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**Human Rights Council**

**Fifty-eighth session**

24 February–4 April 2025

Agenda Item 4

**Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention**

Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran[[1]](#footnote-2)\*

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| *Summary* |
| The present report, submitted to the Human Rights Council pursuant to resolution 55/19, consolidates the findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, with respect to gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity committed in the context of the protests that began on 16 September 2022. In this report, the mission deepened its investigations into patterns of violations and crimes by State authorities, and their evolution in the aftermath of the protests, including impunity and responsibilities, and a roadmap for accountability, justice, truth and reparations. |

I. Introduction

1. This report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 55/19 in which the Council extended the mandate of the Independent International Fact-finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (“the mission”) for a period of one year, to ensure, among others, that the large amount of evidence of human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022, especially with respect to women and children, is fully and effectively documented, verified, consolidated and preserved. The mission interpreted this aspect of its mandate as *inter alia* aimed at supporting accountability efforts, including the pursuit of truth, equality, justice and reparations, for and by victims and their families.

2. This report comprises consolidated findings from the mission’s two years of investigations, including additional information and evidence that established new facts and circumstances of gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity in the context of the protests. To support accountability efforts for victims, the mission submits an accompanying conference room paper (A/HRC/58/CRP.1) containing detailed analysis of its findings, including a roadmap for accountability, truth, equality, justice and other measures to ensure effective redress for victims and survivors, as well as transformative reparations to break the cycle of violence and discrimination.

3. In its resolutions S-35/1 and 55/19, the Council called on the Government of Iran to cooperate fully with the mission, including by granting it unhindered access to the country, and providing information necessary to fulfil its mandate. Since the start of the mandate, the mission sent 36 information requests to the Government. While acknowledging responses to five such letters, the mission regrets that the rest remained unanswered, and that in the responses received, the Government did not provide the underlying information requested. Requests for meetings to discuss substantive issues with Iran’s Permanent Representative in Geneva have not received a positive response. The mission reviewed information made available by the Government including subsequent response to this draft report, and where relevant reflected the factual information contained therein. The mission also reviewed the report of the State-appointed “Special Committee to investigate the 2022 unrest”, published in March 2024 and met with its members on 3 March 2025 and received additional information.

4. The mission expresses its gratitude to victims, witnesses and civil society organisations providing information, who came forward with their experiences despite ever-increasing security risks for them and their families, including well-founded fears of reprisals for cooperating with the mission.

II. Methodology and standard of proof

5. The mission was guided by methodologies and best practices of the United Nations entities and bodies, ensuring a victim-centred approach, with specific attention paid to the gender dimension of the violations and crimes documented. In all its activities, the mission continued to ensure strict adherence to the principles of “do no harm,” independence, impartiality, objectivity, transparency and integrity.[[2]](#footnote-3)

6. In line with UN investigative bodies’ general practice, the mission applied the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard of proof.[[3]](#footnote-4)

7. The mission has thus far collected and preserved over 38,000 evidence items. These include interviews with 285 victims and witnesses and others providing information, as well as information received from credible human rights organizations, forensics and other subject-matter experts, and hundreds of secondary sources to corroborate and contextualize the information gathered.[[4]](#footnote-5)

III. Continuous persecution against women, girls and others supporting human rights

A. Pervasive persecution of women and girls defying the mandatory *hijab*

8. Two and a half years after the protests began in September 2022, women and girls in Iran continue to face systematic discrimination, in law and in practice, that permeates all aspects of their lives, particularly with respect to the enforcement of the mandatory *hijab*.

9. Despite pre-election assurances by the new President, Dr. Masoud Pezeshkian, to ease strict enforcement of mandatory *hijab* laws, State authorities continued to enact and impose new measures to suppress women and girls’ fundamental rights, and continued repression against those expressing solidarity with the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement. The State is increasingly reliant on State-sponsored vigilantism in an apparent effort to enlist businesses and private individuals in *hijab* compliance, portraying it as a civic responsibility. State rhetoric has also shifted towards explaining the refusal of women and girls to wear the mandatory *hijab* as being due to their purported lack of awareness or education.

1. Increased policing and criminal prosecution

10. On 13 April 2024, at the request of the Head of the Judiciary, FARAJA launched the so-called “Noor” plan, emphasizing it would comprise the deployment of police officers countrywide, to “confront women and girls” promoting “social anomalies by appearing without the *hijab*.” In support, on 21 April 2024, Hassan Hassanzadeh, IRGC Commander for Tehran, announced the establishment and deployment of the so-called “ambassadors of kindness,” to monitor compliance in public spaces, including at markets, parks and on public transport. A credible human rights organization reported that, in 2024, at least 618 women were arrested in the context of the “Noor” plan.

11. Pursuant to established patterns, the mission investigated cases of women and girls who were subjected to physical violence during arrests and in detention by the “morality police” for alleged non-compliance. The mission received reports that, though the Vozara facility in Tehran appears to no longer be serving as a detention facility for women and girls allegedly flouting the mandatory *hijab* laws, such women continue to be arrested and detained in police stations operated by the Public Morality Security Police.

12. State authorities, moreover, sought to cement the already existing discriminatory legal framework against women and girls regarding the mandatory *hijab* through the judiciary*.* During the second half of 2024, women were increasingly summoned to appear before Criminal or Revolutionary Courts, including the Ershad Judicial Complex in Tehran. In some cases, they were sentenced, including to flogging, based on evidence referred to as “reports provided by security forces” or “pictures submitted by the police” – reaffirming that women remain frequently monitored and reported on by the State apparatus for non-compliance. Most women were sentenced to pay a fine and, in at least in one case, a woman’s bank account was closed.

13. On 23 November 2024, Roshnak Alishah was lashed 14 times following sentencing by Branch 1907 of the Ershad Judicial Complex for “disturbing public chastity.” Ms. Alishah had been arrested on 3 November 2024 in connection with a video she posted online which showed her, without the mandatory *hijab,* confronting a man on a motorcycle who had assaulted her earlier. More recently, in March 2025, prominent Iranian singer Mehdi Yarrahi was lashed 74 times as part of his sentence in connection with a song he wrote during the protests criticising the mandatory *hijab.* The mission reiterates its previous findings that corporal punishment, such as flogging, constitutes State-sanctioned torture and amounts to a violation of the right to security of the person.

2. The “Hijab and Chastity” Law

14. On 1 December 2024, Iran’s Parliament Spokesperson announced that the “Hijab and Chastity” Law was set to come into force on 13 December 2024. On 14 December 2024, however, the Supreme National Security Council announced that the Law was suspended pending further review. The Law is yet to be signed by the President or officially promulgated. According to information from the Government, there is a “domestic discourse” as to whether the enforcement mechanism for violations of the Law should be penal or civil in nature.

15. The current draft, if adopted, would intensify State control over women’s and girls’ bodily autonomy and infringe upon fundamental rights and freedoms. Women could face up to 10 years in prison and a fine of up to the equivalent of US $12,000 for non-compliance. If their conduct is deemed to amount to “corruption on earth,” as defined under Article 286 of the Islamic Penal Code, they may also face the death penalty.[[5]](#footnote-6) The law would further delegate enhanced enforcement powers to Iran’s security apparatus and to citizens and businesses, while also increasing the use of technology and surveillance.

3. Escalating restrictions of women and girls’ access to fundamental rights

16. Though the “Hijab and Chastity” law has not yet officially passed, measures to implement it have already begun, including within the broader context of the “Noor” plan (above). Such measures include the expansion of existing restrictions on women’s and girls’ access to social and economic rights, and related services, including health, education, employment, banking and public transport. The Government has also continued closing private businesses, including cafes, restaurants and commercial offices, for non-compliance with the mandatory *hijab* rules.

17. In November 2024, the head of the Department of Women and Family at the Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice announced opening a “clinic” targeting teenage girls to undergo “scientific and psychological treatment for *hijab* removal.”

4. Enhanced surveillance

18. The Mission previously documented the far-reaching use of technology by the Government of Iran to restrict freedom of expression. Distinctively, it was used to monitor women’s and girls’ compliance with the mandatory *hijab* and acts of solidarity with the protests. In April 2024, in Tehran and southern Iran, the State resorted to aerial drone surveillance to monitor *hijab* compliance in public spaces. A new facial recognition software was also reportedly installed in April 2024 at the entrance gate of the Amirkabir University in Tehran, to monitor such compliance by women students.

19. The practice of confiscating vehicles from women for alleged violations of the mandatory *hijab* laws also persisted, including through increased reliance on individuals empowered by the State to exercise elements of governmental authority to enforce compliance.

20. For example, the mission obtained a copy of the “Nazer” mobile application, which enables vetted individuals and the police across Iran to report instances of non-compliance by women and girls in private vehicles. In September 2024, “Nazer” was updated to allow for such monitoring of women in ambulances, public transport or taxis. “Nazer” is accessible through the official FARAJA website. Users may add the location, date, time and the license plate number of the vehicle in which the alleged mandatory *hijab* infraction occurred, which then “flags” the vehicle online, alerting the police. It then triggers a text message (in real-time) to the registered owner of the vehicle, warning them that they had been found in violation of the mandatory *hijab* laws, and that their vehicles would be impounded for ignoring these warnings.

5. Eradicating women’s rights initiatives

22. The State also increased efforts to suppress remaining independent women’s initiatives and activism. Human rights defenders were sentenced to lengthy prison sentences for their women’s rights activism, as illustrated in the case of 10 women and one man arrested in Gilan province in September 2023 and sentenced to imprisonment for periods ranging from three to six years, and collectively for 60 years.

23. Golrokh Ebrahimi Irae, a woman human rights defender, has remained in Evin prison for over 30 months, since her arrest in late September 2022. In April 2023, she was sentenced by Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court to seven years in prison and a ban on residing in Tehran, for her support to the protests. In June 2023, Ms. Irae announced that she would not seek a pardon because she believed that she had been arrested and detained solely for her activism.

24. Imprisoned women activists and human rights defenders continue to be implicated in new charges and additional sentencing for pursuing activism while in prison. These include Narges Mohammadi, sentenced in October 2024 to an additional six-months imprisonment in Evin prison, for protesting the execution of Reza Rasaei (see paragraph 33). Ms. Mohammadi was released on medical furlough on 4 December 2024, after her health had significantly deteriorated following denial of medical care on at least nine occasions between September and October 2024.

25. Likewise, Reza Khandan, the husband of prominent human rights defender Nasrin Sotoudeh, was arrested on 23 December 2024 in Tehran and transferred to Evin prison to serve a three-year prison sentence, reduced on appeal, on national security charges, including “propaganda activities against state,” for producing and distributing “no-to-mandatory-*hijab*” pins in 2019.

B. Escalated repression against victims, their families and other groups supporting rights and equality

26. Victims, including those who published information on incidents of blindings sustained during protests, were tracked down by security officers, and repeatedly harassed, intimidated and threatened to not engage in public activities whether relating to their own injuries or those sustained by others.

27. The family of Jina Mahsa Amini was prevented in September 2024, for a second time, from commemorating the death of their daughter. In January 2025, Ms. Amini’s father was charged with “propaganda against the State” by the Revolutionary Court in Saqqez after protesting the death sentence of activist Pakhshan Azizi (paragraph 41).

28. As in 2023, so again during the second anniversary of the protests in 2024, security forces escalated repression against grieving families to silence and prevent them from gathering at gravesites, especially in peak-protest locations and in minority-populated provinces. Family members were arrested during house raids, on their way to or while attending commemoration services, and some were beaten. Others were reported to have been held in unknown locations, in acts amounting to enforced disappearance. Families who publicly advocated for accountability for their loved ones were charged with “propaganda against the State” or “inciting riots” to silence and discredit their demands. Some were denied employment, dismissed from their positions or demoted, leaving families financially struggling and further isolated.

29. The mission also found a pattern of persistent harassment, threats, intimidation, arrests and criminal prosecution against those who expressed support for the protests. These include human rights defenders, journalists, teachers, lawyers, students, trade union leaders, musicians, artists and others.

30. The continuous enforcement of inherently discriminatory laws and policies, along with increased policing and criminal prosecution, reflects the State’s ongoing persecutory conduct aimed at supressing women and girls’ rights to equality. Persecutory acts extend to victims and their families who have been systematically intimidated to remain silent, as well as to those who have acted in solidarity, such as human rights defenders, lawyers and journalists, forcing many to leave Iran (see Section VII). Against this backdrop, the State intensified surveillance, restricted digital space even further and extended its repression beyond Iran’s borders, to silence those who continued to speak up both inside and outside the country (see Sections VII and IX). Together, these actions demonstrate concerted State efforts to stifle dissent, perpetuating a climate of fear and systematic impunity, that deny victims the rights to truth, justice, accountability and reparations (see Section X).

IV. Increased use of death penalty in the aftermath of the protests

31. While the Government has not published comprehensive data in relation to sentencing and executions, credible human rights organizations recorded an escalation of executions in the aftermath of the protests, with between at least 938 to 973 persons recorded as having been executed in 2024. This is a notable, three-fold increase from 2021, the year before the protests.

32. In the months preceding the second anniversary of the protests in September 2024, executions spiked, with 93 individuals executed in August 2024 alone, twice as many as the 45 executions reported in the previous month of July 2024. While the majority of those executed were convicted of drug related offenses, this marked upward trend in executions spiking after the 2022 protests appears to indicate a nexus with the overall repression of dissent in this period. This is in line with the authorities’ longstanding use of the death penalty and executions to instil fear and as a tool of political repression against dissenting voices, including protesters and minorities.

A. Executions and death sentences in the context of the protests

33. At the time of publication, the Government had executed 10 men in relation to the protests. On 6 August 2024, Reza (Gholamreza) Rasaei, a young Kurdish protester of Yeresani faith, was executed in secret, without prior notice to his family or lawyer, and following a trial marred by serious fair trial violations, including a confession obtained under torture. He was sentenced for his alleged role in the murder of an IRGC official on 18 November 2022 during a protest in Sahneh, Kermanshah province.

34. At least 11 men and three women remain at imminent risk of being sentenced to death or executed in the context of the protests. On 12 November 2024, Branch 13 of the Criminal Court in Tehran convicted six young men to death in a group trial for “participation in murder and intentional assault” in connection with the death of Basij agent, Arman Ali-Varadi, in the Ekhbatan neighbourhood, Tehran. The death sentences were imposed amid credible reports of gross fair trial violations, including confessions extracted under torture, and forcing defendants to self-incriminate, including on camera.

35. On 16 May 2024, the mission requested information from the Government regarding the cases of rapper Toomaj Salehi, activist Mahmoud Mehrabi and protester Mojahed Kourkouri, following the death sentences imposed on them. The mission expressed its concerns regarding gross fair trial violations and allegations of confessions obtained under torture used to convict the three men. In its response to the mission, Iran’s High Council for Human Rights refuted allegations of torture and asserted that the defendants had been granted access to a lawyer, without providing the underlying information used to convict them, as requested by the mission.

36. The mission welcomes the subsequent overturning of the death sentences of rapper Toomaj Salehi and activist Mahmoud Mehrabi by the Supreme Court on 22 July and 8 October 2024, respectively. It notes with concern, however, that while Toomaj Salehi was released on 1 December 2024, Mahmoud Mehrabi remains in prison to date two years after his arrest in 2023 for his activism for expressing views critical of the Government and supporting the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement.

37. Alarmingly, on 11 December 2024, following a re-trial, the Revolutionary Court in Ahwaz reimposed the death sentence against Mojahed Kourkouri, even though Iran’s Supreme Court had overturned his sentence earlier that month.

B. Gender impact

38. The use of the death penalty against women activists and women human rights defenders also escalated, particularly following their convictions for national security offenses, including in relation to their activism. This disturbing development, noticeable in the aftermath of the protests, is indicative of growing retaliatory tactics against women for their unabated defiance against Iran’s discriminatory laws and policies.

41. Between July and October 2024 alone, three women activists and human rights defenders were sentenced to death on charges of “armed rebellion against the state” (*baghi*), namely Sharifeh Mohammadi, Pakhshan Azizi and Varisheh Moradi. Ms. Mohammadi was sentenced to death for her previous membership in the “Coordinating Committee to Form Workers’ Organization” which the State linked to the Komala party, considered by it to be a “terrorist” organisation. Ms. Moradi was sentenced on charges of “armed rebellion” through membership of the East Kurdistan Free Women Society which the Government linked to the “Kurdistan Free Life Party,” considered a “terrorist organization” by the State. Ms. Azizi was sentenced for her alleged membership in the “Kurdistan Free Life Party,” as well as for her support to families of those killed during the protests. The women were convicted amidst reports of serious fair trial violations and confessions obtained under torture.

42. On 8 January 2025, Iran’s Supreme Court upheld the death sentence of Ms. Azizi. On 13 February 2025, Branch 2 of the Revolutionary Court in Rasht upheld the death sentence of Ms. Mohammadi, thereby placing her at immediate risk of execution.The case of Ms. Moradi is still pending review before Iran’s Supreme Court.

V. Consolidation of the Mission’s investigations

43. The mission found it important to conduct further investigations into additional geographical areas where the impact on victims was particularly severe, such as emblematic incidents in minority-populated regions, as well as in Tehran, Mazandaran and Alborz provinces. It further investigated patterns of conduct against particular groups, including children, ethnic and religious minorities and LGBTQ+ persons. It also focused on allegations of extra-judicial executions and State-declared “suicides” of protesters. In relation to the use of force, the mission prioritized investigations where security forces used military-grade and other lethal weapons and ammunition.

44. On the basis of new evidence, the mission has to date investigated killings and injuries, arbitrary arrests, torture and ill-treatment, rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence in at least 17 provinces. This reinforced the already robust evidentiary basis gathered in the first mandate, forming the foundation of the mission’s findings of gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity. This section summarises a sample of new emblematic incidents and patterns investigated by the mission.

A. Use of force resulting in deaths and injuries

45. The mission established additional instances of unnecessary and disproportionate use of lethal force by security forces that resulted in killings and injuries of protesters and bystanders, including children, who engaged in protected conduct and did not pose an imminent threat of death or serious injury.[[6]](#footnote-7)

46. The mission has thus far amassed substantial evidence that reaffirms widespread patterns of systematic ocular injuries resulting in blinding of protesters and bystanders in eight provinces. Victims who sustained such injuries were effectively “branded,” as they continue to live with the visible signs of their injuries, and multiple pellets lodged in their heads and bodies, on occasion so deep that doctors are unable to remove them. They still suffer from serious health complications and risk of infection, in addition to acute, chronic or complex psychological trauma.

1. Karaj, Alborz province

47. The mission investigated a key protest on 3 November 2022 in Karaj where at least three protesters were shot and injured with metal pellets. One protester was blinded as a result, while another, a woman, sustained injuries 160 pellets shot into her face and body. The third victim, a woman human rights defender who participated in several protests while wearing the *hijab,* was shot at and injured in her legs while attempting to run away from the site.

48. The mission also conducted further investigations into the case of Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini and Mohammad Mehdi Karami, two protesters who were executed on 7 January 2023, in a summary trial marred by gross fair trial violations, including evidence obtained under torture used to convict them of the killing of Seyyed Ruhollah Ajamian, a Basij officer, at this protest site in Karaj.

49. The mission collected additional information about the killing of the said officer. State media stated that protesters threw stones at Mr. Ajamian, and then kicked, beat, dragged him to the ground and stabbed him multiple times. Witness testimonies indicated that some protesters asked those beating him to “stop” and not “drag him on the ground.” While video footage showed him unconscious on the ground, no blood is visible on his clothes or body that could be indicative of the reported multiple stabbing to his torso that led to his death. Though clearly in the possession of the State, no other evidence that the court relied upon to convict and sentence Mr. Hosseini and Mr. Karami to death was made public, including a forensic report referenced by the Judiciary. Information requests sent by the mission to the Government remained unfulfilled, preventing it from assessing all the evidence in accordance with its methodology.

B. Arbitrary arrests, and torture and ill-treatment in detention

50. New evidence reaffirmed patterns of widespread arrests and detention of women, children and men for their participation in or support to the protests. The mission found that plainclothes agents conducted many of these arrests, before transferring victims to IRGC custody and the Ministry of Intelligence, to both official and unofficial detention facilities.

51. Victims, including children, were subjected to torture and ill-treatment, including beating, flogging and prolonged solitary confinement. Torture and ill-treatment were carried out in unofficial detention facilities operated by the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence, and in the 2-A and 209 security wards of Evin prison, controlled by the same entities.

52. The mission identified a pattern of mock executions of detained protesters, including children, in the custody of the IRGC, the Criminal Investigation Unit of the FARAJA (*Agahi*) and Ministry of Intelligence, in acts amounting to torture. Plainclothes agents wearing surgical masks to conceal their identities arrested protesters and transferred them in civilian vehicles to unofficial detention facilities. To extract confessions, security officers subjected victims to torture and ill-treatment. When victims refused to confess, some were forcibly taken out of their cells, transferred to another detention facility, including in one case, to an official prison, and placed on chairs with nooses around their necks. Two women were subjected to a mock execution at gunpoint, including by a firing squad.

53. The mission also obtained new information in relation to detention conditions in Mahabad (West Azerbaijan) and Tabriz (East Azerbaijan) central prisons. Detainees in both facilities were held in overcrowded and unsanitary cells, with some forced to sleep on the floor or share one bed. In Tabriz central prison, authorities refused to transfer detainees to medical facilities, despite visible pellet injuries and signs of beatings.

C. Rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence

54. The mission established additional cases of sexual violence against women, children and men protesters, including rape, gang rapes, rape with an object, threats of rape and genital electrocution, including against female relatives, intrusive body searches and gender-specific verbal abuse. Such acts were perpetrated during detainees’ transfers to, and in the custody of, the Criminal Investigation Unit of the FARAJA (*Agahi*), IRGC Intelligence and the Ministry of Intelligence.

55. A woman was arrested at a protest site in 2023, beaten severely, including with chains, subjected to two mock executions, raped in the custody of the *Agahi*, and gang-raped by plainclothes agents in an undisclosed location.

56. Security officers, moreover, perpetrated sexual violence against a woman protester immediately after they shot and injured her at a protest site. The victim described that she was assaulted after a plainclothes agent shot, at close range, over 200 metal pellets into her body and genitalia.

D. Protester deaths dismissed by the State as “suicide”

57. The mission collected additional information and evidence in relation to at least six cases where the mission found indicia of extra-judicial executions of protesters, later dismissed by the State as “suicide.” These include three children, namely, Sarina Ismaeilzadeh, Nika Shakarami and Sarina Saiedi, as well and three adults, Atefeh Na’ami, Saman Beyg, and Dr. Aida Rostami.

58. The mission acknowledges the significant challenges in investigating these cases to determine the actual cause(s) and circumstances of the deaths. It expresses serious concern, however, that the State response to these deaths is reminiscent of its handling of other incidents, and the killings of individuals at or near protest sites, and as such, forms part of a systematic pattern to conceal the truth and evade potential responsibility for the deaths. This includes delayed or flawed investigations into the deaths, contradictory State narratives on the cause of death, withholding information such as medical and toxicology reports to attest for a “suicide,” and cases where the mission found indicia of physical violence perpetrated by State agents concomitant to or preceding the death. It also includes credible information from relatives contesting the official narratives on the cause(s) of the deaths, coupled with persistent threats and arrests, denial of commemorative services, criminal charges and sentencing (including to flogging) of family members, for seeking justice for the death of their loved ones. Some of the victims were, moreover, reported to have been monitored by security forces prior to their death, due to their role in supporting the protests, suggesting that they may have been deliberately targeted. Together, these patterns are indicative of State responsibility for the violation of the right to life and denial of justice with respect to the deaths.

E. Ethnic and religious minorities

1. Use of force resulting in killings and injuries

Sistan and Baluchestan

59. The mission deepened its investigations into the “Bloody Friday” protests, an emblematic protest where a credible human rights organization recorded the highest number of casualties (103) in a single day during the protests. It carried out further investigations into other key protests in 2023, all of which took place near religious sites of profound value for the Baluch minority.

“Bloody Friday” protests, 30 September 2022

60. The mission previously found that the use of lethal force by the security force on “Bloody Friday” was generally unnecessary and, in some instances, disproportionate to the alleged threat posed by some of the protesters to public order, and that the tactics and weapons used in responding to what was a generally peaceful assembly, were unlawful and likely the result of discriminatory policies.

61. Further investigations yielded additional evidence of the use of force resulting, *inter alia*, in the killing of a 7-year-old child and worshippers inside the Mosalla. The girl’s death was likely caused by a gas canister that struck her on the head, and is attributable to the security forces, who used tear gas canisters in close proximity – less than 100 meters – from the women’s section. The mission was unable to determine whether worshippers inside the Grand Mosalla were individually targeted by security forces or whether the damage to the religious site was intentional. The mission deems, however, that both the casualties inside and the structural damage were at the very least a foreseeable consequence of an intentional act, due to the nature of the military grade weapons used near the site where worshippers, including children, were known to attend Friday prayers at noon.

Zahedan in the aftermath of “Bloody Friday”

62. Throughout 2023, and in contrast to other parts of the country, protests in Zahedan continued regularly on Fridays after mid-day prayers, with security forces responding with the same levels of violent repression.

63. On 29 September 2023, around 300 protesters, including some 100 boys, gathered near Makki Mosque to commemorate the victims of the “Bloody Friday” events in 2022. Protesters chanted and some threw stones at riot police officers deployed earlier nearby. In response, security forces dressed in black and plainclothes agents positioned near Makki Mosque and nearby streets, shot with shotguns, machine guns, and tear gas, injuring many. Security forces then arrested protesters, including boys as young as 15, *en masse* in front of Makki Mosque.

64. On 20 October 2023, protesters gathered in front of Dar-al-Alum, a prominent Sunni madrasa near Makki Mosque. Security forces used tear gas against the protesters, injuring them, and carried out mass arrests including of children, some as young as eight years. The following day, the Dar-al-Alum school issued a statement condemning the arrests and injuries and noting that security forces had entered the madrasa’s residential complex without presenting the staff with a warrant, searched residences inside and assaulted several teachers, arresting one.

Accountability

65. “Bloody Friday” in Zahedan was a rare incident in that the State took steps to investigate and hold accountable officials responsible for unlawful killings. The Government acknowledged that the shooting of “police forces” resulted in “injuries and loss of life” of worshippers and “by-passers” who did not take part in the “unrest.”[[7]](#footnote-8)

66. The judicial process has been however inadequate, not least due to a lack of transparency. Following investigations, on 21 June 2023, Zahedan’s Military prosecutor, Hossein Ali Mir, confirmed that 15 low-ranking law enforcement personnel had been convicted and sentenced in connection with “Bloody Friday,” and that some had since lodged an appeal.

67. On 13 January 2025, Ali Movahedi-Rad, head of the Sistan and Baluchestan Judiciary, reportedly announced that the charge of “murder” was dropped due to alleged difficulties in identifying the perpetrator(s) and then sentenced some officers to up to 10 years imprisonment and “blood money” payments. State media has not, to date, published additional information on these trials, including the names of the alleged perpetrators and the charges upon which they had been sentenced to imprisonment. The lack of transparency on the part of the State in relation to this emblematic protest raises serious concerns as to whether State investigations were conducted in good faith, and whether accountability measures were truly meaningful. The mission’s investigations also confirmed that some victims and families were threatened to remain silent and to accept “blood money.”

68. The mission obtained no information indicating that investigations were initiated in relation to the protests on 29 September or 20 October 2023.

69. The mission acknowledges the security concerns in Iran’s border provinces, and the history of armed movements in Sistan and Baluchestan, with at least two documented clashes, during the reporting period alone, between security forces and armed groups resulting in deaths of officials.

70. The mission emphasizes, however, that, while it is plausible that armed elements might have been present on 30 September 2022, particularly in the evening, the protest was largely peaceful and driven by long-standing unaddressed grievances rooted in decades-long structural discrimination against minorities. This is also evidenced by the disproportionately high number of child victims in Zahedan in 2022 and again in 2023. Evidence of injuries during the “Bloody Friday” anniversary, including to children, as well as near the Dar-Al-Alum madrasa a year later, is further indicative of the recurrent unnecessary and disproportionate use of lethal force by the security forces in Zahedan, including in the context of law enforcement operations in the close vicinity of Sunni mosques.

2. Kermanshah, Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces

71. New evidence reaffirmed that security forces deployed military grade weapons and military equipment in protests in Kurdish-populated provinces more frequently than in central regions, and immediately after protests began, resulting in injuries and killings of protesters. Such weapons included firearms, automatic and semi-automatic assault rifles, including Winchester rifles and AK47, and military grade weapons, including G3 and DShK heavy machine guns. Security forces equally resorted to using shotguns and firearms with ammunition containing metal pellets.

72. The mission reaffirmed that in Saqqez city, FARAJA special forces and IRGC intelligence units deployed military vehicles and shot and injured protesters with firearms on 17 September 2022, the day of Jina Mahsa Amini’s funeral.

73. Witness statements and death certificates obtained by the mission showed additional instances of killings of protesters at or near protest sites in peak protest towns in Kurdish-populated provinces, including Bukan, Mahabad, Sanandaj and Javanroud. In some of these cases, victims were shot dead with firearms.

3. East Azerbaijan province

74. The mission received credible information that a significant number of killings and injuries resulting from the use of lethal force also occurred in East Azerbaijan province, where the Azerbaijani Turk minority primarily resides.

Discriminatory practices in the context of detention and sentencing in minority-populated regions

75. Investigations reaffirmed large-scale arrestscarried out in provinces with ethnic and religious minorities with victims, including children, predominantly held in unofficial detention facilities operated by the IRGC, IRGC intelligence and the Ministry of Intelligence. In East Azerbaijan province, the mission identified two additional unofficial detention facilities, both reportedly operated by the IRGC, where Azerbaijani Turk protesters were held.

76. To extract confessions, minorities were subjected to particularly egregious forms of torture, including waterboarding, sexual violence, being suspended from the ceiling by their arms, forcibly administered unknown substances, and solitary confinement for up to 18 days. In Sistan and Baluchestan, IRGC officials forced detainees to clean the cells with their bare hands and prevented victims from sleeping at night. Security forces also mocked their ethnicity, cultural values and traditional attire, and used dehumanizing and degrading language against them, including calling them “mountain goats” and “animals,” reflective of deep-rooted structural discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities. New evidence also reaffirmed earlier established patterns demonstrating that members of ethnic minorities were charged at a higher rate with and convicted of national security offences by Revolutionary Courts, including for “gathering and colluding to commit crimes against security,” “disrupting public order,” and “propaganda against the system.”

Gender impact

77. Women belonging to ethnic and religious minorities experienced distinct harms that were compounded by pre-existing discrimination and violence against them, both as women, and as minorities. In one case, a woman belonging to one ethnic and religious minority group was arrested during a protest in September 2022 and detained by intelligence officers. During interrogations, intelligence officers mocked her physical appearance, and ridiculed her cultural values, telling her: “You [minority group], it will be better for us if you all die; your entire generation should be destroyed. As a woman belonging to [the minority group], how do you even dare to stand against the State?”

F. LGTBQ+ persons

78. The mission continued to investigate the treatment of LGBTQ+ persons during the protests. Iran remains one of the few countries that imposes the death penalty for consensual same-sex relationships while the criminalization of LGBTQ+ persons has long been considered discriminatory by UN human rights mechanisms. This is further exacerbated by discriminatory public statements by officials, at the highest levels, against LGBTQ+ persons that have been perpetuated over decades.

79. Against this backdrop, LGBTQ+ persons actively took to the streets to support the protests, in solidarity with those protesting for gender equality more broadly, and to spotlight their grievances.

80. In the context of the protests, LGBTQ+ persons were disproportionately affected by virtue of their real or perceived sexual orientation and gender identity. In detention, LGBTQ+ persons were subjected to dehumanising insults, threats and treatment amounting to torture. To extract confessions, victims were also threatened with being outed to their families or communities. LGBTQ+ persons were also prosecuted for various national security offences and threatened in the context of interrogations with prosecution for same-sex relations.

82. Pre-existing discriminatorylaws and policies created a permissive environment for gross human rights violations to be committed against LGBTQ+ persons.The evidence suggests that the State’s actions constituted an intentional campaign to target and suppress LGBTQ+ persons through systematic violence and discrimination in the context of the protests. On this basis, the mission finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that LGBTQ+ persons were specifically targeted in acts amounting to gender persecution. This targeting was based on their real or perceived sexual orientation and gender identity, intersecting with their activism and political beliefs.

VI. Children

83. During the reporting period, the mission deepened its investigation into the situation of children in the context of the protests as a key feature of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement. With students, girls and boys, long at the forefront of protest movements in Iran, State authorities resorted to particularly violent measures to punish children and young people for their pivotal role in the September 2022 protests. These included the use of lethal force that resulted in killings and maiming of children, mass arrests and detention, as well as disappearance, torture and sexual violence against child victims, some as young as seven.

84. Under the Iranian Penal Code, the age of criminal responsibility is linked to the “age of maturity,” which is nine years for girls and 15 years for boys (Art. 147). This renders children particularly vulnerable to violations in detention, as well as to harsh penalties, including for national security offenses for protected conduct. The very low age of criminal responsibility for children is, in and of itself, a clear violation of the rights of the child, under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Iran is a party. The lower age for criminal responsibility for girls, compared to boys, impacts girls adversely, further exacerbating discrimination against them on the grounds of gender and age.

A. Killings and injuries of children

85. The mission previously found and has reaffirmed as credible that between 57 to 68 children were killed in the context of the protests.

86. In resorting to unnecessary and disproportionate use of force, security forces, including IRGC and the police, killed and maimed child protesters and bystanders, predominantly boys, including some as young as seven.

87. The mission found that children were killed by the security forces, after being shot with live ammunition or metal pellets at close range. For example, a 16-year-old boy from Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan, Kumar Daroftadeh, was shot while on his way to watch a football match on 30 October 2022. He had been shot with pellets at close range by plainclothes agents, after he had been targeted for his alleged leading role in the protests. According to credible information, the second fatal shot was fired after he had already fallen to the ground and was begging the agent not to shoot him again.

88. Children were also killed as a result of injuries consistent with severe beatings and blunt force trauma, resulting from multiple blows with batons to children’s heads by security forces, including the IRGC.

B. Arbitrary arrests

89. Children were routinely arrested for their participation in the protests, and beaten, including with batons, punched, kicked and slapped by the security forces holding them. Children were then blindfolded, handcuffed and taken to unofficial facilities operated by the IRGC, Ministry of Intelligence, Basij and the police.

90. Children described harrowing accounts of their experiences during transfers to detention facilities. This included being thrown into ambulances and stomped on, placed in the trunk or on the floor of unmarked civilian cars and transported to detention facilities operated by various security agencies.

C. Detention, torture, sexual violence and enforced disappearance

91. In detention, children were routinely held alongside adults in both official and unofficial facilities, often for weeks at a time, without being informed of the reasons or grounds for their arrest or detention and without access to a lawyer, in some cases amounting to enforced disappearance.

92. New evidence reaffirmed the widespread scale of torture, as well as ill-treatment, including patterns of psychological torture, used against arrested and detained girls and boys in the context of the protests. Particularly concerning were patterns of psychological torture, including mock executions, threats of killings and rape or threats of harm directed at family members aimed at instilling terror and fear. In this context, the mission also established a pattern of solitary confinement of children for up to nine days, in unofficial facilities operated by the IRGC intelligence, Ministry of Intelligence, and the Basij. Judges dismissed reports of torture provided to them by child defendants, refused to challenge the validity of confessions obtained under reported torture, and failed to address visible marks of beatings on children at trial.

D. Trial and sentencing of children

93. The mission established a pattern whereby judicial and detaining authorities routinely circumvented mandated juvenile courts for proceedings involving minors, instead trying children for their participation in the protests before Revolutionary Courts, including for national security offenses.

94. Children were not afforded any form of leniency or sentence mitigation despite their status. Court documents showed that girls and boys as young as 12 were charged with national security offenses for protected conduct, including participating in protests and writing slogans. In one case, in late 2022, a girl was simply arrested for writing slogans in East Azerbaijan province. She was charged and convicted of “propaganda against the state” by a Revolutionary Court and sentenced to one year in prison.

95. According to other credible information, in some cases, children were not provided with a lawyer, even from the list of lawyers approved by the Judiciary. When children were assigned a lawyer, however, it was common for them to advise that children accept the charges and admit guilt, apparently on the understanding that doing so might lead to their release or a commutation of sentence, despite the lasting impact of a criminal conviction on their record.

E. Impact

97. The treatment of children in the context of the protests has had a particularly deleterious effect on them, with many still suffering from physical disability, trauma, depression and other forms of physical and psychological consequences. Experts who spoke with the mission expressed concern about child victims’ limited access to support services, often driven by fear and other barriers, risking enduring and lasting emotional, social, physical, and psychological repercussions, with many suffering from suicidal ideation. In one case, the parents of a child who had sustained injuries from being shot at with live ammunition during a protest, said they were left with no other choice but to tie their son up with a rope every evening to prevent him from committing suicide.

VII. Digital space

98. The digital space has been a critical forum in Iran, enabling people to communicate, organize, express their views, and seek truth and justice. In response, the State has leveraged digital tools to silence dissent, with technology amplifying and extending State control to restrict freedom of expression and association, and to control narratives.

99. Having imposed internet shutdowns during protests and developing its own National Internet Network (NIN), the State continues to restrict the use of mobile applications and engages in widespread surveillance. These tools are not only used to curtail freedom of opinion and expression but also to monitor and target individuals, including activists and journalists, and to intimidate, stifle dissent and silence critical views. Repression thus extends beyond physical spaces, affecting online platforms where many seek to express themselves freely, effectively silencing victims and human rights defenders.

100. Following the protests, the Iranian government intensified cyber surveillance and control. In February 2024, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace banned VPNs and required users to access foreign platforms through state-approved domestic proxies, enabling potential government surveillance. Citizens were also forced to use local apps for essential services, such as banking or education, while a credible report found that some, including the *Bale* app, monitored user activity.

101. Further restrictions included a November 2023 law mandating real-time online activity tracking to analyse social behaviour and prevent “harms,” raising concerns over the right to privacy. The May 2024 "Judicial Transformation and Excellence" Law granted government access to citizens' private data, including banking and SIM card records. In September 2024, authorities deactivated the SIM cards of journalists, activists, and human rights defenders, restricting access to banking and essential services. To regain access, victims were summoned for interrogation by security agencies, including the Cyber Police (FATA) and IRGC Intelligence.

VIII. Displacement

102. Persecutory acts have created a pattern of displacement, preventing victims from living safely in the location of their choice in Iran, or voluntarily returning to their homes from abroad.

A. Internal exile

103. Such punitive measures include sentences of internal exile which in practice result in forcibly relocating victims to serve a prison sentence, or to reside in exile in economically disadvantaged parts of the country, separating them from families and communities. In the context of the protests, activists, human rights defenders, and victims and witnesses of protest-related violence have been sentenced to imprisonment in internal exile by Revolutionary Courts, or to reside in exile in remote areas for up to 21 years. Once exiled, individuals are prohibited from attending gatherings, using the telephone or Internet, and are placed under surveillance by the security forces.

104. The mission finds that, by resorting to internal exile, the State has intentionally displaced individuals based on their dissenting political opinions to a pre-designated location by the Ministry of Intelligence within the country against their will in a manner that is forced in nature, is in violation of the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from one’s home or place of residence amongst others.

B. Inability to remain

105. The mission interviewed numerous victims, witnesses and family members who had fled abroad since 2022. In all the cases investigated, victims were forced to flee owing to threats of violence and coercion, caused by fears of arbitrary arrests, detention, sexual violence, criminal prosecution and sentencing, including the death penalty. For example, the additional deployment in West Azerbaijan province of security forces between October and November 2022 amplified fears of violence and arrests compelling many to leave.

106. Such threats and coercion, combined with the application, or its threat, of ongoing discriminatory laws and policies engendered an environment of palpable fear and duress, which left many with no choice but to leave Iran. Their departure occurred in a context of a coercive environment, such that victims did not have the ability to freely consent to leave, thus rendering their decision to leave forced in nature.

C. Inability to return

107. Victims consistently reported facing immense difficulties in deciding to leave, and their preference to remain with their families and communities and advocate for their rights in Iran. Their decision to leave Iran was not made lightly, as they knew that they would likely not be able to return.

108. Many continue to face consequences of the violations and crimes they endured during the protests. Victims who suffered physical injuries, in particular blinding, continue to bear visible scars. These also inhibit their ability to return due to well-founded fear of persecution, which may occur precisely due to their ‘branding’ or bearing visible physical marks of their support for the protests. Torture and rape survivors continue to bear the physical and psychological consequences of the harms suffered in detention, as they attempt to navigate a new life abroad outside their communities and most often without their families.

IX. Transnational repression

109. Even those who have fled Iran and engage in activism from abroad remain vulnerable to threats, intimidation, and harassment online and offline, as State authorities have extended their repression beyond the borders of Iran. To control the flow of information surrounding the protests, Iranian journalists reporting from abroad as well as human rights defenders and victims who spoke up were particularly targeted. Not only were these claims credible, but they also had significant consequences for their families, with some being detained, interrogated, or subjected to other forms of retaliation, including loss of employment. This extraterritorial threat against people located on the territory of another State resulted in human rights violations, including of freedom of expression, the right to privacy, right to life, and right to be free from torture, in addition to the palpable fear caused by repeated threats, including by proxy when directed against families inside Iran.

110. Following the designation by the Iranian authorities in 2022 of four Persian-speaking media outlets, including BBC Persian, Iran International, Radio Zamaneh and Radio Farda, as “terrorist” organizations, Iranian officials, including senior members of the IRGC, threatened journalists who had engaged in media activity against Iran with “consequences.” These increased threats against journalists and activists abroad further escalated to attempted murders or kidnapping of several journalists affiliated with Iran International, including in the United Kingdom, United States, Europe and countries neighbouring Iran. Since 2022, at least 15 instances of attempted murder or kidnapping were documented in the United Kingdom, reportedly leading to increased security measures and the temporary closure of media offices.

112. Likewise, victims abroad received threatening messages and/or calls from unknown individuals on their personal phones, due to their advocacy and activism in the context of the protests. Such threats were often gendered, accompanied by physical and online defamation campaigns. The nature of the threats, coupled with the persistent pressure on family members inside Iran, indicated that these threats were part of coordinated action against individuals considered critical of the Government of Iran.

113. The mission established a consistent pattern of authorities resorting to systematic repression by proxy on individuals through harassment, arrests and detention of their families who had remained in Iran. Victims were thus forced to cut contact with relatives in Iran, including by blocking some on social media, to ensure their safety. Victims abroad also described experiencing profound fear and anxiety.

X. Accountability

A. Impunity

114. The mission’s investigations yielded scarce verifiable information regarding accountability measures at the domestic level. The mission was informed by the “Special Committee on the 2022 unrests” that “621 judicial cases have been filed against law-enforcement officials […] [o]f which 563 cases have culminated in judicial rulings”, including the payment of 7400 billion toman. However, the Committee neither provided a detailed breakdown of the number of criminal convictions or acquittals, administrative measures, and compensation paid to victims, nor did it give details on the underlying human rights violations adjudicated. The mission also has not received any of the supporting material to be able to fully verify the Special Committee’s assertions. The Government has also communicated to the mission that the Ministry of Interior has promulgated a new directive establishing a “Permanent Commission for Redress” and a protocol for compensating damages arising from “security-related” incidents this year, without providing further information regarding the scope of its mandate.

115. For the few victims who pursued legal action, judicial authorities delayed or dismissed complaints, despite receiving medical reports attesting to their injuries or video footage of the underlying incidents. When victims reported having been injured by plainclothes agents, judges dismissed complaints on the ground of difficulties in identifying the alleged perpetrator(s) and pressured them to accept “blood money.” Other cases, including that of Jina Mahsa Amini, have been stalled for more than two years, without effective judicial proceedings. Families, victims and their lawyers have been and are relentlessly harassed, detained, prosecuted and otherwise punished for seeking accountability.

116. Although at least two official military personnel accused of killing two protesters were convicted of murder and sentenced to death through *quesas* (“retribution”), and some 15 low-ranking security officials were tried in the context of the “Bloody Friday” incident. In the absence of publicly available information about the proceedings, such trials do not appear to represent an effective remedy for victims, nor do they effectively guarantee non-repetition.

117. It is thus imperative that comprehensive accountability measures continue to be pursued in Iran, and in their absence, outside the country, in accordance with the expectations of many victims and survivors.

118. In November 2024, the mission held consultations with victims and their families on their understanding of justice, truth and reparations, to ensure that its recommendations regarding accountability measures were reflective of victims’ expectations, including those of women, children, and minorities. Victims and survivors expressed their expectations for comprehensive accountability measures that include truth, justice, transformative reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence by the State. In its accompanying conference room paper, the mission has prepared a roadmap for justice and accountability for the international community and other stakeholders in this collective endeavour, including proposals for prosecutions, domestic legal reforms, and the establishment of a victims' fund.

B. Findings

119. During its second mandate, the mission significantly strengthened its evidence underpinning the findings in its previous reports. The mission thus reaffirms that the Iranian authorities committed gross human rights violations in the context of the protests, many of which amount to the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance and other inhumane acts, committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian population, namely women, girls and others expressing support for human rights, including ethnic and religious minorities, and LGBTQ+ persons.

120. Additional investigations further reaffirmed the disproportionate impact of these crimes against humanity on children, who were among those at the forefront of the protests. Contrary to Iran’s obligations to respect the “best interests of the child,” authorities did not differentiate between child protesters and adults, subjecting them to harsh treatment in the streets, in detention and within judicial institutions. As a result, children suffered unfathomable harm, the impact of which may be transgenerational.

121. The mission also found that ethnic and religious minorities, in particular Kurds and Baluchis, as well as LGBTQ+ persons, were victims of crimes against humanity and affected as separate persecuted groups. As part of the targeted civilian population, the mission found that the authorities acted with aggravated discriminatory intent against Kurdish and Baluchi minorities as well as LGBTQ+ persons, for their participation and support to the protests. Considering decades-long deep-rooted structural and institutional discrimination and marginalisation of these groups, the State created a permissive environment for such criminal conduct.

122. While the protests have subsided, persecutory conduct has taken on more insidious forms such as death sentences and executions, arbitrary detention, including following grossly unfair trials, judicial and physical harassment and threats and intimidation. The mission finds that persecutory conduct on gender grounds continues in the form of on-going repression of women and girls defying the mandatory *hijab* laws, as well as protesters and their families and other groups advocating for accountability, including truth, justice and reparations. The escalating use of the death penalty, especially against women, to intimidate, silence and deter both women and the broader population, from speaking out or taking to the streets again is alarming. Hundreds of protesters who now live with permanent disabilities, including blinding, or face ongoing psychological trauma for their advocacy for equality and rights under the banner of “Woman, Life, Freedom,” remain victims of this persecution.

123. In parallel, and in lieu of addressing the legitimate grievances of the protesters, State authorities have continued to enforce and even expand the scope of discriminatory laws and policies against women and children, and those acting in solidarity with protesters, and to deny victims and survivors truth, justice or reparations. The State apparatus has remained fully mobilised to criminalise acts of defiance or dissent through arbitrary detentions, threats, harassment, increased surveillance and the tightening of civic space, both in Iran, and abroad through transnational repression. Such conduct indicates the continued persecutory intent of the authorities. Given the mission’s earlier findings of crimes against humanity and the continuing nature of some of those crimes, exacerbated by systematic impunity, there is a real risk of recurrence of gross violations of the right to life and other crimes, as documented in the mission’s reports.

C. Responsibility

124. In its reports and findings, the mission detailed the role of different State entities in relation to the violations committed, as well as their failure to take all reasonable, necessary measures to prevent and punish violations. The mission considers that this constitutes a breach of Iran’s international obligations under international treaty and customary law.

125. The mission further expanded its investigation into the roles, structures, and responsibilities of the IRGC, the Basij, the Ministry of Intelligence, the Ministry of Interior, the police (FARAJA), including its special forces, and the “morality police”, the provincial governors, as well as the Judiciary. The findings in relation to the related four areas of investigation, namely the use of force, detention, the role of the judiciary and the mandatory *hijab* enforcement, are detailed in the mission’s conference room paper. Regarding the Judiciary, the mission notes that in certain circumstances, judges incur individual criminal responsibility for their acts. The cases investigated illustrate the instrumental role that some judges have played in the repression of the protests and in upholding and perpetuating a system of persecution. Judges have relied on torture-tainted evidence and issued death sentences in trials marred by flagrant fair trial violations. The judiciary has contributed toward sustaining the policy of the State and the entrenchment of a system of institutionalized and structural discrimination based on gender.

126. In light of their roles and authority within the entities listed above, the heads of those entities bear responsibility.

127. In the context of its preservation mandate, the mission conducted a detailed mapping of the structures of State entities, selected information on which will be included in the conference room paper. The mission also collected and analysed material on the identities and responsibility of alleged perpetrators. This information is included in a confidential list to be handed to the OHCHR High Commissioner at the end of the Mission’s mandate.[[8]](#footnote-9) The Mission notes that it is an investigative not a judicial body. As such, any final determination of criminal responsibility should be made by judicial authorities following proceedings meeting fair trial standards and due process guarantees under international human rights law. Lastly, the mission created profiles of entities, incidents and persons of interest. The mission recommends that the investigation on the structures and the profiles continues, in particular in relation to collecting additional linkage evidence for purposes of legal proceedings.

XI. Conclusion and recommendations

**128. Human rights concerns in the Islamic Republic of Iran are extensive and complex and transcend both the temporal and material scope of the mandate entrusted to this mission by the Human Rights Council.**

**129. The mission reiterates its previous findings with respect to the commission of gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity in the context of the protests, including ongoing persecutory conduct against women and girls and others supporting human rights in the context of the protests. Such conduct includes the use of the death penalty and executions, arbitrary arrests and cases of torture and ill treatment, judicial and other forms of harassment of human rights defenders and related systemic impunity. These serious human rights concerns, coupled with the risk of recurrence of violence against those who continue to express dissent or challenge the State and its policies, make it essential for the Human Rights Council and the international community to continue to be strongly seized of the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.**

**130. The mission reiterates its recommendations from its previous reports, which regrettably have not been implemented to date. It further recommends that, upon completion of the mission’s mandate, the Human Rights Council consider mandating an independent body to follow-up on the mission’s work. Such a body could continue to investigate allegations of serious human rights violations and crimes against humanity in Iran, both past and ongoing, the root causes of such violations and crimes, including structural and systemic discrimination against women, men and children, including on grounds of gender, ethnicity and/or religion and/or political beliefs. This independent body could continue the Mission’s investigation on violations of the right to freedom of expression and association and of assembly, focusing on the harassment of human rights defenders, lawyers, artists, teachers and medical professionals. A focus on equal access to justice and public life should be maintained. Moreover, it should be tasked with monitoring and following up on domestic and international accountability and with continuing the mission’s investigation of the responsibility of alleged perpetrators both State entities and individuals, by documenting, verifying, consolidating and preserving evidence for legal proceedings. This body should have an explicit mandate to cooperate with judicial authorities that comply with international human rights standards and with other legal or quasi-judicial bodies engaged in the protection of victim’s rights, in close consultation with victims, survivors, civil society, UN human rights mechanisms, including the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and other relevant stakeholders.**

1. \* The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline so as to include the most recent information. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. The mission’s terms of reference are available from https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffm-iran/index. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. For the mission’s detailed methodology see A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 30-43. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Idem. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. According to the Government’s response, the reference of Article 286 in the law pertains to establishing centres of corruption and prostitution and bears no relevance to the *hijab*. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. The mission reaffirms its previous findings that security forces were killed and injured and found instances of violence by protesters but concluded that the large majority of protests were peaceful. See also A/HRC/58/CRP.1.  [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. “Summary of the report of the Presidential Committee on the 2022 unrests”, March 2024, p.82-86. “A Collection of Explanatory Reports Regarding the Death of Mahsa Amini and the Recent Riots in Iran”, High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of in Iran, p. 99. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. See also OHCHR publication “Who is responsible?” [↑](#footnote-ref-9)