Country Policy and Information Note
Libya: Humanitarian situation

Version 1.0

April 2025

Contents

Executive summary

Libya has faced armed conflict, civil unrest, and political instability since 2011. However, conditions have improved since the October 2020 ceasefire.

In June 2022, Libya and the UN approved the 2023–2025 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF), focusing on peace, economic development, social progress and environmental sustainability, transitioning the country toward development efforts rather than emergency humanitarian assistance.

The general humanitarian situation in Libya is **not** so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment as defined in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

In general, a male is likely to be able to internally relocate. It is unlikely to be reasonable for a single woman as a result of militias and armed groups restricting their movement. Consideration must be given to the person's circumstances and the levels of violence across the country at the time of consideration.

Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.

Assessment

About the assessment

This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of **whether**, **in general**:

- the humanitarian situation is so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to inhuman or degrading treatment as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

- internal relocation is possible to avoid persecution/serious harm

- a claim, if refused, is likely or not to be certified as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers **must**, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case's specific facts.

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

1.1.3 Decision makers must also consider making an international biometric data-sharing check, when such a check has not already been undertaken (see Biometric data-sharing process (Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process)).

1.1.4 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person's claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

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1.2   Exclusion

1.2.1   Various groups in the conflict in Libya have been responsible for serious human rights abuses.

1.2.2   Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

1.2.3   If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).

1.2.4   For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

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2.   Convention reason(s)

2.1.1   A severe humanitarian situation does not in itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.

2.1.2   In the absence of a link to one of the 5 Refugee Convention grounds necessary to be recognised as a refugee, the question to address is whether the person will face a real risk of serious harm in order to qualify for Humanitarian Protection (HP).

2.1.3   However, before considering whether a person requires protection because of the general humanitarian situation, decision makers must consider if the person faces persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. Where the person qualifies for protection under the Refugee Convention, decision makers do not need to consider if there are substantial grounds for believing the person faces a real risk of serious harm meriting a grant of HP.

2.1.4   For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds, see the Asylum

Instruction, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

3.   Risk

3.1.1   The general humanitarian situation in Libya is **not** so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment as defined in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

3.1.2   Whilst not country-specific to Libya, decision makers should note the Upper Tribunal (UT)'s findings and general approach to assessing humanitarian conditions in OA (Somalia) (CG) [2022] UKUT 33 (IAC) (2 February 2022):

'In an Article 3 "living conditions" case, there must be a causal link between the Secretary of State's removal decision and any "intense suffering" feared by the returnee. This includes a requirement for temporal proximity between the removal decision and any "intense suffering" of which the returnee claims to be at real risk. This reflects the requirement in Paposhvili [2017] Imm AR 867 for intense suffering to be "serious, rapid and irreversible" in order to engage the returning State's obligations under Article 3 ECHR. A returnee fearing "intense suffering" on account of their prospective living conditions at some unknown point in the future is unlikely to be able to attribute responsibility for those living conditions to the Secretary of State, for to do so would be speculative.' (Headnote 1)

3.1.3   Based on the findings in OA, the threshold for granting humanitarian protection under paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules in an Article 3 ECHR "living conditions" case, is very high. The onus is on the person to demonstrate that they would be subjected to intense suffering which would be 'serious, rapid and irreversible' upon return to Libya.

3.1.4   However, decision makers must consider each case on its facts. Even where there is not in general a real risk of serious harm because of the general humanitarian situation, a person may still face a real risk of serious harm because of their specific circumstances.

3.1.5   Libya has faced armed conflict, civil unrest, and political instability since 2011. However, conditions have improved since the October 2020 ceasefire. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview reported a 36% drop in people needing urgent aid compared to 2021 and shifted the focus from emergency relief to long-term recovery. In June 2022, Libya and the UN approved the 2023 - 2025 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF), focusing on peace, economic development, social progress and environmental sustainability, further transitioning the country toward development efforts (see Background and country context and the Country Policy and Information Note Libya: Security situation).

3.1.6   UNOCHA stated that there were 250,000 people in need of humanitarian assistance in 2024 but did not specify what groups of people made up this figure, what their humanitarian needs were or how many people would require humanitarian assistance in 2025. Based on the information in this note, it is likely that these people fall short of the thresholds set out in OA (see People in need).

3.1.7 Libya's economy remains reliant on oil and gas, which made up 60% of GDP and nearly all exports and government revenue in 2023. A leadership crisis at the Central Bank of Libya led to an 8.5% drop in oil production during the first 10 months of 2024. However, as oil output recovers, GDP is expected to grow 9.6% in 2025 and 8.4% in 2026. Libya's 2023 unemployment rate stood at 18.7%, rising to 24.7% for women and 49.4% for young people, with 68% of young women unemployed (see [Economy](#) and [Employment](#)).

3.1.8 The World Food Programme (WFP) reported a 19.8% increase in the cost of essential food items between January and December 2024. The Western region remains the most expensive, with food prices 4.87% higher than the national average. Non-food essentials, including fuel, also saw a 7.45% cost increase in 2024. According to the WFP, at the time of writing, there were 898,600 people with insufficient food consumption in the Western region (approximately 12.2% of the population), 434,900 in the Eastern region (approximately 5.9% of the population), and 92,000 in the Southern Region (approximately 1.2% of the population) (see [Food](#)).

3.1.9 Libya faces severe water scarcity, relying mostly on non-renewable groundwater, with demand exceeding supply. According to the UN Development Programme (UNDP), there will be a projected water deficit of 4,200 million cubic meters in 2025. To address this, the UNDP and Libya's Government of National Unity are developing a National Water Security Strategy to improve governance, infrastructure, and climate resilience ([Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)](#)).

3.1.10 Libya has a housing shortage, especially in urban areas, with most public housing poorly built and maintained. Housing types include public social rental, private formal, private informal, and traditional homes, with informal housing often lacking security and services. In December 2024, Prime Minister Osama Hamad announced a major development scheme, including 20,000 new housing units in Benghazi, as part of broader reconstruction efforts aimed at stability and improved living conditions (see [Housing/Shelter](#)).

3.1.11 Libya has adequate health facility coverage (2.8 per 10,000 people which is above World Health Organization targets), but 273 of 1,355 primary care facilities are closed due to conflict, damage, or lack of maintenance. The health workforce is large but unbalanced, with a shortage of nurses and general doctors, however, the government is working to train more family physicians and generalist nurses to strengthen primary care. While health services are free and widely accessible, funding, staffing, and procurement issues lead to uneven service quality, causing patients to bypass poorly equipped facilities (see [Healthcare](#)).

3.1.12 Libya's education system faces major challenges, with 160,000 children and 5,600 teachers in need of support as a result of damaged schools, teacher shortages, outdated curricula, and financial barriers. In 2023, UNICEF and the Ministry of Education took steps to improve the education system by training teachers, installing new class rooms and rehabilitating WASH facilities at schools (see [Education](#)).

3.1.13 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).

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4. Protection

4.1.1 The state is not able to provide protection against a breach of Article 3 ECHR because of general humanitarian conditions if this occurs in individual cases.

4.1.2 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

5. Internal relocation

5.1.1 In general, a male is likely to be able to internally relocate. It is unlikely to be reasonable for a single woman to internally relocate as a result of militias and armed groups restricting their movement. Consideration must be given to the person's circumstances and the levels of violence across the country at the time of consideration.

5.1.2 For more information see the Country Policy and Information Note Libya: Security situation.

5.1.3 For further guidance on considering internal relocation and factors to be taken into account see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

6. Certification

6.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

6.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).

Country information

About the country information

This section contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment which, as stated in the About the assessment, is the guide to the current objective conditions.

The structure and content follow a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.

This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.

The COI included in this note covers events up to and including 31 December 2024. Any event taking place or report published after this date will not be included.

Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

Other points to note

Libyan Dinar (LYD) to Pound Sterling (GBP) currency conversions throughout this note are based on the exchange rate of £1 = 6.24 LYD.

This note focuses on the humanitarian situation for Libyan nationals and not the situation for migrants, refugees or asylum seekers in Libya.

7.   Background and country context

7.1.1   In November 2024, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) published a report entitled 'Libya Assistance Overview' which stated:

'Libya has experienced widespread armed conflict, civil unrest, and political instability since 2011. While the humanitarian situation in the country has improved since an October 2020 ceasefire agreement, Libya's population continues to suffer the effects of political and economic instability amid ongoing violence. Migrant populations - including asylum-seekers, refugees, and other non-Libyan populations residing in and transiting through Libya - and internally displaced persons (IDPs), remain among the most vulnerable populations, according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

'Libya remains a major transit country for refugees and migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, with more than 760,000 migrants estimated to be in-country as of July 2024, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Conflict in Sudan since April 2023 has driven more than 102,000 Sudanese refugees to flee across the border into Libya as of October 2024, with the majority of refugees residing in areas near Libya's borders with Chad, Egypt, and Sudan.'[1]

7.1.2   In January 2023, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) published a report entitled 'Libya Humanitarian Overview 2023'.

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[1] USAID, Libya Assistance Overview, November 2024

The report, the most recent iteration at the time of writing, stated:

'The 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) showed that no affected population group factored on the extreme end of the severity scale (5-catastrophic), indicating a marked decrease in the number of people in need of lifesaving humanitarian assistance; a reduction by 36 per cent from 2021 in the overall People in Need (PiN) figure … As such, a new Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) was not issued for 2022; instead, the 2021 HRP was further extended to cover the residual humanitarian needs until end 2022, highlighting the change in context to a transition from emergency programming to longer term recovery and development.

'… The United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) for the period 2023 to 2025 was signed and approved by the Libyan government and the United Nations in Libya in June 2022. The Cooperation Framework is composed of four pillars on peace and governance, sustainable economic development, social and human capital development, and climate change, environment and water. Given decreasing humanitarian needs, the two collective outcomes of the Framework support the transition from humanitarian to development programming.'[2]

7.1.3 For information about the armed conflict in Libya, see the Country Policy and Information Note Libya: Security situation.

8. Geography and demography

8.1 Geographical classifications

8.1.1 In May 2022, REACH, a 'humanitarian initiative providing granular data, timely information and in-depth analysis from contexts of crisis, disaster and displacement'[3] published a report entitled 'Libya: 2021 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment'. The report stated the following regarding administrative subdivisions in Libya:

'**Region**: The highest administrative subdivision of Libya below the national level. There are three regions: the West ("Tripolitania"), the East ("Cyrenaica") and the South ("Fezzan").

'**Mantika**: The second administrative subdivision of Libya, or the equivalent of a district. The country currently has 22 mantikas, which are regionally divided as follows, according to the UN COD [Common Operational Dataset]:

'West: Al Jabal Al Gharbi, Al Jfara, Al Margeb, Azzawya, Misrata, Nalut, Sirt, Tripoli, Zwara.

'East: Al Jabal Al Akhdar, Al Kufra, Almarj, Benghazi, Derna, Ejdabia, Tobruk.

'South: Al Jufra, Ghat, Murzuq, Sebha, Ubari, Wadi Ashshati.

'**Baladiya**: The third administrative subdivision of Libya, or the equivalent of a municipality. At the time of data collection … the country had 101 baladiyas.

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[2] UNOCHA, Libya Humanitarian Overview 2023 (Page 11,13,14), 26 January 2023
[3] REACH, What we do - REACH, no date

'**Mulhalla**: The fourth administrative subdivision of Libya, roughly equivalent to a neighborhood. Libya currently has 667 mulhallas.'[4]

8.2   Maps

NOTE: The maps in this section are not intended to reflect the UK Government's views of any boundaries.

8.2.1   The below map was published by UN Geospatial in November 2015[5]:

8.2.2   The below map was published by REACH and shows the 22 mantikas (districts) of Libya as well as the borders of the Western, Eastern and Southern regions[6]:

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[4] REACH, Libya: 2021 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (page 8), 24 May 2022
[5] UN Geospatial, Libya, 1 November 2015
[6] REACH, Libya: 2021 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (page 8), 24 May 2022

8.3 Demography

8.3.1 In an article on Libya, Encyclopaedia Britannica stated: 'The two main cities are Tripoli and Benghazi. They contain about one-third of the country's entire urban population and about one-fourth of the total population. Tripoli, with a metropolitan population of more than two million people, is the de facto political capital and the most important economic centre. Benghazi, with its metropolitan area of more than one million people, is the primary city in Cyrenaica.'[7]

8.3.2 According to the CIA World Factbook, as of 2024, Libya has a population of approximately 7,361,263 of which 'well over 90% of the population lives along the Mediterranean coast in and between Tripoli to the west and Al Bayda to the east; the interior remains vastly underpopulated due to the Sahara and lack of surface water …'[8]

8.3.3 The 3 most populated areas are Tripoli (1.183 million), Misratah (984,000) and Benghazi (859,000)[9].

8.3.4 The same source published the below population distribution map[10]:

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[7] Encyclopaedia Britannica, Libya, updated 19 February 2025
[8] CIA World Factbook, Libya (Geography, People and Society), updated 12 February 2025
[9] CIA World Factbook, Libya (People and Society), updated 12 February 2025
[10] CIA World Factbook, Libya (Geography), updated 12 February 2025

Population per square kilometer

9.   Socio-economic indicators

9.1   Basic indicators

Population	7,361,263 (2024 estimate)[11]
Life expectancy at birth	77.7 years (2024 estimate)[12]
Maternal mortality ratio (deaths per 100,000 live births)	72 (2020 estimate)[13]
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	10.7 (2024 estimate)[14]
Population in multidimensional poverty[15] (thousands)	144 (2022)[16], 128 (2024),[17]
Literacy rate (age 15 and older)	91% (2015 estimate)[18]
Average years of schooling (primary to tertiary education)	7.8[19]

9.2   Economy

9.2.1   In an overview of the Libyan economy, updated on 20 September 2024, The

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[11] CIA World Factbook, Libya (People and Society), updated 12 February 2025
[12] CIA World Factbook, Libya (People and Society), updated 12 February 2025
[13] CIA World Factbook, Libya (People and Society), updated 12 February 2025
[14] CIA World Factbook, Libya (People and Society), updated 12 February 2025
[15] UNDP, 2024 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (page 2-4), 17 October 2024
[16] UNDP, 2024 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (page 25), 17 October 2024
[17] UNDP, 2024 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (page 25), 17 October 2024
[18] CIA World Factbook, Libya (People and Society), updated 12 February 2025
[19] UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 2023-2024 (page 275), 13 March 2024

World Bank stated:

'The Libyan economy is driven by the oil and gas sector and remains undiversified, with a large public sector. In 2023, the oil and gas sector represented 60 percent of GDP [Gross Domestic Product], 94 percent of exports, and 97 percent of government revenues. The private sector remains underdeveloped but has significant growth potential and currently employs nearly 14 percent of the workforce.

'While Libya is an upper middle-income country, its development indicators and institutional capacity do not match its income level. Years of conflicts and divisions have led to inadequate public investment and infrastructure maintenance despite the growing oil production, coupled with a distortive presence of the state in the economy and a restrained development of the private sector.'[20]

9.2.2   On 17 December 2024, The World Bank published a report entitled 'Libya Economic Monitor: Stabilizing Growth and Boosting Productivity (Fall 2024)' (The World Bank report) which stated:

'The recent crisis at the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) over its leadership, which began in August and ended in late September of this year [2024], severely impacted the country's oil production and overall economy. The crisis was triggered by a power struggle between rival governments and factions vying for control over the CBL's management of hydrocarbon wealth and fiscal policies. The situation was eventually resolved with the appointment of a new Governor, Deputy Governor, and Board of Directors …

'Precipitated by the CBL crisis, oil production contracted by 8.5 percent during the first 10 months of 2024. With the closure of major oil fields announced by the Benghazi based authorities late August, average oil production fell from 1.17 mbpd [million barrels per day] before the crisis to 0.95 and 0.54 mbpd in August and September, respectively. With the resolution of the CBL crisis, oil production ramped up to reach 1.3 mbpd towards end of October.

'… Libya's economic outlook relies heavily on the oil and gas sector, which constitutes a significant portion of its GDP, government revenue, and exports. With oil production expected to average 1.1 mbpd in 2024, GDP is anticipated to shrink by 2.7 percent this year. As oil output recovers in 2025 and 2026, reaching 1.2 and 1.3 mbpd, respectively; GDP growth is expected to rebound to 9.6 percent and 8.4 percent in 2026. Meanwhile, non-oil GDP growth is estimated to grow by 1.8 percent in 2024 supported by private and public consumption, and average around 9 percent during 2025–2026 to reflect strong recovery in oil exports.'[21]

9.2.3   The same report additionally stated:

'For over a decade now, the conflictual transition has had a devastating impact on the Libyan economy, estimated at US$600 billion in constant 2015 dollars. In 2023, Libya's GDP absent the conflict is estimated to be 74 percent higher than the realized GDP. The high reliance on the oil sector, weak diversification, low and falling productivity owing to inefficient allocation of labor and capital, and deteriorating health and education quality are some

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[20] The World Bank, The World Bank in Libya (Overview), updated 20 September 2024
[21] The World Bank, Libya Economic Monitor … (Executive Summary), 17 December 2024

of the key challenges that are holding back Libya's long-term prosperity.'[22]

9.3   Employment

9.3.1   The World Bank report stated the following and produced the following graph: '… [T]he national unemployment rate in 2023 is 18.7 percent, with a higher rate of 24.7 percent for women. However, it is estimated that 49.4 percent of youth is unemployed, and the rate reaches 68 percent for female youth. Unemployment has remained relatively stable since the revolution, as 89 percent of the Libyan labor force is employed in the public sector (Labor Force Survey 2022) …'[23]

FIGURE 2 • Unemployment Rates

Source: modeled ILO estimate.   [24]

10.   People in need

10.1.1   The UNOCHA Libya Humanitarian Overview 2023 report stated that there were 329,000 people in need of humanitarian assistance in 2023. Of this 329,000 people, there were 150,000 migrants, 87,000 returnees, 49,000 internally displaced people and 43,000 refugees[25]. It additionally provided the below table[26] which breaks down the total figure into percentages based on severity of need:

Severity of needs: current

MINIMAL	STRESS	SEVERE	EXTREME	CATASTROPHIC
38%	34%	21%	8%	0%

10.1.2   On 4 December 2024, UNOCHA published a report entitled 'Global Humanitarian Overview 2025'. The report, 'an annual assessment of global

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[22] The World Bank, Libya Economic Monitor … (Executive Summary), 17 December 2024
[23] The World Bank, Libya Economic Monitor … (Page 2), 17 December 2024
[24] The World Bank, Libya Economic Monitor … (Page 2), 17 December 2024
[25] UNOCHA, Libya Humanitarian Overview 2023 (Page 4), 26 January 2023
[26] UNOCHA, Libya Humanitarian Overview 2023 (Page 4), 26 January 2023

humanitarian needs'[27], stated that in 2024 there were 250,000 people in need of humanitarian assistance in Libya[28]. The report did not define the different groups of people that comprised this figure, nor any additional information regarding what humanitarian assistance they needed or any estimate for people in need in 2025.

11. Food

11.1.1 On 15 January 2025, the World Food Programme (WFP) published a report entitled 'Libya Market Price Monitoring, December 2024'. The report refers to a 'Minimum Expenditure Basket' (MEB), which is 'an operational tool to measure how much the average household requires in monetary terms to meet their basic needs on a regular basis in a given context at a specific period.'[29] The report, which covers the cost of food items, non-food items and fuel across Libya, stated:

'Libya's Food MEB increased by +0.41 percent from November to December 2024, reaching [Libyan Dinar] LYD 844.83 [£135.41]. This increase continues the upward trend observed throughout most of the year, ultimately reaching +19.80 percent higher than January 2024 (LYD 705.18 [£113.04]).

'The eastern region saw a +1.39 percent increase in the Food MEB, reaching LYD 816.20 [£130.80], with Al Kufra remaining the most expensive municipality at LYD 949.78 [£152.24], +12.42 percent higher than the national food basket …

'The western region increased by +0.66 percent, reaching LYD 885.95 [£142.01]. The region remains the most expensive in Libya, with food prices +4.87 percent higher than the national value of LYD 844.83 [£135.31].

'Food MEB prices in the south decreased by -0.29 percent to LYD 823.82 [132.06] ...

'Meanwhile, Non-Food MEB prices increased by +7.45 percent to LYD 110.06 [£12.64], with significant rises in the western and southern regions.'[30]

11.1.2 The Libyan Dinar (LYD) to Pound Sterling (GBP) currency conversions in the paragraph above are based on an exchange rate of £1 = 6.24 LYD[31].

11.1.3 The same source additionally published the below table showing the prices of commodities between November 2024 and December 2024:

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[27] UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2025 (Page 2), 4 December 2024
[28] UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2025 (Page 18), 4 December 2024
[29] UNHCR, Quantifying cost of living for cash-based interventions (page 6), November 2023
[30] WFP, Libya Market Price Monitoring, December 2024, 15 January 2025
[31] xe.com, LYD to GBP, as of 13 March 2025

|	November 2024	December 2024
Food Basket		
Bread (5Pc)	LYD 1.45 ▼ -8.1%	LYD 1.47 ▲ +1.0%
Rice (Kg)	LYD 5.53 ▼ -4.6%	LYD 5.67 ▲ +2.5%
Couscous (Kg)	LYD 7.14 ▼ -9.0%	LYD 7.34 ▲ +2.9%
Pasta (500g)	LYD 2.82 ▼ -4.9%	LYD 2.78 ▼ -1.6%
Potatoes (Kg)	LYD 5.44 ▲ +2.0%	LYD 4.58 ▼ -15.7%
Tomatoes (Kg)	LYD 3.41 ▲ +8.4%	LYD 3.7 ▲ +8.3%
Pepper (Kg)	LYD 5.14 ▼ -0.1%	LYD 5.13 ▼ -0.2%
Onions (Kg)	LYD 3.26 ▼ -0.8%	LYD 3.49 ▲ +7.0%
Tomato Paste (400g)	LYD 4.65 ▼ -2.6%	LYD 4.67 ▲ +0.4%
Chicken (Kg)	LYD 20.34 ▲ +3.2%	LYD 20.14 ▼ -1.0%
Eggs (30Pc)	LYD 17.68 ▲ +5.0%	LYD 19.25 ▲ +8.9%
Tuna (200g)	LYD 4.92 ▼ -7.3%	LYD 4.82 ▼ -1.9%
Milk (L)	LYD 5.91 ▼ -2.6%	LYD 5.84 ▼ -1.3%
Oil (L)	LYD 8.2 ▼ -0.7%	LYD 8.35 ▲ +1.8%
Salt (Kg)	LYD 1.43 ▼ -8.9%	LYD 1.5 ▲ +5.1%
Sugar (Kg)	LYD 5.19 ▼ -3.9%	LYD 5.06 ▼ -2.5%
Black Tea (250g)	LYD 6.78 ▼ -1.0%	LYD 7.24 ▲ +6.7%
Non-Food Basket		
Handwash Soap (Pc)	LYD 2.84 ▼ -5.2%	LYD 3.18 ▲ +12.2%
Dishwashing Liquid (L)	LYD 3.99 ▼ -7.4%	LYD 4.21 ▲ +5.5%
Laundry Detergent (L)	LYD 6.06 ▼ -3.0%	LYD 7.49 ▲ +23.7%
Toothpaste (Pc)	LYD 5.5 ▼ -6.7%	LYD 5.67 ▲ +3.1%
Sanitary Pads (10Pc)	LYD 4.76 ▼ -23.9%	LYD 4.44 ▼ -6.7%
Fuel		
Public Cooking Fuel (11Kg)	LYD 8.64 ▼ -12.5%	LYD 10.05 ▲ +16.3%

[32]

11.1.4   In January 2020, the WFP introduced a new tool called HungerMap Live[33] which '… pulls together different publicly available data streams - such as data on food security, weather, population size, conflict, hazards, nutrition, and macro-economic data … to track and predict food security in near real-time.'[34] The HungerMap for Libya (as of 13 March 2025) showed the prevalence of insufficient food consumption in the different regions of Libya:

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[32] WFP, Libya Market Price Monitoring, December 2024, 15 January 2025
[33] WFP, WFP launches HungerMap Live, 20 January 2020
[34] WFP, HungerMap Live – Project Overview, updated 2 January 2025

Prevalence of insufficient food consumption

Very Low	Low	Moderately low	Moderately high	High	Very high
0-5%	5-10%	10-20%	20-30%	30-40%	Above 40%

[35]

11.1.5 People with insufficient food consumption 'refer to those with poor or borderline food consumption, according to the Food Consumption Score'[36] ('a composite score based on households' dietary diversity, food consumption frequency, and relative nutritional value of different food groups'[37]). The HungerMap estimated that there are 898,600 people in the Western region with insufficient food consumption, 434,900 in the Eastern region and 92,000 in the Southern region[38].

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12.   Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)

12.1.1 In January 2024, the African Development Bank Group (ADBG), a 'multilateral institution whose objective is to contribute to the sustainable economic development and social progress of … African countries'[39], published a report entitled 'Defining a new approach to water management in Libya'. The report, citing various sources, stated:

'Libya has deployed enormous investments in the water sector to mobilize water resources to meet the country's growing water demand for domestic, agricultural, and industrial sectors. Numerous water supply projects have been implemented, as well as water resources mobilized from unconventional water sources. These comprised of groundwater abstraction infrastructure, seawater desalination plants, small dams and a huge groundwater transfer project from the south to the north, the Man-made

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[35] WFP, HungerMap Live, as of 13 March 2025
[36] WFP, HungerMap Live (Glossary), no date
[37] WFP, Food Consumption Score, 4 October 2019
[38] WFP, HungerMap Live, as of 13 March 2025
[39] ADBG, Frequently asked questions on the AfDB Group, no date

River Project (MmRP), which total cost until the end of 2017 was reported by Project Authority to be 12.4 Billion Libyan Dinars [£1.9 billion] …

'Libya relies essentially on its non-renewable groundwater resources to meet its water needs, as surface water resources are scarce, and renewable groundwater resources are extremely limited. Except for the main Mediterranean coastal strip, the country is characterized by arid and desert climate conditions, where rainfall is very scarce.

'National water demand is currently estimated at 4,309 million cubic meters per year (Mm³/year) compared to 820 Mm³/year of available renewable water. This leaves an enormous gap of nearly 3,489 Mm³/year between renewable water supply and water demand, amounting to over 5 times the shortfall in the volume of renewable water available to meet annual water demand.

'Prior to 2011, the functionality and availability of water services were relatively adequate, although sub-optimal in quality, thanks to the large investments made in the construction, operation, and maintenance of water sector infrastructure. However, the situation has drastically changed since 2011. Like all other aspects, civil unrest caused severe damage to the water sector. Currently, functionality and water services availability face critical challenges caused by aging facilities, incessant armed conflict, political, economic, and institutional instability, as well as continuous cuts in the power and fuel supply, in addition to the human resources capacities in the water sector, which have been decimated by staff displacement, administrative split, and the lack of investment in the sector. Therefore, the country not only faces production challenges but also significant access, distribution, and service problems.'[40]

12.1.2 The same source also provided the below graphic. The acronym in the graphic (GCWW) refers to the General Company for Water and Wastewater, one of three institutions that supply Libya with domestic water[41]. The ADBG report did not state when the GCWW provided the underlying information used to produce the graphic[42]:

Figure 19 - Source: GCWW

12.1.3 On 30 September 2024, UNDP published an article entitled 'Innovating for Water Security and Resilience in Libya' which stated:

'Water scarcity is one of Libya's greatest challenges, threatening its long-

[40] ADBG, Defining a new approach to water management in Libya (page 7-8), 30 January 2024
[41] UNICEF, Assessment of Water Supply systems and Institutions in Libya (page 1), 23 March 2021
[42] ADBG, Defining a new approach to water management in Libya (page 31), 30 January 2024

term stability, development, and even social cohesion. As one of the most water-stressed nations globally, Libya relies predominantly on non-renewable groundwater resources, with agriculture alone consuming 85% of this precious supply. Excessive reliance on non-renewable groundwater has resulted in groundwater depletion, seawater intrusion, and an acute water shortage, with a projected deficit of 4,200 million cubic meters by 2025. Over the past decade, political instability has further exacerbated these challenges, damaging critical infrastructure and weakening the resilience of key water institutions. The consequences extend beyond development - limited access to water can fuel tensions, disrupt community cohesion, and undermine peace. As such, sustainable water management is not just an environmental priority but a vital component for ensuring long-term stability and social harmony in Libya.

'Recognizing the urgency, UNDP has partnered with the Government of National Unity (GNU) to establish a committee to develop a National Water Security Strategy (NWSS). This strategy aims to lay the foundation for a sustainable and equitable approach to water governance and resource management, ensuring its efficient use and equitable distribution. The strategy also focuses on mitigating the impacts of climate change, addressing infrastructure deterioration, and strengthening the country's water resource management institutions in Libya.'[43]

12.1.4 CPIT was unable to find any additional recent information (i.e. within the last 2 years) on WASH in the sources consulted (see [Bibliography](#)).

13.   Housing/Shelter

13.1.1 In November 2023, the Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa (CAHFA), an independent think tank in South Africa[44], published a housing finance country profile for Libya which stated:

'Libya suffers from a severe housing shortage, particularly in urban areas where housing programmes are dominated mainly by public social rental housing … In the urban areas of Libya, housing is typically categorised in four types: public social rental, private formal, private informal, and traditional. Public social rental housing has been provided by the government since the 1970s and is located on the outskirts of cities. This housing is often of poor quality, design, and maintenance. Private formal housing is developed by the private sector and is in well-serviced areas near or within city centres. Private informal housing is developed by individuals or groups with official permits and is in peri-urban areas or slums. They are often affordable but lack quality and security. Traditional housing is the oldest form of housing, dating to the pre-colonial era. They are built with local materials and techniques, owned by indigenous households which have strong ties to their land and community.'[45]

13.1.2 On 1 December 2024, Libya Update, a Libyan news website based in Benghazi[46], published an article which stated:

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[43] UNDP, [Innovating for Water Security and Resilience in Libya](#), 30 September 2024
[44] CAHFA, [About CAHF](#), no date
[45] CAHFA, [Africa Housing Finance Yearbook 2023 – Libya](#) (page 2), November 2023
[46] Libya Update, [About us](#), no date

'The Libyan Prime Minister, Osama Hamad, confirmed that Libya is going through an unprecedented boom in the field of development and reconstruction, noting that the most prominent areas of this development are currently focused on providing suitable housing for young people in various Libyan cities.

'This came during a speech he gave on the occasion of the launch of the project to complete 20,000 housing units in the city of Benghazi, in the presence of representatives of 27 implementing companies.

'Hamad explained that "actions and reality are the best response to anyone who tries to question the reconstruction and development efforts."

'The Prime Minister stressed that these works are being carried out with high efficiency, and with the combined efforts of all relevant parties, with the aim of providing a decent and safe life for all Libyan citizens.

'… According to Hamad, these projects reflect the government's commitment to enhancing Libya's stability and providing basic services to citizens across the country.'[47]

13.1.3   CPIT was unable to find any additional recent information (i.e. within the last 2 years) regarding housing in the sources consulted (see Bibliography).

14.   Healthcare

14.1.1   In June 2024, an article entitled 'A rapid mixed-methods assessment of Libya's primary care system' was published by BMC Health Services Research, 'an open access, peer-reviewed journal that considers articles on all aspects of health services research.'[48] The article stated:

'Libya has an adequate density of facilities overall, albeit with a skewed distribution across the regions. The stated health facility density of 2.8 health facilities/10,000 people is above the WHO target of 2/10,000, but this count includes private facilities.

'According to government records, there are currently 728 [Primary Health Care] PHC Units, 571 PHC Centres, and 56 Polyclinics. Units provide maternal, neonatal, nutritional, child and school health services, vaccination, early diagnosis of infectious diseases, health promotion, registration and follow up of chronic diseases, curative services, local water quality monitoring and assessment of local environmental risk factors. PHC Centres offer supervision for PHC Units, the same basket of services, plus dental care. Polyclinics offer more specialised care for catchment areas of 50-60,000 people, accepting both walk-ins and referrals from PHC Units and Centres.

'Although Libya has 1,355 PHC facilities in all (according to official figures in the latest Health Sector Bulletin), 273 are closed because of either a lack of maintenance (51 percent), inaccessibility on account of conflict (20 percent), physical damage (19 percent), or other parties occupying it (11 percent).

'… Libya has a large health workforce, but the skill mix is unbalanced. The cumulative density of physicians, nurses, and midwifes is 8.68/1,000, which

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[47] Libya Update, Inauguration of 20,000 housing units …, 1 December 2024
[48] BMC Health Services Research, Home page, no date

is virtually double the ratio the WHO recommends for achieving universal health coverage. However, there is a surfeit of axillary clinical staff and a shortage of nurses, general doctors, and family physicians. There is a drive toward boosting the number of family physicians - currently around 124 - and experiments with introducing community health workers to operate in a sensitization and signposting role, directing people to appropriate PHC services. The government is also keen to train more generalist nurses for primary care, moving away from a recent trend to train single disease specialists.'[49]

14.1.2 The same source stated:

'… [T]he Libyan PHC system has a number of strengths. There is a high level of national policy commitment to universal health coverage, equitable service provision, and the development of a strong PHC network. There are a large number of PHC facilities, and a reasonable number of staff providing relatively good levels of geographic coverage. Physical and financial access to services is good, with short travel times and free care at the point of use. Staff tend to be highly committed to their work, and patient-provider respect and trust are high, according to the most recent surveys. Recognising the importance of family medicine, a small but growing number of doctors are being trained in this specialty.

'However, broken financing, staffing, and procurement systems severely hamper quality. There is wide variation in the quality of care, the comprehensiveness of services on offer, and general service readiness. This is partly driven by the absence of national standards that spell out the staffing and other resources that ought to be available at every facility if they are to deliver a set list of essential medical services. Patients are savvy about which facilities function better and tend to bypass those that lack the requisite staff, medicines, or access to investigations.'[50]

15.   Education

15.1.1 In May 2024, REACH published a report entitled 'Barriers and Enablers to Education in Libya'. The report, citing various sources and based on consultations with children aged 12-18 years old, teachers, and frontline workers[51], stated:

'The educational infrastructure in Libya faces significant challenges, with around 160,000 children and 5,600 teachers in urgent need of support related to access or quality of education due to a decade of conflict and macroeconomic issues. Damaged schools, lack of maintenance, delayed supplies, and power outages contribute to these challenges. As identified in the Joint Education Needs Assessment (JENA 2022), obstacles such as insufficient equipment, teacher strikes, outdated curricula, and electricity cuts hinder student completion rates, leading to dropout, non-enrolment, and non-attendance.

' … Many schools lack proper WASH (Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene) facilities. Teachers, children aged 12-18, and social workers have all spoken

[49] Allen, N, and others, A rapid mixed-methods assessment … (page 6-8), BMC, 11 June 2024
[50] Allen, N, and others, A rapid mixed-methods assessment … (page 11-12), BMC, 11 June 2024
[51] REACH, Barriers and Enablers to Education in Libya (page 2), April 2024

up about this issue. Some schools have dirty toilets, and the water available is not always safe to drink. The scarcity of education centers in rural areas presents a significant challenge as reported by children 12-14 years old and social workers in Ubari, Hay Andalus, Ajdabiya and Sebha. Limited access to schools hinders the availability of education for these children, impacting their ability to attend and engage in learning.

'… Participants in almost all the assessed Baladiyas [see Geographical classifications] have highlighted regarding safety and security concerns. These encompass a spectrum of violence, including physical altercations, verbal abuse, bullying, harassment, corporal punishment, racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination.

'… All participant groups emphasized that the lack of financial resources to cover essential educational needs such as school uniforms, stationery, and school bags is critical to education access. These findings were also supported in the Joint Education Needs Assessment (JENA 2022), as financial constraints as financial constraints were reported to be one of the primary reasons for dropouts.

'… All participants noted the teacher shortage, either generally or specifically for subjects like mathematics and physics.'[52]

15.1.2 On 16 February 2024, UNICEF published its annual report on Libya, covering events in 2023 (the 2023 UNICEF report). The report, the latest annual report at the time of writing, stated:

'In the reporting year [2023], UNICEF in collaboration with the Ministry of Education (MoE) rolled out [the] Education Management and Information System (EMIS). The EMIS will provide the needed data ranging from enrollment, transition, and completion of schooling of all children in the formal education sector to help inform effective programming. This information system will also help in identification of children at risk of dropping out of the school system and children with disabilities hence enabling timely and targeted intervention.

'… UNICEF initiated a large-scale in-service teacher training programme focusing on refresher pedagogy courses. This is led by the Ministry of Education and will run for two years from 2024 benefiting 50,000 children. … In 2023 alone UNICEF has supported the capacity building of 219 teachers and education personnel across Libya on inclusive education.

'In 2023, through UNICEF's concerted effort to improve access to specialized resources in schools for children with disabilities, 50 Montessori rooms were installed in integrated schools to provide access to learning for children with disabilities and 40 master trainers and 179 teachers were trained on inclusive education.

'… Additionally, to support education providers to deliver inclusive, gender-responsive and quality education, UNICEF mainstreamed accessibility and gender inclusivity through infrastructural improvements to the learning environment. WASH facilities in 12 schools were rehabilitated, and accessibility features constructed. In the Wadi Atba municipality, 2 prefab classrooms were provided to expand the learning space available for

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[52] REACH, Barriers and Enablers to Education in Libya (page 1, 4-6), April 2024

children.

'… In parallel to the infrastructural support, UNICEF continued to provide essential learning materials to children reaching 22,500 children early childhood education kits.'[53]

16.   Displacement

16.1.1 For information on displacement and internally displaced persons (IDPs) see the Country Policy and Information Note Libya: Security situation.

17.   Freedom of movement

17.1.1 For information on freedom of movement see the Country Policy and Information Note Libya: Security situation.

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[53] UNICEF, Libya Country Office Annual Report 2023 (page 5-6), 16 February 2024

Research methodology

The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the [Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI)](#), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation's (ACCORD), [Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual,](#) 2024. Namely, taking into account the COI's relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

- the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source

- how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used

- the currency and detail of information

- whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources

Commentary may be provided on source(s) and information to help readers understand the meaning and limits of the COI.

Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used and the COI compared to ensure that it is accurate and balanced, and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.

The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.

Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the [bibliography](#).

Terms of Reference

The 'Terms of Reference' (ToR) provides a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of this note and forms the basis for the country information.

The following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

- socio-economic indicators, including statistics on life expectancy, literacy, school enrolment, poverty rates, levels of malnutrition

- socio-economic situation, including access to and availability to:
    - food
    - water for drinking and washing
    - accommodation and shelter
    - employment
    - healthcare – physical and mental
    - education
    - support providers, including government and international and domestic non-government organisations
    - variation of conditions by location and/or group
    - whether government is purposely withholding or not delivering support services, if so to which areas/groups

- internally displaced persons (IDPs) – numbers, trends and location

- freedom of movement

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Version control and feedback

Clearance

Below is information on when this note was cleared:

- version **1.0**
- valid from **15 April 2025**

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section

The information on this page has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section

Changes from last version of this note

First version of a standalone humanitarian situation note.

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Information about the IAGCI's work and a list of the documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector's pages of the gov.uk website.