is not exhaustive but provides examples of incidents which the Panel was able to corroborate.

Date	Location	Incident Details
4 Sep 2024	Bakouma, Mbomou prefecture	UPC incursion at mine site called Yangou-Ouada (Bria axis). Threatened artisanal miners, looting, demanded tax of between 5,000-50,000 CFA from artisanal miners and collectors at the site.
7 Sep 2024	Sam-Ouandja, Haute-Kotto prefecture	UPC incursion a Yangou-Bamara mine site not far from (north of Sam-Ouandja on Ouanda-Djallé axis). Threatened artisanal miners with weapons and stole miners' property.
9 Sep 2024	Bakouma, Mbomou prefecture	UPC armed elements stopped a truck near Bakouma mining area en route from Bria and forced the driver to pay 600,000 CFA for its release.
13 Sep 2024	Bocaranga, Ouham-Pendé prefecture	3R armed elements incursion in Pakale mining area, kidnapped 4 miners, demanded 600,000 CFA per miner for their release.
16 Sep 2024	Bocaranga, Ouham-Pendé prefecture	See above. Miners released. Sources indicated that ransom was paid.
16 Sep 2024	Madjam mine site, Vakaga Prefecture	Incursion CPC armed elements at the Madjam mine site (SW of Tiringoulou), threatened and robbed artisanal miners.
16 Sep 2024	Sam-Ouandja, Haute-Kotto prefecture	Moto taxi driver and passengers robbed near Bertalata mining site (north of Sam-Ouandja) by suspected UPC, including a small quantity of gold.
17 Sep 2024	Gadzi, Mambéré prefecture	3R incursion reported at mining sites near Gadzi / Sewe (east of Carnot). FACA operation launched in response.
23 Sep 2024	Nzako, Mbomou prefecture	UPC incursion at Yangou-Hoda mine site (north of Nzako), possessions looted.
24 Sep 2024	Balaka, Ouham prefecture	Violent incursion by armed actors at Balaka mine site, resources and possessions pillaged from artisanal miners and collectors.
15 Oct 2024	Botto, Mambéré-Kadeï prefecture	3R presence report at Botto mine site (northwest of Berberati), involved in illicit exploitation.
15 Oct 2024	Bakouma, Mbomou prefecture	5-6 UPC armed elements observed near Kpangou mine site (north of Bakouma).
16 Oct 2024	Pombolo, Mbomou prefecture	UPC "general" Adamou Adjawa established base near Pombolo and deploys elements to control nearby mine site.
21 Oct 2024	Madjam mine site, Vakaga prefecture	Armed elements conducted attacks at Madjam mining site (west of Tiringoulou). Armed robbery, injuries and one death reported.
24 Oct 2024	Koundé, Nana-Mambéré prefecture	3R armed group elements reported at mine in Koundé (northwest of Bouar), pushing out artisanal workers.
28 Oct 2024	Ngoutéré, Ouham-Pendé prefecture	3R and other armed elements involved in hit-and-run armed robberies, looting and threatening community near Ngoutéré mining area.
4 Nov 2024	Wili mine site, Ombella-Mpoko prefecture	3R incursion into Wili mine (between Bossangoa and Bossembélé) and looting at nearby village. Retaliation against Fulani community.

6 Nov 2024	Nzako, Mbomou prefecture	UPC elements attacked FACA posted to Yangou Hada mine site (north of Nzako). One FACA reportedly killed.
7 Nov 2024	Bocaranga, Ouham-Pendé prefecture	3R incursion at mine site west of Bocaranga. Attacked gold miners, armed robbery of gold, cash, equipment and possessions. 3 injured.
11 Nov 2024	Gbeti and Kpande mine sites, Nana-Mambéré prefecture	3R incursion Gbeti and Kpande mine sites (southwest of Bouar). Armed robbery of traders present, extortion at nearby village.
22 Nov 2024	Sangou mine site, Sam Ouandja, Haute-Kotto prefecture	FACA and Russian instructors carried out an operation at Sangou mine site (northeast of Sam-Ouandja) where armed groups had controlled, taxed and been involved in illegal mining operation.
25 Nov 2024	Foh, Nana-Mambéré prefecture	Unidentified armed elements carried out attack at Foh mine site (southwest of Bouar). 5 kidnapped. Ransom paid.
25 Nov 2024	Mbassa mine site, Nana-Mambéré prefecture	Armed elements ambushed civilians on axis to Mbassa mine site (southwest of Bouar).
5 Dec 2024	Kouki, Ouham prefecture	20 FACA and Russian instructors entered site in the Kouki mining area, seized equipment, motorcycles, phones and natural resources collected by artisanal miners. Injuries reported.
8 Dec 2024	Bakouma, Mbomou prefecture	15 armed group elements attacked Yangou Hoda mine site, looted artisanal miners.
9 Dec 2024	Babaza and Danly mine sites, Mambéré-Kadeï prefecture	FACA demanded money from workers at Babaza and Danly mine sites. 1 artisanal miner killed. Investigation opened.
15 Dec 2024	Gamanga mine site, Ouham-Pendé prefecture	Armed elements aggressed local population near mine site. 1 death reported.
23 Dec 2024	Bogolo, Nana-Mambéré prefecture	Altercation between civilian and FACA. 1 death reported.
23 Dec 2024	Gbakette, Ouham-Pendé prefecture	FACA operation against 3R/CPC elements operating at Hourouhou mine site who had attempted armed robbery on artisanal miners. Reports vary from 6-13 dead, including 3R local leader, several wounded. Related clashes between 3R and anti-balaka in locality.
24 Dec 2024	Oumou and Sanya mine sites, Ouham-Pendé prefecture	3R attack on Oumou and Sanya mine sites, attempted armed robbery of artisanal miners, demanding gold and money. 4 deaths reported, 2 injured. FACA intervention.
5 Jan 2025	Kosso, Ouham-Pendé prefecture	3R incursion at Kosso mine site (south of Paoua). 8 FACA kidnapped. Released following day.
8 Jan 2025	Kete-Gbako, Ouham prefecture	Armed incursion at mine site near Kete-Gbako. 3 injuries reported.
9 Jan 2025	Yolembe mine site, Nana-Mambéré prefecture	3R incursion at Yolembe mine site (southwest of Bouar). Armed robbery of gold. 1-2 reported killed, 4 abducted. 11-12 January ransoms paid. Clashes with local militias after.
11 Jan 2025	Gobolo, Nana-Mambéré prefecture	FACA altercation resulting in 1 death.

22 Feb 2025	Nassoya mine site, Nana-Mambéré prefecture	Armed elements killed three Fulani near Nassoya mine site (north of Baboua).
26 Feb 2025	Balaka, Ouham prefecture	FACA and Russian instructors military operation. Confrontation with armed elements led by Florent Kema. 6 civilians dead. Reported FACA and allies 3 deaths, more injuries.
28 Feb 2025	Ouanda-Djallé, Vakaga prefecture	UPC incursion at Keye mining site (southwest of Ouanda-Djallé). Armed robbery of cash and possessions of artisanal miners.
8 Mar 2025	Bakouma, Mbomou prefecture	UPC incursion at Yangou Hoda mine site. 1 attacker overwhelmed and captured by miners, beaten to death. Also armed robbery on nearby axis.
22 Mar 2025	Sam-Ouandja, Haute-Kotto prefecture	Armed robbery of artisanal miner (and 2 moto passengers) by three armed elements on axis outside Sam Ouandja, Yalinga axis, taking large sum of cash, 16g of gold and 3.5 carat diamond and motorcycle.
24 Mar 2025	Boutabaye mine site, Vakaga prefecture	Incursion by approx. 10 UPC elements at Boutabaye mine site (west of Ouanda Djallé). Beat artisanal miners, armed robbery of motos, phones and large sum of money.
3 Apr 2025	Sakamadji, Mambéré-Kadeï prefecture	Armed elements set up base at Sakamadji (northwest of Berberati) and active in Sanghamine area. Involved in illegal mining operation and extortion from community.
7 Apr 2025	Rafäi, Mbomou prefecture	Sources reported that FACA confiscated gold from artisanal miner returning from Karmadar mine site.

Annex 13: Photographs and map of paths out of mine sites used to transport illegally mined gold to Cameroon



Source: Photograph and hand-drawn map of mine sites and crossing to Cameroon provided by confidential source on 3 April 2025.

Annex 14: Photographs of gold collected from the site and reportedly smuggled to Cameroon



Source: Photographs provided by confidential source on 3 April 2025.

Annex 15: Copy of decree establishing Cooperative Minière Douagouzou Fils (CMDF)

MINISTÈRE DES MINES ET DE LA GÉOLOGIE
DIRECTION DE CABINET
DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DES MINES
DIRECTION DE L'EXPLOITATION MINIÈRE ET DE LA PROTECTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT
SERVICE DES EXPLOITATIONS ARTISANALES ET SEMI-MÉCANIQUES

REPUBLICQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité – Dignité – Travail

**ARRETE N° 172/24/MMG/DIRCAB/DGM/DEMPE/SEASM. -
PORTANT AGREMENT DE LA COOPERATIVE MINIERE DOUAGOUZOU FILS
«CMDF»**

LE MINISTRE DES MINES ET DE LA GEOLOGIE

Vu la Constitution de la République Centrafricaine du 30 août 2023 ;
Vu la Loi n° 24.008 du 21 août 2024, portant Code Minier de la République Centrafricaine ;
Vu le Décret n°23.199 du 30 août 2023, portant promulgation de la constitution de la République Centrafricaine ;
Vu le Décret n° 22.040 du 07 février 2022, portant nomination du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement ;
Vu le Décret n° 24.001 du 04 janvier 2024, portant nomination ou confirmation des Membres du Gouvernement ;
Vu le Décret n° 23.148, du 06 juin 2023, portant organisation et fonctionnement du Ministère Chargé des Mines et de la Géologie et fixant les attributions du Ministre.
Vu la Demande formulée en date du 13 juin 2024 par Monsieur **BATOURE Aliou**, Président de la **COOPERATIVE MINIERE DOUAGOUZOU FILS «CMDF»**.

SUR RAPPORT DU DIRECTEUR GENERAL DES MINES

Rue de l'Industrie BP 26 Bangui République Centrafricaine
Tél. +236 21 61 39 44 Fax : +236 21 61 06 46
Website : <https://ministereminesrca.com/>

ARRETE

- Article 1^{er} :** Est agréée la **COOPERATIVE MINIERE DOUAGOUZOU FILS** en abrégée «**CMDF**» dont le siège se trouve à BELOKO;
- Article 2 :** Cette Coopérative **CMDF**, enregistrée sous le n°693 du registre d'immatriculation des Coopératives de la Direction de l'Exploitation Minière et de la Protection de l'Environnement, est tenue de fonctionner conformément à la législation minière relative aux activités des Coopératives ;
- Article 3 :** Les membres de la Coopérative Minière **CMDF** ont l'obligation de renouveler annuellement leurs patentes conformément aux dispositions de l'article 207 de la Loi N° 24.008 du 21 Aout 2024, portant Code Minier de la République Centrafricaine ;
- Article 4 :** La Coopérative Minière **CMDF** est tenue de produire un rapport annuel de ses activités à la Direction Générale des Mines et à la Direction Régionale des Mines de leurs zones d'activités ;
- Article 5 :** Outre les dispositions du Code Minier en vigueur réglementant les activités des coopératives minières, la violation des articles 3 et 4 du présent Arrêté entraîne le retrait pur et simple dudit agrément ;
- Article 6 :** Le présent Arrêté qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature sera enregistré et publié au journal officiel.




Fait à Bangui, le 12 2 OCT 2024

Rufin BENAM-BELTOUNGOU
Ministre chargé des Mines et de la Géologie

Rue de l'Industrie BP 26 Bangui République Centrafricaine
Tél. +236 21 61 39 44 Fax : +236 21 61 06 46
Website : <http://ministere.miner.ca.com/>

Annex 16: Communiqué regarding a joint operation involving local residents and Cameroonian Defense and Security Forces on 31 March which led to the arrest and interrogation of a suspected member of the 3R in the village of Zamboï

<p>REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN Paix - Travail - Patrie ***** REGION DE L'EST ***** DEPARTEMENT DU LOM ET DJEREM ***** ARRONDISSEMENT DE GAROUA-BOULAI ***** SOUS-PREFECTURE DE GAROUA-BOULAI *****</p>		<p>REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON Peace - Work - Fatherland ***** EAST REGION ***** LOM AND DJEREM DIVISION ***** GAROUA-BOULAI SUBDIVISION ***** GAROUA-BOULAI SUBDIVISIONAL OFFICE *****</p>
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00000003 / CRP/B15.04 DU 03 AVR 2025

COMMUNIQUE RADIO-PRESSE N°


Le Sous-préfet de l'Arrondissement de Garoua-Boulai informe les populations de cette circonscription administrative que, le 31 mars 2025, une action concertée des populations et des Forces de Défense et de Sécurité a permis d'interpeller et d'exploiter un présumé membre du groupe rebelle centrafricain « 3R » dans la localité de Zamboï.

L'infortuné dans sa besogne aurait initié un prélèvement de fortes sommes d'argent aux orpailleurs menant des activités dans cette zone et installés en territoire camerounais.

L'Autorité administrative saisit ainsi cette occasion pour féliciter et encourager aussi bien les vaillantes populations de Zamboï que les valeureux éléments des Forces de Défenses et de Sécurité ayant contribué à l'arrestation du malfrat susévoqué ; et invite l'ensemble des populations de l'Arrondissement de Garoua-Boulai à plus de vigilance et de collaboration dans le cadre du renseignement prévisionnel, afin de contribuer à l'embellie sécuritaire ainsi qu'au développement de la circonscription.

COPIE :

- GOUVERNEUR/EST/Bertoua
- PREFET/LD/Bertoua
- MAIRE/CGB/GB
- AFFICHAGE (LARGE DIFFUSION)
- CHRONOS/ARCHIVES.-




LE SOUS-PREFET

Julien-Martial ASSE

Administrateur Civil Principal

Annex 17: Chart demonstrating the percentage production share per company in 2024



Analysis of export figures based upon official government trade statistics from the Ministry of Mines and Geology, on file with the UN Secretariat.

Annex 18: Photograph of basic equipment at a gold refining company compound in Bangui



Source: photograph taken by the Panel, 1 April 2025, Bangui.

Annex 19: Export certificate for gold export by one Bangui-based refinery (some details redacted)

MINISTERE DES MINES ET DE LA GEOLOGIE ***** DIRECTION DE CABINET ***** DIRECTION GENERALE DES MINES ET DE LA GEOLOGIE ***** DIRECTION DES DONNEES, DE LA REGULATION ET DU SUIVI DE LA COMMERCIALISATION ***** BUREAU D'EVALUATION ET DE CONTROLE DE DIAMANT ET OR *****	REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE Unité - Dignité - Travail *****
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FEUILLE D'EXPORTATION D'OR

N° 099/2022
 BUREAU D'ACHAT : [REDACTED]
 Période d'Achat : [REDACTED] /2022
 Régions : ABBA-YALOKÉ-BERBERATI-BOALI

DONNEES DE L'EXPORTATEUR

Poids : 23 556,98 (Lingot) Grammes
 Valeur d'achat : 588 924 500 FCFA
 Prix au Gramme : 25 000 FCFA





DONNEES DE L'EXPERTISE AU BECDOR

Poids : 23 556,98 (Lingot) Grammes
 Valeur d'Expertise : 588 924 500 FCFA
 Prix au Gramme : 25 000 F CFA

DONNEES TAXATION

Poids 23 556,98 (Lingot) Grammes
 Valeur Taxable : 588 924 500 FCFA
 Prix au gramme : 25 000 FCFA
 Date d'exportation : [REDACTED] /2022

NB : La valeur taxable est la plus disante entre la valeur d'achat et la valeur d'expertise.

LES EXPERTS 	BECDOR 	USAF CENTRALE 	DOUANE 
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Source: confidential

Annex 20: Letter dated 14 March 2025, Kimberly Process Chairman response to CAR government on the subject of management of confiscated diamond stockpiles



UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
MINISTRY OF ECONOMY



الإمارات العربية المتحدة
وزارة الاقتصاد

To Luc Florentin Simplicie Brosseni Yali
Focal point of the Central African Republic
Ministry of Mines and Geology of Central African Republic

Dubai, March 14, 2025

Subject : Management of Confiscated Diamond Stockpiles

Dear Luc,

I hope this letter finds you well.

Together with the Chairs of the WGM and WGDE, we have carefully reviewed the letter from the Central African Republic (CAR) regarding the management of confiscated diamond stockpiles resulting from the seizure of illegal diamonds by CAR authorities. After extensive deliberation, we have concluded that the management of these stocks falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereign state of the Central African Republic.

It was unanimously agreed that confiscated diamonds are a matter of criminality and should therefore be handled in accordance with the criminal laws of the Central African Republic. As such, these diamonds become the property of the government and cannot be returned to the individuals or entities from whom they were seized.

The Kimberly Process advises that these diamonds be treated as sovereign assets, with any revenue generated from their sale rightfully belonging to the State as the legitimate owner. While we can offer guidance on the management of the sale, the entire process must be conducted by the CAR as a sovereign State.

kpchair2024@dmcc.ae | +971 4 6655100 | Kimberly Process, Uptown Tower, Dubai, United Arab Emirates





UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
MINISTRY OF ECONOMY



الإمارات العربية المتحدة
وزارة الاقتصاد

Furthermore, the classification and handling of these diamonds should be determined based on national laws governing such cases, as this matter does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Kimberley Process. However, for the sake of transparency, we recommend that they be clearly marked as confiscated goods.

Please do not hesitate to reach out should you require any further assistance.

Warm regards,


A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "AS".

Ahmed Bin Sulayem
Kimberley Process Chairman

Source: confidential

Annex 21: Social media posts from President Touadéra's official X account regarding cryptocurrency and the recent memecoin launch

27 April 2022, pinned post



9 February 2025



9 February 2025



10 February 2025



10 February 2025



10 February 2025



10 February 2025




10 February 2025



12 February 2025

↳ Faustin-Archange Touadéra reposted

 **CAR Meme News** ✓ @CARMemecoinNews · Feb 12

CAR Meme: 48-Hour Recap Since Launch!

The past 48 hours have been insane! Here's what's happened since \$CAR officially hit the market:

ATH: \$900M – From an \$80K market cap to \$900M in just 4 hours!
 Volume: Nearly \$1B since launch – One of the biggest DEX volumes in crypto in such a short time!
 Exchanges: Listed on @MEXC_Official, @BingXOfficial, @BitMartExchange, @LBank_Exchange, @XTexchange, & many more!
 Trending #1 on Solana
 Community: 27K+ holders and growing
 Development: New real world Central African Republic initiatives launched
 First-ever country memecoin – Endorsed by President Faustin-Archange Touadéra!

Coming up next: We're expanding our listings and securing major partnerships to strengthen our market presence. A global marketing push will drive greater visibility and engagement. We're also forging real-world collaborations with large institutions to enhance credibility and impact. Additionally, expect regular updates on key country development initiatives as we continue to drive growth and innovation.

This started as a memecoin experiment, but we're committed to building and delivering.

146 88 339 102K

12 February 2025

 **Faustin-Archange Touadéra** ✓ @FA_Touadera · Feb 12

Thank you @TF1 for the clarifications. My account was not hacked, I was not the victim of any deepfake, and I reaffirm my commitment to innovation, blockchain, and the development of @CARMemecoinNews in the Central African Republic.



From tf1info.fr

478 310 835 244K


13 February 2025



4 April 2025



17 April 2025



Annex 22: Document from Ministry of Mines and Geology of the Central African Republic, dated February 10, 2025, announcing the launch of the CAR MEME COIN (\$CAR) as the country's official memecoin

The document notes that the project is a joint effort between the CAR government and the company BARNESLEY Ltd, and its official information is available at car.meme.

<p>MINISTRE DES MINES ET DE LA GEOLOGIE ***** DIRECTION DE CABINET ***** N° <u>119</u>/25/MMG/DIRCAB.</p>		<p>REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE Unité - Dignité - Travail *****</p>
Bangui, le 10 FEV 2025		

LE MINISTRE DES MINES ET DE LA GÉOLOGIE

Mesdames, Messieurs,

Il m'est agréable de vous informer que CAR MEME COIN (\$CAR) est un projet du Ministère des Mines et de la Géologie, exécuté par le Comptoir de Minerais et Gemmes (COMIGEM) en collaboration avec la société **BARNESLEY Ltd**, sous la très haute impulsion de Son Excellence Professeur **Faustin-Archange TOUADERA**, Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat.

Le CAR MEME COIN (\$CAR) est le memecoin officiel du pays, visant à promouvoir l'innovation, le développement économique et l'adoption des technologies blockchain.

Le site officiel du projet est car.meme, où toutes les informations légitimes et officielles concernant le CAR MEME COIN sont publiées.

Pour toute information complémentaire, nous restons à votre disposition.

Avec nos remerciements anticipés, nous vous prions de croire Mesdames, Messieurs, à notre parfaite considération.




Rufin BENAM BELOUNGOU
Ministre chargé des Mines et de la Géologie.-

Ampliations :
- SEM PR/CE.....ATCR


Rue de l'Industrie, BP 26 – Bangui – République Centrafricaine
 Tél. : +236 21 61 22 48
 Site web : www.ministereminesrca.com

Annex 23: Screenshot showing \$CAR memecoin value, accessed of 24 April 2025



Annex 24: laissez-passer dated 29 November 2024 drafted on the CPC letterhead and signed by two CPC “generals”, both with the title of military chief of staff, “general” Mahamat Ahmat and “general” Mahamat Idjel. The herder’s name was redacted for safety reasons.

COALITION DES PATRIOTES
POUR LE CHANGEMENT
ETAT MAJOR GENERAL
SECRETARIAT GENERAL
N° ____/CPC/ETG/SG/2024



République Centrafricaine

Unité - Dignité - Travail

LAISSER-PASSEZ

Noms : [REDACTED]

Prénoms : _____

Somme versée : _____

Nombres des bœufs : 85

Zone de : CHAXIEL

Validé : _____

NB : le concerné ci-dessus a rempli les critères de son laissez-passez, par ailleurs, nous demandons autorités de lui faciliter les passages.


Le présent laissez-passez est établi pour servir et valoir ce que de droit.

Fait à Mambeya, le 29/11/2024

Le chef d'Etat-major

General. MAHAMAT AHMAT


964-16444




Le chef d'Etat-major

General. MAHAMAT IDJEL

99-1820-16




012345 6789

Annex 25: Evolution of AAKG since 2023

Detailed chronology of events which led to the decision to extend training and integration opportunities to the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) ethnic self-defense militia, and challenges during and following the training process.

AAKG origins and the request for government support to fight the UPC¹¹¹ in the Haut-Mbomou prefecture

The AAKG was created in early 2023, with a two-fold set of declared objectives: i) to liberate Haut-Mbomou from “UPC occupation”, and ii) to encourage FACA and Internal Security Forces to come and secure “liberated towns”, see below letter from the AAKG to MINUSCA Obo office, dated 27 September 2023, wherein the AAKG expressed anger at UPC atrocities perpetrated with impunity against the population of Haut-Mbomou, and the lack of capacity of the government and MINUSCA to protect them.¹¹²

In mid-March 2023, the AAKG militia group attacked the UPC in Bambouti and took control over the small town on the border with South Sudan, along the main road linking CAR and South Sudan. Following this initial incident, violence escalated and throughout 2023 there were reports of persistent and grave violations committed against civilians by the UPC and the AAKG across the Haut-Mbomou prefecture. At that time, there was limited presence of state authority outside of Obo, the UPC controlled Mboki and Zémio, in the Haut-Mbomou prefecture, and government was looking for ways to address and de-escalate the violence.

The Panel was informed that in November 2023, at least three AAKG representatives had met with President Touadéra and his special advisor on national organisations, Fidele Gouandjika, at the Presidential Palace in Bangui, asking for material support to strengthen their group’s capacity to fight the UPC.

A few months later, in March 2024, FACA and Russian instructors arrived in Obo to meet with AAKG leaders there.

While in Obo in March 2024, the Panel noted that the authorities and the AAKG representatives were discussing different and opposing approaches for how to address the situation, ranging from on the one hand disarming the AAKG and strengthening the FACA’s control of the militia, to on the other hand training the AAKG in order to make them able to fill the security vacuum and protect the population.

During the same period, an ongoing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme for ex-UPC elements previously led by Guenderou, was delayed, and the ex-combatants were becoming increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress. During a visit to the Haut-Mbomou prefecture in February 2024, Guenderou stated that only 31 out of 64 properly disarmed elements had received some form of training and that even those had received limited support (S/2024/444, paras 79-82).

While the Panel has not been able to establish the precise details of the decision-making process, multiple credible sources confirmed that by the end of March 2024 a plan was agreed between by FACA, Russian instructors and AAKG to give a group of 100 AAKG elements military training in Obo and to provide them with arms and uniforms.

FACA and Russian instructors first round of military training and integration for the AAKG

Training for a group of demobilized AAKG militia started at the end of March 2024 and lasted for one month. The Panel met with participants who explained that in their view the training they received was modelled on the basic training given to FACA recruits in Berengo.¹¹³ The participants were provided with a military uniform and an AK-pattern assault rifle. For many, if not most, it was the first time that they had been taught how to disassemble and reassemble an automatic weapon (many Azande are traditional hunters who own and know how to make and use artisanal weapons).

In terms of the selection process for trainees, the FACA and Russian instructors tasked the two most senior AAKG leaders in Obo, Celestin Bakayogo Leman (aka “General Leman”) and Elie Gomengue (aka “Elie Pasteur”, referring to his role as a local pastor) to select 100 persons who would be trained. In addition to Leman and Elie Pasteur, three other AAKG senior

¹¹¹ L’Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) led by sanctioned individual Ali Darassa (Cfi.015).

¹¹² While there are no updated reliable statistics on the composition of the population of the Haut-Mbomou prefecture, a UN background note on the Haut-Mbomou prefecture from March 2025 states that states that the Azande are the predominant ethnic group in the prefecture, alongside the Fulani and other groups. https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/5-_background_note_on_the_haut-mbomou_prefecture.pdf.

¹¹³ Berengo is a former palace of president, and later emperor of CAR, Jean-Bedel Bokassa (emperor from 1979-1996) located in Lobaye prefecture in southwest CAR. It now serves as a training camp used by the Russian instruction mission.

militia members took part in deciding who should be selected for the training: Marcelin Kangoyessi (aka “Maxon”) who was also General Leman’s “deputy”, Elie Dimanche, and Michel Komboyeki, the AAKG delegate. The Panel considers these five men to be senior AAKG commanders, constituting the core leadership of the AAKG group (see photos below).

The Panel is not aware of any formal or informal vetting of the participants proposed by the AAKG carried out by the FACA, or any other body. All five senior AAKG leaders mentioned above were among the 100 participants. Panel sources observed that they received early indication that when the training began, there may not have been a fully developed understanding between the AAKG, FACA and Russian instructors regarding the future status and responsibilities of the participants once they completed the training.

On 1 May 2024, a ceremony was organized to mark the end of the training. Both FACA and Russian instructors were present and spoke. The Panel was informed by confidential sources who were present that both FACA and Russian instructors representatives claimed ‘ownership’ of the participants and somehow implied contradictory chains of command for the trained AAKG militia. A few days later, and conceivably to avoid ambiguity as to the status of the trained AAKG militia members, on 6 May 2024, the CAR Ministry of Defense and the Restructuring of the Army, issued a document entitled “Decision regarding the incorporation of young recruits into the Central African Armed Forces”.

The document lists the 100 participants of the training, each of whom was assigned with a FACA matriculation number ranging from 2024-1-1666 to 202-1-1765. All 100 of the new recruits were male. Article 1 of the document states that the 100 names listed are incorporated into FACA in a “*Battalion Hors Rang*” and are authorized to be contracted for an engagement of three years, from 1 May 2024, as “*soldat de 2eme classe*”. Article 2 states that “the Minister of National Defence has the full right to terminate the employment contract entered into by the interested parties”.

All the five senior AAKG commanders are on the list: Celestin Bakayogo-Leman (no. 16), Elie Dimanche (no. 33), Elie Gomengue (no. 41), Marcelin Kangoyessi (no. 52) and Michel Koumboyeki (no. 55). It also includes: Cedric Parfait Agbia (no. 3), aka Baloko or Boloko. The Panel wrote about Baloko aggressing, abducting and threatening to kill a Muslim Azande in Obo (S/2024/444, para 59-61). Baloko also led the AAKG group that blocked a MINUSCA convoy 12 km west of Obo on 8 March 2024, offloaded a commercial truck that was in the convoy, suspecting it was carrying weapons, and threatened to kill the Muslim civilian passengers on board (see S/2024/444, para 62-66).

Post-training deployment of AAKG elements integrated into the FACA

The majority of the 100 men who were integrated into the FACA in May, including the five senior AAKG leaders remained in the Haut-Mbomou prefecture. Sources observed that senior leaders were given the role of group leader (*chef de groupe*), each commanding on average 10 elements. However, these same confidential sources confirmed that, full distinction between newly integrated FACA and local “untrained AAKG” militia was not respected, resulting in integrated FACA often commanding AAKG militia even in the wake of training.

General Leman’s deputy, Marcelin Kangoyessi, was posted to Bambouti with 28 elements. The Panel was not able to establish whether these were all newly integrated FACA soldiers or also included non-trained AAKG militia members. The Panel was informed that the group was based at the gendarmerie building and that they maintained a cordial relationship with the MINUSCA troops deployed in Bambouti.¹¹⁴

Trained and integrated AAKG have expressed to the Panel that they were not interested in fighting outside their home area of Haut-Mbomou prefecture, however, the Panel is also investigating information it has received regarding alleged deployments elsewhere in the country.

Second AAKG training May-June 2024, Obo

In May 2024, a second group of around 100 AAKG elements were selected for and started the same one-month military training in Obo. The Panel was not able to establish whether the second group of Azande youth who received training in Obo in May-June 2024 were officially integrated into the FACA and assigned matriculation numbers like the first group of 100. The Panel continues to work to verify their status.

¹¹⁴ On 7 May 2024, the MINUSCA Force established a Temporary Operating Base (TOB) in Bambouti (Haut-Mbomou prefecture), 80 km east of Obo (road connection is 101 km by very rough road) and just 3km from the border with South Sudan (see S/2024/473, para 37).¹¹ The small frontier town of Bambouti had been controlled by the UPC from October 2019 until mid-March 2023, when the group was attacked and forced out by the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) militia (see S/2024/444, para 34-39 and 51-55).

UPC elements pushed out of Mboki and Zémio, some opt to be disarmed

At the end of May 2024, Russian instructors and FACA composed of integrated AAKG conducted joint military operations, advancing from Obo westwards to Mboki and then Zémio, pushing out the UPC and taking control over the town centres. Some UPC leaders and elements opted to disarm, including UPC commander Ahamd Petit, who had commanded the UPC in Bambouti until the AAKG attacked and drove them out in March 2023.¹¹⁵ Ahamd Petit was brought to Camp Berengo and trained and integrated into the FACA and was later deployed as FACA in Bambari.¹¹⁶

The UPC elements who did not want to be disarmed retreated north along the Dembia-Derribissaka axis, notably and areas with gold mines located on the northern end of this axis, towards Basse-Kotto prefecture, and others moved south and crossed into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The UPC retreat into the DRC provoked a stream of Congolese refugees into Zémio. Confidential sources from that same refugee population informed the Panel that the UPC had looted and were harassing the local populations, including stealing cattle for meat from Fulani cattle herders.

A third training for AAKG and ex-UPC planned, then cancelled

In August 2024, multiple sources informed the Panel that a third training for AAKG recruits to the FACA was being planned, this time in Zémio. The FACA and Russian instructors were said to be preparing for joint training for 30 disarmed ex-UPC elements alongside local AAKG militia. Confidential sources in Zémio observed that it was planned as a “social cohesion” initiative. The 30 ex-UPC elements slated for the training were already living on the FACA base on the periphery of Zémio town. And, in anticipation of the training, Azande youth started arriving in Zémio from surrounding villages, living with family in various Zémio neighborhoods, hoping to be selected. Some also set up small shelters around the FACA base. The Panel received multiple contradictory claims as to the relations between the ex-UPC group and the incoming Azande youth and AAKG in Zémio. Some said the relations were good and friendly. Others asserted that many of the Azande did not agree to being trained alongside the ex-UPC.

However, in the frame of escalating violence across Haut-Mbomou prefecture, the Panel was informed that the final round of training never took place.

The Panel will continue to follow the evolution of the AAKG militia and the trajectory of new FACA units composed of integrated AAKG, with a view to clarifying their role in ongoing conflict dynamics in the region and how their recruitment, training and integration into the FACA progresses.


¹¹⁵ See S/2024/444, para. 103 and annex 10, and Panel confidential update Aug 2024.

¹¹⁶ Confidential community and security sources in Zémio, February 2025.

Annex 26: Photos from a demonstration in Zémio town on 6 November 2024



Translation of the banner text: “The civilian population of Haut-Mbomou says no to manipulation, no to support to armed groups of UPC, CPC and M23 by MINUSCA, no to the lying reports of MINUSCA against the FACA Ti Aznade in Central Africa”.



Translation of the text on the two placards: “MINUSCA CAR or Haut-Mbomou is not your patrimony” and “MINUSCA Haut-Mbomou wants to live in peace and cultivate it’s field.”

The Panel spoke to community members in Zémio who watched the march that day, and who saw the two Muslim men, who happened to be on the roadside in the Muslim market area, when the marchers passed by, and saw them being forcefully pulled into the march by some of the organizers, and handed the placards seen in the above photo, and ordered to march.



The partly visible white placard reads: “Stop France”.

All three photos obtained by the Panel from confidential sources.

Annex 27: Ministry of Defence document dated 6 May 2024 entitled "Decision regarding the integration of young recruits into the Central African Armed Forces"

MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
ET DE LA RECONSTRUCTION DE L'ARMEE

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité- Dignité- Travail


DIRECTION DE C A B I N E T

N° 206 /MDNRA/DIR-CAB

VISA: EMA/BRH *JP*

VISA: DO *JP*

*Dr. 2003
du 6/5/24*



DECISION
---000000---
PORTANT INCORPORATION DES JEUNES RECRUES
DANS LES FORCES ARMÉES CENTRAFRICAINES.

LE MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE.

VU : La Constitution de la République Centrafricaine du 30 août 2023 ;
VU : La Loi n°20.017, du 11 juillet 2020, portant Statut Général du Militaire ;
VU : Le Décret n°23.199, du 30 août 2023, portant promulgation de la Constitution de la République Centrafricaine ;
VU : Le Décret n° 22.040 du 07 Février 2022, portant nomination du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement ;
VU : Le Décret n°24.001 du 04 Janvier 2024, portant nomination ou confirmation des Membres du Gouvernement.
VU : Le Décret n°16.360 du 27 Octobre 2016 portant organisation et fonctionnement du Ministère de la Défense Nationale et fixant les attributions du Ministre ;
VU : Le Décret n°85.432 du 12 Décembre 1985 fixant la réglementation applicable aux personnels militaires non officiers de l'Armée Nationale ;
VU : Le Décret n°00.006 du 05 Janvier 2001, modifiant et complétant le Décret n°82/001 du 04 Janvier 1982, portant règlement du régime de rémunération applicable aux militaires, Gendarmes et Gardes Républicains de l'Armée Nationale ;

DECIDE

Art.1^{er} : Les Jeunes Centrafricains dont les noms suivent, sont incorporés dans les Forces Armées Centrafricaines au Bataillon Hors Rang (BHR) et sont autorisés à contracter un engagement de trois (03) ans, service comptant du 1^{er} Mai 2024, soldat de 2^{ème} classe ledit jour et reçoivent les numéros matricules suivants :

N°	GRADE	NOM(S)	PRENOM(S)	MATRICULE
1	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ABAYOYOGU	Elie	2024-1-1666
2	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ABOURA	John Daniel	2024-1-1667
3	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	AGBIA	Cédric Parfait	2024-1-1668
4	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	AGOUMAR	Polycarpe	2024-1-1669
5	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	AGOUMEYESSI	Dieudonné	2024-1-1670
6	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ANDARADI	Odilon	2024-1-1671
7	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ANGO	Dieu Beni	2024-1-1672
8	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ANGREBI	Rodrigue	2024-1-1673
9	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ANIDAOUE	Marien Blanchi	2024-1-1674
10	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ANISSOI	Jean Théodule	2024-1-1675

1

11	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ATOKA	Séverin	2024-1-1676
12	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	AZIAYO	Jethro Albert	2024-1-1677
13	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BAÏME	Odilon	2024-1-1678
14	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BAKONGADA	Clément	2024-1-1679
15	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BAKOYOGO	Freddy	2024-1-1680
16	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BAKOYOGO-LEMANE	Célestin	2024-1-1681
17	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BAMANDA	Patrick	2024-1-1682
18	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BAMIRA	Jean Richard	2024-1-1683
19	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BANDATIROVOUROU	Guy	2024-1-1684
20	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BASSOUBA	Patrice	2024-1-1685
21	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BAZINGOMBE	Flavien	2024-1-1686
22	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BERAMBOLIKIA	Mathieu	2024-1-1687
23	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BHI	Merci Sylvestre	2024-1-1688
24	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BIGOU	Narcisse	2024-1-1689
25	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BIH	Arnauld	2024-1-1690
26	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BINIBANGUILI	Narcisse	2024-1-1691
27	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	BOÏMOUKE	Adolphe	2024-1-1692
28	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	DANGA	Marc	2024-1-1693
29	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	DANGAMBOLI	Jean Aimé	2024-1-1694
30	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	DASSOU-SIMBOLI	Aimé	2024-1-1695
31	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	DIMANCHE	Paul	2024-1-1696
32	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	DIMANCHE	Jean Bosco	2024-1-1697
33	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	DIMANCHE	Elie	2024-1-1698
34	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	FOFANA	Alex	2024-1-1699
35	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	FOUGOD	Dieudonné	2024-1-1700
36	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	GAMBOLI	Roméo	2024-1-1701
37	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	GANIKPIO	Charles Vivien	2024-1-1702
38	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	GARASSOUNGUE	Placide	2024-1-1703
39	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	GATANGA	Sylvain	2024-1-1704
40	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	GBAWE	Richard	2024-1-1705
41	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	GOMENGUE	Elie	2024-1-1706
42	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	GOUGA	Jean	2024-1-1707
43	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	GUASTINE	Emmanuel	2024-1-1708
44	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	GUENE	Wilson	2024-1-1709
45	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	GUEWE	Emmanuel	2024-1-1710
46	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	GUINEMBOLI	Donatien	2024-1-1711
47	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	GUINESSOUNGUE	Barthélemy	2024-1-1712
48	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	GUINIAGOUME	Salomon	2024-1-1713
49	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	HAROUN	Jean	2024-1-1714
50	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	IMASSOGO	Blaise	2024-1-1715
51	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	IMMA-ABIA	Jackson	2024-1-1716
52	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	KANGOYESSI	Marcelin	2024-1-1717
53	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	KASSIA	Brice	2024-1-1718
54	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	KOUMANDAÏNIE	Don de Dieu	2024-1-1719
55	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	KOUMBOYEKI	Michel	2024-1-1720
56	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	KOUMBOZINGUI	Fouda	2024-1-1721

57	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	KPINGBI	Exact	2024-1-1722
58	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	KPIONDARANI	Jean Marie	2024-1-1723
59	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	LENGBE	Rufin	2024-1-1724
60	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MAKAKPIO	Jean Louis	2024-1-1725
61	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MALONG	Chist	2024-1-1726
62	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MBATAPAI	Dieu Merci	2024-1-1727
63	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MBIKOMBOLI	Onésime	2024-1-1728
64	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MBOLIFOUÉ	David	2024-1-1729
65	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MBOLIFOUGUIMI	Dieu Merci	2024-1-1730
66	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MBOLIFOUGUIMI	Justin	2024-1-1731
67	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MBOLIFOURE	Georges	2024-1-1732
68	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MBOLIGOSSIE	Méthode	2024-1-1733
69	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MBOLIHAMBOUNGARETE	Privat	2024-1-1734
70	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MBOLIHENGAKO	Jean Claude	2024-1-1735
71	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MBOLIHINIE	Jean	2024-1-1736
72	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MBOLIKIDIE	Laurent	2024-1-1737
73	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MBOLIKINAHON	Flavien	2024-1-1738
74	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MBOUGO	Benjamin	2024-1-1739
75	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MBOUGORENGBE	René	2024-1-1740
76	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MERCI	Emmanuel	2024-1-1741
77	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MERCI	Eugène	2024-1-1742
78	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MIMBOU	Chancel	2024-1-1743
79	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MINOSSA	Justin	2024-1-1744
80	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MOBIEKE	Hugues	2024-1-1745
81	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MOUBIPAI	Dieudonné	2024-1-1746
82	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	MOUSSEREPAI	Faustin	2024-1-1747
83	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	NDOBI	Luther	2024-1-1748
84	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	NGBAKPIOYO	Raphaël	2024-1-1749
85	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	NGOME	Michel	2024-1-1750
86	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	OUMBAYO	Jean	2024-1-1751
87	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	OUROUKPIO	François	2024-1-1752
88	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	OUROUKPIO	Donatien	2024-1-1753
89	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	SALA	Jean	2024-1-1754
90	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	SIRO	Hermann	2024-1-1755
91	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	TINGBINDI	Emmanuel	2024-1-1756
92	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	VODI	Samson	2024-1-1757
93	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	WADOUKIETE	Gabriel	2024-1-1758
94	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	WILLIAM	Louis	2024-1-1759
95	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	YANGARAKPIO	Aristide	2024-1-1760
96	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	YENOTE	Jean Baudouin	2024-1-1761
97	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZANGAGOUME	Olva Brice	2024-1-1762
98	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZANGAGOUME	Brice Alex	2024-1-1763
99	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZESIO	Foifoï	2024-1-1764
100	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUNOKIETE	John Bonheur	2024-1-1765

Art.2 : Le contrat d'engagement souscrit par les intéressés pourra être résilié de plein droit par le Ministre de la Défense Nationale.

Annex 28: Two cases that exemplify targeted human rights abuses and violations in Zémio and Mboki

The second half of 2024 was marked by targeted abuses and violations against:

- Members of the Muslim community in the Haut-Mbomou prefecture, who were routinely accused of having supported the UPC when the group controlled town in the prefecture;
 - Individuals who denounced violations perpetrated against civilians by the incoming integrated Azande FACA soldiers
 -
1. Harassment, detention and threat to life of the Imam of Zémio, August-September 2024 ¹¹⁷

Following the disarmament of UPC elements in Zémio between May and July 2024, there were persistent rumors of weapons not being handed in and instead being hidden in the homes of Fulani or Muslim traders in Zémio. At the end of August, Elie Gomengue, AAKG leader and integrated FACA soldier, accused the Imam of Zémio, of hiding a weapon of a disarmed UPC element named Yousuf, who was no longer in Zémio.

On 24 August, the 62-year-old Imam, was apprehended at his house around 0800 hours by a group of AAKG who had come from Mboki. They accused the Imam of hiding the UPC element's weapon. According to multiple testimonies gathered locally, the group removed the Imam from his house and walked him along the main road for approximately one kilometer to the Gendarmerie station while beating and insulting him in full view of the townspeople. The Imam was detained in a small room at the Gendarmerie. The same morning, the UPC element's wife, her infant and a 32-year-old male Muslim civilian, were also apprehended and detained in relation to the same case.

The Lieutenant in charge of the Gendarmerie informed the Panel that he had grown increasingly worried that the AAKG would kill the Imam, following repeated threats. On 7 September, he sought help from MINUSCA. The woman and her infant were released, and the Imam and the other male suspect were transferred to the MINUSCA Permanent Operating Base (POB) "for protection of life". The POB is located approximately 500m from the Gendarmerie station.

On 11 September, following a meeting attended by the *sous-préfet*, the deputy mayor, police, gendarmerie, FACA and MINUSCA military observers, representatives of the Nepalese battalion and MINUSCA civil affairs section Community Liaison Assistants, it was concluded that there was no longer a threat to life of the Imam and the other man, and the two were formally handed back into the custody of the Gendarmerie. The Imam paid 200,000 CFA (\$350 USD) to the *sous-préfet* who then signed their release papers.

The Imam told the Panel that, as the representative and spokesperson of the Muslim community in Zémio as an authority figure vis-à-vis the local authorities, other religious and community leaders, he felt disempowered and having "lost his dignity and authority". After being released, he rarely left his home, and no longer participated in community meetings. The Imam's neighbours communicated to the Panel that, in their view, the public humiliation, mistreatment and detention of the Imam, undermined the safety of and respect for the Muslim community living in Zémio.

2. Abduction and killing of Adama Aimé, Vice-President of the local peace committee, December 2024

At approximately 1800 on 3 December 2024, Adama Aimé, a well-known member of the Zémio community, was walking home. He was last seen near the Gendarmerie building,¹¹⁸ heading towards the hospital and his house located just a few hundred metres away in the neighborhood of Aregue 1, where he was the *chef de quartier*.

The next day his adult daughter, who lives in her father's household, alerted the neighbors and local authorities that her father had not come home the previous night. The Mayor of Zémio, immediately organized search parties for Adama and in the weeks that followed actively sought to locate him.

¹¹⁷ Confidential sources drawn upon in this section include Muslim and Azande community members in Haut Mbomou prefecture, local officials, security sector sources, and civil society.

¹¹⁸ Confidential source whom the Panel met in Zémio, February 2025.

On 9 December a fellow *chef de quartier* in Zémio formally reported Adama's disappearance to the police and requested that an investigation be launched (see the letter to the Police commander below).

On 23 December, some fishermen found the decomposing body of Adama in the Mbomou river, near the village of Gadia, around 20 km southeast of Zémio. The body bore markings of torture or of post-mortem mutilation, his right arm and left leg were cut off to the bone, and stomach area was ripped open.¹¹⁹

Background and possible motive

Adama had moved to Zémio from Berberati in the 1980s and had married a Zande woman and started a family. He had worked as a teacher for many years and had taught most of the young professional adults who worked in associations and organizations in the town. Adama was the president of the local body assembling traditional chiefs, known as the *Amical des Chefs de Zémio*. He was an effective and trusted focal point for the UN agencies and NGOs that visited or operated in the sub-prefecture, and was known as an individual capable of reaching out to, assembling and mobilising all groups within the community.

Between 2019-2024, Adama served as the Vice President of the local Peace Committee¹²⁰ wherein he played a critical role in mediation, conflict management and peacebuilding in the community and with the various armed groups in the region. For example, he mediated with the LRA faction that eventually disarmed and were repatriated to Uganda in 2023; and between the community and the UPC, when the UPC were in control of Zémio. He had also started to address the violence perpetrated by AAKG. The Panel spoke to sources in Zémio and Bangui, who shared that in the months prior to his disappearance and death, Adama had been speaking out against the incoming integrated Azande FACA soldiers and the untrained AAKG militia members who had arrived from nearby villages hoping to also be trained. Both these groups were erecting roadblocks, harassing people, and perpetrating crimes and violence, including rape and other sexual violence in and around Zémio (note that in August 2024 the Minister of Justice had established a Commission of Inquire to investigate allegations of grave human rights violations committed in Zémio).

Adama was described by multiple credible Panel sources as the “backbone” of the Peace Committee. Multiple Panel sources noted that, after his disappearance, the community was “gripped by fear”, while the other Peace Committee members were inactive, concerned and shocked by what had occurred.¹²¹ Sources also noted that Adama had shared with them that he had felt he was in danger and had received threats after condemning the behavior of the AAKG. The Panel continues to investigate the case.




Adama Aimé, Zémio. Photos from sources in Zémio.

¹¹⁹ Confidential sources: community members and officials in Zémio.

¹²⁰ The Local Peace Committee in Zémio and other sub-prefectures in Haut-Mbomou were supported by the NGO Invisible Children active in CAR for many years, see <https://invisiblechildren.com/program/peace-committees/>.

¹²¹ Panel interviews with community members in Zémio, February 2025.



Letter addressed to the Police in Zémio, dated 9 December 2024: “Complaint against Unknown for the disappearance *Chef de Quartier* of Aregue 1, Mr. Adama Aimé.”

Received from confidential source in Zémio, Feb 2025.

Annex 29: Statement by the Minister of Justice on the report of the Commission of inquiry into events in Zémio in August 2024, dated February 2025

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

Unité – Dignité – Travail



**DECLARATION DU MINISTRE D'ETAT CHARGE DE LA
JUSTICE RELATIF AU RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION
D'ENQUETE SUR LES EVENEMENTS DE ZEMIO**

BANGUI, Février 2025

Suite aux dénonciations qui m'ont été faites des événements survenus dans la ville de Zemio au mois d'août 2024 et susceptibles de constituer de graves atteintes aux Droits de l'Homme, le Ministère de la Justice a mis en place, par Arrêté ministériel, une Commission d'enquête judiciaire en vue de faire la lumière sur les dits événements.

La Commission d'enquête est composée de Magistrats et d'Officiers de Police judiciaire.

Elle a pour missions de :

- procéder à la vérification des faits allégués ;
- auditionner les éventuels victimes et témoins ;
- identifier les auteurs présumés ;
- recueillir toutes informations utiles à la manifestation de la vérité et ;
- dresser procès-verbal de tout en vue de la saisine éventuelle des juridictions compétentes.

Il ressort de ce procès-verbal que :

Courant l'année 2017, le groupe armé rebelle dénommé union pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC) membre actuelle de la CPC aurait commis de graves exactions à savoir : exécutions sommaires, assassinats, pillages dans certaines villes de la Préfecture du Haut-Mbomou, en ciblant particulièrement les personnes civiles en raison de leur appartenance ethnique et religieuse.

Face à cette situation, le groupe d'autodéfense dénommé « **Azandé ani lpi gbè** » dit **AAKG**, fut créé par les jeunes ressortissants de cette localité en vue de lutter contre les exactions perpétrées par l'UPC. C'est ainsi que plusieurs affrontements ont eu lieu entre les **AAKG** et l'**UPC**.

Ces affrontements récurrents, à relent ethnique et religieux ne cessent de se produire entre les groupes rivaux et des exactions constituant de graves violations des Droits humains seraient commises sur les civils.

Des corps sans vie sont retrouvés, des destructions de biens sont constatées et des représailles sont exercées par l'autre groupe et vice versa.

Ces violations graves des droits humains se seraient perpétrées dans la ville de Zemio et les localités environnantes.

Certains auteurs de ces faits, appartenant aux groupes rivaux, sont déjà identifiés et interpellés. Dès lors, j'ai déjà instruis le Procureur Général près la Cour d'Appel de Bambari de mettre immédiatement en mouvement l'action publique par les parquets du ressort en vue de traduire les auteurs, coauteurs et complices partout où ils se trouveraient devant les juridictions pénales compétentes.

En outre, le Gouvernement que dirige Son Excellence **Félix MOLOUA**, Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement, sous l'autorité de Son Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat, Professeur **Faustin Archange TOUADERA**, à travers les Ministères de la Justice, de la Sécurité Publique, de la Défense Nationale et de l'Administration du Territoire ont déjà pris toutes les mesures nécessaires visant à protéger les paisibles populations du Mbomou et Haut-Mbomou et de rétablir l'ordre dans ces deux Préfectures.

Mais d'ores et déjà sur instructions de Son Excellence, Monsieur Président de la République, Chef d'Etat, Professeur **Faustin Archange TOUADERA** un Tribunal de Grande Instance sera créé à Zemio pour garantir d'avantage l'accès à la Justice afin de faire cesser des éventuelles violations des droits humains dans cette localité.

Force doit rester à la Loi sur toute l'étendue du territoire national.

JE VOUS REMERCIE.



Annex 30: Testimonies from Dembia, October 2024

Summary of testimonies by two Muslim men (here called Witness 1 and Witness 2) who witnessed and were victims of the prolonged attack on civilians in Dembia 1-7 October 2024, collected by the Panel in Zémio, February 2025

During the last days of September 2024, rumors started to circulate in Dembia of an imminent AAKG attack on the town. Some people, including Sudanese refugees, left Dembia moving towards Rafäi.

Witness 1 and Witness 2 were both involved in commercial activity in Dembia, and Witness 2 owned a shop there. On 1 October 2024, the two were returning to Dembia after doing some business in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). They were in a pirogue and about to reach the shore on the CAR side, when they heard shots coming from the town (which lies about 500 meters north of the river). The boat man who ferried them across, a member of the Zande community, warned them not to go into town, but Witness 1 and Witness 2 insisted as they were worried about their family and their property.

As W1 and W2 were about to walk into town, six armed elements in military uniform approached from the side of the town, whom they understood to be “the AAKG”. The armed elements threatened to shoot and kill them, unless they paid a sum of 350,000 CFA (approximately \$620 USD). The armed elements held Witness 1 hostage at the river, while Witness 2 was allowed to go into town to fetch the money and come back.

Witness 2 found groups of AAKG armed elements shooting in all directions, shouting and going in and out of the shops along the road. They stole cash, mobile phone, and other items. If they did not find cash, they beat up the shopkeepers. They moved around the town on foot and on motorcycles, catching and beating up men, women and children. Witness 2 found that his shop, where he had left in brother in charge, had been ransacked and he found that there was no cash left. W2 said that his brother later informed him that the AAKG had forced him to give them 3 million CFA (approximately \$5,200 USD) in cash from the shop. Through friends he managed to hurriedly scramble together around 100,000 CFA (approximately \$175 USD), and with that Witness 2 rushed back to the river, and gave it to the AAKG elements, who took it and then left W1 and W2 to go.

Witness 1 and Witness 2 both lived near the house of a trader called Habib (a 48-year-old Muslim). Just after midnight on 2 October 2024, “Leman” [Celestin Bakayogo Leman] and “Elie Pasteur” [Elie Gomengue] came to Habib’s house, demanded money, and took him away. W1 and W2 later learned that Habib had been killed. His body was found on 6 October, at the riverside near the river crossing to the DRC. W2 had spoken to one of the Azande boatmen who had discovered Habib’s body, but the boatman could not or did not want to give any information about the incident. Habib’s wife and children fled to Rafäi.


Around 2 or 3 October, General Leman ordered that a Fulani representative called Nuhn, and another man called Habib, should come to the mayor’s office. The AAKG had taken over the mayor’s office and were using it as a base. Leman, Elie, Maxon all questioned Nuhn and Habib accusing them of having warned the population about the arrival of the AAKG: “Who told the people we were coming, who warned them?” they had shouted. Nuhn and Habib were forced to lie on the ground on their stomachs, were whipped as they were questioned.

On another day, at around 13h, Witness 1 saw the AAKG shoot a man by the name of Idriss in the chest and then cut his throat. Idriss was a Sudanese refugee and trader, around 65 years old, who had been staying at the Sudanese camp site, around 2 km west of Demia on the road leading to Rafäi. Witness 1 later heard that Idriss had walked into town to look for his daughters.

The same day, Witness 1 was also forced on the ground by an armed element. This was in the town center near the mosque during daytime. The armed man stood above Witness 1, beating him, and Witness 1 was sure he would be killed. At that moment Elie Pasteur came, and he said to the armed element, “don’t kill him”. The element obeyed, and Witness 1 was left to go. Witness 1 one observed that: “The elements respected Elie very much.”

Letter from AAKG to MINUSCA Office Obo, dated 27 September 2023 outlining the “Position of the AAKG group”

Three-page letter signed by delegate of the AAKG group, Michel Koumboki.



Ainsi, pourquoi aujourd'hui si nous voulons libérer notre territoire mais que c'est la MINUSCA qui va nous obliger à dialoguer ; dialoguer avec qui et devant qui et pourquoi ? est ce qu'on a un problème contre l'Etat Centrafricain ? ou nous aidons l'Etat à assoir son autorité dans les villes du Haut Mbomou qui sont sous influences des UPC qui règnent depuis des années en votre présence.

Notre principe, c'est de combattre les UPC et leurs complices tout en respectant les principes du Droit International Humanitaire et la protection de la population civile non armée ;

Si votre intention est de nous contraindre à accepter vos exigences, alors vous vous êtes largement trompé. **Un civil armé n'est plus un civil, vous devez le savoir.**

De tout ce qui précède, l'unique chose que nous pouvons vous rappeler, c'est qu'avant tout, nous sommes nés sur le territoire du Haut Mbomou et nous ferons tout ce qui est possible pour défendre notre localité lorsqu'elle se sent en danger, mais vous, vous êtes venus pour rechercher vos intérêts et d'ici peu de temps, vous partirez chez vous et le Haut Mbomou restera toujours Haut Mbomou.

Faisons la paix avec ceux qui aiment la paix et la guerre avec ceux qui aiment la guerre ;

Nous attendons notre Gouvernement pour se prononcer sur ce qui se passe dans notre territoire et vous, vous n'êtes qu'un appui à nos autorités ; donc ne forcer pas une chose que vous ne comprenez pas la tenue et l'aboutissant.

On en a marre !

SACHEZ-LE UNE FOIS POUR TOUS : Notre ferme engagement, c'est la défense de l'intégrité de notre territoire et de la dignité de chaque population du Haut Mbomou conformément au respect des Droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales.

Notre objectif c'est de combattre les UPC d'Ali Ndarassa et tout groupe de personne qui sera en connivence avec ces derniers. Avec l'aide de Dieu et de nos ancêtres, nous réussirons à bouter les UPC d'Ali Ndarassa et les LRA hors de notre localité.

A cet effet, toute personne tant physique que morale qui sera un obstacle pour la libération de la préfecture du Haut Mbomou entre les mains des rebelles de l'UPC d'Ali Ndarassa sera notre ennemi juré.

Notre lutte, c'est de ramener la paix, la Sécurité, la libre circulation des personnes et de biens et que l'autorité de l'Etat revienne dans la préfecture du Haut Mbomou.

Vous parlez de dialogue, nous, on parle de la libre circulation, du respect des droits humains et des libertés fondamentales ; Si les bandits de l'UPC empêchent les gens à circuler librement sur leur territoire et que les Droits de l'Homme et des libertés fondamentales sont menacés par des forces négatives alors on ne voit pas les motifs fondés pour un dialogue ;

Nous n'avons rien contre les forces de la MINUSCA et les FACA ainsi que les FSI ; ce que nous réclamons depuis le début de nos opérations, c'est l'installation de l'autorité d'Etat dans les villes que nous libérons afin d'assurer pleinement la libre circulation des personnes et de biens et de permettre le développement de notre préfecture.

Dans cette entente,

Recevez notre sincère collaboration patriotique

Ampliations :

- Présidence.....01
- Présidence de l'assemblée nationale.01

- Primature.....01
- Les députés du Haut-Mbomou.....05
- Le Préfet du Haut-Mbomou.....01
- Bureau MINUSCA Bangui.....01
- Bureau MINUCA Obo.....01
- Archive.....01

Fait à Obo, le 27 Septembre 2023

Le Délégué du Groupe AAKG

AZANDE ✱

AMIKPIG-BE

KOUMBOKI Michel
Tel : 72092179

*h. f. approuvé
PHB 3/2023.*

Annex 31: Photographs of the five senior leaders of the AAKG who were trained in integrated into FACA



Célestin Bakayogo-Leman,
aka « General Lemane »
FACA matriculation number :
2024-1-1681




Elie Gomengue
aka « Elie Pasteur »
FACA matriculation number :
2024-1-1706



Marcelin Kangoyessi
Deputy of Bakayogo-Leman in the AAKG
FACA matriculation number :
2024-1-1717



Elie Dimanche
FACA matriculation number :
2024-1-1698



Michel Koumboyeki
FACA matriculation number :
2024-1-1720



The close-up photographs are cut from the above group photo, except for that of Michel Koumboyeki, which the Panel obtained from a confidential source.

The group photo was taken in Obo May 2024, during a visit to Obo of Dmitry Sytyi, Deputy Head of Russia House, Bangui, and was widely published in various online media and social media accounts,

Annex 32: Map highlighting locations mentioned in the report

From west to east:

Mbomou prefecture

- **Dembia:** Civilians attacked between 1-7 October 2024

Haut-Mbomou prefecture

- **Tabane:** MINUSCA peacekeeper killed on 28 March 2025
- **Zémio:** various events, including abuse and arrest of Imam of Zemio, August-September 2024
- **Obo:** location of training for AAKG members by FACA and Russian instructors from March 2024
- **Bambouti:** Initial AAKG attack on the UPC in March 2023.

