

**CRISIS ANALYTICS**

**DR CONGO**

# **MONTHLY DISPLACEMENT REPORT**

**June 2023**





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Cover photo: IDP camp in Ituri, eastern DRC. © Mercy Corps.



# I. Methodological approach

## Data collection

The researchers and analysts of the Crisis Analysis Team in the Democratic Republic of Congo (CAT-DRC) collect, triangulate, and analyze information from primary and secondary sources. Each week, researchers conduct interviews with key informants to better understand the events that contribute to the humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC (violent incidents, epidemics, natural disasters, etc.). They analyze their potential impact on humanitarian operations. These interviews take place with local administrative officials, customary representatives, health personnel, representatives of the army and armed groups, as well as humanitarian organizations active in Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Tanganyika and Maniema. The CAT-DRC also uses several secondary sources made available by humanitarian partners (e.g., OCHA, INSO) and the community. All information undergoes a triangulation process before analysis and dissemination. However, the information presented in this report is subject to change at the time of publication due to rapidly changing situations in the region. If you have any comments or information you would like the CAT-DRC to follow up on, please complete a feedback form linked below:

[CAT-DRC feedback form](#)

## Data analysis and report structure

The analyses presented focus on two main themes: (i) population displacement and the status of humanitarian needs coverage; and (ii) humanitarian access in the areas hosting the most displaced in eastern DRC.

### Displacement and humanitarian needs

Analysis of displacement is the first section of this report. This section aims to (i) document and understand new population movements which occurred during the month covered by

this report, and (ii) assess and map humanitarian needs from unassisted displacement that took place in the past four months, including the month under review. Areas with high unassisted displacement are referred to as displacement hotspots.

Both displacement hotspots and new displacements are analyzed at the territory level in the five provinces studied in eastern DRC, and are presented on Map 1. On this map, territories are categorized into class intervals (shown by a graduated colored background) that correspond to the number of households hosted in the territory which have not yet received humanitarian assistance. The number of households used to categorize territories corresponds to the sum of all major displacements, i.e., over 300 households, reported in each territory between **March and June 2023**.

Displacements of over 300 households in June are also illustrated on Map 1, by marking the position of the localities hosting the displaced people. These new displacements are then described in more detail, on a case-by-case basis, with maps showing population movements of departure and reception areas for each of the territories concerned.

### Humanitarian access

Analysis of humanitarian access is the second section of this report. To do this, CAT-DRC categorizes incidents by a humanitarian access score. This score has six levels, from 1 to 6, which describe the severity of security incidents and their impact on humanitarian access. Level 1 corresponds to a situation where the incident does not result in access restrictions. Level 6, the highest level, corresponds to a situation where the incident causes extreme access restrictions. Incidents at levels 4 to 6 are those that severely impact humanitarian access and generally involve ambushes, clashes between armed actors, attacks and looting of villages, and natural disasters. The humanitarian access score allows the CAT-DRC to identify the main hotspots in eastern DRC. For


a given month, analysis of the access scores makes it possible to identify actors who have caused significantly restricted humanitarian access. From one month to the next, this score also allows us to understand the evolution of humanitarian access restrictions in the territories studied.

Given the large number of territories studied in eastern DRC, CAT-DRC has focused its analysis on only those territories with a high concentration of displaced persons. Priority is given to those areas that have recorded the largest number of displaced persons over the last four months (including the month covered by this report) and whose humanitarian needs have not yet been met. These areas with high concentrations of IDPs are typically the ones that should be targeted for humanitarian intervention in the short term. As such, documenting access restrictions to these areas is relevant. Specifically, in this report, the territories included in the humanitarian access analysis are those where the number of displaced/returned persons is greater than the median value (17,435 households) of displacements recorded in all territories over the past four months (see Annex 1).

## II. Displacement and humanitarian needs

### Overview of humanitarian needs

The territories of **Rutshuru** and **Masisi** (North Kivu), **Mahagi** and **Djugu** (Ituri) had the largest number of households that moved and/or returned between **March** and **June 2023**, whose humanitarian needs were not covered by any humanitarian assistance up to the end of **June 2023** (Map 1). In June, **Rutshuru** territory hosted the largest waves of population movements, with **18,765** returnee households and **1,262** newly displaced households. These return movements can be attributed to the relative lull in the security situation in the area, particularly in connection with the presence of the East African Community Regional Forces (EACRF), which have led to a significant reduction in high-impact security incidents.




Map 1. Displacement hotspots in eastern DRC, from March 2022 to June 2023. Displacements in June 2023 are marked by dots. Territories are colored according to the number of households displaced and/or returned in the last four months, and not yet receiving humanitarian assistance. (Source: CAT-DRC)

# Population movements, June 2023

## Ituri

### Mahagi territory

Attacks by CODECO–URDPC combatants on civilians in Mahagi territory displaced **3,900** households in the Logo health zone (1,905 households) and the Rimba health zone (1,995 households). In the Logo health zone, people were displaced from the Adrasi locality to Ndr'ele, Ulyeko, Djpahoy, Lenju, Draju, Kpanyi and Thedeja.<sup>1</sup> In the Rimba health zone, people were displaced from the Avu locality to Peda-centre, Paker-Ari, Ndegue, Djupanyalenge, Zavi, Pamitu, Djuvudo, Terag and Uwilo.<sup>2</sup>




Map 2. Population movements in Mahagi territory, June 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC)

1 ETools, alerte 4793 du 14 juin 2023

2 ETools, alerte 4794 du 14 juin 2023

## Mambasa territory

Following an ADF attack on civilians and the FARDC, **1,667 households** were displaced from the localities of Andukwakwan, Manyá and Pekele (Lolwa health zone) to the locality of Mambasa-centre (Mambasa health zone).<sup>3</sup>



Map 3. Population movements in Mambasa territory, June 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC)

<sup>3</sup> EHtools, alerte 4811 du 25 juin 2023

## Rutshuru Territory

In June, **18,765 households** returned to their places of origin in Rutshuru territory. As in May, this was due to an improvement in conditions following the reduction in M23 militancy. These returns were recorded in two health zones: Birambizo (4,507 households) and Rwanguba (14,258 households). Populations returned from several localities in the Rutshuru health zone (Table 1), as well as from Nakivale, Kisoro and Chaka in Uganda.<sup>4,5,6,7</sup>

Origin		Households	Destination	
Health Zone (Territory)	Localities		Health Zone	Localities
Rutshuru	Mweso	4 507	Birambizo	Bukombo 1
	Nyanzale			Bukombo 2
	Kikuku			Kazumba
	Kabizo			Kazuba
	Katsiru			Gashavu
	Mashango			Kavumu, Shonyi
	Rutshuru-centre, Kiwanja	8 382	Rwanguba	Nyarukwangara, Kakondo Shinda
	Rutshuru-centre Kiwanja	1 730		Mutabo, Katundwe, Chandago
	Rutshuru-centre Kiwanja	4 146		Kitivita, Kavira, Kabaya, Munanira, Bushisha, Butaro

Table 1. Number of households returned in the different health zones of Rutshuru territory.

4 EHtools, alerte 4786 du 01 juin 2023


5 EHtools, alerte 4785 du 01 juin 2023

6 EHtools, alerte 4784 du 01 juin 2023

7 EHtools, alerte 4808 du 24 juin 2023



However, a further **1,262 households** were reportedly displaced to the localities of Mulimbi, Lubwe Sud and Bishusha (Bambo health zone). These households came from Rushenge, Rushovu, Katongo, Kihonda, Marrangar, Bungushu and Hohe (also in Bambo health zone) following clashes between the FARDC and the M23.<sup>8</sup>




Map 4. Population movements in Rutshuru territory, June 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC)

<sup>8</sup> EHtools, alerte 4790 du 07 juin 2023

## Masisi territory

The return of **2,741 households** was reported in Masisi territory. Specifically, people have returned to Bihambwe, Mema and Kisuma (Masisi health zone) from Katale, Lushebere, Mutiri and Masisi-centre. These returns follow a relative improvement in security conditions following the reduction in clashes linked to the M23 crisis.<sup>9</sup>




Map 5. Population movements in Masisi territory, June 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC)

<sup>9</sup> EHtools, alerte 4792 du 16 juin 2023

## Lubero territory

Clashes between Mai-Mai Yita and Mai-Mai FPP/AP armed groups in Lubero territory displaced **1,163 households**. These displacements took place from Ngelekeni, Hutwe and Kandile to Kaseghe (Alimongo health zone); from Nkekeni and Kavisa to Kikuvo (Kayna health zone) and Hutwe (Alimbongo health zone).<sup>10,11,12</sup>




10 ETools, alerte 4806 du 20 juin 2023  
 11 ETools, alerte 4809 du 25 juin 2023  
 12 ETools, alerte 4810 du 25 juin 2023

## South Kivu

### Kabare Territory

Nearly **1,055 households** were affected by a fire in Camp Zaire (Kadutu health zone) in the city of Bukavu. These households moved to host families, particularly in the Nkafu district, whose homes were unaffected.<sup>13</sup>

In addition, clashes between the Raia Mutomboki Blaise Lukisa and Mubangu factions led to the displacement of **2,861 households** from the localities of Nkafu, Kabiruhya, Miranda, Kafukiro, Chironge, Chipopo, Nyamuziba, Mushashimu, Kababambwe, Kasimba and Nyamaziba (Kaniola health zone) to the localities of Kaniola (Kaniola health zone) and Mudaka (Miti Murhesa health zone).<sup>14</sup>



Map 7. Population movements in Kabare territory, June 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC)


<sup>13</sup> EHtools, alerte 4795 du 14 juin 2023

<sup>14</sup> EHtools, alerte 4797 du 10 juin 2023



## Shabunda territory

Severe mental health disorders caused by the ongoing conflict in the Batali groupement and the conflict over the management of the Lwindi mining site, near the village of Kabulongo in the Kakole health zone, led to the preventive displacement of **1,032 households** from the Lwindi locality to the Kalabula, Kalonda, Bikenge, Musonga, Kitakita, Nepanepa, Matala, Mutumbi 1 and 2, Wakenge, Kamakungu, Tusonge, Kalomba, Kisanga and Kabulongo localities.<sup>15</sup>



Map 8. Population movements in Shabunda territory, June 2023. (Source: OCHA data/CAT-DRC)

<sup>15</sup> EHtools, alerte 4796 du 15 juin 2023

### III. Humanitarian access

#### Overview of humanitarian access

In **Ituri**, community dialogue initiatives took place in Irumu territory (between members of the Lesse and Bira communities) and in Mahagi territory (between leaders of the Alur community). These peace-seeking initiatives, organized in particular under the supervision of religious leaders, led to a temporary reduction in clashes between the armed groups active in these territories, and to a relative lull in the area. These initiatives reinforce similar actions taken in May during the Aru dialogue, in which CODECO combatants took part. However, in Djugu territory, where the largest number of CODECO combatants are concentrated, the group remains active and community dialogues are limited. Finally, in Mambasa territory, the militancy of the Mazembe Kifiagiyo Mai-Mai has restricted humanitarian access on the RN44, in the south of the territory.

In **North Kivu**, there has been a general improvement in humanitarian access, particularly in Rutshuru, and a decline in clashes with the M23 and in high-impact security incidents, notably attributed to the presence of the EACRF. Although the M23 has not been very active in the Bwisha chiefdom (Rutshuru territory), its members continue to carry out attacks against Wazalendu combatants from several local armed groups in the Tongo chiefdom and Masisi territory. These attacks have hampered humanitarian access, particularly in Bukombo and Tongo (Rutshuru territory) and Bashali Mokoto (Masisi territory). Cases of targeted executions and abductions of civilians by unidentified armed individuals were particularly noted in the Bwito chiefdom. The security situation was also marked by a reconnaissance mission to the Rumangabo pre-cantonment site for M23 combatants, carried out by MONUSCO, the EACRF and the joint verification mechanism. The site was established in May by the EAC presidents.

In **South Kivu** there were reinforcements (largely through forced recruitment) of the ranks of the Gumino-Twirwaneho in the Kigoma, Lemera, Mbalala Nord, Basimuniaka Sud and Bijombo groupements in the Fizi, Mwenga and Uvira highlands, as well as in the Itombwe sector. In addition, because of a leadership dispute over control of the area, clashes between two FDLR factions (Amada and Bonnet) were recorded in the Lulenge sector, in the Kilembwe groupement.

In **Tanganyika**, armed members of the Twa community continued to attack civilian Bantu populations, triggering clashes with the FARDC and the Bantu self-defense armed group known as the Tabwe, particularly in the Moba territory.

In **Maniema**, the situation in June remained broadly similar to that in May, with only slight restrictions to humanitarian access to the province.




Figure 1. Distribution of security incidents according to their humanitarian access score in eastern DRC, May and June 2023. (Source: INSO data/CAT-DRC)

# Humanitarian access in territories with major humanitarian needs

In this section, we present, for each of the provinces monitored, statistics of security incidents that have had a high impact on humanitarian access. Humanitarian access is then analyzed in greater detail in the territories that are displacement hotspots, or rather those that have recorded the highest number of displaced people and returnees over the last four months (March to June), and which have not yet received any assistance.

## Ituri




Figure 2. Security incidents causing high to extreme humanitarian access restrictions in Ituri in June 2023. (Source: INSO data/CAT-DRC).

## Aru territory

With only three security incidents that recorded a high impact on humanitarian access in June, **humanitarian access remained generally good in Aru territory**, as was the case in May. Armed group activity remains low, however the presence of the South Sudanese armed group, the National Salvation Front (NSF) (created in March 2023 but generally not very active) was noted. Its combatants were responsible for three cases of extortion and kidnapping, slightly restricting humanitarian access along the Ingbokolo–Agoroba and Ingbokolo–Kimba routes in the Rumu and Kurumu groupements. Other isolated acts of extortion (15) were carried out by uniden-

tified armed individuals whose main motive was economic predation, targeting traders on roads in the Angilia (Aru–Ingbokolo route), Abedju (Odhumoni–Rogale route) and Kurumu (Ariwara–Kengezi Base and Aru–Kengezi Base routes) groupements, but without causing any major restrictions to humanitarian access.

## Mahagi territory

In June, as in May, **humanitarian access in Mahagi territory improved**. This steady improvement was the result of peace initiatives launched in May as part of the Aru dialogue, and reinforced in June by new community dialogues. These dialogues were initiated by the consortium Action pour la paix et la concorde (APC) and Inter Peace, with the support of local community leaders. Several armed groups, including CODECO, participated in these dialogues and raised awareness of the need to cease hostilities. As a result, these armed groups have reduced their militancy, and few security incidents with a high impact on humanitarian access were recorded in the territory.

In June, there were a total of seven incidents causing restrictions to humanitarian access, six of them caused by CODECO–URDPC militancy. These incidents included three attacks on the FARDC and on civilians, specifically members of the Alur community. These attacks reduced access along the Ngote–Rimba, Akusi–Djumali (Ngote groupement), Ndrele–Jalusene (Jupawualu groupement) and Ndawe–Apala (Apala groupement) routes.

In addition, CODECO–URDPC set up a new position at Zaraa (Jupawualu groupement). It should be noted that two positions were installed in the same groupement in May. The CODECO–URDPC established positions in this groupement because of its proximity to the Walendu Pitsi sector, considered to be CODECO’s base.




## Djugu Territory

With 46 high-impact incidents restricting humanitarian access in June, equivalent to that of May, **humanitarian access restrictions in Djugu territory remained high**. CODECO combatants (ALC, FDBC, URDPC) remained active, causing 90% of the high-impact security incidents recorded. This constant militancy by CODECO factions runs counter to the various peace dialogues held in May and June in Ituri, which recommend that groups cease hostilities. The security situation can be explained by the very high presence of CODECO combatants in Djugu territory, making it more difficult for their leaders to control them.

In June, CODECO-URDPC carried out 12 attacks against both the FARDC and Zaire-FPAC, and against civilian populations. These clashes restricted access to the Lossa-Ndrema, Ng-bavi and Pitso groupements (on the RN27 and the Pitso-Pilo road), Buku (Blukwa Etat-Gbabu, Maze-Rhoo, Largu-Blukwa Etat, Dhedja-Blukwa routes) and the Pimbo groupement (Jina-Djugu road on the RN27). In addition, CODECO-URDPC combatants were responsible for three ambushes against traders on the Maze-Rhoe road in the Buku groupement.

CODECO factions (ALC, FDBC and URDPC) have set up 14 new positions in different localities<sup>16</sup> (map 9) for the purpose of economic predation across the territory.



Map 9. New positions installed by CODECO in Djugu territory in June 2023. (Source: INSO data/CAT-DRC).

<sup>16</sup> CODECO have set up new positions in Abara, Adde, Agrr, Bakonde, Blukwa-Mbi, Dhessa, Kpabu, Lara, Lumbu, Meli, Ndjaza, Salo and Tchunga.

## North Kivu




Figure 3: Security incidents causing high to extreme humanitarian access restrictions in North Kivu in June 2023. (Source: INSO data/CAT-DRC).

### Lubero Territory

Although there was no recorded population displacement in May in Lubero territory, it was one of the territories with the highest number of displaced households between March and June 2023. **Humanitarian access improved slightly in Lubero territory:** security incidents with a high impact on humanitarian access halved between May and June, from 41 to 22. This drop in incidents is the result of the migration of Mai-Mai Mazembe, one of the armed groups most active in Lubero, to Beni territory on the Ituri border to fight the ADF. Incidents in June consisted of three armed clashes which caused restrictions to humanitarian access in the Luongo, Utwe and Luongo groupements (Musienene–Muhangi route). These clashes pitted the FARDC against the Yira Mai-Mai, and the latter against the Front des Patriotes pour la Paix du Peuple/Armée du peuple (FPP/AP Kabindo). There were also high levels of urban crime, particularly in the town of Butembo, in Lubero territory. More than 20 cases of extortion, mainly orchestrated by unidentified armed individuals, were recorded in the communes of Bulengeri, Kitemi, Mususa and Vulamba. In addition, an improvised explosive device (IED) concealed along the roadside with adhesive tape in the commune of Kalemire (Butembo) was dismantled by the police. Although the culprits remain unknown, the practice of laying explosive devices remains highly dangerous if proliferated in public places and on busy main roads.

### Rutshuru Territory

**June saw a remarkable improvement in humanitarian access in Rutshuru territory.** This was illustrated by a 60% drop in security incidents with a high impact on humanitarian access, from 53 to 21 between May and June. This was due to a reduction in clashes between the M23 and the FARDC and other local armed groups, encouraged by the presence of the EACRF in the territory. Improved access and the presence of humanitarian organizations in the territory, including OCHA and UNICEF, Mercy Corps, the Red Cross, World Vision and Solidarités Internationales, continue to motivate people to return to their places of origin.

Incidents in June included five armed clashes between the M23 and Nyatura MC and FDLR combatants, in the Tongo and Bukoma groupements. In addition, six ambushes were reported throughout the territory, with the M23 and Nyatura MC fighting each other. These security incidents hampered humanitarian access on the Bishusha–Tongo, Birambizo–Tongo, Tongo–Mulimbi (Tongo groupement), Kizimba–Bukombo (Bukombo groupement), Kinyandonyi–Karambi (Busanza groupement), Kiwanja–Ishasha (Bukoma groupement) and Bishusha–Katsiru routes south-west of Birambizo and on the RN2 (Rustshuru–Kiwanja).

Furthermore, despite the designation of the Rumangabo military camp (Gisigari groupement) as a pre-cantonment site,<sup>17</sup> no specific action has been taken to initiate this process. The absence of a timetable for the implementation of the site makes it impossible to know when this process will be effective.

### Masisi territory

**Humanitarian access in Masisi territory has improved compared to May.** Incidents with a high impact on humanitarian access almost halved from May (93 incidents) to June

17 Radio Okapi, [Le camp de Rumangabo retenu comme nouveau site de pré-cantonnement du M23](#), 31 May 2023.

(50 incidents). In particular, incidents linked to the M23 crisis decreased considerably. This reduction in clashes is due to the presence in the territory of the EACRF (along the Sake–Kitchanga–Mweso route) made up of Burundian contingents, which act as a buffer force limiting attacks between the M23 and state and non-state armed actors. Favoring a political solution to the M23 crisis, the FARDC rarely engaged in military operations against the M23 over the past two months. This low-key strategy seems to be mirrored by local armed groups. They do however fight to maintain control over their initial positions against M23 attacks.

In June, the M23 carried out 12 attacks against ANCDH, FDLR, Nyatura Kagiri and APCLS combatants. These attacks restricted humanitarian access in the Bashali-Mokoto and Bashali-Kayembe groupements, in Kamur-onza, precisely along the Kalambairo–Burungu route and on the RP1030 provincial road. There were also 13 cases of extortion and ambushes by Nyatura CMC and Kagiri, Mai-Mai Pareco/FF combatants, mainly against traders on the Kitchanga–Mweso and Sake–Kitchanga routes, as well as on the Mushaki–Bihambwe (Matanda groupement) and Rushoga–Ngungu (Muvunyi Karuba groupement). Of these 13 ambushes, two targeted the M23.

In addition, for economic predation and territorial control, factions of Mai-Mai (Kifuafua, Kirikicho and Pareco/FF) clashed with each other and carried out attacks on civilians, restricting humanitarian access in the Ufaman-du I and II groupements.

Nyiragongo territory

Although no new displacements were recorded in Nyiragongo in May, it received the most displaced households between March and June 2023. **Humanitarian access in Nyiragongo territory improved in June**, as security incidents with a high impact on humanitarian access have steadily declined since the deployment of the EACRF to support the territory against M23 militancy. In June, no clashes between armed actors were reported in the territory. However, the M23 set up a barrier at

Mwaro, on the Kibumba–Rugari route, which restricted access to the RN2 and prevented the passage of MONUSCO convoys. The removal of this barrier required the intervention of contingents from the EACRF present in the area.

Humanitarian access in the territory was restricted by five popular demonstrations; on one occasion demonstrators prevented the passage of MONUSCO on the Goma–Kibumba route. In addition, on 30 June, which marked the 63rd anniversary of the DRC’s independence, several demonstrators organized religious ceremonies in front of the MONUSCO base (Katindo district) to pray for the return of peace to the east of the country. These demonstrations restricted access to the University of Goma–Museum section of the road. Finally, displaced persons in the Kanyaruchinya camp expressed their anger at the temporary suspension of humanitarian assistance (Buvira groupement).




Figure 4: Security incidents causing high to extreme humanitarian access restrictions in South Kivu in June 2023. (Source: INSO data/CAT-DRC).


Fizi territory

**Humanitarian access in June remained similar to that in May in Fizi territory**, with an equivalent number of security incidents with a major impact on humanitarian access. In June, there were five clashes between the Mai-Mai Biloze Bishambuke against Gumino-Twirwane-

ho (Makanika faction) and Red-Tabara combatants. These clashes, which took place in the Basimunyaka Sud groupement, restricted access on the Mboko-Hauts Plateaux de Kamombo, Kitshula-Kahila, Kabingo-Kabandja and Kibingo-Milimba routes (south of Minembwe). The FARDC also launched an offensive against the Mai-Mai Muhasha, setting fire to their camp at Mulenga. Three ambushes by Mai-Mai Biloze Bishambuke and Gumino-Twirwaneho were also reported on the Mimbi-  
lo-Monyi (Basimunyaka Sud groupement), Lulimba-Misisi (Basikasilu groupement), and Lubichako-Nyangi (Bahungwe groupement) routes. These ambushes targeted a mining operator, the FARDC and taxi drivers.

In addition, five popular demonstrations were held across the country. The demonstrations were organized to denounce the provincial governor's decision to suspend the mayor of Baraka and to express anger at recurrent police harassment. As a result of the road blockades, humanitarian access was severely restricted on the Ngalula-Ndolo road in Nyangi (Babungwe Sud groupement) and on the RN5, notably in Lusenda, Mboko, Lubumba, Lweba, Baraka and Katanga (Batombwe groupement). An INGO convoy was prevented from passing on the Lusenda-Baraka road.

Figure 5: Security incidents causing high to extreme humanitarian access restrictions in Tanganyika in June 2023.



Source: (INSO data/CAT-DRC)

No displacement hotspots were recorded in Tanganyika province March and June 2023.

**Humanitarian access restrictions remain relatively low throughout the province.** The overall security situation is dominated by urban crime, particularly in Kalemie territory. It was also marked by attacks by armed members of the Twa community against the FARDC and against a new Bantou Tabwa self-defense group in Moba territory, creating severe access restrictions along the Moba-Mpala (at PK4), Moba-Maseba-Kayobwe (at PK55) and Lake Tanganyika coastal routes.

There are no displacement hotspots in Maniema province. **Nine incidents with a high**

## Maniema

**impact on humanitarian access were recorded in the Kabambare territory in June, causing low access restrictions in the province.** The incidents reported are linked in particular to the militancy of the Mai-Mai Malaika (Hercule faction). They have set up a position in Alata (Basumba groupement). In addition, they have imposed illegal taxes at point kilometer 12 (PK 12) south of Kabambare, in the Bahombo groupement.



# Annex 1. Categorization of needs and selection of priority areas for humanitarian access analysis

## Categorization of humanitarian needs

In order to categorize territories according to humanitarian needs, we have represented classes of humanitarian needs using the Sturges formula.<sup>14</sup> For a statistical series of  $n$  values, Sturges proposes the number  $k$  of classes based on the formula [1].

$$k = 1 + 3.3 * \log(n) \text{ formule [1]}$$

where  $\log$  is the base logarithm 10

The class interval  $i$  is then calculated by equation [2].

$$i = \text{formula } \frac{\text{max-min}}{k} \text{ [2]}$$

where  $\text{max}$  and  $\text{min}$  are the maximum and minimum values of the series respectively.

Applying these formulas to the population displacement data series has enabled us to group territories into five classes of 15,200 household intervals, as illustrated in the table below. Territories whose displacement did not reach the threshold of 1,000 households over the last four months (March to June 2023) are grouped in a dedicated class, noted as "< 1,000 households". Table 1. Number of households displaced between January and May 2023. Only movements of more than 1,000 households have been counted.

Table 1. Number of households displaced between March and June 2023. Only territories that recorded at least one displacement of more than 1,000 households were considered. (Source: OCHA/CAT-DRC)

	Province	Territory	Displaced households	Priority
1	Nord-Kivu	Rutshuru	77981	Yes
2	Ituri	Mahagi	57502	Yes
3	Nord-Kivu	Masisi	39476	Yes
4	Ituri	Djugu	35423	Yes
5	Sud-Kivu	Fizi	21661	Yes
6	Nord-Kivu	Goma	18682	Yes
7	Ituri	Aru	18464	Yes
8	Nord-Kivu	Lubero	17435	Yes
9	Nord-Kivu	Walikale	9338	No
10	Sud-Kivu	Kalehe	6781	No

11	Ituri	Irumu	5431	No
12	Sud-Kivu	Shabunda	4994	No
13	Sud-Kivu	Kabare	4833	No
14	Nord-Kivu	Beni	4810	No
15	Ituri	Mambasa	4089	No
Min			4089	
Max			77981	
Median			17435	
Classification K		$1+3,3\log(15)$	4,9 ~ 5 classes	
Classification i		$(\max-\min)/k$	15138,4 ~ 15 200 households	

## Selection of priority areas

The analysis of humanitarian access is done in territories considered to be major displacement hotspots. For a territory to be considered a 'major displacement hotspot', the number of households hosted (and not assisted) in that territory must be greater than or equal to the median value of displacement recorded in all territories during the period considered for analysis. Thus, for the dataset in Table 1, with a median trip size of 13,947 households, the major trip hotspots are those where the number of households displaced is greater than or equal to 13,947. These areas are identified by the column 'priority' and are those for which a humanitarian access analysis has been detailed in this report.

## ACRONYMS & ARMED GROUPS

**ADF** (Allied Democratic Forces) – founded in the 1970s as a Ugandan Islamist group in opposition to the Ugandan government, they fled to the DRC in the 1990s. In April 2019, they declared themselves the Central African Wilaya under the Islamic State. In November 2019, they pledged allegiance to the Islamic State's new leader after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's death.

**APCLS** (Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo) – Formed in 2010 and led by Janvier Karairi, traditionally located in Masisi. The APCLS claim to defend the interests of the Hunde population.

**Banro** (Banro Corporation) – a Cayman Islands-based gold mining company focused on the development of its four projects in the South Kivu and Maniema provinces of the DRC.

**CNRD** (National Council for Renewal and Democracy) – armed dissident group of the FDLR created in 2016.

**CODECO** (Coalition for the Defense of East Congo) – In November 2019, a faction split off and called itself Mai Mai Sambaza. Please refer to information below for the URDPC.

**FARDC** (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) – The official armed forces of the DRC.

**FDLR-FOCA** (short form, FDLR in this report; Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) – Established in 2000 by remaining Interahamwe groups from pre-genocide Rwanda. An ethnically Hutu group traditionally opposed to Tutsis.

**FNL** (National Forces of Liberation) – A Burundian rebel group formed in 1985. Currently allied with the Mai-Mai Yakutumba and the FDLR in South Kivu.

**FRPI** (Patriotic Resistance Front Ituri) – Established in 2002 to support the Lendu-dominated Nationalist Integrationist Front (FNI). Have demobilized in the past and are going through a third demobilization effort.

**Gumino** – A self-defense group claiming to protect the interests of the Banyamulenge in the upper plateau of Uvira and Fizi.

**ICCN** (Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation) – Congolese government department that oversees the protection of national parks in the DRC.

**Mai-Mai Kifuafula** – Established in 2002 by Delphin Mbaena, one of the longest-standing armed groups in the country and established to combat the FDLR. Traditionally Tembo roots and based in South Kivu. Currently in negotiations with the Congolese government for integration into the FARDC and/or PNC.

**Mai-Mai Mazembe** – A collection of self-defense militias established between 2015 and 2016 in response to FDLR abuses against the Nande and Kobo communities in Lubero and Walikale. Control much of southern Lubero.

**Mai-Mai Sambaza** – Breakaway armed group from CODECO due to differences regarding the peace process.

**Mai-Mai Simba** – A group established in 1964 based in Ituri, Haut-Uele and Maniema provinces. They are considered the oldest Congolese armed group. They were established to fight for a Congolese State based on the ideals of the first Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba.

**Mai-Mai UPLC** (Union of Patriots for the Liberation of Congo) – An armed group based in North Kivu, in areas south of Beni and on the road to Butembo.

**MAC** (Mouvement acquis pour le changement) – Led by Mbura Matondi, they can be found in Toto, Walikale in North Kivu.

**MONUSCO** (UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) – The UN mission to the DRC that took over from earlier peacekeeping operations. Has a controversial mandate in the DRC.

**NDC-R** (Ndume Defence of Congo, Renove) – Created by Guidon Shimiray Mwisasa in 2015 and traditionally based in Walikale and southern Lubero. Established to counter the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a Rwandan Hutu group targeting Tutsis in eastern Congo.

**Nyatura CMC** (Coalition of Movements for Change) – An umbrella movement of mostly Nyatura groups and Congolese Hutu militias that may have emerged as local partners to the FDLR.

**Nyatura FPC** – A Congolese Hutu self-defense militia that emerged between 2013 and 2014 under the leadership of Dominique Ndaruhutse (Domi) and part of the CMC coalition. Traditionally based in Bukombo in Rutshuru.

**PNC** (Congolese National Police) – The national police force of the DRC.

**Raia Mutomboki** – A series of self-defense groups under different leaders traditionally based in Kalehe and Walikale in South Kivu and in Masisi in North Kivu, and existing in opposition to the FDLR.

**Red Tabara** (Resistance for a State of Law) – A Burundian armed group that has been highly active since 2015 in opposition to president Nkurunziza.

**RDF** (Rwanda Democratic Forces) – The official armed forces of the Rwandan government.

**RPRC** (Patriotic Resistance of Eastern Congo) – A coalition of armed groups formed in November 2019 with the Mai-Mai Mazembe, Mai-Mai Simba, Raia Mutomboki, Alliance of Patriots for the Liberation of Congo, and Movement Acquired for Change in Lubero, Rutshuru, Masisi, and Walikale. They are mainly fighting another

coalition of armed groups that includes the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, Nyatura, and National Council for Renewal and Democracy.

**Turarambiwe** – A local self-defense group claiming to protect the interests of the Hutu population against the exactions of the NDC-R in Masisi. Established recently and considered a Nyatura group.

**Twirwaneho** – A Banyamulenge militia based mostly in the high plateau of Fizi. Maintains ties with Ngumino.

**Sokola 1 and Sokola 2** – “Sokola” means “to clean” in Lingala. Sokola 1 and Sokola 2 are two FARDC operations against armed groups. Sokola 1 focuses on the territories of Beni and Lubero. Sokola 2 focuses on the territories on Masisi and Walikale and, in August, also in Rutshuru. They are also present in South Kivu.

**UNPOL** – The United Nations Police

**UPC** (Congolese Patriots Union) – a former militia now political group in Ituri, created in the context of the Ugandan occupation. The initial movement was founded by Thomas Lubanga and supported and mostly composed by the Hema community in the province.

**UPDF** – Uganda People’s Defense Force

**URDPC** – Union of Revolutionaries for the Defense of the Congolese People (a CODECO faction). In his announcement, Ngudjolu presented the URDPC’s three objectives: (1) to defend the DRC against foreign aggression; (2) to guarantee freedom and prosperity on national soil; and (3) to fight for the rule of law.

**ZDF** – Zambian Defense Forces





### **Crisis Analysis Team - DR Congo**

We provide timely, accurate, and inclusive data-based analysis to help teams and programs make informed decisions. We identify, explore, and analyze the linkages between socio-political, economic, and cultural dynamics in crisis and conflict areas of eastern DRC. Our goal is to inform the humanitarian and development community on how to better adapt programming to the needs of the population.

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