



Security Council

Distr.: General
1 December 2022

Original: English

Letter dated 28 November 2022 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2633 (2022) have the honour to transmit herewith the interim report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 18 of the resolution.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan on 4 November 2022 and was considered by the Committee on 18 November.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the interim report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Michael **Gibb**
Coordinator
Panel of Experts on South Sudan

(Signed) Mayank **Bubna**
Expert

(Signed) Ivonne **Gallegos**
Expert

(Signed) Thato **Ramoeletsi**
Expert

(Signed) Valerie **Yankey-Wayne**
Expert



Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2633 (2022)

Summary

In August 2022, the Government of South Sudan extended the transitional period established under the terms of the 2018 peace agreement by two years, effectively postponing elections until at least December 2024.

Reactions have been mixed. There is understandable relief that, notwithstanding deep political tensions and mistrust within the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity, there remains a political process to preserve and extend. There is dismay that, even after four years, so much of the peace agreement has yet to be realized. And there is suspicion that the extension is aimed only at entrenching the political and economic interests of the elites who have been the agreement's primary beneficiaries to date.

The political process resulting from the 2018 peace agreement, boosted by the formation of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity in February 2020, has navigated several potentially treacherous political crises. A unified senior command structure for the country's security services was agreed, an opposition boycott of the Parliament that had threatened a key pillar of government was resolved, and the first batch of the necessary unified forces eventually graduated, starting in August 2022.

The survival of this political process is, however, explained principally by the lack of palatable alternatives to the elites that comprise the process and whose political and economic interests are largely tied up with its survival.

Even in the context of the tumultuous history of South Sudan, the mere survival of a peace process does not equate to progress. The value of the political process is contingent upon its ability to resolve the numerous economic, security and humanitarian crises facing the vast majority of the population. And in this regard, it is failing. The politics of Juba take place against a backdrop of widespread subnational violence, pervasive human rights abuses, including endemic and systemic conflict-related sexual violence, and humanitarian and economic crises that have combined to leave most of the population reeling from successive and compounding shocks. Millions are displaced, and many key humanitarian indicators, most notably food security, are at their worst levels since the achievement of independence.

The political and peacebuilding process headquartered in Juba has been largely focused on sustaining itself rather than on governing to alleviate these crises. As a result, politicized subnational violence has spread across much of the country's interior, including within areas previously under firm government control. Meanwhile government and opposition forces, defectors and non-signatory armed groups have continued to clash, even as the Government encourages peace.

While some necessary unified forces have graduated, there is no clear plan for their deployment nor any agreement on the middle ranks of their integrated command structure. At present, they appear to be a marginalized addition to the already complex security landscape rather than a single viable national fighting force.

Notwithstanding the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity in Juba, therefore, the social and political fabric of the country continues to fray. Further fragmentation, not unification, is the prevailing force beyond Juba.

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Background	4
A. Mandate and travel	4
B. Cooperation with international organizations and other stakeholders	4
C. Methodology	5
II. Two more years of transition	5
A. Mixed reactions to the extension of the transitional period	5
B. Non-signatories reject the extension but remain fragmented	6
C. Necessary unified forces graduated but not deployed	7
III. Widespread subnational violence	8
A. Violence in Tonj North	8
B. Extrajudicial executions in Mayom	9
C. Violence and instability in Upper Nile	11
IV. Compounding humanitarian crises	12
A. Floods and food insecurity	12
B. Subnational violence undermines food security	13
C. Food procurement for the military	14
V. Accountability for serious abuses remains limited	14
A. Killings in Kajo Kaji	15
B. Military tribunal in Yei	16
VI. Regional and international engagement	17
A. Regional security cooperation and training	17
B. International engagement	18
VII. Fragmented public finances	18
VIII. Conclusion	20
IX. Recommendations	20
Annexes*	21

* Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Background

A. Mandate and travel

1. By its resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council imposed a sanctions regime targeting individuals and entities contributing to the conflict in South Sudan and established a sanctions committee (the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan). The Committee designated six individuals for targeted sanctions on 1 July 2015. With the adoption of its resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), the Council imposed an arms embargo on the territory of South Sudan and added two individuals to the list of designated individuals. On 28 May 2022, with the adoption of its resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#), the Council renewed the sanctions regime until 31 May 2023.

2. By its resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#), the Security Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan until 1 July 2023 so that it might provide information and analysis in support of the work of the Committee, including as relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities who might be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 11 of resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#).

3. On 22 June 2022, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, appointed the five members of the Panel (see [S/2022/508](#)).

4. During the reporting period, the Panel travelled twice to South Sudan, as well as to Kenya, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates.

B. Cooperation with international organizations and other stakeholders

5. While the Panel operates independently of United Nations agencies and institutions, it wishes to express its gratitude to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and other United Nations staff, including in New York.

6. During its visit to South Sudan, the Panel requested meetings with eight institutions and ministries within the Government of South Sudan but received only one reply. The Panel was able to speak with the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations and the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs, as well as informally with senior figures within the South Sudan People's Defence Forces, members of the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly and other government officials.

7. In paragraph 17 of its resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#), the Security Council emphasized the importance of the Panel consulting with concerned Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations and UNMISS.

8. The Panel was able to consult extensively with United Nations bodies and agencies in South Sudan and elsewhere. It also consulted with most of the security mechanisms established under the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.

9. The Panel sent multiple requests to regional and other Member States for meetings and was able to meet with representatives of the Governments of Uganda and the United Arab Emirates in their respective capitals.

10. The Panel also sent 27 official letters to the Government of South Sudan, regional Member States and other individuals and entities, to which it received 15 substantive responses prior to drafting the present interim report. The responses subsequently received by the Panel are included in the annexes to the present report.

C. Methodology

11. The present report was prepared on the basis of the Panel's research and investigations. The Panel conducted numerous interviews to compile a body of credible information, obtained from a wide range of sources, and reviewed documentation made available by individuals, commercial entities, confidential sources and the Government. In addition, the Panel drew on its earlier work, including previous public and confidential reports to the Security Council and the Committee.

12. The Panel followed the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 (S/2006/997). The Panel has corroborated the information contained in the present report using multiple independent sources to meet the appropriate evidentiary standards.

13. The Panel conducted its research with the greatest transparency possible, while giving priority to confidentiality where necessary.

II. Two more years of transition

14. With elections and the end of the transitional period fast approaching, a two-year extension has preserved the ongoing political process while raising questions about the Government's capacity and will to accelerate the implementation of the peace agreement.

A. Mixed reactions to the extension of the transitional period

15. On 4 August 2022, the President, Salva Kiir Mayardit, announced a two-year extension of the transitional period established under the terms of the 2018 peace agreement,¹ with an accompanying road map outlining a new timetable for the implementation of its numerous outstanding provisions.²

16. The extension was endorsed by all parties to the agreement, although some dissenting voices, such as the National Democratic Movement, labelled the extension "cynical".³ Other opposition groups and civil society coalitions complained that consultations had been inadequate,⁴ while a public perception survey conducted in three States revealed doubts over the ability and willingness of the Government to achieve additional progress during the additional two-year period.⁵

17. Some procedural progress has, however, been made in the wake of the extension. On 24 October 2022, for example, Parliament passed the constitution-making process bill, which will provide a legal framework for guiding the development of a permanent constitution.⁶

¹ The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, signed in September 2018, originally included provisions for an eight-month pre-transitional period followed by a 36-month transitional period (chap. 1.1.2). The transitional period eventually started in February 2020, with the formation of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity.

² See annex 1.

³ See annex 2.

⁴ See annexes 3 and 4. See also Eye Radio, "Peace parties implemented 27% of R-ARCSS in 3 years, will 70% be in 2 years?", 12 August 2022, available at www.eyeradio.org/peace-parties-implemented-27-of-r-arcss-in-3-years-will-70-be-in-2-years.

⁵ Reports obtained from international observers in Warrap, Lakes and Eastern Equatoria States.

⁶ Interviews with Members of Parliament, September and October 2022.

18. In addition, officials engaged in the political process have financial incentives for extending the current arrangement. The country's finances are increasingly dedicated to running the Government rather than delivering services. During the first half of the 2021/22 financial year, approximately 80 per cent of on-budget expenditure was devoted to public administration and the security sector.⁷ Members of Parliament each receive payments that are approximately three hundred times the amount received by the average soldier.⁸ The total cost of an additional annual health-care allowance of \$15,000 per Member of Parliament is twice the amount spent on the Ministry of Health during the first half of the 2021/22 financial year.⁹

B. Non-signatories reject the extension but remain fragmented

19. Non-signatory armed groups unanimously rejected the extension of the transitional period. The National Salvation Front described the extension as an “illegal” attempt to maintain power and the status quo,¹⁰ while the “Like-minded Stakeholders for a New Political Dispensation in South Sudan”, which includes South Sudan United Front/Army sanctioned individual General Paul Malong Awan Anei (SSi.008), “categorically and unequivocally” rejected the extension.¹¹

20. Notwithstanding calls for peace, fighting between the National Salvation Front and government forces has continued in southern Central Equatoria, while government forces have detained perceived Malong supporters in western and northern Bahr el-Ghazal in several operations since June 2022.¹²

21. Since the announcement of the extension, non-signatory armed groups have increased their efforts to forge a broader alliance and maintain their relevance, including by meeting with other opposition figures, such as the leader of the South Sudan People's Movement/Army, Stephen Buay Rolnyang, and sanctioned individual Simon Gatwech Dual (SSi.002) of the Kit-Gwang group.¹³ A national consensus forum has proposed fresh round-table discussions,¹⁴ while the National Salvation Front has rejected a proposal for a unified military front and command structure proposed by Mr. Buay.¹⁵

22. Further to talks organized by the Community of Sant'Egidio in Rome, in October 2022, six opposition groups reorganized themselves as the Non-Signatory South Sudanese Opposition Groups¹⁶ and held consultations with troika envoys, as well as with representatives of the European Union and the Vatican and Sant'Egidio leadership.¹⁷

⁷ Expenditure reports prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Planning, covering the period from July to December 2021, on file with the Panel. The above figure combines spending on security, rule of law (including the police), economic functions and public administration.

⁸ Approved budget for the 2022/23 financial year.

⁹ Expenditure reports produced by the Ministry of Finance and Planning on file with the Panel.

¹⁰ See annex 5.

¹¹ See annex 6.

¹² Reports from international observers obtained by the Panel.

¹³ Statements on file with the Panel.

¹⁴ Sudans Post, “Gen. Cirilo, Gen. Malong and Gen. Pagan reunites under one umbrella”, 26 October 2022. Available at www.sudanspost.com/gen-cirilo-gen-malong-gen-pagan-reunites-under-one-umbrella.

¹⁵ See annexes 7, 8 and 9.

¹⁶ The United Democratic Revolutionary Movement/Army, the National Democratic Movement-Patriotic Front, the National Salvation Front, the South Sudan United Front/Army, the Sudan National Movement for Change and the Real Sudan People's Liberation Movement.

¹⁷ Interviews with senior representatives of non-signatory groups, October 2022; see annexes 10 and 11. Sanctioned individual Paul Malong (SSi.008) applied for, and was granted, a travel exemption to participate in the interviews.

C. Necessary unified forces graduated but not deployed

23. After several delays, on 30 August 2022, an initial contingent of the necessary unified forces graduated in Juba. Additional contingents in Torit, Maridi, Wau¹⁸ and Bor subsequently graduated also.

24. There has been minimal independent verification of official figures, but as of November 2022, some 37,000 to 40,000 necessary unified forces soldiers have graduated from 13 of the 17 training centres, predominantly from the Equatorias and greater Bahr el-Ghazal.¹⁹ The remaining training centres, most of which are located in the Upper Nile region, are expected to contribute additional forces but have been severely affected by conflict, flooding and other logistical challenges.²⁰

25. While some trainees reportedly graduated with sticks rather than weapons, several government officials privately conveyed to the Panel that that had been intended to protest the arms embargo, implying an inability to arm the necessary unified forces rather than reflecting a genuine shortage of arms.²¹ It may also reflect an intention to keep the integrated forces weak relative to their counterparts in the South Sudan People's Defence Forces and other security services.

26. In many cases, Panel investigations indicate that graduates were hastily assembled or even freshly recruited. Forces were moved between training centres to facilitate graduation, leading to confusion over numbers and identities.²² The Minister of Information of Eastern Equatoria State noted, for example, that there were "people at the training centre ready for graduation who did the training and finished but now we have other forces who are coming in who were not even at the training centre and they needed to be graduated".²³

27. Opposition groups are counting on the success of the necessary unified forces, viewing the creation of a single unified national army as crucial for protecting their interests and influence, and they stressed to the Panel that all Forces soldiers had been "technically" graduated by means of the presidential decree on 30 August 2022.²⁴

28. However, it is far from clear whether the Government shares this vision for the necessary unified forces. There is no substantial deployment plan for the graduated forces. Many soldiers were simply ordered to return to their communities after graduation.²⁵ A former officer of the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition told the Panel that "the graduation has not made any difference in my life. I have returned to my usual activities for survival, making charcoal to sell".²⁶ As of October

¹⁸ Interviews with security mechanisms and senior government officials, September and October 2022.

¹⁹ Ibid. As at 4 November 2022. See also annex 12.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Interviews with government and military officials, September and October 2022.

²² Interviews with senior government officials, October 2022. See also Radio Tamazuj, "Torit: Graduation of unified forces postponed again", 13 September 2022, available at <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/torit-graduation-of-unified-forces-postponed-again>.

²³ Sudans Post, "Watchdog 'disappointed' as Eastern Equatoria postpones graduation of peace forces for third time", September 2022. Available at www.sudanspost.com/watchdog-disappointed-as-eastern-equatoria-postpones-graduation-of-peace-forces-for-third-time.

²⁴ Interviews with senior opposition officials, October 2022.

²⁵ Interviews with security sector personnel, government officials and international observers, September and October 2022.

²⁶ Telephone interviews with graduates in Torit, October 2022.

2022, only one batch of around 2,000 graduated necessary unified forces soldiers had been deployed in Warrap State, although not as part of a formal deployment plan.²⁷

29. In effect, the necessary unified forces exists only as a poorly equipped and trained parallel force. Both the South Sudan People's Defence Forces and the National Security Service continue to engage in their own recruitment,²⁸ including of children,²⁹ while some of the most powerful elements of the South Sudan People's Defence Forces, notably the Tiger Battalion, remain outside the process entirely.³⁰

30. The challenges associated with reforming the security sector are evident in payroll data. According to government figures, around 420,000 individuals are on the security sector payroll.³¹ Far from planning to reduce this figure, the Minister of Finance and Planning stressed in his budget speech that the unification of armed forces would increase the security sector wage bill by a further two thirds.³²

III. Widespread subnational violence

31. Subnational violence has persisted between government and opposition forces, including in Unity and Upper Nile States. In recent months, several prominent incidents have underscored the extent to which the Government is struggling to maintain security within areas under its traditional control.

A. Violence in Tonj North

32. On 25 June 2022, armed Dinka youth and government security forces clashed in Rualbet, Tonj North, Warrap State, killing dozens of soldiers, including at least 18 senior military officers.³³ More than 8,000 people were displaced.³⁴ These events carried added significance because Tonj is home to many of the most prominent political and security elites of South Sudan and has historically remained consistently under government control.

33. One local observer described a growing "negative reaction to State presence" in the area over recent years, reflecting growing tensions within the Government's core constituencies outside Juba.³⁵ At a locally organized peace conference held in April

²⁷ Interviews with security sector personnel, government officials and international observers, September and October 2022.

²⁸ See e.g. the reports of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism entitled "Illegal recruitment and training by National Security Service in Tambura County, Western Equatoria State, 26 July 2022" and "Violations of the R-ARCSS and ACoH in Nasir County, Upper Nile State by party signatories, 26 July 2022". Available at <https://ctsamvm.org/ctsamvm-violation-reports>.

²⁹ The recruitment of children in South Sudan has been widely documented and reported by international organizations and both domestic and international civil society. See also the annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/76/871-S/2022/493).

³⁰ Interviews with government and military officials, October 2022.

³¹ Ministry of Finance and Planning, "Preliminary Narrative Report on Utilization of RCF Funds", 12 March 2021. Available at www.mofep-grss.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/LD.-Report-on-Use-of-RCF-Funds-Revised-version-March-27-2.pdf.

³² Minister of Finance and Planning, budget speech for the fiscal year 2022/23, July 2022. Available at <https://3309b9.n3cdn1.secureserver.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Budget-Speech-Latest-02-08-2022-1.pdf>.

³³ See annex 13. See also Eye Radio, "Armed civilians kill dozens of soldiers in Warrap State", 27 June 2022, available at www.eyeradio.org/armed-armed-civilians-kill-dozens-of-soldiers-in-warrap-statecivilians-kill-eighteen-soldiers-in-warrap-state.

³⁴ Number One Citizen, "Over 8,000 people displaced in Tonj", 29 July 2022. Available at <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2022/07/29/over-8000-people-displaced-in-tonj>.

³⁵ Telephone interview with a prominent local Warrap observer, October 2022.

2022, community representatives worried that communal tensions in Tonj were getting “out of hand following the signing of the [Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan]” and the subsequent failure to reach a “consensus on ... [the] selection of people to fill positions at various levels of government”.³⁶ They also expressed concerns over the “involvement of ... some government officials and security officers in fuelling intercommunal conflict through incitement and provision of lethal weapons”.³⁷

34. A disarmament exercise was launched in May 2022 but was soon undermined by tensions and distrust.³⁸ Disarmament forces, including the National Security Service, were accused of bias towards certain communities,³⁹ including by targeting the Awan Parek, with reports emerging of coercion and the arrests of local chiefs.⁴⁰

35. As tensions grew, violent cattle raids eventually culminated in the attack on government forces and, on 25 June 2022, the President, Mr. Kiir, ordered a major military operation in Rualbet.⁴¹ Hundreds of military personnel were deployed from divisions 3, 5 and 11, as well as from Central Equatoria.⁴² In addition, an armed helicopter was reportedly observed in the area.⁴³

36. Despite assurances that the Government would not engage in “collective punishment”,⁴⁴ reports indicate that the deployment led to numerous arbitrary arrests, killings and rapes, including gang rapes of Awan Parek women and minors. Local health-care facilities were commandeered by security forces, and humanitarian access was denied along all roads leading to Rualbet.⁴⁵ As a result, crops were not harvested, leading to concerns over food insecurity in Tonj North into 2023.

37. Mr. Kiir announced the formation of two investigative committees following the conflict in Rualbet. The first, in August 2022, failed to meet its three-week reporting deadline.⁴⁶ The second, comprising a high-level security team from Juba, was sent to “handle the situation itself” and produced a report that has not been made public.⁴⁷

B. Extrajudicial executions in Mayom

38. On 8 August 2022, four men allied to opposition commander Stephen Buay Rolnyang were executed in Kaikang, near Mayom, Unity State. The executions were

³⁶ Official conference summary on file with the Panel.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Radio Tamazuj, “Tonj East community surrenders over 900 illegal guns in disarmament exercise”, 27 May 2022. Available at <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/tonj-east-county-community-surrender-over-900-illegal-guns-in-disarmament-exercise>.

³⁹ Telephone interviews with national and international observers, June to October 2022.

⁴⁰ Ibid; corroborated by reports obtained by the Panel. See also annexes 14, 15 and 16.

⁴¹ Sudans Post, “Kiir to ‘punish’ killers of high-ranking military officers, civilians in Tonj”, June 2022. Available at www.sudanspost.com/kiir-to-punish-killers-of-high-ranking-military-officers-civilians-in-tonj.

⁴² Telephone interviews with national and international observers, June to October 2022; corroborated by reports obtained by the Panel. See also Eye Radio, “Top security chiefs vow to restore security in Tonj North”, 3 July 2022, available at www.eyeradio.org/top-security-chiefs-vow-to-restore-security-in-tonj-north.

⁴³ Interviews with national and international observers, September and October 2022.

⁴⁴ Remarks made by the President, Salva Kiir Mayardit, on independence day in South Sudan, 9 July 2022.

⁴⁵ Telephone interviews with national and international observers, June to October 2022; corroborated by reports obtained by the Panel.

⁴⁶ City Review, “President Kiir forms committee to probe Warrap conflicts”, 4 August 2022.

Available at <https://cityreviewss.com/president-kiir-forms-committee-to-probe-warrap-conflicts>.

⁴⁷ As of October 2022. Interview with senior South Sudan People’s Defence Forces officer, October 2022. Statements by the Government on file with the Panel.

carried out by government security forces working with senior State and national government officials. The executions were videotaped and photographed, and the footage was widely distributed.⁴⁸

39. Mayom is a largely Nuer enclave in Unity State that has historically been under government control. Like Mr. Buay, the executed men were all from Mayom and had previously defected from government forces to form the South Sudan People's Movement/Army.⁴⁹

40. On 22 July 2022, in retaliation for South Sudan People's Defence Forces operations targeting the South Sudan People's Movement/Army, forces under the command of Mr. Buay attacked and burned down the Mayom County Commissioner's office, killing the County Commissioner, James Chuol Gatluak Manime, and nearly a dozen members of the government forces.⁵⁰ The County Commissioner was widely reported to be the brother of the National Security Adviser, Tut Kew Gatluak Manime.⁵¹

41. In the days that followed, senior Sudanese officials met with the victim's family in Khartoum and, according to witnesses, promised to capture those behind his killing. A Sudanese delegation also travelled to South Sudan to discuss the incident, meeting with Mr. Kiir and Mr. Gatluak.⁵²

42. Meanwhile, the Governor of Unity State, Joseph Nguen Monytil, and several members of his state government travelled to Mayom⁵³ and addressed a large gathering, promising the "swift and tough punishment" of anyone linked with the South Sudan People's Movement/Army.⁵⁴ In a statement dated 29 July 2022, a South Sudan People's Defence Forces spokesperson in Juba described the participation of the South Sudan People's Defence Forces Mobile Infantry in various operations against the South Sudan People's Movement/Army in Mayom.⁵⁵ The next day, fighters of the South Sudan People's Movement/Army ambushed and destroyed a military convoy transporting military equipment to Mayom, killing several government soldiers.⁵⁶

43. At the same time, officers from the Rapid Support Forces of the Sudan located 11 soldiers of the South Sudan People's Movement/Army that were in hiding in the Sudan.⁵⁷ Seven were killed,⁵⁸ and the remaining four officers, Gatluok Majiok, Nyuon Garang Kuol, Pur Ruop Kuol and Dhoal Barpuoh Tap, were handed over to South Sudanese authorities at the border.⁵⁹

⁴⁸ Videos and photographs on file with the Panel.

⁴⁹ Telephone interviews with senior South Sudan People's Movement/Army members, community members and government officials, May to August 2022. Additional case documents on file with the Panel.

⁵⁰ See annexes 17 and 18.

⁵¹ Eye Radio, "'There will be no revenge,' says grieving Tut Gatluak", 15 July 2022. Available at www.eyeradio.org/there-will-be-no-revenge-says-grieving-tut-gatluak.

⁵² Statement by the Office of the President of South Sudan, 27 July 2022.

⁵³ Statement by the Press Unit of the Office of the Unity State Governor.

⁵⁴ Video and statements released by the Press Unit of the Office of the Unity State Governor.

⁵⁵ See annexes 18 and 19.

⁵⁶ Videos and reports on file with the Panel. See also Sudans Post, "Fighting erupts as gunmen attack army convoy heading to Mayom", 26 July 2022. Available at www.sudanspost.com/fighting-erupts-as-gunmen-attack-army-convoy-heading-to-mayom.

⁵⁷ Interviews conducted with observers and human rights monitors, and reports and videos obtained by the Panel. See annex 20.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ See annex 20. See also Sudan Tribune, "Sudan arrests key rebel officers, hands them to South Sudan", 8 August 2022. Available at <https://sudantribune.com/article262493>.

44. Three of the four men were subsequently executed by firing squad in the presence of South Sudan People's Defence Forces officers and government officials in Kaikang, near Mayom, on 8 August 2022.⁶⁰ Mr. Majiok was burned alive inside a nearby thatched hut.

45. In the aftermath of the executions, the Government of South Sudan opened an investigation into the incident.⁶¹ On 25 August, however, a recommendation by the Council of States to relieve Mr. Monytil of his position as Governor was rejected by the President.⁶² Mr. Monytil told the Panel that the Council's recommendation was unrelated to the executions in Mayom.⁶³

46. Relatives of the executed soldiers have since faced harassment and intimidation in both South Sudan and the Sudan.⁶⁴ The Panel has received and corroborated evidence that the government and security personnel of Unity State abused and detained dozens of individuals, including at least two South Sudanese humanitarian workers and one South Sudanese activist who were perceived to be critical of Mr. Monytil.⁶⁵ At least one local activist was forced to leave the country following death threats and intimidation.⁶⁶ Mr. Monytil denied any involvement in those incidents.⁶⁷

C. Violence and instability in Upper Nile

47. Upper Nile has continued to witness some of the most intense fighting. The violence illustrates how progress towards unification in Juba often belies a deeper fragmentation of groupings and communities across the country's interior.

48. The Government made effective use of the Kit-Gwang faction, formed by the defections of Johnson Olony and Simon Gatwech (SSi.002), to weaken the First Vice-President, Riek Machar, and the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition in Upper Nile.⁶⁸ Soon thereafter, however, the Kit-Gwang faction was itself fragmented when Mr. Olony and Mr. Gatwech split after the Government effectively reneged on its promise to integrate their forces.⁶⁹

49. Violence has since evolved into multiple layered conflicts featuring the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition, Shilluk Agwelek forces aligned with Mr. Olony, pro-Gatwech forces, the White Army, and other armed Nuer groups, including from Unity and Jonglei States.⁷⁰ This mutual fragmentation and weakening likely serves the Government's longer-term interests in enhancing its control of the region.

50. Indiscriminate attacks on civilians have continued, including an attack in September 2022 during which Adidiang, an island on the Nile hosting a large

⁶⁰ Videos and photographs on file with the Panel. See annex 21.

⁶¹ Interview with South Sudan People's Defence Forces spokesperson broadcast on South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, 10 August 2022. Video on file with the Panel.

⁶² Letter from Ministry of Presidential Affairs, dated 25 August 2022, on file with the Panel.

⁶³ See annex 28 for Mr. Monytil's full response to the Panel's enquiries.

⁶⁴ Telephone interviews with confidential sources in Unity State, August 2022.

⁶⁵ Telephone interviews with victims and human rights monitors, as well as State-level officials, August and September 2022. Corroborated by statements and documents obtained by the Panel.

⁶⁶ Interviews with human rights activist, September and October 2022.

⁶⁷ See annex 28.

⁶⁸ See the Panel's final report for 2022 ([S/2022/359](#)).

⁶⁹ Interviews with government and opposition representatives and international observers, August to October 2022.

⁷⁰ Telephone interviews with security personnel, community leaders, opposition leaders and confidential sources, September 2022.

displaced population, was set on fire, leading to the destruction of humanitarian structures and deaths.⁷¹ Rival militia have traded blame for the attack, with Gatwech denying responsibility to the Panel.⁷²

51. In addition, violence spread into Fashoda County in October 2022, and the unpredictable fighting and the changing control of ports and checkpoints have made the corridor along the Nile River highly unstable.⁷³ Meanwhile, security has been heightened in Shilluk villages along the Atar-Malakal-Kodok corridor, further threatening the relationship between Shilluk and Nuer communities.⁷⁴

52. Since the onset of the conflict in Upper Nile and Northern Jonglei, tens of thousands of people have been displaced.⁷⁵ The humanitarian situation in the Malakal Protection of Civilians site has deteriorated significantly, with thousands of displaced persons arriving since early August 2022.⁷⁶

IV. Compounding humanitarian crises

A. Floods and food insecurity

53. South Sudan is currently facing one of the most serious humanitarian crises since its independence. In August 2022, the World Food Programme identified approximately 9 million people in need of humanitarian assistance and 8.3 million, around 72 per cent of the population, who were “severely food-insecure”, the worst figure on record since independence.⁷⁷ Approximately 1.4 million children are expected to be acutely malnourished, with hospital admissions of acutely malnourished children also increasing since 2021.⁷⁸

54. Humanitarians interviewed by the Panel highlighted an emergency caused by multiple compounding factors that have caused the humanitarian situation to deteriorate over many years.⁷⁹ The same populations have now typically been affected on multiple occasions by multiple crises. Aid workers spoke of profound levels of trauma and crowded displacement sites “in which almost no human sound can be heard”.⁸⁰

⁷¹ Telephone interviews with security personnel, human rights observers and community groups in Upper Nile State, September 2022.

⁷² Telephone interview with Simon Gatwech, October 2022.

⁷³ Telephone interviews with security personnel, human rights observers and community groups in Upper Nile State, September 2022.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ See e.g. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan: Flash update on developments in Kodok, Upper Nile”, 11 October 2022. Available at www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/document/south-sudan-flash-update-developments-kodok-upper-nile-11-october.

⁷⁶ Telephone interviews with security personnel, human rights observers and community groups in Upper Nile State, September 2022.

⁷⁷ World Food Programme (WFP) South Sudan, Country Brief, July 2022. See also WFP, “South Sudan: Food assistance suspended as funding dries up and nation faces hungriest year since independence”, 14 June 2022, available at www.wfp.org/stories/south-sudan-food-assistance-suspended-funding-dries-up-and-nation-faces-hungriest-year; and Eye Radio, “UN data: South Sudan’s population falters around 11 million”, 13 July 2022, available at www.eyeradio.org/un-data-south-sudans-population-falters-around-11-million.

⁷⁸ Ibid. See also Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot – September 2022”, 11 Oct 2022, available at www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/infographic/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2022.

⁷⁹ Interviews with humanitarians, October 2022.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

55. Flooding has caused countrywide devastation, with aid agencies assessing that more than 900,000 people have been affected across 9 of the country's 10 States.⁸¹ Flooding has also caused widespread displacement, submerged both agricultural and grazing land and worsened the already substantial logistical difficulties associated with the delivery of aid.

56. Subnational violence has reduced humanitarian access and targeted aid workers. South Sudan remains the most dangerous place in the world for aid workers, with the number killed while on duty up to September 2022 – eight – already exceeding the total of five for all of 2021.⁸² In one incident, armed elements associated with the National Salvation Front abducted 12 local health workers in the greater Yei region in Central Equatoria.⁸³ The health workers, who were involved in administering a vaccination campaign, were accused by the Front of conducting a population census on behalf of the Government.⁸⁴

57. The South Sudanese pound has also depreciated by more than 50 per cent since May 2022, severely affecting the population's purchasing power⁸⁵ while driving up the cost of imports. Since May 2022, food costs have increased at a historically high pace across much of the country.⁸⁶ Furthermore, as government and military salaries have gone unpaid, checkpoints and other impediments to humanitarian access have proliferated, making it still more challenging to deliver aid.⁸⁷

B. Subnational violence undermines food security

58. Subnational violence has continued to displace tens of thousands of civilians, with some suggesting that attacks on civilian populations have been deliberately timed to maximize their impact on food security, for example by displacing populations during the critical planting or harvesting seasons.⁸⁸

59. In April 2022, for instance, the Government embarked on a military campaign against civilians in Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition-controlled areas of Leer County, Unity State, the home of the First Vice-President, Riek Machar. Local county commissioners and their deputies made extensive use of Nuer youth militias

⁸¹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudan Flooding Snapshot No. 2, 11 October 2022, available at www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/infographic/south-sudan-flooding-snapshot-2-october-11-2022. See also International Crisis Group, "Floods, Displacement, and Violence in South Sudan", October 2022, available at <https://southsudan.crisisgroup.org>.

⁸² Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Amidst deteriorating humanitarian situation in South Sudan, violence against civilians and humanitarian workers rises", press release, 30 September 2022. Available at www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/document/press-release-hc-statement-ingo-whh-staff-killed-2022-september-30.

⁸³ Interviews with international observers, human rights activists and civil society representatives, and reports obtained by the Panel, September and October 2022.

⁸⁴ Reports obtained by the Panel.

⁸⁵ Comparison of official rates between May and October 2022.

⁸⁶ Interviews with humanitarian actors, June 2022. See also Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot May 2022, available at www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/infographic/south-sudan-humanitarian-access-snapshot-may-2022; and Cash Working Group, Joint Market Monitoring Initiative findings, 9–15 May 2022, 22 June 2022, available at www.impact-repository.org/document/reach/117f6c2f/SSD-JMMI_Factsheet-May-2022-final2.pdf.

⁸⁷ Interviews with humanitarian actors, June to October 2022.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

from Koch and Mayendit Counties, supported by the South Sudan People's Defence Forces, to attack and displace civilians.⁸⁹

60. With this violence and displacement occurring early in the planting season, local populations missed an entire cultivation cycle, which, combined with subsequent flooding, created pockets of phase 5 (famine) conditions in Leer expected to last until at least mid-2023.⁹⁰

C. Food procurement for the military

61. The Government has, however, procured significant quantities of food for the military.

62. In September 2022, the South Sudan People's Defence Forces received a large shipment of food from Amo Investment Company Limited.⁹¹ Present at the delivery ceremony was Kur Ajing Ater, identified as the Chairperson of the company.⁹² In its final report for 2022 (S/2022/359), the Panel reported on the Government's efforts to finance an off-budget military food procurement deal with Mr. Ater's Amuk Trading and Investment Company Limited through a \$650 million oil-backed loan, which vastly exceeded the \$39 million budgeted for goods and services for the security sector for the entire year. South Sudan People's Defence Forces personnel confirmed to the Panel that those food supplies were for the South Sudan People's Defence Forces rather than the necessary unified forces.⁹³

63. The procurement practices of the army remain subject to limited oversight. While procurement is ostensibly performed by the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs, Mr. Kiir unilaterally created the post of Director for Military Procurement within the South Sudan People's Defence Forces during the unification of the top command structure, allowing the Forces to continue its own independent procurement process.⁹⁴

V. Accountability for serious abuses remains limited

64. On 5 April 2022, Mr. Kiir announced the creation of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing, further to section 5.2 of the peace agreement.⁹⁵ In the months that followed, the Government also announced the formation of investigative

⁸⁹ Reports, pictures, and audio obtained by the Panel. Interviews with local and national politicians, national and international monitors, humanitarians and civil society organizations. April to August 2022. Statement by the Chairperson of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in a technical committee meeting, 25 April 2022.

⁹⁰ Telephone interviews with humanitarians, August to October 2022.

⁹¹ See annex 22.

⁹² South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, news broadcast on file with the Panel. The company is variously presented as Amo, Amou, Amok or Amuk Trading and Investment Company. Documents obtained by the Panel suggest that the company was incorporated in November 2019, shortly after Kur Ajing Ater and Lou for Trading and Investment Company Limited were sanctioned by the United States Department of the Treasury for corruption related to bribery and procurement. A South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation broadcast and Panel interviews also confirm that Kur Ajing Ater is the primary representative of Amo/Amou/Amok/Amuk Trading. See also The Sentry, "Sanctioned South Sudanese Businessmen Are Skirting US Sanctions", October 2021, available at <https://thesentry.org/reports/south-sudanese-skirting-sanctions>.

⁹³ Interview with military official, October 2022.

⁹⁴ Document on file with the Panel.

⁹⁵ Statement by the President, delivered on 5 April 2022, on file with the Panel.

committees following high-profile incidents in Mayom,⁹⁶ Rualbet,⁹⁷ Kajo Kaji,⁹⁸ Leer⁹⁹ and Eastern Equatoria State.¹⁰⁰

65. As of November 2022, the outcomes of those investigations have not been made public, and little progress has been made towards the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan pursuant to chapter 5 of the peace agreement. Several officials and observers have stressed that those accountability initiatives might be primarily focused on rehabilitating the image of the South Sudan People's Defence Forces.¹⁰¹ Several suspected military perpetrators have been placed on medical leave or rotated to other locations.¹⁰²

A. Killings in Kajo Kaji

66. On 26 May 2022, the South Sudan People's Defence Forces rounded up three civilians from Kiri village, near Kajo Kaji, Central Equatoria, walked them a short distance and executed them without trial or questioning.¹⁰³ The killings were likely in retaliation for the earlier death of a soldier in the area.¹⁰⁴ In the hours that followed, the soldiers returned to the village, where they beat locals, confiscated cell phones and detained additional civilians.¹⁰⁵

67. The South Sudan People's Defence Forces initially denied knowledge of the incident.¹⁰⁶ Following the emergence of photographic evidence, however, the Government announced the creation of a fact-finding committee comprising members of various security organs, all with close ties to the Government.¹⁰⁷

⁹⁶ Statement by the Office of the President, dated 12 September 2022.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ The Radio Community, "Committee formed to investigate killing of three civilians in Kajo-Keji", 30 May 2022, available at <https://theradiocommunity.org/committee-forms-to-investigate-killing-of-three-civilians-in-kajo-keji>; and Eye Radio, "Gov. Adil forms committee to investigate Kajo-Keji incident", 2 June 2022, available at www.eyeradio.org/gov-adil-forms-committee-to-investigate-kajo-keji-incident.

⁹⁹ Statement by the Office of the President, dated 15 September 2022. An additional fact-finding committee was formed by the Council of States on 14 October 2022.

¹⁰⁰ Eye Radio, "Kiir to form committee to probe Magwi violence, summons Lobong and others", 14 May 2022, available at www.eyeradio.org/kiir-to-form-committee-to-probe-magwi-violence-summons-lobong-and-others.

¹⁰¹ Interviews with a senior South Sudan People's Defence Forces officer, government official and international observers, October 2022.

¹⁰² Interviews with senior government and military officials and civil society members, October 2022.

¹⁰³ Interviews with local civilians and national and international observers, June 2022. See also Human Rights Watch, "Execution-Style Killings Emblematic of Impunity by South Sudan Army", 1 June 2022, available at www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/01/execution-style-killings-emblematic-impunity-south-sudan-army. See annexes 23, 24, 25 and 26.

¹⁰⁴ Sudans Post, "South Sudan army soldiers murder 3 civilians in gruesome killing in Kajo-Keji", 27 May 2022, available at www.sudanspost.com/south-sudan-army-soldiers-murder-3-civilians-in-gruesome-killing-in-kajo-keji.

¹⁰⁵ Interviews with local civilians and national and international observers, June 2022. See also Human Rights Watch, "Execution-Style Killings Emblematic of Impunity by South Sudan Army", available at www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/01/execution-style-killings-emblematic-impunity-south-sudan-army.

¹⁰⁶ The City Review, "SSPDF 'yet to receive reports on Kajo Keji killings'", 29 May 2022, available at <https://cityreviewss.com/sspdf-yet-to-receive-reports-on-kajo-keji-killings>.

¹⁰⁷ Eye Radio, "SSPDF chief seeks probe over Kajo-Keji killings", 1 June 2022, available at www.eyeradio.org/sspdf-chief-seeks-probe-over-kajo-keji-killings.

68. Local civilians who gave eyewitness testimonies to journalists were harassed by soldiers, with some subsequently fleeing their homes.¹⁰⁸ At least one witness and his family were pursued by South Sudanese security agents in Uganda after the Government had announced the creation of the fact-finding committee.¹⁰⁹ In at least one instance, the witness was forcibly removed from a home in Kampala by South Sudanese agents and threatened with execution.¹¹⁰

69. In September 2022, a local commander implicated in the killings was rotated out of Kajo Kaji.¹¹¹

B. Military tribunal in Yei

70. In March 2022, two soldiers of the South Sudan People's Defence Forces were killed near Abegi, west of Yei town, Central Equatoria, in the course of the Government's clashes with the National Salvation Front. Soon thereafter, a group of soldiers conducted revenge killings, looting, and the rape and torture of civilians in neighbouring villages, leading to significant displacement.¹¹² In response, the Government recalled more than a dozen soldiers to the military barracks in Yei town and announced the detention of 16 soldiers to be tried by military court martial in Yei.¹¹³

71. In April 2022, the South Sudan People's Defence Forces announced delays in the trials and suggested that it would expand the court martial process to include a long backlog of additional cases pending in Yei.¹¹⁴ In the interim, a reconciliation process was hastily convened between the community and the South Sudan People's Defence Forces that, according to some observers, involved the coercion of civilians.¹¹⁵

72. In May 2022, the Government announced that 45 cases dating back as far as 2016 and involving 55 perpetrators, including civilians, would be tried in military courts.¹¹⁶ The trials started in June 2022 and concluded the same month, with several problems reported, including the trial of several civilians in military courts, the

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., “‘We are hunted for speaking to media,’ Kajo-Keji residents”, 4 June 2022, available at www.eyeradio.org/we-are-hunted-for-speaking-to-media-kejo-keji-residents.

¹⁰⁹ Interview of affected persons and other observers in Uganda, September and October 2022. Official investigative report by Ugandan authorities on file with the Panel.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Reports obtained by the Panel. See also Western Equatoria News, “Government installs new garrison commander for Kajo Keji County”, 29 September 2022.

¹¹² Interviews with civil society members and reports from international observers, March to June 2022.

¹¹³ Ibid. See also The City Review, “16 SSPDF officers detained over lootings, killings”, 30 March 2022, available at <https://cityreviewss.com/16-sspdp-officers-detained-over-looting-killings>; and Radio Tamazuj, “About 16 SSPDF officers to face trial over atrocities in Yei”, 11 April 2022, available at www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/about-16-sspdp-officers-to-face-trial-over-atrocities-in-yei.

¹¹⁴ Number One Citizen, “Yei locals urged to report offences committed by soldiers”, 26 April 2022, available at <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2022/04/26/yei-locals-urged-to-report-offences-committed-by-soldiers>; *ibid.*, “Military court adjourned amidst Iftar festival, official”, 30 April 2022, available at <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2022/04/30/military-court-adjourned-amidst-iftar-festival-official>.

¹¹⁵ Interviews with civil society monitors, April 2022.

¹¹⁶ Number One Citizen, “Over 40 to appear before military court martial”, 11 May 2022, available at <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2022/05/11/over-40-to-appear-before-military-court-martial>.

absence of legal representation and translation, and a lack of privacy and protection for victims.¹¹⁷

73. Few soldiers were convicted of violence in Abegi, and there were no investigations into command responsibility.¹¹⁸ All of the convicted soldiers were from low-level ranks, and several were subsequently transferred out of Yei.¹¹⁹

VI. Regional and international engagement

A. Regional security cooperation and training

74. A range of regional security cooperation agreements have deepened the country's ties with neighbouring States. The Panel has documented several regional training programmes as well as the supply of non-lethal military equipment to South Sudanese security forces. In most cases, training appears to have benefited the South Sudan People's Defence Forces, the National Security Service, and police forces that have not been integrated into the necessary unified forces.

75. The Rwanda National Police announced a one-year police senior command and staff course in March 2022, with the intake including police officers from South Sudan.¹²⁰

76. According to the Ministry of Defence of Kenya, several members of the South Sudanese security services graduated from a training course for general services officer cadets organized at the Kenya Military Academy in Nakuru County in March 2022.¹²¹

77. In addition, South Sudanese forces were included in the training of an East African Community standby force, hosted by Uganda, in Jinja, from 27 May to 16 June 2022. The objective of the programme was to train forces to support operations, disaster management, counter-terrorism and counter-piracy.¹²² South Sudan will also contribute a battalion of the South Sudan People's Defence Forces to the regional force deployment of the East African Community in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹²³

78. In August 2022, a delegation of senior South Sudanese security officials travelled to Addis Ababa and signed a security cooperation deal with their Ethiopian counterparts.¹²⁴ On 12 August, sanctioned individual James Koang Chuol (SSi.003) met with senior representatives of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces in Juba and,

¹¹⁷ Interviews with national and international observers, June to October 2022; corroborated by documents obtained by the Panel.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Rwanda National Police website, "Police senior command and staff course students start study tour", 14 March 2022, available at www.police.gov.rw/media-archives/news-detail/news/police-senior-command-and-staff-course-students-start-study-tour.

¹²¹ Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, "President Kenyatta lauds modernization of Kenya's military training", 31 March 2022, available at www.kbc.co.ke/president-kenyatta-lauds-modernization-of-kenyas-military-training. Kenyan Ministry of Defence website, "President Uhuru commissions first batch of graduate general service officers", 1 April 2022, available at <https://mod.go.ke/news/president-uhuru-commissions-first-batch-of-graduate-general-service-officers>.

¹²² Broadcast from Urban TV Uganda on file with the Panel.

¹²³ Panel interviews with government officials, October 2022; corroborated by various broadcasts on file with the Panel.

¹²⁴ South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation news broadcasts, 14 August and 16 August 2022.

in a media interview after the meeting, confirmed that “hundreds of South Sudanese officers and officials” would be trained by the Ethiopian military.¹²⁵

79. Panel interviews and South Sudanese news broadcasts have also confirmed the delivery of two consignments of military equipment from the Sudan in August 2022.¹²⁶ The consignment reportedly included uniforms and other non-lethal equipment intended to support the graduation of the necessary unified forces.¹²⁷

B. International engagement

80. The Government of South Sudan has increased its engagement with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf States. Companies operating from the Gulf are among the most prominent buyers of South Sudanese crude oil and lenders to the Government.¹²⁸ To date in 2022, Mr. Kiir has visited the United Arab Emirates on at least five occasions, with other commercial and government delegations also visiting Juba.¹²⁹ There were also five high-level meetings between South Sudan and the Government of Saudi Arabia in 2022, in Juba and Riyadh.¹³⁰

VII. Fragmented public finances

81. The accumulation and preservation of power at the national and subnational levels require the ability to generate and distribute revenues.¹³¹ This has created competition for access to positions of power at the national and local levels, as the previously described tensions in Tonj illustrate.

82. In addition, it encourages the fragmentation of the finances of South Sudan into budgets and accounts over which individuals can assert control, undermining parallel efforts to centralize the country’s revenues and subject them to meaningful oversight.

83. This is exemplified by the continued diversion of public funds, and oil revenues in particular, into accounts and projects managed outside the budget process. Such diversions threaten to undermine the impact of the country’s public financial management reforms, many of which are focused on the budget process.

84. The first half of the 2021/22 financial year provides a vivid illustration. While the Government received in excess of \$535 million in oil revenues during that period,¹³² none of the revenues reached the Treasury’s accounts from which salaries and ministerial budgets are paid.¹³³

85. More than 50 per cent of oil revenues, amounting to \$268 million, were allocated to the oil-for-roads programme detailed in previous Panel reports.¹³⁴ Additional allocations go directly to the Ministry of Petroleum (3 per cent) and to the

¹²⁵ Ibid., 12 August 2022. See also [S/2022/359](#).

¹²⁶ Panel interviews, August 2022. See also Eye Radio, “Unified peace forces receive combat wears”, 26 August 2022, available at www.eyeradio.org/unified-peace-forces-receive-combat-wears.

¹²⁷ Ibid.; and South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation interview on file with the Panel.

¹²⁸ See [S/2022/359](#).

¹²⁹ Various statements by the Office of the President on file with the Panel.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Interviews with government officials and international observers, July to October 2022; corroborated by documents produced by the Ministry of Finance and Planning on file with the Panel.

¹³² The period covers July to December 2021. Interviews and correspondence with traders purchasing crude oil from South Sudan and government documents on file with the Panel.

¹³³ Documents prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Planning on file with the Panel.

¹³⁴ See [S/2021/365](#) and [S/2020/1141](#).

Nile Petroleum Corporation,¹³⁵ which remains under the control of the Office of the President, notwithstanding appeals from both Parliament and the Ministry of Petroleum for it to be placed under the control of the Ministry.¹³⁶

86. Moreover, the figures reveal the extent to which South Sudan continues to rely on commercial borrowing to plug gaps in its finances.¹³⁷ During the first half of the 2021/22 financial year, around \$200 million was allocated to repaying previously unreported loans from the National Investment and Development Bank of South Sudan, which has been providing short-term credit to the Government since October 2020.¹³⁸ The loans, which have been repaid on a rolling basis, are worth a total of more than \$675 million, with \$540 million borrowed during the 2021/22 financial year.¹³⁹ An additional \$150 million was obtained from the International Monetary Fund.¹⁴⁰

87. It is not clear from the available expenditure reports how these loans were spent or why short-term credit has been sought since October 2020. Documents prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Planning account for only 107 billion South Sudanese pounds (around \$237 million) in on-budget expenditure during that period.¹⁴¹

88. In addition to the oil-for-roads programme, the gap helps to explain how ad hoc off-budget spending, such as the procurement of vehicles and food for the military, remains possible despite the financial pressures on the country's budget.

89. The 2022/23 budget shows a deficit of around 560 billion South Sudanese pounds, creating pressure to borrow additional funds or reduce spending on salaries and other budget lines. An additional \$135 million has already been borrowed from the National Investment and Development Bank, with figures seen by the Panel revealing significant borrowing from the Central Bank of South Sudan also, which printed in excess of 270 billion South Sudanese pounds (\$423 million) between March and August 2022,¹⁴² coinciding with a significant depreciation in the value of the pound.

90. Moreover, testimonies received by the Panel indicate that South Sudan has continued to maintain in-kind transfers of oil to the Sudan at around 19,000 to 25,000 barrels per day, notwithstanding the transitional financial arrangement having been paid off around February 2022.¹⁴³ While South Sudan still pays fees to the Sudan for the transport of oil through its pipelines, the amount owed to the Sudan is now considerably lower, and the Sudan has very likely accumulated debts in excess of

¹³⁵ Documents on file with the Panel. Interviews with government officials, August to October 2022.

¹³⁶ Third reading of the 2022/23 budget by the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly; document on file with the Panel.

¹³⁷ The Panel's final report for 2022 [S/2022/359](#) detailed a previously unreported loan of \$539 million in 2019. See also annex 27.

¹³⁸ Confidential documents on file with the Panel, corroborated by documents prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Planning of South Sudan and interviews with confidential sources, September to November 2022.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ International Monetary Fund, Country Report No. 22/266, "2022 Article IV Consultation And Second Review of the Staff Monitored Program", July 2022. Available at www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2022/English/ISSDEA2022001.ashx.

¹⁴¹ Documents produced by the Ministry of Finance and Planning on file with the Panel.

¹⁴² A document on file with the Panel and prepared by the Central Bank of South Sudan details 271,813,538,906.32 South Sudanese pounds in Government borrowing between 9 March and 12 August 2022. The Bank's statistical bulletin for August 2022 details around 305 billion South Sudanese pounds in borrowing between March and August 2022. According to the Bank of South Sudan, one United States dollar exchanged for around 634 South Sudanese pounds at the end of August 2022.

¹⁴³ Interviews with Government officials and international observers, July to October 2022; corroborated by documents on file with the Panel.

\$300 million to South Sudan as a result.¹⁴⁴ Limited accounting for the transfers make them vulnerable to diversion or misappropriation.

VIII. Conclusion

91. In October 2022, Bishop Santo Loku Pio Doggale, the Auxiliary Bishop of Juba, argued that “there is no peace that can be lived by an individual, it doesn’t work, if all the corners of South Sudan are not in peace, there is no peace”.¹⁴⁵ For most of the population of South Sudan, those remarks ring true. A great deal of governmental will, resources, and carefully targeted international support will be needed to ensure that the next two years of the transition can serve to deliver what the first four did not.

IX. Recommendations

92. The Panel recommends that the Government of South Sudan:

(a) Publish the findings of official fact-finding reports and inquiries into major incidents of subnational violence, including in Mayom, Rualbet, Kajo Kaji and Leer;

(b) Manage the oil-for-roads programme through the ordinary budget process in order to secure greater transparency and oversight with regard to the allocation and spending of the associated public funds.

93. The Panel recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan:

(a) Reiterate to the Government of South Sudan the exemption and notification requirements detailed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#) and revised in paragraph 2 of resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#);

(b) Reiterate to the States members of the East African Community and all member States bordering South Sudan that the provision of technical, training, financial or other assistance related to military activities falls within the scope of the arms embargo, as imposed under paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#);

(c) Consider developing a template exemption request for training in which it is specified whether training is provided to the necessary unified forces of South Sudan or to other branches of the security sector;

(d) Reiterate to Member States that, pursuant to section 12 (d) of the guidelines of the Committee for the conduct of its work, all notifications or requests for exemptions pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#) and paragraph 2 of resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#) shall contain, inter alia, the name of the end user, including whether or not that user forms part of the necessary unified forces.

¹⁴⁴ International Monetary Fund, Country Report No. 22/266.

¹⁴⁵ Eye Radio, “‘They lie to you, peace only benefits politicians’, says Bishop Santo”, 11 October 2022. Available at www.eyeradio.org/they-lie-to-you-peace-only-benefits-politicians-says-bishop-santo.

Annexes

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Annex 1: Speech by President Salva Kiir on the extension of transitional period	22
Annex 2: Statement National Democratic Movement on the extension of the transitional period	25
Annex 3: Statement by South Sudan Women on the extension of the transitional period	28
Annex 4: Statement by The Voluntary Civil Society Taskforce on Implementation of the Peace Agreement on the extension of the transitional period	29
Annex 5: Statement by the National Salvation Front (NAS) on the extension of the transitional period	30
Annex 6: Statement by the Like-minded stakeholders for a New Political Dispensation in South Sudan on the extension of the transitional period.	32
Annex 7: Proposal for Unified Military Front circulated by Stephen Buay Rolnyang	33
Annex 8: SSUF/A Response to proposal for Unified Military Front	35
Annex 9: NAS Response to Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang’s Proposals for Joint Military Command	36
Annex 10: Call for stakeholders consultative meeting that launched the National Consensus Forum	37
Annex 11: Press Statement on Non-Signatories South Sudan Opposition Groups consultations with Troika, the European Union, the Vatican Secretariat and Sant’Egidio	39
Annex 12: General overview of reported NUF graduation ceremonies as of November 2022	40
Annex 13: List of SSPDF officers killed in Rualbet, Tonj North	41
Annex 14: Letter from the Awan Parek community to the Governor of Warrap State	42
Annex 15: Letter from the Awan Parek community to the Governor of Warrap State	44
Annex 16: Statement by the Majak Youth Association	47
Annex 17: Statement by SSPM/A, dated 22 July 2022, concerning operations in Mayom	48
Annex 18: Statement by the SSPDF on attack on Mayom town.	51
Annex 19: List of casualties from SSPM/A attacks on Mayom	53
Annex 20: Involvement of Sudanese Rapid Support Forces in arrest of SSPM/A members in Sudan	54
Annex 21: Still from a video showing execution of three SSPM/A officers near Mayom	55
Annex 22: SSBC Broadcast detailing food delivery to SSPDF forces on 23 September 2022	56
Annex 23: Press statement by Central Equatoria State’s Youth Union in response to killings in Kajo Keji.	57
Annex 24: Statement on killings in Kajo Keji by Central Equatorian Member of Parliament.	58
Annex 25: Statement by the Pojulu community on killings in Kajo Keji	62
Annex 26: Photograph of civilians killed in Kajo Keji	63
Annex 27: Overview of South Sudan’s outstanding disclosed debts as of June 2022.	64
Annex 28: Response from Dr Joseph Monytil Wejang, Governor of Unity State, dated 17 November 2022	65

Annex 1: Speech by President Salva Kiir on the extension of transitional period, dated 4 August 2022

The Republic of South Sudan
Speech by His Excellency, the President on the extension of R-ARCSS

August 4, 2022

- Your Excellency, Dr. Riek Machar, First Vice President of the Republic
- Your Excellences, Vice Presidents of the Republic
- Right Honorable, Jemma Nunu Kumba, Speaker of R-TNLA
- Honorable ministers of R-TgoNU
- Members of National Legislature
- Members of diplomatic Corps
- Representatives of Civil Society present
- Invited guests.

Ladies and gentlemen

Today, I am informing the people of South Sudan that the political parties who signed the Revitalized Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) have unanimously agreed to a 24-month extension of the interim period. I want you to understand why we reached this decision.

As seen in the unanimous decision across political parties, we are not extending the transition because I want to stay in the government longer. We don't want to rush you into an election that will take us back to war. I have been fighting since I was a teenager when I joined the first Anyanya, and I spent 50 years in the armed struggle so that

you could feel the same dignity that many others worldwide feel. Nothing compares to the happiness I felt as the SPLM/A delivered your independence.

When we founded the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, we had the opportunity to build a country we would all cherish and defend. But, as your leaders, we lost focus after independence. Instead of building an effective state and cohesive nation, we began fighting among ourselves for power. As a result, we took you back to an even more bitter war where brothers fought themselves for seats.

The revitalized agreement was our chance to correct our mistakes, and I do not underestimate or dismiss what we have achieved already through this agreement. We have stabilized the country and established a framework to transform the state by building effective institutions. Due to unforeseen circumstances, we had to finance the agreement alone amid other serious priorities, like a bloated government and catastrophic flooding. As a result, significant issues remain unimplemented. Among these, we must prioritize some to succeed as a country.

I consider the reunification of the army, constitution-making, and the conduct of a census necessary to implement elections and establish a new government without reverting to war. Reunifying the army means we would protect the outcomes of the elections against spoilers who would use it as an occasion for violence. The constitution-making process will determine what type of government we need - decentralized, centralized, federal, parliamentary, presidential, etc. These choices, if wisely decided, will set South Sudan on a course of progress for centuries to come. The census will provide

the evidence upon which we will determine the details of voting, state formation, and nation-building. We will redouble our efforts to complete these to lead you to a successful election and build an effective government.

While Article 8.4 says that two-thirds of the parties can amend the agreement, Riek Machar and others unanimously decided to extend the transition period. Our shared intention is to take you to a peaceful election. While we want to implement the agreement entirely, we must be realistic. We did not even implement the mighty CPA fully, yet it remains a historic accomplishment that none will deny or reverse. Therefore, we have decided to prepare the soil over the next 24 months to plant the seeds of South Sudan's elections with a unified army, visionary constitution, and firm understanding of our country upon which to build a government that can complete the war on poverty, ignorance, and hopelessness.

While we deliver this message with heavy hearts, we nonetheless have clear minds. We know this transitional government is not what you deserve, but it is better than war. So, we extend the transition period as a pragmatic and realistic choice for 24 months of healing and consolidating.

Others, like myself, spent their entire lives struggling for the dignity of the South Sudanese people. I close this message by calling on two of them, in particular, to come back to South Sudan and collaborate with us in creating conditions for a complete political transition from war to lasting peace. Comrades Pagan Amum and Thomas Cirilo should come back home and join hands with us in Juba, like some of their comrades have. We were together in the liberation, and while we have deferred, we need them to join us now to set history on a correct course.

Thank you

Annex 2: Statement National Democratic Movement on the extension of the transitional period, dated 4 August 2022



Chairman

Date: 4 August 2022

Statement on the extension of the transitional period of R-ARCSS

We followed today, the 4th of August, the function organized by the President of the Republic for the extension of the transitional period beyond 22 February 2023. The NDM would like to make its position clear on this matter.

- 1- All along the implementation process we have all observed deliberate stalling, obstruction and selective implementation of some provisions of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). There were even cases of clear violations of the agreement by the major Party in it. Today, four (4) years since the R-ARCSS was signed on 12 September 2018, the Parties have not completed implementing the activities earmarked for the Pre-Transitional Period which was to be for 8 months only, such as the unification of the forces and completing the formation of government structures which remain outstanding. Nothing was done regarding the activities of the Transitional Period which started on 22 February 2020. It was clear that these deliberate obstructions of the agreement were driving at the extension of the transitional period for the regime to buy more time in power.
- 2- Driven by its total commitment to R-ARCSS, the NDM has been consistent in pointing out moves meant to stonewall the implementation of the peace agreement and has been putting forward practical suggestions to the Parties and Guarantors on how to accelerate the implementation process, even to forego some provisions, so that the elections are conducted on time. This was necessary not only to end the vicious cycle of transitional governments the country has been reeling under since 2005, but most importantly to avail the opportunity for the South Sudanese to vote for the first time since the country became independent eleven (11) years ago so as to elect a government that can truly represent them. All these suggestions went unheeded.

- 3- We are cynically told today that because the necessary prerequisites for conducting a free, fair and credible election have not been implemented, it was necessary to extend the transitional period under the same administration that has been responsible for the failure and deliberate obstruction of implementing the same for the last four (4) years. For sure, this extension has nothing to do with the implementation of R-ARCSS but more to do with staying in power for as long as possible. No number of extensions will ever change the equation.
- 4- Sadly, some of those who have been on the receiving end all this time have joined the bandwagon wanting to believe in the specious argument that the alternative to extension is the unravelling of the agreement or what they called Square One! It is an empty scare tactics. It is also a flawed argument and the NDM did present a plan to RJMEC on 19 June 2022 titled "A roadmap for the general elections in South Sudan" suggesting the way forward which was neither blanket extension nor for sure suggesting going to Square One.
- 5- Our roadmap was based on the realization that the prerequisites for conducting credible elections were not fulfilled, and hence it wouldn't be possible to carry out free, fair and credible elections by 22 December 2022 as planned. Based on this reality what was required was to work out a new timetable for elections based on the implementation of the prerequisites. If that timetable goes beyond 22 February 2023, then a new transitional period is to be worked out to cover that extra time needed to conduct the elections. Both the timetable and the new setup beyond February 2023 have to be agreed in an inclusive conference of all the active forces in South Sudan: the Parties and Stakeholders to R-ARCSS, the civil society organizations and the holdout groups who are now in negotiations with the government. Since the President had a special mention of some of the hold out groups, why exclude them from discussing the way forward? That conference was to be held outside South Sudan and mediated/facilitated by IGAD, AU or UN (this trio is carrying out a similar role in Sudan) and witnessed by the Troika, EU and other friends of South Sudan. The government whose mandate and legitimacy expires on 22 February 2023 cannot arrogate to itself a matter which concerns the future of the whole country. The South Sudanese needed to be consulted to find out if they can trust a government that has failed to take them to elections in four years and still counting to do so in two more years. Those in government should have even been conscious enough about the conflict of interests in the decision they have taken.

6- The roadmap which was unveiled today, is conspicuously silent on any explanation regarding why it was not possible to keep to the timetable of R-ARCSS, contains no guarantees as to how the two years will be different from the previous four, the extension is not tied to the elections timetable nor to the implementation of the outstanding activities, and no mention at all of an all-inclusive conference for the South Sudanese to discuss and agree on the way forward beyond 22 February 2023. It is that conference that would decide on the transitional administration that can be trusted to carry out the elections.

On the basis of the above the NDM, as a signatory to R-ARCSS, distances itself from the roadmap rolled out today as it is just nothing but increasing the time of stay of the current government in power. We advise our colleagues in government to revisit their stand and present what they signed today as their position in a round table conference of all the active political and civil society forces in South Sudan. That is the only legitimacy the South Sudanese will trust. There is still enough time for them to do so.

Our people are still suffering as the insecurity surges, the economy plummets, our refugees continue to languish in millions under difficult conditions in the refugees' camps and those remaining in the country face extreme humanitarian difficulties including hunger, disease, violations of human rights and floods. We should be mindful of them more than clinging to power that does not serve the very people we claim to represent. True leaders are those who put the interests of the people above their own.


Dr Lam Akol,
Chairman of NDM



Annex 3: Statement by South Sudan Women on the extension of the transitional period, dated 5 August 2022

South Sudanese Women

PRESS STATEMENT FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Rejection of the Extension of the Revitalized Peace Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS)

August 5th, 2022

South Sudanese women leaders and their constituencies express their extreme concerns about the extension of the transitional period for twenty-four months after February 2023.

We note that women and girls have suffered the most in South Sudan's internal conflict since 2013. They have been subjected to systematic sexual violence, including rape, and their access to socioeconomic justice and political participation have greatly diminished. Three years after the signing of the Revitalized Peace Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), the agreement on power-sharing has neither ended the violence nor delivered the basic services to the suffering citizens.

The current government has failed the people of South Sudan several times in the last eleven years. It has failed to carry out its mandate, including implementing the peace agreement and protecting the civilians. Therefore, the extension of the transitional period under the current leadership would neither produce a real democracy nor end the suffering of the people.

Thus, there is a need for convening an inclusive conference that brings together various South Sudanese stakeholders, including representatives of the government, political parties, opposition groups, civil society, people with disabilities, women, and youth groups, traditional chiefs, the diaspora, faith-based groups, and friends of South Sudan, among others. The goal of the proposed conference is to discuss the way forward and to agree on an inclusive roadmap that leads to the formation of a new transitional administration, with a specific mandate and timelines, led by technocrats to stabilize the country and transition it to democracy.

South Sudanese Women include civil society organizations, academia, entrepreneurs, faith-based, women with disabilities, and youth groups, among others.

Email Contact: ssudanesewomen@gmail.com

Annex 4: Statement by The Voluntary Civil Society Taskforce on Implementation of the Peace Agreement on the extension of the transitional period, dated 4 August 2022



The Voluntary Civil Society Taskforce on Implementation of the Peace Agreement

PRESS STATEMENT

Call for Inclusive and Consultative Process for Discussions of Road-Map on Implementation of Outstanding Provisions of the R-ARCSS

4th August 2022

We the Civil Society groups, express our concerns and outmost disappointment in the recent turn of events and especially how R-TNoGU has chosen to handle the process for developing a Road-Map on the implementation of outstanding provisions of R-ARCSS.

Acknowledging the continues lamentation from key actors within R-TGoNU trying to convince the public and friends of South Sudan that the Agreement is difficult to be implemented or rather not implementable. How would they alone develop a Road-Map for the same agreement without widely consulting the stakeholders?

After signing of R-ARCSS and following its incorporation into the Transitional Constitution of Republic of South Sudan (TCRSS) 2011 as amended, R-ARCSS become part of the social contract between the People and the Government and there are clear procedures outlined for any amendment to be introduce to the agreement by the parties or any person. Therefore, in our opinion the current processes of developing Road-Map, be it for implementation of outstanding provisions of the R-ARCSS within the remaining seven months or an extension, must be done through a credible, legitimate, inclusive and People Driven Processes. Therefore we wish to state the following:

- We consider the ongoing conversation on the purported developed Road-Map, as intra and inter parties' conversation, hence, we urge the parties to build consensus and convince the people of South Sudan that they indeed will honor their own Road-Map.
- The alleged "civil society consultations" as rightfully attributed to one entity within the civil society, is not enough. We wish to categorically state that this is not sufficient consultations and defeat the meaning and spirit of inclusivity as outlined in R-ARCSS.
- As representative of Civil Society groups and in an effort to echo the concerns of the public including the forces that have remained in the training centers and cantonment areas for way longer that one could humanly bear, we would wish to hear the parties clearly articulate what will they do different to realize the implementation of the remaining provision of the R-ARCSS in the next seven months.
- Any discourses pertaining renewal, remolding and rethinking of post February 2023 governance arrangement and political dispensation must include the participation of all stakeholders for realization of Inclusive People Driven Process.

End

It is worth noting that the Voluntary Civil Society Taskforce on Implementation of Peace Agreement (The Taskforce) is a network of over 30 diverse and impartial civil society organizations (CSOs) with wider grassroots presence in 10 States and 3 Administrative Areas. The Taskforce works to ensure that there is genuine implementation of the peace agreement that paves way to peace and stability in South Sudan. For

Annex 5: Statement by the National Salvation Front (NAS) on the extension of the transitional period, dated 8 August 2022



SOUTH SUDAN

Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People

National Salvation Front/ Army

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

General Headquarters

Ref: NAS/OSM/15

8th August 2022.

STATEMENT ON THE EXTENSION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD

On 4th August 2022, the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) under President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Dr. Riek Machar illegally extended the interim period giving themselves another twenty-four (24) months in power after February 2023. This illegal decision of the SPLM political elites in Juba has not come as a surprise to the National Salvation Front (NAS) as NAS has been monitoring and alerted the public of the secret political and diplomatic machinations that culminated into this decision.

NAS from the onset of the conception of the Revitalized Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and its subsequent signing, rejected this agreement because it does not address the root causes of the conflict in the country. The extension of the life-span of R-ARCSS until 2025 means renewing the same futile agreement that has prolonged the suffering of the people of South Sudan and now taking the country to total collapse and disintegration.

The Leadership of NAS would like to state the following to the people of South Sudan and the International Community:


1. NAS Condemns in the strongest possible terms the illegal action of President Kiir and his peace partner the First Vice President Dr. Riek Machar on extending their period in office under the pretext of implementing the flawed R-ARCSS. Their sole aim is being in power and maintaining the status-quo.
2. NAS maintains its position that R-ARCSS is a flawed agreement and will not bring about sustainable peace and transformation in the country. The R-ARCSS has never addressed the root causes of the conflict in the country; hence, the extension of the interim period for another 24 months is prolonging the suffering of the people of South Sudan and thwarting sustainable peace.

Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk

3. The extension of the life-span of the R-TGoNU until 2025 means the extension of impunity, corruption, insecurity, inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic violence, obstruction of civil space and stifling of freedom of expression.
4. President Salva Kiir is on record on several occasions complaining that the R-ARCSS is designed not to be implemented because it is non-implementable. There is therefore no logic in the extension of something that is unimplementable.
5. NAS reiterates its strong conviction and commitment that durable peace can prevail in South Sudan only if the root causes of the conflict in South Sudan are addressed through all-inclusive and credible political process.
6. The call of President Salva Kiir on NAS Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Thomas Cirillo Sawka to go to Juba to participate in peace building is futile attempt by President Kiir to distract the people of South Sudan from holding him to account for illegally clinging on to power and avoiding the root causes of the conflict that must be addressed to bring about sustainable peace. NAS calls on President Kiir to make a patriotic gesture to immediately step down and allow the people of South Sudan to chart their destiny towards sustainable peace and prosperity.
7. NAS urges IGAD, AU, TROIKA and the International Community to stand with the people of South Sudan in the rejection of the extension of the interim period of the R-ARCSS and support the people of South Sudan to chart a new way forward to end the war and achieve sustainable peace.
8. NAS calls on the people of South Sudan, political parties, civil society groups, faith-based groups, professionals, Women and Youth to reject and resist this illegal decision by Salva Kiir and Riek Machar and chart a way forward for the country.

Suba Samuel Manase

NAS Spokesperson



Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk

Annex 6: Statement by the Like-minded stakeholders for a New Political Dispensation in South Sudan on the extension of the transitional period

Statement of the Like-Minded Stakeholders for a New Political Dispensation in South Sudan on the unilateral extension of the Transitional Period by R-TGONU

The Like-Minded Stakeholders for a New Political Dispensation in South Sudan met on Saturday, 6th August 2022, convened by NSSOG and PCCA, to deliberate on the unilateral extension of the transitional period by the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU). The participants in the meeting consisted of the Non-Signatory South Sudanese Opposition groups (NSSOG) to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), other opposition movements, the People's Coalition for Civil Action (PCCA), other civil society organizations, women groups, youth associations, religious leaders, prominent personalities and issued the following statements:

1. We categorically and unequivocally reject another extension of the Transitional Period by R-TGoNU beyond its current expiry of February 2023. The R-ARCSS has already been extended twice in the Pre-Transitional Period and R-TGoNU has failed to achieve sustainable peace. President Salva Kiir has repeatedly said that "this agreement was designed not to be implemented." He made similar remarks about the initial ARCSS signed in August 2015 that it was "not a Bible nor a Koran", meaning it was open to violations.
2. We reiterate our position that the R-ARCSS is a flawed agreement that has not addressed the root causes of the conflict in the country and hence will not lead to sustainable peace. The agreement has only exacerbated the suffering of the people of South Sudan.
3. We call upon the people of South Sudan, in all their diversities, to unite and embark on broad-based consultative processes that would culminate in an inclusive political dialogue by all the South Sudanese stakeholders in a round table conference, in a neutral place, to agree on a new viable transitional arrangement

Finally we recognize and applaud the material and diplomatic support of regional and international partners for peace in our country and seize this opportunity to extend an open invitation to EAC, IGAD, AU, UN, TROIKA and indeed all other friends of South Sudan to help the people of South Sudan in their desire to unite and shape the future of their country through an inclusive national political process.

General Thomas Cirillo: NAS



General Paul Malong
Awan: SSUF/A



Ambassador Emmanuel
Ajawin: NDM-PF



Mr Alex Yatta
Lukadi: SSNMC




Ustaz Thomas Tut Doap:
UDRM/A



Hon Pagan Amum
Okiech: Real SPLM



Mr. Abraham Awolich:
PCCA




Mr. Wol Deng Atak: UPDP



Mr. Abraham Lado Lolik: SSPR Abraham lolik


Ms Suzanne Jambo: STEPS




Ms Angela Tuna SAA




Dr Henry Lejukole, Academic & Professionals




Annex 7: Proposal for Unified Military Front circulated by Stephen Buay Rolnyang, dated 19 October 2022



**SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT / ARMY
(SSPM / A)**



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN & COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF



SSPM/A/10/015/2022 **19 October 2022**

To: General Paul Malong Awan -Chairman and commander-in-chief, SSUF/A
 R: General Thomas Cirilo Swaka -Chairman and commander-in-Chief, NAS
 R: General Simon Gatwech Dual -Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, SPLM/A-IO (Kitgwang)

Re- Unified Front

Dear Comrades,

I am writing to your comradeship requesting for the formation of a unified military front to challenge the regime physically in a joint military front to liberate the people of South Sudan from the dictatorship rule in Juba.

Formation of Joint military High Command Council (JMHCC)

S/N	Rank	Name in full	Position
1.	General	Paul Malong Awan	Commander -in-Chief of the Unified forces
2.	General	Thomas Cirilo Swaka	Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Forces
3.	General	Simon Gatwech Dual	Chief of General staff of Unified Forces
4.	General	Stephen Buay Rolnyang	Deputy Chief of General staff for Operations and Security
5.	General	From NAS	Deputy Chief of General staff for Admin and finance
6.	General	From SSUF/A	Deputy Chief of General staff for Logistics and Procurement
7.	General	From IO-Kitgwang	Deputy Chief of General Staff for Military Orientation

Office of the chairman and commander-in-Chief

1

2. Formation of the Unified Fronts.

1. **1st Front** – Equatoria region to be commanded by a General officer from the NAS.
2. **2nd Front**- Upper Nile region to be commanded by a General officer from the IO Kitwang.
3. **3rd Front**- Bhar El Ghazal region to be commanded by a General officer from the SSUF/A.

3. Formation of Infantry Divisions

1st Front infantry Divisions (Equatoria Region)

1. 1st Infantry Division- **Central Equatoria**
2. 2nd Infantry Division- **Eastern Equatoria**
3. 3rd Infantry Division- **Western Equatoria**

2nd Front infantry Divisions (Upper Nile Region)

1. 4th Infantry Division- **Unity state**
2. 5th Infantry Division- **Upper Nile state**
3. 6th Infantry Division – **Jonglei state**

3rd Front infantry Divisions (Bhar El Ghazal Region)

1. 7th Infantry Division-**Northern Bhar El Ghazal, Wau and Raja**
 2. 8th Infantry Division- **Warrap**
 3. 9th Infantry Division- **Lakes**
4. Your c/ship positive respond will be highly appreciated.



General Stephen Buay Rolnyang
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, SSPM/A
SSPM/A GHQ DAJO, UPPER NILE REGION

Office of the chairman and commander-in-Chief

Annex 8: SSUF/A Response to proposal for Unified Military Front, dated 21 October 2022



SOUTH SUDAN UNITED FRONT/ARMY

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN AND C-IN-C OF SSUF/A

Date: October, 21, 2022

No: SSUF/A/ OoC/ C.I.C/ 5-A-1

To: Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang,
Chairman and C-IN-C SSPM/A

R: Gen Thomas Cirillo Swaka Chairman and C-IN-C of NAS

R: Gen. Simon Gatwech Dual, Chairman and C-IN-C of SPLM/A - IO Kitgwang

Re: Establishment of Joint Military High Command Council (JMHCC) and Unified Forces.

In reference to your letter dated 19 October, 2022, vide number SSPM/A/10/015/2022. In which you come up with a proposal to challenge the regime by fighting collectively under one leadership and launch offensive fronts to save our country from the brutality of the Salva Kiir government.

We would like to assure you that, your proposal has been accepted by this end. We will work together until this proposal finds its way to implementation.

In order to restore the current situation imposed against the people of South Sudan, from the dominance of this tyrannical regime, we ought to unite as leaders, and launch a full-scale military operation against the Juba regime.

The only solution to save the country from the hands of the dwarves, is an organized military campaign from all directions, we lack this strategy and the government of Salva Kiir has found ways to prolong the suffering of our people. Let's unite for the dignity of the people of South Sudan.

Please accept my assurances of highest consideration.



Gen. Paul Malong Awan
Chairman and C-IN-C of South Sudan United Front/Army.

+254757694736

garangkuot287@gmail.com

Annex 9: NAS Response to Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang's Proposals for Joint Military Command

Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk



SOUTH SUDAN
Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People
National Salvation Front/ Army
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON
General Headquarters

Ref: NAS/OSM/22

25th October 2022.

Statement on the Proposal of Formation of a Unified Military Front

The Leadership of the National Salvation Front (NAS) has come across a letter circulating online in form of a proposal signed by Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang, the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of South Sudan People's Movement/Army (SSPM/A). In the letter, dated 19th October with reference SSPM/A/10/015/2022, and subject: **United Front**, Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang proposes the formation of what he terms a **United Force** and proposes the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of NAS, Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka, to be the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the proposed United Forces.

The Leadership of NAS would therefore like to state the following:

1. NAS has taken note of the content of the letter of Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang, the C-in-C of SSPM/A expressing his opinion on the need of having a military alliance.
2. NAS Leadership has neither been consulted nor has it discussed anything with Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang about his proposal. NAS therefore is not a party to his proposal.
3. NAS is committed to the new Road-map by the National Consensus Forum (NCF) towards convening a Round-table Conference of all South Sudanese Stakeholders: political parties, civil society groups, faith-based groups, women groups and youth groups to address the root causes of the conflict in the country and chart a way forward to sustainable peace.
4. NAS is a movement with structures such as the Salvation Council (SC) and Military Command (MC). These structures perform different functions and roles including provision of guidance and direction to NAS Leadership on strategic issues like working together with other opposition groups and making alliances.
5. NAS Leadership urges its members supporters to treat this proposal for the establishment of a united military force as an individual's opinion.

Suba Samuel Manase
NAS Spokesperson.



Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk

Annex 10: Call for stakeholders consultative meeting that launched the National Consensus Forum



The People's Coalition for Civil Action

Juba, South Sudan

Email: thecivilactionssd@gmail.com

23rd July 2022

For Immediate Release

The Call for Stakeholders Consultative Meeting

The People's Coalition for Civil Action (PCCA) wishes to invite all civil society, political parties/movements, faith-based organizations, and political groups to prepare for stakeholders consultative meeting. This invitation is a direct response to recent calls by stakeholders for a national political dialogue or a roundtable to decide on the future of South Sudan prior to the end of the Transitional Period of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

The PCCA is a pro-democracy non-violent movement committed to pursuing political change in South Sudan through non-violent actions and discourses, which it deems are the most appropriate means for reversing the slow decay and steady breakdown of the South Sudanese nation. The PCCA strongly believes that South Sudan is redeemable when its people can unite to challenge the status quo, which is defined by lack of strategic vision, deviation from peace and democratic paths, growing authoritarian rule, extreme violence, ethnic divisions, ubiquitous insecurity, deep rooted impunity, and widespread menace of corruption and economic mismanagement.

Confronting this situation is not a task of any special genius loner, it requires a formidable unity of purpose among the people and among the civil and political forces in South Sudan to rescue and avert the inevitable disintegration of the country if it is allowed to continue its present path.

Driven by the desire to unite the people of South Sudan, the PCCA, in collaboration with South Sudan opposition political forces, civil society organizations, and the faith-based groups, plans to convene a virtual solidarity meeting for all the stakeholders in South Sudan. The meeting aims at building consensus among the stakeholders on urgent matters around the impending expiration of the transitional period in South Sudan and to consider recent calls for a roundtable. As a corollary, the meeting hopes to consolidate unity and consensus on matters critical to and pertaining to peace and stability in South Sudan.

Specifically, the meeting has the following objectives:

1. Getting to know one another

1



2. Exploring collective response to the impending expiration of the R-ARCSS Transitional Period and the term of the RTGoNU.
3. Presenting a viable alternative route to peace beyond the R-ARCSS—the roundtable.
4. Consolidating unity among South Sudan stakeholders, including agreeing on a model and structure of future engagements.
5. Issue a joint communique.

The PCCA believes in the following as guiding its engagement with the stakeholders:

1. We believe that the fundamental problem in South Sudan is rooted in the failure of political leadership and so seeking a solution that addresses the leadership issue is critical.
2. The 8 years of joint Kiir—Riek administration (2005—2013), plus the 2015 and 2018 agreements, show clearly that Salva Kiir and Riek Machar cannot work together because of deep-seated mistrust and sheer incompetence, but they are holding the country to ransom as every peace agreement brings them back to lead the country. It is this mistrust between them that is the cause of the failure of the two peace agreements to deliver on the desired results. The people of South Sudan in the National Dialogue Conference were unanimous that the two must step aside if the country is to enjoy peace and stability. It is our considered opinion that the two must not be part of any transitional set-up after 22 February 2023.
3. The people of South Sudan have spoken through the South Sudan National Dialogue, its resolutions must therefore be considered part of a puzzle in building national consensus, with an eye to subject controversial provisions to further debates as a measure to include those who were excluded.
4. We believe that one way to avoid more crises in the country is to convene a national political dialogue that will culminate in a new administration of public trust, led by people of consensus and technocrats. We also believe in the need to build a new, credible, inclusive professional national army and security with the support of international military panel of experts.
5. We do not consider the current security, political, and economic conditions conducive for the conduct credible, free, and fair elections, though we believe strongly in the exercise of democratic elections as the basis for attaining a legitimate government.
6. The PCCA believes that South Sudan has seen more than enough violence, so we seek change in South Sudan non-violently.

If you seek inclusion in this consultative meeting, please contact the PCCA at thecivilactionssd@gmail.com.

The People Shall Prevail!



...The End...



Annex 11: Press Statement on Non-Signatories South Sudan Opposition Groups consultations with Troika, the European Union, the Vatican Secretariat and Sant'Egidio, October 2022

**NONE SIGNATORIES SOUTH SUDANESE OPPOSITION GROUPS
(NSSOG)**

Press Statement on Rome Meetings

The leaders of the Non-Signatory South Sudan Opposition Group (NSSOG) held consultative meetings from 10th -14th October 2022 in Rome, Italy. The meetings were convened to explain and seek support for a New Political Dispensation in South Sudan in light of the failure of the Reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) to implement the flawed Revitalized Agreement to Resolve the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) .

During the five- day period, the Non-Signatory Opposition Groups held separate meetings with the Special Envoys of the TROIKA countries (USA, UK, NORWAY) to South Sudan and EU Representatives; the Vatican Secretary of Relations with States; the leadership of the Community of Sant'Egidio; and Diplomatic Missions. The NSSOG leaders explained the urgent need to rescue the country through the building of a National Consensus for a New Political Dispensation for South Sudan that will culminate in a Roundtable Conference. The Roundtable Conference will bring together South Sudanese Political Groups, Civil Society Organizations, Faith-based groups and religious leaders, and women and youth groups to discuss and address the root causes of the conflict in the country and chart the way forward towards achieving permanent peace and sustainable democracy in the country.

The leaders of NSSOG urge all South Sudanese to be vigilant against misrepresentations and distortions of the meetings by some media outlets and individuals. These Rome meetings were planned and conducted to find the most appropriate ways of how to rescue the country from the violent vicious cycles of failed transitions and illegitimate extensions of the failed transitional governments and prevent South Sudan from total disintegration and collapse.



Pa'gan Amum Okiech
NSSOG SPOKESPERSON

October 21st, 2022.

Annex 12: General overview of reported NUF graduation ceremonies as of November 2022

Panel interviews with government officials, military officers, security mechanisms, and international observers, corroborated by press reporting and government statements, indicate the graduation of Necessary Unified Forces has proceeded broadly along the following lines, as of 4 November 2022.

Training centre	Graduation ceremony	Graduation date	
Greater Equatoria region			
1	Gorom	Juba	30 August 2022
2	Maridi	Maridi	17 September 2022
3	Morota	Juba / Bor	27 September 2022
4	Owinykibul	Torit	19 September 2022
5	Muni	Juba	30 August 2022
6	Rajaf	Juba	30 August 2022
7	Lologo	Juba	30 August 2022
8	Rambur	Juba	30 August 2022
9	Agut-Makur	Juba	30 August 2022
Grater Upper Nile region			
10	Alel		
11	Twofogia		
12	Panyier	Bor	27 September 2022
13	Muom		
14	Kaljak		
Greater Bahr el Ghazel region			
15	Mapel	Wau	4 November 2022
16	Pantit	Wau	4 November 2022
17	Masanabira	Wau	4 November 2022

As the Panel has detailed in this Interim Report, however, there has also been considerable uncertainty over the number and identities of many graduates. Not all forces from a given training centre have been included in the relevant graduation ceremony and some training centres have been renamed and/or relocated. Additional ad hoc training centres, including centres associated with existing SSPDF facilities, have also been used to train some Necessary Unified Forces, though it remains unclear how these have been integrated into graduation ceremonies to date. With little verification of numbers and identities available, this table is only intended as a broad overview of the pattern of reported graduations to date.

Annex 13: List of SSPDF officers killed in Rualbet, Tonj North

RUALBET PAYAM OF TONJ NORTH
DATE 25/06/2022

1/no	RANK	NAMES IN FULL	DEAD
1.	COL.	AMOL DAU DENG	DEAD
2.	COL.	DAU LUAI BOL	DEAD
3.	LY-OL	AKETCH CHIMAN PACH	DEAD
4.	MAJ.	DENG MATHIANG ACHIR	DEAD
5.	MAJ.	SANTINO KUOT KUOT	DEAD
6.	MAJ.	MATOC DENG MAGOK	DEAD
7.	MAJ.	MUORTER MADHIEU	DEAD
8.	CAPT.	KUOL AGOK KUC	DEAD
9.	CAPT.	ABIEL LANG NYANG	DEAD
10.	CAPT.	DENG AGOK MAWIEN	DEAD
11.	CAPT.	KUOT GONG MADOL	DEAD
12.	CAPT.	ANOL NGONG	DEAD
13.	CAPT.	MADHIEU DENG YOR	DEAD
14.	1 st LY.	TONG AKOON AKOT	DEAD
15.	1 st LY.	WIEU AKON DENG	DEAD
16.	1 st LY.	MANYOR THIAK GON	DEAD
17.	1 st LY.	WILLIAM CHIRUONG	DEAD
18.	RLSM.	BOL REECH MADOL	DEAD
19.	RLSM.	MARIAK GUM AKECH	DEAD
20.	RLSM.	JOK MADUT KIIR	DEAD
21.	S/M.	MANUT LUAI CHAN	DEAD
22.	S/M.	MACHAR AGUER MAWIEN	DEAD
23.	SGT.	MANYANG CHOL MAJOOK	DEAD
24.	SGT.	THON GUET MANGOK	DEAD
25.	SGT.	MAJAK AGOK	DEAD
26.	SGT.	KUC KUC BAK	DEAD
27.	CPL.	BAK GARANG BAK	DEAD
28.	CPL.	RUMBOK MANGONG YAK	DEAD
29.	CPL.	BOL	DEAD
30.	CPL.	WOL THONY AKOL	DEAD
31.	CPL.	MANUT GUANG	DEAD
32.	CPL.	AKOON CHOL MARINO	DEAD

RUALBET MAYANG OF TONJ NORTH
DATE: 25/06/2022

1/no	RANK	NAMES IN FULL	DEAD ONE
1	COL.	AMOL DAU DENG	DEAD
2	COL.	DAU LUAI BOL	DEAD
3	LY-O.L	AKETCH CHIMAN PACH	DEAD
4	MAJ.	DENG MATHIANG ACHIR	DEAD
5	MAJ.	SANTINO KUOT KUOT	DEAD
6	MAJ.	MATOC DENG MAGOK	DEAD
7	MAJ.	MUORTER MADHIEU	DEAD
8	CAPT.	KUOL AGOK KUC	DEAD
9	CAPT.	ABIEL LANG NYANG	DEAD
10	CAPT.	DENG AGOK MAWIEN	DEAD
11	CAPT.	KUOT GONG MADOL	DEAD
12	CAPT.	ANOL NGONG	DEAD
13	CAPT.	MADHIEU DENG YOR	DEAD
14	1 st LY.	TONG AKOON AKOT	DEAD
15	1 st LY.	WIEU AKONG DIEN	DEAD
16	1 st LY.	MANYOR THIAK GON	DEAD
17	1 st LY.	WILLIAM CHIRUONG	DEAD
18	RLSM.	BOL REECH MADOL	DEAD
19	RLSM.	MARIAK GUM AKECH	DEAD
20	RLSM.	JOK MADUT KIIR	DEAD
21	S/M.	MANUT LUAI CHAN	DEAD
22	S/M.	MACHAR AGUER MAWIEN	DEAD
23	SGT.	MANYANG CHOL MAJOOK	DEAD
24	SGT.	THON GUET MANGOK	DEAD
25	SGT.	MAJAK AGOK	DEAD
26	SGT.	KUC KUC BAK	DEAD
27	CPL.	BAK GARANG BAK	DEAD
28	CPL.	RUMBOK MANGONG YAK	DEAD
29	CPL.	BOL	DEAD
30	CPL.	WOL THONY AKOL	DEAD
31	CPL.	MANUT GUANG	DEAD
32	CPL.	AKOON CHOL MARINO	DEAD

Annex 14: Letter from the Awan Parek community to the Governor of Warrap State

Hon. Aleu Ayieny Aleu
Governor, Warrap State
Kuajok, South Sudan

June 1st, 2022

REF: Appeal for Urgent Intervention to address the growing insecurity in Tonj North County

Honorable Governor,

We are writing to you as representatives of the people and leaders from Awan Parek Community to raise this urgent appeal. We are compelled by the recent deterioration in the security situation in our area to register our deepest concern to you as the leader of our state and the sole authority mandated to resolve threats to our common welfare as people.

The ongoing series of attacks against innocent and defenseless civilians in our area have severely damaged the harmony that has historically prevailed among our various communities. The sense of impunity that prevails in our area is reaching unprecedented levels. People who have maimed, injured and killed people are continuing to roam freely, even when their involvement is public knowledge.

We would like to specifically note the following recent attacks that led to the death of civilians to illustrate the scale of this problem:

1. On 12th March, 2022, a group of armed youth from Gongoor launched an attack on a group of residents gathered at marriage ceremony in Anyibuth (Lian Ayii Section of Awan Parek). This attack led to the death of Akec Wol Mayen, a male of 27 years and seven wounded people are: - Wut Manyual Akec, a male of 41 years, he is a Sub – Chief in Lian Ayii section, Gum Majok Mayiik 53 years old, Manguak Mayen Mayen, a male of 35 years, Mangong Madut Mayen 43 years, Akec Mangong Madut, 50 years, Ayol Mayom Mawien a young girl of 12 years.
 2. On 3rd May, 2022, another group of armed youth from Gongoor launched an attack at Ngapdengnoon and killed in cold blood Mrs. Anger Gook Mawien, a mother of five children approximately 60 years old and Mabior Majok Aneithii, a male of 54 years old, and wounded person Ayii Majok Deng Ayii (Majok- Alek).
- On 4th April, 2022, a group of armed youth launched a night attack at Apor Village that extremely resulted to the serious wound of Mrs. Akuol Athian Anci, a mother of 8 children, 66 years old.
- On 13th May, 2022, a group of armed youth raided a peaceful cattle camp resulting to the killing of Nhialic Chol Dhel in cold blood and took away hundred herds of cattle which remain at large.
- On 30th April, 2022, a group of armed youth raided 53 cows of Mayiik Ayii and Bol at Ayilor village which remains at large too. In the same raid, two old women were inhumanely driven away with cows and later released back and their health is under threat.

6. On 16th March, 2022, a group of armed youth from Gongoor subsequently raided Machuet Village that resulted to the looting of 130 of goats and sheep of Manut Mabok Angong.
7. On 11th April, 2022, another looting occurred in the village of Gak area in which 11 cows of Matueny Noon were ransacked and not recover up to date
8. On 4th April, 2022, a group of armed youth launched a ransack on the herds of cattle of Paan Bol to which 53 cows were all taken and later Tonj North County authorities successfully managed to recover the 53 cows to rightful owners.
9. On 15th May, 2022, a group of armed youth came and driven away 12 cows of Lual Maduot Kuot in Agoor Village.
10. On 25th April, 2022, a group of armed youth robbed four oxen in Lian Ayii section
11. On 3rd April, 2022, a force came and arrested Akec Arop Makerdit without warrant of arrest from county and Payam authorities and taken to unknown location in which the family does not know his whereabouts up to date
12. On 4th May, 2022, an unknown force from Awul Payam came to Lian section without the knowledge of Rualbet Payam authorities, arrested and detained Wol Malueth Ngong at unidentified location.
13. On 3rd May, 2022, a road – ambushed occurred at Akol – Awet to which a public transport car was looted.
14. On 17th May, 2022, a group of armed youth from Awul Payam went and raided a village in Awan Parek and driven away 50 heads of cattle.

The above-mentioned incidents are just illustrations of the scale and severity of this problem, and we strongly believe that your intervention is urgently needed along the following tracks:

- We call on your government to expeditiously investigate this attacks, arrest the suspects and ensure their trial to assure families of victims that there is rule of law that will hold criminals accountable.
- We call on your government to finalize the comprehensive civilian disarmament campaign across all counties of Greater Tonj, because uneven disarmament has emboldened some criminal elements to target some vulnerable communities with their illegally acquired arms.
- We call on your government to implement the resolutions of the Greater Tonj Peace Conference, which specifically called for the declaration of the state of emergency among other urgent steps. This will allow your government and other national institutions to comprehensively address the persistent challenges of insecurity in Warrap State.

Sincerely,

Signed:



Chairman, Awan Parek Community Association in Juba

cc: Chiefs of Awan Parek

cc: File

Annex 15: Statement by Awan Parek community

Statement For Immediate Release

SN01-2022-0625 - Office of Awan Parek Diaspora Community
Email: awanparekdiasporacommunity@gmail.com
Tel: +1814-703-4358. Cell: +6147-062-8228
June 26, 2022

Re: APDC's statement on civilian's killing, looting, the burning of villages and unlawful detentions of local chiefs by South Sudan's security forces in Rualbet payam.

Washington-Ottawa- Melbourne: The esteemed office of Awan Parek Diaspora community has issued the following statement regarding the killing, looting of property, burning of villages and unlawful detentions of chiefs by National Security forces based in Awul Payam.

First and foremost, the Awan Parek Diaspora Community would like to express our heartfelt condolences to the families and friends that have lost their lives, both civilians and security officers, in this senseless, ongoing violence. We unreservedly condemn the fighting or any continuation of the violence and urge that it be brought to stop immediately!

Timelines of events leading to current security situation

On April 3, 2022, National Security forces came to Awan and arrested Akec Arop Makerdit without the knowledge of the county and payam authorities and taken to an unknown location in which his whereabouts is not known up to date.

On April 4, 2022, a group of armed youth dressed in military uniforms looted a village called Gak and a property of a civilian man called Matueny Noon were ransacked.

On April 25, 2022, another group of armed youth claiming to be from National Security forces raided four oxen in Lian Ayii section of Awan Parek and took the oxen to Awul Payam instead of Warrap town which is the county headquarters.

On May 4, 2022, unknown security forces came from Awul Payam to Lian again without the knowledge of Rualbet Payam administrators, arrested and detained a civilian called Wol Malueth Ngong at an unknown location up to date.

On May 17, 2022, a group of armed youth from Awul Payam went and raided a village in Awan Parek and drove away 50 heads of cattle. All these cows have not yet been recovered and returned to rightful owners, yet the army is stationed in Awul where the alleged armed youth came from.

On June 10, 2022, a group of armed youth from Awul Payam came to Rualbet and Killed a 7ft 20-year-old brilliant young man by the name Parek Bol Awengdit and ran back to Awul, where the security forces are stationed. The government of Warrap state led by Aleu Ayieny Aleu deliberately or ineptly failed to arrest the culprits.

On June 10, 2022, a group of armed forces was sent to Rualbet to arrest youth claimed to be wanted by the army. This happened to be the same day that Parek Bol Awengdit was killed.

On June 19, 2022, the acting commissioner and Governor went to Rualbet with huge armed forces and arrested all the three chiefs of Awan Parek community. The chiefs are currently in detention in the National Security prison whereby they are being subjected to insurmountable human rights abuses every day. They are denied access to food and medical attention. This should not happen in 2022.

On June 25, 2022, National Security forces from Awul Payam, deliberately attacked three sections (Awan, Jurlian & Jurbol) of Rualbet payam from different directions. The army armed with heavy artillery and modern machine guns started shooting unarmed civilians deliberately which resulted in 38 deaths, 82 wounded and immeasurable destruction of property worth. The deliberate targeting of civilian populations based on their ethnic identity by means of killings, burning of 130 huts, raiding of over 200 herds of cattle by the soldiers, unlawful detention of Paramount Chief Mabiore Parek, Sultan Ayii Majok and Sultan Maduot Wunkuel Noon by National Security Service, provoked civilians to fight back in self defense.

Human rights abuses

So far, there is crystal clear evidence that the army has committed human rights abuses, and even though the situation is still fluid, it is going to be beyond dire. We in the diaspora strongly condemn the human rights abuses meted on the vulnerable civil population by South Sudan Defence forces that is meant to protect lives and property of its people.

Immediate steps needed to contain this evolving security situation

This group would like nothing but an end to an armed conflict. As such, we beseech the authorities in charge to:

1. Order restrain and protect human rights by ensuring accountability for abuses committed by soldiers and the National Security forces.
2. Release all the chiefs from Awan Parek Community that were detained in placed in deplorable prison conditions without cause. Their continued detention without trial is degenerating the situation.
3. Allow humanitarian aid into the area to help more than 760 displaced civilians of which majority arin Jur-Lian Ayii, Awan-Noon and Jur-Bol areas.
4. Ensure the protection of civilians against deliberate killing, the destruction of their homes.
5. Declare a state of emergency as per recommendation by the resolution of Greater Tonj Peace Conference of 2022.
6. Review the need for the presence of the National Security forces in Awul - if the forces stationed in Awul cannot impartially keep peace among feuding communities, then they need to be removed. There is no national border needing protection by the National armed forces in Awul. If they are stationed there to keep peace among feuding neighboring communities, then they have failed and failed miserably.
7. The state government needs to immediately engage community chiefs and other local leaders to help put this conflict to an end. Begin this process by forming a task force that is composed of individuals representing stakeholders from feuding communities.

8. In addition to the above immediate steps being taken, we urge the President of the Republic of South Sudan, the Chief of General Staff and the National Government to also consider relieving the state Governor, General ALeu Ayieny, of his duties. He has exhibited an inability to maintain peace in the state - that's his number one role, and if he can't do that, then someone else capable of protecting lives of not just the civilians but also of the national security and armed forces present in Warrap state. The state is in bad need of a Governor who can provide innovative solutions to current security|problems in the state.

-The End-


Approve by Awan Parek Diaspora Community members:

1. Akoon Mabuoc Deng
2. Ayii Machar Madut
3. Bol Aweng Machar
4. Bol Maluach Kuot
5. Kuot Parek Machar
6. Maduot Mabior Parek
7. Machar Maduot Madut
8. Manyang Kuot Maduot
9. Majak Maluach Kuot
10. Parek Athian Anei
11. Wol Akech Wol

**For media inquiries, please direct them to awanparekdiasporacommunity@gmail.com
Tel: +1814-703-4358. Cell: +6147-062-8228.**

Cc Tonj Community in Juba chairman: Ustaz Lewis Anei Madut
Cc Warrap State Acting Governor:Ustaz Diing Wek
Cc IGP- Gen. Majak Akech Malok
Cc Minister for internal security: Gen. Obuto Mamur
Cc Chief of General staff: Gen. Satino Deng Wol
Cc President of South Sudan: H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit
Cc U.S. Embassy in South Sudan
Cc Embassy of Canada to South Sudan
Cc United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
Cc Amnesty International.

Annex 16: Statement by the Majak Youth Association, dated 5 June 2022



MAJAK YOUTH ASSOCIATION FOR DEVELOPMENT
"United in Diversity"

5th Jun, 2022

From the office of the chairperson.


Condemnation of the Arrest and torture of Ajak Aliel Ajak, Mapiny Chok Mapiny, Arol Chol Marou and Mangong Juac in Tonj North county by National security General, Mawien-magol.

We had received with sadness and disturbances from within us, the illegal arrest, torture and detention of the above mentioned young people from both Majak and Alabek Payams of Lou Mawien community. The young men were arrested this morning of Sunday the 5th of June. They were seen being driven to unknown location in a national security's pick up land cruiser. The motif of the arrest, torture and detention is attributed to the fact that the young men refused to participate in the faked community peace conference which is being forced on the community by Gen. Mawien-magol Mawien, Abur Achol Chol, Hon. Mawien Dhee, Athuai Athuai and commissioner Kuol Akoon of Tonj North county. It is really very bad that the members of the group are using their resources and positions to oppress and blackmail the innocent civilians in order to tune them towards their self-interests.


We strongly condemned as Majak Payam youth leadership in Juba that illegal arrest, torture and detention of the youths and urge both National and the state governments to immediately intervene and release these young people while they hold account those perpetrators behind the arrest. What we know is that the act committed by these youths in refusing to go to participate in the so called peace conference is not a national security threat neither is it of state or local security threat. It is just their individual right to do so.

we call upon the National security leadership in Juba to immediately pay keen attention to the activities of General Mawien-magol in Lou Mawien community. It is not the first time this particular General acted like this, the first was in 2018 when he tied one of the community youth by the name Malual Lual known as Malual Auling behind the military tank and pulled him anguishly on the ground just to blackmail him to not accept the creation of a new county in the community by then and in the end nothing was done. National security is a very credible institution which South Sudanese have faith in. It shouldn't be allowed to be abused and made unpopular by one person. We know the president ordered the Generals in active service like Gen. Magol not practice politics and stir up communities but Gen. Magol had defied this order and indulges himself in stirring up communities in Lou Mawien for his own interests. Very unfortunate!

In our humble opinion, we believe Peace shouldn't be blackmailing. It should be voluntary. It is not individual but a common belonging. If one owns it and forces people to it, then there must be something wrong with it and so Forcing people to participate in the peace-making is in doubt the credibility of Gen. Magol's peace in the first place.

Sign 

Nelson Wol Machin Abalgak,
Chairperson of Majak Youth Association for Development (MYAD)



Annex 17: Statement by SSPM/A, dated 22 July 2022, concerning operations in Mayom



**SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT (SSPM)
SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S ARMY (SSPA)
SSPM/SSPA GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
DAJO, UPPER NILE REGION**



SSPM/SSPA/7/025/2022

22nd July 2022

Re- SSPM/A Press release

Major General Kerubino Ruay Tap, the SSPDF Commander of 4th infantry Division came to Mayom town, unity state last week with intention to clear Mayom area of the SSPM/A forces and launched an attack on SSPM/A forces at Bong on 21/7/2022, killing one SSPA soldier. The SSPM/A forces retaliated immediately by attacking and capturing Mayom this morning on 22/7/2022, around 0300 Hours AM.

The SSPM/SSPA high command has directed the SSPM/A forces to withdraw from Mayom town to nearby villages where they shall be re-organized and conduct similar operations against military objectives, regime pro-militias and regime installations in Western Upper Nile **(Unity state)** and part of Warrap, Northern Bhar El Ghazal and Raja.

As part of our rule of engagement, the SSPM/SSPA shall be committed to minimize unnecessary suffering of civilians and other non-combatants including religious people, correspondents, local and international NGOs and foreign nationals.

1

Chairman and Commander-in-Chief



The SSPM/SSPA is hereby cautioning the international oil workers in Western Upper Nile and Upper Nile regions to be evacuated immediately within one week time to avoid being caught in crossfire because the regime could not guarantee their safety.

The SSPM/SSPA is committed to liberate the people of South Sudan from the dictatorship's policy of divide -and -rule along tribal lines setting tribes against tribes, institutionalized corruption and creating more territorial militias impeding formation of the national and professional army in the country for them to remain in power for the rest of their life. Our People have been tribalized by the regime. They are unable to work together to achieve justice and freedom to confide in each other or even to do much of anything at their imitative.

Therefore, It is an optional for the SSPM/SSPA to choose violent means because all forms of peaceful and non-violent means have failed, and we are left only with an armed resistance to liberate our people by unseating this despotic regime in the shortest time possible and install a democratic system of governance in the Republic of South Sudan to allow our citizens to choose their leaders in a free and fair elections and decide on our laws.

Finally, the SSPM/SSPA urges all the SSPDF officers and local armed youths to join the revolutionary army to rescue our country from disintegrating into tribal factions.



No foreign saviours that shall come to our help. Some foreign states will even assist the regime to advance their own economic or political interests and some foreign states will act against a regime only to gain their own economic, political, or military control over the country.

The foreign states may become actively involved for positive purpose only when the internal resistance movement has already began shaking the regime, it will therefore, focus international attention on brutal nature on the regime. Therefore, international pressure will be very useful when they are supporting a powerful internal Resistance Movement like the SSPM/SSPA. However, in the absence of a strong internal resistance movement, such actions by foreign states are unlikely to happen. Let us help ourselves by standing together so that we must unseat this repressive regime so that we enjoy Permanent peace, justice, and freedom in our beloved nation.

The Chairman and Commander -in-Chief of the SSPM/SSPA congratulates the SSPM/A gallant forces for capturing Mayom town, unity state.

SSPM/SSPA- Oriaah!! Victory is ours!!!




General Stephen Buay Rolnyang
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief
SSPM/SSPA

3

Chairman and Commander-in-Chief



Annex 18: Statement by the SSPDF on attack on Mayom town, dated 29 July 2022


In conclusion, the leadership of SSPDF would like to make the following assurances:

1. That surgical offensive operations will continue in order to bring to justice bandits' field commanders that include, Spiritual Leader Lt. Gen. Gai Machaek, Maj. Gen. Gatluak Majok and their subordinates.

2. That Commercial flights should continue with their normal operations since rebels operating in and around Mayom do not have capacity to showdown aircrafts.

3. Finally, allegations that Maj. Gen. Keribeno Ruai Tap, Commander of 4th Infantry Division, Brig. Gen. Kugar Yar, Military Intelligence Chief and Brig. Gen. Chabak Machiek Gatpan, Commander of 11th, Infantry Brigade were arrested in Mayom and flown to Juba is un true. To the contrary, they came to Juba to submit situational report and for further consultations with the command.

Regards



The image shows a handwritten signature in blue ink, which appears to be 'L. R. K.', written over a circular official stamp. The stamp is from the 'DIRECTORATE OF MEDIA & PRESS' at 'SSPDF - GHQS' and is dated '29 JUL 2022'. The text 'OFFICE OF SSPDF SPOKESPERSON' is visible at the bottom of the stamp.

Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang "psc"(ET)
Director for Media & Press and SSPDF Spokesman,
SSPDF GHQs-Bilpam

Annex 19: List of casualties from SSPM/A attacks on Mayom, dated 22 July 2022



Ref: RSS/USB/MC

Date: 22/07/2022

Mayom attack casualties at 2: 30 AM

Names of Deceased people

S/No	Rank	Name in full	Unit	Title
1.	Maj. Gen.	James Chuol Gatluak Manime	County	Commissioner
2.	Brig. Gen.	Simon Wayah Ruai	Wildlife Service	Chief Inspector
3.	2 nd Lt.	Mawum Matur	SSPDF	Soldier
4.	2 nd Lt.	Joklena Bakuony	Wildlife Service	Police
5.	R/SM	Reyhok Wicyey Chuol	Police Service	Policeman
6.	PVT	Yien Tap Badeng	SSOA	Soldier
7.	PVT	Gatpan Dor Madiet	SSPDF	M.I Personnel
8.	PVT	Tiem Nyok Muon	SSPDF	M.I Personnel
9.	SGT	Gatduel Jany Koh	SSPDF	Soldier
10.	PVT	Majiek Bol	Police Service	Policeman
11.	PVT	Gatziay Tetleh Leak	Police Service	Policeman
12.	PVT	Gatdet Malieth	Police Service	Policeman

Names of Wounded People

S/No	Rank	Name in full	Unit	Title
1.	Capt	Zoal Juoy Duop	SSPDF	Officer
2.	Capt.	Chipak Rok Deng	SSPDF	Officer
3.	2 nd Lt	Deng Gatjiek Patal	Police service	Policeman
4.	SGT	Mun Yoach	Police Service	Policeman
5.	PVT	Puok Kuol Gatjiek	Police service	Policeman
6.	PVT	Lam Mead Gatwech	Police service	Policeman
7.	PVT	Wadar Lual Wuor	Police service	Policeman
8.	PYT	Kuaher Mut Kernyang	Police Service	Policeman
9.	PVT	Riak Matung Bieth	Police service	Policeman
10.	PVT	Both Machuop Mathoat	Police service	Policeman
11.	Girl	Nyekuola Kotek Maliah	Civilian	Girl
12.	Woman	Nyepch Nyuon Dak	Civilian	Woman
13.	PVT	Bol Mawich Dak	SSPDF	Soldier

Sign:

Gatdet Gany Madut Dirngu
Executive Director of Mayom County

Tel: +211917728800 / 211915688199

Annex 20: Images showing involvement of Sudanese Rapid Support Forces in arrest of SSPM/A members in Sudan



Gatluak Majiok



Killing of Gatluak Majiok in Kaikang, near Mayom, in South Sudan



Annex 21: Still from a video showing execution of three SSPM/A officers near Mayom




Annex 22: SSBC Broadcast detailing food delivery to SSPDF forces on 23 September 2022




Front row centre are the SSPDF's Deputy Chief of General Staff for Logistics and Mr. Kur Ajing Ater

Annex 23: Press statement by Central Equatoria State's Youth Union in response to killings in Kajo Keji, dated 29 May 2022



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE
YOUTH UNION
United Youth for Sustainable Development



PRESS STATEMENT

29th May 2022

CONDEMNATION LETTER ON THE GRUESOME KILLINGS OF INNOCENT SOULS IN KAJO-KEJI BY SSPDF AND IN GEMEIZA AND MANGALLA PAYAMS BY MURLE YOUTH AND IN KISARO CATTLE CAMPS BY DINKA BOR.

The Youth Of Central Equatoria State had learnt with regret about the barbaric and heinous acts of killings to the innocent civilians in Kajo-Keji county Kangapo (II) Kiri Boma.

1. On the 26th May 2022, where three young men were brutally killed by South Sudan Peoples Defense Forces (SSPDF) as their pictures are circulating on the social media. The victims of these unprovoked killings are Savior Yamba (18years old), Justin Lisok (17years old) and Taka Ika Wani (38 years old).
2. On 16th May 2022 another young man was killed in Nyepo Payam in which the perpetrators who are heartless took a photo over the dead body stepping on the late.
3. On 21st, May 2022, the Murle youth attacked Pokor Village of Kanyawai Boma, Gemeiza killing three innocent souls, one woman and two old men who were cultivating in their farms and were forced to leave their children as orphans on no account at all. Their names are: Cecilia Twori, Aquilino Wani and Angelo Kinyong.
4. On the same date 26th May 2022, while the people were still mourning the deceased, the Murle youths attacked a kraal in Kworojik village of Yeki Boma, Mangaia Payam which claimed two lives of young men called Lodu Kenyi and Gore Mario while Kenyi Gal and Lukenyi have sustained serious injuries and they are in critical condition at Giada military hospital in Juba.
5. On 26th May 2022 at 5:00 am, the Dinka Bor attacked the Mundari at Kisaro cattle Camp and they killed three innocent persons and wounding one person now at Giada military hospital. The names of the deceased are: Luko Wani Makej, Malie Gulou and Loku Jesh.


The youth of Central Equatoria State strongly condemn these evil behaviors against our people in their localities and those who are still recovering from the stigma of being forced as refugees in the neighboring countries.

The CESYU leadership calls upon the national Government in Juba to intervene and urge the government of Central Equatoria State and the Pibor Administrative Area to urgently cooperate to resolve this issue once and for all.


And we call for the immediate replacement of Col. Kamilo the area commander of SSPDF in Kajo-Keji for failing to apprehend the culprits as this act will build mistrust with the SSPDF.

#END#

Address: Youth Training Center - Nimara Talata – Juba, South Sudan
Email: cesyouthunion@gmail.com



Annex 24: Statement on killings in Kajo Keji by Central Equatorian Member of Parliament, dated 27 May 2022



The three civilians shot dead by the SSPDF are:

S/No	Name	Age	Remark
1.	Mr. Sevious Yambe Lomuresuk	18 years	Killed
2.	Mr. Justin Lisok Lomuresuk	16 years	Killed
3.	Mr. Taha Yiga Wani	38 years	Killed

All the deceased are from itorgwe village of Kiri Boma, Kangepo Two payam.

Rt. Hon. Speaker

These gruesome intentional killing of my people has been happening without prevention to the next victim nor attempt of stopping it from reoccurrences.

As I write, justice for the deceased has not been served. With such, making the people very vulnerable and deterring, depriving and preventing all efforts for the return of the displaced and the refugees to their ancestral land in Central Equatoria State and negatively impacting the lives of kajo-keji people.

Find herein attached picture from the scene of the heinous crime



Rt. Hon. Speaker

On May 21, 2022 at 2:00 Pm, some Murle Armed Civilians attacked village called Pokoro of Kanyara Boma, Gqmeiza killing three people of whom one is a woman while the deceased were cultivating farmland.

S/No	Name	Age	Remark
1.	Akuilino Wani	62 years	Killed
2.	Yohana Kinyong	52	Killed
3.	Cicilia Twori	Unknown	killed

Again on May 25, 2022, some Dinka Bor armed cattle keepers attacked Kisaro Cattle Camp and they killed three people and wounded a person who is currently nursing serious wounds at Giada Military Hospital.

S/No	Name	Remark
1.	Malie Gulou	Killed
2.	Loku Jesh	Killed
3.	Luko Wani Makej	Killed

Also on May 26, 2022 some Murle Youth attacked a kraal in Kworojik village of Mangala Payam which two people were killed and one injured from Mundari and one person from Murle also got killed.

S/No	Name	Remark
1.	Lodu Kenyi	Killed
2.	Kenyi Gai	Killed
3.	Lukenyi	Seriously injured
4.	Unkown Murle Youth	Killed

Rt. Hon. Speaker

As you are aware about the plan launched by the Government of Central Equatoria through Juba County as published in so many media outlets during the launching of Juba County Modern Maternity (Modern hospital for women), the project is ongoing with exceptional cases and challenges.

But on May 19, 2022, to our surprise, the SSPDF fence the large portion of the land including the main road leading to the facility and the facility itself. This has negatively impact the ongoing project which situated on the northern Juba, South of Bilpam. This is second to that one of Garbu where both the Governor and his officials escaped death narrowly.

The mentioned facility is aimed to serve the biggest population of Juba if given chance to be completed by the State Government as health is wealth, calm and restrain has to be maintained through rule of law rather than intimidation and threats.

Hon- PLD

Rt. Hon. Speaker

In lieu of all the aforementioned citations I jotted, read together with the above mentioned provisions as cited herein, I am hereby humbly moving the motion to summon the undermentioned constitutional post holders to appear before the august house in shortest time possible to give accurate and comprehensive statements regarding their mandates in protecting the people and their properties.

1. The Hon. Minister of Defence should be summoned to answer some questions related to her Ministry.
2. The Hon. Governor of Central Equatoria should be summoned on the same issues raise hereinabove.
3. The Hon. Chief Administrator of Pibor Administrator Area should be summoned on the same.

In conclusion, I will appreciate on behalf of my people if the August house shall adopt my recommendations as mentioned hereunder:

1. Immediate investigation of the barbaric and heinous act in Kajo-keji County.
2. Immediate reconsideration and replacement of the army Commander in Kajo-keji by any other civilian friendly Commander.
3. The Council of States to initiate Commissioners Forum to enhance coordination and cooperation between Commissioners in all the 10 States and 3 Administrative Areas.
4. Central Equatoria State Government must disburse Security and Development Funds to all its Counties.
5. The Council of States must consider punitive measures over serious persistence administrative and security failures.

Signed

Hon. Paulino Lukudu Obede
Central Equatoria State
Member, Decentralized Governance and States Affairs Committee

Hon - PLO

Annex 25: Statement by the Pojulu community on killings in Kajo Keji



Pojulu Information Desk (PID)

pojuluinfordisk@gmail.com

No. # 20220530-3A

Subject: Condemnation
Reference: SSPDF-Massacre

On behalf of Pojulu Communities worldwide, we condemn in the strongest possible terms the recent egregious and uncouth killing of three youth in Kari Boma, Kajo Keji County of Central Equatoria State by some ill-disciplined members of the SSPDF.

The arbitrary killing of these unarmed youth is a flagrant violation of humanitarian principles enshrined in the International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law, and International Jurisprudence whereof, conflict parties must protect children (youth) from being killed, maimed, or injured.

No justification whatsoever would warrant the killing and display of the victims as if they were some animal trophies. Whichever reasons may have prompted the members of the SSPDF to carry out such a barbaric act, South Sudan is a country governed by the rule of law and the victims would have to be brought to a court of justice.

We, therefore, demand from the Government of Central Equatoria State, the Chief of Staff of Defense Forces of the SSPDF, the immediate arrest of the SSPDF members and their subsequent trial in a court of law.


We also want to extend our heartfelt condolences to the bereaving family, friends, and relatives of the victims and pray that God rests their souls in peace.

Sincerely,
Pojulu Information Desk (PID), Admin

Signature: _____

Annex 26: Photograph of civilians killed in Kajo Keji

Several photographs of the victims of the killings in Kajo Keji were widely shared on social media in South Sudan. Several were also obtained and verified independently by the Panel. One of the photographs, depicting the same scene at a slightly different time, was also included in the Statement on killings in Kajo Keji by Central Equatorial Member of Parliament, dated 27 May 2022, included as annex 23, lending further corroboration to the images.



Annex 27: Overview of South Sudan's outstanding disclosed debts as of June 2022

Republic of South Sudan external Debt												
Loan codes	Creditor Name	Currency	Principal	Disbursed Amount	Undisbursed Amount	Interest Rate	Interest Charged repaid	Principal repaid	Outstanding Debt	Start Date	Grace Period	Maturity / Payment Dates
WORLD BANK LOANS												
IBADP220	Statistical Capacity Building Project	USD	8,000,000	8,282,298.84	717,401.06	15% 2%	32,811.87	132,630.18	8,149,668.69	15 Jan 2021	2Yrs	11 Jan 2021 15 Jan 11 June
IDA 14010	Health Rapid Response project	USD	10,000,000	9,047,211.71	912,788.29	15% 2%	42,300.87	-	9,047,211.71	13 April 2024	8 yrs	15 April 21 15 April 11 Oct
IBADP216	Health rapid needs	USD	21,000,000	21,000,000.00	3,000,000.00	15% 2%	539,860.00	-	22,000,000.00	15 April 2024	7Yrs	15 April 21 15 April 13 Oct
IDA 12840	Subey Net	USD	21,000,000	18,753,267.91	2,246,732.09	15% 2%	144,521.20	-	18,753,267.91	01 Dec 2021	6Yrs	01 Dec 20 01 June 01 Dec
IDA 13630	E.A Regional Canal	USD	80,000,000	1,770,207.69	78,229,792.31	15% 2%	23,721.28	-	1,770,207.69	01 June 2021	8Yrs	01 June 20 01 June 01 Dec
IDA 13130	Local Government Service Delivery	USD	50,000,000	44,493,048.68	5,506,951.32	15% 2%	207,866.30	-	44,693,048.68	13 April 2021	10Yrs	13 April 2021 13 Oct 2032
IMF Loans												
IMF CRF 1		USD	270,904,170	270,904,170	-	-	-	-	270,904,170			
IMF CRF 2		USD	174,904,170	174,904,170	-	-	-	-	174,904,170			
African Development Bank												
			27,518,800	18,545,177	8,991,628	0	128,310	-	18,545,177			
Financial Institutions Development Bank Loans												
		Currency	11,170,000	7,600,000	3,570,000.00	0.00%	41,618.58	0	7,600,000.00	22 May 2017	10 Yrs	22 May 20 1 February 3 July
		USD	1,725,000	816,628	908,372.29	0.00%	33,821.07	0	816,627.71	22 May 2017	10 Yrs	22 May 20 1 February 3 July
		USD	14,641,800	39,128,344	4,383,215.73	0.00%	47,130.17	0	39,128,344.30	22 May 2017	10 Yrs	22 May 20 1 February 3 July
Other creditors												
			8,077,000,000	8,077,000,000	-	0	167,521,610	6,552,136,510	1,701,871,390			
	Subsea Energy	USD	800,000,000	660,000,000	-	-	28,874,516.16	471,241,290.01	1,328,717,111.11	Apr-17		Dec-18
	Treasury Energy	USD	300,000,000	300,000,000	-	-	-	300,000,000	-			
	Abramco	USD	400,000,000	400,000,000	-	-	-	211,254,737.42	188,745,262.58	May 2018	1YR	March 2023 (4YRS)
	Abramco	USD	250,000,000	250,000,000	-	-	-	250,000,000	-	Oct 2018	1YR	April 2021 (3 YRS)
	China Export-Import Bank	USD	150,000,000	150,000,000	-	2.00%	2,995,374.93	10,999,987.67	177,000,012.33	21 January 2018	5Yrs	21 Jan 2021 1 January and 11 July
	Qatar National Bank	USD	300,000,000	300,000,000	-	0	-	114,190,641.90	185,809,358.10			June 17 2018 June 17 2027
	TFA	USD	3,028,000,000	3,028,000,000	-	0	-	3,028,000,000	-			
	NAASDEC	USD	530,000,000	530,000,000	-	-	130,655,710.11	117,698,181.20	411,344,818.89			
Grand Total in USD			8,478,848,979	8,570,798,218	99,944,713	0	103,481,493	6,577,468,218	2,031,515,981			

Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning

Annex 28: Response from Dr Joseph Monytil Wejang, Governor of Unity State, dated 17 November 2022



REPUBLIC OF SOUTHSUDAN
GOVERNMENT OF UNITY STATE - BENTIU
SECRETARIAT GENERAL
 Office of the Governor
The Governor



VERY URGENT

17th of November 2022,

MICHAEL GIBB
 Co-ordinator
 Panel of Experts on South Sudan
 (Extended pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2633 (2022))
 United Nations N.Y. 10017
 (212) 963-5598
biggs@un.org
 New York
 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Mr. Gibb,

**RE: ALLEGATIONS THAT I WAS INVOLVED IN EXTRA-JUDICIAL
 KILLINGS IN KAIKANG IN UNITY STATE, SOUTH SUDAN**

Dear Mr. Gibb,

I have received your letter of November 4, 2022 in which the UN Panel of Experts for South Sudan makes the dreadful claim that I was not only complicit but actually participated in the killing of four members of the South Sudan People's Movement/Army who had earlier murdered the County Commissioner of Mayom County and 12 other people in Unity State where I currently serve as Governor.

Under different circumstances, I would have ignored these claims but to do so now, in the fraught circumstances of a South Sudan still in a difficult transition, would give the allegations a credibility they don't deserve with the danger that these baseless claims could then be used by others to draw adverse conclusions against me.

NMA

1

Email: unitystate-bentiu@gmail.com

Your letter makes one broad factual claim, namely, **that I commanded and controlled the armed and civilian forces that sought, captured and executed the four men and that I was, more damningly, physically present at the killing of the four at Kaikang in Unity State on the 8th of August 2022.**

The evidence offered in support of this claim is a series of photographs, some video clips of unknown provenance and witness testimony referred to but not attributed to any particular person. The rest of the 'evidence' is largely inferential.

First, it is inferred that I must have been involved in the killings because I was summoned by H.E. the President of the Republic to explain to him the situation in Unity State. The implication seems to be that H.E. would not have issued such summons if he thought that I was not involved.

Second, my complicity is also inferred from a letter written by the South Sudan Council of State to H.E. the President asking that I be fired.

Third, the other inferences make no links to the extra-judicial killings. Instead, they accuse me or my allies of a host of other violations: they have been intimidating civilians in IDP camps and, in one specific instance, they threatened an individual, a youth leader, who has since fled Unity State in fear for his life.

My response to the claims in your letter is in two parts. In the first part, following immediately below, I have summarised my rebuttal to the Panel's four principal claims. In the second part, I furnish the Panel with more detail, providing factual background to each of my responses and- where necessary- adding an analysis of the South Sudan legal context to buttress the facts.

Part 1: Summary Rebuttal of the Panel's Claims

I wish to make five statements in rebuttal to the Panel's four principal claims.

- a) The most damaging claim – which also seems to serve as the prop of the case against me - is that I had 'command' and 'control' of the forces and civilians who perpetrated the killings. This claim is given credence, the letter implies, by the further claim that I was physically present at the execution of the men on the 8th of August 2022.

This claim is **patently false**. It can only be one of two things: **a cruel case of mistaken identity or an egregious fabrication made by people who are recklessly indifferent to the damage their lies have the potential to cause.** I spent the 8th of August with chiefs

NMN

and administrators in Mankien Payam, more than 60 kilometres away. There is a press release issued by my press unit reporting the proceedings in Mankien (See the attached press statement) and a video-recording of the proceedings made by an official videographer showing me physically present. (An official recording is herewith attached)

- b) The second claim is that H.E. the President summoned me to explain to him the situation in Mayom. The inference seems to be that H.E.'s summons to me were accusatory, implying that somehow I was involved in the killings.

If this is the meaning of the claim in your letter, it is both erroneous and unfortunate. Both constitutionally and politically, State Governors are the eyes of President in the States. When threats to peace and security sprout in a State, the President's first call is to his most important security apparatus in the State. The apex security co-ordinating institution in each State in the Republic is the State Security Committee. That Committee is chaired by the Governor. Who would you and the Panel have the President call first when there are serious lapses of security if not the Governor?

- c) A third claim is that the Council of State had written to H.E. the President requesting him to fire me. The inference seems to suggest that the Council of State made this request arising from its concern over my personal involvement in the killings.

Again, **if that was your inference, it is deeply mistaken.** In fact, the Council of State had first summoned me to discuss the general state of security in both Mayom and Leer Counties of Unity State. Arising from that discussion and the Council's broader concerns about rising insecurity in the two counties, the Council had asked me to fire the County Commissioners for the two counties of Koch and Mayendit. I had then pointed out to the members that whereas before the Revitalised Peace Agreement Governors could – and often did fire county commissioners, that power had since been removed from them and vested in the President of the Republic. My refusal to act outside the scope of the powers of the Governor was the trigger for the Council's request to H.E. to fire me. As it is, the response from the Presidency to the Council of State rejected the request to fire me and confirmed that my reading of the law was correct. (Attached please find the response from the Office of the President)

- d) **The evidence adduced by the Panel to support the various allegations against me is thin and fragmentary** and much of what is laid out to anchor points a), b) & c above is heavily drawn from press accounts and video clips taken by amateurs or participants

MIN

in the events surrounding the killings. Of particular concern to me is the fact that though your letter and the Panel's Monthly Update to the Security Council for August 2022 indicates that there are also documents and interviews that buttress these press accounts and video-clips, I am unable to find a single fact or claim in the letter or the Monthly Update that is footnoted to an interview or a document.

- e) In addition to these claims, **your letter has conflated state and national responsibilities**. The result is that the Panel would have me perform functions that are vested by the laws in the national government and South Sudan people Defence Forces (SSPDF) whilst at the same time implying that I should not perform duties that the law obliges me to. Thus, the letter charges that I had command and control of the SSPDF—which would be a bold usurpation of the mandate of the national government's functions. The same letter then condemns me for turning up on the 22nd of July at the site where Commissioner Gatluak and the accompanying 12 others were murdered even though my appearance there was consistent with my role as Governor and Chair of the State Security Committee. In those two capacities, it was my job to co-ordinate, but not command responses to the breakdowns of security.

My answer to the Panel's principal claims can then be summarised as follows: **The allegation that I was complicit in the extra-judicial killing of the four men at Kaikang is meritless and wholly lacking a factual and legal basis.**

PART 2: DETAILED RESPONSE TO THE PANEL'S VARIOUS CLAIMS.

In this part I wish to organise my responses in nine (9) sub-headings as follows:

- 1. The Core Allegations Against me**
- 2. The Sources of the Panel's Evidence against me**
- 3. The Political and Military Context of the Violence in Unity State**
- 4. The Allegations about My role in the Extra-judicial Killings**
 - a. Rallying Soldiers and Civilians**
 - b. The Governor's Role in the Security of the State**
 - c. Presence at the Executions in Kaikang**
- 5. The Law on Command and Control of Military Operations**
- 6. The Council of State's Request to H.E. the President to Fire Me**
- 7. The Youth who fled on Account of Threats**
- 8. Intimidation of civilians in IDP camps**
- 9. Conclusion**

1. The Core Allegations Against me

Handwritten signature/initials

Your letter's central claim is that "forces and civilian authorities" under my command "participated in the extrajudicial execution of four individuals affiliated with the SSPM/A opposition armed group in the Mayom region of Unity State in July 2022." The letter says that my culpability is founded on five discrete claims, namely, 1) that I was personally present at the execution of three of those men at Kaikang; 2) that I was summoned by H.E. the President to explain the killings; 3) that an unnamed youth leader—whose party affiliation is not identified—has fled Unity State after asking me to resign in the wake of the killings; 4) that the Council of State has written to H.E. asking him to fire me and 5) that some people—allegedly associated with me or my office—have threatened civilians in IDP camps if they criticise the Unity State government. According to the letter, these killings were either reprisals or revenge killings carried out following SSPM/A operations that had targetted government forces and killed the Mayom County Commissioner by burning him and twelve other people alive in his house.

This letter is a detailed response to each of these claims. However, before I make a substantive response to each discrete allegation, I would like to begin with two general comments, that is to say, 1) a comment on the sources of the Panel's evidence against me and 2) a discussion of the political context of these killings which is critical to the matter but has been ignored by the Panel.

2. The Sources of the Panel's Evidence against Me

According to your letter, the Panel of Experts relied on evidence drawn from documents unidentified and interviews with unnamed persons conducted by the Panel. However, these are the documents footnoted in your letter: a report from Eye Radio for the 24 August 2022, titled "Council of States writes to President Kiir to fire Monytul"¹; a report from Number One Citizen Daily dated the 19 August 2022, titled "Unity governor clarifies suspected killing to President Kiir"; a report in Sudan's Post, titled "Kiir summons Governor Monytul over Mayom extrajudicial killings"², a report in Sudan's Post titled, "Youth leader flees into hiding in Unity State after asking Governor Manytul to resign" dated the 11 of September 2022; a report in the Sudan Tribune, titled "Sudan arrests key rebel officers, hands them to South Sudan" dated the 8 of August 2022; and a report from Eye Radio, Bentiu protestor: "I can't walk or urinate" dated the 8 of September 2022.³

¹ <https://www.eyeradio.org/council-of-states-writes-to-president-kiir-to-fire-monytul/>

² <https://www.sudanpost.com/kiir-summons-governor-manytul-over-mayom-extrajudicial-killings/>

³ <https://www.eyeradio.org/bentiuprotector-i-cant-walk-or-urinate>

The rest of the footnoted evidence is basically a collection of still photos and videos downloaded by or given to the Panel by those that they met.

I am deeply concerned about the Panel's heavy reliance on media accounts and amateur videos to ground the serious and injurious allegations against me. As the UN Security Council itself noted in one of the recitals in the 2015 Resolution, the Media in South Sudan has not always played a positive role or acted in the best tradition of independent media. The Resolution itself noted the inherent biases that are, unfortunately rife in South Sudan Media, lamenting that South Sudan media had been used to broadcast hate speech and transmit messages instigating sexual and ethnic violence. Most critical for this letter, the Resolution had even called on the Government of the Republic of South Sudan "to take appropriate measures to address such activity." With the greatest respect, then, I submit that the Panel's uncritical reliance on media stories and self-promoting videos by private militias to buttress the serious allegations in the letter does not—even on a lenient and most sympathetic reading—constitute a full, fair and impartial investigation. I will return to this point later in this response.

3. The Political and Military Context of the Violence in Unity State

I am also puzzled by the lack of any discussion of the political context of the events in the letter. I offer that context not as an excuse for the violence but to point out that by treating as straight-forward what is complex and deeply political, the Panel's approach may end up complicating rather than resolving the wider problems of South Sudan in general and of Unity State in particular. The broad-brush analysis in the Panel's Monthly Updates to the Security Council, the sources of and the nature of the evidence adduced, the rush to judgment whilst various local processes are still underway ([see discussion elsewhere in this letter](#)) has resulted in an unfortunate, extremely misleading and heavily one-sided characterisation of the unfortunate events of July 2022 in Mayom County in Unity State

Let me draw your attention to the extremely polarised and inflamed context in which these events happened. Unity State, like other parts of South Sudan is going through a difficult and fraught transition. We must frame all the issues in this larger political context.

Unity State has been, historically, one of the major sticking points between the Government and Sudan People's Liberation Movement-IO headed by Dr. Riek Machar. Dr. Machar hail from the Unity State and have long fought and resented the fact that I am Governor of Unity State. Particularly worthy of note but mentioned neither in your letter nor in any of Panel's Monthly Updates is that the person whose actions triggered these unfortunate events, the SSPM/A army Commander, Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang, a

MMW

defector from the South Sudan People's Defence Forces, wanted to be Governor of Unity State.

General Stephen Buay organised and directed the forces that murdered County Commissioner of Mayom, James Chuol Gatluak Manime. Your Monthly Report mentions—rather casually and in passing—that this murder, in which the Commissioner was incinerated alive in his house, also included “nearly a dozen government security forces.” General Buay has uploaded unapologetic audio-clips gloating over both the murder and Commissioner Gatluak and these additional murders. (**Attached for your listening is an audio of General Buay talking about those killings**)

By failing to name these actions for what they are, namely, **wanton and unprovoked acts of mass murder**, the Panel thereby fails to recognise the weight and effect that these events had on the immediate political and military realities in Unity State. General Buay's reckless actions served to inflame the raw emotions that the revitalised peace process has been trying to mend.

In the aftermath of the murders my immediate task was to arrest the rapidly escalating situation. I was in Bentiu, the state capital, on the day of the killings. As soon as I learnt of the attacks, I immediately called and briefed H.E. the President Salva Kiir. I informed H.E. that I would immediately make my way to the site of the killings—both to get a full picture of what had happened and to calm down what I already knew—and had been told—would be an extremely volatile situation.

On arrival, I found that Juba had already despatched the Deputy Chief of Defence in Charge of Operations, to take charge of the military side of the operations. My focus therefore shifted to recovery of the remains of Commissioner Gatluak and the twelve others who were immolated with him. My team and I recovered what remains we could, conducted prayers and then buried them.

The day after the prayers, and completely oblivious to the highly curdled public mood he had fomented, General Stephen Buay's men ambushed a convoy of three vehicles and burnt another 18 people to ashes. (**The extremely troubling photos of the mayhem at the scene of that ambush are attached**). This is important because it underlines what the Panel's Report and letter both ignored: The hunt for the four men who were executed at Kalkang nearly a fortnight later took place in a fraught environment ruled by public rage, emotionalism and anger over the murder and burning of at least 30 people.

4. The Allegations about My role in the Extra-judicial Killings

My own role also evolved in that highly charged context where I faced the draining task of maintaining law and order in the face of imminent disorder, even anarchy. Your letter accuses me of "rallying soldiers and inciting military action against civilians" adding that on the 26th of July I was "seen in military attire directing a counter insurgency force" during which I also promised "swift and tough punishment" against anyone linked with the SSPM/A.

My response to this is short: My primary duty was to hold fort against the incipient forces of breakdown and anarchy. I have neither the military nor the political mandate to direct counter-insurgency measures. I did not issue and could not issue directions to the military. The soldiers of the South Sudan People Defence Forces have neither a moral nor a command responsibility to comply with anything that I might direct them to do.

I want to begin by responding to these claims before answering the question of military attire.

a) Rallying Soldiers and Civilians

The evidence adduced for this claim is a still photo showing me standing amongst soldiers of the SSPDF. Quite apart from showing me dressed in military fatigues (a matter addressed below) there is nothing to say what is happening in the photo. It is not clear whether I am speaking at all let alone whether the speech is a rallying call or something else.

Unfortunately, no factual claim of evidential value can be derived from the fact that I was dressed in military fatigues. And the reason for my kitting out in jungle camouflage is straight-forward. I was a civilian in an area of active military operations. If I had turned out in civilian clothes I would have stood out like a sore thumb, easy target for a shooter. I had already been threatened by SSPM/A in the wake of the murder of Commissioner Gatluak. The threat was specific to me and unambiguous: my funeral would be next. I am a former soldier and I have learnt to take such threats seriously. That is why I turned up appropriately camouflaged, to blend in with the soldiers on site.

b) The Governor's Role in the Security of the State

I am puzzled by statements in your letter seemingly implying that it was illegitimate for me to go to the killing site and meet with the soldiers of the SSPDF. That totally ignores my mandate as Governor and my co-ordinating role and political responsibility for the security and welfare of Unity State as the Chair of the State Security Committee. As the Transitional Constitution of Unity State makes clear, the Governor⁴ is

⁴ The Governor's office is established under Chapter 1 of Part Six of the Transitional Constitution of the Unity State (The State Executive)

the head of the government of the state⁵. In that capacity the Governor represents "the will of the people."⁶ One specific function under that broad grant of power is the duty to "preserve the security of the state." The legal machinery for security at the state level includes the State Police Service⁷ and the State Security Committee.⁸

The composition and mandate of the State Security Committee is set out in the South Sudan National Security Service Act of 2014. Under section 25 of the Act, the State Security Committee is a committee of nine (9) members consisting of the Governor and Deputy Governor as Chair and Deputy Chair respectively; the Security Advisor (if any) as a member; the State Ministers for Local Government and Finance as members; the Head of Legal Administration as a member; the Commander of the SPLA Forces in the State as a member; the State Commissioner of Police as member; and the Director of Internal Security Bureau as Secretary.

The functions of the State Security Committee are to (a) maintain and keep security in the State; (b) co-ordinate among security agencies at State level; (c) receive reports from security committees in counties; (d) submit periodical reports to the Council; and (e) carry out any assignment delegated by the Council or Technical Committee.⁹

As the Constitution, read together with the National Security Services Act, clearly shows, the Governor and the Deputy Governor- who in this case happens to be from the SPLM- IO have very important co-ordinating - but not commanding - responsibilities for security at the state level. It is in this context - as the Chair of the State Security Committee - that I called for and addressed an urgent gathering of the various forces, emphasizing, in firm terms, that the fragile peace in Unity State could not hold unless the culprits - clearly identified and known, by the recorded admission of General Stephen Buay to be members of the SSPM/A - were brought to book. (in audio-clip attached above) I mentioned the SSPM/A as culprits by name. They, too, have named themselves as such. Given this, I am not clear **why my identifying SSPM/A as the culprits by name** should ineluctably lead your Panel to infer that I thereby condoned or was complicit in the extra-judicial killing of the four.

⁵ See article 99(1) of the Transitional Constitution of Unity State

⁶ See id.

⁷ Established under part eight, chapter 1 from article 129 of the Transitional Constitution of Unity State.

⁸ Established under part eight, chapter 1 under article 133(1) of the Transitional Constitution of Unity State.

⁹ See section 26 of the South Sudan National Security Service Act of 2014

NMP

I admit that I addressed the security forces: it was part of my job. Not to have done so after such wicked destructiveness in an environment of charged emotions would have been a serious dereliction of my duties as laid down in both national and state constitutions and the laws of South Sudan. Indeed, that is the constitutional and legal context in which H.E. the President summoned me to brief him on the events in Mayom County and to outline to him the steps my government had taken to restore normalcy and deal with threats to peace. I find the notion—implicit in your letter—that the presidential summon was somehow political or moral censure as wholly unwarranted and, frankly, risible. Governors are the eyes of the President on the ground. Who, if not the Governor, should the President call on for explanations when threats to law and order sprout and spread within a state?

That said, and as I explain below, in matters of restoring security in which military operations are involved, the Office of Governor—my office—may lead but it does not rule: the Governor has no constitutional, legal, political or moral mandate, or capacity, to command and execute military operations.

c) Presence at the Executions in Kaikang

The claim that I was present at executions at Kaikang is, supposedly, the *coup de grace* of the Panel's case against me. It is unfortunately the proof—if such were needed of the dangers of relying on media's 'pictorial' evidence.

Let me start with a brief background: Those responsible for the murder of Commissioner Gatluak and the 12 people immolated along with him were sought, found and arrested on the 6th of August, 2022. On the 8th of August they were executed at Kaikang. Your letter claims that I was present during their execution and a still photo, supposedly showing me mingling with the soldiers, is attached to your 'bundle of evidence.' That claim is patently false and the person in the picture that you attached is certainly not me.

As it happens, on the day of the executions, Tuesday, August the 8th 2022, I was more than 60 kilometres away in Mankien Payam where I chaired a one-day conference of traditional chiefs and administrators from the eleven payams of Mayom county. There is both an official account of this event and a video-recording of the proceedings made by an official videographer (See attached press statement and accompanying video above).

Though—as the evidence shows—I was not at the scene of the execution, I was subsequently briefed about the situation in Kaikang. Once again, I think that it is important that the Panel understand the

context. According to my information, Kaikang was a scene of utter chaos on the day of the killings. The crowd was emotionally charged and acted disorderly and the mood was generally foul and tempestuous. As narrated to me, the officers on site lost control in the ensuing disorder. The relatives of the assassinated Commissioner and of the men murdered with him were on the scene and grief and anger were expressed equally and loudly. The combined mix of soldiers, armed local youth and an angry public wrought an atmosphere of 'nobody-in-charge' which left it unclear who was making orders, including—crucially—who made the order to execute the culprits. In my view, context calls for a judicious investigation and a measured response. Peace and justice should be achieved together.

I believe that this would be a complete answer to the allegation that I was—in effect—an accomplice in extra-judicial killings. Even so, I would like to highlight a number of legal issues and actions regarding the command and control of the operation that led to the executions that have been overlooked in your letter. Let me begin with the legal framework for command and force accountability during operations.

5. The Legal Framework for the Command and Control of Military Operations

The assassination of Commissioner Gatluak and the 12 others killed with him was a military operation by SSPM/A. Consequently, the operation to search for and apprehend the killers involved was also a military rather than a police operation. Had it been a state police operation, it would have been under my command. However, as a military operation, it was fully under the SSPDF chain of command. All the operations undertaken to apprehend the culprits were managed under the framework established by Sudan People's Liberation Army Act 2009 (as amended). That act is comprehensive: it sets out the parameters of command; defines the chain of command and accountability and provides for the punishment of military and civil offences committed during operations.

The claim that forces and civilians under my command conducted both the operations and carried out the execution is speculative and fallacious. The Sudan People's Liberation Army Act 2009 defines what both "command" and "commanding officer" mean in the context of operations.¹⁰ Provisions on command and control of military operations are then detailed in chapter 3. Section 13 of the act vests overall command in the President, who is also the Commander-in-Chief.

¹⁰ See section 5 Interpretation, "Command means authority exercised by Sudan People's Liberation Army commander over his or her sub-ordinates by virtue of rank and, or assignment." A commanding officer on the other hand "means an officer in charge of Sudan People's Liberation Army combat and service support units."

In that capacity, the President sets the political and military objectives of the SPLA. He issues directives for the deployment of the forces. He frames and issues military orders to the Chief of Defence Forces. In performing some of his functions, the President is aided by the Command Council established under section 15. From the Commander-in-Chief, the chain of command flows down to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief and from him or her to the Chief of the Defence Forces and the Deputies of the Chief of Defence Forces.

As I have said elsewhere in this letter, on the 22nd of July 2022 when I arrived at the site of where Commissioner Gatluak and the 12 others were burnt alive, I found that a Deputy Chief of the Defence Forces in Charge of Operations already had arrived from Juba and taken charge of the military side of the affairs. This underlined to me that the national government understood how dangerous these killings were to South Sudan's delicately poised peace process. At no point from that day, did command ever shift from the South Sudan Defences Forces to me.

Whilst I am distraught by the claims your letter alleges about me, I am anxious that the truth about who ordered the executions on the 8th and why be established. As you probably know, South Sudan has a comprehensive legal framework for dealing with wrongdoing—including wrongful killings—by members of the South Sudan People's Defence Forces. The main legal provisions are to be found in both the Sudan People's Liberation Army Act of 2009 and the South Sudan Penal Code Act of 2008—especially Chapters XVI (covering offences related to death) and XVII (covering offences related to bodily injury and Intimidation).

In my view, the fact that the Mayom killings are cognisable offences under the laws of South Sudan means that there are local mechanisms for investigating and punishing such conduct. I am convinced that this is in fact the reason why H.E. the President Salva Kiir took action, on the 8th of September 2022, to establish a high-level Investigation Committee with ample powers to investigate the killings and the factors that may have led to them. The Committee has a four-fold mandate, namely: 1) to investigate cases of insecurity including reported cases of extra-judicial killings, rape and destruction of property; 2) to summon and interrogate any suspect(s) implicated in the incident, including those in custody; 3) to apprehend and interrogate any suspects at large where appropriate and 4) to identify, summon and interview any witness or witnesses. The Investigation Committee was initially given a very tight deadline but this has been subsequently extended to enable them conduct a fair, full and impartial investigation. That process is now actively underway.

Given the on-going national processes, my immediate concern is that the Panel has prejudged matters. Your letter draws definitive conclusions about

my alleged culpability without referencing the efforts of the South Sudan Government to get to the bottom of the matter. It looks to any disinterested by-stander that in this matter, the UN is acting in parallel to—and preempting rather than supporting and reinforcing—the efforts of Government of South Sudan.

It is my firm belief that an incomplete or partial investigation that isolates and condemns some actors but not others before all facts are publicly established is inimical to the peace efforts in South Sudan. In truth, any investigation that is not legally and politically even-handed would only inflame the combustible realities on the ground in Unity State and in the Republic of South Sudan more generally.

6. The Council of State Request to H.E. the President to Fire Me

I have to say that I don't quite understand how this relates to the extra-judicial killings. I assume that the Panel presupposes that the immediate reason for the Council of State's letter to the President requesting that I be fired—(See attached letter)—is my alleged culpability in the extra judicial killings. If that is the claim, then it is another patently skewed misreading of the facts. It is also an extremely partial interpretation of the political context. That context is defined by two summons that the Council of State had issued to me.

In its summons, the Council had asked me to explain two violent incidents, one in the Mayom County—covered in your letter—and another in Leer County—not mentioned in your letter. The incident in Leer involved a violent confrontation between SPLM-IO and community youth militia. The immediate trigger were grievances by the local youth that SPLM-IO cadres were rustling and selling cattle in order to fund conflict. The notoriety of cattle rustling is a matter of public record and has been noted by the UN itself.

This, then, was the background against which the Council of State asked me to fire two County Commissioners whom the SPLM-IO had accused—in a series of social media uploads and postings—of being complicit in the violence in both Leer and Mayom Counties. The gravamen of the Council of State's complaint to the President was that I had failed to sack the two Commissioners, which they saw as a dereliction of duty on my part. I explained to them that since the Revitalised Peace Agreement in 2018, Governors could no longer fire County Commissioners. That power now vested in the President.

In rejecting the request from the Council of State, the Office of the President correctly pointed out that if a Governor fired a County Commissioner such a Governor would be acting *ultra vires* the relevant laws.

7. The Claim that Some Unnamed Youth was forced to flee on Account of Threats

I am unsure how to respond to this claim since the youth leader was neither named nor his political affiliation identified. I do not even know when and where he called for my resignation. The truth is that in the fluid political environment in South Sudan and in Unity State, in particular, the society is suspicious and polarised both in terms of identity and politics. There is a multitude of armed people. Chaos can arise spontaneously or it can arise because it has been planned by those who don't want peace. That means that at, any time, both the reality and perception of threat are widespread. I have myself received an explicit threat to my life. I know many more people who have received such threats and quite a few who have been killed. I am also aware that in a charged political environment, people will make reckless comments to score political points.

Given all this, I do not know what to make of the claim around this youth leader: Who threatened him? Where? How was the threat framed? How is that linked to me or my administration? Was the threat ever reported to the authorities? Where is the record or log of that report?

8. Intimidation of civilians in IDP camps

I am unaware of any people associated with me or my government walking around IDP camps intimidating civilians. Most importantly, these IDP camps are ran by the UN. I have not received any reports from the UN Camp Administrators that members of my government are threatening the civilians in these camps. I have not seen any complaints sent to the national government in Juba. I, therefore, have no basis for official action as State Governor.

Even though both the national government and state governments are aware that IDP camps have been used—in South Sudan and elsewhere in Africa—as recruiting grounds for rebels and insurgents, the government has left these camps well alone.


9. Conclusion

In concluding my response to your letter, I wish to reiterate my commitment to peace and reconciliation in South Sudan, a country I love and have served and sacrificed for over the years.

My plea is that all well-wishers—including the UN and the Panel of Experts—do everything they can to stabilise and strengthen the political order in South Sudan in general and in Unity State in particular. Only when such order is restored and stabilised can we avoid the deadly actions that are at the heart of your letter and my response to it.

I wish you well in your work.

Yours Sincerely,



**DR JOSEPH MONYTUIL WEJANG
GOVERNOR OF UNITY STATE,
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**