Safey and Access Review

Q4 2024

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Introduction

Welcome to the Q4 2024 edition of the INSO Safety and Access Review (SAR), our flagship product designed specifically for NGO headquarters staff and decision-makers.

This report synthesises data analysis from the Quarterly Reports produced by each of INSO's country programmes to create a convenient, comprehensive, strategic overview that we hope will support situational awareness, operational planning and policy development.

All the information contained in the SAR is sourced directly from our extensive network of platforms and subjected to multiple layers of review from field offices up to our global Analysis Team, ensuring you receive reliable information and insightful perspectives.

While our International Advisory Board will assist and contribute to the development of our global products over time, we very much appreciate your ongoing support, engagement and feedback.

Phil Riding

*Deputy Director
Analysis Team*

Glossary

SECURITY INCIDENT refers to all "Theft", "Confine", Threat" and "Attack" events reported to INSO regardless of type, severity, perpetrator, intent or outcome. For instance, it includes all petty criminal robberies and threats as well as armed assaults and bombings. It includes all accidental involvement as well as all deliberate and targeted attacks. It includes all incidents in which no one was injured or hurt and all those in which someone was.

CONFLICT is a term divided into two recognised types by international humanitarian law: international armed conflict (IAC) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC). IAC exists whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more States whereas NIAC represents protracted armed confrontations between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a State. For a situation to be classified as a non-international armed conflict, armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organisation. According to ICRC guidance, 'internationalised' armed conflicts occur between two different factions fighting internally but supported by two different states.

OAG indicates an 'Organised Armed Group'. Rather than adopt terms such as 'Irregular' or 'Opposition', which imply an identity motivated, mobilised and moulded in contradistinction to 'Regular' or 'State' forces, INSO applies OAG to encompass combatants, such as Al-Qaida or Islamic State, that neither perceive nor define themselves under state-centric parameters. According to International Humanitarian Law, an armed party to the conflict is one which fulfils the criteria of exhibiting a leadership structure, carrying arms openly, possessing a distinctive emblem and comprising internal disciplinary systems. The first two conditions refer to OAG characteristics while the latter two relate to determining prisoner-of-war status. Other 'organised' factors may include the existence of a headquarters, access to military equipment/training, the ability to plan, coordinate and implement military operations as well as negotiate agreements. For Mali, and to differentiate between the presence of diverse OAG interests and operations, INSO adopts the term 'proscribed OAG' to detail the activities of selected salafi-jihadi groups internationally designated as 'terrorist' organisations.

NGO is a 'Non-Governmental Organisation' legally established as a private, non-profit and tax-exempt organisation (i.e. a Charity in the UK; a 501(c) (3) in the USA; and an ASBL in Belgium). The organisation must be registered as a non-profit in both its home State and the country of operation. The definition does not include any UN Agency, Fund or Programme or any Private Development Contractors.

SERIOUS INCIDENT categorises any incident that caused the abduction, injury or killing of NGO staff. INSO makes this distinction to observe what percentage of all incidents result in these most serious outcomes. In this report, 'abducted' refers to the number of staff impacted by the incident, namely abductees, whereas the 'NGO Incidents by Type and Quarter' charts for each platform detail the number of abduction cases.

*INSO presently operates and provides services in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria and Ukraine. Although INSO is only currently covering conflict-related hotspots in DRC (North and South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika), these will be addressed as areas within their respective countries as opposed to being categorised under geographically-specific regions.

Key Developments: West Africa & Latin America

HAITI

A spate of incidents targeting a medical NGO, in apparent retaliation for its treatment of injured OCG members, was the highest-impact trend within NGO incidents in Q4. Meanwhile, security forces targeted OCG leaders in Port-au-Prince, although with limited success.

MALI

Conflict activity remained concentrated in the central and southern regions, driven largely by JNIM activity and government forces' operations, both of which curtailed NGO access. Meanwhile, the military government further delayed any political transition with authorities likely to remain mistrustful of NGOs.

BURKINA FASO

Rising OAG violence contributed to a 25% year-on-year increase in civilian casualties in 2024, while IED attacks specifically reached new highs in Q4. Access remains constrained as a result, causing a decline in NGO incidents, as less programming was reported in this challenging environment.

Key Developments: Europe & Middle East

UKRAINE

Access in Ukraine did not change significantly, though the effects of external factors, such as the US elections are yet to unfold. Advances by Russian forces in Q4 have so far had little strategic significance, although they have severed key supply routes for NGOs and Ukrainian forces alike.

LEBANON

A full-scale conflict erupted between Hezbollah and the IDF in Q4. Despite a ceasefire deal in November, which is expected to hold throughout early 2025, IDF's continued presence on Lebanese territory risks sporadic exchanges with Hezbollah in the coming months.

PALESTINE

Prior to the Gaza ceasefire announced in early 2025, NGOs faced record conflict levels combined with the increasing frustration of the residents with the absence of basic services. Unrest will remain a key issue in Gaza amid concerns of possible collapse of the ceasefire.

IRAQ

Iraqi authorities increased security measures along the border with Syria in response to the fall of the Assad government, pre-empting any IS resurgence. The conflict between PKK and Turkish forces saw a slight decrease, but may escalate in 2025 due to developments in Syria.

SYRIA

The Assad government collapsed in early December following an HTS-led advance on Damascus. Taking advantage, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army targeted the SDF in northeast Syria. Significant unrest impacted NGOs nationwide following the fall of the former government.

Key Developments: Central & East Africa

NIGERIA

OAGs in the Northwest continue to cause significant insecurity through increasing IED activities and the abduction of at least 2,845 civilians and one NGO staff member. In the Northeast, OAGs committed the highest number of incidents in two years, targeting both government forces and civilians.

CAMEROON

The government intensified operations against OAGs in the Far North and NWSW, successfully targeting OAG leaders, driving a reduction of OAG violence in NWSW. However, civilians remain exposed to OAG intimidation and threats of violence against those perceived as collaborating with the government.

CAR

The security situation remains fluid, with government forces stepping up efforts to extend their influence beyond the capital and regain control of mining areas and key transport routes. Upcoming elections in 2025 are leading to growing political tensions, with OAGs targeting voter registration activities.

DRC

Dynamics in eastern DRC including the intensifying M23 offensive, increased ADF attacks and MONUSCO's drawdown have deepened security vacuums and could further restrict humanitarian access and hinder NGO staff safety. The seizure of Goma in early 2025 will have the greatest impact on access.

SOMALIA

AS attacks, political tensions in Jubaland, and continued communal violence drove insecurity this quarter, while the AUSSOM transition stalled. The handover and closure of AU-run bases risks creating localised security vacuums that may threaten NGO safety and access in affected areas.

SUDAN

The conflict in Sudan continued at an elevated intensity and remained defined by an increasingly fragmented actor map; civilians continued to be impacted by the use of heavy weapons in contested regions and faced reprisals attacks notably in Al Jazira for alleged support for opposing authorities.

SOUTH SUDAN

The period was defined by political instability amid a series of changes affecting senior level government positions which sparked tensions; NGOs were also concerned with a new amendment undergoing parliamentary review to an NGO bill which will increase regulatory and reporting requirements.

MOZAMBIQUE

The concurrent impact of the ongoing IS insurgency, widespread election-related protests, and the destruction caused by Cyclone Chido contributed to growing humanitarian needs and increasingly complex access environments in Cabo Delgado and Nampula; their impact will continue in 2025.

INSO

Burkina Faso
Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Legend

- ☐ International boundary
- ⬚ Administrative boundary
- ▱ Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- — 1
- — 2

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

Total NGO incidents in 2024 — 50
Killed — 4
Injured — 3
Abducted — 4

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio
12 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents
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NGO by security incident ratio*
4 Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security inc

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*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month

2024

Security incidents by perpetrator

Total **3,800**

- OAG (**52**%)
- Government Forces (**26**%)
- Criminal (**10**%)
- Others (**12**%)

Map labels: MALI, NIGER, BENIN, GHANA, TOGO, IVORY COAST, NIGERIA
Gorom Gorom, Ouahigouya, Kaya, Dédougou, Koudougou, Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Diapaga, Bobo Dioulasso, Banfora, Gaoua
Regions: Sahel, Nord, Centre-Nord, Boucle du Mouhoun, Plateau Central, Centre-Ouest, Centre-Sud, Centre-Est, Est, Hauts-Bassins, Cascades, Sud-Ouest

100 km

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Direktion für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit DEZA / Direction du développement et de la coopération DDC / Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC / Agencia Suiza para el Desarrollo y la Cooperación COSUDE

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: Q1 2024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024

NGO incidents by type and quarter

TOTAL Q4 2024 INCIDENTS: **8**

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2024 Q4	1	2	5	0
2024 Q3	4	5	6	2
2024 Q2	4	1	5	1
2024 Q1	3	3	8	0

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: OAG, Others, Criminal, Government Forces

Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Overall conflict levels in 2024 were slightly lower than the previous twelve months, although incidents did increase in Q4 for the second year in a row.

- Civilian casualties increased by 25% from 2023 to 2024, with significant losses also recorded among government forces and VDP, while attacks on escorted convoys fell in Q4.

- Clashes between JNIM and IS increased in 2024 to the highest levels in four years, while IED attacks targeting security forces also reached new levels, with 60 in Q4 alone.

- The new government appointed in December is continuing a military-led approach to the security crisis, albeit reducing diplomatic tensions by releasing French and Ivorian detainees.

NGO Incident Insight

- Q4 saw only seven NGO incidents, the lowest total in over four years; this is likely as the security environment is prohibitive and NGOs have reduced their exposure accordingly.

- OAGs abducted NGO staff on two occasions in Q4, however these were relatively low-impact events where the victims were released after questioning.

- The increasing prevalence of IEDs contributed to the deterioration of humanitarian access conditions, as well as the establishment of enclaves by OAGs.

- Police arrested several NGO workers over accusations that they had stolen aid supplies due for distribution among IDPs; the outcome of the accusations is unknown.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Given continued programming impediments, NGOs should review the criticality of all planned activities to ensure they meet thresholds that reflect organisational risk appetite.

- Occasional abductions of NGO staff by OAGs will continue to happen in their areas of influence: staff require tailored training and policy guidance on how to navigate encounters.

- Given increasing prevalence of IEDs, NGOs should review and update route assessments to reflect recent trends and seek advice from specialist agencies to minimise the threat.

- Sahelian governments are increasingly mistrustful of NGOs and in order to maintain acceptance NGOs should ensure accountability mechanisms are effective.

Cameroon

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Legend

- International boundary
- Administrative boundary
- Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- 1
- 2
- 3

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

	Total NGO incidents in 2024	49
	Killed	1
	Injured	4
	Abducted	51

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

23 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

4 Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security inc

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

### Total security incidents by month

2024

Security incidents by perpetrator

- Government Forces (**31%**)
- Criminal (**15%**)
- OAG (**1%**)
- Others (**52%**)

Total **7,036**

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: ■ Q1 2024 ■ Q2 2024 ■ Q3 2024 ■ Q4 2024

(Areas: North-West, South-West, Extreme-nord)

NGO incidents by type and quarter

TOTAL Q4 2024 INCIDENTS: **15**

(Donut: 8, 5, 2)

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2024 Q4	2	5	8	0
2024 Q3	1	4	8	0
2024 Q2	2	3	8	0
2024 Q1	0	4	4	0

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: Others, Government Forces, Criminal, OAG

(Months Jan–Dec grouped into Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 — 2024)

Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Q4 saw a slight decrease in conflict intensity overall, however government forces' and criminal activity grew alongside declining OAG incidents.

- Comprehensive campaigns by security forces limited OAG activity, leading to a 32% drop in OAG incidents from October to November.

- OAGs in the Far North Region continued targeted assaults against government positions while increasing kidnappings of civilians for ransom.

- In NWSW, OAGs exerted their influence through lockdowns and the use of kidnapping, assaults, and threats against non-compliant civilians.

NGO Incident Insight

- There were 15 incidents affecting humanitarians in Q4, five of which were abductions, slightly above the totals recorded in the two previous quarters in 2024.

- NGOs were most affected by theft and OAG-perpetrated abductions; meanwhile, NGOs did not report any incidents perpetrated by government forces.

- In the Far North, NGO access and programming were disrupted by multiple demonstrations during aid distribution events, as well as local flooding.

- NGOs in NWSW are increasingly impacted by OAG activities, including abductions arising from challenges in negotiating access with conflict actors.

INSO Operational Foresight

- The upcoming presidential election is expected to impact conflict dynamics, with political uncertainty increasing government scrutiny of NGOs.

- Petty crime will continue to be a key concern in urban centres, especially Maroua, with staff requiring appropriate support and physical security measures at offices and residences.

- In the Far North, NGOs should review their community acceptance and accountability strategies, particularly for distribution activities.

- Efforts to improve acceptance and reduce abductions should emphasise NGOs' political neutrality and clearly communicate programme activities and their objectives.

Central African Republic

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Legend:
- ☐ International boundary
- ⬚ Administrative boundary
- ☐ Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- — 1
- — 3
- — 4
- — 6

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

🧍 **Total NGO incidents in 2024**	**122**
🧍 **Killed**	**1**
🧍 **Injured**	**20**
🤲 **Abducted**	**5**

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

2 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

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NGO by security incident ratio*

7 Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security inc

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○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○
○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○
○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month

2024

Security incidents by perpetrator

Total **7,376**

- ■ Criminal (**36%**)
- ■ Government Forces (**30%**)
- ■ OAG (**28%**)
- ■ Community Force (**4%**)
- ■ Others (**2%**)

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: ■ Q1 2024 ■ Q2 2024 ■ Q3 2024 ■ Q4 2024

Areas (x-axis): Bamingui-Bangoran, Bangui, Ouaka, Ouham, Ombella M'poko, Haute-Kotto, Ouham Pende, Mambere-Kadei, Mbomou, Basse-Kotto

NGO incidents by type and quarter

TOTAL Q4 2024 INCIDENTS: **28**

Donut segments: 21, 3, 3, 1

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2024 Q4	1	3	21	3
2024 Q3	3	4	17	2
2024 Q2	3	5	20	0
2024 Q1	0	19	20	1

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: ■ Criminal ■ Government Forces ■ OAG ■ Community Force ■ Others

x-axis: Jan, Feb, Mar (Q1), Apr, May, Jun (Q2), Jul, Aug, Sep (Q3), Oct, Nov, Dec (Q4) — 2024

Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Q4 saw a small increase in security incidents, reflecting military efforts to regain control of mining areas and transport routes.

- Sustained military operations appear to have suppressed OAG activity in Bamingui-Bangoran while prompting OAG activity in the west.

- Preparations for the 2025 elections are ongoing, a process that will be contested by OAGs and political opponents, increasing insecurity.

- The Foreign Agents Act, which would apply to NGOs, was returned for revision after parliamentarians requested more information from the bill's sponsors.

NGO Incident Insight

- Q4 saw 28 NGO incidents, which was consistent with yearly trends; a peak of 15 incidents happened in December, linked to year-end festivities.

- Encounters between NGOs and OAGs led to four incidents; NGOs continue to experience theft on main roads and at programming locations.

- Census agents have been repeatedly targeted by OAGs, making registration locations unsafe for NGOs and programming activities.

- NGOs continue to be hampered by bureaucratic impediments; however, joint workshops have made progress towards simplifying procedures for NGOs.

INSO Operational Foresight

- NGOs will continue to be targeted by criminal actors due to their relative wealth; NGO staff should take care to actively manage their visibility and profile even when off duty.

- The security situation across CAR remains complex and volatile, requiring regular reviews of emerging security dynamics, triggers, indicators, and actor movements.

- NGOs should be aware of where and when Agence Nationale Electorale (ANE) activities are being carried out and adjust activity plans accordingly.

- Despite elections being postponed until July, a credible census is unlikely to be completed in time, increasing the likelihood of unrest and the need for contingency planning.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Legend

- International boundary
- Administrative boundary
- Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- 1
- 3
- 5
- 7

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

Total NGO incidents in 2024	**398**
Killed	**10**
Injured	**59**
Abducted	**14**

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

9 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

**7** Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security inc

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month


2024

Security incidents by perpetrator

Total **21,460**

- Criminal (**39%**)
- OAG (**16%**)
- Government Forces (**16%**)
- Others (**28%**)

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Agencia Suiza para el Desarrollo y la Cooperación COSUDE

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Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: ■ Q1 2024 ■ Q2 2024 ■ Q3 2024 ■ Q4 2024

(Areas: Nord-Kivu, Ituri, Sud-Kivu, Tanganyika, Maniema, Haut-Katanga, Haut-Lomami)

NGO incidents by type and quarter

TOTAL Q4 2024 INCIDENTS: **75**

(Donut segments: 31, 19, 16, 9)

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2024 Q4	16	19	31	9
2024 Q3	11	25	60	13
2024 Q2	11	7	70	21
2024 Q1	9	26	54	16

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: ■ Criminal ■ OAG ■ Government Forces ■ Others

(Months Jan–Dec 2024, grouped Q1–Q4)

Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Overall incident totals fell slightly in Q4, but remained significant in comparison with previous years as conflict dynamics in eastern DRC intensified throughout Q4.

- M23 intensified its offensive in North Kivu, prompting widespread displacement and regional tensions between the DRC government and Rwanda, which supports M23.

- ADF attacks expanded into new areas of Beni and Lubero, exploiting the security vacuum left by M23 advances in North Kivu and Ituri.

- The closure and transfer of MONUSCO bases has amplified security vacuums, while the introduction of multinational military forces, such as SAMIDRC, has failed to bring stability.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGO incidents dropped by 30%, but this reflects a declining operational footprint due to a worsening security environment rather than a reduction in threats to humanitarians.

- M23 members shot dead an NGO staff member off duty in North Kivu reportedly following accusations he had links to an OAG.

- While NGOs were not directly targeted, ADF attacks killed 298 this quarter and nearly 1,500 this year, 97% of whom were civilians.

- Humanitarian access has further deteriorated, with increased road travel constraints and restrictions on humanitarian flights, limiting NGO mobility and response capacity.

INSO Operational Foresight

- NGO risk exposure remains high, particularly in areas where conflict persists; further reductions in NGO activity may lead to gaps in service delivery.

- As M23 consolidates control over Goma, NGOs must navigate access negotiations while maintaining community acceptance to ensure operational continuity where possible.

- ADF's expansion into new areas will likely increase risks along key transit routes, forcing NGOs to reassess travel and security plans.

- As MONUSCO draws down, localised conflicts and criminal activity may escalate, further shaping operational access and requiring NGOs to adapt operational footprint.

INSO

Haiti
Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Legend

- ☐ International boundary
- ⬚ Administrative boundary
- ☐ Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- — 5
- — 10
- — 15
- — 20

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

Map labels: Nord-Ouest, Cap-Haïtien, Nord, Nord-Est, Gonaïves, L'Artibonite, Centre, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, Port-au-Prince, Grand'Anse, Nippes, Les Cayes, Sud, Sud-Est, UNITED STATES MINOR OUTLYING ISLANDS

100 km

Co-funded by the European Union

	Total NGO incidents in 2024	61
	Killed	0
	Injured	4
	Abducted	11

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

8 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

⬤⬤⬤⬤⬤⬤⬤⬤◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯◯

NGO by security incident ratio*

15 Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security in

⬤⬤⬤◯◯

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month

2024

Security incidents by perpetrator

- Criminal (**40%**)
- Government Forces (**31%**)
- Foreign Government Forces (**0%**)
- Others (**30%**)

Total **2,852**

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: Q1 2024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024

Areas: West, Artibonite, North, South, Centre, North-East, North-West, Nippes

NGO incidents by type and quarter

TOTAL Q4 2024 INCIDENTS: **25**

Segments: 9, 8, 5, 3

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2024 Q4	9	5	3	8
2024 Q3	4	3	4	4
2024 Q2	5	1	1	2
2024 Q1	0	3	8	1

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: Criminal, Government Forces, Others, Foreign Government Forces

Months: Jan, Feb, Mar (Q1); Apr, May, Jun (Q2); Jul, Aug, Sep (Q3); Oct, Nov, Dec (Q4) — 2024

Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Security incidents increased in Q4 from the previous three months, with the most significant growth coming in attacks, which rose by around 30%.

- Police and law enforcement agencies concentrated their activities against gangs in Port-au-Prince, targeting the leaders of Kraze Barye and the spokesperson for Viv Ansanm.

- Police operations in Bas-Artibonite and the capital, as well as OCG attacks in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, led to population displacement.

- OCGs carried out simultaneous attacks in Port-au-Prince while aircraft were hit by gunfire on 11 November, resulting in the closure of Haiti's airport.

NGO Incident Insight

- Notable increases in attacks and verbal threats against NGO staff were recorded in Q4, as humanitarian neutrality came under pressure from law enforcement and vigilantes.

- Misinformation about NGOs and unsubstantiated claims about their relationships with OCGs has led to targeted attacks on humanitarians providing medical care.

- As humanitarian needs increase, there is growing interference in NGO activities by a range of actors, including attempts to influence beneficiary selection and aid diversion.

- The indefinite suspension of commercial flights has negatively impacted access; a UNHAS helicopter is available but has been recently targeted by OCGs, threatening domestic mobility.

INSO Operational Foresight

- The police and Multinational Security Support Mission have failed to avert rising insecurity and NGOs should integrate continued insecurity into planning assumptions.

- Mistrust of NGOs is likely to persist and so collective advocacy towards all actors is essential to demand respect for humanitarian space, especially for medical programming.

- Attempts to subvert beneficiary selection may grow; NGOs need to communicate clear criteria and ensure they are compliant with donor reporting on aid diversion.

- Given continued disruption to flights, NGOs should use consider road moves where possible, forward-basing supplies, and responsible engagement of local partners.

INSO

Iraq
Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Total NGO incidents in 2024 — **4**

Killed — **0**

Injured — **0**

Abducted — **0**

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

**0** out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

0 Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security inc

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Legend

- □ International boundary
- ⋯ Administrative boundary
- ⬡ Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- — 1

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

Map labels: Zakho, Dahuk, Tall Afar, Mosul, Irbil, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, SYRIA, Tikrit, Salah al-Din, Diyala, Baqubah, Baghdad, Al Fallujah, Ar Rutbah, Anbar, Karbala, Babylon, Al Kut, Wassit, An Najaf, Ad Diwaniyah, Qadissiya, Al Amarah, Maysan, As Samawah, Ash Shatrah, An Nasiriyah, Thi-Qar, Najaf, Muthanna, Basra, Basrah, JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, LEBANON, IRAN, Zagros M

100 km

In partnership with Canada

Total security incidents by month

(Bar chart, vertical axis 0–1000, horizontal axis Jan–Dec 2024)

Security incidents by perpetrator

Total **10,200**

- Government Forces (**48%**)
- Criminal (**32%**)
- Foreign Government Forces (**8%**)
- Community Force (**6%**)
- OAG (**3%**)
- Others (**2%**)

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: Q1 2024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024

(Bar chart with areas: Baghdad, Ninawa, Kirkuk, Salah Al-Din, Erbil, Anbar, Dohuk, Sulaymaniya, Diyala, Basra; y-axis 0 to 800)

NGO incidents by type and quarter

TOTAL
Q4 2024
INCIDENTS:
1

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2024 Q4	0	1	0	0
2024 Q3	0	1	1	0
2024 Q2	0	0	0	0
2024 Q1	1	0	0	0

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: Government Forces, Criminal, Foreign Government Forces, Community Force, OAG, Others

(Stacked bar chart by month Jan–Dec 2024, grouped into Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4; y-axis 0 to 1000)

Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Iraqi authorities increased security measures along the border with Syria following the fall of Assad's regime, amid increased concerns about potential IS proliferation in Iraq.

- Turkish forces conducted 137 attacks this quarter compared to 320 in the previous, reflecting both an expected seasonal downturn and Turkey's diverted attention towards Syria.

- OAG attacks against Israel launched from Iraq peaked in November, after which they subsided amid an escalation of rhetoric from Israel, threatening Iraq with retaliation

- Elections in KRI in October led to nine incidents related to inter-party rivalry and procedural contestation, though this largely subsided by early November.

NGO Incident Insight

- The additional measures included closure of several border crossings and increased scrutiny of incoming Syrian nationals, without creating significant access challenges for NGOs.

- TAF-PKK clashes remain limited to remote border areas where the collateral risk to NGOs is elevated, with four out of 10 TAF-initiated attacks resulting in civilian casualties in Q4.

- The operating environment for NGOs remained unaffected, despite a surge in misinformation suggesting impending IDF attacks and sporadic attempts of security forces to curb OAGs.

- As election-related violence remained limited, its effect on NGO access was temporary and revolved around road closures during rallies in Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Increasing IS presence in Iraq is unlikely as a resurgence of the OAG in Syria has not been observed. NGOs will however continue facing heightened vigilance of security forces.

- The conflict between PKK and TAF will be in part shaped by the US posture towards Kurdish entities in the region, highlighting the need for wide-ranging contingency plans.

- Considering the ceasefires in Lebanon and Gaza, the motive for the OAG attacks from Iraq faded; risk to NGOs will remain low, depending on developments in Gaza.

- As the formation of the government is pending, NGOs should prepare for collateral exposure to sporadic violence and demonstrations amid attempts to form a PDK-PUK coalition.

1 January to 31 December 2024

	Total NGO incidents in 2024	1
	Killed	0
	Injured	3
	Abducted	0

## Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

0 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

**0** Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security inc

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Legend

- ☐ International boundary
- ⬚ Administrative boundary
- ▢ Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- No Humanitarian incidents

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

Trablous

Beirut

Zahlé

SYRIA

100 km

N

Total security incidents by month

2024

Security incidents by perpetrator

Total
4,844

- Foreign Government Forces (**95%**)
- Government Forces (**3%**)
- Criminal (**1%**)
- OAG (**0%**)
- Others (**0%**)

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: ■ Q1 2024 ■ Q2 2024 ■ Q3 2024 ■ Q4 2024

(Y-axis: 0, 250, 500, 750, 1000, 1250, 1500, 1750, 2000; X-axis areas: Nabatieh, South, Baalbek-Hermel, Mount Lebanon, Beqaa, North, Beirut, Akkar, Keserwan-Jbeil)

NGO incidents by type and quarter

No reported NGO incidents
in Q4 of 2024

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2024 Q4	0	0	0	0
2024 Q3	1	0	0	0
2024 Q2	0	0	0	0
2024 Q1	0	0	0	0

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: ■ Foreign Government Forces ■ Criminal ■ OAG ■ Government Forces ■ Others

(Y-axis: 0, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500; X-axis months Jan–Dec grouped Q1–Q4, 2024)

Conflict Activity Hindsight

- A simmering conflict between Hezbollah and Israel escalated into a full-scale war in October and November, with southern Lebanon logging 74% of all incidents coutnrywide.

- Hezbollah and Israel agreed on a ceasefire at the end of November, though Israel has continued to launch an average of three airstrikes per day in Lebanon since then.

- The IDF remained deployed in Lebanon despite the ceasefire and continued to demolish houses, claiming that this was to prevent the return of Hezbollah units.

- The Lebanese military began demining efforts in areas under its control, conducting 135 controlled detonations of UXO since the ceasefire.

NGO Incident Insight

- Damage to key infrastructure and health facilities, as well as frontline activity, rendered southern Lebanon temporarily inaccessible, however no NGO incidents have been recorded.

- In October, media reports suggested that an airstrike hit an NNGO facility in Nabatyieh, a risk that has reduced since the ceasefire, but could change if the deal collapses.

- According to anecdotal reports, Israeli ground forces operations directly impacted community relief workers during the war, while clashes with Hezbollah continue.

- UXO contamination in affected areas is a significant impediment to aid programming and prevents rapid response, particularly shelter reconstruction.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Conflict levels comparable to last quarter are unlikely to return in the coming months, though NGOs should account for possible re-escalation in contingency plans.

- While the ceasefire is expected to hold, sporadic clashes and airstrikes will continue; NGOs in southern Lebanon should use available HNS as long as advised by relevant agencies.

- Lebanon's newly elected president is expected to enable armed forces' deployment in the south, which will be an indicator of gradual return of a normal access environment.

- Amid gradual demining, humanitarian action perceived as slow to respond may face degraded acceptance, particularly in the absence of effective community engagement.

INSO

Mali

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Legend

- International boundary
- Administrative boundary
- Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 5

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

Map labels:
Taoudenni, ALGERIA, MAURITANIA, Tombouctou, Tessalit, Kidal, Aguelhok, Araouane, Boùrem, Menaka, Timbuktu, Goundam, Gao, Ménaka, NIGER, Nara, Sokolo, Mopti, Djenné, Kayes, SENEGAL, Kayes, Markala, Ségou, Koulikoro, Bamako, Bougouni, Sikasso, BURKINA FASO, NIGERIA, GUINEA, IVORY COAST, GHANA, SIERRA LEONE

100 km

Total NGO incidents in 2024: 124

Killed: 0

Injured: 1

Abducted: 46

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

6 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

12 Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security incidents

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month

2024

Security incidents by perpetrator

- Government Forces (**32**%)
- Criminal (**31**%)
- OAG (**31**%)
- Foreign Government Forces (**1**%)
- Pro-Government OAG (**0**%)
- Others (**5**%)

Total **6,132**

UK aid
from the British people

Co-funded by
the European Union

Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra
Direktion für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit DEZA
Direction du développement et de la coopération DDC
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC
Agenzia Svizzera per lo Sviluppo e la Cooperazione SDC
Agencia Suiza para el Desarrollo y la Cooperación COSUDE

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: ■ Q1 2024 ■ Q2 2024 ■ Q3 2024 ■ Q4 2024

(Areas: Segou, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Mopti, Gao, Kayes, Tombouctou, Menaka, Bamako, Kidal)

NGO incidents by type and quarter

TOTAL Q4 2024 INCIDENTS: **36**

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2024 Q4	1	13	22	0
2024 Q3	1	11	14	0
2024 Q2	1	6	17	0
2024 Q1	1	8	28	1

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: ■ Government Forces ■ OAG ■ Foreign Government Forces ■ Criminal ■ Others ■ Pro-Government OAG

(Months: Jan–Dec, grouped Q1–Q4, 2024)

Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Overall security incidents were consistent in Q4 with the preceding period, with conflict activity taking place at an elevated rate throughout 2024.

- Patterns of conflict were largely unchanged in Q4, as insecurity remained concentrated in central and southern regions driven by OAG and security forces' activity.

- Among OAGs, which were the most prevalent perpetrator of security incidents, JNIM accounted for the majority of conflict activity, primarily in Segou and Mopti.

- A government reshuffle was not followed by a commitment to a political transition, reinforcing the continuity of the military government.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGO incidents rose slightly in Q4, but remained below the level seen in Q1 of 2024, with petty and violent crimes by far the most prevalent act type.

- Criminality dominated NGO incidents in Q4, while confinements were around 30% of the total, with government forces controlling access and OAGs abducting staff.

- Government operations proved disruptive, for example NGO staff were detained in a cordon and search operation targeting JNIM in Menaka.

- Access was limited by a new series of road restrictions imposed by the government, while UNHAS flights restarted after their suspension in September.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Conflict dynamics are likely to remain unchanged in the coming months as government efforts to contain OAGs stall, however NGOs should still review actor maps periodically.

- OAGs continue to intercept staff in transit and NGO workers need to be adequately trained to navigate these encounters while carrying appropriate documentation about their work.

- Mistrust of NGOs by government forces is likely to increase; engagement with CMCoord mechanisms, and strategic communication of principles are essential for acceptance.

- As controls over routes evolve, NGOs should ensure they maintain a live system of regularly updated route assessments, incorporating restrictions by all armed actors.

INSO

Mozambique

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Legend

- ☐ International boundary
- ⬚ Administrative boundary
- ☐ Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- — 1
- — 2

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

	Total NGO incidents in 2024	39
	Killed	1
	Injured	6
	Abducted	0

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

7 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

●●●●●●●○○○

NGO by security incident ratio*

18 Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security in

●●●●○○○○○○...

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month

2024

Security incidents by perpetrator

Total **957**

- Criminal (**26%**)
- Government Forces (**25%**)
- OAG (**7%**)
- Foreign Government Forces (**4%**)
- Others (**38%**)

ukaid

Co-funded by the European Union

Direktion für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit DEZA
Direction du développement et de la coopération DDC
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC
Agencia Suiza para el Desarrollo y la Cooperación COSUDE

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: Q1 2023, Q2 2023, Q3 2023, Q4 2023

(Areas: Cabo Delgado, Nampula)

NGO incidents by type and quarter

TOTAL Q4 2024 INCIDENTS: **14**

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2024 Q4	5	4	5	0
2024 Q3	0	3	6	0
2024 Q2	1	3	5	0
2024 Q1	1	0	6	0

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: Others, Criminal, Government Forces, OAG, Foreign Government Forces

(Months: Jan–Dec 2024; Quarters Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4)

Conflict Activity Hindsight

- The impact of ongoing OAG and criminal activities was compounded by intensifying political unrest and the impact of Cyclone Chido.

- Election-related protests and accompanying violence led to at least 300 deaths, 600 injuries, 4000 arrests and widespread property destruction.

- OAGs continued their geographical expansion northern Cabo Delgado towards the southern districts of the provice and the northern areas of neighbouring Nampula Province.

- Cyclone Chido caused 120 deaths, 868 injuries, damaged over 155,500 homes, and destroyed entire communities in Mecufi, Cabo Delgado.

NGO Incident Insight

- There were 14 NGO incidents, including two serious incidents, recorded in Q4; a small increase from the nine recorded in the previous quarter.

- More than half of NGO incidents in Q4 - including road blocks, looting, and vandalism - were caused by civilians protesting the election results.

- OAG incursions, looting, and abductions, have caused displacement and intensified humanitarian needs further straining response capacities.

- At least 20 NGOs were affected by Cyclone Chido, facing damaged facilities, disrupted services, and difficulties in reaching affected communities.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Operations in Nampula and Cabo Delgado will remain challenging due to continued political dissent, growing security vacuums and extreme weather events.

- NGOs should maintain neutrality and be ready to enact contingency plans at short notice. NGO access is likely to be restricted by GF response to protests.

- Strengthening coordination with communities and other NGOs will enhance information gathering and help NGOs to mitigate access constraints

- A particularly intense cyclone season is anticipated until April. NGOs should safeguard facilities and pre-position supplies in preparation for further events.

INSO

Nigeria
Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Total NGO incidents in 2024	72
Killed	4
Injured	10
Abducted	5

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

13 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

●●●●●●●●●●●●●○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○

NGO by security incident ratio*

**10** Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security in

●●○○○

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month

Security incidents by perpetrator

- OAG (**23%**)
- Criminal (**21%**)
- Government Forces (**18%**)
- Others (**39%**)

Total **9,282**

Map legend

Total Security Incidents 202
- ☐ International boundary
- ⬡ Administrative boundary
- ⬡ Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- — 1
- — 3
- — 4
- — 6

Total Security Incidents
1 - 3
3 - 6
6 - 9
9 - 12
12 - 15
15 - 20
20 - 50
50 - 100
100 - 150
150 - 200
Over 200

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: Q1 2024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024

NGO incidents by type and quarter

TOTAL Q4 2024 INCIDENTS: **19**

Donut values: 1, 5, 13

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2024 Q4	5	1	13	0
2024 Q3	4	1	16	4
2024 Q2	2	6	6	0
2024 Q1	3	2	8	1

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: Others, Criminal, Government Forces, OAG

Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Despite military operations, OAG actors continue to perpetrate a plurality of security incidents in both the Northeast and Northwest.

- In the Northeast, OAGs committed the highest number of incidents in two years, attacking GF and violently enforcing compliance on civilians.

- The Northwest continued to experience the majority of the OAG incidents recorded by INSO Nigeria, including growing IED incidents and the abduction of 2,800 civilians.

- Local media outlets report 61 people died as a result of stampedes during five separate aid distribution events across Nigeria in December.

NGO Incident Insight

- In Q4, there were 19 incidents affecting NGOs, with the three-quarters reported in the Northeast, likely due to more significant NGO presence compared to the Northwest.

- OAG activity in the Northeast continues to restrict humanitarian access, but NGOs are mainly affected by urban criminality, primarily theft.

- NGO staff were injured in two incidents in the Northwest, one abduction and an armed assault, which were perpetrated by OAGs and criminals.

- Fatal stampedes occurred at two NGO distributions and demonstrations disrupted a third, indicating the potential severity of these incidents.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Ongoing economic hardship could spark further demonstrations, creating heightened riot-related risks for NGO staff and property in the vicinity.

- NGOs should remain aware of the significant risks from OAGs if attempting to extend programming activities outside the cities and towns under military control.

- While NGOs are not currently targeted by OAGs in the Northwest, engagement with all actors will be important for maintaining perceptions of neutrality.

- NGOs should review aid distribution policies, including crowd control measures, to reduce staff and beneficiary risks and in advance of increased government scrutiny.

Palestine
Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Legend

☐ International boundary
┊ Administrative boundary
☐ Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
— 5
— 11
— 17
— 23

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

Total NGO incidents in 2024	**186**
Killed	**48**
Injured	**60**
Abducted	**2**

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

21 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

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○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○

NGO by security incident ratio*

8 Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security inc

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*each circle represents 5 incidents.

SYR

Nablus

JORDAN

Gaza

EGYPT

100 km

N

Co-funded by
the European Union

Total security incidents by month

(bar chart, values by month)

- y-axis: 0, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000
- Feb, Mar, Apr, May, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec

2024

Security incidents by perpetrator

■ Foreign Government Forces (**92**%)
■ Government Forces (**3**%)
■ OAG (**1**%)
■ Criminal (**0**%)
■ Others (**3**%)

Total
19,396

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: Q1 2024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024

(Bar chart — Gaza Strip and West Bank)

NGO incidents by type and quarter

Donut chart:
TOTAL Q4 2024 INCIDENTS: **109**
70, 27, 9, 3

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2024 Q4	70	9	27	3
2024 Q3	26	3	9	3
2024 Q2	21	1	4	2
2024 Q1	4	1	2	1

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: Foreign Government Forces, Government Forces, Others, OAG, Criminal

(Stacked bar chart by month, Q1–Q4 2024)

### Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Prior to the Gaza ceasefire agreed upon in early 2025, the conflict escalated, increasing by 76% between the third and fourth quarter of the year.

- In late October, Israel banned UNRWA from operating in Israel and East Jerusalem, alleging that the organisation supports Hamas; the ban took effect in late January 2025.

- The end of 2024 saw a growing intensity of IDF operations allegedly targeting OAGs in the West Bank with the support of the Palestinian Authority (PA).

- Israeli settler violence continued at a steady tempo in the West Bank this quarter, involving armed assaults and destruction of agricultural land.

NGO Incident Insight

- Incidents affecting humanitarians rose from 44 to 133 this quarter. Apart from IDF attacks, NGOs faced more criminality and incidents suggesting decreasing acceptance.

- Although interaction with UNRWA was not criminalised, the lack of clarity around the ban's implementation created compliance risks that may result in scrutiny in the future.

- Operations around Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm created access constraints for NGOs who were unable to access project sites in several areas, including the Nur Shams Camp.

- Several Israeli settlers in East Jerusalem threw stones at an IO vehicle, demonstrating a direct risk to humanitarians whose neutrality may be seen as compromised.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Both conflict levels and NGO incidents are likely to drop in Gaza due to the ceasefire, though NGOs will need to adapt security systems to navigate a high degree of unrest.

- The ban came into force despite the ceasefire, creating legal and operational risks; NGOs should assess the risk related to ties with the agency and prepare for potential staff arrests.

- The operations and the PA's perceived complicity are likely to increase tensions with residents; NGOs should review the reputational risks presented by engaging with the PA.

- With the renewed US support of settlement policies, NGOs in the West Bank should assess the effect of potential expansion of settlements on their project sites.

INSO

Somalia
Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Legend

- International boundary
- Administrative boundary
- Humanitarian Incidents

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- 1
- 2

Total NGO incidents in 2024 — **115**

Killed — **9**

Injured — **16**

Abducted — **16**

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

16 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

**17** Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security in

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

## Total security incidents by month

2024

Security incidents by perpetrator

Total **3,468**

- OAG (**35%**)
- Government Forces (**29%**)
- Criminal (**17%**)
- Community Force (**12%**)
- Foreign Government Forces (**2%**)
- Others (**5%**)

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: Q1 2024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024

Areas: South West State, Mogadishu, Jubaland, Hirshabelle, Puntland, Sool, Sanaag & Togdheer, West Somaliland, Galmudug

NGO incidents by type and quarter

TOTAL Q4 2024 INCIDENTS: **31**

Donut values: 11, 8, 8, 4

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
	⚡	🤲	🏃	👥
2024 Q4	11	8	8	4
2024 Q3	8	12	1	5
2024 Q2	11	9	1	3
2024 Q1	15	9	5	5

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: OAG, Government Forces, Criminal, Community Force, Others, Foreign Government Forces

Months: Jan, Feb, Mar (Q1); Apr, May, Jun (Q2); Jul, Aug, Sep (Q3); Oct, Nov, Dec (Q4) — 2024

### Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Overall security incidents rose considerably this quarter, by around 10%, driven by a surge in communal violence and criminal incidents.

- AS activity continued to pose threats to civilians; despite this overall incident volumes perpetrated by the group remained below the 2023 quarterly average.

- Tensions between the federal and Jubaland authorities escalated into clashes, elevated casualty figures and the emergence of new frontlines in Ras Kamboni, Lower Juba.

- The AU's new peacekeeping operation, AUSSOM, took effect on 1 January but the transition from its current footprint will continue into the second quarter of 2025.

NGO Incident Insight

- Three fatal NGO incidents involving communal violence or OAGs were recorded; in one, an NGO staff member aboard a vehicle was killed during a clan militia ambush in Abudwaq.

- AS IED attacks killed two staff in two separate incidents in Lower Shabelle, the group also detonated an IED at an NGO compound gate in Baidoa without injuries reported.

- NGOs in Jubaland sheltered in place and limited movements during clashes between Jubaland and federal forces in Ras Kamboni and Dollow, however none were directly impacted.

- The AUSSOM transition process has yet to impact NGOs, however, uncertainty over the timing of bases closures has created concern over potential security vacuums.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Communal violence is expected to remain a key driver of insecurity, posing collateral risks to humanitarian actors, especially in contested areas.

- AS is unlikely to increase targeting of NGO staff; however, the group will continue perpetrating IED attacks targeting government-linked sites and vehicles.

- Political and security tensions in Jubaland will likely persist, though the impact on NGOs is expected to remain manageable unless the situation escalates further.

- The phased transition may lead to temporary security gaps, requiring NGOs to closely monitor developments and adapt operational security measures accordingly.

Sudan

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Total NGO incidents in 2024		62
Killed		8
Injured		4
Abducted		2

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

9 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

●●●●●●●●○○

NGO by security incident ratio*

14 Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security in

●●●○○

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Legend

- □ International boundary
- ⬚ Administrative boundary
- ▭ Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- — 1
- — 2
- — 3
- — 4

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

Map labels: Wadi Halfa, Port Sudan, Dongola, Tokar, Merowe, Atbara, EdDamer, Omdurman, Kassala, SUDAN, Medani, Gedaref, Geneina, El Fasher, Sennar, El Obeid, Kosti, Niyala, Babanusa, Kadugli

100 km

Total security incidents by month

Month	Value
Jun	~5
Jul	~215
Aug	~240
Sep	~275
Oct	~330
Nov	~345
Dec	~315

2024

Security incidents by perpetrator

- Government Forces (**61%**)
- OAG (**28%**)
- Criminal (**9%**)
- Others (**2%**)

Total **1,713**

ukaid

Co-funded by the European Union

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: Q1 2024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024

Areas (x-axis): Khartoum, North Darfur, Aj Jazirah, Sennar, West Darfur, White Nile, South Darfur, North Kordofan, River Nile, East Darfur

NGO incidents by type and quarter

TOTAL Q4 2024 INCIDENTS: **28**

(Donut segments: 13, 10, 5)

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2024 Q4	10	5	13	0
2024 Q3	11	12	8	0
2024 Q2	0	2	1	0
2024 Q1	0	0	0	0

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: Government Forces, Criminal, Others, OAG

Months (x-axis): Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr, May, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec

Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Sudan's conflict remained defined by multiple geographically separated frontlines and the deployment of heavy weaponry in civilian areas in multiple parts of the country.

- Conflict escalated in Khartoum, Al-Fashir, and key frontlines, with heavy artillery and airstrikes throughout the quarter; however, there were few major shifts in territorial control.

- Criminal incidents involved a notable rise in small arms fire including during armed robberies with Darfur and key urban areas experiencing a concentration of these attacks.

- The defection of an RSF commander in Al Jazirah led to reprisals, including attacks on hundreds of settlements that resulted in the displacement of over 300,000 people.

NGO Incident Insight

- In Q4, criminals drove nearly half of NGO incidents, while RSF were responsible for 25%; however, reporting and communication challenges hindered incident verification.

- In a serious incident, an unidentified aircraft conducted an airstrike in Yabus, Blue Nile State, which resulted in the deaths of three IO staff.

- Six armed robberies affected NGOs this quarter, the majority of which occurred in the Darfur region compared with only two the previous quarter.

- NGOs faced increased collateral risks, particularly in regions affected by ongoing clashes including in Al-Fashir, North Darfur, however incidents remained underreported.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Criminality and RSF activities will continue to pose major security risks, particularly in Darfur, where NGO operations remain highly constrained.

- NGO risk management should integrate the potential for increased airstrikes and drone attacks in 2025, which can impact areas well beyond frontlines.

- Criminal threats will remain a key concern, particularly on transit routes and urban centres experiencing ongoing fighting; insecurity will worsen as the conflict continues.

- In areas with shifting frontlines or active RSF-SAF confrontations, the risk of reprisal attacks could further restrict NGO operations and humanitarian access.

INSO

South Sudan
Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Total NGO incidents in 2024   **176**

Killed   **8**

Injured   **20**

Abducted   **17**

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

9 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

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○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○

NGO by security incident ratio*

27 Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security in

●●●●●◐○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○
○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○
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*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Map Legend

- ☐ International boundary
- ☐ Administrative boundary
- ☐ Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- — 2
- — 4
- — 6
- — 9

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

SUDAN

ETHIOPIA

Melut

Upper Nile

Malakal

Aweil

Gogrial

Northern Bahrel Ghazal

Unity

Nasir

Western Bahr el Ghazal

Wau

Warrap

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Rumbek

Lakes

Jonglei

Bor

Western Equatoria

Maridi

Central Eq

Juba

Kapoeta

Equatoria

Yambio

Yei

KENYA

Nimule

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

UGANDA

100 km

N

Total security incidents by month

2024

Security incidents by perpetrator

- Criminal (**55%**)
- Community Force (**21%**)
- Government Forces (**15%**)
- OAG (**2%**)
- Others (**8%**)

Total **1,890**

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: Q1 2024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024

NGO incidents by type and quarter

TOTAL Q4 2024 INCIDENTS: **29**

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
	💥	🙌	🏃	🗣️
2024 Q4	3	5	19	2
2024 Q3	5	11	35	1
2024 Q2	7	10	28	5
2024 Q1	13	9	20	3

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: Criminal, Community Force, Government Forces, Others, OAG

## Conflict Activity Hindsight

- The dismissal of General Akol Koor Kuc by President Salva Kiir prompted clashes on 21 November amid a series of changes affecting high-level positions.

- Socio-economic conditions worsened and government introduced new taxes as oil exports – a main source of state revenue – face disruptions linked with the Sudan conflict.

- An amendment to an NGO-related law (NGO Act 2016) underwent parliamentary review following approval by the Council of Ministers.

- Incidents pertaining to intercommunal violence rose by nearly 20% this quarter, with fatalities also increasing proportionally, with nearly 300 killed.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGOs were not directly affected during clashes on 21 November however, several organisations limited movements and field presence to mitigate collateral threats.

- The sole NGO staff fatality this quarter occurred when individual criminals shot and killed an NGO staff member during a robbery.

- The proposals have sparked concerns that NGOs will face increased bureaucratic impediments and coordination challenges with state and national authorities.

- Communal violence disrupted access, including the 72-hour closure of the Juba-Bor Road following a cattle raid, and drove collateral threats to NGO staff and facilities.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Discussions around transitional arrangements and elections will remain sources of tension that could drive unrest and related impediments to programming.

- Criminal activity will likely continue to impact NGOs with a sustained risk of violence; this should be incorporated into criticality assessments prior to staff deployment.

- If passed, the changes to the NGO Act may impose additional regulatory requirements, potentially impacting humanitarian operations and funding approvals.

- ICV is expected to remain a major security concern, with risks of further road closures, movement restrictions, and increased humanitarian access constraints.

INSO

Syria

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Legend

- □ International boundary
- ⣿ Administrative boundary
- ▭ Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- — 1
- — 3
- — 5
- — 7

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

TURKEY

Aleppo
Al Hasakah
Ar Raqqah
Al Ladhiqiyah
Hamah
Dayr az Zawr
Tartus
Hims
IRAQ
Tadmur
Abu Kamal
Ad Nabk
LEBANON
Damascus
Rural Damascus
Al Qunaytirah
JORDAN

100 km

N

Total NGO incidents in 2024		**80**
Killed		**4**
Injured		**12**
Abducted		**0**

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

14 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

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NGO by security incident ratio*

3 Humanitarian incidents out of every **500** security inc

◑○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○
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
*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month

2024

Security incidents by perpetrator

- Government Forces (**40%**)
- OAG (**16%**)
- Criminal (**14%**)
- Foreign Government Forces (**12%**)
- Community Force (**4%**)
- Others (**14%**)

Total
15,237

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

Legend: Q1 2024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024

Areas (x-axis): Aleppo, Idleb, Lattakia, Ar-Raqqa, Al-Hasakeh, Dar'a, Hama, Homs, Rural Damascus, As-Sweida

NGO incidents by type and quarter

TOTAL Q4 2024 INCIDENTS: **22**

Donut segments: 10, 6, 4, 2

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2024 Q4	10	4	6	2
2024 Q3	7	10	8	0
2024 Q2	8	4	4	6
2024 Q1	6	1	4	0

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Legend: Government Forces, OAG, Others, Criminal, Foreign Government Forces, Community Force

Months (x-axis): Jan, Feb, Mar (Q1); Apr, May, Jun (Q2); Jul, Aug, Sep (Q3); Oct, Nov, Dec (Q4) — 2024

## Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Syria saw the fall of Assad's government following an OAG offensive; the aftermath has been marked by the HTS-led Transitional Government's attempt to consolidate control.

- Amid the regime change, the Syrian National Army (an OAG) and the Turkish military launched an offensive against SDF-held territory, capturing Menbij.

- The transitional period continues to be marked by a degree of unrest, which has led to looting and rising levels of serious criminality.

- Following the government collapse, Israel expanded its occupation of the Golan Heights, while notably increasing the number of airstrikes against military facilities.

NGO Incident Insight

- After the temporary evacuation of staff, NGOs returned to Damascus, negotiating new access modalities across Syria with the transitional authorities.

- Increased conflict activity caused disruption of aid programming in Menbij, while a Turkish UAV attack in Kobani resulted in the death of an NGO staff member.

- NGO staff and property were targeted by looters and armed robbers in at least five incidents in Ar-Raqqa, Aleppo and Al-Hasakeh governorates.

- Most IDF attacks have been highly targeted, posing limited threat to NGOs, however in an isolated case, an IDF airstrike in Homs killed NNGO staff.

INSO Operational Foresight

- The government will likely remain moderate and open to various aid programming; NGOs should still prepare contingencies for new gender regulation and OAG infighting.

- SDF's ability to retain control in NES will depend on coalition forces remaining and SDF-HTS negotiations; any US withdrawal may prompt changes in access conditions.

- Pockets of unrest are expected to persist as conflict continues in north and northeastern Syria; NGOs should review site security measures and reassess acceptance.

- HTS is unlikely to confront Israel, although IDF actions sparked protests and illustrate the need for conflict-sensitive programming, especially while political tensions remain high.

INSO

Ukraine
Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

Legend

- □ International boundary
- ⬚ Administrative boundary
- ▭ Humanitarian Incidents

Humanitarian Incidents 2024
- — 1
- — 3
- — 5
- — 7

Total Security Incidents 2024
- 1 - 3
- 3 - 6
- 6 - 9
- 9 - 12
- 12 - 15
- 15 - 20
- 20 - 50
- 50 - 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- Over 200

Total NGO incidents in 2024 — **145**

Killed — **11**

Injured — **27**

Abducted — **0**

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

17 out of every **50** Humanitarian incidents

● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

NGO by security incident ratio*

1 Humanitarian incident out of every **500** security incid...

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month

2024

Security incidents by perpetrator

- Foreign Government Forces (**93**%)
- Government Forces (**7**%)
- Others (**1**%)

Total **72,906**

Security incident volumes by area and quarter

NGO incidents by type and quarter

TOTAL Q4 2024 INCIDENTS: **41**

	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
	💥	🤝	🏃	👥
2024 Q4	30	10	0	1
2024 Q3	38	0	1	2
2024 Q2	28	4	4	0
2024 Q1	21	5	1	0

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Foreign Government Forces ■ Government Forces ■ Others

Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Conflict levels were nearly 50% higher than Q4 2023, despite a 5% drop in security incidents from the previous three months, which had no impact on the security environment.

- Russia's use of short-range combat UAVs, which surged throughout 2024 was at its highest since the beginning of this phase of the conflict in 2022.

- Russia captured a record amount of territory this quarter since 2022, predominantly in Donetska, approaching Pokrovsk and encircling Chasiv Yar City.

- Russia resumed country-wide missile attacks against heating and electricity infrastructure in November, following a lull of three months.

NGO Incident Insight

- The past quarter saw 41 incidents impacting NGOs, with most resulting from Russian attacks and a spike in incidents related to mobilisation.

- A UAV attack against an NGO vehicle during an evacuation caused the sole NGO fatality in Q4; UAV and other frontline risks are pushing NGOs into indirect implementation.

- Frontline shifts led to an increased displacement rate as well as the disruption of routes between Dnipropetrovska and Donetska Oblasts used by humanitarians

- The most impactful missile attack killed 11 civilians and injured 84 in Sumy, while energy disruption affected civilians and NGOs alike in multiple cities, including Kharkiv.

INSO Operational Foresight

- De-escalation is unlikely in the coming quarter despite expectations of Ukraine-Russia negotiations; NGOs will face entrenched risks, particularly near the frontlines.

- There are no indications of an imminent decrease in UAV attacks, and Ukraine's increasing jamming capabilities will not lower the UAV risk to NGOs in the short term.

- Steady Russian advances will likely continue, though without altering the conflict dynamics; NGOs should regularly review their exposure as the frontlines shift.

- While the mild winter reduced the impact attacks on the energy grid, attacks will continue; NGOs must ensure staff do not become complacent regarding air-raid alarms.

NGOs affected by lone vehicle theft

Overall security incidents declined slightly by 5%, with criminal incidents, including theft, remaining the most reported category, comprising nearly 50% of the total. The only NGO-related incident recorded in Q4 was a criminal incident involving an INGO employee who allegedly stole a vehicle belonging to the organisation and drove it to Uganda. The vehicle was recovered in Moroto, Uganda. This incident was among eight theft-related NGO incidents in 2024, reinforcing criminality as the primary risk to NGO operations. While theft remains the dominant threat, the overall direct impact on NGO operations remains relatively low.

Increase in AS operations

Q4 recorded the highest number of Al-Shabaab (AS)-related incidents in 2024, with 19 incidents which surpassed the quarterly average of 16 this year. These incidents resulted in one fatality and 15 injuries, the majority of whom were government forces targeted in attacks on military sites in Mandera, Garissa, and Wajir counties. While AS activity remained concentrated in border regions, the rate of attacks in Q4 suggests a resurgence in operations, particularly against state security positions.

ICV falls due to weather limiting migration patterns

Intercommunal violence declined slightly, with 32 incidents recorded in Q4 compared to 36 in Q3. Turkana County reported the highest number of cases, followed by Laikipia, Samburu, and Baringo-Elgeyo-Marakwet counties. The reduction in conflict is largely attributed to improved pastoral resources due to favourable rainfall patterns, likely leading to lower migratory activity among pastoralist communities, which often fuels tensions.

However, banditry persisted, despite ongoing government security initiatives such as Operation Maliza Uhalifu in the North Rift region. While security forces continue efforts to suppress banditry and cattle rustling, localised violence remains a persistent challenge, particularly in regions with ongoing territorial disputes.

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter

Criminal | OAG | PSC/PMC
Government Forces | Others | Foreign Government Forces
Community Force