



SUDAN
Omdurmân
Khartoum

Sudan: Query Response

The situation in Khartoum and Omdurman – An update (4th edition)

June 2022 (COI between 1st January 2020 – 30th April 2022)

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A. Explanatory Note

Background

This report presents Country of Origin Information (COI) on Sudan focusing on the current situation in Khartoum and Omdurman for a range of specific profiles identified to be of relevance in refugee status determination for Sudanese nationals. This report marks the fourth update and follows Asylum Research Centre's (ARC), Query Response, [The situation in Khartoum and Omdurman – An update \(3rd version\)](#) of 5 February 2020, [Query Response, The situation in Khartoum and Omdurman – An update](#) of 13 September 2018 and [Query Response, The situation in Khartoum and Omdurman](#), of 9th September 2015.

ARC was instructed to research the following issues:


What are the living conditions and treatment of those persons who habitually reside in Khartoum or Omdurman, especially those who are not originally from there, focusing on:

- *Darfuri*
- *Nuba* [Note: Not to be confused with the Nubian of north Sudan]
- *Other ethnic and/or religious minorities*
- *Students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists*
- *(Perceived) political opposition/association with opposition groups, participating in demonstrations/protests, involvement in political groups including student unions*
- *Persons who have participated in protests (inside or outside of Sudan)*
- *Persons who have shown or are perceived to have shown opposition*
- *IDPs*
- *Returnees*
- *Women*
- *Children*
- *Individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity*
- *Any other profiles not listed here but on whom relevant country information has been located*

Research focused on COI that specifically referred to these distinct profile groups, but it became necessary to expand on these profiles to also include health care workers, lawyers, artists, and teachers. It is important to note though that a range of civilians living in Khartoum and Omdurman and who have participated in protests and demonstrations have also been affected in the reporting period but that often sources do not specify the origin or profile of those targeted and arrested.

Also note that Greater Khartoum consists of the three towns of Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman. However, sources do not consistently distinguish between these and therefore when describing 'Khartoum' it should be borne in mind that they may either be referring to Khartoum the city, Greater Khartoum the tripartite area or, less often but still possible, to Khartoum State. Radio Dabanga¹ provided the following infographic of Khartoum state localities:

¹ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan's govt. militia starts 'head-shaving campaign' in Khartoum North](#), 23 September 2018



The COI presented in this report is illustrative but not exhaustive of the information available in the public domain, nor is it determinative of any individual human rights or asylum claim. All sources are publicly available and a direct hyperlink has been provided.

A list of sources and databases consulted is also provided in this report, to enable users to conduct further research and source assessments. Research concentrated on events that took place between 1st January 2020 and 30th April 2022. All sources included in this report were accessed in May and June 2022.

The following reports, which post-date the cut-off point have been included given that they address issues of relevance for this report:

- Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese military holding at least 3 journalists since early April](#), 4 May 2022
- UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022
- Al Jazeera, [Protesters remain in Sudan's prisons as dialogue is postponed](#), 10 May 2022
- UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan](#), 17 May 2022
- The Guardian, [Sudan security forces clash with protesters against military coup](#), 24 May 2022
- The Guardian, [‘Our friends didn’t die in vain’: Sudan’s activists aim to topple military regime](#), 28 May 2022
- Waging Peace, [Country situation in Sudan](#), June 2022
- UN Sudan, Statement by Adama Dieng, [UN Designated Expert on the situation of human rights in Sudan, at the end of his visit to the country on 4 June 2022](#), 4 June 2022
- Sudanese Congress Party, [Twitter posts](#), 5 June 2022

To complement the desk-based research and identified gaps in reporting on specific profiles, conversations were held with representatives of the following two organisations:

- Waging Peace
- An international organization based in Sudan

The full transcript notes, which have been shared with and signed off by the relevant interlocutors, have been attached as [Annexes](#) to this report.

Moreover, the transcription notes of a podcast deemed useful for the purpose of this report was also sought and included in this report: *Asylum Speakers*, Episode 37: *What's happening in Sudan? Everything you need to know and what you can do about it*, with *Waging Peace* of 17th January 2022.

Disclaimer

This document is intended to be used as a tool to help to identify relevant COI and the COI referred to in this report can be considered by decision makers in assessing asylum applications and appeals. While we strive to be as comprehensive as possible, no amount of research can ever provide an exhaustive picture of the situation. It is therefore important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist. **This report is also not a substitute for individualised case-specific research and therefore this document should not be submitted in isolation as evidence to refugee decision-making authorities.** Whilst every attempt has been made to ensure accuracy, the authors accept no responsibility for any errors included in this report.

B. List of Sources

Not all of the sources listed here have been consulted for each issue addressed in the report. Additional sources to those individually listed were consulted via database searches. This non-exhaustive list is intended to assist in further case-specific research. To find out more about an organisation, view the 'About us' tab of a source's website

Databases

[Asylos's Research Notes](#)

[EUAA COI Portal](#)

[European Country of Origin Information Network \(ECOI\)](#)

[Relief Web](#)

[UNHCR Refworld](#)

News

[African Arguments](#) [Sudan pages]

[Afrol News](#)

[All Africa](#)

[Al Jazeera](#)

[Ayin Network](#)

[The East African](#)

[Insecurity Insight](#)

[Inter Press Service](#)

[The New Humanitarian](#) [Sudan pages]

[Radio Dabanga](#)

[Radio Tamazuj](#)

[Reuters](#)

[Sudan In The News](#)

[Sudan Tribune](#)

Sources

[76 Crimes \[LGBT\]](#)

[Act for Sudan](#)

[Armed Conflict Location & Event Date Project \(ACLED\)](#) [Sudan pages]

[Article 19](#) [Freedom of expression and information]

[Aegis Trust](#)

[African Studies Centre Leiden](#)

[Africa Center for Strategic Studies](#)

[African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes \(ACCORD\)](#)

[African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies \(ACJPS\)](#)

[Africa Review](#)

[African Union Peace and Security Council](#)

[Alliance for Child Protection in Humanitarian Action](#)

[Amnesty International](#) [Sudan pages]

[Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit \(ATLEU\)](#)

[Assessment Capacities Project \(ACAPS\)](#) [Sudan pages]

[Association for the Prevention of Torture](#)

[Atlantic Council](#)
[Atlas of Torture](#)
[Brookings Institution](#)
[Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies](#) [Sudan pages]
[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](#)
[Centre for Security Governance](#)
[Centre for Strategic and International Studies](#)
[Child Rights International Network](#) [Sudan pages]
[Christian Solidarity Worldwide](#)
[The Christian Post](#)
[CHR Michelsen Institute](#) [Sudan pages]
[CIA World Factbook](#) [Sudan pages]
[Combatting Terrorism Center](#)
[Committee to Protect Journalists](#) [Sudan pages]
[Crisis Action](#)
[Crisis 24](#)
[Darfur Network for Monitoring and Documentation](#)
[Darfur Women Action Group](#)
[Death Penalty Worldwide \(Cornell Law School\)](#)
[Displacement Tracking Matrix \(DTM\)](#) [Sudan pages]
[Doctors Without Borders](#)
[The Economist Intelligence Unit](#) [Sudan pages]
[EASO's List of sources in its report 'Researching the situation of lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons \(LGBT\) in countries of origin'](#)
[East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project](#) [Defend Defenders](#) [Sudan pages]
[Edge Media Network](#) [LGBT]
[Eldis](#)
[Enough Project](#)
[Equal Rights Trust](#)
[Eric Reeves, Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy](#)
[European Council on Foreign Relations \(ECFR\)](#)
[European Institute of the Mediterranean \(IEMed\)](#)
[Foreign Affairs \(published by Council on Foreign Relations\)](#) [Sudan pages]
[Freedom House – Freedom in the World 2022](#) [Sudan pages]
[Frontline Defenders](#)
[Gay Star News](#)
[Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect](#)
[Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack](#) [Sudan pages]
[Global Fund for Peace](#)
[Global Gayz](#)
[GlobalSecurity.org](#)
[Governance Social Development Humanitarian Conflict \(GSDRC\)](#)
[Hands off Cain](#)
[Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research](#)
[Hudo Centre](#)
[Humanitarian Response](#) [Sudan pages]
[Hudson Institute](#)
[Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust](#) [Sudan pages]
[Humanity & Inclusion \[formerly Handicap International\]](#)
[Human Rights Watch](#) [Sudan pages]
[Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan/Small Arms Survey](#)

[Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada](#)
[Inclusive Security](#)
[Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa](#)
[Institute for Economics & Peace – Global Peace Index 2021](#)
[Institute for the Study of War](#)
[Institute for War and Peace Reporting](#)
[Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre \(IDMC\)](#) [Sudan pages]
[International Alert](#)
[International Bar Association](#)
[International Centre for Prison Studies](#)
[International Commission of Jurists](#)
[International Committee of the Red Cross \(ICRC\)](#)
[International Crisis Group](#)
[International Disability Alliance](#)
[International Federation for Human Rights](#) [Africa pages]
[International Federation of Journalists](#)
[International Freedom of Expression Exchange](#)
[International Institute for Strategic Studies](#)
[International Labour Organisation \(ILO\)](#) [Sudan pages]
[International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans and Intersex Association \(ILGA\)](#)
[International Organization for Migration \(IOM\)](#)
[International Office for Migration Sudan Mission](#)
[International Refugee Rights Initiative](#)
[International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims](#)
[International Rescue Committee](#)
[IPI Global Observatory](#)
[Jamestown Foundation](#)
[Kaleidoscope Trust](#) [LGBT]
[Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor](#)
[Long War Journal](#)
[Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders](#) [Sudan pages]
[Minority Rights Group International](#)
[Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization](#)
[Oakland Institute](#)
[OECD's Social Institutions & Gender Index](#)
[Open Society Foundations](#)
[Organization for Refuge, Asylum & Migration \(ORAM\)](#)
[Out Right Action International](#) [LGBT]
[Overseas Development Institute \(ODI\)](#)
[Oxfam](#)
[Peace Women](#)
[Penal Reform International](#)
[Physicians for Human Rights](#)
[Pink News](#) [LGBT]
[Redress](#)
[Refugees International](#)
[Reporters Without Borders](#)
[Rift Valley Institute](#)
[Rights Africa](#)
[Rights for Peace](#)
[Right to Education](#)

[Saferworld](#)
[Save the Children \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Sexual Rights Initiative](#)
[Small Arms Survey](#)
[SOGICA Database \[LGBT\]](#)
[Sudanese Archive](#)
[Sudan Democracy First Group](#)
[Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa](#)
[Sudan Consortium](#)
[Sudan Social Development Organisation](#)
[Sudan Unlimited](#)
[Their World](#)
[Transparency International](#)
[UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office – Human Rights and Democracy Reports](#)
[UNAMID \(UN African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur\)](#)
[United Nations Children’s Fund \(UNICEF\) \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[United Nations Committee Against Torture](#)
[United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights](#)
[United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women](#)
[United Nations Committee on Enforced Disappearances](#)
[United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child](#)
[United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities](#)
[United Nations Development Programme \(UNDP\)](#)
[United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees \(UNHCR\)](#)
[United Nations Human Rights Council](#)
[United Nations Human Settlements Programme \(UNHABITAT\)](#)
[United Nations Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#)
[United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan \(UNITAMS\)](#)
[United Nations News Centre](#)
[United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UNOCHA\)](#)
[United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights \(UNOHCHR\) \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict](#)
[United Nations Population Fund \(UNPFPA\)](#)
[United Nations Secretary General reports](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to education](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially in women and children](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences](#)
[United Nations Sudan](#)

[United Nations Women](#)
[United States Institute of Peace](#)
[United States Congressional Research Service](#)
[United States Department of State \[Annual human rights report; annual religious report; annual child labour report; annual trafficking report; annual terrorism report\]](#)
[Unrepresented Nations and People's Organisation](#)
[Uppsala Universitet – UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia](#)
[Waging Peace](#)
[Women Under Siege Project](#)
[World Bank \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[World Food Programme \(WFP\)](#)
[World Health Organisation \(WHO\) \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[World Organisation Against Torture \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[World Prison Brief](#)
[Women Living Under Muslim Laws](#)
[Women News Network \(WNN\)](#)
[Women's Refugee Commission](#)
[WorldWatch Monitor \[Sudan pages\]](#)

C. List of Acronyms

ACAPS	Assessment Capacities Project
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Date Project
ACJPS	African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies
ADF	Alliance Defending Freedom
ARC	Asylum Research Centre
ATLEU	Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit
BTI	Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index
CCSD	Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors
COI	Country of Origin Information
CRP	Central Reserve Police
CSW	Christian Solidarity Worldwide
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
ECFR	European Council on Foreign Relations
ECOI	European Country of Origin Information Network
EET	Emergency Event Tracking
ERC	Empowerment Removal Committee
ETD	Emergency Travel Document
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFC	Forces of Freedom and Change
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FIDH	International Federation for Human Rights
GIS	General Intelligence Service
GSDRC	Governance Social Development Humanitarian Conflict
HART	Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HUDO	Human Rights and Development Organisation
IAPD	International Alliance for Peace and Development

ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICU	Intensive Care Units
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFJ	International Federation of Journalists
IEMed	European Institute of the Mediterranean
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILGA	International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans and Intersex Association
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation
KIA	Khartoum International Airport
LGBTIQ	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex and Queer
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OMCT	World Organisation Against Torture
ORAM	Organization for Refuge, Asylum & Migration
PLACE	People's Legal Aid Centre
POR	Public Order Regime
RSF	Rapid Support Force
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SCOC	Sudanese Church of Christ
SHRM	Sudan Human Rights Monitor
SIHA	Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa
SJU	Sudanese Journalists Union
SNA	Sudan News Agency
SOGI	Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
SPA	Sudanese Professionals Association
SPEC	Sudan Presbyterian Evangelical Church

SRI	Sexual Rights Initiative
SMSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General (of the United Nations for Sudan)
SSC	Sudanese Sovereign Council
SSC	Sudan SOGI Coalition
SWANA	South-West Asia and North Africa
TLC	Transitional Legislative Council
TSC	Transitional Sovereignty Council
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHABITAT	United Nations Human Settlement Programme
UNITAMS	United Nations Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITAMS	United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan
UNOHCHR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNPFPA	United Nations Population Fund
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WHRDs	Women Human Rights Defenders
WNN	Women News Network

1. Preface: Political and security situation overview (January 2020 – April 2022)

In December 2018 a wave of protests started, triggered by price increases, which forced then President Omar-al Bashir to step down on 11th April 2019. During that time over 100 people, mainly protesters, were killed. In April 2019 a transitional military council took power. Protests continued demanding that military authorities hand over the government to civilian rule, resulting in security forces violently dispersing a sit-in in June 2019, killing up to 241 protesters² and injuring more than 700 others.³ As Human Rights Watch reported “The security forces were led by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which have a documented record of abuses and attacks on civilians in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile”.⁴ Amnesty International found that “Sudan’s crackdown on protests against the government of deposed President Omar al-Bashir in 2018 and 2019 involved all branches of the country’s security forces”, including the police, the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS – renamed in July 2019 to the General Intelligence Services (GIS)) and the RSF.⁵

In August 2019, a transitional government was formed composed of military and civilian leaders, but led by the military for the first 22 months, General Abdelfattah al-Bourhan and Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (known as ‘Hemeti’), commander of the RSF, with a civilian prime minister, Dr. Abdalla Hamdok, a former UN official, and cabinet, and subsequently chaired by a civilian for 18 months, culminating in elections in 2022. In March 2020, Dr. Abdalla Hamdok survived a “reported assassination attempt” in Khartoum.⁶

Director of research at the African Center for Strategic Studies, Joseph Siegle, importantly noted that:

Military governments have led Sudan for all but ten years since independence in 1956 [...]

The military has become accustomed to playing a dominant role in the government and economy. The security services are estimated to control over 250 companies in a range of sectors, including gold mining, livestock, arms, telecommunications, banking, and construction.⁷

Waging Peace also stated in June 2020 “The security sector has not been meaningfully reformed, making the continued involvement of military groups, and torture-prone intelligence services, in Sudan’s transitional bodies controversial”.⁸ A letter signed by 25 organisations and presented to the UN Human Rights Council in September 2020 noted that “In Khartoum and elsewhere, imbalances of power remain obvious between the civilian and military sides of the executive branch. A network of State-owned companies controlled by the military and security apparatus still operate and may even fuel crimes against civilians”.⁹

² The Guardian, [Sudan accused of masterminding lethal attacks on Khartoum protesters](#), 5 March 2020

³ See The Guardian, [Sudan accused of masterminding lethal attacks on Khartoum protesters](#), 5 March 2020; Human Rights Watch, [Sudan: A Year On, Justice Needed for Crackdowns](#), 10 April 2020; DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [An unfinished revolution: The situation of women human rights defenders in Sudan](#), December 2021, *The Sudanese Revolution*

⁴ Human Rights Watch, [Sudan: A Year On, Justice Needed for Crackdowns](#), 10 April 2020

⁵ Amnesty International, [Sudan: All security agencies that attacked protesters must be held to account](#), 10 March 2020

⁶ UN News, [Sudan Prime Minister survives attempted assassination](#), 9 March 2020

⁷ Joseph Siegle (Africa Center for Strategic Studies), [The Sudanese Military’s Interests in Civilian Rule](#), 22 March 2021 [published on Tawazun blog]

⁸ Waging Peace, [Justice and Accountability in Sudan](#), 11 June 2020, p. 2

⁹ Joint letter by 25 human rights organisations, [The Human Rights Council should support systemic human rights reforms in Sudan](#), 9 September 2020, p. 3

With special reference to the RSF, the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) noted in July 2020:

the transitional Constitution has maintained the RSF as one of the main forces despite its torture records. The NSA act protecting and giving immunity to members of the RSF has not been repealed. The Transitional government has not proposed a vetting process within the RSF to identify agents that have extensively practiced torture over years.¹⁰

The same organisation further noted in September 2021:

the RSF was established by the Al-Bashir regime in 2013 to fight rebel armed groups in Sudan, and designated a regular military force under the transitional constitutional charter of Sudan. International human rights organisations have accused the RSF of committing [sic] crimes against humanity during the war in Darfur. Moreover, this military force carried multiple unlawful detentions of civilians throughout 2020 and had a leading role in the June 2019 Khartoum massacre, where more than 100 people were killed.¹¹

The Fragile States Index 2021, funded by The Fund For Peace, classified Sudan in its annual report published in May 2021 as falling under the six “High Alert” countries and thus classifying it as 171 out of 179 countries.¹² Furthermore, Waging Peace, together with Protection Approaches and REDRESS, warned in October 2020 that “The historic experience of identity-based violence against racial, ethnic, religious, political, LGBTQ+ and other groups, including mass atrocities, means Sudan remains a country of high risk”.¹³

REDRESS noted in April 2021 “A diverse set of actors are both historically and presently responsible for acts of torture and other human rights violations in Sudan. This includes the security forces and regular forces. However, Sudan’s weak judicial sector also contributes to a climate of impunity, facilitating continued use of torture and the commission of other human rights violations. Eradicating these abuses therefore requires a comprehensive reform of Sudan’s institutions, including through mainstreaming training for national actors in these key sectors”.¹⁴

Similarly, DefendDefenders stated in December 2021 “Despite legal and institutional reforms, the legacy of the al-Bashir dictatorship remained visible in many spheres of life”.¹⁵ The same organisation further noted “The transitional authorities, including the (now dissolved) Transitional Government and the SC, faced many challenges, in a volatile political situation. Inability to bring about structural change is most noticeable in areas and sectors affected by corruption, nepotism,

¹⁰ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Briefing paper, \(Post\)-COVID19 era in Sudan: The urgency to unravel the torture and inhuman treatments system one year after the Transition](#), July 2021, 3. *Keeping the legal roots of torture in Sudan: driving the changes with the handbrake?*, p. 8

¹¹ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), [Sudan: The use of criminal law to target critics must stop](#), 24 September 2021

¹² Fund for Peace (FFP), [Fragile States Index Annual Report 2021](#), 20 May 2021, p. 6/7

¹³ Protection Approaches / REDRESS / Waging Peace, [A hopeful yet fragile peace, How the UK can support Sudan’s democratic transition and pursuit of justice](#), October 2020, p. 1

¹⁴ REDRESS / People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE), [Sudan: Human rights two years after Al-Bashir’s removal](#), April 2021, p. 17

¹⁵ DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [An unfinished revolution: The situation of women human rights defenders in Sudan](#), December 2021, Executive Summary, p. 13

and abuse of power. HRDs [human rights defenders] interviewed for this report pointed to a lack of security sector reform, and little to no restructuring of law enforcement”.¹⁶

In conversation with the Co-Executive Directors Sonja Miley and Maddy Crowther from the NGO Waging Peace, Maddy Crowther described the situation of the security forces as follows:

I think it's even more complicated because of how fractured the security environment is. So, for instance, with the General Intelligence Service, I'd say that's definitely restarted sort of patterns of targeting that are probably along those lines, are probably racialized in the ways we've kind of already said and having to remember that is possibly more aligned to the Sudanese armed forces and an Islamist backing. Whereas when you're looking at patterns of violence by the RSF, maybe some of the armed movements and the JPA signatories who are now in the capital, maybe that does look a bit different. So it's almost like I can imagine, I can speculate that this has become more kind of power politics as Darfur becomes this theatre for what happens in the centre. It's not this neutral space where it's intercommunal conflicts happening. It's a political-military theatre where the battle for who's going to run Sudan is being fought between Hemedti, between Bourhan. So I suspect it's getting more complicated and a harder picture to draw [...]

But I don't have any reason to suspect it's lessened. If anything, I suspect it's become different, worse, and more confusing.¹⁷

Speaking on the Podcast *Asylum Speakers* in January 2022, Marwa, a Sudanese journalist, TV presenter and producer, highlighted:

And there has been a transitional government. Unfortunately, it was share between civilian and military, which is part of the old regime. They paved the way for the old regime to get back and to rule again. So we have to start again from scratch to fight against the military government because it's the same government that repressed people, detained them for expressing their points of views or asking for their rights [...]

Till this moment, people and youth, they will be shot and die just because they go outside.¹⁸

In a study on Sudan's youth in mid-2021, defined by The Carter Center as those “under the age of 30, who constitute nearly 70% of the population”, almost “two-thirds of youth surveyed reported an improved sense of personal security [since the establishment of the Transitional Legislative Council (TLC)]. Yet in Khartoum, almost half of respondents (49.7%) reported a deterioration in personal security, and Khartoum respondents, along with those from White Nile, Kassala, and Gezira states, expressed less optimism about the course of the transition than other regions”.¹⁹

During the reporting period 21 August to 21 November 2021 the UN noted that “There was a worrying deterioration in the security environment in the country [...] In addition to the impact of the attempted coup on 21 September and the coup on 25 October, intercommunal conflict and clashes between armed groups continued in several locations, along with prolonged protests in the

¹⁶ DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [An unfinished revolution: The situation of women human rights defenders in Sudan](#), December 2021, *Post-Revolution Climate for WHRDS*, p. 43

¹⁷ Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace). See [Annex D.2](#) further below for transcription notes.

¹⁸ Marwa (Journalist, TV presenter and producer), Podcast *Asylum Speakers*, Episode 37, 17 January 2022. See [Annex D.3](#) further below for transcription notes.

¹⁹ The Carter Center, *Sudan's Youth and the Transition: Priorities, Perceptions and Attitudes*, August 2021, p. 8, 10, 11

east and counter-terrorism operations by security forces in Khartoum”.²⁰ One of these clashes took place on 1st September 2021 between government forces and “one of the signatory armed groups to the Juba Peace Agreement, the Tamazuj, in Soba, in the southern part of the city of Khartoum”.²¹ As for what the Sudanese government characterised as ‘counter terrorism operations’, these occurred between 28 September and 4 October 2021 in Khartoum and featured “exchange of fire between the security forces and alleged terrorist cell members reportedly affiliated with Da’esh, in two separate incidents. Six security personnel and 3 suspects were reported to have been killed, while four security personnel were injured and 25 suspects were arrested. Various weapons, including firearms and explosives, were reportedly seized as a result of the operations”.²²

In October 2021 General Abdelfattah al-Bourhan “seized complete power [...] dissolved the country's civilian cabinet, arresting Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and other prominent civilians with whom the military had agreed to share power until elections were held next year [2022]”.²³ The military coup occurred one month before General Abdelfattah al-Bourhan “was due to hand over the presidency of the SC [Transitional Sovereign Council] to civilian representatives, as per the power-sharing agreement and Constitutional Document of 2019”.²⁴ According to reporting by The Guardian, General Abdelfattah al-Bourhan “justified the seizure of power and the dissolution of the country’s transitional government by saying infighting between the military and civilian parties had threatened the country’s stability. The military was meant to have passed leadership of the joint sovereign council to a civilian figure in the coming months”.²⁵ Reuters reported that al-Bourhan “promised to hold elections in July 2023 and hand over to an elected civilian government then”.²⁶ In the meantime, REDRESS noted that “He unilaterally announced the suspension of Articles 11, 12, 15, 16, 24-3, 71, and 72 of the Constitutional Document. These articles pertain to the SC, the Transitional Council of Ministers and Cabinet, the Transitional Legislative Council (which was to be constituted), and the TMC [Transitional Military Council]. The latter’s dissolution seems to have been annulled, paving the way for military rule”.²⁷

The World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and its Sudanese network member, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), stated during its joint oral statement in November 2021 during the UN’s Human Rights Council special session on the human rights situation in Sudan:

Our organisations are worried about the deterioration of the human rights situation following the military coup on 25th October that led to at least 10 people being killed and 250 injured during the recent peaceful demonstrations. The arbitrary arrests of at least 36 civilians, human rights defenders,

²⁰ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan](#), 3 December 2021, para. 16

²¹ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan](#), 3 December 2021, para. 19

²² UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan](#), 3 December 2021, para. 20

²³ Alex de Waal (BBC News), [Sudan coup: Why the army is gambling with the future](#), 27 October 2021

²⁴ REDRESS, [Sudan: The UN Human Rights Council should act urgently and hold a special session](#), 28 October 2021

²⁵ The Guardian, [Sudan’s army seizes power in coup and detains prime minister](#), 25 October 2021

²⁶ Reuters, [Seven killed, 140 hurt in protests against Sudan military coup](#), 26 October 2021

²⁷ REDRESS, [Sudan: The UN Human Rights Council should act urgently and hold a special session](#), 28 October 2021

activists, journalists, and political leaders at their homes and their incommunicado detention is particularly worrisome.²⁸

Amnesty International recorded the death of “at least 53 people” killed and “hundreds injured in demonstrations” following the October 2021 military coup.²⁹ Frontline Defenders reported in November 2021:

The number of people killed in Sudan since the beginning of the military coup has reached 40, while more than 500 people have been injured. During the protests on 13 November 2021, more than 215 people were injured and 7 were killed. Sudanese security forces arrested 140 protesters on 13 November 2021 in different areas in Khartoum. Among them 10 children were detained in Omdurman, whom the police refused to release on bail. During the protest on 17 November 2021, approximately 150 people were injured, although the actual numbers could not be confirmed due to the communication shutdown.³⁰

On 21st November 2021 a political agreement was signed, reinstating Abdalla Hamdok as prime minister and enabling “the transition to civilian rule and release political prisoners”.³¹ However, as DefendDefenders highlighted “civilian coalition and the SPA [Sudanese Professionals Association], as well as 12 ousted ministers, refused to acknowledge the new agreement”.³² Jihad Mashamoun, researcher and political analyst of Sudanese affairs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explained: “Both the country's political forces and protestors rejected the agreement proposed by Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) and Commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok because the agreement did not give the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) a role in the transitional government, and because the agreement was not between military and civilian actors, but rather between al-Burhan and Hamdok”.³³

In January 2022, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok resigned “stating the unmet demands from the civilian side, including the end to lethal force against peaceful protesters”³⁴, “leaving the army in full control”³⁵. noted “As at March 2022, the leader of the coup and commander of the SAF, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, heads the central government. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, is his deputy. Hemedti is the commander of the RSF, the Darfur-based paramilitary group”.³⁶

Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, noted in March 2022 that:

she was deeply troubled by the reversal of human rights achievements following the military coup in Sudan last October, which had again plunged the country into crisis. Two years of progress towards institutional and legal reform that Sudan had been making since 2019 was now being eroded. A wide

²⁸ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Joint oral Statement during the 32nd special session of the Human Rights Council](#), 5 November 2021

²⁹ Amnesty International, [The state of the world's human rights: Sudan 2021](#), 28 March 2022

³⁰ Frontline Defenders, [Sudanese and International organisations call for an end on attacks against Sudanese women human rights defenders and protesters](#), 19 November 2021

³¹ Article 19, [Sudan: Military must immediately stop crackdown on Freedom of Expression and Assembly](#), 24 November 2021

³² DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [An unfinished revolution: The situation of women human rights defenders in Sudan](#), December 2021, *Note to reader*, p. 7

³³ Jihad Mashamoun (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), [Sudanese Protest the Agreement Between Al-Burhan and Hamdok](#), 22 December 2021

³⁴ Acaps, [Sudan: Scenarios, March 2022](#), Annex A – Current situation, p. 15

³⁵ BBC News, [Sudan coup: Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok resigns after mass protests](#), 3 January 2022

³⁶ Acaps, [Sudan: Scenarios, March 2022](#), Annex A – Current situation, p. 15

range of human rights violations had been documented since the coup, in a context of total impunity. There was concern about the pattern of targeted arbitrary arrests and detention of prominent protest organizers and demonstrators either during protests, at their homes, or in hospitals.³⁷

The Head of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), Volker Perthes, who is also the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Sudan (SRSG), told the UN Security Council in March 2022:

Unfortunately, since my last briefing to this Council in January, the situation in Sudan has not improved. The country has been without a functioning government since the coup of 25 October, protests against the coup and the violent repression of such protests are continuing. And as a result, in the absence of a political agreement to return to an accepted transitional path, the economic situation, the humanitarian situation, and the security situation are deteriorating.³⁸

He further noted with regards to the security forces:

More recently, there have also been disturbing reports of increased tensions between and within the different security forces. Some interlocutors express concern that if a political solution is not found, Sudan could descend into conflict and divisions as seen in Libya, Yemen or elsewhere, in a region already beset by instability.³⁹

Further information about one of the actors involved in the “violent crackdown on protesters” since the 25 October 2021 coup, the Central Reserve Police (CRP), is provided in a March 2022 briefing by REDRESS.⁴⁰ According to the source, “the CRP is a militarised police unit falling under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. In practice, the CRP, under the command of General Al-Shami Abdallah Mohamed Abdoun, reports directly to General Intelligence Service (GIS) leadership, in a continuation of Bashir-era practices”.⁴¹ The briefing further highlighted that the “CRP forces have also played a role in the ongoing campaign of arbitrary arrests and detentions across Sudan, which has involved the custodial torture and ill-treatment of hundreds of protestors, activists, and human rights defenders”.⁴² This was corroborated by Human Rights Watch who spoke to witnesses who had said that “the anti-riot police and Central Reserve Police (CRP), a militarized police unit, led the lethal response on January 17 [2022]. Six witnesses said that the CRP used live ammunition against unarmed protesters at multiple locations throughout the day. Regular police beat and arrested peaceful protesters”.⁴³

In March 2022 Mohamed Osman, Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch, wrote in The Guardian:

What we are seeing in Sudan isn't the work of a few bad apples but the actions of a well-managed apparatus bent on denying people's basic rights, trying to break the will of the protest movement while also buying time to cement their power [...]

The military junta has also tactically deployed forces and rotated units in an apparent attempt to deflect responsibility. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the army leader, has blamed the police for crackdowns, even though the military has been involved.

³⁷ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNOHCHR), [Human Rights Council Discusses the Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua and in Sudan](#), 7 March 2022

³⁸ UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), [UNITAMS SRSG Mr. Volker Perthes remarks to the Security Council](#), 28 March 2022

³⁹ UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), [UNITAMS SRSG Mr. Volker Perthes remarks to the Security Council](#), 28 March 2022

⁴⁰ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

⁴¹ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

⁴² REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

⁴³ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Ongoing Clampdown on peaceful Protesters](#), 3 February 2022

Police officials have denied using excessive and lethal force despite overwhelming evidence of the opposite. After his reinstatement as prime minister, in November last year, Abdalla Hamdok sacked the then police chief and his deputy. This, however, did not stop security force crackdowns.

A prosecutor in Khartoum said the presence of many forces creates confusion, which makes it harder for investigators to identify those responsible.

Since the revolution, Sudanese protesters have been clear that without an end to impunity and reform of abusive forces, the path to democracy is blocked.

The military has used brute force to suppress the protesters, shooting at them with live rounds and teargas canisters and preemptively arresting individuals perceived as active within protest groups.⁴⁴

Human Rights Watch reported in April 2022 that since the declaration of a state of emergency in October 2021 and issuance of “an emergency order granting security forces immunity and restored arrest powers to the General Intelligence Service (GIS)” in December 2021, “arbitrary arrests of protesters have spiked. The authorities abuse their emergency powers to carry out unlawful detentions, including incommunicado detentions”.⁴⁵ In his report to the UN Human Rights Council, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

Emergency Decree No. 3/2021, issued on 24 December 2021, granted exceptional law enforcement powers to the regular forces and the General Intelligence Service. The Decree authorized them to arrest and detain without warrant, enter and search private and public places, seize private and public funds and property, and prohibit, restrict or regulate the movement of persons. The Decree also granted the members of the regular forces and the General Intelligence Service temporary immunity from prosecution for all acts committed in the performance of their duties. It served to reinforce the state of emergency and impeded judicial oversight over arrests and detentions.⁴⁶

At the end of March 2022 “UN Special Envoy and Head of Mission UNITAMS Volker Perthes denounced the current situation in Sudan before the UN Security Council and warned that the country was heading towards economic and security collapse if the restoration of a civilian-led transitional government was not achieved”.⁴⁷ As Waging Peace rightly pointed out: “it is not to be understood that Sudan has a government as such, and in any case certainly not a legitimate one. Even the United Nations have been briefed on the fact that ‘The country has been without a functioning government since the coup of 25 October’”.⁴⁸ During a meeting early April 2022 between Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mr Perthes, “al-Burhan reiterated his willingness to hand over power to an elected government, he rejected a reform of the security sector, although this is an integral part of the Juba peace agreement”.⁴⁹

Adama Dieng, UN Designated Expert on the situation of human rights in Sudan, stated at the end of his visit to Sudan on 4th June 2022:

⁴⁴ Mohamed Osman (The Guardian), [Sudan’s military is brutally suppressing protests – global action is needed](#), 22 March 2022

⁴⁵ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated](#), 28 April 2022

⁴⁶ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, para. 14

⁴⁷ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 4 April 2022, Sudan, p. 10

⁴⁸ Waging Peace, [Country situation in Sudan](#), June 2022, *Post-25 October 2021 military coup, Security situation*, para. 33

⁴⁹ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 4 April 2022, Sudan, p. 10

I flagged my deep concern at the human rights violations documented since the coup [October 2021]. It is simply unacceptable that 99 people have been killed and more than 5,000 injured as a result of excessive use of force by the joint security forces responding to protests. I also raised my concern at the arbitrary and mass arrest and often incommunicado detention of resistance committee members, protestors, activists, media professionals and others in the context of protests; sexual and gender-based violence and acts of torture and ill-treatment in the course of arrest and during detention and lack of fair trial and due process guarantees.⁵⁰

Serious concerns have also been raised by Waging Peace in their most recent 'Country situation in Sudan' report of June 2022:

The current situation in Sudan, of political deadlock; of protests met with deadly force and arbitrary arrest, detention and torture; of increasing violence and atrocity crimes in Darfur and other periphery regions; and of economic collapse, will continue for the foreseeable. Sudan is unstable and prone to deteriorating further into complete state failure, especially considering the willingness of military leaders to engage in a fire sale of Sudan's assets, while systematically undermining its institutions, and any system of checks and balances which might deliver justice, fairness, accountability, and counter impunity. While there are many uncertainties, it is clear there is a risk that old patterns of racist discrimination and persecution will resurface against black Africans, i.e. non-Arab Darfuri and Nuba individuals, especially while military actors are reinstating Bashir-era policy-makers and civil service professionals in their posts, and restoring arbitrary powers of arrest, detention, and torture to racist bodies like the General Intelligence Service.⁵¹

2. Situation, including evidence of attacks and other forms of ill-treatment, of specific groups in Khartoum and Omdurman

2.1. Acts of violence

Note that the information cited is illustrative, but not exhaustive of the information available in the public domain. Sources do not necessarily clearly distinguish or specify the profiles of individuals targeted by acts of violence, arbitrary arrest or detention. Some of these individuals may also hold intersectional identities. It is therefore imperative to consult a number of potentially relevant sub-headings presented below.

2.1.1. Black African people (including Darfuri and Nuba)

Racism and hate speech in Sudan

In March 2021, Rights for Peace published a report, which identified "that prejudice, discrimination and divisions, often exacerbated by incitement to hostility, have impacted communities in Sudan and are continuing to fuel violence".⁵² Whilst the report does not specifically address the situation in Khartoum or Omdurman it provides useful context with inferences for the current situation in Sudan. For further information see: Rights for Peace, [Discrimination and Hate Speech Fuel Violence in Sudan](#), March 2021.

⁵⁰ UN Sudan, Statement by Adama Dieng, [UN Designated Expert on the situation of human rights in Sudan, at the end of his visit to the country on 4 June 2022](#), 4 June 2022

⁵¹ Waging Peace, [Country situation in Sudan](#), June 2022, *Executive summary*, para. 1

⁵² Rights for Peace, [Discrimination and Hate Speech Fuel Violence in Sudan](#), March 2021, *Introduction*, p. 5

Adjoa Osafo-Binfoh, a graduate and postgraduate of Law and International Relations, provided the following overview of racism in Sudan on the Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust's (HART) blog in March 2021:

as the world rallied together [in 2020] to condemn police brutality and other forms of racially motivated violence against black people, Sudan, it appeared, was not yet ready to shed the racism and discrimination that have become so deeply entrenched in the fabric of the country.

In order to make sense of the racial tension that exists in Sudan between the Arab and black populations, it is necessary to explain, in short, the origins of prejudiced attitudes within the country.

642 marked the year in which Sudan was first invaded by Arabs and even though their initial quest to conquer Sudan proved unsuccessful, they persevered. [...]

Islam and Arabic culture were also imposed on the black African ethnic groups that were already living there. Those who decided against subscribing to the culture and religion of their oppressors were maltreated; slavery was rampant.

Tensions between black and Arab Sudanese were further strained centuries later when the British colonial administration favoured the, "predominantly Muslim-Arab North, while sidelining the largely Christian and animist African South," the effects of which were profound.

When the country gained independence in 1956, the Muslim-Arab North attempted to, "assimilate the rest of the country by force." The black African south revolted and this led to the civil wars of 1955-1972 and 1983-2005, in which victims of mass killings and rape were often targeted, "solely on the basis of their non-Arab ethnicity."

While the civil wars that blighted the country for close to 40 years have since ceased, it is clear that the discrimination that has, for centuries, been inflicted upon the country's black ethnic groups, is far from a thing of the past.

Take, for example, the racist sentiment voiced by Dr. Ihsan Fagiri, an Arab-Sudanese woman who, in 2019, was awarded the prestigious Weimar Human Rights Award for her services to women's freedom and equality. In addition to this accolade, she holds a position of prominence as President of The No To Women's Oppression Initiative. The Initiative, a human rights group, has been commended internationally for its defence of women's rights in Sudan. In the summer of 2020, however, the organisation was thrust into the spotlight for all the wrong reasons when word began to circulate that Dr. Fagiri had left a bigoted comment on a photograph of a mixed-race married couple. Commenting on the photograph, Dr. Fagiri said, "...in choosing her [black] husband...", the white wife "may have been looking for the creature missing on the evolutionary ladder between humans and monkeys." The great irony being that the significance of racial equality clearly failed to resonate with her, a so-called proponent of human rights. [...]

Taken together, the comments made by Ihsan Fagiri and the subsequent decision taken by her organisation to downplay the seriousness of what was said speaks volumes about the lack of importance shown towards racial equality in Sudan today. Sudan, it seems, still has a long way to go until its black population are respected and treated as equals in their own land.⁵³

On its undated webpage dedicated to 'Sudan', Reporters Without Borders noted that "Sudan is a multicultural, multiethnic society where tolerance and coexistence are in jeopardy. Ethnic groups' sensitivities are heightened. Accusations over perceived insults are increasing, with the media frequently a target. Interference by religious groups, which use their networks to defend their interests, are contributing to worsening conditions for journalists. The revolution has come to

⁵³ Osafo-Binfoh, A. (Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust Blog), [Guest Blog: An Overview of Racism in Sudan](#), 26 March 2021

represent greater outspokenness on social networks, but in uncontrolled form, it feeds racism and misogyny and targets women and ethnic and sexual minorities”.⁵⁴

In an interview with Cedoca in February 2021, the Documentation and Research Department of the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, the founder of an organisation in the Nuba mountains stated:

There has been a shift since the revolution but people with power and money still treat people from this area in a second class citizens. [...]

People become more open minded but the constant information/propaganda flow from the former government about people from the Nuba Mountains and Darfur ('they are evil', 'they destroy the country' etc) is still in the minds of certain people.⁵⁵

A Sudanese journalist and security analyst who lives in Brussels, who was also interviewed in February 201 for the same Cedoca report, stated:

Despite these violations, however, it is important to note that the level of crackdown against the groups from the marginalised regions has decreased in places such as Khartoum and major urban areas outside the conflict regions. This is largely due to the dissolution of the former National Intelligence and Security and Service (NISS) which systematically persecuted members of the ethnic groups coming from the conflict areas. The current transitional government took measures to halt these violations by delegating the power of arrest and detention to the Sudanese police. The police should only detain persons and hold them in custody on legal grounds. [...] However, the military component whose leading members belonged to old regime, continue to commit violations against non-Arab persons. These violations, albeit in narrower scale than before, are still being carried out by the Sudanese military factions and security units.⁵⁶

In April 2022 a number of NGOs “once again draw attention of the international community to the growing threats of racism, hate speech and intolerance in Sudan. Hate speech and public calls for incitement to ethnic violence, particularly through Sudanese animated social media platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, and Clubhouse as outlined in our joint urgent appeal of 20 January 2022, are growing unabated in the silence of the Sudanese authorities”.⁵⁷ The same organisations explained:

we are utterly outraged by the racist comments made by prominent Sudanese lawyer(s) member(s) of the defense team of leaders of the disposed regime, who are currently under trial in Khartoum. This unfortunate incident, which went viral through live broadcasting by Sudan’s official media outlet i.e., Sudan News Agency (SNA), took place inside a courtroom in Khartoum on Tuesday, 12 April 2022. In their racist wrath, the lawyer(s) used disparaging language and uttered insults against the sanctity of Islam to show further contempt for and denigrate the outgoing Director-General of Sudan Radio and TV Corporation.

Of special concern is the absence of any response from the Sudanese authorities to this reprehensible verbale assault. The revelation of this racist insult sent shock waves across Sudan and provoked a nationwide outcry yet neither the Transitional Sovereignty Council nor the Acting Minister of Justice or the Minister of Information addressed the public and explained the official position of government on the matter, which constitutes a threat to Sudan’s fragile social fabric and peace. The apathy of the

⁵⁴ Reporters Without Borders, [Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 19.05.2022]

⁵⁵ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.3. *Houding van de maatschappij*

⁵⁶ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.4.2. *De huidige situatie*

⁵⁷ Darfur Network For Monitoring & Documentation, [Urgent: Appeal on Racism and Hate Speech in Sudan](#), 19 April 2022

Sudanese authorities towards this racist assault amounts to condoning this criminal act in flagrant violation of the country's obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination to which Sudan acceded on 21 March 1977.⁵⁸

Speaking on the Podcast *Asylum Speakers* in January 2022, Sonja Miley, Co-Executive Director of Waging Peace, highlighted:

there's been a marginalization of certain groups, and they are usually the black Africans who did not have access to healthcare in the same way as the Arab population or the elite. People were beaten for speaking their own tribal languages. Their names were taken from them. They were given more Arabized names. People don't have access to jobs in the same way, and all of that still exists.⁵⁹

Her colleague and Co-Executive Director, Maddy Crowther, added:

Eventually, there were groups, armed movements in Darfur that sprang up that were intent on claiming their rights. And when they did so, government responded incredibly violently and with scorched earth tactics. [...]

So that includes poisoning wells, that would include burning entire villages, bombing entire villages, and often committing just heinous atrocities. They would arm and provide resources to local militia, local Arab militias who were called the Janjaweed or the Devils on Horseback. That was about 2003, 2004 that we saw the first big waves of violence. But I think the most important thing for listeners to know is that that's never really gone away. And in fact, the Janjaweed has changed its name. It's now called the Rapid Support Forces. But the deputy in head at the top of Sudan's current government, I say that in inverted commas, but the group ruling the country in the military coup is the head of the RSF. So we've got the Janjaweed. The genocidaires are at the top of the country, and that's where we are today, and that's despite Sudan having gone through just these amazing people-led revolutions. [...]

And where we are today is the military is just clinging onto control, onto power. They do not want to leave. And when it looked like the balance was being tipped out of their favour, they acted and enacted a military coup and now we're back in charge. And the worry is that that's just going to create more marginalisation, more violence against periphery groups, huge repressions, and we're seeing that now.⁶⁰

In conversation with the Co-Executive Directors Sonja Miley and Maddy Crowther from the NGO Waging Peace, Maddy Crowther described racism in Sudan as "systematic".⁶¹ When asked whether she had any information on the situation and treatment of Darfuri in Khartoum and Omdurman, Maddy Crowther answered:

So if you're asking us specific for evidence that would fall directly under that category, yeah, what we don't have is necessarily a list of incidents that have affected one particular ethnicity over another. I think we've also mainly found evidence, particularly post-coup, that related to individuals who would be classified in their reporting as protesters. And there wouldn't actually be a lot of sort of granularity of detail or their profile beyond that, except maybe gender would come through, but very rarely would ethnicity or race be something that was mentioned. I think what we have found post-2020 are sort of two things I'd say. And Sonja, please jump in. One is a lot of evidence and a lot more public

⁵⁸ Darfur Network For Monitoring & Documentation, [Urgent: Appeal on Racism and Hate Speech in Sudan](#), 19 April 2022

⁵⁹ Sonja Miley (Waging Peace), Podcast *Asylum Speakers*, Episode 37, 17 January 2022. See [Annex D.3](#) further below for transcription notes.

⁶⁰ Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace), Podcast *Asylum Speakers*, Episode 37, 17 January 2022. See [Annex D.3](#) further below for transcription notes.

⁶¹ Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace). See [Annex D.2](#) further below for transcription notes.

discussion of what systematic racism looks like in Sudan, and that can be anything from societal attitudes. [...]

But my understanding is that the pervasiveness of racism in Sudan is mostly unchanged, and it will still have all sorts of effects on your ability to live a life that you might choose to live in Sudan and real impacts in terms of employability, where you can live in Khartoum and Omdurman. [...]

There used to be euphemistic terms referring to race. It might be your identity, your belonging, or even sometimes ethnicity might be used as the standard was my sense, but now at least people are discussing it. But it's becoming clearer than ever that it's just pervasive. It is the water people are swimming in and as it is in so many countries, our own countries, I'm sure included but yeah. That's just a theme that I really hope is on the minds of those reading your report and others. And it can't be dismissed as kind of like, "There are some racists." It really feels like this is a culture in which there is a hierarchy based on race which is pervasive, whether or not there is one person of that race in a ministry, which tends to be sometimes what you read. That's not a culture-- that's not a culture change we would accept in our own institutions, and it certainly shouldn't be one we accept in Sudanese institutions. [...]

So I just wanted to emphasise the systemic nature of what we're talking about. And when you started talking about the constructs that we're talking about off record, and you led by saying the Darfur experience in Omdurman-- I just wanted to mention I know that there is that focus on Darfur, but it really is a black African experience. And we really kind of need to be a lot more conscious, use the language a lot more consciously to be able to be reflective and name the experience of the black African people. So whether you're from the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Darfur, if you are black African, your experience, in our experience over 18 years, is vastly different to that of somebody from the centre, from the elite, who's had a lot more opportunity and a lot more privilege.⁶²

Sonja Miley added:

the testimonies that we've taken from asylum seekers in working with them have almost not even had any language around their treatment because it is so ingrained. They are so used to being called slave, Abeed. They're so used to being beaten. They're used to being slapped around. They will not go to the police for a beating because, well, that's just what happens [...]

So how it manifests for those who are black African is they do not have the same access to society in Khartoum, in Omdurman. They live in the black belt, which is what Maddy was alluding to. They have shacks that they're living in. They don't have electricity, running water. Their ability to find jobs is less. They're not able to be part of the infrastructure of society. There are some black Africans who have high positions in government, which is the difficulty for people to kind of get their heads around, of course, but they also ascribe to this elite place. So, yeah, there are plenty of people of colour here in the UK who have high positions, but we still have a structure in place that is disadvantaging people of colour [...]

And we've noticed throughout the transition-- so this is 2020 on-- a kind of unwillingness to sometimes reckon with racialised aspects of state violence and ways in which, yes, you might be more liable to be arrested, prosecuted, detained, ill-treated in detention if you have a particular racial profile. And it's almost like a blindness to commenting on that issue because the other challenges are so large. You are facing a situation where you've got to comment on the arrest and detention of so many people potentially, and you have limited bandwidth. And it's not the most pressing issue. And that's always kind of how it's been presented to us, as this is at a time where we're having to represent journalists who are being attacked and other at-risk groups and women and [inaudible]. The last thing you're going to do is really segregate your data based on race and look at if you have a racial issue, when you clearly have a coup issue, you clearly have a military issue [...]

⁶² Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace). See [Annex D.2](#) further below for transcription notes.

So we're much more likely to hear about the arrest and detention of people who have an existing human rights profile. We're likely to hear about what's happening to them, but what we won't hear about are the people who are just arrested and detained and whose cases never go further than that because they're socially deprived. Probably because they have been arrested on a racial basis, at some point in that decision making, maybe not explicitly, but it's there, it's a theme.⁶³

With regards to the focus being on Khartoum and Omdurman, Sonja Miley noted [original emphasis]:

it's too detrimental to look in isolation. Where is the concentration on what's happening in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan? There is absolute impunity going on. There is no accountability [...]

Every day, every day so and so was murdered because X person or persons tried to report. Nothing was done. This person was raped. This group of people were displaced every single day. And there's not a real examination of why and what's happening there. But when you speak to the people, you see the exact same thing, it is the black African communities who are being oppressed and persecuted and have no access to justice or the law, the representation in the law. [...]

So all of these, to look in isolation, only you're zooming in. And the context of the wider lens really is important. It's meaningful. There's also a lot of denialism that's happening at the moment and a worrying group that we've heard of that seem to be stirring a racist group, a very racist group that is stirring some animosity thinking that or perpetuating some myth that Darfuris are going to come and seek revenge on those in the centre and murder and massacre, and it's sowing a lot of discord and fractiousness and animosity. And then there's just pure denialism of that anything happened in Darfur.⁶⁴

In conversation with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan, ARC's Director was told in May 2022:

We do not have information about the situation and treatment of these groups [Black Africans], but I know there is a sort of generalised racism against Black Africans, the Darfuri, in Khartoum, which I understand has increased since some senior officials from Darfur, who were party to the Juba peace agreement, joined the transitional government, which was perhaps seen as a threat by sectors of the Arab population. There has been an increase in racist hate speech in social media. I am sure they face discrimination in other way.⁶⁵

Importantly, Waging Peace in their most recent 'Country situation in Sudan' report of June 2022 provided the following useful contextual summary in relation to the treatment of black Africans in Sudan:

Racism was rampant in Sudan prior to the coup. After all, one of the rallying cries of the 2018-2019 revolution explicitly tied racism to Bashir's violent practices in Darfur, and general push to establish an Arab-dominant governance model under the banner of 'Arabisation'. 2019's protestors chanted, "*ya onsri wa maghroor kol albalad Darfur*" or "Oh you arrogant racist, the whole country is Darfur." The protest movement at that time was also pushing back against associations of black African groups with armed rebel movements, in a recognition that these groups had imputed political opinion [...]. Nonetheless, the revolution and unseating Bashir was not enough to banish racism, and attitudes persisted, especially in the absence of any law-making by the transitional government to criminalise racism; nor attempts to review, for instance, civil service employment criteria through an equitable nationwide system. Systematic discrimination has continued in this permissive legal vacuum [...]

⁶³ Sonja Miley (Waging Peace). See [Annex D.2](#) further below for transcription notes.

⁶⁴ Sonja Miley (Waging Peace). See [Annex D.2](#) further below for transcription notes.

⁶⁵ Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes.

A key demonstration of racism in practice in Sudan is the widespread use of the term *abid*, meaning slave. This word is used openly to those of non-Arab Darfuri, Nuban, or other black African backgrounds, and mostly said by those from (self-perceived) Arab backgrounds. Post-coup, the term, and racist attitudes more broadly, have come to the fore given events during a trial hearing in the case against Bashir. Bashir's defence team were caught on microphone in April 2022 complaining about journalist Lukman Ahmed, who had just been fired as director of Sudan's state-owned broadcaster the Sudanese General Corporation for Radio and Television, saying, "This 'slave' [abid] with his ugly nose irritates me." The lawyer's comments went viral on social media, with many suggesting they cast light on broader racist societal attitudes [...]

To give another concrete example, the targeting of someone with longer, more 'African' hair, including dreadlocks, in Sudan is something we have mentioned to us frequently, especially in Khartoum. In an incident following the coup, a female member of the diaspora told us she breathed a sigh of relief when a well-known activist was released from detention in Sudan after his arrest with his dreadlocks intact, as it meant his treatment could not have been that poor, and because if he had been forcibly shaved this would have incited further protest action for the unjust move.⁶⁶

2022 – Khartoum

The Sudanese Congress Party's press statement of 4th June 2022, published through their Twitter account and translated via Google, stated:

The joint forces of the armed forces, the police, the rapid support and individuals believed to be affiliated with the notorious security apparatus, during the past few days, carried out security campaigns in the outskirts and south of the capital, Khartoum, under the name of combating crime.

These campaigns were accompanied by widespread attacks on an ethnic basis that affected the residents of those areas, who are mostly displaced from the areas of conflict and war in the west of the country and the state of Blue Nile, such as the residents of the Angola neighborhood in the Mayo region, in a repetition of the despicable scenarios followed by the former regime before its fall.

Our people confronted it with the famous revolutionary chant, "Oh, racist and arrogant, the whole country is Darfur." Houses were raided and safe families were terrorized in a horrific and humiliating manner, without presenting legal document.

Some of them were blackmailed into giving up these holdings in exchange for not being arrested, and many innocent citizens were photographed on the basis that they were perpetrators of looting crimes without any investigations or judicial procedures, according to the testimony of many of them in a documented investigative report published by the Ayin Media Network.⁶⁷

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

Serious concerns have been raised by Waging Peace in their most recent 'Country situation in Sudan' report of June 2022:

Sudan is unstable and prone to deteriorating further into complete state failure, especially considering the willingness of military leaders to engage in a fire sale of Sudan's assets, while systematically undermining its institutions, and any system of checks and balances which might deliver justice, fairness, accountability, and counter impunity. While there are many uncertainties, it is clear there is a risk that old patterns of racist discrimination and persecution will resurface against black Africans, i.e. non-Arab Darfuri and Nuba individuals, especially while military actors are

⁶⁶ Waging Peace, [Country situation in Sudan](#), June 2022, *Treatment of black Africans in Sudan*, paras. 17, 18, 20 and 22

⁶⁷ Sudanese Congress Party, [Twitter posts](#), 5 June 2022

reinstating Bashir-era policy-makers and civil service professionals in their posts, and restoring arbitrary powers of arrest, detention, and torture to racist bodies like the General Intelligence Service. It is therefore our belief that black Africans will again be subject to targeting and harassment, as well as harsher treatment under a security system drawing on historic practices of command-and-control. It is our position that individuals returned to Sudan as rejected asylum-seekers would be in danger especially where they are black African. Such individuals are unable to avail themselves of the protection of state authorities, nor reasonably able to internally relocate within Sudan, and especially to Khartoum.⁶⁸

2.1.2. Christians

2020 - Khartoum

In March 2020, Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) called on the “Sudanese authorities to investigate the case of a church [The Sudanese Church of Christ in Jabarona “on the outskirts of the capital city”] in greater Khartoum, Sudan, which was attacked by extremists four times between December 2019 and January 2020”.⁶⁹ According to the same source, “In addition to the attacks, church leaders also received serious threats from Muslim extremists living in the area, who warned that they would not allow churches to be built in the area even if official permission was granted”.⁷⁰

In October 2020 “According to Morning Star News, on October 6 [2020], three Christians were beaten by three Muslim men who said they were upset with the continued presence of Christians in the Alsamrab neighborhood of Khartoum North. The beatings were reported to police; media reported the victims were pressured to drop the case” reported the U.S. Department of State in its annual report.⁷¹

2021 – Khartoum

Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) reported in November 2021 of “two assassination attempts against individuals who worked for Sudan’s civilian-led government, which was overthrown on 25 October in a military coup”.⁷² Specifically the:

first assassination attempt took place on 27 October [2021] when Boutros Badawi, adviser to the Minister of Religious Affairs, was attacked at around 8pm as he was walking to his home in Khartoum. Mr Badawai reportedly realised that two people were following him when one of them shot at him but missed. He escaped his assailants by seeking refuge in a nearby home and leaving via a back route. This is not the first time his life has been threatened. In July [2021], Mr Badawi was attacked by five armed men who assaulted and threatened to kill him if he continued to speak out about the government’s failure to adequately respond to the issue of confiscated properties belonging to churches, and issues surrounding the Sudan Presbyterian Evangelical Church committees.⁷³

⁶⁸ Waging Peace, [Country situation in Sudan](#), June 2022, *Executive summary*, para. 1

⁶⁹ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [CSW urges government action in case of Khartoum church attacked for times by extremists](#), 18 March 2020

⁷⁰ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [CSW urges government action in case of Khartoum church attacked for times by extremists](#), 18 March 2020

⁷¹ U.S. Department of State, [2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sudan](#), 12 May 2021, *Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom*

⁷² Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Individuals who worked for civilian government targeted in assassination attempts](#), 3 November 2021

⁷³ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Individuals who worked for civilian government targeted in assassination attempts](#), 3 November 2021

As to the second assassination attempt, the same source reported:

The second assassination attempt took place on 28 October three days after the coup, when two people on motorcycles fired a hail of bullets at a car belonging to Taha Osman, a member of the anti-corruption Committee tasked with dismantling institutions set up by the previous regime. Mr Osman was not in the vehicle, but his cousin Mustafa Moheldeen was killed.⁷⁴

2020 - Omdurman

In its submission to the UN Human Rights Council, Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) reported that “From December 2019 to January 2020 a church building belonging to the Sudanese Church of Christ (SCOC) in Jabarona, Omdurman was attacked on four occasions. Additionally, its leaders received threats from Muslim extremists living in the area, who warned they would not allow churches to be built in the area even if official permission was granted”.⁷⁵ It was reported that the same church was attacked again in August 2020.⁷⁶

In February 2020 a Sudanese Church of Christ church was “set on fire in Ombadda Block 18, Omdurman”, with the perpetrators remaining unknown, according to CSW.⁷⁷

The same source reported that in June 2020 “Mariel Bang, a South Sudanese Christian, was killed, and four others seriously injured in the Shigla area of Omdurman by a mob of youth who reportedly shouted “Allah u Akbar”.⁷⁸

2021 – Omdurman

In May 2021, Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) reported “A building belonging to the Sudanese Church of Christ (SCOC) in the city of Omdurman, Sudan, was demolished [...] following threats from local residents and authorities. The building was in the process of being rebuilt after being burned down in August 2020”.⁷⁹ According to the same source, whilst the government did not designate a committee to investigate the incident, “The trial of eight people accused in the arson in August 2020 is ongoing at Dar-alsalam Criminal Court, marking the first prosecutions for damaging a church in the nation’s history”.⁸⁰

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

The Christian Post reported in March 2020 that “Sudan’s transitional government has abolished committees formed under the Islamist regime of former President Omar al-Bashir that were used to take over church properties”⁸¹ and in May 2020 stated that “Sudan’s transitional government and a

⁷⁴ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Individuals who worked for civilian government targeted in assassination attempts](#), 3 November 2021. See also Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Christian advisor to Minister of Guidance and Religious Endowments attacked by armed men](#), 5 July 2021

⁷⁵ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Written submission to the 48th session of the Human Rights Council](#), September 2021, para. 4. See also Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Churches targeted despite positive developments](#), 9 September 2020

⁷⁶ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Written submission to the 48th session of the Human Rights Council](#), September 2021, para. 5. See also Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Churches targeted despite positive developments](#), 9 September 2020

⁷⁷ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [General Briefing: Sudan](#), 1 May 2020

⁷⁸ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Written submission to the 48th session of the Human Rights Council](#), September 2021, para. 9

⁷⁹ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Church demolished in Omdurman](#), 28 May 2021

⁸⁰ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Church demolished in Omdurman](#), 28 May 2021

⁸¹ The Christian Post, [Sudan abolished Islamist committees formed to confiscate church properties](#), 19 March 2020

rebel group that fought against the Muslim-majority country's longtime authoritarian leader Omar al-Bashir, who was ousted last year, have agreed to form an independent national commission for religious freedom"⁸².

In July 2020 it was reported that Sudan abolished its apostasy law, i.e. Article 126 of the 1991 Criminal Laws Act.⁸³ According to an article published by the WorldWatch Monitor, a group of 29 Sudanese NGOs stated that "an amendment now allows non-Muslims to buy, sell and drink alcohol. But enforcement on the grounds of 'religion' may, the group says, 'pave the way for a new wave of racism and discrimination between citizens'".⁸⁴

On its undated webpage dedicated to 'Sudan', Reporters Without Borders noted that "Sudan is a multicultural, multiethnic society where tolerance and coexistence are in jeopardy. Ethnic groups' sensitivities are heightened. Accusations over perceived insults are increasing, with the media frequently a target. Interference by religious groups, which use their networks to defend their interests, are contributing to worsening conditions for journalists. The revolution has come to represent greater outspokenness on social networks, but in uncontrolled form, it feeds racism and misogyny and targets women and ethnic and sexual minorities".⁸⁵

In an interview with Cedoca in March 2021, the Documentation and Research Department of the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, an independent journalist stated without specifying where in Sudan: "Non-Arab still face discrimination. Christians even more".⁸⁶

In its submission of March 2021 to the UN Human Rights Council, the Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) noted that "discriminatory legal provisions perpetuate a climate of religious discrimination in the country", including incidents of "social hostility against Christians and other minorities".⁸⁷ According to the UN's 'Summary of Stakeholders Submissions' on Sudan, the National Human Rights Commission "noted with concern the growth of hate speech, racism and racial discrimination and the rise of ethnic conflicts, in the absence of relevant legislative and administrative measures and public policies".⁸⁸

2.1.3. Students

Note that the information cited is illustrative, but not exhaustive of the information available in the public domain. Sources do not necessarily clearly distinguish or specify the profiles of individuals targeted by acts of violence, arbitrary arrest or detention. Some of these individuals may also hold intersectional identities. It is therefore imperative to also refer to the information contained in the sub-sections of [2.1. Acts of violence](#) and [2.2. Arbitrary arrest and detention](#). Contextual information

⁸² The Christian Post, [Sudan opens path towards religious freedom](#), 24 May 2020

⁸³ WorldWatch Monitor, [NGOs say changes to Sudan's Islamic laws don't go far enough](#), 18 August 2020

⁸⁴ WorldWatch Monitor, [NGOs say changes to Sudan's Islamic laws don't go far enough](#), 18 August 2020

⁸⁵ Reporters Without Borders, [Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 19.05.2022]

⁸⁶ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.5. *Situatie van specifieke profielen in Khartoem*

⁸⁷ Alliance Defending Freedom, [Universal Periodic Review – Third Cycle, Submission to the 39th Session of the Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review Working Group](#), March 2021, para. 2

⁸⁸ UN Human Rights Council, [Summary of Stakeholders' submissions on Sudan, Report of the Office of the United Nations high Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 13 August 2021, para. 19. Original report, in Arabic, by the National Human Rights Commission, as submitted to the UN Human Rights Council can be accessed [here](#)

provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2021 - Khartoum

Eye Radio reported that one of those killed during the protests following the October 2021 coup, was a South Sudanese university student who was “hit by a stray bullet while coming back from the University”.⁸⁹

The Ayin Network reported in November 2021 that “While security forces targeted many citizens on 25 October [2021] – the day of the military coup, students from the University of Khartoum experienced some of the worst harassment. Soldiers and related militias such as the Rapid Support Forces raided their dormitories and shot, beat, and stole from both male and female students alike”.⁹⁰ Reporting on the same incident, Frontline Defenders stated: “On the first night of the coup, military forces raided the dorms of female students of Khartoum University. These young women were beaten, verbally abused and forced to evacuate the dorm in the middle of the night”.⁹¹

Similarly, in conversation with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan, ARC’s Director was told in May 2022 with regards to the targeting of students:

Only one incident, which was right after the coup. I think it was the day after when there were mass protests against the coup and the security forces invaded the dormitories of Khartoum University. Both male and the female dormitories, while the students were there, and assaulted several of the women. [...] The attack followed an anti-coup protest very close to the dormitories. After that, most of the universities closed because of the security situation, the political situation, and they didn't reopen until sometime this year [2022]. Since then, haven't heard of students being particularly singled out.⁹²

2022 - Khartoum

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported that in January 2022 “security forces fired teargas inside El-Sheikh Mustafa Alamin High school in Khartoum while students were sitting exams”.⁹³

2022 - Omdurman

Insecurity Insight reported that in January 2022 “security forces reportedly raped female students of Hajjar university” in Omdurman.⁹⁴

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

In an interview with Cedoca in March 2021, the Documentation and Research Department of the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, an independent journalist stated:

⁸⁹ Eye Radio, [S Sudanese student among people killed in Khartoum protests](#), 27 October 2021

⁹⁰ Ayin Network, [Sudan's Coup: Targeting of University of Khartoum students](#), 12 November 2021

⁹¹ Frontline Defenders, [Sudanese and International organisations call for an end on attacks against Sudanese women human rights defenders and protesters](#), 19 November 2021

⁹² Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes.

⁹³ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan coup update: Dozens of peaceful protesters killed whilst 36 others are imprisoned without trial by authorities](#), 22 February 2022

⁹⁴ Insecurity Insight, [Reporting Sexual Violence, Monthly News Brief](#), January 2022, Sudan, p. 3

[...] for political/students/activists/NGO personnel/alleged supporter of rebel movements, it's better than before the revolution. Supporters of groups non-signatory to Juba, notably Fur supporters of Abdelwahid and 2 areas supporters of Abdelaziz, are likely to face discrimination, including from rebels signatory to Juba.⁹⁵

2.1.4. Political activists

Note that the information cited is illustrative, but not exhaustive of the information available in the public domain. Sources do not necessarily clearly distinguish or specify the profiles of individuals targeted by acts of violence, arbitrary arrest or detention. Some of these individuals may also hold intersectional identities. It is therefore imperative to also refer to the information contained in the sub-sections of [2.1. Acts of violence](#) and [2.2. Arbitrary arrest and detention](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

In an interview with Cedoca in March 2021, the Documentation and Research Department of the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, an independent journalist stated:

[...] for political/students/activists/NGO personnel/alleged supporter of rebel movements, it's better than before the revolution. Supporters of groups non-signatory to Juba, notably Fur supporters of Abdelwahid and 2 areas supporters of Abdelaziz, are likely to face discrimination, including from rebels signatory to Juba.⁹⁶

2.1.5. (Perceived) political opposition/association with opposition groups, participating in demonstrations/protests, involvement in political groups including student unions

Note that the information cited is illustrative, but not exhaustive of the information available in the public domain. Sources do not necessarily clearly distinguish or specify the profiles of individuals targeted by acts of violence, arbitrary arrest or detention. Some of these individuals may also hold intersectional identities. It is therefore imperative to also refer to the information contained in the sub-sections of [2.1. Acts of violence](#) and [2.2. Arbitrary arrest and detention](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 - Khartoum

Vox news reported in February 2020 that “Sudanese security forces fired tear gas at demonstrators in Khartoum who were protesting the government’s removal of officers and soldiers who’d supported the revolution that overthrew the country’s longtime dictator, Omar al-Bashir, in April

⁹⁵ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.5. *Situatie van specifieke profielen in Khartoem*

⁹⁶ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.5. *Situatie van specifieke profielen in Khartoem*

2019”.⁹⁷ According to Anadolu Agency, 53 protesters were injured.⁹⁸ The demonstration was called by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA).⁹⁹

The UN reported that “Tensions escalated in Khartoum on 21 October [2020] during demonstrations called for by a group of political parties, members of the FFC [Forces for Freedom and Change] and SPA [Sudanese Professionals Association] to commemorate the 1964 revolution. Demonstrators demanded government reform and the reversal of the amendments to the Constitutional Document. One protester was killed, which triggered more protests the next day. Another protester died of her injuries on 25 October [2020]”.¹⁰⁰

2021 – Khartoum

In May 2021 “the body of Mohamed Ismail ‘Wad Aker,’ a resistance committee member, was found in the morgue of al-Tamayuz hospital in Khartoum. According to media reports, Ismail was last seen on April 3 [2021]. The autopsy reported he died as the result of torture. He was participating in a vigil for protesters killed in 2019. The case remained pending at year’s end” reported the U.S. Department of State in its annual human rights report.¹⁰¹

In its September 2021 briefing, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees reported that “It was reported that rebels and security forces exchanged fire in Khartoum on 01.09.21, resulting in at least two deaths and several injured persons. The violence was triggered by the eviction of the Rahaf housing complex in Soba by security forces. In October 2020, police temporarily housed peace delegations from various armed groups in the complex to support the peace process in the country. Some of those accommodated in the complex united under the name “Tamazuji” and refused to move out as requested, hence the eviction. In the course of the operation, seven rebel fighters were arrested, while others escaped to neighbouring city quarters, it was said. Surrounding roads were closed and the presence of security forces increased for security reasons”.¹⁰²

In its October 2021 briefing, the same source reported that “thousands of people protested on 16.10.21 against the current civilian-military transitional government and called for it to be dissolved [...] The demonstration was organised by various political parties, including parts of the alliance Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC). In the course of the demonstration, clashes occurred between the demonstrators and supporters of a civilian government”.¹⁰³

2022 – Khartoum

In the 6th January 2022 ‘Marches of the Millions’, called by the resistance committees, “at least three protesters were reportedly killed in Khartoum”.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁷ Vox, [Sudan just took a step backward on its path to democracy](#), 21 February 2020

⁹⁸ Anadolu Agency, [Sudan: 53 people injured in anti-army protests](#), 21 February 2020

⁹⁹ Vox, [Sudan just took a step backward on its path to democracy](#), 21 February 2020

¹⁰⁰ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan Report of the Secretary-General](#), 1 December 2020, para. 9

¹⁰¹ U.S. Department of State, [2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 12 April 2022, Section 1., A. Arbitrary deprivation of life and other unlawful or politically motivated killings

¹⁰² German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 06 September 2021, Sudan, p. 11

¹⁰³ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 18 October 2021, Sudan, p. 12

¹⁰⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Three protesters killed in Khartoum as Marches of the Millions sweep Sudan](#), 7 January 2022

On 17th January 2022, according to Sudanese Archive “peaceful demonstrators took to the streets in mass demonstrations” in Khartoum, “which the state’s resistance committees coordinators called for to demand the ‘formation of a civilian government’”. The actions of security forces on that day resulted in the killing of seven people, according to the Central Committee of Sudan Doctors, and dozens of others sustained injuries”.¹⁰⁵ According to the same source “at about two o’clock in the afternoon, according to what the shadows of the sun’s rays analyzed, began Excessive acts of violence against demonstrators, including tear gas and shooting, and video clips revealed joint Sudanese security cooperation between the Central Reserve Forces and the riot police”.¹⁰⁶

The Ayin Network reported in April 2022 on the most recent rounds of protests:

Sudan’s nationwide demonstrations against military occupation reached new levels of engagement on 6 April with thousands of protestors in the streets of the capital, Khartoum, along with protests taking place in 15 different states across the country.

Coined the “6 April [2022] earthquake” protestors marched towards the presidential palace and army headquarters, chanting that the military must “return to the barracks”. The Sudanese resistance committees, which lead the popular protests against the military coup, called for a demonstration on the anniversary of 6 April 2019 –a historic day marking the beginning of the sit-in that helped topple former president Omar al-Bashir. [...]

The high numbers of demonstrators were met by a volley of repressive measures used by the security forces – everything from tear gas and sound bombs to a more recent tactic of using cartridges. The cartridges fire a spray of pellets specifically designed, protestors told Ayin, to cause mass injuries and suppress the marches. The Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors (CCSD) confirmed the death of one protestor and at least 78 injured. According to the committee, El-Tayib Abdelwahab, just 19 years old, died after a bullet damaged his femoral artery during protests in the East Nile region of Khartoum state.¹⁰⁷

2022 – Omdurman

On 17th January 2022, according to Sudanese Archive “peaceful demonstrators took to the streets in mass demonstrations” in Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahri, “which the state’s resistance committees coordinators called for to demand the ‘formation of a civilian government’”. The actions of security forces on that day resulted in the killing of seven people, according to the Central Committee of Sudan Doctors, and dozens of others sustained injuries”.¹⁰⁸

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

In an interview with Cedoca in February 2021, the Documentation and Research Department of the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, Enrico Ille, researcher associated with the LOST Research Network, stated:

The situation has become much more complicated in a less straightforward authoritarian and discriminatory setting. The operation of security and military agents is much more obscure under the new government, and very much defined by resistance to change in the political landscape. In general, I would say that political activism directed against the supporters of the old regime is the most critical

¹⁰⁵ Sudanese Archive, [Violence in Khartoum on January 17, 2022 anti-coup protest](#), 30 March 2022, Introduction

¹⁰⁶ Sudanese Archive, [Violence in Khartoum on January 17, 2022 anti-coup protest](#), 30 March 2022, Introduction

¹⁰⁷ Ayin Network, [The 6 April “Earthquake” protest: new levels of engagement](#), 8 April 2022

¹⁰⁸ Sudanese Archive, [Violence in Khartoum on January 17, 2022 anti-coup protest](#), 30 March 2022, Introduction

factor for personal insecurity at the moment, rather than origin from the mentioned areas. However, the historical structures of inequality, where these areas are marginalized, are still in place as well.¹⁰⁹

An independent journalist interviewed for the same Cedoca report stated:

[...] for political/students/activists/NGO personnel/alleged supporter of rebel movements, it's better than before the revolution. Supporters of groups non-signatory to Juba, notably Fur supporters of Abdelwahid and 2 areas supporters of Abdelaziz, are likely to face discrimination, including from rebels signatory to Juba.¹¹⁰

The Guardian reported in May 2022 that “Nearly 1,600 pro-democracy campaigners [resistance committees] in Sudan have been arrested in the past eight months, and 96 killed in a series of protests. Almost every weekend, the police deploy shotguns and teargas to clear streets of barricades and demonstrators. More than 100 were injured in three days last week alone”.¹¹¹

2.1.6. Persons who have participated in protests (inside or outside of Sudan)

Note that the information cited is illustrative, but not exhaustive of the information available in the public domain. Sources do not necessarily clearly distinguish or specify the profiles of individuals targeted by acts of violence, arbitrary arrest or detention. Some of these individuals may also hold intersectional identities. It is therefore imperative to also refer to the information contained in the sub-sections of [2.1. Acts of violence](#) and [2.2. Arbitrary arrest and detention](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 - Khartoum

In April 2020, Crisis24 reported that police fired teargas at “supporters of former president Omar al-Bashir during demonstration in Khartoum”, who had demanded “the fall of the transitional government despite an ongoing ban on large gatherings due to restrictions put in place to curb the spread of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19). The protesters criticized Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok's recent austerity policies and a rise in the cost of bread and other goods”.¹¹²

2021 – Khartoum

DefendDefenders reported in its report on human rights defenders that “In April 2021, hundreds of women protested in Khartoum, calling for more legal reforms for women, such as ratification of the CEDAW Convention. The demonstration witnessed male backlash. In one incident, a man drove his car into the female protesters. In another, a group of male university students shouted at the women, threatening them with rape”.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.4.2. *De huidige situatie*

¹¹⁰ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.5. *Situatie van specifieke profielen in Khartoem*

¹¹¹ The Guardian, [‘Our friends didn’t die in vain’: Sudan’s activists aim to topple military regime](#), 28 May 2022

¹¹² Crisis24, [Sudan: Police fire teargas at pro-Bashir supporters in Khartoum April 16 /update 2](#), 17 April 2020

¹¹³ DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [An unfinished revolution: The situation of women human rights defenders in Sudan](#), December 2021, *Post-Revolution Climate for WHRDS*, p.

In May 2021, Amnesty International reported that the Sudanese security forces “shot dead at least two protesters and injured dozens at a demonstration in the capital, Khartoum. The demonstration was held to demand justice in connection with an attack by security forces on peaceful demonstrators in June 2019 when over 100 people were killed and hundreds injured”.¹¹⁴ The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), reporting on the same incident, noted the “injury of 37 others” in addition to the “killing of the two peaceful protesters”.¹¹⁵ The death of two protesters and the ‘severe’ injury of 37 people was also confirmed in the report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan of 27 July 2021.¹¹⁶

International Crisis Group’s ‘CrisisWatch’ of October 2021 reported that:

Head of Sovereign Council, Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, 25 Oct declared state of emergency, dissolved Sovereign Council and transitional govt as military forces detained several civilian govt officials including PM Hamdok. Military same day shut down internet access, blocked roads and bridges in capital Khartoum, and stormed state broadcaster’s headquarters in neighbouring Omdurman city. Tens of thousands immediately took to streets in Khartoum to denounce coup; security forces cracked down using live ammunition, reportedly leaving at least seven dead and 140 injured. In following days, demonstrators blocked roads in Khartoum with makeshift barricades and burning tyres, and several sectors went on strike to reject coup, culminating in 30 Oct countrywide protests which saw tens of thousands demand restoration of civilian-led govt amid ongoing internet shutdown; troops killed at least three in Omdurman and reportedly injured at least 245 across country.¹¹⁷

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) documented that on 21st October 2021 Sudanese authorities injured “17 peaceful demonstrators” in Khartoum.¹¹⁸

On 25th October 2021, following the military coup, “seven protesters had been killed and 140 people wounded after security forces fired on demonstrators. As night fell in Khartoum, witnesses described gangs of young men armed with sticks reportedly beating anyone found on the streets” reported The Guardian.¹¹⁹

International Crisis Group’s ‘CrisisWatch’ of November 2021 reported that:

Tens of thousands 25 Nov demonstrated against deal in capital Khartoum and other cities, called for justice for “martyrs” killed in demonstrations; security forces 30 Nov fired tear gas to disperse new protest in Khartoum. Earlier in month, near daily anti-coup protests held despite intensifying repression. Hundreds 7 Nov rallied across country as part of two-day civil disobedience campaign; security forces reportedly fired tear gas and arrested dozens. Thousands 13 Nov took to streets in Khartoum; medical authorities said at least eight protesters killed and over 200 injured. In deadliest

¹¹⁴ Amnesty International, [The state of the world’s human rights: Sudan 2021](#), 28 March 2022, *Excessive use of force*

¹¹⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Urgent call to investigate the killing and injuring of protesters in Khartoum](#), 14 May 2021

¹¹⁶ See UN Human Rights Council, [Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 27 July 2021, para. 27

¹¹⁷ International Crisis Group, [CrisisWatch October 2021](#), Undated [Research result generated on 24.05.2022]

¹¹⁸ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Urgent call to investigate the injuring of 17 peaceful demonstrators in Khartoum](#), 24 October 2021

¹¹⁹ The Guardian, [Sudan’s army seizes power in coup and detains prime minister](#), 25 October 2021

crackdown since coup, security forces 17 Nov killed at least 15 demonstrators in and around Khartoum; hundreds more reportedly wounded; renewed clashes reported next day in Khartoum.¹²⁰

On 30th October 2021 during mass protests in Khartoum, Omdurman and East Nile, “Hundreds of protesters were wounded and several were killed as security forces used heavy fire” reported Radio Dabanga.¹²¹ According to the same news article the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors reported that “the total number of injured in the October 30 processions in Khartoum, El Gedaref, and Kassala reached 165, including eight serious injuries in Omdurman Hospital. At least 47 of those wounded were shot with live ammunition”.¹²²

Sudanese Archive’s investigation focused on the photos and videos that were published on social media platforms of the 30th October 2021 protests in Khartoum and Omdurman and found that “the same or similar patterns in violence against protesters on October 30, 2021 as occurred in 2019, both before and after former president Omar Al-Bashir was ousted from office. We found similarities in: type of violence, injuries, and likely perpetrators”.¹²³ In relation to Khartoum, the Sudanese Archive team verified sources revealing the presence of “a large group of people in mixed uniforms, appearing to be from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and the Sudanese police”, who “shot teargas and guns towards protesters”.¹²⁴

According to Article 19 “The protesters demanded a return to civilian rule after the military coup leader General Abdel Fattah Burhan dissolved the cabinet of ministers and the Sovereign Council, arrested Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and several other senior officials, and called a state of emergency”.¹²⁵

The World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and its Sudanese network member the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) noted on 2nd November 2021 that “at least 10 civilians killed, 250 injured and 36 detained in unknown locations” following the October 2021 military coup.¹²⁶ Amnesty International reported in November 2021 that “According to the Sudanese Doctors’ Committee, a group monitoring the situation, at least 40 people were killed mostly by live ammunitions during demonstrations in the capital Khartoum since 25 October [2021]”.¹²⁷ This number was confirmed in a UN article which stated in mid-November 2021: “At least 39 people have been killed by security forces in Sudan since the 25 October military coup, 15 of whom were reportedly shot dead on Wednesday [a few days earlier than 18.11.2021]”.¹²⁸

On 13th November 2021, “Opposition groups, civil society organisations and the general public took part in a ‘Million Man’ march [...] to protest against the military coup”, but were met by “excessive force from security forces resulting in more than 200 cases of injury in Khartoum. More than 100 of

¹²⁰ International Crisis Group, [CrisisWatch November 2021](#), Undated [Research result generated on 24.05.2022]

¹²¹ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan coup: protesters killed during large Oct 30 Marches of the Millions](#), 31 October 2021

¹²² Radio Dabanga, [Sudan coup: protesters killed during large Oct 30 Marches of the Millions](#), 31 October 2021

¹²³ Sudanese Archive, [Shot in the streets: Violence against protesters in Sudan on October 30, 2021](#), 1 December 2021, *Introduction*

¹²⁴ Sudanese Archive, [Shot in the streets: Violence against protesters in Sudan on October 30, 2021](#), 1 December 2021, *Violence against protesters on Al-Siteen Street in Khartoum and Conclusion*

¹²⁵ Article 19, [Sudan: Military must stop crackdown on protesters and restore Internet](#), 4 November 2021

¹²⁶ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: International community should adopt urgent measures to stop human rights violations](#), 2 November 2021

¹²⁷ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Investigate the killings of people after military crackdown against protesters](#), 24 November 2021

¹²⁸ UN News, [Bachelet condemns killings of peaceful protesters in Sudan](#), 18 November 2021

those cases were by live ammunition, 3 due to rubber bullets, 17 injuries attributed to tear gas canisters, 13 cases of suffocation, 8 were injured by being beaten using police batons and 62 cases of burns and superficial injuries” reported Article 19.¹²⁹

A few days later, on 17th November 2021, “10 people were shot dead by security forces and 70 protesters were injured during pro-democracy demonstrations in Khartoum with reports further indicating that security forces were heavily deployed on main roads and intersections, using tear gas to prevent gatherings”.¹³⁰

Amnesty International reported in November 2021 that according to the Sudanese Doctors’ Committee “Security forces intensified the use of lethal force to counter organized protests in the capital Khartoum on 13 and 17 November [2021], killing at least 23 people”.¹³¹ The same source further noted “Research by Amnesty International confirmed that nine of the slain protesters had all died of gunshots that targeted their heads, necks and chests on 13 and 17 November, including one from sniper bullets, as well as at least 50 cases of injuries from gunshot wounds. At least one was shot by a sniper. The use of lethal force was unwarranted since they were all unarmed. The organization has also established that security agents raided hospitals”.¹³² Human Rights Watch, also reporting on events that occurred on 17th November 2021 in Khartoum noted that “Bahri, a town within Khartoum, had the highest toll, with at least 11 killed and over 77 injured”.¹³³

On 6th December 2021 SUDO (UK) reported that “Sudan witnessed another wave of protests led by Resistance Committees against the military coup in major cities including Khartoum, Gedaref, Sennar and others” whereby in Khartoum protesters were on the one hand met with teargas resulting in “several injuries amongst the protesters” and on the other hand were “attacked by a gang armed with knives. The armed gang were reportedly shuttled to the protests by a bus owned by the State’s transportation company. As they attacked, the armed gang demanded the protestors returned to their homes but were eventually chased away by the demonstrators”.¹³⁴

Radio Dabanga reported in relation to demonstrations that took place as part of the ‘Marches of the Millions’ on 25th December 2021:

The Central Committee of Sudan Doctors reports that at least 235 demonstrators were injured in the Marches of the Millions in Sudan on Saturday. Most of the injuries, 173, occurred in Khartoum, as Sudanese security forces responded to the anti-coup demonstrations with volleys of live ammunition, tear gas, and stun grenades, as protestors converged on the Republican Palace. A litany of other violations has been reported during demos across Sudan, with forces raiding hospitals and neighbourhoods, in what the Sudanese Professionals Association called “a frenzied campaign”.¹³⁵

The Darfur Bar Association, according to Radio Dabanga, reported that “has received 30 complaints of sexual harassment, including 16 complaints of rape, allegedly perpetrated by security forces in

¹²⁹ Article 19, [Sudan: Military must immediately stop crackdown on Freedom of Expression and Assembly](#), 24 November 2021

¹³⁰ Article 19, [Sudan: Military must immediately stop crackdown on Freedom of Expression and Assembly](#), 24 November 2021

¹³¹ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Investigate the killings of people after military crackdown against protesters](#), 24 November 2021

¹³² Amnesty International, [Sudan: Investigate the killings of people after military crackdown against protesters](#), 24 November 2021

¹³³ Human Rights Watch, [Sudan: Security Forces Use Lethal Force on Protesters](#), 23 November 2021

¹³⁴ SUDO (UK), [Violations as protestors demonstrate against military coup, December 6](#), 7 December 2021

¹³⁵ Radio Dabanga, [‘Frenzied campaign’ against December 25 Sudan demos – 235 injured](#), 27 December 2021

Khartoum during the suppression of the Marches of the Millions in Sudan on Saturday, December 25 [2021]. Three complaints of rape were laid by young men, and 13 confirmed cases by women".¹³⁶

UN News reporting on protests that took place on 30th December 2021 stated: "The protests marked the eleventh round of major demonstrations in the country since 25 October [2021], when the military first removed from office, but then later reinstated the Prime Minister in a coup, ending a transitional civilian power-sharing agreement. According to news reports, the protesters are calling for the military to cease playing any role in government, in the run up to fresh democratic elections. Four were reportedly shot dead by security forces during Thursday's demonstrations close to the capital Khartoum, with authorities using live fire and tear gas on the crowds, according to witnesses, while nearly 300 protesters were injured, along with dozens of police".¹³⁷

2022 – Khartoum

BBC News reported that on 4th January 2022 "Security forces in Sudan have fired tear gas at pro-democracy demonstrators in the latest mass protests against military rule following October's [2021] coup. Thousands of people in several cities took to the streets chanting anti-coup slogans and calling for the downfall of Sudan's ruling council. Tear gas was used to disperse crowds in the capital Khartoum and in Port Sudan".¹³⁸

In its briefing of 10th January 2022, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees reported that "protests against the military, against the October 2021 coup and in favour of a purely civilian government continued on 06.01.22. According to the security forces, two protesters were killed and 54 members of the security forces were injured during the renewed protest that took place in the capital Khartoum [...] Further protests took place in Khartoum on 09.01.22, in the course of which a young man was killed".¹³⁹

According to the same source "On 13.01.22, renewed nationwide protests took place against the military takeover. According to media reports, live ammunition and tear gas were used. A senior police officer and a protester were killed in Khartoum. The police announced that the policeman who was on duty at the protest had been fatally stabbed by protesters".¹⁴⁰

The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees reported that "On 14.02.22, the regular Monday rallies took place again. According to the media, thousands of people took part in the protests against the military government dubbed the "March of Millions" in the cities of Khartoum, Omdurman and Port Sudan, among others. According to the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors, two protestors were shot by security forces, one of them fatally".¹⁴¹

In February 2022 "Sudanese security forces violently cracked down on demonstrations in Khartoum, Omdurman, Port Sudan and elsewhere, injuring more than 200 protesters. Thousands of people took to the streets as part of the 'Break the Chains' millions march to demand the release of prisoners. The security forces reportedly used excessive force, including the firing of live ammunition

¹³⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur Bar Association: 16 rapes during Dec 25 Sudan demos](#), 29 December 2021

¹³⁷ UN News, [Sudan: Refrain from 'disproportionate use of force' against protesters](#), 31 December 2021

¹³⁸ BBC News, [Sudan coup: Sudan forces fire tear gas at protesters](#), 4 January 2022

¹³⁹ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 10 January 2022, *Sudan*, p. 12

¹⁴⁰ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 17 January 2022, *Sudan*, p. 124

¹⁴¹ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 21 February 2022, *Sudan*, p. 11

and tear gas, against the largely peaceful protests” reported the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.¹⁴² In one particular incident, Human Rights Watch reported:

On February 28 [2022], after dispersing protests near the Presidential Palace in Khartoum, anti-riot police and Central Reserve Police members detained a 32-year-old protester and beat him with gun butts, batons, and iron rods before stripping him fully naked in the street. “They were beating me everywhere, including on my head. I couldn’t see or feel anymore.” The police eventually left him, and a passerby drove him to a hospital.¹⁴³

International Crisis Group’s ‘CrisisWatch’ of March 2022 reported that “Security forces 10 March shot dead two people including 11-year-old boy during anti-coup protests in capital Khartoum and neighbouring Omdurman city. Thousands 17 March protested soaring prices and poor living conditions in Khartoum and across country, prompting clashes with police which left 187 reportedly injured”.¹⁴⁴

The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees reported that “On 30.03.22, protesters and security forces clashed in the capital. The conflict was triggered by an official order to remove commercial stalls located along streets. This measure is part of a campaign by the military government to remove so-called negative features in the city. When the stalls were not removed, security forces looted and destroyed them in the night to 30.03.22. The following morning, protests broke out against the military government’s action, with the security forces using tear gas and stun grenades. During further nationwide protests on 31.03.22, a protester was shot dead by security forces in Khartoum; more than 50 people were reportedly injured by the use of live ammunition. Security forces reportedly used tear gas, stun grenades and batons to crack down on demonstrators in several towns”.¹⁴⁵

International Crisis Group’s ‘CrisisWatch’ of April 2022 reported that “on anniversary of 2019 sit-in in front of military headquarters in capital Khartoum, thousands 6 April [2022] marched in Khartoum and across country, demanding civilian rule; security forces shot one protester dead”.¹⁴⁶

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

The joint security forces have repeatedly used excessive force in response to peaceful protests against the coup, in particular in Khartoum State (Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman). The protests, which are coordinated by local resistance committees, commenced on the day of the coup and continued with increased frequency after the signing of the political agreement on 21 November 2021. As at 10 April 2022, over 55 demonstrations had been organized.

According to credible sources, as at 10 April 2022, 93 persons, including 1 woman and 15 children (14 boys, 1 girl), had been killed and over 5,000 persons, including 46 children (44 boys, 2 girls), injured as a result of unnecessary and disproportionate use of force by the joint security forces. All except two deaths and 184 injuries were registered in Khartoum State. Of those killed, 86 died as a result of injuries caused by live ammunition, with the majority (70) shot in the head and/or neck (40) or the chest (30). Seventeen persons died from injuries to other parts of their bodies. In addition, 4 persons died after being hit by tear-gas canisters in the head or neck (2) or the chest (2), and 2 died after

¹⁴² Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, [Atrocity Alert No. 289: Sudan, Somalia and Venezuela](#), 23 February 2022

¹⁴³ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated](#), 28 April 2022

¹⁴⁴ International Crisis Group, [CrisisWatch April 2022](#), Undated [Research result generated on 24.05.2022]

¹⁴⁵ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 4 April 2022, *Sudan*, p. 10

¹⁴⁶ International Crisis Group, [CrisisWatch April 2022](#), Undated [Research result generated on 24.05.2022]

severe beatings by security forces. Of those killed, 3 were bystanders, including a 14-year-old girl. Of the injured, 961 were shot with live ammunition, 1,573 hit by tear-gas canisters and 692 suffered breathing difficulties as a result of tear-gas inhalation. Security forces reportedly also injured 44 protesters in 2022 by running over them with their vehicles. Video evidence suggests that in some cases this was intentional. According to credible sources, injuries sustained by protesters included loss of vision or serious damage to eyes (13 persons), loss of limbs (11), paralysis (7) and damage to internal organs (7).¹⁴⁷

The report further noted with regards to the perpetrators:

Medical reports, video footage and eyewitness statements point to the use of lethal weapons against protesters, including AK-47 assault rifles and machine guns, in breach of international human rights law regulating the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials, which prohibits the use of those firearms and ammunition that cause unwarranted injury or present an unwarranted risk. Evidence collected also indicates that protesters were directly targeted or shot at from close range by security forces during the protests. For example, on 17 November 2021, according to eyewitnesses, security forces wearing regular police and Central Reserve Police uniforms fired live ammunition, including from machine guns, directly at protesters in Al-Mouassasa station and Shambat in Khartoum-North, killing eight persons, including one woman, and injuring many others. Also on 17 November, at 60th Street in Khartoum, a police officer in Riot Police uniform shot a protester, who was hiding behind a car, in the head, through the front window of the car. On 17 January 2022, joint security forces members wearing different uniforms fired live ammunition at protesters who were approaching the Republican Palace in Khartoum. According to reliable sources, 7 protesters were killed and 80 others injured (46 by live ammunition and 34 by tear-gas canisters), including 1 protester who shared testimony with the joint human rights office of how he had been hit in the arm.

On many occasions, security forces reportedly fired tear-gas canisters and stun grenades directly at the upper body or heads of protesters, causing serious injuries. Medical reports indicated that over 30 per cent of the injuries were caused in this way [...]

Since mid-January 2022, the joint security forces have regularly used shotguns to disperse protests, mainly in Khartoum State but also in Wad Medani in Al-Gazira State. As at 10 April 2022, 2 men and 3 boys had reportedly died as a result of being hit by shotgun pellets and at least 367 others had been injured. One person interviewed stated that while participating in a demonstration on 30 January 2022, he had been shot by an officer wearing a Central Reserve Police uniform standing about five metres away. Medical professionals confirmed that the weapon used was a shotgun – pellets can clearly be seen on X-rays and typically cause multiple wounds.

Security forces have consistently denied use of live ammunition, including in meetings with the Expert [...]¹⁴⁸

On 24th May 2022, The Guardian reported: “Security forces in Sudan have mounted a fierce crackdown in recent days to crush remaining unrest, six months after a coup that brought a military regime to power in the unstable strategic country. Police fired teargas and shotguns at protesters as thousands took to the streets in the capital, Khartoum, and twin city of Omdurman on Monday. The violence followed a similarly harsh response to demonstrations over the weekend. In all, 113 people have been injured and one killed in recent days, according to doctors”.¹⁴⁹

2020 – Omdurman

¹⁴⁷ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, paras. 20/21

¹⁴⁸ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, paras. 22, 23, 24 and 25

¹⁴⁹ The Guardian, [Sudan security forces clash with protesters against military coup](#), 24 May 2022

Covering the period 28 June to 4 July 2020, ACLED reported that “One demonstrator was killed in Omdurman, as the use of live ammunition was reported during police interventions in Greater Khartoum and the town of Kebkabiya in North Darfur”.¹⁵⁰

2021 – Omdurman

On 30th October 2021 during mass protests in Khartoum, Omdurman and East Nile, “Hundreds of protesters were wounded and several were killed as security forces used heavy fire” reported Radio Dabanga.¹⁵¹ According to the same news article the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors reported that “three protesters were killed during yesterday's October 30 mass civil disobedience processions in Omdurman. Two of them died in Omdurman Hospital and another in El Arbaeen Hospital. All of them were shot directly by security forces. Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that Omdurman witnesses a large Rapid Support Forces (RSF) presence and that several civilians were shot by the forces, including one killing in a hospital. They estimate the total number of deaths to be higher”.¹⁵²

Sudanese Archive's investigation focused on the photos and videos that were published on social media platforms of the 30th October 2021 protests in Khartoum and Omdurman and found that “the same or similar patterns in violence against protesters on October 30, 2021 as occurred in 2019, both before and after former president Omar Al-Bashir was ousted from office. We found similarities in: type of violence, injuries, and likely perpetrators”.¹⁵³ In relation to Omdurman, the Sudanese Archive team verified sources revealing the presence of “a large group of people in mixed uniforms, appearing to be from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Force (RSF), and the Sudanese police”, who “shot teargas and guns towards protesters”.¹⁵⁴

Amnesty International reported in November 2021 that “18-year-old secondary school student Elshaikh Youssef was marching with his friends on 40th Street in Omdurman, Khartoum's twin city, when he told his friends that he had spotted a sniper on one of the rooftops. As Elshaikh pointed upwards he was shot with a bullet that came from the same direction, a family member and his friends told Amnesty International”.¹⁵⁵

In December 2021, the Christian Post reported the killing of four protesters by security forces in Omdurman, while “participating in anti-coup protests”.¹⁵⁶ Radio Dabanga reported that “Doctors say that a fifth person died today, after being hit by a tear gas cannister in the chest. Dozens were injured, some by live ammunition. Exact numbers are still unclear but 30 wounded cases were transferred to the El Arbaeen Hospital”.¹⁵⁷

2022 – Omdurman

¹⁵⁰ Lay, T. (ACLED), [Regional Overview: Africa, 28 June-4 July 2020](#), 8 July 2020

¹⁵¹ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan coup: protesters killed during large Oct 30 Marches of the Millions](#), 31 October 2021

¹⁵² Radio Dabanga, [Sudan coup: protesters killed during large Oct 30 Marches of the Millions](#), 31 October 2021

¹⁵³ Sudanese Archive, [Shot in the streets: Violence against protesters in Sudan on October 30, 2021](#), 1 December 2021, *Introduction*

¹⁵⁴ Sudanese Archive, [Shot in the streets: Violence against protesters in Sudan on October 30, 2021](#), 1 December 2021, *Violence against protesters on Al-Siteen Street in Khartoum and Conclusion*

¹⁵⁵ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Investigate the killings of people after military crackdown against protesters](#), 24 November 2021

¹⁵⁶ The Christian Post, [Sudanese forces kill 4 civilians during protests against military coup, doctor group says](#), 31 December 2021

¹⁵⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan forces fire live ammo, tear gas on demo – five civilians dead](#), 31 December 2021

According to a briefing by the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, during protests on 19th January 2022, “another protester was killed by the use of live ammunition in Omdurman”.¹⁵⁸ In early February 2022 the same source reported that “four protestors were injured by live ammunition during protests held in Omdurman town”.¹⁵⁹

The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees reported that “On 14.02.22, the regular Monday rallies took place again. According to the media, thousands of people took part in the protests against the military government dubbed the “March of Millions” in the cities of Khartoum, Omdurman and Port Sudan, among others. According to the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors, two protestors were shot by security forces, one of them fatally”.¹⁶⁰

In February 2022 “Sudanese security forces violently cracked down on demonstrations in Khartoum, Omdurman, Port Sudan and elsewhere, injuring more than 200 protesters. Thousands of people took to the streets as part of the ‘Break the Chains’ millions march to demand the release of prisoners. The security forces reportedly used excessive force, including the firing of live ammunition and tear gas, against the largely peaceful protests” reported the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.¹⁶¹

International Crisis Group’s ‘CrisisWatch’ of March 2022 reported that “Security forces 10 March shot dead two people including 11-year-old boy during anti-coup protests in capital Khartoum and neighbouring Omdurman city”.¹⁶²

The Ayin Network reported in April 2022 on the most recent rounds of protests:

Sudan’s nationwide demonstrations against military occupation reached new levels of engagement on 6 April with thousands of protestors in the streets of the capital, Khartoum, along with protests taking place in 15 different states across the country. [...]

The high numbers of demonstrators were met by a volley of repressive measures used by the security forces – everything from tear gas and sound bombs to a more recent tactic of using cartridges. The cartridges fire a spray of pellets specifically designed, protestors told Ayin, to cause mass injuries and suppress the marches [...]

Eyewitnesses in Omdurman, however, say heavily armed security forces opened fire on protestors to prevent them from reaching the parliamentary building, severely injuring one young woman in the abdomen in the process. Thousands of demonstrators took shelter in the inner residential streets of the neighbourhoods of Bant and Al-Mawrada in Omdurman, while security reinforcements arrived in the evening. As some of the protestors retreated, security forces surrounded Omdurman’s El Arbaeen Hospital, preventing any injured access to the facility. According to the doctors’ statement, coup forces fired bullets and sound bombs at the demonstrations within earshot of the staff and patients.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁸ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 24 January 2022, *Sudan*, p. 12

¹⁵⁹ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 14 February 2022, *Sudan*, p. 15

¹⁶⁰ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 21 February 2022, *Sudan*, p. 11

¹⁶¹ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, [Atrocity Alert No. 289: Sudan, Somalia and Venezuela](#), 23 February 2022

¹⁶² International Crisis Group, [CrisisWatch April 2022](#), Undated [Research result generated on 24.05.2022]

¹⁶³ Ayin Network, [The 6 April “Earthquake” protest: new levels of engagement](#), 8 April 2022

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

The joint security forces have repeatedly used excessive force in response to peaceful protests against the coup, in particular in Khartoum State (Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman). The protests, which are coordinated by local resistance committees, commenced on the day of the coup and continued with increased frequency after the signing of the political agreement on 21 November 2021. As at 10 April 2022, over 55 demonstrations had been organized.

According to credible sources, as at 10 April 2022, 93 persons, including 1 woman and 15 children (14 boys, 1 girl), had been killed and over 5,000 persons, including 46 children (44 boys, 2 girls), injured as a result of unnecessary and disproportionate use of force by the joint security forces.¹⁶⁴

On 24th May 2022, The Guardian reported: “Security forces in Sudan have mounted a fierce crackdown in recent days to crush remaining unrest, six months after a coup that brought a military regime to power in the unstable strategic country. Police fired teargas and shotguns at protesters as thousands took to the streets in the capital, Khartoum, and twin city of Omdurman on Monday. The violence followed a similarly harsh response to demonstrations over the weekend. In all, 113 people have been injured and one killed in recent days, according to doctors”.¹⁶⁵

General information (January 2020 – April 2022)

According to the Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ravina Shamdasani, in January 2022 “Credible statistics from the Central Committee of Sudan Doctors show that 71 people have been killed and more than 2,200 injured by State security forces during protests since the 25 October 2021 coup d'etat. Of these, 17 were killed just since the beginning of this year”.¹⁶⁶ The same press statement further noted: “Our Joint Human Rights Office in Sudan has also noted a pattern demonstrating that more than 25 per cent of those injured were hit directly by teargas canisters. This raises concerns that security forces are firing teargas canisters horizontally, directed at individuals, in violation of international standards”.¹⁶⁷

In its update covering the period 25 October 2021 to 10 February 2022 the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported that “Security forces have continued to use excessive force to crackdown on protests. ACJPS has documented at least 82 protesters killed since the coup on 25 October 2021. Of the 82, 38 are from Omdurman, 3 Khartoum Bahari, 23 Khartoum, 3 Aljazeera state and the rest are from other parts of the country”.¹⁶⁸

During the period 22 November 2021 and 21 February 2022, the UN reported that “planned and spontaneous protests and sit-ins took place in Khartoum and across the country. The majority of the demonstrations were peaceful, while there were, reportedly, incidents of stone-throwing and an

¹⁶⁴ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, para. 20/21

¹⁶⁵ The Guardian, [Sudan security forces clash with protesters against military coup](#), 24 May 2022

¹⁶⁶ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNOHCHR), [Press briefing notes on Sudan](#), 18 January 2022

¹⁶⁷ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNOHCHR), [Press briefing notes on Sudan](#), 18 January 2022

¹⁶⁸ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan coup update: Dozens of peaceful protesters killed whilst 36 others are imprisoned without trial by authorities](#), 22 February 2022

attack on a police station. Security forces routinely used excessive force, including live ammunition, stun grenades and tear gas to disperse protesters”.¹⁶⁹ The same source further explained:

During the reporting period, the human rights situation worsened, with widespread reports of human rights violations, in particular in the context of the response of security forces to protests in the Khartoum area against the coup and against the involvement of the military in government. Despite calls for restraint, security forces repeatedly used excessive force, firing live ammunition, stun grenades and tear gas at protesters, resulting in deaths and serious injuries, including of women and children.¹⁷⁰

Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, noted in March 2022 that:

As of 3 March [2022], credible sources reported 85 people killed, including 1 woman and 11 children, due to disproportionate use of force by security forces during protests. The High Commissioner expressed alarm at attacks on hospitals and medical facilities and assaults on their staff, with injured people blocked from accessing ambulances. Forced incursions into six hospitals by security forces had been documented, with medical staff assaulted. The High Commissioner deplored the widespread arbitrary arrests and detentions, with flagrant disrespect for the rights of those arrested.

The Joint Human Rights Office reported that more than 1,000 people had been arrested for opposing the coup and its consequences between 25 October 2021 and 3 March 2022. The High Commissioner was concerned about the pattern of targeted arbitrary arrests and detention of prominent protest organizers and demonstrators either during protests, at their homes, or in hospitals, and welcomed the release of 115 people last week. The High Commissioner was disturbed by the violations of the rights of children directly linked to the recent demonstrations and the 25 allegations of rape, gang rape and other forms of sexual violence against women, girls and men. Attacks against journalists and human rights defenders were increasing, posing a severe threat to freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly.¹⁷¹

In March 2022, Article 19 noted that since October 2021 and up to 7th March 2022, “at least 71 people have been killed in Sudan” for exercising their right to freedom of expression and assembly.¹⁷² The same article further noted that since October 2021, “authorities in Sudan have adopted a range of repressive actions that have denied the right to freedom of expression and assembly. This includes harassment, intimidation of protesters and citizens, and arbitrary raids on media houses.”¹⁷³

In April 2022 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights noted its concern “by reports of the continued excessive use of force by the security services, including the military, which has resulted in at least 82 deaths and serious injuries to many demonstrators to date”.¹⁷⁴

Human Rights Watch reported in April 2022 that:

Sudan’s security forces have unlawfully detained hundreds of protesters since December 2021 and forcibly disappeared scores as part of its broader clampdown on opposition to the October 25 [2021] military coup [...]

¹⁶⁹ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan Report of the Secretary-General](#), 2 March 2022, para. 13

¹⁷⁰ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan Report of the Secretary-General](#), 2 March 2022, para. 27

¹⁷¹ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNOHCHR), [Human Rights Council Discusses the Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua and in Sudan](#), 7 March 2022

¹⁷² Article 19, [Sudan: UN must examine free expression crisis](#), 7 March 2022

¹⁷³ Article 19, [Sudan: UN must examine free expression crisis](#), 7 March 2022

¹⁷⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [516 Resolution on the worsening human rights situation in Sudan following the October 25 coup d’état – ACHPR/Res.516 \[LXX\]](#), 4 April 2022

Security forces have beaten and otherwise ill-treated detained protesters, including stripping child detainees naked and threatening sexual violence against women.¹⁷⁵

Reporting on the period 22 February to 5 May 2022, the UN Secretary-General noted that:

Throughout the reporting period, human rights violations continued, and abuses against civilians were reported across the country, including in Khartoum and resulting from intercommunal clashes in Darfur. Security forces continued to use excessive force against protesters, including firing live ammunition, stun grenades and tear gas, reportedly resulting in 13 civilian deaths, all of whom were men (8) and boys (5), and 1,708 injuries. In addition, reports were received of 186 arbitrary arrests and the ongoing detention of approximately 138 resistance committee leaders, political protesters and civil society activists. Forty-eight individuals were released during this period.¹⁷⁶

2.1.7. Persons who have shown or are perceived to have shown opposition

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

2.1.8. Human rights activists

Note that the information cited is illustrative, but not exhaustive of the information available in the public domain. Sources do not necessarily clearly distinguish or specify the profiles of individuals targeted by acts of violence, arbitrary arrest or detention. Some of these individuals may also hold intersectional identities. It is therefore imperative to also refer to the information contained in the sub-sections of [2.1. Acts of violence](#) and [2.2. Arbitrary arrest and detention](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 - Khartoum

In an interview with Cedoca in February 2021, the Documentation and Research Department of the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, the founder of an organisation in the Nuba mountains stated in relation to Khartoum:

The activist community are watched and are experiencing some similar attacks like the Nuba and Darfuri have experienced before although there are differences. Nuba and Darfuris are ethnic groups that have been attacked while activists are specifically attacked for their political views.¹⁷⁷

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

Frontline Defenders reported in November 2021:

Since the beginning of the military coup on 25 October 2021, Sudanese women human rights defenders (WHRDs) and peaceful protesters have been facing growing violations. An internet blackout which has been ongoing since then has increased the risks faced by WHRDs in Sudan and severely

¹⁷⁵ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated](#), 28 April 2022

¹⁷⁶ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan](#), 17 May 2022, para. 22

¹⁷⁷ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.5. *Situatie van specifieke profiele in Khartoem*

restricted their efforts of monitoring and documenting the violations committed by the military and security forces against human rights defenders and civilians in Sudan. Women's rights groups are working in the context of a complete closure of civil space and restrictions in movement and communication. WHRDs in Sudan are facing an unprecedented crackdown as the coup leaders are targeting journalists, members of resistance committees, union leaders, lawyers, students and civil society activists.

During and after the protests in several neighborhoods in Khartoum and other cities, videos of Sudanese women being beaten by members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and other security forces reflected the amount of violence exhibited against women on the streets. Women protesters were beaten and subjected to verbal abuses by the joint forces.¹⁷⁸

2.1.9. Journalists

Note that in July 2020 amendments to the 2018 Cybercrime Law, which “imposes unacceptable restrictions on the right to freedom of expression”, now also criminalises the “spread of ‘fake news’ online, introduced even harsher restrictions that severely impact journalists and their reporting on the COVID-19 pandemic” highlighted Article 19.¹⁷⁹ For more information on the Cybercrime Law and its amendments “against international freedom of expression standards”¹⁸⁰, see Article 19's [briefing](#).

2020 – Khartoum

The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and its affiliate, the Sudanese Journalists Union (SJU), stated in October 2020 that “Security forces attacked journalists and prevented them from covering protests in Sudan’s capital Khartoum on 21 October [2020]”.¹⁸¹ The source specifically highlighted two incidences:

Security forces wearing plain clothes and carrying batons surrounded Saad Eddin Hassan, a correspondent for the Al-Arabiya network, in an attempt to prevent him from reporting on a demonstration taking place in the centre of Khartoum.

The second incident took place in the South of the city, where photographers for Sky News Arabia were attacked by security forces while covering a peaceful march. According to media reports, the security forces beat a photographer and erased all pictures he took during the protests. The Culture and Information Ministry confirmed the incidents.¹⁸²

2021 - Khartoum

According to news reports, the Committee to Protect Journalists reported that “On October 21 [2021], pro-military protestors assaulted Ahmed Hamdan, a reporter and the director of news for local independent daily newspaper Al-Dimuqrati, while he was covering their demonstration outside of the parliament according to news reports, and local journalist Adel Color who spoke with CPJ via

¹⁷⁸ Frontline Defenders, [Sudanese and International organisations call for an end on attacks against Sudanese women human rights defenders and protesters](#), 19 November 2021

¹⁷⁹ Article 19, [Sudan: Cybercrime Law can restrict vital information during pandemic](#), 10 November 2021. See also Reporters Without Borders, [Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 19.05.2022]

¹⁸⁰ Article 19, [Sudan: Cybercrime Law can restrict vital information during pandemic](#), 10 November 2021

¹⁸¹ International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), [Sudan: Security forces attack journalists and obstruct reporting on protests](#), 26 October 2020

¹⁸² International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), [Sudan: Security forces attack journalists and obstruct reporting on protests](#), 26 October 2020

messaging app. Hamdan suffered head injuries for which he received stitches at a local hospital and was released after a few hours, according to Color and those reports”.¹⁸³

According to the same source “On the same day, pro-military protestors hit three media workers with the British broadcaster BBC with their hands as they were covering a pro-military demonstration in front of the presidential palace in Khartoum, according to a Facebook post by BBC correspondent Mohamed Osman, and a local journalist who spoke with CPJ via messaging app on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal. The local journalist said the crew, which included a producer, a cameraman, and an assistant, fled the scene and that nobody was injured”.¹⁸⁴

A few days later, on 23rd October 2021:

supporters of the former president Omar al-Bashir’s National Congress Party, which was banned in 2019, stormed the headquarters of local independent news agency Sudan News Agency (SUNA) to stop a press conference there organized by Forces of Freedom and Change, a coalition of civil society groups, according to a statement by SUNA, news reports, and Color.

During the incident, National Congress Party supporters beat SUNA journalist Al-Ahmadi Farah who underwent surgery for a broken hand at a hospital in Khartoum the following day, according to SUNA’s statement and Color.¹⁸⁵

On the same day in a separate incident “pro-military protestors prevented journalist Marwan Negm el-Din, a correspondent for Qatari broadcaster Al-Jazeera, from covering the protests that took place on the Al Mk Nemer bridge in Khartoum, according to a report in regional news site Al-Araby Al-Jadeed and a local journalist who spoke to CPJ via messaging app on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal. The protestors grabbed Negm el-Din’s phone while he was filming, according to CPJ’s review of a video sent by the local journalist which documents the incident”.¹⁸⁶

African Arguments reported on journalist Ali Farsab who on 17 November 2021 was “headed to the Bahri area in north Khartoum to cover the enormous anti-coup demonstrations [...] His scalp was grazed by a bullet before soldiers beat him, fracturing his hand as his head bled. When his assailants saw protestors filming them, they carried Farsab to a side alley and continued to hit him [...] Farsab says the blows and insults only increased once the soldiers learnt he was a reporter for the independent newspaper -Al-Tayyar. He was held for three days, during which he was denied medical treatment, before his eventual release”.¹⁸⁷

Amnesty International noted in its annual report covering 2021:

Military authorities also targeted press who covered anti-army protests. On 30 December [2021] security forces attacked the offices of two TV stations in Khartoum, assaulting journalists and firing

¹⁸³ Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese military forces arrest state television manager, pro-military protesters assault journalists amid unrest](#), 26 October 2021

¹⁸⁴ Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese military forces arrest state television manager, pro-military protesters assault journalists amid unrest](#), 26 October 2021

¹⁸⁵ Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese military forces arrest state television manager, pro-military protesters assault journalists amid unrest](#), 26 October 2021

¹⁸⁶ Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese military forces arrest state television manager, pro-military protesters assault journalists amid unrest](#), 26 October 2021

¹⁸⁷ African Arguments, [“Back to the former lies”: Sudan everts to media repression post-coup](#), 16 December 2021. See also Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese journalist Ali Farsab shot and detained while covering anti-coup protest](#), 19 November 2021

tear gas into their offices after they broadcast footage of security force violations against protesters.¹⁸⁸

2022 - Khartoum

Radio Dabanga reported in March 2022 that “A photojournalist for Ayin Network was seriously wounded by live ammunition in the vicinity of the Republican Palace in central Khartoum during his coverage of yesterday's Marches of the Millions. Security forces shot him four times after which the journalist required emergency treatment in the hospital, but his condition is now stable”.¹⁸⁹

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

On its undated webpage dedicated to ‘Sudan’, Reporters Without Borders noted that “A military coup d’état on October 25, 2021 signaled a return to information control and censorship. Journalists are working in a worsening climate of violence [...] Since the coup, conditions for media and journalists have worsened. The sector is deeply polarised. Journalistic critics have been arrested, and the internet is regularly shut down in order to block the flow of information”.¹⁹⁰ The same source also highlighted:

Threats that journalists face have intensified in recent years with the emergence of new militias and armed movements. Reporters are systematically attacked and insulted in demonstrations, by both the army and rapid-response forces. Journalists who criticise the authorities or have published compromising documents involving the government are under constant surveillance and electronic monitoring. Correspondents can only work under a special media pass issued by the government. A permit must be granted for most regions each time a reporter travels there. The government exploits the private lives of women journalists to intimidate them. Their chats on social networks are under constant monitoring, which leads to threats and, at times, reprisals. Anti-journalist predators enjoy total impunity and are protected by the authorities. No law protects journalists, although some civil institutions, such as the Sudanese Journalists Network, the Sudanese Media Network, and Journalists for Human Rights, have established mechanisms for following up and documenting violations of reporters’ rights.¹⁹¹

Without specifying the location, the Ayin Network reported in December 2021 that “security forces kidnapped individual journalists. On 13 November [2021], masked military intelligence abducted Shawgi Abdul Azim after he had given an interview to Al-Jazeera in which he was deemed to have been overly critical of the regime. Azim’s kidnappers, he told African Arguments, forced him to sign a pledge not to criticise the military in the future. Other journalists have faced similar attacks. Atif Mohamed, the editor of El Sudani newspaper, was driving home when masked men blocked his car and attempted to abduct him. Mohamed narrowly managed to escape”.¹⁹²

In conversation with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan, ARC’s Director was told in May 2022:

What we saw after the coup was a tightening of restrictions on civic space in general, and around 55 instances in which journalists were targeted, including with summons, arbitrary arrest and detention of 25 media workers, among them four female journalists, and raids on media premises. In some

¹⁸⁸ Amnesty International, [The state of the world’s human rights: Sudan 2021](#), 28 March 2022, *Freedom of expression*

¹⁸⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Photojournalist covering yesterday's Marches of the Millions severely injured by Sudanese security forces](#), 22 March 2022

¹⁹⁰ Reporters Without Borders, [Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 19.05.2022]

¹⁹¹ Reporters Without Borders, [Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 19.05.2022]

¹⁹² Ayin Network, [“Back to the former lies” – Sudan reverts to press repression](#), 16 December 2021

cases, journalists/photographers/ media workers were assaulted and/or their equipment damaged, destroyed, or confiscated. In at least one instance in which journalists were filming protests from the top of a building, security forces entered the building and assaulted them, breaking their equipment. So I think the risks associated with reporting and journalism increased after the coup, particularly for journalists who were reporting on the protests against the coup or were critical of the coup or military authorities.¹⁹³

The same source further added that “We’ve heard from several media actors that they’ve been verbally warned not to publish or to broadcast information which is critical of the coup or authorities. A number of licenses of media houses were withdrawn after the coup but were later restored”.¹⁹⁴

2.1.10. Health care workers

2021 – Khartoum

Radio Dabanga reported that in April 2021, “Two protesters [medics] were seriously injured on Sunday morning during raids on a meeting at El Tamiz Hospital in Khartoum that included committees and other revolutionary bodies [...] El Tamiz Hospital sit-in began last week in protest against the decomposition of 190 bodies in the hospital mortuary which was leading to the emission of unpleasant odours and the flow of blood and bodily fluids. The protesters are demanding the removal of the bodies from the mortuary and for autopsies and DNA testing”.¹⁹⁵

Insecurity Insight reported that in March 2021 “several doctors who were meeting after providing free treatment in deprived areas to the east of the city were reportedly assaulted by military police. Three doctors were also arrested on dubious charges”.¹⁹⁶

Between 25 October and 21 November 2021 the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) documented “several incidents where security forces have obstructed the provision of health care”, specifically reporting:

Medical workers have been targeted for arrest and detention for participating in anti- coup protests. [...]

In Khartoum Bahri and Omdurman, security forces fired tear gas inside hospitals terrifying both patients and medical staff. This also disrupted medical staff as they were attending to patients. Security forces on several occasions blocked access to hospitals by deploying forces at the entrance who threatened and intimidated persons trying to access hospitals including patients and blood donors. In Khartoum, staff members at the national blood bank office were sent on forced leave for a day. Security forces also raided hospitals and arrested injured protesters. Similar tactics were used during crackdowns on the 2018-2019 revolution.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes

¹⁹⁴ Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes

¹⁹⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Khartoum hospital sit-in raided; medics injured](#), 26 April 2021

¹⁹⁶ Insecurity Insight, [Attacks on Health Care, Monthly News Brief](#), March 2021, *Sudan*, p. 3

¹⁹⁷ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan coup update: Violence against and obstruction of health care by security forces](#), 15 December 2021. See also Radio Dabanga, [‘A new massacre’ comes to light as witnesses report on the November 17 protests](#), 19 November 2021

Human Rights Watch similarly reported that “On November 13 [2021], police prevented wounded protesters from receiving medical care, harassed medical staff in East Nile hospital in Bahri and in Al-Arbaeen hospital in Omdurman”.¹⁹⁸

The World Health Organization (WHO) reported in January 2022 that since November 2021 there have been “15 reported attacks on health care workers and health facilities” in Khartoum and other cities, “11 of which have been confirmed”.¹⁹⁹ According to the same source:

Most of these attacks were committed against health care workers in the form of physical assault, obstruction, violent searches, and related psychological threats and intimidation. Also reported were 2 incidents involving raiding and military incursion of health care facilities. [...]

There have also been reports of arrest of patients and health care workers, as well as injury, detention and forced search of health personnel. These incidents resulted in the suspension of emergency services in some health facilities, as well as patients and medical personnel fleeing without completing medical treatment.²⁰⁰

WHO further noted an “increasing number of incidents against health care in Sudan [...] especially as the country documented a relatively low number of incidents in previous years (1 in 2020, 7 in 2019), even during social and political unrest situations in 2019. In 2021, Sudan recorded 26 incidents of attacks on health care, with 4 deaths and 38 injuries of health care workers and patients. Most of the incidents were due to direct assaults on health care workers, which is an unusual pattern compared to other reporting countries”.²⁰¹

According to USAID’s ‘Complex Emergency’ Fact Sheet, “A January 24 [2022] statement released by three Sudanese medical organizations alleged that Sudanese forces fired bullets to prevent injured protestors from entering Khartoum’s Royal Care International Hospital for treatment. In addition, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported temporarily suspending humanitarian operations in Khartoum due to insecurity and staff safety concerns after security forces arrested and detained nine MSF staff members on January 24 [2022]”.²⁰²

2022 – Khartoum

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported that in January 2022 “security forces fired teargas inside two hospitals [one in Khartoum and one in Omdurman] on 6 January 2022, affecting both patients and medical workers in hospitals”.²⁰³

In mid-January 2022, WHO’s Regional Director for the Eastern Mediterranean, Dr. Ahmed Al-Mandhari, reported that “So far, 11 incidents have been confirmed in the capital, Khartoum, and other cities. ‘Most of these attacks were committed against healthcare workers in the form of physical assault, obstruction, violent searches, and related psychological threats and intimidation’, said Dr. Al-Mandhari. At least two of the confirmed incidents involved raids and incursions by military personnel on facilities, he said. Others included arrests of patients and workers, as well as

¹⁹⁸ Human Rights Watch, [Sudan: Security Forces Use Lethal Force on Protesters](#), 23 November 2021

¹⁹⁹ World Health organization (WHO), [Attacks on health care in Sudan must stop now](#), 11 January 2022

²⁰⁰ World Health organization (WHO), [Attacks on health care in Sudan must stop now](#), 11 January 2022

²⁰¹ World Health organization (WHO), [Attacks on health care in Sudan must stop now](#), 11 January 2022

²⁰² USAID, [Fact Sheet #2, Sudan – Complex Emergency, 18 February 2022](#), *Sudanese Authorities Target Civilians, Health Actors During Recent Unrest*, p. 3

²⁰³ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan coup update: Dozens of peaceful protesters killed whilst 36 others are imprisoned without trial by authorities](#), 22 February 2022

injury, detention and forced searches [...] Dr. Al-Mandharisaid is also aware of the interception of ambulances, personnel and patients during their attempts to find safety”.²⁰⁴

2021 – Omdurman

Between 25 October and 21 November 2021 the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) documented “several incidents where security forces have obstructed the provision of health care”, specifically reporting:

Medical workers have been targeted for arrest and detention for participating in anti- coup protests. In Omdurman, injured peaceful protesters were denied access to urgent medical care when security forces prevented ambulances from crossing roadblocks. In Khartoum Bahri and Omdurman, security forces fired tear gas inside hospitals terrifying both patients and medical staff. This also disrupted medical staff as they were attending to patients.²⁰⁵

Human Rights Watch similarly reported that “On November 13 [2021], police prevented wounded protesters from receiving medical care, harassed medical staff in East Nile hospital in Bahri and in Al-Arbreen hospital in Omdurman”.²⁰⁶

2022 – Omdurman

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported that in January 2022 “security forces fired teargas inside two hospitals [one in Khartoum and one in Omdurman] on 6 January 2022, affecting both patients and medical workers in hospitals”.²⁰⁷

The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees reported that “Since the coup on 25.10.21, the government security forces have also repeatedly targeted hospitals and their staff. On 07.02.22, security forces in Omdurman attempted several times to enter the premises of a hospital where injured protestors were being treated. In doing so, they prevented a number of injured people from entering the hospital. In a similar earlier action carried out by the armed forces, one wounded person died because the blockade caused them to be treated too late”.²⁰⁸

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

During the period 22 November 2021 and 21 February 2022, the UN reported that security forces “attacked health facilities and medical personnel, intercepted ambulances and in some cases prevented injured patients from receiving medical care”.²⁰⁹

In a joint oral statement during the 49th session of the UN Human Rights Council in March 2022, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) and Sudan Human Rights Monitor (SHRM) reported that since October 2021 “the police, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have used unjustified and disproportionate force against peaceful demonstrators, resulting in at least 82 deaths. The

²⁰⁴ UN News, [Sudan: 15 attacks on health facilities and workers in two months](#), 12 January 2022

²⁰⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan coup update: Violence against and obstruction of health care by security forces](#), 15 December 2021

²⁰⁶ Human Rights Watch, [Sudan: Security Forces Use Lethal Force on Protesters](#), 23 November 2021

²⁰⁷ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan coup update: Dozens of peaceful protesters killed whilst 36 others are imprisoned without trial by authorities](#), 22 February 2022

²⁰⁸ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 14 February 2022, *Sudan*, p. 15

²⁰⁹ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan Report of the Secretary-General](#), 2 March 2022, para. 27

repression extends to human rights defenders and dissenting voices seeking access to health care services, appallingly after being attacked by the security forces [in retaliation for being critical of the coup d'état]".²¹⁰

Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, noted in March 2022 that:

I am also alarmed by the attacks on hospitals, medical facilities and assaults on their staff. In one incident, security forces fired tear gas into an emergency ward. In others, they blocked injured people from accessing ambulances and medical care. Between November 2021 and March 2022, the Joint Human Rights Office documented forced incursions into six hospitals by security forces, where in some instances, they beat and arrested injured protesters and assaulted medical staff. Ambulance drivers have also been harassed while transporting injured protestors.²¹¹

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council on the situation between 25 October 2021 and 10 April 2022, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

The World Health Organization reported 25 attacks on health facilities, their personnel and patients in the Sudan between 25 October 2021 and 15 March 2022.

During the reporting period, the joint human rights office verified forced incursions into eight hospitals by security forces during protests in Khartoum. Hospitals and other medical facilities located along the main protest routes were the main targets. At least three of these hospitals, namely, Al-Arbaeen hospital, Khartoum teaching hospital and Al-Faisal hospital, have been attacked more than three times. On 17 November 2021, the surgical ward at Al-Arbaeen hospital was reportedly hit by tear-gas canisters fired by Riot Police and Central Reserve Police. On 30 December 2021, security forces entered the Khartoum teaching hospital and fired tear gas into an emergency room packed with protesters who had been injured in a nearby demonstration. During demonstrations on 17 January 2022, security forces reportedly stormed into Al-Jawda hospital in Khartoum and fired tear gas inside.

Attacks against ambulance drivers transporting injured protesters to medical facilities, harassment and assault of medical staff, and arrests of protesters inside hospitals by security forces were also documented. In addition, on 24 January 2022, nine Sudanese and international staff of Médecins sans frontières were arrested after leaving a hospital where they had been working and were detained overnight.²¹²

2.1.11.Lawyers

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

The Ayin Network reported in April 2022 that "After the 6 April [2022] protests, Emergency Lawyer members became targets of the security forces with many placed under surveillance [...] In other cases, security forces have directly attacked the lawyers. According to Iqbal Ahmed, security forces attempted to shoot lawyer Dr Amjed Abdel-Salaam during the 6 April protests. On the same day, lawyer Yahya Muhammed survived gunshot wounds to the head. Teargas canisters and sound

²¹⁰ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights Oral statement during the 49th session of the Human Rights Council during the Enhanced interactive dialogue on the oral update of the High Commissioner on the situation of human rights in the Sudan since the military takeover \(HRC res. S-32/1\)\(Item2\)](#), 7 March 2022

²¹¹ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNOHCHR), [Oral update on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 7 March 2022

²¹² UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, paras. 43-45

bombs were also thrown into Yahya Muhammed's house after the advocate invited protestors to join him to break the fast for the Ramadan celebrations in his home".²¹³

2.1.12. Artists

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

2.1.13. Teachers

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

2.1.14. IDPs

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

2.1.15. Returnees

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

In its Briefing to the UK government, Waging Peace, together with Protection Approaches and REDRESS, noted that "The Home Office have an obligation to more accurately reflect the situation in Sudan in policy and information notes and other guidance issued to caseworkers; there is consensus among country experts that the transition is fragile, with little evidence of reduced risk to those returned to the country as rejected asylum-seekers".²¹⁴

2.1.16. Women

Note that the information cited is illustrative, but not exhaustive of the information available in the public domain. Sources do not necessarily clearly distinguish or specify the profiles of individuals targeted by acts of violence, arbitrary arrest or detention. Some of these individuals may also hold intersectional identities. It is therefore imperative to also refer to the information contained in the sub-sections of [2.1. Acts of violence](#) and [2.2. Arbitrary arrest and detention](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

²¹³ Ayin Network, [Detained for nothing: military resorts to mass arbitrary arrests](#), 10 April 2022

²¹⁴ Protection Approaches / REDRESS / Waging Peace, [A hopeful yet fragile peace, How the UK can support Sudan's democratic transition and pursuit of justice](#), October 2020, p. 2

2020 – Khartoum [State]

In a nation-wide qualitative assessment of gender-based violence, co-authored by UNFPA and the Government of Sudan, “research was conducted in 60 localities and camps, across Sudan, between August and November 2020”.²¹⁵ With regards to Khartoum State, “When asked about what are the types of GBV that are most common in their community, respondents mentioned: sexual violence (29%), domestic violence (24%), psychological violence (22%), economic violence including denial of education (9%), forced marriage (8%) and FGM (7%)”.²¹⁶ The participants of the study further highlighted that:

Violence increased since last year because of “the total absence of authorities” Boy, Umm Bedda, Khartoum.

Harassment and GBV are politicised, and connected to a conservative/military versus civil rule “during the new year celebrations at the Green Square, whenever a girl complained about harassment, the police told them this is the civil rule you wanted” Girl, Omdurman, Khartoum.

“In Khartoum state, last year’s political changes opened more space for discussion on GBV. There have been many cases of bullying against activists in the area of GBV because the society is still not prepared for such openness” Expert, Khartoum.

Respondents also talked about the worsened economic situation as a cause of increase in GBV prevalence, as women are mostly dependent on men for financial resources: “economic violence gotten much worse due to the bad economic situation” Woman, Umm Bedda, Khartoum. Shortages also impacted GBV: “girls are now going out at night in search for bread in remote places” Man, Omdurman, Khartoum.

COVID19 worsened GBV in the state “confinement resulted in domestic violence and plenty of FGM and children marriage” Boy, Umm Bedda, Khartoum.²¹⁷

2021 – Khartoum

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported that:

Renewed incitement of violence against women and girls caused fear and resulted in actual attacks, especially after March 2021, when the Director of the Khartoum State Police called for the reinstatement of the Public Order Law. The statement of the Director prompted social media posts inciting violence against women, including flogging and chemical burning to disfigure their faces. The Ministry of Interior subsequently removed the Director from his position. Nevertheless, verbal and physical attacks against women on the street were reported in Khartoum. On 8 April 2021, a large number of women in Khartoum stormed the streets to protest violence and discrimination against women. They marched to the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior and the office of the Attorney General. During the march, the women faced attacks by a group of men; one man ploughed his car into the group of protesting women while another reportedly threatened to rape them. These incidents were reported to the police and the perpetrators were arrested and prosecuted. However,

²¹⁵ UNFPA / Government of Sudan, Voices from Sudan 2020, [A Qualitative Assessment of Gender Based Violence in Sudan](#), 18 July 2021, p. 4

²¹⁶ UNFPA / Government of Sudan, Voices from Sudan 2020, [A Qualitative Assessment of Gender Based Violence in Sudan](#), 18 July 2021, p. 50

²¹⁷ UNFPA / Government of Sudan, Voices from Sudan 2020, [A Qualitative Assessment of Gender Based Violence in Sudan](#), 18 July 2021, p. 51

OHCHR is still concerned about reports of retaliatory actions by the attackers against the women who reported to the police.²¹⁸

DefendDefenders reported in its report on human rights defenders that “In April 2021, hundreds of women protested in Khartoum, calling for more legal reforms for women, such as ratification of the CEDAW Convention. The demonstration witnessed male backlash. In one incident, a man drove his car into the female protesters. In another, a group of male university students shouted at the women, threatening them with rape. Despite several complaints being filed, no charges were brought, and instead the woman who led the complaint against the driver of the car was held in detention for two days after friends of the driver brought counter claims against her”.²¹⁹

In May 2021, The National reported that “Incidents of women being assaulted in Khartoum are on the rise. A number of attacks, including ones where women are whipped, slapped in the face and beaten in public by young men, have been recorded as a violent social media campaign seeking to ‘punish the immodestly dressed,’ takes to the streets”.²²⁰

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported in September 2021 about the beating of two women by the community police forces for ‘indecent dressing’.²²¹ When Mr. Al-Fateh Hussein, a “human rights activist and a member of the Democratic Alliance of Sudanese Lawyers” intervened, “the police beat the activist and took him to the Public Order Police Station in the Al-Dim neighborhood along with the two women. The police arrested and detained all three of them until the next day [...] when they were released”.²²²

Frontline Defenders reported in November 2021:

Women in Sudan are currently facing rapidly growing militarisation of the state in daily life. The Women’s rights movement in the public space is threatened by the heavy deployment of troops around Khartoum and all over Sudan. Working women, especially street vendors, are living under constant fear of harassment and violence while working on the streets. A women street vendor said “We are intimidated by the numbers of soldiers on the streets, we do not feel safe to work early morning or in the afternoon anymore”.²²³

In December 2021, ACJPS reported that “security operatives reportedly raped 8 female protesters in Khartoum”.²²⁴ Ilaf Nasreldin, writing for the Sudan blog of the CHR. Michelsen Institute, also noted that “On the 19th of December 2021 in Khartoum, amongst other violations, activists confirmed two rapes and two other cases of sexual violence, while the Office of the United Nations High

²¹⁸ See UN Human Rights Council, [Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 27 July 2021, para. 32

²¹⁹ DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [An unfinished revolution: The situation of women human rights defenders in Sudan](#), December 2021, *Post-Revolution Climate for WHRDS*, p. 50

²²⁰ The National, [Sudan’s women flogged in public by young men ‘inspired by’ violent social media campaign](#), 5 May 2021

²²¹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Urgent call for investigation into the ill-treatment of three people including a human rights defender by community police in Khartoum](#), 30 September 2021

²²² African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Urgent call for investigation into the ill-treatment of three people including a human rights defender by community police in Khartoum](#), 30 September 2021

²²³ Frontline Defenders, [Sudanese and International organisations call for an end on attacks against Sudanese women human rights defenders and protesters](#), 19 November 2021

²²⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan coup update: Dozens of peaceful protesters killed whilst 36 others are imprisoned without trial by authorities](#), 22 February 2022

Commissioner for Human Rights reported 13 rapes”.²²⁵ The original press briefing note stated “our Joint Human Rights Office in Sudan has received allegations that 13 women and girls were victims of rape or gang rape. We have also received allegations of sexual harassment by security forces against women who were trying to flee the area around the Presidential Palace on Sunday evening”.²²⁶

The Darfur Bar Association, according to Radio Dabanga, reported that “has received 30 complaints of sexual harassment, including 16 complaints of rape, allegedly perpetrated by security forces in Khartoum during the suppression of the Marches of the Millions in Sudan on Saturday, December 25 [2021]. Three complaints of rape were laid by young men, and 13 confirmed cases by women”.²²⁷

2022 - Khartoum

In one particular incident, Human Rights Watch reported that on 24th January 2022:

regular police and CRP officers beat and sexually assault a 29-year-old activist as she and two friends fled police who were violently dispersing a protest in Khartoum. Police forces attacked the car she was riding in, fired a teargas canister into the car, then pulled her and her friends out and looted their belongings.²²⁸

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) expressed its ‘deep concern’ about “the increasing trend of rape of women in Sudan by security forces and armed militia. On 14 March 2022, at around 07:00pm, a group of seven men in Central Reserve Police uniform fired tear gas at a public vehicle carrying passengers while it approached Almuslamia bridge in Khartoum. The police officers ordered the driver of the vehicle to stop before they started beating passengers, some later ran away. One of the two female passengers on the vehicle, a 19-year-old university student was detained and reportedly raped alternately by five of the policemen before she was rescued by a resident of the area who responded to her alarms”.²²⁹

A few days later Human Rights Watch documented another incident of threats of sexual violence:

On March 23 [2022], security forces violently arrested an 18-year-old student at her home, blindfolded her, and drove to an unknown location, where members of the security forces then beat and threatened her with sexual assault.²³⁰

2021 – Omdurman

Frontline Defenders reported in November 2021: “Seven people were killed and dozens of women were injured during the protests on which took place on 13 November 2021 [...] another 6 women were reported to be detained in Omdurman”.²³¹

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

²²⁵ Ilaf Nasreldin (CHR. Michelsen Institute), [Addressing gendered violence: A goal or a threat to the Sudanese revolution](#), February 2022

²²⁶ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNOHCHR), [Press briefing notes on Sudan protests](#), 21 December 2021

²²⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur Bar Association: 16 rapes during Dec 25 Sudan demos](#), 29 December 2021

²²⁸ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated](#), 28 April 2022

²²⁹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan Coup Update: 18 members of the dismantle and anti-corruption committee detained incommunicado, rape allegations and other violations](#), 23 March 2022

²³⁰ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated](#), 28 April 2022

²³¹ Frontline Defenders, [Sudanese and International organisations call for an end on attacks against Sudanese women human rights defenders and protesters](#), 19 November 2021

On its undated webpage dedicated to 'Sudan', Reporters Without Borders noted that "Sudan is a multicultural, multiethnic society where tolerance and coexistence are in jeopardy. Ethnic groups' sensitivities are heightened. Accusations over perceived insults are increasing, with the media frequently a target. Interference by religious groups, which use their networks to defend their interests, are contributing to worsening conditions for journalists. The revolution has come to represent greater outspokenness on social networks, but in uncontrolled form, it feeds racism and misogyny and targets women and ethnic and sexual minorities".²³²

According to Amnesty International's annual report focusing on 2021, "Security forces reportedly subjected women to gender-based violence to counter their growing participation in protests, including two reported rapes in December [2021]".²³³

Following interviews with 39 human rights defenders and woman human rights defenders between July 2020 and June 2021, DefendDefenders noted that "Many HRDs [human rights defenders] interviewed for this research drew attention to the fact that society has not liberalised its attitudes towards women since legal reforms were announced, but that the situation had in fact deteriorated – drawing comparisons with post-revolution Egypt. The disconnect between the legal reforms and the reality on the ground, has led to criticism of the Ministry of Justice only making reforms only on paper".²³⁴ The report found that:

Of the 39 HRDs interviewed for this research, 18 had previously experienced physical threats and 26 had experienced verbal threats. In addition, of the interviewed WHRDs, 18 reported sex discrimination and seven, SGBV. These figures capture threats or incidents from before, during, and after the Revolution. [...]

A wide range of responses were given concerning the source of the threats against HRDs. They include, but are not limited to, the state and their operatives (e.g., NISS, police, RSF); social media users; community members; and even other HRDs. The majority of HRDs who observed a shift in the threats directed against them felt that the source had moved from being primarily the state and its agents and affiliates, to society and communities they work in.²³⁵

In March 2022, Human Rights Watch documented another incident of threats of sexual violence:

On March 23 [2022], security forces violently arrested an 18-year-old student at her home, blindfolded her, and drove to an unknown location, where members of the security forces then beat and threatened her with sexual assault.²³⁶

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council on the situation between 25 October 2021 and 10 April 2022, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

Numerous reports were received of human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence, against women and girls, who have been at the forefront of protests against the coup. The Expert and the joint human rights office verified, through interviews with victims and witnesses, 13

²³² Reporters Without Borders, [Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 19.05.2022]

²³³ Amnesty International, [The state of the world's human rights: Sudan 2021](#), 28 March 2022, *Excessive use of force*

²³⁴ DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [An unfinished revolution: The situation of women human rights defenders in Sudan](#), December 2021, *Methodology* and *The Legal and Institutional Framework for HRDS and WHRDS in Sudan*, p. 14 and p. 35

²³⁵ DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [An unfinished revolution: The situation of women human rights defenders in Sudan](#), December 2021, *Post-Revolution Climate for WHRDS*, p. 46/47

²³⁶ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated](#), 28 April 2022

incidents of rape, gang rape, attempted rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence that had been perpetrated in Khartoum in the context of protests against the coup during the reporting period.²⁷ They involved 14 victims (10 women, 1 girl, 1 man and 2 boys). Other allegations of such violence are still being verified. Most of the verified acts of sexual and gender-based violence took place during the evening of 19 December 2021 in Khartoum while the victims were leaving protest sites.

The verified incidents were perpetrated by members of the joint security forces or armed men in civilian clothes. According to first-hand sources, in the evening of 19 December 2021, several men wearing security forces uniforms gang-raped a woman, causing her serious injuries. In early March 2022, several members of the Central Reserve Police gang-raped a woman escaping a tear-gas attack on public transport. An analysis of the incidents reported suggests that sexual violence was used to punish women for taking part in protests and to intimidate them into staying away from future protests. This assessment has been supported by reports of ill-treatment of and threats against women by the joint security forces during and after arrests. For example, in mid-March 2022, a woman protester detained by unidentified security officials was severely beaten, verbally abused, sexually harassed and threatened with rape before being told to stop her involvement in protests and released.²³⁷

In conversation with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan, ARC's Director was told in May 2022:

The authorities do not want to accept that sexual violence takes place. This was true in the case of the mass rapes that took place in the context of the conflict in Darfur, and it has been the case in relation to cases of rape, gang rape and other kinds of sexual violence perpetrated by security forces in the margins of protests. For example, a large number of cases were reported after the protest of 19 December [2021], which received widespread media attention. [...]

There were also many allegations of sexual harassment and intimidation of women taking part in protests, and some faced direct threats against them, which has made the environment for women activists more hostile.²³⁸

2.1.17.Children

2020 and 2021 – Khartoum

The U.S. Department of State noted in its annual report on child labor that “Traffickers exploit homeless children in Khartoum—including Sudanese and unaccompanied migrant children from West and Central Africa—in sex trafficking and in forced labor for begging, public transportation, large markets”.²³⁹

2022 – Khartoum

During the period 22 November 2021 to 21 February 2022, the UN reported that it had “verified 120 serious violations of children’s rights that occurred in the context of the civil unrest as a result of the military coup on 25 October [2021]. Nine children have been killed during demonstrations, mainly in Khartoum, while another 13 have been injured. Most violations were against adolescent boys. Boys

²³⁷ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, paras. 39 and 40

²³⁸ Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes

²³⁹ See U.S. Department of State, [2020 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan](#), 16 June 2020, *Trafficking Profile* and U.S. Department of State, [2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan](#), 25 January 2022, *Trafficking Profile*

and girls as young as 12 have been detained. Children have been impacted as a result of frequent attacks on medical facilities”.²⁴⁰

International Crisis Group’s ‘CrisisWatch’ of March 2022 reported that “Security forces 10 March shot dead two people including 11-year-old boy during anti-coup protests in capital Khartoum and neighbouring Omdurman city”.²⁴¹

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

Following interviews with 39 human rights defenders and woman human rights defenders between July 2020 and June 2021, DefendDefenders highlighted the following incident of child abuse:

In March 2021, 13-year-old Samah al-Hadi was shot three times and run over by a car, allegedly by her father, after she requested to transfer schools. Despite the fact that neighbours told police that the father was known to abuse his children, he was released without charge. No post-mortem was carried out and the father was given permission to quickly bury Samah’s body. The case caused outrage on social media in Sudan, with a petition to re-open the police file amassing close to 3,000 signatures. Many women spoke out online, recounting times that they had been subject to violence at home – drawing attention to the high rates of domestic violence in Sudan, where it is not specifically covered by law. Those who have spoken out about Samah’s death have faced harassment online and reprisals from the government.²⁴²

According to a January 2022 briefing by the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “According to the information available to UNICEF, nine children have been killed and 13 injured during the demonstrations so far. In total, UNICEF is currently investigating more than 120 serious violations against children”.²⁴³

2.1.18. Individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity

2020 – Khartoum

In September 2020 “A video circulated on social media [...] showed crowds of people in a bus station in Khartoum physically attacking two persons calling them homosexuals and voice their rejection to their appearance and dress style. As to date, none of the attacked persons felt reporting the case to the police is a safe option, nor the police acted on itself to investigate and hold perpetrators to account”.²⁴⁴

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

On its undated webpage dedicated to ‘Sudan’, Reporters Without Borders noted that “Sudan is a multicultural, multiethnic society where tolerance and coexistence are in jeopardy. Ethnic groups’ sensitivities are heightened. Accusations over perceived insults are increasing, with the media frequently a target. Interference by religious groups, which use their networks to defend their

²⁴⁰ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan Report of the Secretary-General](#), 2 March 2022, para. 32

²⁴¹ International Crisis Group, [CrisisWatch April 2022](#), Undated [Research result generated on 24.05.2022]

²⁴² DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [An unfinished revolution: The situation of women human rights defenders in Sudan](#), December 2021, *Post-Revolution Climate for WHRDS*, p. 50

²⁴³ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 24 January 2022, *Sudan*, p. 12

²⁴⁴ Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC), [Shadow report for the third Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Sudan, Human rights violations based on SOGIESC in Sudan](#), 2021, para. 20

interests, are contributing to worsening conditions for journalists. The revolution has come to represent greater outspokenness on social networks, but in uncontrolled form, it feeds racism and misogyny and targets women and ethnic and sexual minorities".²⁴⁵

In March 2020 ILGA reported that "mass rioting and looting" took place "as well as one person dead, as a result of public outrage against a presumed 'gay wedding'" in River Nile State.²⁴⁶ Reporting on the same incident Bedayaa as part of the Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC) submission to the 2021 Sudan's UN Universal Periodic Review provided additional detail as follows:

At 'Tawaheen Al-Dahab market, Abu Hamad, River Nile State, north of Khartoum, Sudan', where a Sudanese citizen was killed because of his perceived sexual orientation, several shops and cafes were damaged and burned, and approximately 80 persons were arrested. The incidents escalated after hundreds of citizens of this area gathered and demanded the Sudanese authorities to impose security control on mining sites according to a statement issued by the Executive Director of Abu Hamad district, Yahya Khaled Abdel Baset. The citizens also demanded to deport whom 'Yahya Khaled' called as the 'persons of bad behaviors' from the district hereby indirectly referring to LGBTQI+ persons. The statement also indicated that the killed citizen has been transferred to Atbara city, due to the refusal of the locals to bury him in the district's graves.

It is claimed by another statement issued by the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company in the River Nile State that the incidents happened because of holding a party "gay marriage" ceremony in one of the cafes in Abu Hamad. This led to a security chaos that was fueled by incitement from some individuals at the market. The statement concluded that all the necessary legal measures have been taken to impose the security control and evacuate what is called "persons with bad behaviors" from all mining sites.²⁴⁷

Following this incident, a statement was published by three organisations noting: "Even though all the received news does not conclusively confirm the reasons and causes of this escalation, they are all agreed on the death of a Sudanese citizen and the refusal to bury him in the district's graves as a result of these violent incidents. These incidents followed by published videos contain homophobic verbal and physical abuse against a person; these videos showed this person while being severely beaten by perpetrators. Consequently, a homophobic social media campaign was outspread as an incitement to kill people with different sexual orientations".²⁴⁸

Research conducted between October and December 2020 by the organisation Bedayaa on the needs of the LGBTQI+ community in Sudan found that:

28.1% mentioned that they were discriminated against because of their sexual orientation when asking for services [e.g. access to health services]. 36.5% preferred not to answer and 35.3% did not mention any discrimination. Great number of the informants mentioned that they were exposed to verbal abuse (68.5%), 66.6% were bullied and 24.5% faced physical assaults. 35% faced sexual abuse, 10.5% were sexually harassed and 33.4% were harassed. Then 35% did not get the services as expected and got harassed. Then 35% did not get the services as expected and got delays or rejection of services.²⁴⁹

The same source further noted:

²⁴⁵ Reporters Without Borders, [Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 19.05.2022]

²⁴⁶ ILGA, [Our identities under arrest, A global overview on the enforcement of laws criminalising consensual same-sex sexual acts between adults and diverse gender expressions](#), December 2021, p. 102

²⁴⁷ Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC), [Shadow report for the third Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Sudan, Human rights violations based on SOGIESC in Sudan](#), 2021, para. 3 and 4

²⁴⁸ Bedayaa, [Statement](#), 10 March 2020

²⁴⁹ Bedayaa, [Needs Assessment Report 2020, LGBTQI+ in Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 05.06.2022], p. 20

Despite the lack of [legal] knowledge, only few people said they have been arrested or discriminated against (10%). The rest of the respondents said they were not arrested (81%) and 8.8% preferred not to share an answer. Here also the socio-economic backgrounds of the participants plays a role in were not arrested (81%) and 8.8% preferred not to share an answer. Here also the socio-economic backgrounds of the participants plays a role in terms of protection from police.

Most of the people (59.7%) do not feel comfortable and safe to ask for help from police even when they are at risk. This explains that most people live in a state of avoidance by not getting themselves in any trouble. Since more people have not been arrested, few (30.7%) were harassed while in police premises [...]

People mentioned various types of abuse by the police such as sexual harassment, sexual abuse, physical assaults, bullying and rape.²⁵⁰

With special reference to queer women, the study concluded that:

Our conversers in this part emphasized that queer women challenges can hardly be seen outside notions of patriarchy that face most Sudanese women. Nonetheless, they have the burden of confronting ideals of masculinity, femininity, as well as patriarchy. Their experiences are marked by fear and discomfort. Carrying everyday activities is not an easy task for many queer women in Sudan. Looking for support and services is risky; it carries the burden of discrimination and distress. Living in such a state produces more social anxieties and plays an exclusionary role for these women. One does not move beyond their safety nets, only socializes in limited circles and as such get services does not move beyond their safety nets, only socializes in limited circles and as such get services via these networks, which is limited. Many queer women rely on information from their trusted friends and this restricts them to a small circle of services providers when available. They do not have safe spaces where circles of trust can grow or where they can get a wider set of information. There is no reference for 'safe' services providers and thus, queer women fear seeking these services randomly.²⁵¹

Radio Dabanga reported in January 2021:

Fabo Elbaradei, an LGBTQ+ activist based in the capital Khartoum, welcomed the surprise move to lift the death penalty but said it would not change life much for gay people in Sudan. "We are subjected to social discrimination and we face a prison sentence ... for simply being who we are," he told the Thomson Reuters Foundation in emailed comments. "We are still deprived of our right to live like any other members of society."²⁵²

A report by Bedayaa as part of the Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC), submitted for the 2021 Sudan's Universal Periodic Review reported that:

The situation of the LGBTQI+ persons in Sudan still did not progress and remains dire. It compounds multiple factors that also correspond to the overall concerns, such as failure to reform security forces; lack of protection against non-discrimination; and de-prioritization of progressive legal reform. Abuses against members of the community continue, whether by third parties or state actors [...]

LGBTQI+ individuals are constantly harassed, beaten up, and in some cases killed because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. These acts of hostilities are perpetrated by members of the society and state actors directly and indirectly by not providing necessary protection to the

²⁵⁰ Bedayaa, [Needs Assessment Report 2020, LGBTQI+ in Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 05.06.2022], p. 23/24

²⁵¹ Bedayaa, [Needs Assessment Report 2020, LGBTQI+ in Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 05.06.2022], p. 32

²⁵² Radio Dabanga, [Report: Denial of freedom of LGBTQ+ artistic expression in Sudan](#), 3 January 2021

community and enshrined laws criminalizing same sex activity which reinforces prejudice against LGBTQI+ people.²⁵³

In conversation with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan, ARC's Director was told in May 2022:

There is little information about the LGBTI community. Consensual same-sex activities between adults are considered illegal in Sudan. Few people dare talk about sexual orientation or gender identity publicly for fear of personal attacks and threats to their safety. We have not heard of individuals being targeted since the coup because of their sexual identity, but that does not mean that there are no cases.²⁵⁴

2.2. Arbitrary arrest and detention

Note that the information cited is illustrative, but not exhaustive of the information available in the public domain. Sources do not necessarily clearly distinguish or specify the profiles of individuals targeted by acts of violence, arbitrary arrest or detention. Some of these individuals may also hold intersectional identities. It is therefore imperative to consult a number of potentially relevant sub-headings presented below.

2.2.1. Black African people (including Darfuri and Nuba)

Limited relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

It is recommended though to consult the information included under [2.1.1. Black African people \(including Darfuri and Nuba\)](#) under section 2. *Acts of violence*, and particularly sub-heading *Racism and hate speech in Sudan* for useful contextual information.

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

In conversation with the Co-Executive Directors Sonja Miley and Maddy Crowther from the NGO Waging Peace, Sonja Miley stated:

And we've noticed throughout the transition-- so this is 2020 on-- a kind of unwillingness to sometimes reckon with racialised aspects of state violence and ways in which, yes, you might be more liable to be arrested, prosecuted, detained, ill-treated in detention if you have a particular racial profile. And it's almost like a blindness to commenting on that issue because the other challenges are so large. You are facing a situation where you've got to comment on the arrest and detention of so many people potentially, and you have limited bandwidth. And it's not the most pressing issue. And that's always kind of how it's been presented to us, as this is at a time where we're having to represent journalists who are being attacked and other at-risk groups and women and [inaudible]. The last thing you're going to do is really segregate your data based on race and look at if you have a racial issue, when you clearly have a coup issue, you clearly have a military issue [...]

So we're much more likely to hear about the arrest and detention of people who have an existing human rights profile. We're likely to hear about what's happening to them, but what we won't hear

²⁵³ Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC), [Shadow report for the third Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Sudan, Human rights violations based on SOGIESC in Sudan](#), 2021, p. 2 and 3

²⁵⁴ Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes

about are the people who are just arrested and detained and whose cases never go further than that because they're socially deprived. Probably because they have been arrested on a on a racial basis, at some point in that decision making, maybe not explicitly, but it's there, it's a theme [...]

She added:

So when we hear that there's maybe 1,000 people detained in Khartoum, we know about so few of who those people are, how can we even talk about? There's so much uncertainty about what the prison population is and because cases aren't following a path from arrest, to being charged, to going through the court system, that's not happening in every case. We can't even then speculate about why that person was originally arrested, what they might be charged with, whether it's completely sort of a detention without charge, whether they're being held incommunicado, whether they're being ill-treated, whether racial slurs are being used whilst they're ill-treated in detention. [...]

there's really good reporting out there by Redress [...] about the continuity between NISS and GIS and the Central Reserve Police and the security environment, as a whole. How could we not speculate that the same patterns of racialized state targeting are going on now? And I would like someone to prove the counterfactual.²⁵⁵

2.2.2. Christians

2020 - Khartoum

Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) reported that in January 2020 “Sudanese Christian businessman Ashraf Samir Mousad Obid was detained at Khartoum Airport under the orders of the General Intelligence Service (GIS). Mr Obid was returning to Sudan for the first time since fleeing the country in 2015, following a campaign of harassment by the GIS’ predecessor, the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). Mr Obid was detained despite GIS assurances that all names that were previously on the travel restriction list had been removed. When he asked officers for the reason of his detention, he was informed that his name was on a list submitted by GIS, and that he would be given the full reasons once he was transferred to the GIS office. Mr Obid was released after being held for an hour and a half, and on 30 January he was informed by Sudan’s Ministry of the Interior that he was not allowed to leave or enter the country”.²⁵⁶

In August 2020 the Darfur Network For Monitoring & Documentation reported that:

A judge convicts a Christian woman with her little baby and imprisoned her for two months and a fine for possession of four glasses of wine.

This event took place On august 13, 2020, in one of the capital side areas known as Hajj Yousif city located on East Nile locality, Khartoum State. Mary Jashat Sammuel, a 36-year-old mother of three children. She was raided by the Sudanese public order policemen, due to the accusation of possessing four bottles of alcohol that were seized in her home.

She was transferred to the Al-Fayha police station, without any warrant or any issued legitimate/legal statements from the prosecution’s office to explain the context. The prosecution issued a release of her regular guarantee, under the pretext of a search warrant, because this is abuse of the Sudanese criminal procedures law, but the duty officer refused to release her. On the evening of the same day she was sentenced to two months imprisonment with her baby, a penalty 50,000 SDG equivalent to 400\$, and for violating Article 79 of the Criminal Code, according to what was stated in the court’s verdict wording. According to, lawyers declared that since Articles 78 and 79 were amended of the

²⁵⁵ Sonja Miley (Waging Peace). See [Annex D.2](#) further below for transcription notes.

²⁵⁶ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [General Briefing: Sudan](#), 1 May 2020

Criminal Code of 1991 Amendment 2020 and published in the gazette last July, [sic] More than 50 Christian women were tried and convicted on the charge of dealing alcohol.²⁵⁷

2021 – Khartoum

In June 2021, Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) reported:

Rafat Obid, a leader of the Sudan Presbyterian Evangelical Church (SPEC) in Khartoum, was arrested, charged with ‘impersonating others’ under Article 113 of the Criminal Act, and released on bail on 28 June [2021].

Mr Obid, who also leads the church’s council, which is responsible for the its lands and properties, has been accused of falsely representing himself as the leader of the Evangelical church. The allegation was made by members of an illegally constituted committee that had been authorised to act on behalf of the church by the Ministry of Guidance and Religious Endowments under former president Omar al Bashir. In 2017, Mr. Obid was acquitted by the Omdurman Criminal Court of the same charge filed by the same complainant.²⁵⁸

The same source provided the following context regarding this arrest:

Despite the political changes and an improved relationship with the Ministry of Guidance and Religious Endowments, the government department has not officially recognised the committee led by Mr Obid as the legitimate body to administrate on behalf of the church, leaving him and SPEC open to malicious prosecution by the illegitimate committee.²⁵⁹

2.2.3. Students

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2.2.4. Political activists

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 - Khartoum

²⁵⁷ Darfur Network For Monitoring & Documentation, [Sudan: A judge convicts a Christian woman with her little baby and imprisoned her for two months and a fine for possession of four glasses of wine](#), Undated [Last accessed: 01.06.2022]

²⁵⁸ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Evangelical church leader arrested in Khartoum](#), 30 June 2021

²⁵⁹ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Evangelical church leader arrested in Khartoum](#), 30 June 2021

Human Rights Watch reported that Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) "acting without lawful authority, arbitrarily detained dozens of civilians, including political activists, in the capital, Khartoum during 2020 [...] The detainees were held incommunicado or in circumstances constituting enforced disappearances".²⁶⁰

2021 – Khartoum

BBC News reported on 28th October 2021 that "Troops reportedly travelled house to house in Khartoum arresting local protest organisers".²⁶¹

2022 - Khartoum

Radio Dabanga reported in February 2022 that "Security forces detained more than 38 activists from different parts of Khartoum yesterday and took them to unknown destinations".²⁶²

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

In its submissions to the UN Universal Periodic Review in March 2021, ACJPS and DefendDefenders jointly stated that in February 2021 "Orwa Alsadig, a Sudanese politician and political activist, was sued by the Sovereign Council for publishing lies, fake news, and insults after a speech he made was widely shared on social media".²⁶³

Without specifying the location, the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and its Sudanese network member the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) noted in November 2021 that following the "The Sudanese Joint Security Forces conducted arbitrary arrests of civilians, human rights defenders, activists, journalists, and political leaders at their homes and detained them in undisclosed locations".²⁶⁴

Similarly, Ahmed Soliman, Research Fellow at Chatham House, reported that "The coup has been accompanied by arrests of politicians, activists, and leaders of local resistance committees, including some of Sudan's most effective advocates for democratic transformation. Additionally, administrators appointed since the revolution have been dismissed while members of the old regime and Bashir's feared intelligence service have reappeared".²⁶⁵

REDRESS, together with the People's Legal Aid Centre (PLACE), the Emergency Lawyers' Group and the Darfur Bar Association reported in March 2022 that:

Since the 25 October 2021 coup in Sudan, members of the armed forces, police, General Intelligence Service (GIS), and other security forces have carried out scores of arrests of protestors, journalists, civilian political leaders, and other human rights defenders. Relying on an overbroad emergency order—Emergency Order No 3—issued under an unlawful state of emergency, which permits the arrest of any person who "participates in a crime related to [the state of emergency]," Sudan's

²⁶⁰ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Unlawful Detentions by Rapid Support Forces](#), 1 March 2021,

²⁶¹ BBC News, [Sudan coup: World bank suspends aid after military takeover](#), 28 October 2021

²⁶² Radio Dabanga, [More than 38 activists detained yesterday, over 100 detainees on hunger strike](#), 18 February 2022

²⁶³ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) / DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [Submission to the United Nations Universal Period Review, 39th Session of the UPR Working Group, Sudan](#), 25 March 2021, 2. Freedom of opinion and expression, para. 2.7

²⁶⁴ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: International community should adopt urgent measures to stop human rights violations](#), 2 November 2021

²⁶⁵ Ahmed Soliman (Chatham House), [Reversing the military coup in Sudan](#), 11 November 2021

security forces and military continue to use detention to punish opponents of the coup and to deter others from further activism.²⁶⁶

The same briefing highlighted that these arrests “can be broadly categorised as (1) occurring before, during, or just after protests or (2) targeted arrests conducted from individuals’ places of residence, work, or from other known gathering places”.²⁶⁷

2.2.5. (Perceived) political opposition/association with opposition groups, participating in demonstrations/protests, involvement in political groups including student unions

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 - Khartoum

Amnesty International reported in its annual report covering 2021 that “On 10 July [2021, Muammar Musa Mohammed Elgarari and Mikhail Boutros Ismail Kody (opposition activists and members of the Future Movement Group) were released on bail after being held in prolonged arbitrary detention without charge since June 2020. They were held at a police station in Khartoum North, for harassing members of the Committee for Removal of Empowerment which was established to dissolve the former ruling National Congress Party and to confiscate its property”.²⁶⁸

2021 – Khartoum

The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (FIDH-OMCT) reported that:

The military coup of October 25, 2021 in Sudan, has led to multiple arbitrary arrests of political figures and an escalation of violence in Khartoum and the Darfur region against a broad peaceful movement that opposes it. Civic space has severely been affected by the coup, with several human rights defenders detained incommunicado in the capital and in Darfur [...]

By using live ammunition, joint security forces violently repressed these demonstrations notably on November 13 and 17, resulting in the death of at least 22 people. More than 400 people have been injured in Khartoum since the coup and attacks by joint security forces targeted a number of medical centers in Khartoum, Bahri and Omdurman. Reports by the Central Committee of Sudan Doctors (CCSD) of non-conventional munitions being used by the military are particularly worrying and in breach of international law.

In this context, numerous human rights defenders, civil society activists, resistance committee members, government officials and politicians have been arbitrarily arrested and held

²⁶⁶ REDRESS / People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers’ Group / Darfur Bar Association, [“Taken from Khartoum’s Streets”, Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan’s emergency laws, Legal Analysis](#), March 2022, Summary, p. 3

²⁶⁷ REDRESS / People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers’ Group / Darfur Bar Association, [“Taken from Khartoum’s Streets”, Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan’s emergency laws, Legal Analysis](#), March 2022, Summary, p. 3

²⁶⁸ Amnesty International, [The state of the world’s human rights: Sudan 2021](#), 28 March 2022, *Arbitrary detention*

incommunicado under the Emergency law, most notably in Blue Nile State and the Darfur regions, since October 25, 2021.²⁶⁹

Amnesty International reported in November 2021 that

Nour Al-Din Salah, a senior member of the Sudanese Congress Party, was arrested at midnight on 16 November when a group of armed security agents forced their way into his house in Khartoum. His family members told Amnesty International that they blindfolded him and took him away. The arrest took place just hours after Salah appeared in an interview aired by Al-Jazeera Arabic, in which he criticized the military's takeover of power. His sister told Amnesty International that they are demanding information about his whereabouts and the charges against him.²⁷⁰

Human Rights Watch stated that "From the early hours of October 25 [2021], security agents in Sudan's capital, Khartoum, detained at least 30 civilian political leaders, including six cabinet members. On the same day the army also detained Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and two days later placed him under house arrest".²⁷¹ The same source further noted: "Among those arbitrarily arrested is Cabinet Affairs Minister Khalid Omar Youssef, who was detained by a group of security agents in front of his family in a dawn raid on his house on October 25, family members said" and "Mohamed al-Faki Sulieman, a civilian member of, and spokesperson for, the Sovereign Council, was one of the first officials detained. Al-Faki was also the alternate head of the Committee for Dismantling the Former Regime, a government body to tackle embezzlement and corruption by the ousted government, which was dismantled immediately after the military's takeover. In the weeks before, al-Faki had publicly criticized the military, blaming them for delaying key reforms and instigating political tensions".²⁷² Political adviser to the prime minister, Yasir Arman, was also "violently arrested alongside his brother" on 25th October 2021, as well as Wagdi Salih, a lawyer and "prominent figure in the Committee for Dismantling the Former Regime".²⁷³

The Head of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), Volker Perthes, who is also the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Sudan (SRSG), reported in his statement of November 2021:

UNITAMS strongly condemns the detention of members of the FFC's [Forced for Freedom and Change] Central Council after their meeting with the SRSG.

It has been reported that Taha Osman Isahaq, Sharif Mohamed Osman and Hamza Farouk were arrested near UNITAMS HQ yesterday afternoon.²⁷⁴

Frontline Defenders reported in November 2021:

The joint forces have arrested several resistance committee members in the last weeks. A woman member in the resistance committee in Khartoum was detained for 3 days from 25 to 27 October 2021. She was released after being threatened not to continue her activism.²⁷⁵

²⁶⁹ FIDH-OMCT, [Sudan: human rights defenders and civil society activists particularly targeted amidst the military coup](#), 18 November 2021

²⁷⁰ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Investigate the killings of people after military crackdown against protesters](#), 24 November 2021

²⁷¹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Immediately Free Detainees; Halt Arrests](#), 9 November 2021

²⁷² Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Immediately Free Detainees; Halt Arrests](#), 9 November 2021

²⁷³ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Immediately Free Detainees; Halt Arrests](#), 9 November 2021

²⁷⁴ UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), [UNITAMS Statement of the detention of members of the FFC's Central Council](#), 5 November 2021

²⁷⁵ Frontline Defenders, [Sudanese and international organisations call for an end on attacks against Sudanese women human rights defenders and protesters](#), 19 November 2021

2022 – Khartoum

On 24th May 2022, The Guardian reported:

Security forces have carried out a wave of arrests targeting the resistance committees, a network of informal associations that have organised most of the protests. Nazim Siraj, a high-profile pro-democracy campaigner known for organising medical assistance to injured protesters, was detained on Sunday.

“In the last few days, they have increased the arrests. Two from our [resistance] committee were taken at the weekend. There have been lots of other people taken. We are keeping a low profile these days,” said Yousef Abdallah Adam, a 35-year-old painter and decorator who leads a pro-democracy “resistance committee” in south Khartoum.

Legal representatives said 80 people associated with the protest movement had been detained in less than two weeks. Many have been dispersed to prisons around the country, often hundreds of miles from their homes.²⁷⁶

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

The UN reported that “On 30 June [2021], in commemoration of the thirty-second anniversary of the coup that brought former President al-Bashir to power, as well as of the 2019 ‘million person’ march, thousands of protesters from diverse opposition groups, including revolutionary groups, the Sudanese Communist Party and Islamists, protested in several Sudanese cities demanding the end of the transitional Government. Young people also demonstrated in separate pro-democracy protests in support of the revolution. Sudanese authorities reported the arrest of 200 members of the former ruling party, accusing them of plotting ‘acts of destruction’”.²⁷⁷

In October 2021 “Sudan’s military has seized power in a coup, arrested leading civilian politicians including the prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, and declared a state of emergency as thousands of protesters flooded the streets of Khartoum in opposition”, reported The Guardian.²⁷⁸ Amnesty International noted in its annual report covering 2021:

After the October army takeover, security authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained dozens of civilian political leaders, including cabinet members, and Prime Minister Hamdok who was held for two days before being put under house arrest for almost a month. Other political prisoners, who were held for nearly one month in incommunicado detention without access to their families or legal counsel, were released after the 21 November [2021] accord. However, security forces continued to arrest and charge protesters.²⁷⁹

Without specifying the location, the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and its Sudanese network member the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) noted that “at least 10 civilians killed, 250 injured and 36 detained in unknown locations” following the October 2021 military coup.²⁸⁰ The same joint statement further noted “The Sudanese Joint Security Forces conducted arbitrary arrests of civilians, human rights defenders, activists, journalists, and political

²⁷⁶ The Guardian, [Sudan security forces clash with protesters against military coup](#), 24 May 2022

²⁷⁷ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan Report of the Secretary-General](#), 1 September 2021, para. 8

²⁷⁸ The Guardian, [Sudan’s army seizes power in coup and detains prime minister](#), 25 October 2021

²⁷⁹ Amnesty International, [The state of the world’s human rights: Sudan 2021](#), 28 March 2022, *Arbitrary detention*

²⁸⁰ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: International community should adopt urgent measures to stop human rights violations](#), 2 November 2021

leaders at their homes and detained them in undisclosed locations. At least 36 civilians were arrested and are still held in incommunicado detention”.²⁸¹ Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch confirmed that “at least eight of the 30 detainees whose cases feature in the ACJPS statement are being held in undisclosed locations, without access to family or legal counsel in circumstances that may amount to enforced disappearances”.²⁸²

Similarly, Ahmed Soliman, Research Fellow at Chatham House, reported that “The coup has been accompanied by arrests of politicians, activists, and leaders of local resistance committees, including some of Sudan’s most effective advocates for democratic transformation. Additionally, administrators appointed since the revolution have been dismissed while members of the old regime and Bashir’s feared intelligence service have reappeared”.²⁸³

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJP) also noted:

The patterns of human rights crimes committed over the past two months since the military coup of 25 October 2021 are all too familiar to the Sudanese people. The same conduct used during the al Bashir regime to terrorise civilians throughout the country is now being used to annihilate unanimous demands for democracy [...]

Joint security forces have raided homes and arrested Government officials, advisors and activists. During these raids, family members were arrested without any reasons given. For example, on 24 October 2021, joint forces raided the house of Mr. Yasir Saied Arman, the political advisor to the Sudanese prime Minister and arrested him along with his younger brother, Mr Mujeib Saeed Arman when they found him in Mr. Arman’s resident in Khartoum. They have both been released. Raids also happened in offices including CSOs and human rights activists were detained.²⁸⁴

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

Between 25 October and 17 November 2021, the Sudanese Armed Forces arbitrarily arrested and detained 63 government officials and politically influential figures (1 woman, 62 men), including Prime Minister Hamdok and six ministers. Prime Minister Hamdok was held for one day at an unknown location before being placed under house arrest on 26 October, and was not released until the signing of the 21 November political agreement. The other 62 political figures, including members of the dismantling committee, were reportedly taken, in what many described as a “terrifying” and “humiliating” manner, from their homes by joint security forces, often in front of their families. They were transported to places of detention, blindfolded for at least part of the journey. The detention facilities were identified as primarily those run by the General Intelligence Service and the military. Most of the detainees were held incommunicado and in solitary confinement for eight days, until 2 November 2021, when they were allowed to make short phone calls to their families. A few were held in this situation for two weeks; two detainees were held for more than 15 consecutive days, in contravention of international human rights law. Most detainees interviewed said that they were treated well in detention, despite the conditions in which they were held. In the lead-up to and following the 21 November political agreement, all were released on bail except for a security officer who worked for the dismantling committee. Except for a meeting with the Expert during his visit to

²⁸¹ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: International community should adopt urgent measures to stop human rights violations](#), 2 November 2021

²⁸² Amnesty International, [Sudan: Immediately Free Detainees; Halt Arrests](#), 9 November 2021

²⁸³ Ahmed Soliman (Chatham House), [Reversing the military coup in Sudan](#), 11 November 2021

²⁸⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: Tactics of bloodshed and violence against peaceful protesters is not new](#), 16 December 2021

the Sudan, the remaining detainee has remained in incommunicado detention since 25 October 2021.²⁸⁵

The same report further highlighted:

After Emergency Decree No. 3/2021 was issued, prominent civil society figures, activists, leaders of resistance committees, youth movements, and those supportive of protests, civil disobedience and/or expressing objections to the coup, were increasingly targeted, with greater involvement of the General Intelligence Service in arrests. The arrests were reportedly made at sit-ins and during strikes at places of work; before, during and after protests; and from people's homes or in hospitals. While the protesters and bystanders who were arrested were generally released after a short period, demonstration leaders, members of resistance committees and activists were typically held in incommunicado detention for periods ranging from one day to two months. During such detention, they were generally prohibited from contacting their lawyers and families, who were not informed of their whereabouts, conditions that may amount to enforced disappearance [...]

Following the death of a brigadier-general of the Central Reserve Police in Khartoum on 13 January 2022, security forces increased their arrests of protesters, including preemptive and mass arrests, mainly targeting resistance committee members. Among them were four protesters accused of "criminal conspiracy" and murder – charges punishable with the death penalty – under articles 21 and 130 of the Criminal Act of 1991, for their alleged involvement in the police officer's death.²⁸⁶

The Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, noted that:

As at 10 April 2022, at least 119 persons (all men) whose arrests were linked to the coup and subsequent protests remained in detention. They included 19 persons who either were members of or had collaborated with the dismantling committee. Five of those were arrested after the coup, released after the 21 November agreement, and re-arrested in early February 2022. They were reportedly deprived of visitation rights and denied contact with their lawyers for more than one month after arrest. All 19 are charged with breach of trust under article 177 (2) of the Criminal Act, which is punishable by death.²⁸⁷

Covering the period 25 October to 4 December 2021, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported that "ACJPS has received reliable information indicating that Sudanese authorities have released 140 political detainees arrested for political reasons or for their actual or suspected involvement in anti coup protests in Sudan. Those released include 2 Cabinet Ministers, 2 state governors, 18 teachers, 24 members of the resistance committees, political activists and journalists. They were detained in various prisons across the country since the coup in October 2021. Mr. Mohamed Al-Faki Suleiman, former member of Sudanese Sovereign Council is among those released on bond".²⁸⁸

The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees reported in February 2022 that "The military government is increasingly cracking down on opposition politicians and activists. The latest arrests have included many members of the Sovereign Council, as well as the chairpersons and vice-chairpersons of the Empowerment Removal Committee (ERC). The ERC was established by Abdallah

²⁸⁵ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, paras. 28 and 29

²⁸⁶ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, paras. 31 and 32

²⁸⁷ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, para. 38

²⁸⁸ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [140 political detainees released amidst violent crackdown on anti coup protests](#), 9 December 2021

Hamdok to remove remaining privileges granted by the Al-Bashir regime to its supporters. The military government had previously suspended the ERC, thus terminating its work. The numerous arrests also affect journalists and humanitarian workers. The media have also reported that the ongoing arrests of opponents of the military government have been accompanied by the increased rehabilitation of former supporters of the Al-Bashir regime. Most recently, Taha Osman, a member of the ERC and a leading figure in the political party Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), was arrested on 17.02.22”.²⁸⁹

The Middle East Eye reported in February 2022 that “Two prominent Sudanese political figures holding senior positions in the civilian administration before the military coup in October [2021] were arrested on Wednesday [February 2022]. Khaled Omar Youssef, a former minister of cabinet affairs, was arrested by plainclothes officers during a meeting of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) bloc at the headquarters of the Sudanese Congress Party, senior member Mohamed Hassan Arabi said. Wagdi Saleh, a leading figure of the protest movement and an FFC spokesman, was also arrested, according to FFC leader Omar al-Degeir. Saleh and Youssef were previously involved in a task force that seized property and fired bureaucrats linked to the regime of Omar al-Bashir, who fell in a 2019 popular uprising, Reuters reported. Both men were arrested immediately after the October coup, but were soon released”.²⁹⁰ According to the same source “The arrests come a day after the two men joined an FFC delegation for talks with UN Special Representative Volker Perthes, as part of efforts launched last month aimed at resolving the deepening crisis, AFP reported”.²⁹¹

REDRESS, together with the People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE), the Emergency Lawyers’ Group and the Darfur Bar Association reported in March 2022 that:

Since the 25 October 2021 coup in Sudan, members of the armed forces, police, General Intelligence Service (GIS), and other security forces have carried out scores of arrests of protestors, journalists, civilian political leaders, and other human rights defenders. Relying on an overbroad emergency order—Emergency Order No 3—issued under an unlawful state of emergency, which permits the arrest of any person who “participates in a crime related to [the state of emergency],” Sudan’s security forces and military continue to use detention to punish opponents of the coup and to deter others from further activism.²⁹²

The same briefing highlighted that these arrests “can be broadly categorised as (1) occurring before, during, or just after protests or (2) targeted arrests conducted from individuals’ places of residence, work, or from other known gathering places”.²⁹³

Further information about one of the actors involved in the “violent crackdown on protesters” since the 25 October 2021 coup, the Central Reserve Police (CRP), is provided in a March 2022 briefing by REDRESS.²⁹⁴ According to the source, “the CRP is a militarised police unit falling under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. In practice, the CRP, under the command of General Al-

²⁸⁹ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 21 February 2022, *Sudan*, p. 11

²⁹⁰ Middle East Eye, [Sudan: Two prominent critics of ruling military arrested](#), 9 February 2022

²⁹¹ Middle East Eye, [Sudan: Two prominent critics of ruling military arrested](#), 9 February 2022

²⁹² REDRESS / People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers’ Group / Darfur Bar Association, [“Taken from Khartoum’s Streets”, Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan’s emergency laws, Legal Analysis](#), March 2022, *Summary*, p. 3

²⁹³ REDRESS / People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers’ Group / Darfur Bar Association, [“Taken from Khartoum’s Streets”, Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan’s emergency laws, Legal Analysis](#), March 2022, *Summary*, p. 3

²⁹⁴ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, *para. 2*

Shami Abdallah Mohamed Abdoun, reports directly to General Intelligence Service (GIS) leadership, in a continuation of Bashir-era practices”.²⁹⁵ The briefing further highlighted that the “CRP forces have also played a role in the ongoing campaign of arbitrary arrests and detentions across Sudan, which has involved the custodial torture and ill-treatment of hundreds of protestors, activists, and human rights defenders”.²⁹⁶

The Guardian reported in May 2022 that “Nearly 1,600 pro-democracy campaigners [resistance committees] in Sudan have been arrested in the past eight months, and 96 killed in a series of protests”.²⁹⁷

2.2.6. Persons who have participated in protests (inside or outside of Sudan)

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 – Khartoum

International Crisis Group’s ‘CrisisWatch’ of August 2020 reported that:

On first anniversary of constitutional declaration establishing three-year transitional period, hundreds of thousands 17 Aug took to streets in capital Khartoum and other urban areas to protest delayed implementation of transitional agenda; police fired tear gas to disperse protesters and detained dozens.²⁹⁸

Human Rights Watch reported that “Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), acting without lawful authority, arbitrarily detained dozens of civilians, including political activists, in the capital, Khartoum during 2020 [...] The detainees were held incommunicado or in circumstances constituting enforced disappearances [...] The former detainees said that the security forces held them incommunicado and denied them access to lawyers and their families throughout their detention, which ranged from a week to over a month. Two detainees said RSF guards physically ill-treated them”.²⁹⁹

2021 – Khartoum

Frontline Defenders reported in November 2021: “There were 9 women protesters arrested in Khartoum and transferred to the Omdurman women’s prison. According to the emergency laws, they are to remain in prison for one week without trial and clear charges”.³⁰⁰

2022 – Khartoum

²⁹⁵ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

²⁹⁶ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

²⁹⁷ The Guardian, [‘Our friends didn’t die in vain’: Sudan’s activists aim to topple military regime](#), 28 May 2022

²⁹⁸ International Crisis Group, [CrisisWatch August 2020](#), Undated [Research result generated on 24.05.2022]

²⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Unlawful Detentions by Rapid Support Forces](#), 1 March 2021

³⁰⁰ Frontline Defenders, [Sudanese and International organisations call for an end on attacks against Sudanese women human rights defenders and protesters](#), 19 November 2021

Radio Dabanga reported in January 2022 that “A force wearing civilian clothes and driving unmarked vehicles without plates, detained protesters wounded during the January 13 demonstrations and their companions as they were leaving the Royal Care Hospital in Burri, eastern Khartoum”.³⁰¹

Al Jazeera reported in May 2022: “While some protesters have been released in recent days, security officers continue to crack down on the pro-democracy movement. On May 5, authorities arrested 25 protesters during anti-coup demonstrations. Plainclothes officers later attacked detainee families for demanding the release of their loved ones outside a police station in the capital, and three more people were detained during the incident, according to a cohort of Sudanese attorneys who call themselves the Emergency Lawyers. Sudan’s Public Prosecutor Khalifa Ahmed did not respond to queries sent by Al Jazeera regarding the detention of prisoners without charge for several weeks and months – a practice that lawyers say is against the law”.³⁰²

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

Without specifying the location, the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and its Sudanese network member the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) noted that “at least 10 civilians killed, 250 injured and 36 detained in unknown locations” following the October 2021 military coup.³⁰³ The same joint statement further noted “The Sudanese Joint Security Forces conducted arbitrary arrests of civilians, human rights defenders, activists, journalists, and political leaders at their homes and detained them in undisclosed locations. At least 36 civilians were arrested and are still held in incommunicado detention”.³⁰⁴

REDRESS, together with the People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE), the Emergency Lawyers’ Group and the Darfur Bar Association reported in March 2022 that:

Since the 25 October 2021 coup in Sudan, members of the armed forces, police, General Intelligence Service (GIS), and other security forces have carried out scores of arrests of protestors, journalists, civilian political leaders, and other human rights defenders. Relying on an overbroad emergency order—Emergency Order No 3—issued under an unlawful state of emergency, which permits the arrest of any person who “participates in a crime related to [the state of emergency],” Sudan’s security forces and military continue to use detention to punish opponents of the coup and to deter others from further activism.³⁰⁵

The same briefing highlighted that these arrests “can be broadly categorised as (1) occurring before, during, or just after protests or (2) targeted arrests conducted from individuals’ places of residence, work, or from other known gathering places”.³⁰⁶

Further information about one of the actors involved in the “violent crackdown on protesters” since the 25 October 2021 coup, the Central Reserve Police (CRP), is provided in a March 2022 briefing by

³⁰¹ Radio Dabanga, [Injured protesters detained leaving Sudan hospital](#), 16 January 2022

³⁰² Al Jazeera, [Protesters remain in Sudan’s prisons as dialogue is postponed](#), 10 May 2022

³⁰³ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: International community should adopt urgent measures to stop human rights violations](#), 2 November 2021

³⁰⁴ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: International community should adopt urgent measures to stop human rights violations](#), 2 November 2021

³⁰⁵ REDRESS / People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers’ Group / Darfur Bar Association, [“Taken from Khartoum’s Streets”, Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan’s emergency laws, Legal Analysis](#), March 2022, Summary, p. 3

³⁰⁶ REDRESS / People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers’ Group / Darfur Bar Association, [“Taken from Khartoum’s Streets”, Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan’s emergency laws, Legal Analysis](#), March 2022, Summary, p. 3

REDRESS.³⁰⁷ According to the source, “the CRP is a militarised police unit falling under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. In practice, the CRP, under the command of General Al-Shami Abdallah Mohamed Abdoun, reports directly to General Intelligence Service (GIS) leadership, in a continuation of Bashir-era practices”.³⁰⁸ The briefing further highlighted that the “CRP forces have also played a role in the ongoing campaign of arbitrary arrests and detentions across Sudan, which has involved the custodial torture and ill-treatment of hundreds of protestors, activists, and human rights defenders”.³⁰⁹

Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, noted in March 2022 that:

The Joint Human Rights Office reported that more than 1,000 people had been arrested for opposing the coup and its consequences between 25 October 2021 and 3 March 2022. The High Commissioner was concerned about the pattern of targeted arbitrary arrests and detention of prominent protest organizers and demonstrators either during protests, at their homes, or in hospitals, and welcomed the release of 115 people last week.³¹⁰

The Ayin Network reported in April 2022 that “Immediately after launching the coup [October 2021], military leader Lt.-Gen. Abdelfattah al-Burhan issued the sweeping Emergency and Protection of Public Safety Act as a tool to arrest protestors, according to a legal analysis written by Sudanese law groups. The number of arbitrarily detained persons since the military takeover of has exceeded 100, according to the statistics collected by a brave group of Sudanese lawyers, the Emergency Lawyers Committee”.³¹¹

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

Between 25 October 2021 and 10 April 2022, the Expert and the joint human rights office documented the arbitrary arrest and detention of 1,293 persons linked to the coup or protests against the coup, of whom 143 were women and 157 were children (including 2 girls). This figure does not include those held for short periods and released without charge.

In total, the United Nations monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict verified 222 child rights violations in the context of civil unrest since the coup, including arbitrary arrest and detention of children for participation in demonstrations (157), injuries (46) and killings (15) of children and one attack on a school. In all, 97 per cent of the victims were boys (209). The joint human rights office observed that children detained in Khartoum and at the state level were held on police premises and usually detained together with adults, rather than in juvenile detention facilities under the authority of a family and child judge, in contravention of national legislation.³¹²

Reporting on the period 22 February to 5 May 2022, the UN Secretary-General noted that:

Throughout the reporting period, human rights violations continued, and abuses against civilians were reported across the country, including in Khartoum and resulting from intercommunal clashes in Darfur. Security forces continued to use excessive force against protesters, including firing live ammunition, stun grenades and tear gas, reportedly resulting in 13 civilian deaths, all of whom were men (8) and boys (5), and 1,708 injuries. In addition, reports were received of 186 arbitrary arrests

³⁰⁷ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

³⁰⁸ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

³⁰⁹ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

³¹⁰ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNOHCHR), [Human Rights Council Discusses the Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua and in Sudan](#), 7 March 2022

³¹¹ Ayin Network, [Detained for nothing: military resorts to mass arbitrary arrests](#), 10 April 2022

³¹² UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, paras. 26 and 27

and the ongoing detention of approximately 138 resistance committee leaders, political protesters and civil society activists. Forty-eight individuals were released during this period.³¹³

2.2.7. Persons who have shown or are perceived to have shown opposition

Very limited relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

In its submissions to the UN Universal Periodic Review in March 2021, ACJPS and Defend Defenders jointly stated that in February 2021 “the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and ITUC-Africa addressed a letter to Prime Minister Abdulla Hamdok criticising the arbitrary arrests of trade unionists and the dissolution of trade unions”.³¹⁴

The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees reported in April 2022 that “During calendar week 13, about 30 directors and board members of public universities were dismissed from their offices and replaced by new heads. More professors resigned in protest, while other university employees begun an open-ended strike. Also in calendar week 13, a total of 13 employees of the education ministry were dismissed for not following instructions from the military government”.³¹⁵

In conversation with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan, ARC’s Director was told in May 2022:

While most persons arrested for political reasons since the coup, or for organizing or taking part in protests were released by early June, one person arrested on 25 October [2021] has been held in incommunicado detention since then, without charge. He was a security officer working with the Dismantling Committee, a former police officer. He is still not permitted visits from his family.³¹⁶

2.2.8. Human rights activists

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

³¹³ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan](#), 17 May 2022, para. 22

³¹⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) / DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [Submission to the United Nations Universal Period Review, 39th Session of the UPR Working Group, Sudan](#), 25 March 2021, 4. Freedom of association, para. 4.2

³¹⁵ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 4 April 2022, Sudan, p. 10

³¹⁶ Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes

2020 – Khartoum

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported that in early March 2020 “a RSF officer in Khartoum arrested human rights defender, Mr. Abdul Malik Musa Saleh at the Arabic Market in Khartoum. Mr. Saleh was arrested while he was heading to seek legal consultation from a lawyer regarding the case of Musa Hilal and 250 border guard forces detained and charged between August and December 2017”.³¹⁷

In August 2020 “woman human rights defender Hala Khalid Abugroun was detained for several hours at Khartoum Central Police Station after attempting to report human rights abuses carried out by NISS officers against protestors during a peaceful protest in the capital. She was interrogated for several hours and reported being subject to severe physical abuse, which may amount to torture, by police and security officers” reported Frontline Defenders.³¹⁸ The same source further noted that “Since being arbitrarily detained and subject to physical abuse on 17 August 2020, Hala Khalid Abugroun has attempted to open a file against the officers involved. There has been no progress in this process, and the defender has subsequently received verbal threats from unknown persons indirectly, warning her to cease her attempts to take legal action against the officers involved”.³¹⁹

Radio Dabanga reported on the arrest and detention of human rights and women’s rights defender, Waad Bahjat, in November 2020 “after she broadcasted a live video on Facebook to document an incident in which several women were denied access to fuel and petrol station in Khartoum and were harassed by police officers and officers from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)”.³²⁰ The same news article noted:

After her arrest, she was taken to the El Imtidad police station and released the following day. Bahjat was charged with defamation, insulting a public servant exercising judicial proceedings, publishing false news, and public nuisance according to the 1991 Criminal Act. She was also accused of attacking a police officer and a SAF officer.

Bahjat pleaded not guilty and refuted the accusation. She also asserted that the police officers used force against her.

According to a reliable source, Bahjat was forcibly taken by a police officer and a SAF officer and, at the police station, her phone was taken from her and she was threatened during the interrogation.

It was also reported that Bahjat was subjected to ill-treatment and abuse. A medical report issued after the arrest indicates that she sustained cuts and bruises on her shoulders and arms.³²¹

At the end of March 2021 Waad Bahjat was sentenced to a “6-month suspended prison sentence and to a fine of 10.000 Sudanese pounds (approximately 22 Euros) on charges of “public annoyance” and “use of criminal force” (art. 77 and 143 of the Sudanese Criminal Act). Ms. Bahjat was subsequently detained at the police station attached to the court for several hours after the

³¹⁷ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), Sudan: Continued violations of human rights by the Sudanese armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces, 14 May 2020

³¹⁸ Frontline Defenders, [Arbitrary detention of woman human rights defender Hala Khalid Abugroun](#), 26 August 2020

³¹⁹ Frontline Defenders, [Arbitrary detention of woman human rights defender Hala Khalid Abugroun](#), 26 August 2020

³²⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Blogger and women’s rights defender could face on year in prison over Facebook video](#), 14 January 2021

³²¹ Radio Dabanga, [Blogger and women’s rights defender could face on year in prison over Facebook video](#), 14 January 2021

judgement and released the same day following the payment of the fine” reported the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT).³²²

At the end of November 2020 another female women and environmental rights defender, Khadeeja Aldewaihi, faced judicial harassment as she was summoned for questioning at a Khartoum police station where she was “interrogated about her posts on Facebook dating back to May 13, 2020”.³²³ In December 2020 “she was summoned to the Office of the Cybercrime Prosecutor. In addition to the questions about her Facebook posts, she was asked about her political affiliation and her alleged engagement with the Sudanese communist party. Ms. Aldewaihi was one more time summoned to the Office of the Cybercrime Prosecutor on December 16, 2020, where she was interrogated over her alleged relationship with the Sudanese Universities Graduate Association and their Facebook account”.³²⁴ According to reporting by the OMCT, in March 2021 “Cybercrime Prosecutor of Sudan charged Khadeeja Aldewaihi with ‘publishing false news online’ (articles 24 and 25 of the Cybercrimes Act) in relation to a post she had written on Facebook on May 13, 2020 about the resignation of the Minister of Health and the challenges the health sector faces in Sudan. The prosecutor subsequently referred the case for trial and Ms. Khadeeja could be summoned to court at any time”.³²⁵

2021 - Khartoum

In September 2021 journalist and woman human rights defender Aisha Al-Majidi “was arbitrarily arrested upon her arrival at the Department of Cybercrimes of the Sudanese police in Khartoum, on the basis of a summons issued by the Cybercrime Prosecutor of Sudan. The summons followed the filing of two separate cases against her on the charge of “defamation” (article 159 of the Sudanese Criminal Code) by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Committee for the Removal of Empowerment. Aisha Al-Majidi was released on September 16, 2021. The case is pending before the Prosecutor and can be referred to court at any time”, reported the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT).³²⁶ According to the same source the “judicial harassment against Aisha Al-Majidi s related to two messages [she] posted on her social media in early September 2021 in which she called for the dissolution of the RSF and the use of its infrastructure to build new hospitals, childcare homes and orphanages in Sudan. Aisha Al-Majidi also expressed her views on the role the Committee for the Removal of Empowerment is having in the ongoing Sudanese transition to democracy”.³²⁷

The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (FIDH-OMCT) reported that:

The military coup of October 25, 2021 in Sudan, has led to multiple arbitrary arrests of political figures and an escalation of violence in Khartoum and the Darfur region against a broad peaceful movement

³²² World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), [Sudan: Sentencing of women’s rights defender Waad Bahjat](#), 8 April 2021. See also Frontline Defenders, [Waad Bahjat sentenced](#), 13 April 2021

³²³ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), [Sudan: Judicial harassment of women’s rights defender Khadeeja Aldewaihi](#), 1 April 2021

³²⁴ International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) / World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), [Sudan: Judicial harassment of women’s rights defender Khadeeja Aldewaihi](#), 1 April 2022

³²⁵ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), [Sudan: Judicial harassment of women’s rights defender Khadeeja Aldewaihi](#), 1 April 2021

³²⁶ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), [Sudan: The use of criminal law to target critics must stop](#), 24 September 2021

³²⁷ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), [Sudan: The use of criminal law to target critics must stop](#), 24 September 2021

that opposes it. Civic space has severely been affected by the coup, with several human rights defenders detained incommunicado in the capital and in Darfur [...]

By using live ammunition, joint security forces violently repressed these demonstrations notably on November 13 and 17, resulting in the death of at least 22 people. More than 400 people have been injured in Khartoum since the coup and attacks by joint security forces targeted a number of medical centers in Khartoum, Bahri and Omdurman. Reports by the Central Committee of Sudan Doctors (CCSD) of non-conventional munitions being used by the military are particularly worrying and in breach of international law.

In this context, numerous human rights defenders, civil society activists, resistance committee members, government officials and politicians have been arbitrarily arrested and held incommunicado under the Emergency law, most notably in Blue Nile State and the Darfur regions, since October 25, 2021.³²⁸

Frontline Defenders reported in November 2021:

Three women union activists of the Khartoum water authority were arrested on 4 November 2021, including the chairwoman of the Steering Committee for the Workers of the Khartoum State Water Authority, Rasha Al-Mubarak, and another two union women activists, Asmaa Osman and Huda Khidir.³²⁹

During the period 22 November 2021 to 21 February 2022, the UN reported that “Targeted arrests of resistance committee members and civil society activists, including women’s rights activists in Khartoum and elsewhere in the country, were carried out and remain ongoing. Most were detained for short periods while some were held incommunicado and without charge”.³³⁰

2022 – Khartoum

Frontline Defenders reported in February 2022 that “woman human rights defender Ameira Osman was released from her detention on bail” following her arrest on 20th January 2022 when she was “taken from her house in Khartoum to an unknown location by armed security officers dressed in plain clothes”.³³¹ BBC News reported that Amira Osman is also a member of the Sudanese Communist Party and “It is believed that she was arrested by the General Intelligence Service (GIS) formerly known as the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) but the authorities have not commented”.³³² According to the same source “Amira Osman has been released” in early February 2022 “after being held incommunicado for two weeks. She has been accused of firearms offences which she denies”.³³³

In an undated press release, the Darfur Women Action Group expressed its “grave concern over Sudanese authorities arbitrarily detaining around 200 people in Soba prison, many of whom are activists, and the subsequent violence aimed at protestors calling for their release. In the aftermath of the October 25, 2021 coup, Sudanese forces are continuously arresting protestors who are calling

³²⁸ FIDH-OMCT, [Sudan: human rights defenders and civil society activists particularly targeted amidst the military coup](#), 18 November 2021

³²⁹ Frontline Defenders, [Sudanese and International organisations call for an end on attacks against Sudanese women human rights defenders and protesters](#), 19 November 2021

³³⁰ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan Report of the Secretary-General](#), 2 March 2022, para. 27

³³¹ Frontline Defenders, [Woman human rights defender Ameira Osman released from detention on bail](#), 21 February 2022

³³² Zeinab Mohammed Salih (BBC News), [Sudan’s feared secret police make a comeback](#), 5 February 2022

³³³ Zeinab Mohammed Salih (BBC News), [Sudan’s feared secret police make a comeback](#), 5 February 2022

for a full civilian government and an end to military rule. Sudanese forces are arbitrarily detaining many of these protestors in the overcrowded Soba prison, with reports stating that the detained account for more than 200".³³⁴ The same source further highlighted that "The detainees are not allowed to see their families or lawyers and are denied medical care. It's reported that due to these conditions, over 100 detainees went on a hunger strike in Soba prison".³³⁵

2021 - Omdurman

In September 2021 the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) reported about the arrest of two civil rights activists, Musab Zakaria and Suleiman Jamal, who were:

arbitrarily arrested by members of the RSF while they were protesting against the Vice-President of the Sovereign Council and the Commander in Chief of the RSF in front of a mosque in the neighbourhood of Umbada, in the city of Omdurman. Both activists were peacefully demanding justice and accountability for crimes committed by the RSF against civilians. Musab Zakaria and Suleiman Jamal were transferred to an unknown location and later brought to the Al-Rashideen police station in Omdurman, where a criminal case was filed against them on charges of "disturbance of public peace" and "public nuisance" (articles 68 and 77 of the Sudanese Criminal Code). No witnesses or complainants were present when the case was filed. In the evening of September 11, Musab Zakaria and Suleiman Jamal were transferred to the Khartoum North police station in the city of Khartoum. They were released on bail on September 12, 2021, only after a police officer appeared as a complainant and thus the investigations were completed.³³⁶

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

Without specifying the location, the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and its Sudanese network member the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) noted that "at least 10 civilians killed, 250 injured and 36 detained in unknown locations" following the October 2021 military coup.³³⁷ The same joint statement further noted "The Sudanese Joint Security Forces conducted arbitrary arrests of civilians, human rights defenders, activists, journalists, and political leaders at their homes and detained them in undisclosed locations. At least 36 civilians were arrested and are still held in incommunicado detention".³³⁸

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) also noted:

The patterns of human rights crimes committed over the past two months since the military coup of 25 October 2021 are all too familiar to the Sudanese people. The same conduct used during the al Bashir regime to terrorise civilians throughout the country is now being used to annihilate unanimous demands for democracy [...]

Joint security forces have raided homes and arrested Government officials, advisors and activists. During these raids, family members were arrested without any reasons given. For example, on 24 October 2021, joint forces raided the house of Mr. Yasir Saied Arman, the political advisor to the

³³⁴ Darfur Women Action Group, [Sudanese Authorities Must Cease the Arbitrary Detention of Activists](#), Undated [Last accessed: 01.06.2022]

³³⁵ Darfur Women Action Group, [Sudanese Authorities Must Cease the Arbitrary Detention of Activists](#), Undated [Last accessed: 01.06.2022]

³³⁶ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), [Sudan: The use of criminal law to target critics must stop](#), 24 September 2021. See also African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Two civic rights activists at risk of being sentenced to imprisonment or whipping for trumped up charges](#), 20 September 2021

³³⁷ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: International community should adopt urgent measures to stop human rights violations](#), 2 November 2021

³³⁸ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: International community should adopt urgent measures to stop human rights violations](#), 2 November 2021

Sudanese prime Minister and arrested him along with his younger brother, Mr Mujeib Saeed Arman when they found him in Mr. Arman's resident in Khartoum. They have both been released. Raids also happened in offices including CSOs and human rights activists were detained.³³⁹

Further information about one of the actors involved in the “violent crackdown on protesters” since the 25 October 2021 coup, the Central Reserve Police (CRP), is provided in a March 2022 briefing by REDRESS.³⁴⁰ According to the source, “the CRP is a militarised police unit falling under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. In practice, the CRP, under the command of General Al-Shami Abdallah Mohamed Abdoun, reports directly to General Intelligence Service (GIS) leadership, in a continuation of Bashir-era practices”.³⁴¹ The briefing further highlighted that the “CRP forces have also played a role in the ongoing campaign of arbitrary arrests and detentions across Sudan, which has involved the custodial torture and ill-treatment of hundreds of protestors, activists, and human rights defenders”.³⁴²

Frontline Defenders reported in November 2021:

the WHRD MENA Coalition for Women Human Rights Defenders and North Africa documented the following violations: raids of houses and arrest of women and men, cutting of internet and telephone lines, the use of live ammunition on protestors, and the violent beating of protestors and the targeting of women.³⁴³

REDRESS, together with the People's Legal Aid Centre (PLACE), the Emergency Lawyers' Group and the Darfur Bar Association reported in March 2022 that:

Since the 25 October 2021 coup in Sudan, members of the armed forces, police, General Intelligence Service (GIS), and other security forces have carried out scores of arrests of protestors, journalists, civilian political leaders, and other human rights defenders. Relying on an overbroad emergency order—Emergency Order No 3—issued under an unlawful state of emergency, which permits the arrest of any person who “participates in a crime related to [the state of emergency],” Sudan's security forces and military continue to use detention to punish opponents of the coup and to deter others from further activism.³⁴⁴

The same briefing highlighted that these arrests “can be broadly categorised as (1) occurring before, during, or just after protests or (2) targeted arrests conducted from individuals' places of residence, work, or from other known gathering places”.³⁴⁵

2.2.9. Journalists

³³⁹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: Tactics of bloodshed and violence against peaceful protesters is not new](#), 16 December 2021

³⁴⁰ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

³⁴¹ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

³⁴² REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

³⁴³ Frontline Defenders, [Sudanese and International organisations call for an end on attacks against Sudanese women human rights defenders and protesters](#), 19 November 2021

³⁴⁴ REDRESS / People's Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers' Group / Darfur Bar Association, [“Taken from Khartoum's Streets”, Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan's emergency laws, Legal Analysis](#), March 2022, Summary, p. 3

³⁴⁵ REDRESS / People's Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers' Group / Darfur Bar Association, [“Taken from Khartoum's Streets”, Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan's emergency laws, Legal Analysis](#), March 2022, Summary, p. 3

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant sub-section of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 – Khartoum

In November 2020 the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and its affiliate, the Sudanese Journalists Union (SJU) reported that “Prominent columnist Ishaq Ahmed Fadlallah was arrested on 12 November [2020] after writing an article criticizing the practices of a member of the Empowerment Removal and Anti Corruption Committee”.³⁴⁶

2021 - Khartoum

In February 2021 “Four Sudanese journalists were arrested [in Khartoum and Gedaref] by local security forces on 12 February [2021] due to alleged “incitement of acts of violence, sabotage, and looting across the country” reported the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and its affiliate, the Sudanese Journalists Union (SJU).³⁴⁷

On 30th June 2021, “security officers in plain clothes arrested Al-Jazeera reporter Ali Abu Shaleh while he was covering protests in Khartoum, the capital, according to a report and footage of the arrest posted to Twitter by the broadcaster, which shows officers throwing him into the back of a pickup truck. Officers beat him in custody and then released him about three hours later”.³⁴⁸

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) expressed its concern in September 2021 over the “physical safety and wellbeing of Mr Otaf Abdelwahab Altom, journalist and director of Al-Naba Center for Press Services who was arrested by the police force from his home and taken to Al-Mugran Police Station in Khartoum” following his arrest “based on suspicion of ‘coordinating’ with members of the ousted National Congress party to undermine the Constitutional order in the country. His family has not been able to visit him and they do not know where he is being detained”.³⁴⁹

On 25th October 2021, Maher Abugoukh, a journalist and manager of several news and political programs on Sudan’s state television channels, was arrested from his home in Khartoum following his criticism of the “military during live television and radio interviews, including on October 10 [2021] on local independent station Hala98, which posted the interview on YouTube” reported the Committee to Protect Journalists.³⁵⁰

On 14th November 2021, “Al Jazeera’s Khartoum bureau chief, El Musalmi El Kabbashi, was arrested and detained by Sudanese military authorities who had raided his house. While he was released 2

³⁴⁶ International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), [Sudan: Journalist arrested for reporting on anti-corruption committee](#), 17 November 2020

³⁴⁷ International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), [Sudan: Four journalists arrested amid crackdown on opposition leaders](#), 18 February 2021

³⁴⁸ Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese authorities block news websites, briefly detain Al-Jazeera reporter covering protests](#), 7 July 2021

³⁴⁹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudanese journalist detained incommunicado, faces death penalty](#) [sic], 27 September 2021

³⁵⁰ Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese military forces arrest state television manager, pro-military protesters assault journalists amid unrest](#), 26 October 2021

days later, the authorities have yet to give a reason for his detention”.³⁵¹ The same article further noted that “there were reports of attacks, arrest and detention of journalists covering the pro-democracy protests” the previous days.³⁵²

2022 – Khartoum

The Committee to Protect Journalists reported that since 12th January 2022, “Sudanese military forces in the capital Khartoum have detained, and later released, at least six journalists and media workers, and on January 13, military forces assaulted a freelance journalist and attempted to run over at least two other journalists with military vehicles”.³⁵³ The same source further noted that “All of those journalists were targeted while covering protests against Sudan’s military rulers, which have been ongoing since Sudanese military head Abdel Fattah al-Burhan overthrew the country’s joint civilian-military transitional government in an October 2021 coup d’état”.³⁵⁴ The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) specifically reported that “four Alaraby TV media worker were arrested, following their coverage of “protests calling for civilian rule” and “denouncing the [October 2021] military coup”.³⁵⁵

On 16th January 2022 the Sudanese Ministry of Culture and Information “withdrew the accreditation of two of [Al-Jazeera’s] journalists, Khartoum correspondent Mohamed Omar and photographer Badawi Bashir, in response to the network’s alleged ‘unprofessional coverage’ and reporting that ‘damaged the social fabric’ of Sudan, according to the ministry’s statement included in the report”.³⁵⁶

The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees reported that “On 07.02.22, the broadcaster BBC announced via Twitter that three BBC Arabic reporters had been arrested by security forces and taken to an unknown location. The team concerned has been accredited by the Sudanese Ministry of Information and had been reporting from Khartoum. The BBC was reportedly involved in a close exchange with the Sudanese authorities on the case and was working to secure the swift release of its staff. Since the coup on 25.10.21, there have been repeated repressive measures against media and news agencies and their staff. The measures range from direct attacks by the security forces against journalists to arrests, the storming and closing of offices and confiscation of equipment (cf. BN of 17.01.22)”.³⁵⁷

2021 - Omdurman

³⁵¹ Article 19, [Sudan: Military must immediately stop crackdown on Freedom of Expression and Assembly](#), 24 November 2021. See also Committee to Protect Journalists, [CPJ condemns arrest of Al-Jazeera bureau chief Al-Musalmi al-Kabbashi in Sudan](#), 15 November 2021

³⁵² Article 19, [Sudan: Military must immediately stop crackdown on Freedom of Expression and Assembly](#), 24 November 2021

³⁵³ Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese military arrests, assaults journalists covering protests](#), 18 January 2022

³⁵⁴ Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese military arrests, assaults journalists covering protests](#), 18 January 2022

³⁵⁵ International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), [Sudan: Four Alaraby TV media workers arrested](#), 14 January 2022

³⁵⁶ Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese military arrests, assaults journalists covering protests](#), 18 January 2022

³⁵⁷ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 14 February 2022, *Sudan*, p. 15

African Arguments reported that on 24th October 2021 “the former information minister reported on Facebook that military forces had stormed the state broadcaster in Omdurman and arrested employees”.³⁵⁸

2022 – Omdurman

On 12th January 2022 “military security forces arrested Chinese state-run Xinhua News Agency photographers Mohamed Khidir and Majdi Abdallah and took them to a military base in the neighboring city of Omdurman, according to the Sudanese Journalists Network, a local press freedom group, and Radio Dabanga, a local independent media outlet”, reported the Committee to Protect Journalists.³⁵⁹ According to the same source “Local freelance journalist and press freedom advocate Abdelgadir Mohamed Abdelgadir told CPJ [Committee to Protect Journalists] that both journalists have since been released; Abdelgadir alleged that they were mistreated in custody but was unable to provide further details. CPJ was unable to determine how long they were held or how they were treated in custody.”³⁶⁰

The Committee to Protect Journalists reported that in April 2022 “military intelligence officers arrested reporter Mohamed Sulaiman al-Obied and photographers Mutaz al-Naeem Adam and Mohamed al-Fatih at a checkpoint in the city of Omdurman” and further noted that as of 4th May 2022 “the journalists remained in detention [...] and authorities have not disclosed the reason for their arrests or any charges against them” and whilst being held in Soba Prison in Khartoum, “they have been denied access to their lawyers and families”.³⁶¹ According to the same source “Al-Obied, also known as Yung, works as a freelance reporter and has contributed to the BBC and the British broadcaster Channel 4”, covering protests since the October 2021 coup, whilst “Adam (also known as Ezzo) and al-Fatih (also known as Jalta) both contributed photos of the protests to local news websites”.³⁶²

General information (January 2020 – April 2022)

Without specifying the location, the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and its Sudanese network member the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) noted in November 2021 that “at least 10 civilians killed, 250 injured and 36 detained in unknown locations” following the October 2021 military coup.³⁶³ The same joint statement further noted “The Sudanese Joint Security Forces conducted arbitrary arrests of civilians, human rights defenders, activists, journalists, and

³⁵⁸ African Arguments, [“Back to the former lies”: Sudan everts to media repression post-coup](#), 16 December 2021

³⁵⁹ Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese military arrests, assaults journalists covering protests](#), 18 January 2022. See also the original reporting by the [Sudanese Journalists Network](#) [only available in Arabic] and Radio Dabanga, [News photographers detained in Sudan](#), 13 January 2022

³⁶⁰ Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese military arrests, assaults journalists covering protests](#), 18 January 2022. See also the original reporting by the [Sudanese Journalists Network](#) [only available in Arabic] and Radio Dabanga, [News photographers detained in Sudan](#), 13 January 2022

³⁶¹ Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese military holding at least 3 journalists since early April](#), 4 May 2022

³⁶² Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudanese military holding at least 3 journalists since early April](#), 4 May 2022

³⁶³ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: International community should adopt urgent measures to stop human rights violations](#), 2 November 2021

political leaders at their homes and detained them in undisclosed locations. At least 36 civilians were arrested and are still held in incommunicado detention”.³⁶⁴

Reporters Without Borders specifically highlighted the following arrests during that time:

Maha Al-Talb, a correspondent for Bloomberg and Al-Sharq, spent hours in police custody on 25 October [2021], while Fayez Al-Seleik, the newspaper El Democrati’s well-known columnist, was arrested shortly after giving an interview at Al Jazeera’s Khartoum bureau in which he criticized the coup.

El Democrati, whose editorial line was generally favourable towards the transition, has been particularly targeted by the military. On 28 October [2021], security forces raided its headquarters and went to the home of its editor, El-Haj Warrag, in order to arrest him [...]

Maher Abugoukh, the head of state TV’s news and current affairs programmes, who had voiced reservations about the military when invited on to several radio and TV programmes in early October, was arrested at his home by soldiers on 26 October [2021].³⁶⁵

Article 19 noted that since October 2021 and up to 7th March 2022, “at least 71 people have been killed in Sudan” for exercising their right to freedom of expression and assembly.³⁶⁶ The same article further noted that since October 2021, “authorities in Sudan have adopted a range of repressive actions that have denied the right to freedom of expression and assembly. This includes harassment, intimidation of protesters and citizens, and arbitrary raids on media houses”.³⁶⁷ It further reported that “The Sudan military continues its onslaught against a free and independent media through unauthorised home searches against journalists and arbitrary raids of media houses, namely Al Araby Television, Al Arabiya, Al Hadath and Al Sharq. Many media houses have had their licences cancelled, such as Al Jazeera, while at least 30 news websites have been blocked for publishing content of protests or criticisms of the military in Sudan”.³⁶⁸

Similarly, in December 2021 African Arguments reported that since the military re-instated Prime Minister Hamdok in November 2021, “repression of the press continues as before” and that “Several reporters say they remain highly cautious and self-censor due to fears of retribution. Some said they only conduct interviews behind closed doors and believe their phones might be being tracked”.³⁶⁹

REDRESS, together with the People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE), the Emergency Lawyers’ Group and the Darfur Bar Association reported in March 2022 that:

Since the 25 October 2021 coup in Sudan, members of the armed forces, police, General Intelligence Service (GIS), and other security forces have carried out scores of arrests of protestors, journalists, civilian political leaders, and other human rights defenders. Relying on an overbroad emergency order—Emergency Order No 3—issued under an unlawful state of emergency, which permits the arrest of any person who “participates in a crime related to [the state of emergency],” Sudan’s

³⁶⁴ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: International community should adopt urgent measures to stop human rights violations](#), 2 November 2021

³⁶⁵ Reporters Without Borders, [Press freedom under siege after military coup in Sudan](#), 5 November 2021

³⁶⁶ Article 19, [Sudan: UN must examine free expression crisis](#), 7 March 2022

³⁶⁷ Article 19, [Sudan: UN must examine free expression crisis](#), 7 March 2022

³⁶⁸ Article 19, [Sudan: UN must examine free expression crisis](#), 7 March 2022

³⁶⁹ African Arguments, [“Back to the former lies”: Sudan reverts to media repression post-coup](#), 16 December 2021

security forces and military continue to use detention to punish opponents of the coup and to deter others from further activism.³⁷⁰

The same briefing highlighted that these arrests “can be broadly categorised as (1) occurring before, during, or just after protests or (2) targeted arrests conducted from individuals’ places of residence, work, or from other known gathering places”.³⁷¹

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council on the situation between 25 October 2021 and 10 April 2022, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

Since the coup, the curtailing of the rights to freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly and association has severely restricted the space for private and public expression and exchange of information and ideas, also affecting the enjoyment and exercise of other rights. On 25 October 2021, the authorities imposed a blanket shutdown of mobile-based Internet and telecommunications across the country. Internet access was restored on 18 November 2021 following a court order after complaints were filed by a civil society organization and independent lawyers. The authorities, however, continued disrupting Internet services, particularly during protests. The most recent disruption was recorded on 6 January 2022.

On 25 October 2021, the radio and television broadcasting authority suspended the operation of at least eight private radio stations. Since 1 November 2021, most radio stations have resumed broadcasting, but some have raised concern at interference with their editorial independence. Newspapers that stopped publishing after the coup due to the Internet shutdown and insecurity gradually resumed printing as of 1 November 2021. On 15 January 2022, the Ministry of Culture and Information revoked the broadcasting licence of Al-Jazeera Live, claiming that its journalists were unprofessional in their coverage of events. Given the increasingly hostile environment and restrictions on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, some local organizations, including media outlets, closed their operations.³⁷²

It was further reported that “The safety of journalists, media institutions and civil society actors remains of concern. During the reporting period, at least 52 violations against journalists and media institutions were recorded, including the arbitrary arrest and detention of 23 media professionals (4 of them women), and raids on their premises”.³⁷³

2.2.10. Health care workers

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

³⁷⁰ REDRESS / People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers’ Group / Darfur Bar Association, [“Taken from Khartoum’s Streets”, Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan’s emergency laws, Legal Analysis](#), March 2022, Summary, p. 3

³⁷¹ REDRESS / People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers’ Group / Darfur Bar Association, [“Taken from Khartoum’s Streets”, Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan’s emergency laws, Legal Analysis](#), March 2022, Summary, p. 3

³⁷² UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, paras. 46 and 47

³⁷³ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, para. 48

2021 – Khartoum

The Guardian reported that in October 2021, whilst injured demonstrators were being brought to the Royal Care hospital in Khartoum, “the military asked staff to hand over the wounded [...] ‘They asked us to hand over the injured protesters. Of course we refused,’ he [Salman, a surgeon] added. ‘They used heavy weapons to terrorise us including Doshka [a nickname for the Russian-made DShK machine gun]’. ‘Patients had to hide under their beds and seats’”.³⁷⁴

2022 – Khartoum

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported in January 2022 that “Nine Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) staff members were detained by the Sudanese authorities in the capital Khartoum on the evening of 24 January [2022], before being released the following morning. At the time of their detention, our team was returning to the MSF office from the hospital where they had been working that day. The nine staff members were held overnight in a Khartoum police station and questioned about the organisation’s medical activities before being released on the morning of 25 January. They were not subjected to physical violence during their detention”.³⁷⁵

2.2.11. Lawyers

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2.2.12. Artists

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 - Khartoum

In its submissions to the UN Universal Periodic Review in March 2021, ACJPS and DefendDefenders jointly stated that in September 2020 “Sudanese authorities raided a cultural center and arrested five artists for alleged ‘nuisance’. The courts sentenced the artists to two months in prison and a fine of 5’000 Sudanese pounds. They were later released after the case was annulled by the Court of

³⁷⁴ The Guardian, [‘Patients hid under beds’: Sudan doctors refuse to hand injured protesters to soldier](#), 26 October 2021

³⁷⁵ Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), [“Unacceptable” detention of MSF medical team in Khartoum](#), 26 January 2022

Appeal”.³⁷⁶ Ayin Network reported that “Police arrested 11 individuals at the centre, tied their hands and allowed neighbourhood residents to beat them with sticks [...] Once at the police station, they were denied treatment for injuries incurred”.³⁷⁷ The same source further noted that “The ruling has triggered consternation within the Sudanese public, who consider these charges influenced by elements from the former regime”.³⁷⁸

2021 – Khartoum

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported that:

Artists are also subjected to censoring and prosecution. In March 2021 [...] a poet appeared before the Press and Publications Prosecutor in Khartoum following a complaint lodged against him by the Sovereign Council regarding a poem he read out on television. He was charged under article 159 of the Criminal Act of 1991 related to defamation offences.³⁷⁹

2022 - Khartoum

Radio Dabanga reported in February 2022 that “Lawyer Osman Basri told Radio Dabanga that 17 artists were held while painting murals near Tahrir Stadium in Khartoum North in the early hours of yesterday morning. 21 others were detained in various parts of Khartoum”.³⁸⁰

2022 – Omdurman

Ayin Network reported that in April 2022 “six young civil society activists had just finished breaking fast for the Ramadan holiday when security forces arrested them. Security forces arrested the group of youth, all civil society members with backgrounds in art, film, and media, in Omdurman along Muhandiseen Street”.³⁸¹ According to eyewitnesses, “the detainees were at first taken to Omdurman Military headquarters, where, according to sources within the facility, military personnel proceeded to shave their heads, beat, and insult them”.³⁸²

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported that:

Artists are also subjected to censoring and prosecution. In March 2021, eight artists were arrested and later released by the General Administration of Central Investigations on charges, falsely reported by a media outlet, of producing a porn film [...]

³⁷⁶ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) / DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [Submission to the United Nations Universal Period Review, 39th Session of the UPR Working Group, Sudan](#), 25 March 2021, 2. Freedom of opinion and expression, para. 2.9

³⁷⁷ Ayin Network, [Authorities arrest artists and film-maker in Khartoum](#), 18 September 2020

³⁷⁸ Ayin Network, [Authorities arrest artists and film-maker in Khartoum](#), 18 September 2020

³⁷⁹ See UN Human Rights Council, [Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 27 July 2021, para. 29

³⁸⁰ Radio Dabanga, [More than 38 activists detained yesterday, over 100 detainees on hunger strike](#), 18 February 2022

³⁸¹ Ayin Network, [Detained for nothing: military resorts to mass arbitrary arrests](#), 10 April 2022

³⁸² Ayin Network, [Detained for nothing: military resorts to mass arbitrary arrests](#), 10 April 2022

Artists, especially young women, reported to the Joint Office that they have experienced online smear campaigns aimed at discrediting them.³⁸³

In an undated press release, the Darfur Women Action Group highlighted that “In the aftermath of the October 25, 2021 coup, Sudanese forces are continuously arresting protestors who are calling for a full civilian government and an end to military rule” including “artists who were painting murals, without any formal charges”.³⁸⁴

2.2.13. Teachers

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2022 – Khartoum & Omdurman

The Ayin Network reported in April 2022 that “Sudanese authorities under military coup leader Lt.-Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is targeting the education sector by reversing independent, civilian appointments and directives in the education sector and suppressing teacher protests. Last Tuesday, authorities arrested several leaders of the Teacher’s Committee in Khartoum and other states who had helped organise the nationwide teacher protests over poor salary remunerations. According to a statement issued by the Sudanese Teacher’s Committee, a heavily armed force arrested the head of the Committee in Omdurman, Faisal Hassan Badr, and took him to an unknown location”.³⁸⁵

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

The Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Liz Throssel, reported in November 2021 that “Our Joint UN Human Rights Office in Sudan has verified the arrest of 57 people, including Government officials, political and civil society actors, human rights defenders and journalists, since 25 October [2021] [...] In addition to these arbitrary detentions, hundreds of protesters have also been arrested, including, reportedly, 87 teachers. While most are held for a short time and then released, we understand some remain detained”.³⁸⁶

Frontline Defenders reported in November 2021:

On 7 November 2021, more than 90 teachers were arrested by the Sudanese military including 48 women teachers. They were arrested after the Teachers’ Committee conducted a demonstration rejecting the coup. The arrested teachers reported the use of violence and beatings by the police and the joint forces. This resulted in one teacher having a miscarriage, while the police broke the legs of two other teachers, including Rihab Hassan. The Doctors Committee reported several injuries among teacher protesters. The teachers were released after spending 5 days in detention in inhumane

³⁸³ See UN Human Rights Council, [Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 27 July 2021, para. 29

³⁸⁴ Darfur Women Action Group, [Sudanese Authorities Must Cease the Arbitrary Detention of Activists](#), Undated [Last accessed: 01.06.2022]

³⁸⁵ Ayin Network, [Military authorities target the education sector](#), 3 April 2022

³⁸⁶ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNOHCHR), [Press briefing notes on Sudan](#), 12 November 2021

conditions. Upon their release they were forced to sign declarations stating that they would stop participating in any protests or any political activity.³⁸⁷

2.2.14.IDPs

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

2.2.15.Returnees

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

2.2.16.Women

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2021 – Khartoum

Frontline Defenders reported in November 2021: “There were 9 women protesters arrested in Khartoum and transferred to the Omdurman women’s prison. According to the emergency laws, they are to remain in prison for one week without trial and clear charges”.³⁸⁸

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

Following interviews with 39 human rights defenders and woman human rights defenders between July 2020 and June 2021, DefendDefenders noted that “Many HRDs [human rights defenders] interviewed for this research drew attention to the fact that society has not liberalised its attitudes towards women since legal reforms were announced, but that the situation had in fact deteriorated – drawing comparisons with post-revolution Egypt. The disconnect between the legal reforms and the reality on the ground, has led to criticism of the Ministry of Justice only making reforms only on paper”.³⁸⁹ The same report further noted:

The transitional authorities, including the (now dissolved) Transitional Government and the SC, faced many challenges, in a volatile political situation. Inability to bring about structural change is most noticeable in areas and sectors affected by corruption, nepotism, and abuse of power. HRDs

³⁸⁷ Frontline Defenders, [Sudanese and International organisations call for an end on attacks against Sudanese women human rights defenders and protesters](#), 19 November 2021

³⁸⁸ Frontline Defenders, [Sudanese and International organisations call for an end on attacks against Sudanese women human rights defenders and protesters](#), 19 November 2021

³⁸⁹ DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [An unfinished revolution: The situation of women human rights defenders in Sudan](#), December 2021, *Methodology* and *The Legal and Institutional Framework for HRDS and WHRDS in Sudan*, p. 14 and p. 35

interviewed for this report pointed to a lack of security sector reform, and little to no restructuring of law enforcement. Several interviewees also felt that the changes had not brought any meaningful progress or effect on the ground. This has been evidenced by recent cases of police violence against women, who are still arbitrarily arrested and accused of “prostitution” or other offences.³⁹⁰

In its submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Sudan in October-November 2021, the Sexual Rights Initiative (SRI) reported with regards to the legal and justice systems in Sudan that:

Women are also overly victimized by these systems. Women, particularly from marginalized communities, are disproportionately arrested and detained. There is little to no consideration for their hygiene and health. Sexual violence by authority figures is also rampant in detention centers and prisons, and there is a strong culture of impunity. These violations and the severity of abuse is rooted in women’s racial, social and economic status, with poor women in the informal sector being the main targets. To further exacerbate their financial conditions, they are levied with arbitrary and unreasonable fines.³⁹¹

In an undated press release, the Darfur Women Action Group highlighted that during the February 2022 ‘March of the Millions’ demonstrations “military forces detained four teenage girls who were at the demonstrations and subjected them to an enforced disappearance for three days. The lawyers for the girls stated that they were detained in an unknown location and remained under the terror of security forces”.³⁹²

2.2.17.Children

Very little specific and relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2021/2022 – Khartoum

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

Between 25 October 2021 and 10 April 2022, the Expert and the joint human rights office documented the arbitrary arrest and detention of 1,293 persons linked to the coup or protests against the coup, of whom 143 were women and 157 were children (including 2 girls). This figure does not include those held for short periods and released without charge.

³⁹⁰ DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [An unfinished revolution: The situation of women human rights defenders in Sudan](#), December 2021, *Post-Revolution Climate for WHRDS*, p. 43

³⁹¹ Sexual Rights Initiative (SRI), [Universal Periodic Review of Sudan, 39th Session, October-November 2021, Individual Submission](#), 2021, para. 8

³⁹² Darfur Women Action Group, [Sudanese Authorities Must Cease the Arbitrary Detention of Activists](#), Undated [Last accessed: 01.06.2022]

In total, the United Nations monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict verified 222 child rights violations in the context of civil unrest since the coup, including arbitrary arrest and detention of children for participation in demonstrations (157), injuries (46) and killings (15) of children and one attack on a school. In all, 97 per cent of the victims were boys (209). The joint human rights office observed that children detained in Khartoum and at the state level were held on police premises and usually detained together with adults, rather than in juvenile detention facilities under the authority of a family and child judge, in contravention of national legislation.³⁹³

In February 2022, Amnesty International issued an urgent appeal in which it stated that “Mohammed Adam (17) and Mohammed al-Fatih (18) have been arbitrarily detained by security authorities in Sudan for over a month in connection with the killing of a policeman earlier this year. There are credible concerns the youths were abducted and held without charge, in violation of their due process rights, and subjected to torture while in detention”.³⁹⁴

2.2.18. Individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity

2021 – Khartoum

Referring to the organisation Bedayaa’s shadow report for Sudan’s UN Universal Periodic Report, ILGA stated in its report: “In its shadow report for Sudan’s UN UPR third cycle in 2021, Bedayaa reported that a young man and his partner were arrested while strolling in the street near the International University of Africa, Khartoum. Police claimed they were patrolling the area after receiving reports of men having sex with one another. They were detained, had their phones searched for incriminating content, and one of the pair seems to have been sexually harassed. Both were released after one hour without charge”.³⁹⁵

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

ILGA reported in its annual report covering 2020 that:

Sudan was previously one of the countries which maintained the death penalty for same-sex sexual activity. Law No. 12 of 2020, published in the Official Gazette [in July 2020], amended several sections of Article 148 to remove execution and flogging as punishments for such actions. However, persons found guilty of “sodomy” for a second time may be liable to be imprisoned for up to 7 years and to life imprisonment upon third conviction.

Furthermore, Section 151 punishes acts of “gross indecency” with up to forty lashes and imprisonment for up to one year or a fine. Section 152 punishes acts of sexual nature that cause discomfort to public sentiment or public modesty with imprisonment of up to six months and/or a fine.³⁹⁶

The organisation however also noted that “In July 2020, the same month as the repeal of the death penalty and flogging as punishments for same-sex sexual activity, it was reported that two men were

³⁹³ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, paras. 26 and 27

³⁹⁴ Amnesty International, [Urgent Action, Teenage Protesters Detained and Tortured](#), 28 February 2022

³⁹⁵ ILGA, [Our identities under arrest, A global overview on the enforcement of laws criminalising consensual same-sex sexual acts between adults and diverse gender expressions](#), December 2021, p. 103

³⁹⁶ ILGA, [State-sponsored homophobia, Global Legislation Overview Update, 2020](#), December 2020, p. 123

sentenced to 40 lashes and a fine”.³⁹⁷ Later reporting by the same source further noted: “If unable to pay the fine, they would be sentenced to two months’ imprisonment instead”.³⁹⁸

In 2021 ILGA reported that:

In its shadow report submission in 2021 to Sudan’s Universal Periodic Review, Bedayaa—an organisation operating in the SWANA (South-West Asia and North Africa) region—noted that the legal system in Sudan does not have the safeguards required for persons illegally or arbitrarily detained to access justice, and that judges have the power to assign punishments arbitrarily. Further, laws on gender policing and same-sex behaviour have often been historically used not only against SOGIE persons, but against political opponents, such as in the case of a woman journalist known to be critical of the government who was arrested and jailed for wearing trousers in 2009.³⁹⁹

The same report further highlighted:

Negative social attitudes against sexual and gender diversity also play a large role in the enforcement of criminalising procedures in Sudan, or other forms of extrajudicial violence [...]

as a largely tribal and family-oriented country, many cases fall outside of the scope of State enforcement and thus also may go undocumented.⁴⁰⁰

The original report by Bedayaa as part of the Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC) further stated:

The situation of the LGBTQI+ persons in Sudan still did not progress and remains dire. It compounds multiple factors that also correspond to the overall concerns, such as failure to reform security forces; lack of protection against non-discrimination; and de-prioritization of progressive legal reform. Abuses against members of the community continue, whether by third parties or state actors.⁴⁰¹

In conversation with the Co-Executive Directors Sonja Miley and Maddy Crowther from the NGO Waging Peace, Maddy Crowther stated:

And I think there’s a kind of-- most of the people that we know who would describe themselves or be known as LGBTQI are in that kind of artist community. So I think attacks on the artist community can sometimes be coded in ways that are probably quite interesting. But yeah, we haven’t heard of some sort of specific-- there was a legal case brought against someone for being gay recently, but I think, again, it’s one of those-- it appears in ways you might not initially expect.⁴⁰²

2.2.19. General situation regarding arbitrary arrest and detention [not profile specific]

Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

³⁹⁷ ILGA, [State-sponsored homophobia, Global Legislation Overview Update, 2020](#), December 2020, p. 123

³⁹⁸ ILGA, [Our identities under arrest, A global overview on the enforcement of laws criminalising consensual same-sex sexual acts between adults and diverse gender expressions](#), December 2021, p. 103

³⁹⁹ ILGA, [Our identities under arrest, A global overview on the enforcement of laws criminalising consensual same-sex sexual acts between adults and diverse gender expressions](#), December 2021, p. 102

⁴⁰⁰ ILGA, [Our identities under arrest, A global overview on the enforcement of laws criminalising consensual same-sex sexual acts between adults and diverse gender expressions](#), December 2021, p. 102/103

⁴⁰¹ Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC), [Shadow report for the third Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Sudan, Human rights violations based on SOGIESC in Sudan](#), 2021, p. 2

⁴⁰² Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace). See [Annex D.2](#) further below for transcription notes.

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

In July 2020 the Sudanese army:

issued a statement saying they had appointed a special commissioner to bring lawsuits against individuals who “insult” the army, including activists and journalists, both in and outside of Sudan, who write online.

The army spokesperson invoked the troublesome Cybercrimes Act, an overly broad law introduced in 2007 that has been used by the former regime to target online critics. The act criminalizes the vague concept of the “spread of false news” and publication of “indecent materials.” Recent amendments did not correct the law’s problematic provisions, but instead increased prison sentences.

The army also threatened to use the Publication and Newspapers Act and “crimes against the state” provisions in the Criminal Act of 1991. Both were often used by the former regime to harass real or perceived opponents.⁴⁰³

REDRESS, together with the People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE), the Emergency Lawyers’ Group and the Darfur Bar Association reported in March 2022 that:

Since the 25 October 2021 coup in Sudan, members of the armed forces, police, General Intelligence Service (GIS), and other security forces have carried out scores of arrests of protestors, journalists, civilian political leaders, and other human rights defenders [...]

The total number of individuals arrested and detained under emergency authorities across Sudan is unknown. In early March 2022, the Joint Human Rights Office in Khartoum reported that more than 1,000 people were arrested between 25 October 2021 and 3 March 2022, including nearly 150 children. However, the real figures are likely higher, because varying periods of detention, an absence of centralized recordkeeping (in addition to the widespread practice of state denial of detentions), and a fear of reprisals frustrate efforts to arrive at a complete picture of the problem. At the time of writing, arrests and detentions are ongoing.⁴⁰⁴

The same briefing found that “The period of detention in these cases varies widely, from several hours to several days, though some individuals have been detained for several weeks following protests”.⁴⁰⁵ It further noted: “None of the individuals we spoke to were allowed access to a lawyer, and only some were permitted to contact their families. Some of these detentions may constitute enforced disappearances, in cases where individuals are held incommunicado in unknown detention centres”.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰³ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan’s Army Threatens Activists, Journalists with Lawsuits](#), 24 July 2020

⁴⁰⁴ REDRESS / People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers’ Group / Darfur Bar Association, [“Taken from Khartoum’s Streets”, Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan’s emergency laws, Legal Analysis](#), March 2022, *Summary*, p. 3 and *Background*, p. 6

⁴⁰⁵ REDRESS / People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers’ Group / Darfur Bar Association, [“Taken from Khartoum’s Streets”, Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan’s emergency laws, Legal Analysis](#), March 2022, *Campaign of arrests since January 2022*, p. 12

⁴⁰⁶ REDRESS / People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers’ Group / Darfur Bar Association, [“Taken from Khartoum’s Streets”, Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan’s emergency laws, Legal Analysis](#), March 2022, *Campaign of arrests since January 2022*, p. 12/13

The organisations highlighted also that “Since the restoration of GIS’s [General Intelligence Service] full powers of search and arrest at the end of December 2021, the pace of arrests has demonstrably increased”.⁴⁰⁷

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported about the targeting of members of the Dismantle and Anti-Corruption Committee of 30 June 1989 regime, who were arbitrarily arrested and detained in February 2022:

On 9 February 2022, the office of attorney general in Khartoum North issued arrest warrant against 18 members of the Committee. They were detained and charged under article 177 (2) (criminal breach of trust) of the Sudanese Criminal Act 1991, and have been held incommunicado to date at Suba prison. A police officer attached to the committee who has been held in custody since October 2021 was also charged with the same. The committee was tasked with dismantling the structures of the former regime before its dismissal by the authorities after the coup. The lack of access for lawyers and family members to the detainees.⁴⁰⁸

BBC News reported in February 2022 about the recent arrest of Amira Osman, human rights activist and member of the Sudanese Communist Party by the “General Intelligence Service (GIS) formerly known as the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS)” who have “once again [since December 2021]” been allowed to arrest individuals “without informing their families, or lawyers, of their whereabouts”.⁴⁰⁹ According to the same source:

activists believe that 70 people have been taken by the GIS and neither their families nor their lawyers know where they are.

The GIS was renamed after Bashir's removal. Along with the new name, its powers of arrest were curtailed [...]

A former member of Sudan's human rights commission, lawyer Samier Ali Maceen, fears the reinstatement of the powers of the GIS "represents a huge set-back for human rights and basic liberties" after the October coup.

It is yet another sign that things are going back to how they used to be, before Bashir's overthrow led to a belief that a different Sudan was possible.⁴¹⁰

In conversation with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan, ARC's Director was told in May 2022:

In general, there have been consistent reports of ill-treatment and sometimes degrading treatment at the time of arrest and in detention. It is usually the police who carry out arrests during or after protests. People have also been arrested before protests from their homes by officials in plain clothes they believe work for the intelligence service. Journalists reported that their equipment was confiscated or damaged. Phones and other property is often taken and not returned. An emergency order issued on 24 December 2021 extended the law enforcement powers of the security forces, including the intelligence services, and provided them temporary immunity from prosecution. Most persons arrested in connection with protests have been arrested under this emergency legislation.

⁴⁰⁷ REDRESS / People's Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers' Group / Darfur Bar Association, *“Taken from Khartoum's Streets”, Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan's emergency laws, Legal Analysis*, March 2022, *Campaign of arrests since January 2022*, p. 11

⁴⁰⁸ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), *Sudan Coup Update: 18 members of the dismantle and anti-corruption committee detained incommunicado, rape allegations and other violations*, 23 March 2022

⁴⁰⁹ Zeinab Mohammed Salih (BBC News), *Sudan's feared secret police make a comeback*, 5 February 2022

⁴¹⁰ Zeinab Mohammed Salih (BBC News), *Sudan's feared secret police make a comeback*, 5 February 2022

Although the state of emergency was lifted on 29 May [2022], this order appears to remain in force.⁴¹¹

The same source further noted with regards to the administration of justice:

While almost all persons arrested for political reasons since the coup have been released. What often happens, however, is that they are released on bail, ie the charges against them remain, which means that they can technically be summoned back to court at any time. This could be seen as a kind of intimidation aimed at discouraging people from resuming their political activity or their participation in protests.⁴¹²

Speaking to an activist who recently returned from a visit to Khartoum, Waging Peace reported in June 2022:

We were told by an activist who recently visited Khartoum, returning 19 June 2022, that “there is no government to take care or responsibility of anyone or anything, no security in Khartoum or elsewhere in the country, the rapid response forces and several armed groups from those who signed Juba agreement and other unknown forces are all roaming the capital on 4W pick up trucks robbing Sudanese citizens during the day of their simplest and modest properties. // God knows what happens at night because I was warned not to dare leave our house after 6pm on my own. // People get stopped, searched and arrested for no reason whatsoever and then go missing... and no one cares to ask or say anything because they will be next in line if they dared”.⁴¹³

2.3. Prison conditions and treatment of detainees

2.3.1. Black African people (including Darfuri and Nuba)

It is recommended to consult the information included under [2.1.1. Black African people \(including Darfuri and Nuba\)](#) under section 2. *Acts of violence*, and particularly sub-heading *Racism and hate speech in Sudan* for useful contextual information.

Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 - Khartoum

Al Jazeera’s political cartoonist, Khalid Albaih, reported in August 202 that as “General Shams al-Din al-Kabashi emerged from a house in Omdurman, protesters ambushed him with anti-military chants. Al-Kabashi, who is a member of the ruling sovereign council dominated by the military, had supposedly just had an hours-long meeting with supporters of deposed President Omar al-Bashir. While the protesters’ anger was understandable, given that the military leadership continues to resist dismantling al-Bashir’s regime, some of them went beyond political chants and started shouting racial slurs at the general, who is darker-skinned and hails from the Nuba Mountains region, an area in the southern part of Sudan where most communities are of African descent”.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹¹ Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes

⁴¹² Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes

⁴¹³ Waging Peace, [Country situation in Sudan](#), June 2022, *Post-25 October 2021 military coup, Security situation*, para. 44

⁴¹⁴ Khalid Albaih (Al Jazeera), [Do Black lives matter in Sudan?](#), 13 August 2020

In an interview with Cedoca in February 2021, the Documentation and Research Department of the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, Bushra Gamar, Director of the NGO Hudo recalled the death of an African man from Nuba in December 2020:

The government – police – usually criminalizing them without any crime. [...] and they are treated harsh. I have one example of last December – African man from Nuba was killed by police in Atbara while implementing arrest of him, other one died in Khartoum on the same month after having been interrogated under torture by police.⁴¹⁵

He further added:

The mentality of the government and the ruling groups has not changed since they are the same group with the same mindset as before the revolution. The dominant mentality in Sudan culture is discriminative and racist in favour of Arab ethnicity, so to be changed it needs generations time. In Khartoum there is a kind of slight change, it is done because the international community is looking at Khartoum and the ruling group needs to furbish their reputation. But when we talk about the African groups in Khartoum, it is still the same. However, the military component within the transitional government is al-Bashir's security committee, everything is there, if we talk about NISS, it is still there. Adding to that, now we have RSF in to Khartoum holding official and political roles within the government. Recently, you may not hear about arrests anymore, except here and there, such as the activist that has been killed by torture under RSF arrest. But there are many disappearances. Disappearances are rising in Khartoum. [...] Because people are poor, illiterate and do not know their rights, they fear the police – the people in the black belt do not dare to report disappearances and we do not know the actual number of disappearances.⁴¹⁶

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

Salma Abdalla, a PhD researcher at the Noorse University, interviewed by Cedoca in March 2021, the Documentation and Research Department of the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, noted:

Recruitment of security service personnel ensures to employ those [whjo] identify as Arabs or sympathize with the agenda of the ruling party. Members of security services are indoctrinated to identify and repress potential threats [against] the state including rebel and armed groups from Darfur South Kordofan or Blue Nile. [...] During interrogations by security service or police, it is very common that the first question the detainee is usually asked is to identify their tribe. This question is used by security personnel to assess, detect and single out potential threats [against] the state. Those who identify as non-Arabs from Darfur, South Kordofan or Blue Nile are met with suspicion and often accused of belonging to rebel armed groups, which makes them vulnerable to torture and sever punishment. If the security service officer identifies the detainee to be Arab, their chances to survive torture and punishment is much higher than a non-Arab detainee in the same room. Family name, birthplace or mastering the northern dialect are tools to profile them ethnically.⁴¹⁷

2.3.2. Christians

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

⁴¹⁵ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.4.2. De huidige situatie

⁴¹⁶ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.4.2. De huidige situatie

⁴¹⁷ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.4.2. De huidige situatie

2.3.3. Students

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

2.3.4. Political activists

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant sub-section of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

Further information about one of the actors involved in the “violent crackdown on protesters” since the 25 October 2021 coup, the Central Reserve Police (CRP), is provided in a March 2022 briefing by REDRESS.⁴¹⁸ According to the source, “the CRP is a militarised police unit falling under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. In practice, the CRP, under the command of General Al-Shami Abdallah Mohamed Abdoun, reports directly to General Intelligence Service (GIS) leadership, in a continuation of Bashir-era practices”.⁴¹⁹ The briefing further highlighted that the “CRP forces have also played a role in the ongoing campaign of arbitrary arrests and detentions across Sudan, which has involved the custodial torture and ill-treatment of hundreds of protestors, activists, and human rights defenders”.⁴²⁰

In April 2022 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights noted its concern “by credible reports of numerous cases of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of political and other detainees, of whom there are reportedly at least 400 languishing in detention facilities in Sudan”.⁴²¹

In an undated press release, the Darfur Women Action Group expressed its “grave concern over Sudanese authorities arbitrarily detaining around 200 people in Soba prison, many of whom are activists, and the subsequent violence aimed at protestors calling for their release. In the aftermath of the October 25, 2021 coup, Sudanese forces are continuously arresting protestors who are calling for a full civilian government and an end to military rule. Sudanese forces are arbitrarily detaining many of these protestors in the overcrowded Soba prison, with reports stating that the detained account for more than 200”.⁴²² The same source further highlighted that “The detainees are not

⁴¹⁸ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

⁴¹⁹ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

⁴²⁰ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

⁴²¹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [516 Resolution on the worsening human rights situation in Sudan following the October 25 coup d’etat – ACHPR/Res.516 \[LXX\]](#), 4 April 2022

⁴²² Darfur Women Action Group, [Sudanese Authorities Must Cease the Arbitrary Detention of Activists](#), Undated [Last accessed: 01.06.2022]

allowed to see their families or lawyers and are denied medical care. It's reported that due to these conditions, over 100 detainees went on a hunger strike in Soba prison".⁴²³

2.3.5. (Perceived) political opposition/association with opposition groups, participating in demonstrations/protests, involvement in political groups including student unions

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 – Khartoum

With special reference to COVID-19 in prison, the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) noted in July 2020:

The fear of covid19 contamination also concerned almost 50 former leaders of the National Congress Party (NCP) who remain in Kober prison in Khartoum Bahari in prisons. They are detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells. with the exception of the former president Omar al-Bashir and his former vice president Ali Osman Taha, who were transferred to a private hospital for medical treatment, the others have remained in detention and some of them were tested positive of covid-19.⁴²⁴

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported that:

In December 2020, an active male member of one of the resistance committees in Khartoum was found dead. His body reportedly showed signs of illtreatment that could amount to torture. The authorities confirmed that his death was a result of an interrogation at one of the Rapid Support Forces detention centres.⁴²⁵

2021 – Khartoum

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported that:

On 25 May 2021, the body of a member of one of the resistance committees was found in the morgue of Al Tamayuz hospital in Khartoum, which, according to the resistance committee of Aljiraif Shariq, showed signs of torture. Reportedly, the 25-year-old man, was last seen on 3 April 2021 when he,

⁴²³ Darfur Women Action Group, [Sudanese Authorities Must Cease the Arbitrary Detention of Activists](#), Undated [Last accessed: 01.06.2022]

⁴²⁴ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Briefing paper, \(Post\)-COVID19 era in Sudan: The urgency to unravel the torture and inhuman treatments system one year after the Transition](#), July 2021, 4. *The Sudanese's penitentiary system: a dying house?*, p. 9/10

⁴²⁵ See UN Human Rights Council, [Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 27 July 2021, para. 28

along with members of other resistance committees, took part in a gathering organized in front of the Army General Command in Khartoum.⁴²⁶

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

In April 2022 the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights noted its concern "by credible reports of numerous cases of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of political and other detainees, of whom there are reportedly at least 400 languishing in detention facilities in Sudan".⁴²⁷

Following the interview with a member of a central Khartoum resistance committee, The Guardian reported in May 2022:

"I was held for six weeks and was never charged, saw no lawyer, could not call my family. When I went on hunger strike to complain I was put in a small cell called the fridge, where an air conditioner was kept on maximum and lights on all day and night," said "Rasta", a member of a central Khartoum resistance committee.

Others report chronic overcrowding, brutal beatings, sleep deprivation, repeated humiliation and denial of medical treatment. Age or infirmity makes little difference.⁴²⁸

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council on the situation between 25 October 2021 and 10 April 2022, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

According to witness statements and physical evidence, persons who were arrested were routinely and severely beaten with water hose pipes, sticks, wooden bars and batons, and kicked by members of the security forces wearing boots, including when already restrained. In two separate instances, on 7 November 2021 and 14 March 2022, persons participating in peaceful protests organized by professional teachers' organizations were subjected to severe beatings and other forms of inhuman treatment before being detained in poor conditions in Nyala, South Darfur, and in Khartoum. As a result of the ill-treatment, one woman arrested in Khartoum suffered a miscarriage and another's leg was broken. In February 2022, in three cases documented in Khartoum, protesters were severely beaten and stripped naked.

Many reports were received of joint security forces in Khartoum and White Nile States and in Port Sudan humiliating persons who had been arrested by forcefully shaving their heads, either on the street or near detention facilities [...]

Signs of torture and ill-treatment following arrest were documented in two cases in which the victims were accused of having committed crimes during protests, such as attacks against police and police property. The torture and ill-treatment were reportedly inflicted by security officers in civilian clothes during the first two days of interrogation. One detainee was reportedly made to sign a confession under threat of physical violence. Instances in which detainees were shackled, including while in solitary confinement and for a period exceeding 15 consecutive days, were also documented.

Four cases of enforced disappearance were documented.⁴²⁹

2.3.6. Persons who have participated in protests (inside or outside of Sudan)

⁴²⁶ See UN Human Rights Council, [Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 27 July 2021, para. 27

⁴²⁷ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [516 Resolution on the worsening human rights situation in Sudan following the October 25 coup d'état – ACHPR/Res.516 \[LXX\]](#), 4 April 2022

⁴²⁸ The Guardian, ['Our friends didn't die in vain': Sudan's activists aim to topple military regime](#), 28 May 2022

⁴²⁹ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, paras. 33, 34, 35 and 36

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant sub-section of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

Further information about one of the actors involved in the “violent crackdown on protesters” since the 25 October 2021 coup, the Central Reserve Police (CRP), is provided in a March 2022 briefing by REDRESS.⁴³⁰ According to the source, “the CRP is a militarised police unit falling under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. In practice, the CRP, under the command of General Al-Shami Abdallah Mohamed Abdoun, reports directly to General Intelligence Service (GIS) leadership, in a continuation of Bashir-era practices”.⁴³¹ The briefing further highlighted that the “CRP forces have also played a role in the ongoing campaign of arbitrary arrests and detentions across Sudan, which has involved the custodial torture and ill-treatment of hundreds of protestors, activists, and human rights defenders”.⁴³²

Human Rights Watch reported in April 2022 that:

Sudan’s security forces have unlawfully detained hundreds of protesters since December 2021 and forcibly disappeared scores as part of its broader clampdown on opposition to the October 25 [2021] military coup [...]

Security forces have beaten and otherwise ill-treated detained protesters, including stripping child detainees naked and threatening sexual violence against women.⁴³³

The same source further found:

The security forces generally detain protesters in police facilities or undisclosed locations before transferring them to prison but without bringing them before a court or a prosecutor, Human Rights Watch found.

Four detainees held for between two and four weeks in Soba and Omdurman prisons in January and February [2022] said they were denied family visits and access to lawyers. Two lawyers working on detainee cases said that authorities with oversight responsibilities for detention, including the office of the attorney-general, often deny knowledge of people detained, or send families to other institutions for information.⁴³⁴

The same report also highlighted instances of beatings and sexual violence:

Police, including anti-riot police and Central Reserve Police (CRP), as well as plainclothes officials and other military units, have badly abused protesters when detaining them at demonstrations, including beating and kicking them, and on at least some occasions, committing sexual violence.⁴³⁵

2.3.7. Persons who have shown or are perceived to have shown opposition

⁴³⁰ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

⁴³¹ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

⁴³² REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

⁴³³ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated](#), 28 April 2022

⁴³⁴ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated](#), 28 April 2022

⁴³⁵ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated](#), 28 April 2022

Very limited relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

General information (January 2020 – April 2022)

Serious concerns have been raised by Waging Peace in their most recent ‘Country situation in Sudan’ report of June 2022:

it is also important to note that some of the most immediate repression was targeted at those who had precoup been tasked with investigating illicit financial holdings by the military, such as the Committee for Dismantling the June 30 1989 Regime, Removal of Empowerment and Corruption, and Recovering Public Funds (Dismantlement and Empowerment Removal Committee, DERC) or *tamkeen* committee, which was formally suspended and its members targeted. For instance, Wagdi Salih, a lawyer and prominent member of the DERC, and El Tayeb Osman, the DERC’s rapporteur were arrested on 9 February 2022; Mohamed alFaki, co-chair of the DERC and former Sovereignty Council member was arrested on 13 February 2022; and Taha Osman Ishag, another lawyer and prominent member of the DERC, was arrested on 19 February 2022. These 5 leaders and 15 other members of the DERC were being held incommunicado. Lawsuits are being prepared against them under Section 177(2) of the Sudanese Criminal Act 1991 handling criminal breaches of trust by public servants, the punishment of which can involve the death sentence. On 27 April 2022, 11 prominent members of the DERC were released on bail, following a legal drama after the authorities initially refused to release them even after having the decision of a Sudanese judge to do so. The continued detention for nearly 9 months without trial of one member is alleged to be an attempt to get him to waive corruption lawsuits he has filed against former regime leaders.⁴³⁶

2.3.8. Human rights activists

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 – Khartoum

In August 2020 “woman human rights defender Hala Khalid Abugroun was detained for several hours at Khartoum Central Police Station after attempting to report human rights abuses carried out by NISS officers against protestors during a peaceful protest in the capital. She was interrogated for several hours and reported being subject to severe physical abuse, which may amount to torture, by police and security officers” reported Frontline Defenders.⁴³⁷

⁴³⁶ Waging Peace, [Country situation in Sudan](#), June 2022, *Post-25 October 2021 military coup, Security situation*, para. 47

⁴³⁷ Frontline Defenders, [Arbitrary detention of woman human rights defender Hala Khalid Abugroun](#), 26 August 2020

2021 – Khartoum

According to a report by Frontline Defenders:

On 20 May 2021, Hafiz Haron was subjected to a robbery attempt and found a thief in his house in Al-Khartoum Bahri. The human rights defender attempted to submit a complaint at the local police station, and asked the police to detain the thief. The police refused to log the human rights defender's complaint and after Hafiz Haron insisted, the police detained him for approximately 12 hours. During this time, the human rights defender told Front Line Defenders that he was subjected to verbal and physical abuse. Hafiz Haron was later released on condition that he presented himself at the police station a few days later. Following his release, the human rights defender was hospitalised as a result of the physical abuse he was subjected to during his detention. He had pains in his neck and ear but no severe injuries.

On 23 May 2021, Hafiz Haron went to the administrative police station to submit a complaint against the police who arrested him on 20 May. The police officers asked him to withdraw the complaint. When the human rights defender refused he was arrested again for approximately six hours and was released on bail. On the same day he was charged with several offences including 'threatening the police', 'hindering the police' and 'public annoyance'. However, the human rights defender reported that he is facing another charge, which the police did not disclose to him.⁴³⁸

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported in June 2021 that "Sudanese authorities should urgently investigate the reported abduction, torture, and extra-judicial killing of Mr. Mohamed Ismail Abaker, popularly known as 'Wad Akair', a youth activist and a member of a resistance committee in Al-Jeraif Sharq neighborhood in Khartoum", who was "participating in a sit-in in front of Altamayouz hospital" to protest "the decomposition of bodies at the hospital mortuary".⁴³⁹

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

Further information about one of the actors involved in the "violent crackdown on protesters" since the 25 October 2021 coup, the Central Reserve Police (CRP), is provided in a March 2022 briefing by REDRESS.⁴⁴⁰ According to the source, "the CRP is a militarised police unit falling under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. In practice, the CRP, under the command of General Al-Shami Abdallah Mohamed Abdoun, reports directly to General Intelligence Service (GIS) leadership, in a continuation of Bashir-era practices".⁴⁴¹ The briefing further highlighted that the "CRP forces have also played a role in the ongoing campaign of arbitrary arrests and detentions across Sudan, which has involved the custodial torture and ill-treatment of hundreds of protestors, activists, and human rights defenders".⁴⁴²

In February 2022 "In the course of the visit of the UN expert on human rights Adama Dieng from 20.02.22 to 24.02.22, the military government progressively released 115 activists from detention from 20.02.22 onwards. They had previously been arrested during demonstrations or raids and detained without any official charge or legal process for sometimes several weeks [...] The release of

⁴³⁸ Frontline Defenders, [Hafiz Haron fined and released](#), 10 August 2021

⁴³⁹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Urgent call to investigate the enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killing of Mr. Wad Akair in Khartoum](#), 2 June 2021

⁴⁴⁰ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

⁴⁴¹ REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

⁴⁴² REDRESS, [Sudan: Central Reserve Police, Briefing](#), March 2022, para. 2

the 115 people by the military government had been criticised by opposition lawyers' associations as a cover-up".⁴⁴³

2.3.9. Journalists

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2021 – Khartoum

Covering the period 25 October to 23 November 2021, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported that "In Khartoum, a journalist was blind folded, taken to unknown location and threatened verbally against participating in anti coup events. Similar tactics were used during crackdowns on the 2018-2019 revolution."⁴⁴⁴

2.3.10. Health care workers

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2.3.11. Lawyers

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2.3.12. Artists

⁴⁴³ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 28 February 2022, *Sudan*, p. 12/13

⁴⁴⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan Coup update: killing and continued arbitrary and incommunicado detention of peaceful protestors and obstruction of media coverage of protests](#), 25 November 2021

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant sub-section of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2.3.13. Teachers

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant sub-section of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2.3.14. IDPs

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

2.3.15. Returnees

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

Salma Abdalla, a PhD researcher at the Noorse University, interviewed by Cedoca in March and April 2021, the Documentation and Research Department of the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, noted:

The composition, practices and mentality of the security forces continue as it used to be during the former regime, and they are still far from understanding basic principles of human rights. [...] Sudanese nationals (failed asylum seekers or others) who are being forcibly or voluntarily returned to Sudan through Khartoum International Airport fate should be a source of serious concern. [...] [Failed] asylum seekers, particularly from Darfur and Nuba mountains, are at risk of maltreatment and being discriminated against by security personnel. [...] [The] security service has always been a bigoted entity against the people of Darfur and Nuba mountains. The reforms of the security forces have not been implemented and the discrimination against people from marginalized groups continues to be practiced. Maltreatment by the security forces ranges from harassment, assault, interrogation to torture in detention. There are numerous reports about individuals being killed during ‘investigations’ in the detention by the security service.⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴⁵ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomststregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.3. *Behandeling bij terugkeer*

2.3.16. Women

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 – Khartoum & Omdurman

An investigation carried out by the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA Network) to Omdurman Prison, Dar Al-Teebat, documented “the severe conditions women detainees and prisons are subjected to”:

- Biased enforcement: Women, particularly those from poor and marginalized communities, are disproportionately targeted for arrest under the Public Order Regime (POR) and Sudan Criminal Act.
- Rampant sexual violence: In detention centers and even in prison, sexual violence perpetrated by police, soldiers, and others in authority is rampant and is met with impunity.
- Differential treatment: Human rights violations are normalized within detention centers and prisons in Khartoum and severity of abuse appears to be rooted in racial, social, and economic status.
- Targeting invisible labor: Women who work in the informal sector tend to be targeted for arrest under the POR.
- Economic exploitation and corruption: Fines and bribes levied by POR police and judges constitute a significant source of income and enable the POR to control and oppress poor people.⁴⁴⁶

2022 – Omdurman

Serious concerns have been raised by Waging Peace in their most recent ‘Country situation in Sudan’ report of June 2022:

there is the return of Bashir-era repressive laws based on Islamist doctrine [...]

In a ‘Gender Alert’ report issued by the SIHA Network on 9 June 2022 they mention that Omdurman women’s prison is filled, with their estimates at 1,000 women detainees including those from marginalised backgrounds, in a facility designed to accommodate half that many. They say women are being targeted for charges that are gender-biased, for instance allegations of producing local alcohol, undertaking sex work, or failures of morality and dress that hark back to the Bashir-era Public Order Laws, further indicating that being forced into the informal economy is a risk factor.⁴⁴⁷

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

In its submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Sudan in October-November 2021, the Sexual Rights Initiative (SRI) reported with regards to the legal and justice systems in Sudan that:

Women are also overly victimized by these systems. Women, particularly from marginalized communities, are disproportionately arrested and detained. There is little to no consideration for their hygiene and health. Sexual violence by authority figures is also rampant in detention centers and prisons, and there is a strong culture of impunity. These violations and the severity of abuse is rooted in women’s racial, social and economic status, with poor women in the informal sector being the main

⁴⁴⁶ Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA), [Human Rights Conditions of Female Detainees and Prisoners in Sudan](#), 13 March 2020, p. 1

⁴⁴⁷ Waging Peace, [Country situation in Sudan](#), June 2022, *Post-25 October 2021 military coup, Security situation*, para. 45

targets. To further exacerbate their financial conditions, they are levied with arbitrary and unreasonable fines.⁴⁴⁸

Human Rights Watch reported in April 2022 that:

Sudan's security forces have unlawfully detained hundreds of protesters since December 2021 and forcibly disappeared scores as part of its broader clampdown on opposition to the October 25 [2021] military coup [...]

Security forces have beaten and otherwise ill-treated detained protesters, including stripping child detainees naked and threatening sexual violence against women.⁴⁴⁹

2.3.17. Children

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

In February 2022, Amnesty International issued an urgent appeal in which it stated that "Mohammed Adam (17) and Mohammed al-Fatih (18) have been arbitrarily detained by security authorities in Sudan for over a month in connection with the killing of a policeman earlier this year. There are credible concerns the youths were abducted and held without charge, in violation of their due process rights, and subjected to torture while in detention [...] One of the friends who was detained with him reported seeing Mohammed Adam being beaten on his injured leg, and his mother reports that she saw that two nails had been hammered into his legs, which had also been beaten, leaving him unable to walk".⁴⁵⁰

Human Rights Watch reported in April 2022 that:

Sudan's security forces have unlawfully detained hundreds of protesters since December 2021 and forcibly disappeared scores as part of its broader clampdown on opposition to the October 25 [2021] military coup [...]

Security forces have beaten and otherwise ill-treated detained protesters, including stripping child detainees naked and threatening sexual violence against women.⁴⁵¹

The same source further noted in its report focusing on the arrests since the October 2021 coup:

Children who took part in the protests have not been spared ill-treatment or arbitrary detention.

The parents of four detained boys said that the police did not inform them of their children's whereabouts.

The mother of Mohamed Adam, the 17-year-old detained on January 17 in connection with the killing of a police commander, was only allowed to visit him on February 8. A lawyer accompanying her said Adam described being tortured and that he could see marks consistent with torture and ill-treatment on Adam's body: "He said to us he was tortured by hammering nails into his leg, police beating his injured leg, and he was tied and held upside down.... I also saw cigarette burns on his skin." [...]

On February 24 [2022], police detained a 16-year-old boy in Omdurman alongside two other children while dispersing a protest. The boy's mother said that her son had described being detained by a mix

⁴⁴⁸ Sexual Rights Initiative (SRI), [Universal Periodic Review of Sudan, 39th Session, October-November 2021, Individual Submission](#), 2021, para. 8

⁴⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated](#), 28 April 2022

⁴⁵⁰ Amnesty International, [Urgent Action, Teenage Protesters Detained and Tortured](#), 28 February 2022

⁴⁵¹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated](#), 28 April 2022

of security forces, including CRP, regular police, anti-riot police, SAF, and other men in civilian clothes, who had beaten the boys with fists, gun butts, and batons, and that some members of the force cut the boys clothes off with a knife, stripping them naked.

His mother found him and the other two children at the Omdurman central police station that evening. She said they had marks from the beatings and were wearing oversized jallabiyas [a traditional item of clothing that runs from the neck to the ankle] and were almost naked underneath. “When I complained about this abusive treatment, a police officer there told me: ‘Well, they didn’t arrest your son from his house for doing nothing, he was protesting.’”⁴⁵²

2.3.18. Individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

2.3.19. General situation regarding prison conditions and treatment in prison [not profile specific]

2020 - Khartoum

Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) “acting without lawful authority, arbitrarily detained dozens of civilians, including political activists, in the capital, Khartoum during 2020 [...] The detainees were held incommunicado or in circumstances constituting enforced disappearances”.⁴⁵³ HRW “interviewed four former detainees, two family members, and a lawyer in cases in which the RSF had unlawfully held civilians. The former detainees said that the security forces held them incommunicado and denied them access to lawyers and their families throughout their detention, which ranged from a week to over a month. Two detainees said RSF guards physically ill-treated them”.⁴⁵⁴

Regarding the death in RSF custody of 45-year-old Baha al-Din Nouri [also known as ‘Bahaa el-Din] in Khartoum in December 2020 following his abduction by armed men in civilian clothes in southern Khartoum, family members told HRW that they had seen “visible bruises” on his body and a second autopsy documented “injuries, including brain haemorrhage caused by impact with a blunt object, that are consistent with beatings and that led to Baha al-Din Nouri’s death”.⁴⁵⁵ The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies noted that “Bahaa el-Din’s death is likely the result of torture following his disappearance and detention for five days by members of the Rapid Support Forces”.⁴⁵⁶ In its annual human rights report covering 2021, the U.S. Department of State noted that “The December 2020

⁴⁵² Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated](#), 28 April 2022

⁴⁵³ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Unlawful Detentions by Rapid Support Forces](#), 1 March 2021

⁴⁵⁴ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Unlawful Detentions by Rapid Support Forces](#), 1 March 2021

⁴⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Unlawful Detentions by Rapid Support Forces](#), 1 March 2021. For more information about this particular incident see African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: Urgent call for an investigation into the disappearance and custodial death of Mr. Baha Eldeen Nory Mohamed Ali](#), 30 December 2020

⁴⁵⁶ Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, [New Aspects of Human Rights Crises during the COVID-19 Pandemic, A brief reading of human rights trends in the Arab region](#), 24 March 2021, Sudan

case of Bahaa el-Din Nouri remained pending at year's end [2021]. He was detained by the RSF in Khartoum. His body was found in a morgue five days later showing signs of torture".⁴⁵⁷

In its annual human rights report covering 2020, the U.S. Department of State noted that "Overall conditions, including food and sanitation, were reportedly better in women's detention facilities and prisons, such as the Federal Prison for Women in Omdurman, than at equivalent facilities for men, such as the main prison in Khartoum or the Kober or Omdurman Prisons. In Khartoum juveniles were not held in adult prisons or jails, but they were reportedly held with adults at other prisons".⁴⁵⁸

2021 - Khartoum

In its annual human rights report covering 2021, the U.S. Department of State noted that "Overall conditions, including food and sanitation, were reportedly better in women's detention facilities and prisons, such as the Federal Prison for Women in Omdurman, than at equivalent facilities for men, such as the main prison in Khartoum or the Kober or Omdurman Prisons. In Khartoum juveniles were not held in adult prisons or jails, but they were reportedly held with adults at other prisons".⁴⁵⁹

2022 – Khartoum

Covering the period 1 February to 14 March 2022, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported that in Khartoum "police officers subjected detainees to beating and hair shaving".⁴⁶⁰

Radio Dabanga reported in February 2022 that "More than one hundred detainees in Soba prison continued their hunger strike for the fourth day yesterday. Many other vocal opponents of the military government that took power in the October 25 coup are still missing. Those recently arrested and detained have often been unlawfully detained with no charges brought forwards to start a trial. The detainees are prevented from seeing their families and lawyers and have also been refused medical care by doctors".⁴⁶¹

2020 – Omdurman

In its annual human rights report covering 2020, the U.S. Department of State noted that "Overall conditions, including food and sanitation, were reportedly better in women's detention facilities and prisons, such as the Federal Prison for Women in Omdurman, than at equivalent facilities for men, such as the main prison in Khartoum or the Kober or Omdurman Prisons".⁴⁶²

2021 – Omdurman

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported in January 2021 that "Sudanese authorities should urgently and effectively investigate the circumstances leading to the death of Mr.

⁴⁵⁷ U.S. Department of State, [2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 12 April 2022, *Section 1., C. Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment*

⁴⁵⁸ U.S. Department of State, [2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 30 March 2021, *Section 1., C. Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment*

⁴⁵⁹ U.S. Department of State, [2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 12 April 2022, *Section 1., C. Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment*

⁴⁶⁰ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan Coup Update: 18 members of the dismantle and anti-corruption committee detained incommunicado, rape allegations and other violations](#), 23 March 2022

⁴⁶¹ Radio Dabanga, [More than 38 activists detained yesterday, over 100 detainees on hunger strike](#), 18 February 2022

⁴⁶² U.S. Department of State, [2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 30 March 2021, *Section 1., C. Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment*

Ezz El-Din Hamid Ali, a 22-year-old, who died a day after release from police custody in Omdurman [following his suspicion of stealing a vehicle]. A reliable source told ACJPS that the deceased had serious injuries on his body after he was released from detention and had to be taken to hospital for treatment”.⁴⁶³

In its annual human rights report covering 2021, the U.S. Department of State noted that “Overall conditions, including food and sanitation, were reportedly better in women’s detention facilities and prisons, such as the Federal Prison for Women in Omdurman, than at equivalent facilities for men, such as the main prison in Khartoum or the Kober or Omdurman Prisons”.⁴⁶⁴

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

With special reference to detention conditions and torture in detention, the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) noted in July 2020:

The conditions of prisons and detention centers across Sudan still remains the same as they were during al Bashir’s regime. The prisons and detention centers are overcrowded and insanitary with inadequate medical facilities. Detainees with serious health conditions are referred Military and Police hospitals.⁴⁶⁵

The same organisation further stated in relation to COVID-19 in prisons:

The Covid-19 awareness campaign that began two months ago in Sudan focuses mainly on civilians rather than those in detention. The only efforts by Sovereign Council to protect detainees is the release of 4,633 prisoners from overcrowded prisons all over the country hosting more than 21000 detainees, with a congestion rate of 255% [...]

On March 23, 2020, 4217 male prisoners were released from Alhuda prison located in Omdurman, Khartoum State, following a resolution issued by Sudanese Sovereign Council (SSC). On May 8, 2020 another resolution issued by SSC ordered the release of additional 263 male prisoners from Alhuda prison and 131 Female prisoners from Omdurman women prison in Khartoum. Outside Khartoum, 65 male prisoners have been released from Al-Obid prison in North kordfan after a hunger strike organized by the prisoners demanding for their release. 23 prisoners have also been released from Shalla prison of North Darfur after hunger strike as well.

But the release of detainees did not appear enough to prevent contamination in prisons including for civil society organisations who recommended the release of some soldiers and political actors arrested during the revolution.⁴⁶⁶

In 2020, the Transitional Military government “introduced some legal reforms that prohibit torture of an accused person and recognise that torture can be committed both physically and psychologically”⁴⁶⁷ and in August 2021 Sudan ratified the Convention against Torture⁴⁶⁸. The World

⁴⁶³ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: Urgent call for investigation into the death of Ezz El-Din Hamid Ali in Omdurman](#), 8 January 2021

⁴⁶⁴ U.S. Department of State, [2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 12 April 2022, Section 1., C. Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment

⁴⁶⁵ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Briefing paper, \(Post\)-COVID19 era in Sudan: The urgency to unravel the torture and inhuman treatments system one year after the Transition](#), July 2021, 4. *The Sudanese’s penitentiary system: a dying house?*, p. 8

⁴⁶⁶ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Briefing paper, \(Post\)-COVID19 era in Sudan: The urgency to unravel the torture and inhuman treatments system one year after the Transition](#), July 2021, 4. *The Sudanese’s penitentiary system: a dying house?*, p. 9

⁴⁶⁷ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Enforced Disappearance in Africa: Baseline Study for Sudan](#), September 2020, 1. *Executive Summary*, p. 5

Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) together with the African Center for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) noted at the end of August 2021 however that “unless Sudan’s domestic law aligns with the Convention against Torture, its ratification will fail to concretely improve the lives of detainees”.⁴⁶⁹ It further highlighted in relation to 2020 amendments to Sudan’s 1991 Criminal Act that they “missed the opportunity for a stronger prohibition of torture in line with international human rights obligations. Although the 2020 amendment recognizes that torture can be both physical and psychological and increases the penalty from 3 months to 3 years, its definition of torture is limited to cases where it is inflicted in order to collect/extort information, which is considerably narrower than the internationally recognized definition of torture”.⁴⁷⁰

In April 2021 REDRESS together with the People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) highlighted that “Sudan’s legal system lacks adequate custodial protections or the necessary monitoring mechanisms to ensure the non-repetition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Individuals continue to be detained unlawfully in Sudan, and detainees are often denied basic procedural safeguards”.⁴⁷¹

As part of the ‘Summary of Stakeholders’ submissions on Sudan’ of August 2021 prepared for the UN Human Rights Council, “JS20 [Joint submission 20 submitted by: UPR Coalition for Combatting Impunity in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan] noted that failure to publish the official list of legal places of detention coupled with the absence of an effective judicial oversight over these places led to the existence of secret places of detention”.⁴⁷²

In September 2021 the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) noted that “The condition of prisons and detention Centres across Sudan remains the same as during al Bashir’s regime. ACJPS monitoring reports indicate that prisons are overcrowded, making physical distancing, one of the most effective ways to prevent the spread of covid-19, nearly impossible. They are unsanitary with inadequate medical facilities. They lack adequate professional health practitioners without necessary medical equipment, personal protective gear, infrared thermometers, testing kits, and sanitisers. Detainees with severe health conditions are referred to Military and Police hospitals”.⁴⁷³

During the period 26 October to 11 November 2021, ACJPS documented “the death of at least one person days after his release from custody. Reliable information indicates that the Military Intelligence, SAF and RSF officers have subjected detainees to beating using water horse pipes, sticks and wooden bars, standing for long hours, firing live ammunition at the ground next to detainees’

⁴⁶⁸ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), [Sudan, At a Glance](#), Last reviewed: 2022

⁴⁶⁹ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Center for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: Will the Convention against Torture prompt a better detention system?](#), 30 August 2021

⁴⁷⁰ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Center for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: Will the Convention against Torture prompt a better detention system?](#), 30 August 2021. For further analysis see REDRESS, [Anti-Torture Standards in Common Law Africa: Good Practices and Way Forward](#), 2022

⁴⁷¹ REDRESS / People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE), [Sudan: Human rights two years after Al-Bashir’s removal](#), April 2021, p. 9

⁴⁷² UN Human Rights Council, [Summary of Stakeholders’ submissions on Sudan, Report of the Office of the United Nations high Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 13 August 2021, para. 33. Original report, in Arabic, by the UPR Coalition for Combatting Impunity in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, as submitted to the UN Human Rights Council can be accessed [here](#)

⁴⁷³ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: Authorities must put in place adequate measures to protect detainees from the spread of COVID-19](#), 2 September 2021

feet, forcefully shaving of one's hair and causing head injuries. Due to inhumane detention conditions, a female detainee suffered a miscarriage".⁴⁷⁴

Covering the period 25 October to 23 November 2021, ACJPS reported that it had "documented the torture and ill treatment of detainees by security agencies. Detainees were beaten with horse pipes, iron bars and sticks, boxed with hands, pushed to the ground and forcefully shaving off one's hair. Shaving off the hair of detainees using the same blade without sterilization raise serious health safety concerns as it imposes a high risk of transmission of blood borne diseases".⁴⁷⁵

In December 2021 ACJPS noted that "The patterns of human rights crimes committed over the past two months since the military coup of 25 October 2021 are all too familiar to the Sudanese people. The same conduct used during the al Bashir regime to terrorise civilians throughout the country is now being used to annihilate unanimous demands for democracy".⁴⁷⁶ The same source further noted:

Just like in the al Bashir era, protesters have been detained incommunicado and in unknown locations. They are being held in different detention centers that have not been reformed even after the fall of al Bashir. In Shandi Bus Station in Khartoum Bahri, a popular detention center where the National Intelligence Security Services agents held political prisoners in the former regime, individuals were detained without interrogation. Detainees are also held in prisons such as [...] Omdurman Women's prison and Soba prison in Khartoum [...] in very poor facilities.⁴⁷⁷

REDRESS, together with the People's Legal Aid Centre (PLACE), the Emergency Lawyers' Group and the Darfur Bar Association reported in March 2022 that:

Since the 25 October 2021 coup in Sudan, members of the armed forces, police, General Intelligence Service (GIS), and other security forces have carried out scores of arrests of protestors, journalists, civilian political leaders, and other human rights defenders [...]

In detention, including during transport to prisons and police stations, security and intelligence forces—particularly members of the GIS—routinely beat, kick and subject detainees to other forms of ill-treatment, some of which may rise to the level of torture. Many of the detentions described in this briefing are arbitrary, and some may be considered enforced disappearances.⁴⁷⁸

The same briefing further found that:

A second group of individuals have been targeted for arrest under the emergency laws, arrested from their homes or known gathering places, and held in Khartoum-area prisons such as Soba Prison and Omdurman Women's Prison. Some reports from Sudan have suggested that individuals are, as a matter of practice, being detained for a renewable 21-day period under EO No 3 (Art 4(a)). We have not been able to corroborate these reports, and EO No 3 does not provide for a specific period of detention.

⁴⁷⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan coup update: Former detainee succumbs to injuries obtained while in custody; COVID-19 cases and other violations](#), 15 November 2021

⁴⁷⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan Coup update: killing and continued arbitrary and incommunicado detention of peaceful protestors and obstruction of media coverage of protests](#), 25 November 2021

⁴⁷⁶ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: Tactics of bloodshed and violence against peaceful protesters is not new](#), 16 December 2021

⁴⁷⁷ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: Tactics of bloodshed and violence against peaceful protesters is not new](#), 16 December 2021

⁴⁷⁸ REDRESS / People's Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers' Group / Darfur Bar Association, ["Taken from Khartoum's Streets", Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan's emergency laws, Legal Analysis](#), March 2022, Summary, p. 3

In most cases, individuals arrested and detained in this category are not charged with any crime while in detention, though some have been charged upon their release with a variety of miscellaneous crimes. The majority of individuals arrested in this category are not interrogated during either their arrest or while detained.

No written documents are provided to family members by the prison administration, GIS, or the police in relation to any detainees arrested in this way under EO No. 3. The available arrest records indicate that detainees are arrested and handed over to prison administrators by GIS officers, and that the forms for renewal of detention are issued by the GIS.

Detainees held in Khartoum-area prisons, particularly Soba Prison, are largely held in sections designated for GIS detainees. The GIS is understood to have issued an order preventing detainees from receiving visitors, including from lawyers or doctors. As a matter of practice, internal GIS directives and bylaws are not made public.⁴⁷⁹

In April 2022 the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights noted its concern "by credible reports of numerous cases of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of political and other detainees, of whom there are reportedly at least 400 languishing in detention facilities in Sudan".⁴⁸⁰

Human Rights Watch noted in its report focusing on the arrests since the October 2021 coup:

Beyond the inherent loss of liberty, the impact of arbitrary arrests on the lives of the detainees and their relatives has been profound [...]

Families bear the burden of providing for their loved ones in detention at a time when the economy is on the brink of collapse and inflation rampant, with price increases of essential commodities such as bread and fuel. "In Soba prison – food quality was bad, same as medical care," said a 37-year-old detainee. "Our families had to take the burden of bringing food or provide money so we can buy food and other stuff from a private shop in the prison."

A lawyer noted that many of the families had to undertake long trips to Soba prison, located on the outskirts of Khartoum, 28 kilometers from the center, to provide essentials that should be provided by the prison, including food, blankets, and medication.

A statement by the Emergency Lawyers Group on April 5 said that authorities have transferred some detainees from Soba prison to other prisons outside the capital, including in Port Sudan and White Nile state. The move, they said, makes detainees' access to their lawyers and their families even more difficult.

Parents also worry about the impact on their children's studies [...] A mother said her university-level daughter missed classes while in detention: "I asked the prison administration to provide us with a document confirming my daughter was in prison – because she also missed some university exams, but they refused to provide us with that."⁴⁸¹

In conversation with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan in May 2022, asked about prison conditions and treatment of detainees, the individual responded:

I read recently that the authorities were trying to restrict the practice of begging on the street and were arresting individuals who were begging. And I think some of the groups of people that you're concerned about [e.g. IDPs; Black Africans such as Darfuri and Nuba] may fall into that category.

⁴⁷⁹ REDRESS / People's Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) / Emergency Lawyers' Group / Darfur Bar Association, *"Taken from Khartoum's Streets", Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and enforced disappearances under Sudan's emergency laws, Legal Analysis*, March 2022, *Campaign of arrests since January 2022*, p. 14/15

⁴⁸⁰ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), *516 Resolution on the worsening human rights situation in Sudan following the October 25 coup d'état – ACHPR/Res.516 [LXX]*, 4 April 2022

⁴⁸¹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated*, 28 April 2022

Those begging for money at traffic lights often include small children, five, six years old, little girls, who live on the street with their families.

The conditions in the prisons: there is one recently built prison in SE Khartoum, Soba prison. Many of the other prisons are old and conditions poor. The women's prison in Omdurman was built in 1889. The buildings are dilapidated, there is little and poor sanitation. There are many infants in the prison with their mothers. Women who are convicted or awaiting conviction for murder are shackled, by law. The prison administration does make an effort to provide food and healthcare but they have a very small budget to do so. Food is often supplemented by family members. And I think for the people that you are concerned about [e.g. IDPs; Black Africans such as Darfuri and Nuba], they may not have the funds to provide their relatives with clothes and food.⁴⁸²

2.4. Violence and discrimination against family members of (perceived) political opponents

Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) noted:

The patterns of human rights crimes committed over the past two months since the military coup of 25 October 2021 are all too familiar to the Sudanese people. The same conduct used during the al Bashir regime to terrorise civilians throughout the country is now being used to annihilate unanimous demands for democracy [...]

Joint security forces have raided homes and arrested Government officials, advisors and activists. During these raids, family members were arrested without any reasons given. For example, on 24 October 2021, joint forces raided the house of Mr. Yasir Saied Arman, the political advisor to the Sudanese prime Minister and arrested him along with his younger brother, Mr Mujeib Saeed Arman when they found him in Mr. Arman's resident in Khartoum. They have both been released. Raids also happened in offices including CSOs and human rights activists were detained.⁴⁸³

Frontline Defenders reported in November 2021:

Sudanese women activists outside Sudan reported threats to and questioning of their families in Sudan.⁴⁸⁴

Human Rights Watch reported in April 2022:

Security forces have also ill-treated children including allegedly stripping them naked and partially shaving their heads. Families interviewed said they had been intimidated into dropping possible complaints against the security forces. The mother of a 16-year-old in Madani said that she found her son at a police station after he attended a protest on December 13 [2021]: "I saw my son bleeding and badly beaten. He

⁴⁸² Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes.

⁴⁸³ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: Tactics of bloodshed and violence against peaceful protesters is not new](#), 16 December 2021

⁴⁸⁴ Frontline Defenders, [Sudanese and International organisations call for an end on attacks against Sudanese women human rights defenders and protesters](#), 19 November 2021

was topless. When I requested that my son be medically examined, the police told me: ‘We will release your son without charges, but you will not sue us’.”⁴⁸⁵

Al Jazeera reported in May 2022: “On May 5, authorities arrested 25 protesters during anti-coup demonstrations. Plainclothes officers later attacked detainee families for demanding the release of their loved ones outside a police station in the capital”.⁴⁸⁶

In conversation with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan, ARC’s Director was told in May 2022:

In some cases, intimidation of family members of persons who were arrested after the coup has been reported, usually high profile people – and some reported that their houses were under observation. In some cases, family members reported that unmarked vehicles were parked in front of their houses and there was verbal harassment of family members.⁴⁸⁷

3. Access to justice in Khartoum and Omdurman, including follow-up by State law enforcement agencies in cases of violence and other abuses against members of specific groups

3.1. Black African people (including Darfuri and Nuba)

It is recommended to consult the information included under [2.1.1. Black African people \(including Darfuri and Nuba\)](#) under section 2. *Acts of violence*, and particularly sub-heading *Racism and hate speech in Sudan* for useful contextual information.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

In March 2021, former Darfuri tribal leader, Musa Hilal, was released after four years in detention, “after being pardoned by the country’s Sovereign Council”, reported Mohamed Osman, Africa Researcher at Human Rights Watch.⁴⁸⁸ He was arrested and convicted in 2017 for “allegedly attacking government forces and committing related crimes in Darfur”, but not for the “serious crimes” that were committed in Darfur as he played a “well-documented role leading the Janjaweed militia and serving as a government advisor” between 2020 and 2005.⁴⁸⁹ Mohamed Osman questioned “While his pardon this week is only limited to those 2017 charges, the situation begs the

⁴⁸⁵ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated](#), 28 April 2022

⁴⁸⁶ Al Jazeera, [Protesters remain in Sudan’s prisons as dialogue is postponed](#), 10 May 2022

⁴⁸⁷ Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes

⁴⁸⁸ Mohamed Osman (Human Rights Watch (HRW)), [Sudan’s Pardon of Militia Leader Sends Wrong Message](#), 15 March 2021

⁴⁸⁹ Mohamed Osman (Human Rights Watch (HRW)), [Sudan’s Pardon of Militia Leader Sends Wrong Message](#), 15 March 2021

question as to why a militia leader subject to such serious war crimes accusations is making headlines for being pardoned as opposed to being criminally investigated for Darfur atrocities”.⁴⁹⁰

The Darfur Women Action Group commended in April 2022 the start of the trial against “Ali Muhammad Ali Abd–Al-Rahman, commonly known as “Ali Kushayb,” the ruthless leader of the Janjaweed militia that both commanded and recruited the militias that carried out horrific attacks upon innocent men, women, and children of Darfur”.⁴⁹¹ However, it equally also stated:

The crimes committed against the people of Darfur are crimes of a global magnitude. Despite the fact that some world leaders have made strong statements about the need to hold perpetrators accountable, they have all failed to take concerted action to actually bring the individuals responsible for these crimes to face justice. Moreover, the recent developments in Sudan are a clear indicator of the consequences that can occur when the international community fails to hold despotic leaders accountable. Their inaction has emboldened the military regime to continue the tactics of the Bashir regime of violating international human rights and humanitarian laws, usurping power through a coup, and killing innocent civilians.⁴⁹²

3.2. Christians

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 – Khartoum

According to reporting by The Christian Post in December 2020, “Police in Sudan have arrested nine men in connection with a series of arson attacks on church property and for threatening churchgoers in the Dar El-Salam area of Omdurman in the capital, Khartoum”.⁴⁹³

2021 – Omdurman

In May 2021, Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) reported “A building belonging to the Sudanese Church of Christ (SCOC) in the city of Omdurman, Sudan, was demolished [...] following threats from local residents and authorities. The building was in the process of being rebuilt after being burned down in August 2020”.⁴⁹⁴ According to the same source, whilst the government did not designate a committee to investigate the incident, “The trial of eight people accused in the arson in August 2020 is ongoing at Dar-Alsalam Criminal Court, marking the first prosecutions for damaging a church in the nation’s history”.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹⁰ Mohamed Osman (Human Rights Watch (HRW)), [Sudan’s Pardon of Militia Leader Sends Wrong Message](#), 15 March 2021

⁴⁹¹ Darfur Women Action Group, [An Important Milestone in our Fight for Justice: Beginning of the Trial Against Ali Kushayb](#), 5 April 2022

⁴⁹² Darfur Women Action Group, [An Important Milestone in our Fight for Justice: Beginning of the Trial Against Ali Kushayb](#), 5 April 2022

⁴⁹³ The Christian Post, [Sudan arrests 9 Muslim extremists tied to church burnings, threats against churchgoers](#), 28 December 2020

⁴⁹⁴ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Church demolished in Omdurman](#), 28 May 2021

⁴⁹⁵ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Church demolished in Omdurman](#), 28 May 2021

3.3. Students

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

3.4. Political activists

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

3.5. (Perceived) political opposition/association with opposition groups, participating in demonstrations/protests, involvement in political groups including student unions

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

3.6. Persons who have participated in protests (inside or outside of Sudan)

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2021 – Khartoum

DefendDefenders reported in its report on human rights defenders that “In April 2021, hundreds of women protested in Khartoum, calling for more legal reforms for women, such as ratification of the CEDAW Convention. The demonstration witnessed male backlash. In one incident, a man drove his

car into the female protesters. In another, a group of male university students shouted at the women, threatening them with rape. Despite several complaints being filed, no charges were brought, and instead the woman who led the complaint against the driver of the car was held in detention for two days after friends of the driver brought counter claims against her”.⁴⁹⁶

In May 2021 “the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) fired tear gas and live ammunition at peaceful protesters in Khartoum, killing Osman Ahmed Badr al-Din and Muddather al-Mukhtar Elshafie and wounding 37. The military denied ordering the use of live ammunition and promised an investigation; the prime minister decried the use of excessive force and called on the military and judicial systems to investigate. Attorney General el-Hibir told local media that the Public Prosecution’s Office had opened cases against those who killed protesters. As of year’s end [2021], the cases remained pending” reported the U.S. Department of State in its annual human rights report.⁴⁹⁷ Reporting on the same incident, Human Rights Watch provided the following additional details:

Sudan’s prime minister, Dr. Abdalla Hamdok, described the events as a “crime against peaceful protesters.” On May 12, he announced that steps would be taken to expedite accountability efforts, including by setting a deadline for the conclusion of the investigation into the June 3, 2019 events. The armed forces issued a statement saying the events were “unfortunate” and promising to investigate.

On May 15, the former attorney general told the media that he had received the army’s investigation report and that the army had handed over for prosecution 7 suspects who were in military custody together with 92 other soldiers “suspected of being involved in the attack.” The attorney general said that the seven had been charged with murder and crimes against humanity.⁴⁹⁸

Human Rights Watch also found that:

The prosecutorial authorities should not be bound by the findings of the army’s own investigation and should ensure that all those responsible for abuses, including those responsible under the chain of command, are appropriately held to account, Human Rights Watch said. The government investigation should examine whether the military deliberately planned to prevent the protesters from peacefully dispersing and should include the cases of those injured, not just those killed.⁴⁹⁹

In July 2021 the organisation Hands Off Cain reported that at the Institute of Judicial Sciences in Khartoum “The Special Court convened to try the perpetrators of crimes related to the Sudanese revolution on 27 June 2021 sentenced a former member of the defunct National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) to death by hanging, for the murder of Hassan Mohammed Omar during a mass protest in Khartoum on 25 December 2018”.⁵⁰⁰ According to the same source “This is the first conviction under these articles to be passed down by the court, which was convened to address crimes committed during the mass popular uprising that culminated in the overthrow by military coup of the 30-year dictatorship of Omar Al Bashir. The court also upheld the request by the victim’s family for retribution, provided that the case is submitted to the Supreme Court after the appeal

⁴⁹⁶ DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [An unfinished revolution: The situation of women human rights defenders in Sudan](#), December 2021, *Post-Revolution Climate for WHRDS*, p. 50

⁴⁹⁷ U.S. Department of State, [2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 12 April 2022, *Section 1., A. Arbitrary deprivation of life and other unlawful or politically motivated killings*

⁴⁹⁸ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Lethal Force Used Against Protesters](#), 19 May 2021

⁴⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Lethal Force Used Against Protesters](#), 19 May 2021

⁵⁰⁰ Hands Off Cain, [Sudan: Former security agent sentenced to hang for student’s murder](#), 6 July 2021

period has elapsed. The verdict was met with relief by the victim's family and supporters, who gathered outside the courtroom chanting demands for a speedy execution of the sentence".⁵⁰¹

2021 – Omdurman

In May 2021 the organisation Hands Off Cain reported that "A Sudanese court sentenced to death on 24 May 2021 a paramilitary officer charged with killing a demonstrator" in Omdurman over two years ago".⁵⁰² According to the same source "The court ruled that the officer, Youssef Mohieldin al-Fiky, a major with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, rammed a protester with his car as security forces were dispersing a sit-in outside the military headquarters in June 2019".⁵⁰³

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

The World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and its Sudanese network member the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) noted in July 2021 that "On June 3, 2019, in Khartoum, a joint military operation led by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) shot live bullets at protesters, beat them with sticks and batons, rounded up hundreds and subjected them to various forms of humiliation, including beating, rape and sexual assaults. This led to the enforced disappearance of 14 protestors that are still mission. Despite the establishment of an investigation Committee, by the prime minister, the responsibilities have still not been established".⁵⁰⁴

Similarly, in its submissions to the UN Universal Periodic Review in March 2021, ACJPS and DefendDefenders jointly stated that on 3rd June 2019 "Women protestors were subjected to sexual assault and rape, including gangrape, and medical personnel were attacked. Reports suggest security forces, including the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), killed approximately 120 people, injured more than 900, and raped at least 64 women" and found that "The victims are still waiting for justice".⁵⁰⁵

Human Rights Watch's Africa Researcher Mohamed Osman further explained:

After the transitional authorities were sworn in they established a range of committees to investigate past abuses. While there is no body to specifically address crimes committed against protesters between December 2018 and April 2019, the attorney-general established a committee in January 2020 to investigate a wide range of abuses including extrajudicial killings, from the beginning of al-Bashir's rule through to his ousting.

This year has seen some progress on such cases. Prosecutors announced an unknown number of NISS agents have been charged in connection with abuses against protesters. On March 28, a Khartoum court found the crimes committed against peaceful protesters were part of an attack against the civilian population and confirmed for the first time charges of crimes against humanity against another NISS agent for the killing of a protester in December, 2018.

But many challenges remain, some of which will require resources, others mainly political will.

⁵⁰¹ Hands Off Cain, [Sudan: Former security agent sentenced to hang for student's murder](#), 6 July 2021

⁵⁰² Hands Off Cain, [Sudan: Officer sentenced to death for killing protester](#), 25 May 2021

⁵⁰³ Hands Off Cain, [Sudan: Officer sentenced to death for killing protester](#), 25 May 2021

⁵⁰⁴ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Briefing paper, \(Post\)-COVID19 era in Sudan: The urgency to unravel the torture and inhuman treatments system one year after the Transition](#), July 2021, 1. Overview of Torture and ill-treatments in Sudan, p. 4

⁵⁰⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) / DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [Submission to the United Nations Universal Period Review, 39th Session of the UPR Working Group, Sudan](#), 25 March 2021, 1. Introduction, para. 1.10

Mahmoud al-Sheikh, a member of the attorney-general's committee pointed to several challenges undermining their efforts: "We are struggling to get the security forces to cooperate including by providing us with access to crucial evidence or accept requests of lifting immunities of suspects." Sudan's criminal law does not recognize command responsibility as a mode of liability, which could hinder the possibility of holding mid-to-top level commanders accountable.⁵⁰⁶

The International Alliance for Peace and Development (IAPD), as part of its submission to the UN Human Rights Council noted: "following the massacre that occurred [on 3 June 2019] Sudanese security forces launched a violent attack against pro-democracy demonstrators at the protests' central sit-in site in Khartoum, there have been allegations that the security forces forcibly disappeared dozens of protesters detained on or around June 3. Although the government set up two commissions in 2019 whose mandates include enforced disappearances the commissions are yet to adequately investigate enforced disappearances or even provide recommendations on investigation, prosecution and reparations for victims".⁵⁰⁷

Human Rights Watch reported in November 2021 that "a handful of killings of protesters were investigated and prosecuted prior to the coup, but impunity for serious crimes has remained largely the norm. Obstacles such as lack of cooperation from security forces in lifting immunity for suspects or providing access to evidence continued to challenge existing efforts, said prosecutors, victims' families, and lawyers".⁵⁰⁸

Focusing on the arrests since the October 2021 coup, Human Rights Watch found that:

Under Sudanese law, prosecutors and judges have a responsibility to provide oversight for arrests and detention sites, including both prisons and police stations. However, one lawyer and family members of two detainees said that prosecutors had denied knowledge of the detainees' whereabouts or said that they were not authorized to disclose information on detainees or their whereabouts, citing the exceptional measures under the state of emergency.

The absence of adequate prosecutorial and judicial oversight, as required by law, increases the risk of arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances, Human Rights Watch said.

A member of the Emergency Lawyers Group said that the various security forces involved in the arrests makes tracking or identifying the detaining authority harder: "With no cooperation from authorities, this makes our job harder, creates more anguish for families, and indeed shields perpetrators from responsibilities."⁵⁰⁹

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council on the situation between 25 October 2021 and 10 April 2022, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

The 21 November 2021 political agreement stipulated, among other things, that all events that occurred during demonstrations, including injuries and deaths sustained by both civilians and uniformed personnel, should be investigated and all perpetrators should be brought before courts. However, the ability to investigate allegations of human rights violations against members of the regular forces and the General Intelligence Service will be limited by Emergency Decree No. 3/2021, which granted them temporary immunity from prosecution for all acts committed in the performance

⁵⁰⁶ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Victims of Sudan Crackdown on Protests Await Justice](#), 12 April 2021. For further information on the failings of the investigation committee of the 3rd June 2019 events see Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Justice for June 3 Crackdown Delayed](#), 2 June 2020

⁵⁰⁷ International Alliance for Peace and Development (IAPD), [International Alliance for Peace and Development \(IAPD\) submission on The Republic of Sudan to the UN Universal Periodic Review 2021](#), Undated [last accessed: 20.06.2022]

⁵⁰⁸ Human Rights Watch, [Sudan: Security Forces Use Lethal Force on Protesters](#), 23 November 2021

⁵⁰⁹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Hundreds of Protesters Mistreated](#), 28 April 2022

of their duties. To date, no one has been held accountable for human rights violations that have been committed.⁵¹⁰

The same source further noted:

systematic violations of fair trial and due process rights were observed, in particular denial of the rights of detainees to legal representation and to be promptly brought before a competent judge. Between 25 October and mid-December 2021, detainees did not have access to their lawyers and could not challenge the lawfulness of their deprivation of liberty before a judicial authority. This eroded minimum safeguards and left victims of arbitrary arrest and detention without legal protection, exposing them to the risk of and actual acts of torture and ill-treatment, incommunicado detention and enforced disappearance, without access to effective remedies.⁵¹¹

3.7. Persons who have shown or are perceived to have shown opposition

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

3.8. Human rights activists

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 – Khartoum

In August 2020 “woman human rights defender Hala Khalid Abugroun was detained for several hours at Khartoum Central Police Station after attempting to report human rights abuses carried out by NISS officers against protestors during a peaceful protest in the capital. She was interrogated for several hours and reported being subject to severe physical abuse, which may amount to torture, by police and security officers” reported Frontline Defenders.⁵¹² The same source further noted that “Since being arbitrarily detained and subject to physical abuse on 17 August 2020, Hala Khalid Abugroun has attempted to open a file against the officers involved. There has been no progress in

⁵¹⁰ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, para. 58

⁵¹¹ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, para. 59

⁵¹² Frontline Defenders, [Arbitrary detention of woman human rights defender Hala Khalid Abugroun](#), 26 August 2020

this process, and the defender has subsequently received verbal threats from unknown persons indirectly, warning her to cease her attempts to take legal action against the officers involved”.⁵¹³

2021 – Khartoum

According to a report by Frontline Defenders:

On 20 May 2021, Hafiz Haron was subjected to a robbery attempt and found a thief in his house in Al-Khartoum Bahri. The human rights defender attempted to submit a complaint at the local police station, and asked the police to detain the thief. The police refused to log the human rights defender’s complaint and after Hafiz Haron insisted, the police detained him for approximately 12 hours. During this time, the human rights defender told Front Line Defenders that he was subjected to verbal and physical abuse. Hafiz Haron was later released on condition that he presented himself at the police station a few days later. Following his release, the human rights defender was hospitalised as a result of the physical abuse he was subjected to during his detention. He had pains in his neck and ear but no severe injuries.

On 23 May 2021, Hafiz Haron went to the administrative police station to submit a complaint against the police who arrested him on 20 May. The police officers asked him to withdraw the complaint. When the human rights defender refused he was arrested again for approximately six hours and was released on bail. On the same day he was charged with several offences including ‘threatening the police’, ‘hindering the police’ and ‘public annoyance’. However, the human rights defender reported that he is facing another charge, which the police did not disclose to him.⁵¹⁴

In August 2021 the human rights defender was sentenced to “one month in prison or to pay a fine of 30,000 SDG (58 EUR) instead. The human rights defender was then released after the independent newspaper where he works, Al-Tayar, paid the fine”.⁵¹⁵

3.9. Journalists

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

On its undated webpage dedicated to ‘Sudan’, Reporters Without Borders noted that “No law protects journalists, although some civil institutions, such as the Sudanese Journalists Network, the Sudanese Media Network, and Journalists for Human Rights, have established mechanisms for following up and documenting violations of reporters’ rights.”⁵¹⁶

3.10. Health care workers

⁵¹³ Frontline Defenders, [Arbitrary detention of woman human rights defender Hala Khalid Abugroun](#), 26 August 2020

⁵¹⁴ Frontline Defenders, [Hafiz Haron fined and released](#), 10 August 2021

⁵¹⁵ Frontline Defenders, [Hafiz Haron fined and released](#), 10 August 2021

⁵¹⁶ Reporters Without Borders, [Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 19.05.2022]

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

3.11. Lawyers

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

3.12. Artists

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

3.13. Teachers

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

3.14. IDPs

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

3.15. Returnees

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

3.16. Women

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant subsection of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

2020 – Khartoum [State]

In a nation-wide qualitative assessment of gender-based violence, co-authored by UNFPA and the Government of Sudan, “research was conducted in 60 localities and camps, across Sudan, between August and November 2020”.⁵¹⁷ With regards to Khartoum State, when participants were asked about ‘reporting and response’ of gender-based violence, respondents mentioned:

Violence goes unreported, especially in the case of domestic violence. “If a woman was exposed to violence by her husband, she does not report in consideration of her children’s interest” Woman, Omdurman, Khartoum.

“When violence comes from fathers and brothers, you cannot complain and report or you will be considered without manners. If you complain to your uncle, your father will come back and beat you” Girl, Omdurman, Khartoum.

“If violence from the family there will be a cover up, if the violence is from outside the family they go to court” Woman, Umm Bedda, Khartoum. “when I was talking to the girl, the mother said I will never forgive you if you report about your brother” GBV helpline service provider.

Reporting to official institutions is avoided as it involves lengthy, and corrupted procedures. “People stopped reporting to avoid lengthy procedures. If you have a relative in the police or in the army, they will not let you resort to the law” Boy, Jabal Aulia, Khartoum. “When a person goes to law enforcement, there is a protracted process with no results” Boy, Umm Bedda, Khartoum. “Some people seem to be above the law and there is no point resorting to the law” Boy, Jabal Aulia, Khartoum. “We do not go to the police because they just take your money. You need to bribe the police to take your report seriously” Boy, Sharq al Nile, Khartoum.

If survivors report violence, they would use different mechanisms depending on the type of violence and the seriousness of the incident. “Reporting would happen if violence is committed by strangers” Woman, Umm Bedda, Khartoum. Most respondents mentioned the family as first line of reporting “I

⁵¹⁷ UNFPA / Government of Sudan, Voices from Sudan 2020, [A Qualitative Assessment of Gender Based Violence in Sudan](#), 18 July 2021, p. 4

would tell my mother” Girl, Umm Bedda, Khartoum. “I usually do not talk, but if something serious happens, I would tell my mother who is the person closest to me” Girl, Sharq al Nile, Khartoum.⁵¹⁸

2021 – Khartoum

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported that:

On 8 April 2021, a large number of women in Khartoum stormed the streets to protest violence and discrimination against women. They marched to the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior and the office of the Attorney General. During the march, the women faced attacks by a group of men; one man ploughed his car into the group of protesting women while another reportedly threatened to rape them. These incidents were reported to the police and the perpetrators were arrested and prosecuted. However, OHCHR is still concerned about reports of retaliatory actions by the attackers against the women who reported to the police.⁵¹⁹

DefendDefenders reported in its report on human rights defenders that “In April 2021, hundreds of women protested in Khartoum, calling for more legal reforms for women, such as ratification of the CEDAW Convention. The demonstration witnessed male backlash. In one incident, a man drove his car into the female protesters. In another, a group of male university students shouted at the women, threatening them with rape. Despite several complaints being filed, no charges were brought, and instead the woman who led the complaint against the driver of the car was held in detention for two days after friends of the driver brought counter claims against her”.⁵²⁰

In May 2021, The National reported that “Incidents of women being assaulted in Khartoum are on the rise. A number of attacks, including ones where women are whipped, slapped in the face and beaten in public by young men, have been recorded as a violent social media campaign seeking to ‘punish the immodestly dressed,’ takes to the streets”.⁵²¹ The same source further noted that “The public floggings come at an extraordinarily delicate moment for Sudan. The country is marking the second anniversary of the revolution, which broke out after decades of oppression under a regime that ruled by decree. ‘This campaign is a full-frontal attack on our democracy,’ the First Assistant of the Public Prosecutor in Sudan, Mamoun Farouq, told The National. ‘This will be treated as an act of terror. If women are hit on the streets for their clothes, this is terrorism and flagrant violation of their human rights,’ he said. ‘We encourage any girl or woman who has been threatened or hit by such criminals to stand up and be counted. They should report such crimes to the police and they will find support.’ Mr Farouq said however that most of the incidents go unreported, ‘because women fear stigma in society’”.⁵²²

2021 - Omdurman

DefendDefenders highlighted in its report on human rights defenders an incident of child abuse:

⁵¹⁸ UNFPA / Government of Sudan, Voices from Sudan 2020, [A Qualitative Assessment of Gender Based Violence in Sudan](#), 18 July 2021, p. 51

⁵¹⁹ See UN Human Rights Council, [Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 27 July 2021, para. 32

⁵²⁰ DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [An unfinished revolution: The situation of women human rights defenders in Sudan](#), December 2021, *Post-Revolution Climate for WHRDS*, p. 50

⁵²¹ The National, [Sudan’s women flogged in public by young men ‘inspired by’ violent social media campaign](#), 5 May 2021

⁵²² The National, [Sudan’s women flogged in public by young men ‘inspired by’ violent social media campaign](#), 5 May 2021

In March 2021, 13-year-old Samah al-Hadi was shot three times and run over by a car, allegedly by her father, after she requested to transfer schools. Despite the fact that neighbours told police that the father was known to abuse his children, he was released without charge. No post-mortem was carried out and the father was given permission to quickly bury Samah's body. The case caused outrage on social media in Sudan, with a petition to re-open the police file amassing close to 3,000 signatures. Many women spoke out online, recounting times that they had been subject to violence at home – drawing attention to the high rates of domestic violence in Sudan, where it is not specifically covered by law. Those who have spoken out about Samah's death have faced harassment online and reprisals from the government.⁵²³

The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA Network) reported that “The egregious murder of Samah prompted outcry from feminist and women rights activists in Sudan. In response to critiques of the police's management of this case, the Head of Police for Khartoum publicly blamed women and called for the reinstatement of the moral policing apparatus that existed under the former regime: the public order regime.² This display of misogyny must not be written off as an anomaly, as ‘one crazy man,’ because it is far more dangerous than that. Misogyny is still institutionalized in Sudan, and these remarks by the Head of Police are just the latest development in the resurgence of the forces of militancy and terror, which have been building over the past several months”.⁵²⁴

The Guardian reported that in the same month, “a 19-year-old woman was stabbed to death by her husband and buried by her family before the police became involved, according to Kaltoum Fadlallah, a poet and novelist”.⁵²⁵

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

Focusing on the impact of COVID-19 on Sudanese women, the CHR. Michelsen Institute reported in 2020:

Three decades of Islamist rule institutionalized a culture of violence against women in Sudan. The COVID-19 pandemic and state instructed lockdown has led to an acute situation for many Sudanese women suffering domestic abuse, hence reinforcing the urgency to protect them. One of the biggest obstacles is Sudan's family law, a law that makes it impossible to prosecute domestic violence, especially marital rape.⁵²⁶

In its submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Sudan in October-November 2021, the Sexual Rights Initiative (SRI) reported with regards to the justice system in Sudan that:

Justice systems in Sudan are not built for fulfillment of women's rights or for women reporting and seeking justice for violations of their rights. The structures and the workings of police stations, prisons and courts are all deeply patriarchal, and built to accommodate and favour men. Women are often afraid to go to police stations or courts on their own, fearing dismissal of their cases, or worse, physical and verbal violence.

Many women who experience sexual violence are reluctant to initiate criminal cases. Sexual violence has stigma associated with it, and many women avoid reporting such crimes, particularly if the police

⁵²³ DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), [An unfinished revolution: The situation of women human rights defenders in Sudan](#), December 2021, *Post-Revolution Climate for WHRDS*, p. 50. See also The Guardian, [‘Ugliest crime’: Outcry in Sudan over lack of justice for killing of teenage girl](#), 26 March 2021

⁵²⁴ Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA network), [Civil Society Statement: The Sudanese Transitional Government has Blood on its Hands: The Pattern of Violence against Women and Girls Continues](#), 30 March 2021

⁵²⁵ The Guardian, [‘Ugliest crime’: Outcry in Sudan over lack of justice for killing of teenage girl](#), 26 March 2021

⁵²⁶ CHR. Michelsen Institute, [COVID-19 and the urgent need to protect Sudanese women against violence](#), 2020

officer responsible for pursuing their case is a man. The Criminal Procedure Act of 1991 provides some protections for women during court proceedings: it protects victims from being subjected to questions with offensive comments, and prevents emotionally harmful questions. However, in practice women are mistreated and taunted before and during court proceedings. Even getting to participate in court proceedings is rare as their cases aren't given appropriate attention, and the burden of court fees and legal counsel is too much for most women.⁵²⁷

Ilaf Nasreldin, writing for the Sudan blog of the CHR. Michelsen Institute, noted in February 2022 that:

For the most part, sexual assault goes unpunished due to the societal attitude of indifference towards violence against women, and the implicit acceptance of rape as an unavoidable consequence of women defying their prescribed roles in society. Victims are often afraid of reprisals if they pursue prosecution, as the judiciary system in Sudan is not independent and biased towards the army, security, and police forces. This is further exacerbated via Sudanese judicial legislation which places the burden of proof of rape on the victims, through exhausting and humiliating procedures, in addition to its lacking of legislation that distinctly criminalizes rape in times of political turmoil as a war crime subject to prosecution by specific laws and procedures.⁵²⁸

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council on the situation between 25 October 2021 and 10 April 2022, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

The stigma associated with sexual violence and a lack of trust in the justice system allegedly prevented victims from reporting cases of sexual violence. Victims also faced constraints in accessing timely medical care, psychosocial support and free legal aid. The applicable evidentiary standard for rape, as set out in article 62 of the Evidence Act, discourages reporting of rape cases by women as doing so could entail being charged with adultery if the case is not successfully prosecuted.⁵²⁹

In conversation with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan, ARC's Director was told in May 2022:

The authorities do not want to accept that sexual violence takes place. This was true in the case of the mass rapes that took place in the context of the conflict in Darfur, and it has been the case in relation to cases of rape, gang rape and other kinds of sexual violence perpetrated by security forces in the margins of protests. For example, a large number of cases were reported after the protest of 19 December [2021], which received widespread media attention. After initial denial, the head of the Sovereign Council demanded that an investigation be initiated into the allegations. However, most victims do not report the sexual violence to the police due to lack of faith in the justice system, the stigma associated and fear of reprisals.⁵³⁰

3.17. Children

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

⁵²⁷ Sexual Rights Initiative (SRI), [Universal Periodic Review of Sudan, 39th Session, October-November 2021, Individual Submission](#), 2021, paras. 6/7

⁵²⁸ Ilaf Nasreldin (CHR. Michelsen Institute), [Addressing gendered violence: A goal or a threat to the Sudanese revolution](#), February 2022

⁵²⁹ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, para. 42

⁵³⁰ Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes

For information on acts of violence directed against this particular profile see the relevant sub-section of [2.1. Acts of violence](#). Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

3.18. Individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity

2020 – Khartoum

A report by Bedayaa as part of the Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC), submitted for the 2021 Sudan's Universal Periodic Review reported that in March 2020:

At 'Tawaheen Al-Dahab market, Abu Hamad, River Nile State, north of Khartoum, Sudan', where a Sudanese citizen was killed because of his perceived sexual orientation, several shops and cafes were damaged and burned, and approximately 80 persons were arrested. The incidents escalated after hundreds of citizens of this area gathered and demanded the Sudanese authorities to impose security control on mining sites according to a statement issued by the Executive Director of Abu Hamad district, Yahya Khaled Abdel Baset. The citizens also demanded to deport whom 'Yahya Khaled' called as the 'persons of bad behaviors' from the district hereby indirectly referring to LGBTQI+ persons. The statement also indicated that the killed citizen has been transferred to Atbara city, due to the refusal of the locals to bury him in the district's graves.

It is claimed by another statement issued by the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company in the River Nile State that the incidents happened because of holding a party "gay marriage" ceremony in one of the cafes in Abu Hamad. This led to a security chaos that was fueled by incitement from some individuals at the market. The statement concluded that all the necessary legal measures have been taken to impose the security control and evacuate what is called "persons with bad behaviors" from all mining sites.⁵³¹

With regards to accountability with reference to this particular incident, the same report stated:

The Sudanese transitional government took steps to enhance the protection and promotion of human rights in the country. Lately, In February 2021, Sudan's Sovereign Council has approved the ratification of the International Convention on the protection of all persons from enforced disappearances and international convention against torture, this is an incredibly positive step towards a real change in Sudan. However, up to date, the Sudanese authorities failed to show it carried out a thorough, effective, and independent investigation into the matter of Abu Hamad incident.⁵³²

In September 2020 "A video circulated on social media [...] showed crowds of people in a bus station in Khartoum physically attacking two persons calling them homosexuals and voice their rejection to their appearance and dress style. As to date, none of the attacked persons felt reporting the case to the police is a safe option, nor the police acted on itself to investigate and hold perpetrators to account".⁵³³

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

⁵³¹ Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC), [Shadow report for the third Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Sudan, Human rights violations based on SOGIESC in Sudan](#), 2021, para. 3 and 4

⁵³² Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC), [Shadow report for the third Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Sudan, Human rights violations based on SOGIESC in Sudan](#), 2021, para. 6

⁵³³ Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC), [Shadow report for the third Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Sudan, Human rights violations based on SOGIESC in Sudan](#), 2021, para. 20

In 2020 the Transitional Legislative Council “passed a series of bills amending the Criminal Code to protect fundamental rights, including eliminating the death penalty and flogging as punishments for consensual same-sex intercourse, giving LGBT activists hope that full decriminalization might follow. At present, however, Sudanese law still provides for prison sentences of up to seven years for a second sodomy conviction and a life sentence for a third one”, reported the African Human Rights Media Network.⁵³⁴

A report by Bedayaa as part of the Sudan SOGI Coalition’s (SSC) submission to the 2021 Sudan UN Universal Periodic Review noted:

Security forces in Sudan, and since the ousted regime came to power, were empowered to police behavior whether in public or private spaces. Members of the LGBTQI+ community are more vulnerable to these transgressions than others. Access to justice is hindered by social barriers, fears of repercussions, while the complex legal immunities protect perpetrators from security personnel under the legal system.⁵³⁵

The same source further explained:

the Sudanese law and judicial system today has a major gap that allows for the judges to assign punishments arbitrarily. These punishments include the death penalty or corporal punishment such as ‘flogging’. Additionally, according to the current law of evidence, also known as the rules of evidence, proving the charge has become easier. Courts can simply use digital evidence such as private chats or pictures on mobile phones as the basis for a conviction for homosexuality. (This contrasts with the law before the amendment, where witness testimony was required.) The new rules of evidence might make the possibility of applying the sodomy law more frequent and far-reaching in the future. Moreover, it is important to mention that using digital evidence without official search warrants and legal bases conflicts with the most basic human rights to privacy. Besides, the digital evidence finds its way into use as forensic evidence merely when it comes to cases related to sexuality and bodily rights.⁵³⁶

The Sudan SOGI Coalition also stated in its report that “There is also no anti-discrimination or hate crime legislation that protects LGBTQI+ persons from harassment and abuse based on their sexual orientation and/or gender identity in Sudan. There is also no legislation or policy on gender identity recognition or other rights for transgender or intersex people in the country”.⁵³⁷

In March 2021 Bedayaa noted in its briefing that whilst in July 2020 “legal amendments abolished death penalty as a punishment” the “existence of criminalization itself, carried with prison sentence, runs against the very core of equality and non-discrimination stipulated under the constitutional charter”.⁵³⁸ The same source further stated: “A deeper examination of the recent law reform [...] may reflect a problematic patterns. Those steps are cosmetic in nature, where it serves to reflect a ‘radical’ change for the foreign audience, namely western donors”.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁴ Erasing 76 Crimes, [LGBTI activists live in fear amid renewed Sudan protests](#), 17 December 2021

⁵³⁵ Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC), [Shadow report for the third Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Sudan, Human rights violations based on SOGIESC in Sudan](#), 2021, para. 8

⁵³⁶ Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC), [Shadow report for the third Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Sudan, Human rights violations based on SOGIESC in Sudan](#), 2021, para. 11

⁵³⁷ Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC), [Shadow report for the third Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Sudan, Human rights violations based on SOGIESC in Sudan](#), 2021, para. 21

⁵³⁸ Bedayaa, [Human rights violation based on SOGI in Sudan](#), 25 March 2021, p. 8

⁵³⁹ Bedayaa, [Human rights violation based on SOGI in Sudan](#), 25 March 2021, p. 9

3.19. General situation regarding access to justice [not profile specific]

Contextual information provided in section [1. Preface: Political and security situation overview \(January 2020 – April 2022\)](#) may also be useful to put the information in wider political context.

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

Waging Peace stated in June 2020 “Although in October 2019 a national commission was established to investigate the events of 3 June [2019], headed by human rights lawyer Nabil Adib, it has been criticised on the grounds of transparency and accessibility, especially for sexual violence victims, and it is yet to offer its final report, blaming the delay on the COVID-19 pandemic”.⁵⁴⁰

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan noted in its report covering the situation October 2020 to 30 June 2021 with special reference to the National Independent Investigation Committee on the events of 3 June 2019:

Concerns remain, however, over the ability of the Committee to carry out its full mandate in accordance with due process rules established by the international standards owing to technical, logistical and financial challenges, as well as to the low level of cooperation on the part of some state institutions, in common with other investigative mechanisms created by the Attorney General. In addition, the inadequate criminal justice legal framework, notably the absence of the principle of criminal liability on the grounds of command or superior responsibility, is a serious legal impediment to the pursuit of criminal justice. Despite the progress made, the Committee faces increasing criticism over delays in releasing the findings of its investigations, including the list of indictments.⁵⁴¹

Covering the year 2021, Amnesty International highlighted that “Previous promises to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by security forces remained unfulfilled”.⁵⁴² Specifically the organisation noted:

The government took some positive steps towards enabling justice and accountability for human rights violations, by ratifying the UN Convention against Torture and the International Convention against Enforced Disappearance on 10 August [2021].

However, perpetrators of human rights violations continued to enjoy impunity. Over one decade since the ICC issued arrest warrants against Omar al-Bashir, Ahmad Harun and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, the transitional government continued to fail in its obligation to transfer the suspects to the Hague court to answer charges of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes in Darfur.

The National Investigation Committee, appointed in October 2019 to investigate a brutal attack in which the RSF, the National Intelligence and Security Service and the police killed over 100 protesters and subjected others to sexual violence and other torture and ill-treatment in Khartoum in June 2019, was yet to release its findings. No one was held accountable by the end of the year [2021].

The modest progress made to improve human rights protection during a period of almost three years since Omar al-Bashir’s deposal suffered a major setback after the October military coup. Despite the

⁵⁴⁰ Waging Peace, [Justice and Accountability in Sudan](#), 11 June 2020, p. 2

⁵⁴¹ See UN Human Rights Council, [Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 27 July 2021, para. 43

⁵⁴² Amnesty International, [The state of the world’s human rights: Sudan 2021](#), 28 March 2022

prime minister's pledge in November that the killings of those protesting the takeover would be investigated, there was no evidence of any progress in the matter.⁵⁴³

According to UNOCHA, "2021 has also been characterised by a significant increase in crime in the capital, and the government authorities formed in August-September [2021] a joint security force (military, paramilitary and police) to ensure rule of law and provide security in Khartoum".⁵⁴⁴

With reference to the November 2020 Sovereign Council Resolution No. 489, REDRESS noted that the resolution:

introduced a general amnesty for those who previously carried weapons or participated in military operations in Sudan. Despite the Resolution excluding certain groups from benefiting from the amnesty, including those who have been indicted by the International Criminal Court and those accused of committing serious international crimes or grave human rights violations that fall within the mandate of the Special Criminal Court for Darfur, it may still be incompatible with international law. For example, it is not clear from the Resolution whether those who have committed serious international crimes or grave human rights violations outside Darfur are provided with amnesty by the Resolution. Further, it is uncertain whether the general amnesty is extended to the armed forces of the Sudanese government. If it is, it may be inconsistent with the Juba Peace Agreement, which includes only political leaders and members of the "armed movements" in its amnesty provisions.⁵⁴⁵

With special reference to accountability for torture in Sudan, the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) noted in July 2020 that it "remains a big challenge and near impossible for many victims given":

existing legal barriers in particular laws granting immunities to officials, statutes of limitation, lack of adequate victim and witness protection and a system of special courts for the police and security forces. Authorities have repeatedly failed to ensure prompt, thorough, impartial and effective investigations into allegations of torture and ill-treatments and have failed to ensure effective remedies or provide reparation to the victims.

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) has repeatedly identified and recommended urgent and concerted steps for the Sudanese Government to take which it viewed as necessary to ensure the protection of rights, as well as accountability and justice for violations. However, to date, Sudan has failed to adhere to any of the ACHPR's recommendations and decisions. This increases the climate of impunity and exacerbates the denial of justice for victims. There is not a single case where an alleged perpetrator of torture has been held accountable in Sudan.⁵⁴⁶

Similarly, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies noted in March 2021 that "Sudan still refuses to extradite the defendants wanted to appear before the International Criminal Court in the Hague, the most wanted of whom is former president Omar al-Bashir. Such refusal contradicts statements by several officials in the transitional government and Sovereignty Council, confirming acceptance of cooperation with the ICC; the criminal law was also amended to abolish the criminalization of cooperation with the court. Nevertheless, Ali Kushayb, a senior commander of the pro-government

⁵⁴³ Amnesty International, [The state of the world's human rights: Sudan 2021](#), 28 March 2022, *Right to truth, justice and reparation*

⁵⁴⁴ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview, Sudan](#), December 2021, 1.1 *Context of the Crisis, Security environment*, p. 17

⁵⁴⁵ REDRESS, [The forgotten victims: Enforced disappearance in Africa](#), August 2021, 6. *Gaps in the legal and policy framework to prevent and eradicate ED in Africa*, p. 51

⁵⁴⁶ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Briefing paper, \(Post\)-COVID19 era in Sudan: The urgency to unravel the torture and inhuman treatments system one year after the Transition](#), July 2021, 5. *Accountability efforts by the Transitional government: The Gordian knot*, p. 11

Janjaweed militias who surrendered himself to the court in June, remains the only instance of the Sudanese government authorities' cooperation with the ICC".⁵⁴⁷

During its fact-finding mission to Khartoum and Darfur on January-February 2021, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), found with regards to 'Justice and Civilian protection' that:

The October 2020 Juba Peace Agreement between the government and main rebel groups included various provisions, in particular related to justice and security. However, implementation of the deal's security arrangements has suffered from the same slow pace as the rest of the transition, crucially in a context of withdrawal of international forces from Darfur. At the national level, legal reform progressed slowly, but justice efforts in relation to crimes committed since Bashir's fall, in Darfur as well as in Khartoum, have largely stalled. The main obstacles stemmed from persistent divisions between and within civilian and military components of the transitional authorities, which contributed to the October 2021 coup. A military takeover is likely to complicate further justice efforts.⁵⁴⁸

REDRESS noted in its May 2021 Policy Briefing:

Sudan's transitional government has taken some important steps towards securing justice for past human rights violations and international crimes in Sudan. Increased cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) evidences a commitment by the transitional government to implementing aspects of the Juba Peace Agreement, and willingness to meet Sudan's international legal obligations. On the domestic front, Sudan's Public Prosecution has established several investigative committees, including committees for the investigation of missing persons and the events of 3 June 2019, and has announced efforts to investigate past abuses in key cases.⁵⁴⁹

The same source, however, further highlighted:

These are all notable initiatives, which must now be properly implemented. Yet, more is needed. This includes additional progress on the planned justice institutions under the Juba Peace Agreement and Constitutional Charter 2019, and the elimination of remaining legal and institutional obstacles to accountability. To date, the perpetrators of serious human rights violations and international crimes in Sudan have, by and large, not been held accountable, even as human rights violations continue throughout Sudan.

Some of the key obstacles to accountability can be overcome through urgent legal reforms. As an immediate priority, such reforms should include the abolishment of any existing immunities provisions which make the prosecution of any members of the security and intelligence forces for human rights violations virtually impossible. Longer term, organisations and donors seeking to promote domestic justice initiatives must work to build political will for accountability across all bodies of the transitional government, while at the same time addressing the various challenges related to a lack of capacity and the independence of the Sudanese judiciary.⁵⁵⁰

⁵⁴⁷ Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, [*New Aspects of Human Rights Crises during the COVID-19 Pandemic, A brief reading of human rights trends in the Arab region*](#), 24 March 2021, Sudan

⁵⁴⁸ International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) / African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [*Delays and Dilemmas: New Violence in Darfur and Uncertain Justice Efforts within Sudan's Fragile Transition, Fact-finding mission reports*](#), November 2021, II. *Justice and Civilian Protection within Sudan's Transition*, p. 46

⁵⁴⁹ REDRESS, [*Domestic accountability efforts in Sudan, Policy Briefing*](#), May 2021, para. 3

⁵⁵⁰ REDRESS, [*Domestic accountability efforts in Sudan, Policy Briefing*](#), May 2021, paras. 4/5. See also REDRESS / People's Legal Aid Centre (PLACE), [*Sudan: Human rights two years after Al-Bashir's removal*](#), April 2021, p. 12-14

As part of its submission to the UN Human Rights Council, a joint stakeholder's submission by Human Rights and Development Organisation (Hudo Centre) and Waging Peace noted "reports of extrajudicial killings by state-affiliated security, known armed groups, and unknown armed individuals" and that "Civilian killings by the RSF [Rapid Support Forces] continue without being investigated by the police, and without perpetrators being brought to justice".⁵⁵¹

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council on the situation between 25 October 2021 and 10 April 2022, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

Several mechanisms were set up by the authorities to investigate allegations of human rights violations reported since 25 October 2021. On 18 November 2021, following the killing of protesters during the dispersal by security forces of a protest in Khartoum North on 17 November, the Chief of Police of Khartoum State announced that an administrative committee had been created by the civilian governor to investigate what had occurred. On 2 December 2021, the Prime Minister ordered the Chief of Police to investigate the 30 November 2021 raid of, and arrest of one person inside, El Faisal hospital in Khartoum by the security forces. However, these two investigations are administrative rather than judicial.

On 9 December 2021, the acting Attorney General created a committee to investigate human rights violations and "criminal acts" committed since 25 October 2021. The committee, composed of nine prosecutors, reportedly commenced work on 30 January 2022. However, three committee members reportedly resigned. Due to a lack of complaints submitted by the public, despite public calls for submissions, the committee has reportedly used its ex officio power to start investigations into cases of alleged killings.

On 29 December 2021, following instructions from Lieutenant General Al-Burhan, the acting Attorney General announced the creation of another judicial committee, composed of eight prosecutors, including four women, headed by a senior prosecutor, to investigate the allegations of rape perpetrated during the 19 December 2021 demonstrations. The two committees established by the acting Attorney General were reportedly later merged into one. No information on the progress of their work had been made public as at 10 April 2022. During the visit of the Expert to the Sudan, the head of the committee established on 9 December 2021 informed him that the committee had confirmed the killing of many protesters and one incident of rape. However, the committee had yet to identify any alleged perpetrators.⁵⁵²

In conversation with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan, ARC's Director was told in May 2022 with regards to the administration of justice:

Regarding investigations into human rights violations since the coup, several investigative committees were set up, which we understand have been merged into one, which comes under the authority of the Attorney General. The prosecutor in charge has made some progress in investigations, but people have low expectations that the investigation will result in prosecutions. There have been many committees set up over the last few years to investigate human rights violations and inter-communal violence, which have not resulted in accountability.

The investigative committee has confirmed four cases of sexual violence, based on the four complaints that were filed, which is a defacto acknowledgement that sexual violence took place in the context of protests.

⁵⁵¹ Human Rights and Development Organisation (HUDO) / Waging Peace, [Sudan, Third Cycle Universal Periodic Review, Joint Stakeholder's submission Waging Peace and Human Rights and Development Organisation \(Hudo Centre\)](#), March 2021, p. 3 and 5

⁵⁵² UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, paras. 61-63

People generally have little faith in the justice system when it comes to human rights cases, so victims rarely come forward to file complaints. And often, these investigative committees, they can only conduct investigations based on the complaints filed, with some exceptions (such as cases of unlawful killing). In other cases, such as allegations of sexual violence, injury or assault, a complaint needs to be filed. Also, as in many other places, justice often moves slowly and detainees often stay in pre-trial detention for extended periods. And the death penalty is still imposed some cases. In the last last year, I believe there were 1400 cases in which there was a death penalty verdict, but none of them have been implemented, as far as we know. So there's been a kind of de facto moratorium on the use of the death penalty, even though they continue to pass death sentences.⁵⁵³

4. Freedom of movement in Khartoum and Omdurman

2020 - Khartoum

A joint report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP) on the impact of COVID-19 on gender equality and food security summarised that:

A three week partial lockdown for Khartoum State was announced to start in March and this continued into mid-July with the airport closed. After July, while lockdown restrictions eased in Khartoum, nationwide curfews remained in place and some states had closed borders and limited movements of people. Schools were closed in March 2020 and by March 2021 most basic schools had reopened, except within states experiencing escalating intercommunal violence.⁵⁵⁴

In October 2020 the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that due to COVID-19 restrictions “From 8 July 2020, the Government started to ease the lock-down in Khartoum State. The nationwide curfew was changed from 6:00 pm to 5:00 am and bridges in the capital were re-opened. Travelling between Khartoum and other states is still not allowed and airports will gradually open pending further instructions from the Civil Aviation Authority”.⁵⁵⁵

In November 2020 acaps reported that “Movement in and out of Khartoum is not allowed and some states in Darfur region have closed borders because of COVID-19”.⁵⁵⁶

2021 - Khartoum

Following the coup on 25th October 2021, “military elements [...] closed roads, bridges, and the airport in Khartoum”.⁵⁵⁷

Existence of a blacklist - 2021

Covering the period 25 October to 4 December 2021, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported that “The Sovereign Council issued a travel ban against a former detainee

⁵⁵³ Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes

⁵⁵⁴ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) / World Food Programme (WFP), [The Impact of COVID-19 on Gender Equality and Food Security in the Arab region with a focus on the Sudan and Iraq](#), 21 February 2022, *Sudan Country Analysis, Demographic profile*, p. 39

⁵⁵⁵ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), [Sudan: COVID-19 Situation Overview & Response \(7 October 2020\)](#), 7 October 2020

⁵⁵⁶ Acaps, Sudan, [Humanitarian impact of multiple protracted crises](#), 24 November 2020, *Needs of the affected population*, p. 4

⁵⁵⁷ REDRESS, [Sudan: The UN Human Rights Council should act urgently and hold a special session](#), 28 October 2021

preventing him from travelling for treatment abroad. According to a reliable source, a blacklist [sic] from travels abroad issued a few days before coup targeted a number of former executives and some members of Freedom and Change Alliance”.⁵⁵⁸

Journalists

On its undated webpage dedicated to ‘Sudan’, Reporters Without Borders noted that “Correspondents can only work under a special media pass issued by the government. A permit must be granted for most regions each time a reporter travels there.”⁵⁵⁹

Women - 2021

Frontline Defenders reported in November 2021:

Women’s peace and security in Sudan is under significant threat with the increasing deployment of armed forces in different cities and the control of movement by the military, including checkpoints and constant closure of bridges and roads, and beating and sexual harassment on streets. As a result, Sudanese women’s freedom of movement was restricted for the last 3 weeks. [...] The restriction of movement and shutdown of the internet is hindering women’s access to information, health care and protection from sexual violence.⁵⁶⁰

5. Living conditions in the urban areas of Khartoum and Omdurman

5.1. Black African people (including Darfuri and Nuba)

It is recommended to consult the information included under [2.1.1. Black African people \(including Darfuri and Nuba\)](#) under section 2. *Acts of violence*, and particularly sub-heading *Racism and hate speech in Sudan* for useful contextual information.

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

In an interview with Cedoca in February 2021, the Documentation and Research Department of the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, a Sudanese journalist and security analyst who lives in Brussels, stated:

People from the so-called marginalised areas including the South Kordofan, Darfur and the Blue Nile regions who resettled in urban cities in Khartoum and elsewhere across Sudan suffer exclusion from economic opportunities and lack of services. IDPs and members from these communities who settled in Khartoum for instance, exclusively live in ghettos and poor neighbourhoods in the city’s peripheries in areas such as Mayo, Al-Haj Yousif, Dar al-Salam and others. These areas are characterised by lack of basic services in education, health care and rundown conditions. The longstanding inequality facing these communities is rooted in the Sudanese politics of exclusion marginalisation adopted by successive government in the center which led to rebellion and wars in the above-mentioned regions. A significant number of civilians from these regions had to flee elsewhere as a result of direct attacks against them and their livelihoods. They are thus pushed to the fringes and subjected to deprivation and destitute in the new areas they settled in after displacement. By design and through monopoly of

⁵⁵⁸ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [140 political detainees released amidst violent crackdown on anti coup protests](#), 9 December 2021

⁵⁵⁹ Reporters Without Borders, [Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 19.05.2022]

⁵⁶⁰ Frontline Defenders, [Sudanese and International organisations call for an end on attacks against Sudanese women human rights defenders and protesters](#), 19 November 2021

power, quality education, access to services, employment opportunities are exclusively created and offered to the members of the constituencies of the ruling elites in the center and the northern parts of the country. This is the structural political problem facing the country. It is the root cause of the armed conflict between the peripheries (Darfur, the South Kordofan and the Blue Nile) and the traditional power base in the center.⁵⁶¹

Salma Abdalla, a PhD researcher at the Noorse University, also interviewed by Cedoca in March 2021 reported:

The ongoing economic crisis has left most of Sudanese citizens under extreme poverty. However, people from Darfur, South Kordofan or Blue Nile who move to Khartoum and to other northern cities face multiple difficulties in finding work, housing and access to healthcare and schooling. [...] Long years of war and marginalization by central government have disadvantaged these regions in terms of economic and social developments. Therefore, people from these areas face multiple challenges to integrate in the new communities due to lack of the skills required to compete with people from relatively stable regions, doubled with systemic discrimination in the host communities. In a society where social network represents a great asset to make a living, lacking those networks leaves you with very limited options. People who have moved to Khartoum prior to the war, have adapted and developed some skills to survive resources [sic] that are not available for newcomers.⁵⁶²

The founder of an organisation in the Nuba mountains stated:

A lot of time, people coming from the Nuba Mountains are new to Khartoum, they come from a situation of a bush to a city which they are not used to. The ability to go around is based on family members there. For people coming from these regions language is an issue. Their knowledge of Arabic is limited. [...] Everybody relies on family.⁵⁶³

He further noted with regards to employment opportunities:

Right now when people from these areas go to Khartoum, they have an extremely difficult time to find work because of the economic situation, it is extremely hard. The situation in Khartoum at the moment is even worse than in the Nuba Mountains where there are farms. As the result of the economy being down, buildings are not being built. A lot of Nuba work in the construction sector and live off making bricks. It is a really bad situation for people from Two Areas and Darfur to find work. Ethnic issues do play a role. There is definitely a notion of racism. The word 'slave' is used very openly to black people as Darfuri, Nuba and people from Blue Nile.⁵⁶⁴

In conversation with the Co-Executive Directors Sonja Miley and Maddy Crowther from the NGO Waging Peace, Sonja Miley described the situation for Black Africans as follows:

So how it manifests for those who are black African is they do not have the same access to society in Khartoum, in Omdurman. They live in the black belt, which is what Maddy was alluding to. They have shacks that they're living in. They don't have electricity, running water. Their ability to find jobs is less. They're not able to be part of the infrastructure of society. There are some black Africans who have high positions in government, which is the difficulty for people to kind of get their heads around, of

⁵⁶¹ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.2. Levensomstandigheden

⁵⁶² Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.2.2. Tewerkstelling en economische omstandigheden

⁵⁶³ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.2.1. Toegang tot publieke diensten

⁵⁶⁴ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.2.2. Tewerkstelling en economische omstandigheden

course, but they also ascribe to this elite place. So, yeah, there are plenty of people of colour here in the UK who have high positions, but we still have a structure in place that is disadvantaging people of colour [...]

There is so much, but it's about looking in that direction and needing to look in that direction because we have countless examples to share of the people who have been looked over for their jobs because they had an ID and it said a Black African tribe and there was no other reason why they wouldn't get the job, they were equally as qualified, or how they have lived in the Black Belt and their aunt, who was the provider for the family, lost her job, was let go and how they nearly starved.⁵⁶⁵

Sonja Miley added:

And just to add a little bit more to that, again, looking at Khartoum and Omdurman in a vacuum is disingenuous at best when you're not looking at the economic situation. I mean, there's a crisis happening. And the more people are squeezed, even the middle and upper classes are feeling the pinch, not able to access medication, the sanctions kicking in, all sorts. Those people who are the less privileged and at the bottom of the mountain are going to continue to suffer more. And there is another layer in that area, Khartoum, Omdurman, there is a lot of lawlessness now. Gangs that are just operating with impunity and license. We're hearing about killings. We're hearing about the areas that are more affluent, that are banding together and wanting trying to build gated communities like you might see in South Africa that's happening now, trying to keep some sort of barrier against this lawlessness.⁵⁶⁶

Importantly, Waging Peace in their most recent 'Country situation in Sudan' report of June 2022 provided the following useful contextual summary in relation to the discrimination and poorer life chances experiences by black Africans in Sudan:

It is also worth noting the discrimination and poorer life chances afforded to black African individuals. This is even in an environment characterised by general state collapse [...] i.e. insecurity, prohibitive costs for essential drugs and medicines, including medical help relating to mental health, and impingements on social and economic rights, as well as the right to education, across the board, let alone for the poorest and most marginalised in Sudanese society. For instance, a lack of educational opportunities may limit a black African individual's chances of certain forms of paid employment or career advancement, especially if they have lived at some time in the 'Three Areas' of Darfur, South Kordofan or Blue Nile and are now living in Khartoum as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Therefore, the problem for many black Africans who have been displaced by war and who are vulnerable, is how to survive. A contact who lived on the outskirts of Khartoum told us "there is no hope to generate income due to the barriers for qualified persons, and there is no chance whatsoever for those who are non-qualified". Many are forced into informal employment as 'farisha' or 'street vendors', but such work can also leave them open to the predations of state security and periods of imprisonment, as discussed further below in relation to the targeting of women in these professions [...]

Most black African individuals in Khartoum are forced to live in the 'black belt' area at the edges of the city, known for densely populated shacks with little or no heat, and no running water. Residents organise to combat insecurity and reject joint army and police force raids targeting vulnerable groups. One senior source in Khartoum state, who preferred to speak off-the-record, defended measures carried out by his local authorities towards farisha, stressing that the practices carried out by the security services "is intended to organise markets and flight slums", adding that "we take into account the circumstances of sellers, most of whom are victims of war and low income" [...]

Several contacts have confirmed to us that the 'black belt' would be the only area in which rejected asylumseekers from black African tribes returned to Sudan could find accommodation. This is

⁵⁶⁵ Sonja Miley (Waging Peace). See [Annex D.2](#) further below for transcription notes.

⁵⁶⁶ Sonja Miley (Waging Peace). See [Annex D.2](#) further below for transcription notes.

especially the case if an individual wanted to try and evade identification by the security services, for reasons we outline later in this report. It was expressed to us that where a returnee is educated and has qualifications, they may obtain a position with a small private business. However, they will still be subjected to continuous raids by security forces or criminal individuals from military groups - holding military ID cards, wearing uniforms, or possessing firearms. In such cases, non-compliance with the handover of money or goods can be met with violence, beatings, arrest, detention, or more serious harm [...]

Moreover, such accommodation is sadly not even assured or permanent, as the lack of land use rights or deeds for properties in the 'black belt' mean that land can be assumed by the authorities and repurposed at any time, for instance for development plots, with economic gains going to military companies or political figures [...]

This systematic impoverishment by the authorities of those living in the 'black belt' is intentional to keep marginalised groups, being black Africans from war-torn areas of Sudan, in perpetual insecurity. Business ventures fail under these constraints and the authorities do not provide financial support as a means of crippling any resistance. Civil society groups are not allowed to provide support to people in the 'black belt' as the authorities do not consider such areas as 'refugee camps', or shelters for IDPs.⁵⁶⁷

5.2. Christians

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

5.3. Students, political activists, human rights activists, journalists and other (perceived) opponents of the regime

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

The chairwoman of a Sudanese women's organisation interviewed by Cedoca in February 2021, the Documentation and Research Department of the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, noted:

Definitely university students who are poor and come to the center, they experience discrimination, lack of access to resources. The education institution does not offer any support, they are on their own, and there is consistent protest and lack of engagements by state officials in hearing them.⁵⁶⁸

5.4. IDPs

2020 - Khartoum

In September 2020 International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) reported with regards to the flooding in Khartoum:

⁵⁶⁷ Waging Peace, [Country situation in Sudan](#), June 2022, *Treatment of black Africans in Sudan*, paras. 25 - 29

⁵⁶⁸ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.5. *Situatie van specifieke profielen in Khartoem*

DTM teams activated EET [Emergency Event Tracking] to monitor the situation of individuals affected by the heavy rains across Khartoum state since mid-July, which caused flooding and destruction of infrastructure, houses and livelihoods. DTM disseminated the first EET update in two parts: Part One (released 10 September 2020) estimated a total number of 31,743 flood-affected individuals (6,340 households) and Part Two (released 17 September 2020) estimated a total additional caseload of 84,136 flood-affected individuals (16,754 households). Between 2 – 9 September 2020, field teams visited 59 locations across six localities within Khartoum state namely, Khartoum, Bahri, Jebel Awlia, Um Durman, Karrari and Sharg an Neel. The accumulative figures gathered for the first EET update (Part One and Two combined) estimate a total number of 115,879 individuals (23,094 households) affected by the heavy rains. An estimated 26 per cent of the total caseload (30,064 individuals) have been displaced. Fifteen deaths have been reported, and a further 429 individuals have been injured. Approximately 864 individuals have indicated their household goods and/or livestock to be lost. At least 9,345 individuals (8%) report additional vulnerabilities in need of assistance and support.⁵⁶⁹

The same source further found that “Approximately 5,177 homes have been destroyed and 16,411 partially damaged by the heavy rains across Khartoum state. Most of the flood-affected households (72%) have remained in their own homes, whilst 16 per cent are staying with the host community, six per cent are gathering in open areas and five per cent are sheltering in either schools, public buildings, abandoned buildings, critical shelters or other shelter types. One per cent of affected households are renting accommodation”.⁵⁷⁰ IOM also found that “Emergency shelter, non-food items and health (medical needs) were the most prioritised needs across Khartoum state, followed by water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), food and waste management. Nutrition and educational needs tended to be lower on the list of priorities”.⁵⁷¹

Minority Rights Group International reported in its 2020 publication focusing on minority and indigenous communities and the effect of COVID-19 that:

For urban-based refugees, migrants and IDPs in Sudan, the lockdown measures imposed in response to the pandemic created a lack of mobility that brought work in the informal economy to a standstill. Given that many urban refugee and displaced households rely on small informal jobs for their day-to-day survival, food insecurity for these and other migrant communities in Sudan soared from the onset of the pandemic. In a city like Khartoum, the inability to work in informal economy jobs due to Covid19-related lockdowns placed hundreds of thousands of refugee, internally displaced and migrant households at risk of starvation in 2020.⁵⁷²

2021 - Khartoum

The International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) recorded in 2021 “an estimated 376 IDPs” displaced to Khartoum state due to flooding, who all returned “to their locations of origin by the end of 2021”.⁵⁷³

⁵⁶⁹ International Organization for Migration (IOM), Displacement Tracking Matrix / DTM Sudan, [Flooding in Khartoum State Fact Sheet September 2020](#), 23 September 2020, p. 1

⁵⁷⁰ International Organization for Migration (IOM), Displacement Tracking Matrix / DTM Sudan, [Flooding in Khartoum State Fact Sheet September 2020](#), 23 September 2020, p. 2

⁵⁷¹ International Organization for Migration (IOM), Displacement Tracking Matrix / DTM Sudan, [Flooding in Khartoum State Fact Sheet September 2020](#), 23 September 2020, p. 2

⁵⁷² Minority Rights Group International, [Minority and Indigenous Trends 2021, Focus on COVID-19](#), June 2021, *Sudan: As the refugee and IDP crisis escalates, Covid-19 is bringing new woes*, p. 196

⁵⁷³ International Organization for Migration (IOM), [Displacement Tracking Matrix / DTM Sudan, New Displacement Overview, EET Summary January – December 2021](#), 17 May 2022, p. 1 and 3. See for original DTM Emergency Event Tracking (EET), IOM, [Displacement Tracking Matrix / DTM Sudan, Jebel Awlia, Khartoum](#), 17 August 2021

In a June 2021 city scoping study, it was noted that “The civil wars in southern Sudan (1953-72 and 1983-2005), severe droughts in the Sahel (1980s) and the Darfur conflicts (since 2003) contributed to making Khartoum an important destination for internally displaced people (IDPs). Many migrants were initially sheltered in formally designed IDP camps, but in recent years many have assimilated into the city’s informal settlements. The World Population Review [2021] estimates the number of IDPs in Khartoum to be over 2 million. Thus, Khartoum’s population reflects Sudan’s rich diversity, yet it also mirrors the countrywide pattern of inequality as most of the IDP and informal settlements remain neglected and underserved”.⁵⁷⁴

In a needs assessment of vulnerable populations living in flood-prone areas in Khartoum State in December 2021, settlements included Mayo in Jabal Awlia locality, where IDPs, refugees, and vulnerable host communities reside, south of Khartoum city.⁵⁷⁵ The study reported that:

Although demographic data is very limited, it is estimated that appr. 600,000 vulnerable people live in Mayo, with the majority IDPs from Darfur, Nuba Mountains and Kordofan, as well as refugees from South Sudan, Nigeria, the Central African Republic and Chad. The conditions in Mayo are harsh, characterized by poor infrastructure and facilities, lack of solid waste management, and a lack of access to WASH, leading to Open Defecation, water-borne, and diarrheal diseases. Similar to the Open Areas, because of the lack of water access, communities are also forced to buy water from donkey carts, though the vast majority of the population lives below the poverty line. Protection issues including GBV are high. Mayo also experiences high levels of insecurity and tensions between host communities, IDPs, and refugees, with many people working in the informal sector, including e.g. in alcohol production, and high rates of criminality.⁵⁷⁶

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

According to the internal displacement monitoring centre (IDMC), “there were 2.2 million people living in displacement associated with conflict and violence in Sudan at the end of 2020”.⁵⁷⁷ According to their report covering 2020, “The combination of insecurity, unprecedented flooding and the socioeconomic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic have resulted in increased poverty and conflict”.⁵⁷⁸ As of the end of 2021, Sudan counted 3.2million IDPs, according to the IDMC.⁵⁷⁹

In conversation with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan in May 2022, the individual responded when asked about the situation of IDPs in Khartoum:

I think they fall into a category of people whose situation was already quite precarious and mostly rely on the informal sector for income. What has had a big impact on them is the economic situation, which deteriorated dramatically after the coup [...]

⁵⁷⁴ Ille, E. and Steel, G., *Khartoum: City Scoping Study*, June 2021, p. 4

⁵⁷⁵ Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), *Needs assessment of vulnerable populations living in flood-prone areas in Khaartoum State*, March 2022, *Introduction and Background*, p. 2

⁵⁷⁶ Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), *Needs assessment of vulnerable populations living in flood-prone areas in Khaartoum State*, March 2022, *Contextual Background, Mayo*, p. 3

⁵⁷⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), *Severity of internal displacement, 2021 Report*, 3 November 2021, *Sudan*, p. 80

⁵⁷⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), *Severity of internal displacement, 2021 Report*, 3 November 2021, *Sudan*, p. 80

⁵⁷⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), *Country Profile: Sudan*, Undated [last accessed: 24.05.2022]

And then the prices shot up, and most have not gone down even though the exchange rate has improved, which means that for people already vulnerable like IDPs, it's really difficult for them to survive. There's been an increase in petty crime, which is possibly a consequence.⁵⁸⁰

5.5. Returnees

No relevant information was found amongst the sources consulted within the research timeframe for this report. It is important to note that the absence of information should not be taken as evidence that an issue, incident or violation does not exist.

5.6. Women

2020 - Khartoum

An investigation carried out by the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA Network) regarding violence against Women and Girls during COVID-19 found regarding tea vendors:

In a press statement, the Women Cooperative Union, an association of 13 registered cooperatives in Khartoum, reminded us that many in this sector [informal sector] are still recovering from the state violence they were exposed to after the Khartoum sit-in last year [...]

Women tea sellers have long been converted into scapegoats for community problems. With the COVID-19 crisis, these women are once again being unjustly blamed for the virus, and thus shoulder a greater burden of lost customers.

The precarity of their access to income leaves women with greater exposure to violence and little means to pursue justice or support services [...]

In line with the pattern of militarization across the region, hundreds of Sudanese Army soldiers and Rapid Support forces militia members have been injected into the Khartoum area.

Ostensibly in place to encourage compliance with COVID-19 response measures, this increased presence of military and militia in civilian streets is particularly worrying given the institution's history of targeting women with violence. This policy choice by Sudanese leadership indicates a complete lack of gender-responsive in their approach to this crisis.⁵⁸¹

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

In its submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Sudan in October-November 2021, the Sexual Rights Initiative (SRI) reported with regards to female labour rights in Sudan that:

Most women in Sudan are restricted to working in the informal economy as farmers or as domestic workers. Close to 90% of Sudan's female labour force works in agriculture, and out of that, 90% work in subsistence farming [...]

In addition to traditional expectations and deterrents, there are also legal restrictions on certain types of work for women. Article 19 of the Labour Act prohibits women from working in occupations that are hazardous, arduous, or harmful to their health, including not being exposed to temperatures exceeding "the normal limits borne by women." It is also worth noting that the Article 19 of the Labour Act is in the larger section of "Employment of Women and Young Persons." Women are

⁵⁸⁰ Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes.

⁵⁸¹ Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA), [We are done with playing the same old game: We Demand Change, Violence against Women & Girls \(VAWG\) in the Greater Horn of Africa during COVID-19](#), 24 July 2020, *Context-Specific Findings, Sudan*, p. 12 and 13

codified in law as subclass people without autonomy and needing protections as a young person would.

On the other hand, women working as domestic workers are not covered by the Labour Act. Although some labour protections are provided by other legislation, marginalized women are the ones working as domestic workers and they don't need protection as other women who can't even experience too high of temperatures. Sudanese legislation also only offers 8 weeks of paid maternity leave, less than the ILO standard of 14 weeks.⁵⁸²

5.7. Children

2021 – Khartoum

Between 25 January and 2 February 2021, an interviewee for a report on the impact of COVID-19 on trafficking in Sudan stated that “In the streets when you used to see only two or three children now you see ten or fifteen, especially in Khartoum”.⁵⁸³

Save the Children reported in December 2021 about Montaser and his family who live in Khartoum after moving there 23 years ago “in search of a better quality of life and access to healthcare”.⁵⁸⁴ The article highlighted that “their lives have become increasingly difficult since Montaser’s father died seven years ago, and since the onset of a financial crisis that saw inflation in the country rise to one of the highest levels in the world” and where “Montaser, 14, goes to the market every afternoon to sell sweets to support his family, sometimes staying out until 10pm. Whatever he earns – usually the equivalent of US \$2-3 – he gives to his mother Ihasan to contribute towards feeding their family”.⁵⁸⁵ Moreover, his mother and her daughter Ibtihaj, 25, “try to get whatever casual work they can, and nothing is more important than putting food on the table so that her children can survive. Often, she can only afford to do this once a day. Goods such as coffee and tea are now a distant luxury and she cannot afford to spend money on other essentials, like repairs on the house, clothes or anything her children might need for school”.⁵⁸⁶

UNOCHA described that “Out of the 23 CEmONC [Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric and Newborn Care services] facilities in Khartoum [State], 30 per cent were fully operational during the second half of 2020”.⁵⁸⁷

2022 – Khartoum

BBC News reported in February 2022 about the rescue of a 10-year-old boy from the “crushing mechanism of a rubbish lorry in Sudan's capital, Khartoum”, where he was “working with a truck run by the Khartoum State Cleaning Corporation”, thereby highlighting “the issue of child labour in

⁵⁸² Sexual Rights Initiative (SRI), [Universal Periodic Review of Sudan, 39th Session, October-November 2021, Individual Submission](#), 2021, paras. 12-14

⁵⁸³ University of Nottingham Rights Lab / Global Partners Governance / RUSI / Waging Peace / Modern Slavery & Human Rights Policy & Evidence Centre, [The impacts of COVID-19 on human trafficking in Sudan, A case study of pandemic in transition](#), April 2021, Particular vulnerable populations, Children, p. 24

⁵⁸⁴ Save the Children, [Sudan Crisis: Children forced to work, skip meals as situation worsens](#), 22 December 2021

⁵⁸⁵ Save the Children, [Sudan Crisis: Children forced to work, skip meals as situation worsens](#), 22 December 2021

⁵⁸⁶ Save the Children, [Sudan Crisis: Children forced to work, skip meals as situation worsens](#), 22 December 2021

⁵⁸⁷ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview, Sudan](#), December 2021, 3.3 Health, Affected population, p. 60

Sudan, where children are often exploited and some recruited as soldiers” and the issue of “street children in Khartoum and other big cities”.⁵⁸⁸

5.8. Individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity

General information (January 2020 - April 2022)

Research conducted between October and December 2020 by the organisation Bedayaa on the needs of the LGBTQI+ community in Sudan reported that “the structure of Sudanese society including the institutions that organize people’s living, are mostly built on patriarchal heteronormativity, including institutions that provide basic rights such as health and education”.⁵⁸⁹ The study further found that the “Queer community needs” were:

Psychological support appears to be one of the most important areas of need, 84% of the answers indicated this need. Following this need comes the necessity for entertainment safe spaces, with 63.9% of the respondents stating so. 59.2% mentioned the need of housing shelters for people without housing and protection. Then 53.8% ticked the importance of specialized health centers for the queer community. Employment opportunities are also essential, 44.9% designated it as a need. Others also mentioned the need for training workshops and sessions (44.4%) and 37.8% emphasized the need for capacity building. Also, 37.3% wanted academic references, meaning reading material and the like.

When it comes to health services, people identified different areas of need. 82.8% need information on sexual health, and 75.7% need protection methods from sexually transmitted diseases. 65% required centers for sexual health and 45.6% showed the urgency for education workshops. This was followed by a percentage of 42% who need websites and online platforms. In addition, 34.9% of the people who ticked a need academic references.⁵⁹⁰

The same report further found that:

When it comes to the labor act, only few people know of its articles (17.7%) while 57.4% do not know of them, and 24.8% know some of it. A considerable number of people faced discrimination based on their sexual orientation in their workplace (37.8%) and 46.7% did not have such experiences. Most of those who went through discrimination said it was verbal harassment (41.5%). Then others (24.6%) experienced work unease and complications. 15.4% went through sexual harassment and 3.8% lived sexual assaults. 13.8% were not accepted at jobs. 15.4% went through sexual harassment and 3.8% lived sexual assaults. 13.8% were not accepted at jobs.⁵⁹¹

With regards to discrimination faced by queer women, the report highlighted the following situation when access to health services, in particular gynaecologists:

One of the main challenges queer women face is the discrimination against single women when they visit a gynecologist. Here single, queer women hesitate and fear asking for help regarding sexual and reproductive health. Some interlocutors mentioned that having sexual intercourse as an unmarried woman and visiting a gynecologist is risky. The society is conservative and as such it is rarely acceptable for women to have sexual intercourse outside a marriage. Many doctors may represent such moral stands against sexual freedoms, and they become a source of fear for patients. For a queer woman this is a risk not only because of her sexual “state” i.e. intercourse without marriage,

⁵⁸⁸ BBC News, [Sudanese boy rescued after eight hours trapped in rubbish lorry](#), 15 February 2022

⁵⁸⁹ Bedayaa, [Needs Assessment Report 2020, LGBTQI+ in Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 05.06.2022], p. 10

⁵⁹⁰ Bedayaa, [Needs Assessment Report 2020, LGBTQI+ in Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 05.06.2022], p. 18

⁵⁹¹ Bedayaa, [Needs Assessment Report 2020, LGBTQI+ in Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 05.06.2022], p. 24

become a source of fear for patients. For a queer woman this is a risk not only because of her sexual “state” i.e. intercourse without marriage, but also because of her sexual identity. [...]

There is a tendency from some doctors to impose their moral standards and judge patients accordingly [...]

Overall, the health services available for queer women is surrounded by inaccessibility, fear, and potential stigma. As we mentioned earlier in this section, queer women face similar challenges as do other single women, but they also live in a state of further fear. They struggle for this section, queer women face similar challenges as do other single women, but they also live in a state of further fear. They struggle for being who they are, for being women in a conservative society and sometimes for choosing to be sexually active.⁵⁹²

The study also wanted to find out more about the challenges faced by the Trans community and noted:

For the purpose of this report, we facilitated a focus group discussion (FGD) among four trans people. The FGD aimed at filling a data gap in the survey, as well as in the interviews. In the following section we discuss this FGD and the challenges of trans people.

Trans people have very limited access to medical treatments in Sudan. Most of them need to travel abroad for surgeries, hormonal therapy, and even medical prescriptions. There is no information on centres or clinics that provide trans people health services. The journey of transition/correction is an uneasy one starting from finding a psychiatrist as a first step [...]

The participants shared their emotional experiences on how they were able to know they were trans. One common aspect, they got to understand and know about ‘trans’ only online. They also got to know each other through online platforms. Along the journey, some doctors did not know about trans at all, others tried to convince them they were wrong, others were influenced by religious ideas, and some could not provide support for trans younger than 18 years old. While encountering the trans medical services, people got stereotyped based on feminine and masculine ideals. How a person looks can help them or can be a barrier from getting a service. Fear of society stands between trans people and between getting the information of even how them or can be a barrier from getting a service. Fear of society stands between trans people and between getting the information of even how to take the medicine or where to get a hormonal injection. Currently the people we spoke to, are not getting any medical follow up. They lost contact with the Egyptian doctor, and in Sudan they fear visiting any doctor for hormonal check and follow up. [...]

There are no laws that prevent them from changing their gender, but also no laws that recognize them. Basically, unseen under the legal framework [...]

The interlocutors also agreed that the process of transition/corrections is easier for transmen than for trans women socially speaking. The social and cultural issue is a real burden because it influences how authorities and employees treat trans people. It is very random, meaning there are no regulations that support trans people through their journey. This ‘randomity’ makes them vulnerable to the cultural values of the employees and their ethical or religious stands. Not only the employees but some formal procedures such as having a new birth certificate can employees and their ethical or religious stands. Not only the employees but some formal procedures such as having a new birth certificate can not be done without family involvements. Involving family members for testimony and oath is common in Sudan. In the trans people cases, when applying for new birth certificates they need to bring their mothers or one of their direct relatives from the father's side for testimony. In

⁵⁹² Bedayaa, [Needs Assessment Report 2020, LGBTQI+ in Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 05.06.2022], p. 29/30

cases where a trans person is not in agreement with their families, they can not get their documents done.⁵⁹³

In conversation with the Co-Executive Directors Sonja Miley and Maddy Crowther from the NGO Waging Peace, Maddy Crowther stated:

And we more recently heard of some cases of employment-related issues when someone was, in this case, gay. It was widely understood-- it's sort of widely understood that there are certain categories of profession that are more likely to be done by someone if they are gay, such as in-home cooks. But they also mean that the exchange that they have is that very often that means they don't have a lot of employment rights protection. They don't have a formal contract. It may be that they're just simply not paid for their work was something we heard recently from someone, but it was anecdotal, that they said that's a very known thing. It was almost suggested to us, like everyone knows that if you have that role, maybe that means you're gay because there's some conception of you being sort of safer to be around the family. But very often families will just chuck someone without-- chuck someone on the street without notice. They won't pay them for their services. And that's kind of what we had heard. But I haven't heard recently of a case of someone being publicly flogged or going through the court system for being gay [...]

And I think there's a kind of-- most of the people that we know who would describe themselves or be known as LGBTQI are in that kind of artist community. So I think attacks on the artist community can sometimes be coded in ways that are probably quite interesting. But yeah, we haven't heard of some sort of specific-- there was a legal case brought against someone for being gay recently, but I think, again, it's one of those-- it appears in ways you might not initially expect.⁵⁹⁴

5.9. General information on living conditions in the urban areas of Khartoum and Omdurman [not profile specific]

Health - General information (2020)

In 2020, Munzoul Assal, Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Khartoum, wrote on the Sudan blog of the CHR. Michelsen Institute with regards to the health sector in Sudan in light of COVID-19:

the health sector still is suffering from three decades of neglect by the Islamist regime of ex-President Omar al-Bashir who has largely invested public funds in security and military. The result of the Islamist regime's reluctance to invest in the health sector is dramatic; There are only 4 .6 doctors per 10,000 population and most of them are located in urban centers. There are only an estimated 80 ventilators throughout the country most of which are in private hospitals that most people cannot afford.⁵⁹⁵

Similarly, Human Rights Watch' Africa Researcher, Mohamed Osman, reported in April 2020 that "Sudan's health sector already faced serious challenges of corruption, underfunding, and mismanagement. Even before COVID-19, there was a shortage of nurses, critical care beds, and reportedly only 80 ventilators in the whole country".⁵⁹⁶

Food - General information (2020)

⁵⁹³ Bedayaa, [Needs Assessment Report 2020, LGBTQI+ in Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 05.06.2022], p. 34/35

⁵⁹⁴ Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace). See [Annex D.2](#) further below for transcription notes.

⁵⁹⁵ Munzoul Assal (CHR.Michelsen Institute), [COVID-19 and the challenges of social distancing in Khartoum](#), 2020

⁵⁹⁶ Mohamed Osman (Human Rights Watch (HRW)), [Sudan Should Not Let COVID19 Scuttle Transition](#), 1 April 2020

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) reported in its '2021 Global Report on Food Crises' that "In the Sudan, the number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in Khartoum state almost doubled from 793 000 in June–August 2019 to 1.4 million during the same period in 2020 (IPC, September 2020)".⁵⁹⁷

Impact of floodings - General information (2020)

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported in October 2020 that "The number of people affected by the unprecedented floods affecting Sudan continue to increase [...] More than 400 schools and thousands of health facilities have been damaged, compromising education and health services, especially in North Darfur, Khartoum, West Darfur and Sennar".⁵⁹⁸ UN News similarly reported that:

[Sudanese] Authorities declared a three-month state of emergency in early September after the worst flooding in 30 years.

To date [02.10.2020], more than 860,000 people have had houses destroyed or damaged and more than 120 people have died.

Some 560 schools and thousands of health facilities have also been affected, compromising essential services to communities, especially in North Darfur, Khartoum, West Darfur and Sennar, which account for 52 per cent of all people affected.⁵⁹⁹

Economic situation - General information (2020)

Covering the period 9 September to 23 November 2020, the UN reported that "The economic situation continued to deteriorate during the reporting period. Lockdowns due to the pandemic resulted in a severe decline in economic activity, a lowering of the gross domestic product and the loss of approximately 42 per cent of fiscal revenue. In urban areas, the pandemic also had a negative impact on the large informal economic sector, increasing the precarious situation of daily-wage earners, especially women, who grapple with poverty".⁶⁰⁰

In its subsequent report covering the period 24 November 2020 to 15 February 2021, the UN continued to note that "the economic situation continued to deteriorate" resulting in "sharp increases in the price of bread and vegetables, transport and clothing".⁶⁰¹

2021 – Khartoum

In a June 2021 city scoping study, Khartoum was described as being "central to political and economic developments in Sudan, yet it has also grown in ways that have precluded many of its inhabitants from participating in decision-making and sharing in the city's growing wealth. Exclusionary politics and economic inequality are deeply rooted in the history of Khartoum and the rest of the country, and have contributed to political instability [...] In Khartoum, the challenge is to

⁵⁹⁷ Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), [2021 Global Report on Food Crises](#), September 2021, *Major drivers of food crises across the IGAD region in 2020*, p. 17

⁵⁹⁸ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), [Daily Noon Briefing Highlights: Sudan](#), 1 October 2020

⁵⁹⁹ UN News, [Sudan alert: Flooding and surging inflation threaten humanitarian assistance](#), 2 October 2022

⁶⁰⁰ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan Report of the Secretary-General](#), 1 December 2020, para. 18

⁶⁰¹ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan Report of the Secretary-General](#), 1 March 2021, para. 17

address blatant inequality and the inefficient – and often corrupt – distribution of resources and urban services”.⁶⁰²

Dr. Enrico Ille in his country expert report on the living situation in Greater Khartoum of October 2021 assessed the living conditions of an able-bodied man without social ties after entering Sudan as follows:

In view of the fact that there is no state social system that is even remotely adequate, an able-bodied adult man without a social network and without preferential access to higher income brackets cannot live in Khartoum without falling into deep economic dependency and/or poverty, or to join military or paramilitary groups which, due to widely documented human rights violations committed to date, cannot be classified as a humanitarily acceptable option.⁶⁰³

With regards to access to accommodation, Dr. Enrico Ille summarised his opinion as follows:

Without a family or other support system, only a limited number of possible commercial accommodations remain, the current costs of which are well above the official subsistence level. Low-priced hostels are only a short-term option, with an average monthly cost of 60,000 SDG; Rented apartments are even more expensive. The option of single rooms in rental or private homes remain at SDG 30,000 and are also difficult to find without intermediation; Rental communities, an option only for unmarried men, are more affordable, but characterized by coexistence in a confined space and also with chance or other costs associated with mediation.⁶⁰⁴

As for access to a livelihood, the country expert concluded:

The informal sector is large and diverse in Sudan and especially in the capital Khartoum; there is a reasonable probability that an able-bodied adult male will find work. However, this does not generally mean that a sufficient income can be generated without further social security. An average daily wage of 1000 SDG would only lead to a monthly amount of 30,000 SDG under the most favorable conditions, i.e. daily employment, which in turn is only enough to cover the rental costs alone under favorable conditions. All other options are characterized either by long-term economic dependency, illegality and/or working conditions that are not humanitarian.⁶⁰⁵

Lastly, Dr. Enrico Ille summarised his views on access to medical care:

⁶⁰² Ille, E. and Steel, G., *Khartoum: City Scoping Study*, June 2021, p. 2

⁶⁰³ Dr. Ille, E., *Expert opinion on the general living conditions in the Khartoum metropolitan area, Sudan, with special consideration of the consequences of the Covid-19-pandemic and the floods of 2020 and 2021*, [Gutachten zu den allgemeinen Lebensbedingungen im Ballungsraum Khartum, Sudan, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Folgen der COVID-19-Pandemie, sowie der Hochwasser von 2020 und 2021, 31 October 2021, p. 57. Note that the original report was written and published in German, but for the purposes of this report a working translation was used on 20th June 2022 through the online tool: [Online Doc Translator](#)

⁶⁰⁴ Dr. Ille, E., *Expert opinion on the general living conditions in the Khartoum metropolitan area, Sudan, with special consideration of the consequences of the Covid-19-pandemic and the floods of 2020 and 2021*, [Gutachten zu den allgemeinen Lebensbedingungen im Ballungsraum Khartum, Sudan, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Folgen der COVID-19-Pandemie, sowie der Hochwasser von 2020 und 2021, 31 October 2021, p. 57. Note that the original report was written and published in German, but for the purposes of this report a working translation was used on 20th June 2022 through the online tool: [Online Doc Translator](#)

⁶⁰⁵ Dr. Ille, E., *Expert opinion on the general living conditions in the Khartoum metropolitan area, Sudan, with special consideration of the consequences of the Covid-19-pandemic and the floods of 2020 and 2021*, [Gutachten zu den allgemeinen Lebensbedingungen im Ballungsraum Khartum, Sudan, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Folgen der COVID-19-Pandemie, sowie der Hochwasser von 2020 und 2021, 31 October 2021, p. 58. Note that the original report was written and published in German, but for the purposes of this report a working translation was used on 20th June 2022 through the online tool: [Online Doc Translator](#)

Khartoum does not offer its population adequate basic medical care, both medical facilities and medicines are expensive and insufficient. For someone already on the subsistence level and without social support, a large part of the treatment and medication costs cannot be afforded; an accident or other major health impairment will trigger an almost insolvable financial crisis, which in an emergency will lead to medical care being avoided.⁶⁰⁶

[Note that the expert country report covers the following relevant issues in greater depth - General economic situation; COVID-19 measures and consequences; the floods of 2020 and 2021 – before providing his expert opinion on the ‘living conditions of an able-bodied man without social ties after entering Sudan’ and ‘Living conditions after entry into Sudan’. For access to the report click [here](#).⁶⁰⁷]

Vulnerable groups - General information (2021)

With reference to population groups categorised by UNOCHA in the ‘life-threatening’ or ‘life-sustaining’ categories, it was reported that in 2021 there were 603,325 vulnerable residents classified as living in the ‘life-threatening’ category in Khartoum state, of which slightly less than half further classified as refugees, whilst 1,584,210 vulnerable residents were classified in the category ‘life-sustaining’ of which 307,692 were refugees.⁶⁰⁸

Health - General information (2021)

Covering the period 1st February 2019 to 31st January 2021, the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2022 noted “Health facilities were overwhelmed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The government established a designated health center with 103 beds and 23 intermediate and intensive care units (ICU) in Khartoum. Doctors without Borders established another COVID-19 treatment center in Omdurman Hospital with 20 beds. ICU beds in private clinics cost up to \$1,000 per day, exclude other medical costs, and are thus only for the wealthiest members of the population”.⁶⁰⁹

In its annual report covering 2021 the World Health Organization (WHO) Health Cluster Sudan reported that “70% of the population resides in rural areas, 70% of health workers work in the urban areas with 38% in the capital, Khartoum”.⁶¹⁰

In December 2021, the World Health Organization (WHO) provided the following briefing on COVID-19:

Sudan is witnessing the fourth wave of the COVID-19 pandemic.

⁶⁰⁶ Dr. Ille, E., [Expert opinion on the general living conditions in the Khartoum metropolitan area, Sudan, with special consideration of the consequences of the Covid-19-pandemic and the floods of 2020 and 2021](#), [Gutachten zu den allgemeinen Lebensbedingungen im Ballungsraum Khartum, Sudan, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Folgen der COVID-19-Pandemie, sowie der Hochwasser von 2020 und 2021, 31 October 2021, p. 58. Note that the original report was written and published in German, but for the purposes of this report a working translation was used on 20th June 2022 through the online tool: [Online Doc Translator](#)

⁶⁰⁷ See Dr. Ille, E., [Expert opinion on the general living conditions in the Khartoum metropolitan area, Sudan, with special consideration of the consequences of the Covid-19-pandemic and the floods of 2020 and 2021](#), [Gutachten zu den allgemeinen Lebensbedingungen im Ballungsraum Khartum, Sudan, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Folgen der COVID-19-Pandemie, sowie der Hochwasser von 2020 und 2021, 31 October 2021

⁶⁰⁸ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview, Sudan](#), December 2021, 1.4 Humanitarian Conditions and Severity of Needs, Humanitarian conditions, p. 33

⁶⁰⁹ Bertelsmann Stiftung, [BTI 2022 Country Report — Sudan](#), Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2022, I. Political Transformation, 1 / Stateness, p. 9

⁶¹⁰ World Health Organization (WHO), [2021 Annual Report, Sudan Health Cluster](#), 24 March 2022, Health Cluster Responses, p. 5

The first case was reported in the country in March 2020. By September 21st 2021 Sudan had more than 85,000 suspected COVID-19 cases -- of which 45,730 confirmed by lab results -- with 3,518 associated deaths. Out of 1,041 health workers tested in Sudan, 64% were positive for COVID-19.

The Sudan Ministry of Health and WHO believe that the actual number of cases is much higher due to weakness in surveillance and other factors including limited testing capacity at the onset of the pandemic and the stigma associated with the disease.

Confirmed COVID-19 cases were reported from the country's 18 states, with the highest number from the capital Khartoum (28919) -- which represents 60% of all confirmed cases -- followed by the states of Gezira (4233), River Nile (2593) and Red Sea (2029).

The percentage of deaths among the confirmed cases (case fatality ratio) in Sudan is one of the highest in the region (7.69%). The limited capacities of COVID-19 treatment centers do not match the need.

The socio-economic impacts of the pandemic are significant, particularly among the most vulnerable and disadvantaged populations.

COVID-19 vaccination coverage is low in Sudan. Currently, 94% of the people of Sudan are not vaccinated against COVID-19. There are around two million COVID-19 vaccine doses available in the country and a further nine million doses allocated for Sudan in the first quarter of 2022 by GAVI, the vaccine alliance.⁶¹¹

In its submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Sudan in October-November 2021, the Sexual Rights Initiative (SRI) reported with regards to the health system in Sudan that "The health system in Sudan is faced with many challenges including poor infrastructure and poor compensation for health care professionals. There is also a gap in health policies and implementation by health care professionals; there is no consistency in care, information and services across the country".⁶¹²

With regards to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Sudan, the same source noted:

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to have significant impacts on the economic, social and political conditions in Sudan. The lockdown and limited economic opportunities have led to high tensions in families. The number of GBV [gender-based violence] cases has increased dramatically during these times. Closures of schools and sports activities have created unsafe conditions for girls, as they are more likely to be victims of physical and sexual violence. Women and girls have disproportionate care giving burdens during the pandemic, and many girls have permanently dropped out of school. People are also struggling to adopt new measures to meet nutrition needs in this dire economic situation created by the pandemic. The condition of IDPs has also worsened as they are not being prioritized by the government.⁶¹³

Food - General information (2021)

UNOCHA reported with regards to food insecurity in Khartoum state 2021 that:

⁶¹¹ World Health Organization (WHO), [Statement by WHO Representative in Sudan at the Regional press briefing on COVID-19](#), 22 December 2021

⁶¹² Sexual Rights Initiative (SRI), [Universal Periodic Review of Sudan, 39th Session, October-November 2021, Individual Submission](#), 2021, para. 20

⁶¹³ Sexual Rights Initiative (SRI), [Universal Periodic Review of Sudan, 39th Session, October-November 2021, Individual Submission](#), 2021, para. 27

In 2021, food insecurity continued to increase in areas not usually targeted for humanitarian assistance. For instance, the largest increase in acutely food insecure people – over 200,000 people – came from Khartoum State – the largest urban centre and federal capital.⁶¹⁴

In its 2021 annual report the World Food Programme reported that “Food insecurity continued to increase in areas not usually targeted for humanitarian assistance, including Khartoum as well as eastern Sudan, which seem to be bearing the brunt of the economic crisis and lack of long-term development assistance”.⁶¹⁵

Economic situation - General information (2021)

During the period 2 May to 20 August 2021 the UN reported that “Despite [...] important milestones, the country continued to face severe economic hardship, with daily interruptions in water and electricity and acute shortages of fuel and medical supplies”.⁶¹⁶ In its subsequent report covering 21 August to 21 November 2021 the UN noted: “While there had been initial signs of economic recovery in the Sudan in recent months, the military coup d’état put such progress in jeopardy. Persistent political instability, in both the east and Khartoum, alongside the lingering effects of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and high inflation, also continued to hamper investment, economic activity and private consumption amid high unemployment and low productivity”.⁶¹⁷

In an interview with Cedoca in February 2021, the Documentation and Research Department of the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, Bushra Gamar, Director of the NGO Hudo stated with regards to access to employment for Darfuri and Nuba:

High ranking jobs are not possible since the majority of these groups is illiterate and they cannot get the recommendation (letters or authorized persons) needed. The jobs they are doing are low level jobs: washing, cleaning, house labor with very little wage - you can work all month and get 10 dollar.⁶¹⁸

BBC News reported that following the military coup in October 2021, the World Bank, the African Union and the US suspended its aid to Sudan.⁶¹⁹

Vulnerable groups - General information (2022)

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported in January 2022 that “This year, humanitarian organizations estimate that about 14.3 million people across Sudan will need humanitarian assistance. This includes the Darfurs – where half of the people are estimated to be extremely vulnerable – Khartoum and South Kordofan”.⁶²⁰

Access to health services / Mental health – General information (2022)

⁶¹⁴ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview, Sudan](#), December 2021, 1.2 *Shocks and Impact of the Crisis, Impact on people*, p. 20

⁶¹⁵ World Food Programme, Sudan, [Annual Country Report 2021](#), Undated [Last accessed: 11/05/2022], Overview, p. 3

⁶¹⁶ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan Report of the Secretary-General](#), 1 September 2021, para. 19

⁶¹⁷ UN Security Council, [Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan](#), 3 December 2021, para. 21

⁶¹⁸ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio's](#), 28 June 2021, 2.1.2.2. *Tewerkstelling en economische omstandigheden*

⁶¹⁹ BBC News, [Sudan coup: World bank suspends aid after military takeover](#), 28 October 2021

⁶²⁰ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), [Daily Noon Briefing Highlights: Afghanistan – Sudan – Syria](#), 11 January 2022

In conversation with the Co-Executive Directors Sonja Miley and Maddy Crowther from the NGO Waging Peace, Sonja Miley stated:

And somehow there seems to be in the journey of many, many Sudanese going to Libya and the experiences there where they're they tend to be Black African populations who are imprisoned, sold as slaves, I mean, human slavery, human trafficking, all of that. So leaving Sudan for that experience where any of our clients are there not just months but years until they can finally somehow escape if they do. And they are making their way to Europe. They're often again encountering racism in their experience, and it follows them everywhere. And there's just something about the trauma, the mental health issues [...]

But mental health is a huge issue. There's not a lot of infrastructure in Sudan.⁶²¹

Maddy Crowther added:

And we did a report on this is prerevolution, but on mental health provision. And given the overall deterioration in health facilities throughout Sudan, you can only imagine that the pitch is way worse. And also the needs must be way, way higher. And people sort of now actively at least use the language of traumatised. And the young people who they say-- their political motivations come from being traumatised, and that's being talked about [...]

And the Sudanese, themselves, the Black Africans-- the young Darfuri said his life will be over if he is returned to Khartoum. They have that sense as well. They will not have a life. And he did actually say he would take his own life if he was returned to Darfur because he knows that he's on a kill list. But that sense of dread, that sense of foreboding, that sense of fear to be returned is real.⁶²²

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council on the situation between 25 October 2021 and 10 April 2022, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

The right to health, in particular of those living in poverty, has been impaired due to the surge in the prices of essential drugs and medicines since 25 October 2021. The failure of the authorities to disburse salaries and allowances, including to those in the health-care sector, has also had a negative impact on the provision of medical services.⁶²³

Access to food – General information (2022)

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council on the situation between 25 October 2021 and 10 April 2022, the Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

In a press statement dated 23 March 2022, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme warned that the combined effects of the conflict in Ukraine, the growing economic crisis and poor harvests would likely double the number of persons facing acute hunger to more than 18 million by September 2022. The increase in the prices of staple foods has particularly affected vulnerable groups, such as rural and urban poor, people living in slums and informal settlements, internally displaced persons, refugees and migrants, day labourers and others dependent on the informal sector, including women who sell tea on the street.⁶²⁴

Economic situation - General information (2022)

⁶²¹ Sonja Miley (Waging Peace). See [Annex D.2](#) further below for transcription notes.

⁶²² Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace). See [Annex D.2](#) further below for transcription notes.

⁶²³ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, para. 51

⁶²⁴ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, para. 53

In its February 2022 brief, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees reported: “According to reports from different regions of the country, the economic situation has been deteriorating since the military coup. Constantly rising prices, especially for basic foodstuffs, are causing great hardship for the people. The economic situation which was already very difficult continues to decline and is heightening the danger of a nationwide famine that could spread to urban centres such as Khartoum. The still very high inflation, as well as a lack of central control, are causing uncontrolled price increases in all sectors. Due to insufficient rainfall, a poor harvest is expected this season, which will further aggravate the economic situation and poor food security”.⁶²⁵

The New Humanitarian reported in April 2022 that “Sudan is experiencing its highest humanitarian caseload in a decade amid escalating civil conflict, erratic rainfall, and an economic crisis that has deepened since an October military takeover derailed the country’s transition to democratic rule”.⁶²⁶ The same source interviewed Hassan Mahmoud “a 44-year-old plumber in the capital of Khartoum” who told them that “incomes cannot keep up with prices at local markets. ‘Living in dignity for the lower class, even the middle class, is nearly impossible’”.⁶²⁷ Another Khartoum resident told The New Humanitarian, “Life is impossible with the current living conditions [...] There’s a lack of fuel, cooking gas, and flour, [and there has been] a sharp increase in electricity tariffs”.⁶²⁸

The same source further reported:

Humanitarian assistance has mostly continued since October [2021], though resources are limited. WFP says its food stocks are “dangerously low” and, without new funding, will start running out next month.

Resistance committees and other neighbourhood groups are providing food and mutual aid in some areas. But their efforts are dwarfed by the rising humanitarian needs in both urban and rural settings.⁶²⁹

Adama Dieng, UN Designated Expert on the situation of human rights in Sudan, stated at the end of his visit to Sudan on 4th June 2022:

I also shared my concern over the retrogression in the enjoyment of economic and social rights since the coup, due to the deterioration in the economy, political instability, increased prices – and the threat of poor harvests this year, which are forecast to dramatically increase the number of people living in poverty. I called on the authorities to take concrete steps to prevent this from happening, using the maximum of available resources and by seeking international support, as appropriate.⁶³⁰

In his report to the UN Human Rights Council on the situation between 25 October 2021 and 10 April 2022, the same Expert on human rights in the Sudan, Adama Dieng, reported:

⁶²⁵ German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, [Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration](#), 28 February 2022, *Sudan*, p. 13

⁶²⁶ The New Humanitarian, [In post-coup Sudan, hunger set to double as humanitarian needs grow](#), 15 April 2022

⁶²⁷ The New Humanitarian, [In post-coup Sudan, hunger set to double as humanitarian needs grow](#), 15 April 2022

⁶²⁸ The New Humanitarian, [In post-coup Sudan, hunger set to double as humanitarian needs grow](#), 15 April 2022

⁶²⁹ The New Humanitarian, [In post-coup Sudan, hunger set to double as humanitarian needs grow](#), 15 April 2022

⁶³⁰ UN Sudan, Statement by Adama Dieng, [UN Designated Expert on the situation of human rights in Sudan, at the end of his visit to the country on 4 June 2022](#), 4 June 2022

The coup, the ensuing protests and the increasing political instability, together with the lingering effects of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, have undermined the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights in the Sudan. Immediately after the coup, the country's major international donors and financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, paused disbursements, and the United Nations suspended all cooperation programmes. This combination of factors is likely to lead to a reversal of economic and development gains that had been achieved under the transitional Government, including progress towards debt clearance, exchange rate unification and fiscal consolidation. Aid cuts are having an impact on public expenditure, given the absence of a broad and diversified tax base, a decline in domestic production and economic activities and a steep decline in the value of the Sudanese pound against the United States dollar.⁶³¹

In conversation with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan in May 2022, the individual responded:

the economic situation, [...] deteriorated dramatically after the coup [...]

The family support programme initiated in 2021, which was intended to reach 80% of the population, was suspended. There have been a number of strikes of public servants, including teachers and medical personnel, since November [2021] in some locations, calling for payment of salaries owed. But also, there has been a dramatic increase in costs of basic foodstuffs and electricity. The cost of bread and fuel has doubled since the coup. The cost of electricity has increased by around 600%.

And then the prices shot up, and most have not gone down even though the exchange rate has improved, which means that for people already vulnerable like IDPs, it's really difficult for them to survive. There's been an increase in petty crime, which is possibly a consequence.⁶³²

Serious concerns have been raised by Waging Peace in their most recent 'Country situation in Sudan' report of June 2022:

For those living in Sudan, the situation is disastrous, as the gap between the official and black-market rate for the Sudanese pound widens. The military tried to combat this by floating the exchange rate on 7 March 2022, though there is still hyperinflation, with The Economist citing an official figure of 260%, though speculating that the real figure is way higher. The Central Bank of Sudan recently announced it was issuing a 1,000 Sudanese pound note. Rates for basic goods including food and fuel are rising, especially considering the RussiaUkraine war and the removal of subsidised wheat from market circulation. As ever, the poor, notably IDPs, and those from marginalised areas like Darfur who most regularly engage with the informal economy (due to discrimination in engaging in formal education, accessing services and gaining regular employment) are likely to be hardest hit. Meanwhile, companies held by those allied to the military are able to move money out of the country, and escape the worst economic hardships [...]

The economic crisis creates pressure on all actors in Sudan, from the military who may no longer have the resources to pay patronage networks, though the impacts are felt more by Bourhan, who relies to a slightly larger extent on official economic networks, than Hemetti, who is cash-rich, and whose resources are almost entirely off-book. It also creates a shortened timeline, beyond which Sudan may no longer ever qualify for World Bank or IMF support, which will anger western countries who pushed hard to get Sudan to the HPIC decision point. However, with this deadline now receding in the Paris Club's rear-view mirror, it is clear that no fiscal deadline can accommodate Sudanese political realities, which need time, resources, and political will to solve. There are worries that western countries, including the Troika, will prefer simply to negotiate a quick elite deal incorporating Bourhan and

⁶³¹ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), 9 May 2022, para. 49

⁶³² Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes

Hemetti and other SAF and RSF actors, to one which is based on broader consultation but takes longer. There are also worries that the differing responses of Bourhan and Hemetti speak to wider tensions between the SAF and RSF, which could come to a head and result in civil war. Warnings that the United Nations have heard on this score have been dire, with comments to the effect that actors in Sudan are “concerned about the stability and the very existence of their country” and that “Sudan could descend into conflict and divisions as seen in Libya, Yemen or elsewhere, in a region already beset by instability”.⁶³³

6. Situation of returnees

In its Briefing to the UK government, Waging Peace, together with Protection Approaches and REDRESS, noted that “The Home Office have an obligation to more accurately reflect the situation in Sudan in policy and information notes and other guidance issued to caseworkers; there is consensus among country experts that the transition is fragile, with little evidence of reduced risk to those returned to the country as rejected asylum-seekers”.⁶³⁴

Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) reported that in January 2020 “Sudanese Christian businessman Ashraf Samir Mousad Obid was detained at Khartoum Airport under the orders of the General Intelligence Service (GIS). Mr Obid was returning to Sudan for the first time since fleeing the country in 2015, following a campaign of harassment by the GIS’ predecessor, the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). Mr Obid was detained despite GIS assurances that all names that were previously on the travel restriction list had been removed. When he asked officers for the reason of his detention, he was informed that his name was on a list submitted by GIS, and that he would be given the full reasons once he was transferred to the GIS office. Mr Obid was released after being held for an hour and a half, and on 30 January he was informed by Sudan’s Ministry of the Interior that he was not allowed to leave or enter the country”.⁶³⁵

Salma Abdalla, a PhD researcher at the Noorse University, interviewed by Cedoca in March and April 2021, the Documentation and Research Department of the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, noted:

The composition, practices and mentality of the security forces continue as it used to be during the former regime, and they are still far from understanding basic principles of human rights. [...] Sudanese nationals (failed asylum seekers or others) who are being forcibly or voluntarily returned to Sudan through Khartoum International Airport fate should be a source of serious concern. [...] [Failed] asylum seekers, particularly from Darfur and Nuba mountains, are at risk of maltreatment and being discriminated against by security personnel. [...] [The] security service has always been a bigoted entity against the people of Darfur and Nuba mountains. The reforms of the security forces have not been implemented and the discrimination against people from marginalized groups continues to be practiced. Maltreatment by the security forces ranges from harassment, assault, interrogation to torture in detention. There are numerous reports about individuals being killed during ‘investigations’ in the detention by the security service.⁶³⁶

⁶³³ Waging Peace, [Country situation in Sudan](#), June 2022, *Post-25 October 2021 military coup, Sudan’s economic crisis*, paras. 54 and 57

⁶³⁴ Protection Approaches / REDRESS / Waging Peace, [A hopeful yet fragile peace, How the UK can support Sudan’s democratic transition and pursuit of justice](#), October 2020, p. 2

⁶³⁵ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [General Briefing: Sudan](#), 1 May 2020

⁶³⁶ Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, [COI Focus, Soedan, De situatie van Darfoeri en Nuba buiten hun herkomstregio’s](#), 28 June 2021, 2.3. *Behandeling bij terugkeer*

In conversation with the Co-Executive Directors Sonja Miley and Maddy Crowther from the NGO Waging Peace, Maddy Crowther stated:

But people are always very keen to say that it's sort of arrival into Khartoum International Airport with guards that often are armed or there might be a lot of them. It's clear that you are in some way a sort of wrongdoer that will mark you out for questioning, and it will mark you out for this persecution that doesn't-- it might not look like you getting arrested as soon as you leave the airport, at the airport. It might look like your relatives being tailed. It might look like that you can't ever visit your relatives ever again, even though you're in the same city. You can't rely on any social network you might have had before for the risk that it puts you in. And also, that how you're identified at the airport will have some racial elements to it. If you are a young black African uneducated person with no ties to Khartoum previously, they're going to wonder what's going on, whether you previously fought for an armed movement. [...]

Although you might think that having a huge political profile and even sort of surplus activities that you've done will be the thing that will get you recognized at the airport. In addition to that, not having had that and being someone who's almost untraceable means that you can security services, I suspect, have a feeling of they can do what they want with you and they can work out what your allegiance is. And they can work out if you have relatives that they can target. They can work out if you could be someone who could inform for them. It's not just do you have this profile or not. It's really, even to the people, I think, who are doing that vetting and who's doing that on the day and down to the moment of who's actually manning the desk at that time, it can really make an impact on whether you're going to face hardship when you return to Sudan. And I know that's a really messy answer, but we've had someone tell us that as they were trying to-- that what actually mattered in the moment where they were trying to leave Sudan was whether someone on the appropriate immigration desk felt really busy that day. And so didn't have the time to properly scrutinise their paperwork, because if they had, they would have maybe gone, "Actually, let's call you in for questioning just to work out what's happening." And it literally came down to-- and they described it-- it was the right moment, second by second, I just happened to slip through the net, but you can't rely on that in every case. So I don't know-- there's a risk on return and arrival at the airport.⁶³⁷

In conversation with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan in May 2022, asked whether they had any information in terms of post-return monitoring or whether they knew what happens at the airport once somebody is returned from Europe, the individual responded:

We do not have information about that. We have heard of a couple of instances of people being questioned at the airport, and some arrests taking place at the airport, but not many.⁶³⁸

Serious concerns have been raised by Waging Peace in their most recent 'Country situation in Sudan' report of June 2022:

We have long maintained that arrival at Khartoum International Airport (KIA) creates risks for those returned as rejected asylum-seekers. In our report prepared ahead of AAR, we mentioned that this is a risky manner of (re-)entry to the country for several reasons: firstly, the sizeable security presence at the airport; secondly, the political profile assigned to returning rejected asylum-seekers; and thirdly, the potential for information gained through surveillance networks overseas being used against returnees [...]

On the first point, we hear about a continued sizeable security presence at KIA. The fact that they are profiling those who enter the country is clear from actions taken to stop some individuals from entering Sudan. For instance, on 27 December 2020, researcher Jean-Baptiste Gallopin documented

⁶³⁷ Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace). See [Annex D.2](#) further below for transcription notes.

⁶³⁸ Representative of an international organization. See [Annex D.1](#) further below for transcription notes

that he had travelled to Sudan only to discover he had been placed on a security list, and so was returned on the first flight out of Khartoum [...]

Among the cohort of asylum-seekers and refugees who reach the UK who were forced to travel through the airport, we have heard of the lengths one must go to in order to avoid being detained by the security officials. In one notable instance, a gentleman who had been supported to return to the United Kingdom faced a gun battle between opposing forces within the airport itself, and described to us how his return was only possible because the individual who scrutinised his passport and documentation on the day was distracted. He felt that if another individual had been on the desk that day, and if there was not an ongoing crisis at that very moment, then he would not have made it through the security checks [...]

As we understand it, the appointments to the security positions and desks at the airport are also political, and post-coup there was a widespread changing of the guard at the airport to those sympathetic with the military, as there had been in other departments, ministries, and offices, as mentioned above [...]

A returnee would be known to security as a rejected asylum-seeker for several reasons, not least their possession of an emergency travel document (ETD), but also potentially their accompaniment by a security detail, having non-medical scarring on the body, including tribal scarring pertaining to ethnicity, being black African i.e. non-Arab Darfuri or Nuban, or potentially through information shared by the relevant Embassy team ahead of an individual's arrival in-country. Interestingly, and perhaps even counterintuitively, in the many interviews conducted ahead of our report for AAR, the relatively low political profile of an individual in concert with the above factors, might increase their chances of being targeted. It was expressed to us that those with active profiles as human rights defenders or political activists were assumed to have contacts who would eventually advocate for their better treatment and release from detention, whereas those with a lower political profile were less protected from the harshest treatment and questioning. Simply having stayed out of Sudan for a year or more was identified as a factor increasing someone's interest to the security services [...]

A human rights defender from Sudan told us that once a returned individual is understood to be a "suspected activist", they can expect to be treated in the following ways: to be blackmailed and treated as a source of financial income by the security forces; to be recruited for gathering information as a spy or become a source of information, infiltrating activists groups or political parties; to be blackmailed by threats of harm to family members unless they testify as a witness against someone or confess to something themselves; to face potential recruitment by security forces to join militias such as the RSF and forced to commit human rights violations; or to be executed without any trace such as drowned in a bathroom or their bodies dropped in the River Nile and framed as suicide, said to be common practice.⁶³⁹

With regards to Sudanese diaspora surveillance, Waging Peace stated:

Another dynamic to mention is that Sudanese Embassies abroad gather evidence about the activity of members of the diaspora, including asylum-seekers, and those with even nominal political or social profile prior to leaving Sudan, and can use information to harass those returned to Sudan. Evidence received by email from a Sudanese activist in January 2021 details that 6 former Bashir-era regime figures had been found in the United Kingdom working as undercover spies for the Sudanese security whilst acting as "assistants of the Military Attaché" within the Sudan Embassy, located in London. [...]

⁶³⁹ Waging Peace, [Country situation in Sudan](#), June 2022, *Post-25 October 2021 military coup, Risk on return of rejected asylum seekers, including black Africans*, paras. 77 – 81, 84

Given the process of installing Embassy staff friendly to the military and its aims for Sudan mentioned above, we suspect this trend has continued.⁶⁴⁰

⁶⁴⁰ Waging Peace, [Country situation in Sudan](#), June 2022, *Post-25 October 2021 military coup, Risk on return of rejected asylum seekers, including black Africans*, para. 82

D. Annex

D.1. Conversation transcript notes: International Organization based in Sudan and ARC, 24th May 2022

Transcription details:

Date of interview:	24.05.2022
Date of transcript by	24.05.2022
TranscribeMe:	25.05.2022-22.06.2022
Review and final sign off of transcription notes:	

The below transcription notes relate to an interview Stephanie Huber, Director of ARC, conducted on 24th May 2022 via Teams with a representative of an international organization based in Sudan.

Transcription notes:

Stephanie Huber (ARC)	Let's start with the situation and treatment of journalists and the media. What can you tell us, especially since the Coup [of October 2021]?
Representative of an international organization based in Sudan	<p>On the day of the coup (25 October 2021), all communications (mobile phone and internet) were suspended. Mobile phone networks were restored after a few days, but the internet was not restored for about three weeks, which restricted the safe sharing of information and the ability of journalists and the media to report on what was happening in the country. For a few days after internet was restored, there were still restrictions on access to some social media. There were subsequent disruptions to the internet on some days of protests, the last time in the beginning of January [2022].</p> <p>What we saw after the coup was a tightening of restrictions on civic space in general, and around 55 instances in which journalists were targeted, including with summons, arbitrary arrest and detention of 25 media workers, among them four female journalists, and raids on media premises. In some cases, journalists/photographers/ media workers were assaulted and/or their equipment damaged, destroyed, or confiscated. In at least one instance in which journalists were filming protests from the top of a building, security forces entered the building and assaulted them, breaking their equipment. So I think the risks associated with reporting and journalism increased after the coup, particularly for journalists who were reporting on the protests against the coup or were critical of the coup or military authorities.</p>
Stephanie Huber	Do you have any information on what happens at the time of arrest

(ARC)

or in detention?

**Representative of
an international
organization
based in Sudan**

I don't believe that journalists/media workers have been singled out in terms of their treatment. In general, there have been consistent reports of ill-treatment and sometimes degrading treatment at the time of arrest and in detention. It is usually the police who carry out arrests during or after protests. People have also been arrested before protests from their homes by officials in plain clothes they believe work for the intelligence service. Journalists reported that their equipment was confiscated or damaged. Phones and other property is often taken and not returned. An emergency order issued on 24 December 2021 extended the law enforcement powers of the security forces, including the intelligence services, and provided them temporary immunity from prosecution. Most persons arrested in connection with protests have been arrested under this emergency legislation. Although the state of emergency was lifted on 29 May [2022], this order appears to remain in force.

We've heard from several media actors that they've been verbally warned not to publish or to broadcast information which is critical of the coup or authorities. A number of licenses of media houses were withdrawn after the coup but were later restored. [...]

Some activists complained that social media posts disappeared from their pages. There was speculation that this could have been due to "flooding" of the social media pages (ie manipulation of the logarithm) so that these posts were pushed down the feed.

**Stephanie Huber
(ARC)**

Coming now to another profile I'm researching – do you have any information about what the current situation is like for LGBTIQ+ persons, including those who may or may not have been involved in the protests?

**Representative of
an international
organization
based in Sudan**

There is little information about the LGBTI community. Consensual same-sex activities between adults are considered illegal in Sudan. Few people dare talk about sexual orientation or gender identity publicly for fear of personal attacks and threats to their safety. We have not heard of individuals being targeted since the coup because of their sexual identity, but that does not mean that there are no cases.

It's the same also in relation to the issue of sexual violence. The authorities do not want to accept that sexual violence takes place. This was true in the case of the mass rapes that took place in the context of the conflict in Darfur, and it has been the case in relation to cases of rape, gang rape and other kinds of sexual violence perpetrated by security forces in the margins of protests. For example, a large number of cases were reported after the protest of 19 December [2021], which received widespread media attention. After initial denial, the head of the Sovereign Council demanded that an investigation be initiated into the allegations. However, most victims do not report the sexual violence to the police due to lack of faith in the justice system, the stigma associated and fear of

	reprisals. There were also many allegations of sexual harassment and intimidation of women taking part in protests, and some faced direct threats against them, which has made the environment for women activists more hostile.
Stephanie Huber (ARC)	That's interesting that you mention that because one of my question was going to be in how far family members of particular profiles are being targeted as well.
Representative of an international organization based in Sudan	<p>In some cases, intimidation of family members of persons who were arrested after the coup has been reported, usually high profile people – and some reported that their houses were under observation. In some cases, family members reported that unmarked vehicles were parked in front of their houses and there was verbal harassment of family members .</p> <p>While most persons arrested for political reasons since the coup, or for organizing or taking part in protests were released by early June, one person arrested on 25 October [2021] has been held in incommunicado detention since then, without charge. He was a security officer working with the Dismantling Committee, a former police officer. He is still not permitted visits from his family.</p>
Stephanie Huber (ARC)	Another profile I am looking at is the situation of IDPs in Khartoum. What is their situation like since the coup?
Representative of an international organization based in Sudan	<p>I think they fall into a category of people whose situation was already quite precarious and mostly rely on the informal sector for income. What has had a big impact on them is the economic situation, which deteriorated dramatically after the coup. First, I think, as a result of blockades of the ports, then as a result of the suspension of financial aid by the international community as a whole, including the international financial sanctions of the World Bank. [...] The family support programme initiated in 2021, which was intended to reach 80% of the population, was suspended. There have been a number of strikes of public servants, including teachers and medical personnel, since November [2021] in some locations, calling for payment of salaries owed. But also, there has been a dramatic increase in costs of basic foodstuffs and electricity. The cost of bread and fuel has doubled since the coup. The cost of electricity has increased by around 600%.</p> <p>in January [2022], which means that it's really outside the reach of most people. And cost of medication has also increased. The Sudanese pound was devalued dramatically against the dollar. It has now stabilised. For a while, the fluctuating exchange rate meant that it was difficult to continue with imports of food and other things like medical supplies. And then the prices shot up, and most have not gone down even though the exchange rate has improved, which means that for people already vulnerable like IDPs, it's really difficult for them to survive. There's been an increase in petty crime, which is possibly a consequence. [...]</p>

Stephanie Huber (ARC)	A further profile a lot of European governments are interested in is 'returnees'. Do you have any information on them in terms of post-return monitoring or do you know what happens at the airport once somebody arrives from Europe?
Representative of an international organization based in Sudan	We do not have information about that. We have heard of a couple of instances of people being questioned at the airport, and some arrests taking place at the airport, but not many.
Stephanie Huber (ARC)	I'm also interested in prison conditions and treatment of detainees. What can you tell me about the current situation?
Representative of an international organization based in Sudan	<p>I read recently that the authorities were trying to restrict the practice of begging on the street and were arresting individuals who were begging. And I think some of the groups of people that you're concerned about [e.g. IDPs; Black Africans such as Darfuri and Nuba] may fall into that category. Those begging for money at traffic lights often include small children, five, six years old, little girls, who live on the street with their families.</p> <p>The conditions in the prisons: there is one recently built prison in SE Khartoum, Soba prison. Many of the other prisons are old and conditions poor. The women's prison in Omdurman was built in 1889. The buildings are dilapidated, there is little and poor sanitation. There are many infants in the prison with their mothers. Women who are convicted or awaiting conviction for murder are shackled, by law. The prison administration does make an effort to provide food and healthcare but they have a very small budget to do so. Food is often supplemented by family members. And I think for the people that you are concerned about [e.g. IDPs; Black Africans such as Darfuri and Nuba], they may not have the funds to provide their relatives with clothes and food.</p> <p>Another concern relates to the administration of justice. While almost all persons arrested for political reasons since the coup have been released. What often happens, however, is that they are released on bail, ie the charges against them remain, which means that they can technically be summoned back to court at any time. This could be seen as a kind of intimidation aimed at discouraging people from resuming their political activity or their participation in protests.</p> <p>Regarding investigations into human rights violations since the coup, several investigative committees were set up, which we understand have been merged into one, which comes under the authority of the Attorney General. The prosecutor in charge has made some progress in investigations, but people have low expectations that the investigation will result in prosecutions. There have been many committees set up over the last few years to investigate human rights violations and inter-communal violence, which have not resulted in accountability.</p> <p>The investigative committee has confirmed four cases of sexual</p>

violence, based on the four complaints that were filed, which is a defacto acknowledgement that sexual violence took place in the context of protests.

People generally have little faith in the justice system when it comes to human rights cases, so victims rarely come forward to file complaints. And often, these investigative committees, they can only conduct investigations based on the complaints filed, with some exceptions (such as cases of unlawful killing). In other cases, such as allegations of sexual violence, injury or assault, a complaint needs to be filed. Also, as in many other places, justice often moves slowly and detainees often stay in pre-trial detention for extended periods. And the death penalty is still imposed some cases. In the last last year, I believe there were 1400 cases in which there was a death penalty verdict, but none of them have been implemented, as far as we know. So there's been a kind of de facto moratorium on the use of the death penalty, even though they continue to pass death sentences.

**Stephanie Huber
(ARC)**

Another profile category I'm researching is the situation and treatment of Black Africans such as Darfuri, or those from the Nuba mountains, based in Khartoum or Omdurman. What is their situation like? Are they being singled out or targeted outside of them participating in protests?

**Representative of
an international
organization
based in Sudan**

We do not have information about the situation and treatment of these groups, but I know there is a sort of generalised racism against Black Africans, the Darfuri, in Khartoum, which I understand has increased since some senior officials from Darfur, who were party to the Juba peace agreement, joined the transitional government, which was perhaps seen as a threat by sectors of the Arab population. There has been an increase in racist hate speech in social media. I am sure they face discrimination in other ways.

**Stephanie Huber
(ARC)**

The last profile I am researching and reading less about are students. Do you have any information on them being particularly targeted?

**Representative of
an international
organization
based in Sudan**

Only one incident, which was right after the coup. I think it was the day after when there were mass protests against the coup and the security forces invaded the dormitories of Khartoum University. Both male and the female dormitories, while the students were there, and assaulted several of the women [...] The attack followed an anti-coup protest very close to the dormitories. After that, most of the universities closed because of the security situation, the political situation, and they didn't reopen until sometime this year [2022]. Since then, haven't heard of students being particularly singled out.

D.2. Conversation transcript notes: Waging Peace and ARC, 18th May 2022

Transcription details:

Date of interview:	18.05.2022
Date of transcript by	18.05.2022
TranscribeMe :	19.05.2022 – 09.06.2022
Review and final sign off of transcription notes:	

The below transcription notes relate to an interview Stephanie Huber, Director of ARC, conducted on 18th May 2022 via Zoom with Sonja Miley and Maddy Crowther, both Co-Executive Directors at [Waging Peace](#)

Transcription notes:

Stephanie Huber (ARC): Do you have any information that you would like to share with me on the situation and treatment of Darfuri in Khartoum and Omdurman and particularly since January 2020 up to April this year?

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): So if you're asking us specific for evidence that would fall directly under that category, yeah, what we don't have is necessarily a list of incidents that have affected one particular ethnicity over another. I think we've also mainly found evidence, particularly post-coup, that related to individuals who would be classified in their reporting as protesters. And there wouldn't actually be a lot of sort of granularity of detail or their profile beyond that, except maybe gender would come through, but very rarely would ethnicity or race be something that was mentioned. I think what we have found post-2020 are sort of two things I'd say. And Sonja, please jump in. One is a lot of evidence and a lot more public discussion of what systematic racism looks like in Sudan, and that can be anything from societal attitudes. An example that really sticks in my head is when somebody was talking to me once about the kind of standard comments you might get on a Facebook post where in this particular case, it was an Arable or lighter-skinned woman deciding to marry someone who was darker skinned and kind of perceived to be black African. And the comments on that post were along the lines of like, "Why would you do this? This is a lowering of your standards." And I think there was also a case of a quite prominent human rights defender, a member of the Sudanese Women's Union in Sudan, who used language that sort of suggested in a similar marriage based scenario that someone had decided to marry the missing link from monkey to human, and they actually got fired from their post, which is a welcome move, show that there was a lot more pushback when people used racist attitudes. But my understanding is that the pervasiveness of racism in Sudan is mostly unchanged, and it will still have all sorts of effects on your ability to live a life that you might choose to live in Sudan and real impacts in terms of employability, where you can live in Khartoum and Omdurman. There's a lot more to say about living conditions, which I might leave to you, Sonja, but I think that as a theme needs to come through. And it's something that is, yes, more in the public, like it used to be, that there would be euphemistic terms [...] There used to be euphemistic terms referring to race. It might be your identity, your belonging, or even sometimes ethnicity might be used as the standard was my sense, but now at least people are discussing it. But it's becoming clearer than ever that it's just pervasive. It is the water people are swimming in and as it is in so many countries, our own countries, I'm sure included but yeah. That's just a

theme that I really hope is on the minds of those reading your report and others. And it can't be dismissed as kind of like, "There are some racists." It really feels like this is a culture in which there is a hierarchy based on race which is pervasive, whether or not there is one person of that race in a ministry, which tends to be sometimes what you read. That's not a culture-- that's not a culture change we would accept in our own institutions, and it certainly shouldn't be one we accept in Sudanese institutions. [...]

So I just wanted to emphasise the systemic nature of what we're talking about. And when you started talking about the constructs that we're talking about off record, and you led by saying the Darfur experience in Omdurman-- I just wanted to mention I know that there is that focus on Darfur, but it really is a black African experience. And we really kind of need to be a lot more conscious, use the language a lot more consciously to be able to be reflective and name the experience of the black African people. So whether you're from the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Darfur, if you are black African, your experience, in our experience over 18 years, is vastly different to that of somebody from the centre, from the elite, who's had a lot more opportunity and a lot more privilege. So it's the same kind of structures that we are seeing around the world, and especially since Black Lives Matter.

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): And one of the things that I've noticed, being in my position now for seven and a half years, is that pre-Black Lives Matter and George Floyd and the explosion of activism around that, the testimonies that we've taken from asylum seekers in working with them have almost not even had any language around their treatment because it is so ingrained. They are so used to being called slave, Abeed. They're so used to being beaten. They're used to being slapped around. They will not go to the police for a beating because, well, that's just what happens. And it's through our testimony taking, it's through our interactions with people that we have started to see this pattern when you ask the questions, that people are being targeted because of their race, because of their group, their black African category, and post-Black Lives Matter. There seems to be a slight consciousness change, slight, and maybe not necessarily people who are just arriving, but people who've been here for a while who are black African understanding that, "Wait a minute. This is not okay." And this racism that we have experienced, they're able to name it now in Sudan and the persecution based on the colour of their skin has also met them here in the UK. So they're able to talk about and recognise it now when they are-- and they do. They have told us-- several people have told us about different experiences where they have been the victims of racist attacks here in the UK. So that consciousness is shifting a bit. So we need to really be a lot more consistent with our language, our understanding of what is happening, and zero in, I believe, and call it what it is. So how it manifests for those who are black African is they do not have the same access to society in Khartoum, in Omdurman. They live in the black belt, which is what Maddy was alluding to. They have shacks that they're living in. They don't have electricity, running water. Their ability to find jobs is less. They're not able to be part of the infrastructure of society. There are some black Africans who have high positions in government, which is the difficulty for people to kind of get their heads around, of course, but they also ascribe to this elite place. So, yeah, there are plenty of people of colour here in the UK who have high positions, but we still have a structure in place that is disadvantaging people of colour.

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): I was just going to say that also extends as we see it and through our kind of multiple interactions with Sudanese human rights defenders themselves. And I say this with the utmost respect for the work they're doing. But you have to understand that a human rights community is itself not immune to the kind of societal challenges that it's facing. And we've noticed throughout the transition-- so this is 2020 on-- a kind of unwillingness to sometimes reckon with racialised aspects of state violence and ways in which, yes, you might be more liable to be arrested, prosecuted, detained, ill-treated in

detention if you have a particular racial profile. And it's almost like a blindness to commenting on that issue because the other challenges are so large. You are facing a situation where you've got to comment on the arrest and detention of so many people potentially, and you have limited bandwidth. And it's not the most pressing issue. And that's always kind of how it's been presented to us, as this is at a time where we're having to represent journalists who are being attacked and other at-risk groups and women and [inaudible]. The last thing you're going to do is really segregate your data based on race and look at if you have a racial issue, when you clearly have a coup issue, you clearly have a military issue. So, yeah, that's also been a worry sometimes, is it's not something people are alive to. And I think that also extends to-- the human rights community has its own that it will be looking out for.

And we've heard really worrying things about an inability to really grasp what the prison population, for instance, looks like. So we're much more likely to hear about the arrest and detention of people who have an existing human rights profile. We're likely to hear about what's happening to them, but what we won't hear about are the people who are just arrested and detained and whose cases never go further than that because they're socially deprived. Probably because they have been arrested on a racial basis, at some point in that decision making, maybe not explicitly, but it's there, it's a theme. And I remember, this was pre-revolution, pre-2019 even, but being told by a prominent human rights defender, who is also someone who the Home Office themselves have relied on and interviewed for past country policy and information notes and I think also their fact-finding mission report, who was saying, "Well, when I was detained, I was getting my case splashed on headlines, but next to me in my cell were just boys who had happened to arrange a football match." And I really remember him saying that. And that was the thing that was so egregious to the then Bashir government. But I have every reason to believe that is still happening, is your ability to mobilise anything on a local basis makes you a threat. And their cases have not been--he'd never heard of these people being arrested and the same before because they didn't have the resources or the networks or the connections to raise their cases up to the threshold that would mean that they were spoken about in urgent notices or urgent actions. Yeah, so that's really stuck with me. And I think there's something to be said at the moment for the blind spots of some of the human rights community reporting on post-coup environment. And some of the figures that we're getting might unintentionally exclude other numbers because they're just not focused on them. So when we hear that there's maybe 1,000 people detained in Khartoum, we know about so few of who those people are, how can we even talk about? There's so much uncertainty about what the prison population is and because cases aren't following a path from arrest, to being charged, to going through the court system, that's not happening in every case. We can't even then speculate about why that person was originally arrested, what they might be charged with, whether it's completely sort of a detention without charge, whether they're being held incommunicado, whether they're being ill-treated, whether racial slurs are being used whilst they're ill-treated in detention. I know I'm not answering the question as such, but the unknown is so large and the patterns of how the security used to target people for Bashir, there's no evidence those have changed. And, in fact, there's really good reporting out there by Redress [...] about the continuity between NISS and GIS and the Central Reserve Police and the security environment, as a whole. How could we not speculate that the same patterns of racialized state targeting are going on now? And I would like someone to prove the counterfactual. If you could show me that that's not happening I'm totally willing to hear that. But I have no reason for suspecting that that's not still happening, even if it's happening in some sort of form that no one's writing on an arrest slip, "You've been arrested because you're Black." I'm sure that's not happening, but I know some form of racialized targeting is happening.

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): We can see it in the recent example. Well, maybe not the

targeting, but that you're getting the hint of the environment with the Bashir trial and the lawyer who made the very off the cuff on the mic he thought was not on, racist remarks towards the Black African community and group. And so if that is being-- if we just kind of crack that open a little bit and just kind of explore, as Maddy's saying, sort of what's behind that. There is so much, but it's about looking in that direction and needing to look in that direction because we have countless examples to share of the people who have been looked over for their jobs because they had an ID and it said a Black African tribe and there was no other reason why they wouldn't get the job, they were equally as qualified, or how they have lived in the Black Belt and their aunt, who was the provider for the family, lost her job, was let go and how they nearly starved.

This wasn't in [Khartoum or Omdurman], but a gentleman who was working at a store selling water and he was visited by the Janjaweed and they said that there's a tax now on selling water and he said, "We can't pay this tax," and the tax to the Arabs was one-third of what the tax was to him as a Darfuri. And he said he can't pay. It's not that he won't, he can't pay. He doesn't have the money. And that incident alone is what started his run, him running from the country because he challenged the Janjaweed. He was arrested, detained, tortured, beaten, finally released, but told that he needed to come back every day and clean or sit or wait or these stories that we hear over and over again and told that he would lose his life, he would be killed if he didn't come back and finally fled. Things that basic. He wasn't a part of any rebel groups, nothing. He wasn't even political. It was over saying, "I couldn't pay the water tax," and the squeeze on the lives has become so tight that some might argue that they're fleeing because of economics. Well, they're not when you boil it down because they are being punished. There's a system that beats and tortures and threatens life, loss of life and harm to the family repeatedly for any misstep or any perceived misstep. And that has got to be-- that's oppression.

Stephanie Huber (ARC): Having said what you just said, I'm sure decision-maker still would want to hear from you whether you feel that since the coup and given the ingrained racism that you described whether the situation has exacerbated, has become worse? I've read about it and you've kind of implied in our previous discussion that the same people are still in power, the security forces haven't changed that much the situation on the ground is still as it was under Bashir. What would be your answer to that?

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): I think it broadly holds, but I think it's even more complicated because of how fractured the security environment is. So, for instance, with the General Intelligence Service, I'd say that's definitely restarted sort of patterns of targeting that are probably along those lines, are probably racialized in the ways we've kind of already said and having to remember that is possibly more aligned to the Sudanese armed forces and an Islamist backing. Whereas when you're looking at patterns of violence by the RSF, maybe some of the armed movements and the JPA signatories who are now in the capital, maybe that does look a bit different. So it's almost like I can imagine, I can speculate that this has become more kind of power politics as Darfur becomes this theatre for what happens in the centre. It's not this neutral space where it's intercommunal conflicts happening. It's a political-military theatre where the battle for who's going to run Sudan is being fought between Hemedti, between Bourhan. So I suspect it's getting more complicated and a harder picture to draw. So my hats off to you, good luck in drawing it. But I don't have any reason to suspect it's lessened. If anything, I suspect it's become different, worse, and more confusing [...]

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): And I would say it's too detrimental to look in isolation. Where is the concentration on what's happening in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan? There is absolute impunity going on. There is no accountability. We are on a mailing list, a circulation list from a prominent human rights defender who has monitors on the ground in South

Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Every day, every day so and so was murdered because X person or persons tried to report. Nothing was done. This person was raped. This group of people were displaced every single day. And there's not a real examination of why and what's happening there. But when you speak to the people, you see the exact same thing, it is the black African communities who are being oppressed and persecuted and have no access to justice or the law, the representation in the law. And also Darfur, there's an escalation to the state of the 2004 in the genocide. This all reflects in the center as well. I'm not so well versed about what -- we know somewhat about what's happening in the east, but it's a little bit more of a blurred picture for me. My understanding is not as secure. So all of these, to look in isolation, only you're zooming in. And the context of the wider lens really is important. It's meaningful. There's also a lot of denialism that's happening at the moment and a worrying group that we've heard of that seem to be stirring a racist group, a very racist group that is stirring some animosity thinking that or perpetuating some myth that Darfuris are going to come and seek revenge on those in the centre and murder and massacre, and it's sowing a lot of discord and fractiousness and animosity. And then there's just pure denialism of that anything happened in Darfur. They're so out of touch [...]

Online trolling is also a real factor. There are lot of the Wagner group, the Wagner group, who have been in Sudan since before the revolution, since the time of the revolution. And they're really known for the chaos that they bring and their emphasis on-- Maddy could probably describe this a little bit better. But their emphasis is on online disinformation [...].

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): And I think also this idea of the Darfur is coming to the capital, that's also because people are very critical of the behaviour of Hemeti, and also Minni Minnawi and Gibril Ibrahim. And they're held to-- and that is presented as a regional divide sometimes, is my sense. It's not that they are the coup leadership. It's that somehow Darfur has come into the government in a way people find really uncomfortable. And there's definitely people who would much prefer there to be a clean Arabised Islamised state. That's the image of the state they wanted. And instead, they've got this hybrid model which really imperfectly represents the actual interest of Darfuri people, given the kind of waning memberships of those armed movements. It's not a perfect solution, but a lot of people are using that as they're in to say that Darfur has essentially scuppered peace or scuppered the transition in some way.

That, to me, smacks a little bit of racism and also fails to acknowledge some of the ways in which the political process that was first envisioned post the 2018-2019 revolution didn't adequately take into account the concerns of Darfur. And we had lots of conversations at the beginning of the revolution of saying if you don't prioritise justice and accountability, if you don't prioritise the issues of Darfur and other marginalised areas of Sudan, you will find that those issues come to the fore later and in really chaotic ways. And if you take your eye off what's happening with the Juba peace agreement, it doesn't matter how good a constitutional document you have or how many agreements you've negotiated with the IMF or World Bank, it has the potential to derail what's going on. So I think it's almost like it has that narrative of Darfur is coming to the centre is there, but it isn't a real Darfur. It's not the true view. It's an elite compromise. It's a payroll piece. That's what we're seeing. And it means that once again, the actual issues of Darfur and of Darfuri IDPs or those who maybe were born as Darfuris but grew up in Khartoum, or born in Khartoum as Darfuris which is still important, they're not actually ever really taken into account. They're just sort of imperfectly represented in a government that everyone is saying-- I won't even use the word government, in a coup leadership that people say does not represent them at all.

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): And just to add a little bit more to that, again, looking at

Khartoum and Omdurman in a vacuum is disingenuous at best when you're not looking at the economic situation. I mean, there's a crisis happening. And the more people are squeezed, even the middle and upper classes are feeling the pinch, not able to access medication, the sanctions kicking in, all sorts. Those people who are the less privileged and at the bottom of the mountain are going to continue to suffer more. And there is another layer in that area, Khartoum, Omdurman, there is a lot of lawlessness now. Gangs that are just operating with impunity and license. We're hearing about killings. We're hearing about the areas that are more affluent, that are banding together and wanting trying to build gated communities like you might see in South Africa that's happening now, trying to keep some sort of barrier against this lawlessness. So the whole infrastructure, when it breaks down, even more, those who are marginalized at the very bottom are going to be worse off. And so how do you prove this? Well, you look at every single asylum claim, holistically. You look at each person's claim and you find out more than their ethnicity, and you find out the story and all of that, which is what we support 100% in our work. We want there to be a fair assessment of somebody's claim for asylum. But without all of this coming into play, it's not really fair.

Stephanie Huber (ARC): I was just wondering whether you have any information on the situation and treatment of LGBTQI+ persons, if you've heard anything recently or particularly in the time frame that I'm looking at. Have you heard of any targeted attacks, any profiling beyond probably what is reported, but there is very little reporting, so?

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): There's very little reporting. And in fact, we seem to be the people who go very meta. But that's something we've actually raised quite recently via some programs in the UK, is that there aren't many human rights organizations that are looking at indicators there or even tracking it with regards to things like hate speech, which Sonja, you've already mentioned is rising and well documented. There was some good reporting, by Rights for Peace on that [...] Mainly what we've heard of-- we have some historical reporting we've done on issues affecting those groups. Though, interestingly, even then we had to access it through because it was produced for an individual client through their ability to access HIV antiretrovirals, which is not the same issue, making it a healthcare access issue as opposed to general societal attitudes. My sense is there might be a little bit more-- there's a loosening of attitudes amongst particularly younger people, that would be my sense. But then again, I know that we're also more likely to hear from groups that have that attitude given we're in the UK, we're a UK based organization, and we do still have and have worked with people who have fled for that reason that they feel they wouldn't be accepted, that they would face real consequences. And we more recently heard of some cases of employment-related issues when someone was, in this case, gay It was widely understood-- it's sort of widely understood that there are certain categories of profession that are more likely to be done by someone if they are gay, such as in-home cooks. But they also mean that the exchange that they have is that very often that means they don't have a lot of employment rights protection. They don't have a formal contract. It may be that they're just simply not paid for their work was something we heard recently from someone, but it was anecdotal, that they said that's a very known thing. It was almost suggested to us, like everyone knows that if you have that role, maybe that means you're gay because there's some conception of you being sort of safer to be around the family. But very often families will just chuck someone without-- chuck someone on the street without notice. They won't pay them for their services. And that's kind of what we had heard. But I haven't heard recently of a case of someone being publicly flogged or going through the court system for being gay. But then again, it also ties in with this whole, there was that case where there's several people who were alongside Hajooj Kuka, who is a [Nuba?]activist, but also a filmmaker. And there's this conception, they targeted an artistic community and then because they were making too much noise. But it was all sort of a bit euphemistic for we don't really

know what's going on here, but there was a woman amongst other women and men, and the woman must have more readily accused of being sexually, I don't even know what the word would be, licentious or she was accused of having some sort of ill moral reputation because she was in that company. And I think there's a kind of-- most of the people that we know who would describe themselves or be known as LGBTQI are in that kind of artist community. So I think attacks on the artist community can sometimes be coded in ways that are probably quite interesting. But yeah, we haven't heard of some sort of specific-- there was a legal case brought against someone for being gay recently, but I think, again, it's one of those-- it appears in ways you might not initially expect.

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): I'm kind of curious about how little we have heard since the coup and actually since the revolution, well, since the JPA agreement was signed. And that, to me, almost feels like going backwards in time where there might have been some opening, some more tolerance throughout society, not just from the government or the coup leadership kind of perspective, top-down. But the infrastructure is definitely not there, and society doesn't support the opening of minds towards LGBTQI plus people. And I'm curious about how little we have actually heard. And we have had some conversations recently for this other program here in the UK with community members. And even here, there's a real reticence to even want to engage about LGBTQI plus issues. The association is too close. Too many people know each other in Sudan. It's too dangerous. So that is also information, right. When you don't have any access to anything, that's a lot of information. So yeah, I also haven't heard anything specific in the short period of time you're mentioning.

Stephanie Huber (ARC): Is there anything you would like to add at this stage before we end our conversation?

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): I do have one thing too. [...] I guess it's the thing that we've always referenced, which might only be super relevant in the UK case. But is this point about specifically sort of risk on return as being identified as a failed or a rejected asylum seeker? And I think something we've tried to get through before is that the real risk-- a lot of people have said to us, "Well, if you were to return back through Libya to [inaudible] there's ways that you might be able to reintegrate into communities that might be less worrying. Although even then people will say you're far more-- if you fled and your parents are still family, your sister and mother are still there, the local Janjaweed will know that they had a son that's gone away to Europe and now come back and that's going to bring questions. But people are always very keen to say that it's sort of arrival into Khartoum International Airport with guards that often are armed or there might be a lot of them. It's clear that you are in some way a sort of wrongdoer that will mark you out for questioning, and it will mark you out for this persecution that doesn't-- it might not look like you getting arrested as soon as you leave the airport, at the airport. It might look like your relatives being tailed. It might look like that you can't ever visit your relatives ever again, even though you're in the same city. You can't rely on any social network you might have had before for the risk that it puts you in. And also, that how you're identified at the airport will have some racial elements to it. If you are a young black African uneducated person with no ties to Khartoum previously, they're going to wonder what's going on, whether you previously fought for an armed movement. If so, was it the right one? These questions will be asked. And also that they're in kind of contrast-- this feeds into what I was saying as well about the prison population. Although you might think that having a huge political profile and even sort of surplus activities that you've done will be the thing that will get you recognized at the airport. In addition to that, not having had that and being someone who's almost untraceable means that you can security services, I suspect, have a feeling of they can do what they want with you and they can work out what your allegiance is. And they can work out if you have relatives that they can target. They can work out if you could be someone who could inform for them. It's not just do you have this profile

or not. It's really, even to the people, I think, who are doing that vetting and who's doing that on the day and down to the moment of who's actually manning the desk at that time, it can really make an impact on whether you're going to face hardship when you return to Sudan. And I know that's a really messy answer, but we've had someone tell us that as they were trying to-- that what actually mattered in the moment where they were trying to leave Sudan was whether someone on the appropriate immigration desk felt really busy that day. And so didn't have the time to properly scrutinise their paperwork, because if they had, they would have maybe gone, "Actually, let's call you in for questioning just to work out what's happening." And it literally came down to-- and they described it-- it was the right moment, second by second, I just happened to slip through the net, but you can't rely on that in every case. So I don't know-- there's a risk on return and arrival at the airport. But I know different reports deal with differently. And sometimes they want to take that as their focus. But, yeah, there's something about them not being as well, post-return monitoring. And we're asked to do that. And we're in London. Very often people will say, "Oh, someone's arriving at the airport. Could you just?" And we're like, "How?" We don't have the resources, we don't have the network sometimes. And it's not a responsibility that the embassy, British Embassy takes on because it literally falls outside of their-- all the standard issues with post-return monitoring. But [inaudible] in Sudan, where we know that [inaudible] operates in the airport. We're a bit foolhardy if we think that they're not interested in the makeup of those who return. And now eventually from the UK, people who return from Rwanda, or, who knows? But, yeah, that's just the other side of things that I know we bring out in our report-- try to a little bit and in past reports that would be interesting to see. And I know there's been a lot of work on trying to map what the GIS looks like in the airport, and we're not the best place to do that. But there's stuff out there that's quite good.

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): I did have one more thing and I don't know where this sits or if it really does, but perhaps it's just useful for additional context. But there's a curiosity as well around smugglers and smuggling routes and how and who are at the top. And in the Bashir era, it was known that his brother, I think, was some part of smuggling rings or at least informally known. I thought it was known. And somehow there seems to be in the journey of many, many Sudanese going to Libya and the experiences there where they're they tend to be Black African populations who are imprisoned, sold as slaves, I mean, human slavery, human trafficking, all of that. So leaving Sudan for that experience where any of our clients are there not just months but years until they can finally somehow escape if they do. And they are making their way to Europe. They're often again encountering racism in their experience, and it follows them everywhere. And there's just something about the trauma, the mental health issues, the smuggling rings, and who's to gain from all of this, the amount of money that changes hands. And is there something further to kind of-- is this group of people being exploited? I don't know. I don't know. That's some curiosities that I have. But mental health is a huge issue. There's not a lot of infrastructure in Sudan.[...]

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): Mental health, you're right, is a huge thing. And it doesn't need to just meet the threshold of-- which I know in different country contexts, of will this person take their own life were they to be returned? There are so many real impacts. And we did a report on this is prerevolution, but on mental health provision. And given the overall deterioration in health facilities throughout Sudan, you can only imagine that the pitch is way worse. And also the needs must be way, way higher. And people sort of now actively at least use the language of traumatised. And the young people who they say-- their political motivations come from being traumatised, and that's being talked about. But, yeah, it doesn't feel like beyond some sectors who know Western NGOs who are trying to fund psychosocial care. There's not a generalised understanding of that. And it's something that when people come here, we do that work of trying to let them know what therapy is or let them know

what the impact on their own body might be. And actually, beyond that, even trying to let the volunteers who are a little bit further down that integration journey but are now helping new arrivals know about vicarious trauma, mental health resilience. So that's the kind of holding pattern we find ourselves in. And the idea that when people have extreme mental health difficulties, so many people we work with do would be sent back safely to Sudan, to Khartoum even, which has the best of the country's provision. Even there, that's not going to be dealt with [inaudible] I have no confidence that that would be treated kindly or with compassion.

And we have no confidence. And the Sudanese, themselves, the Black Africans-- the young Darfuri said his life will be over if he is returned to Khartoum. They have that sense as well. They will not have a life. And he did actually say he would take his own life if he was returned to Darfur because he knows that he's on a kill list. But that sense of dread, that sense of foreboding, that sense of fear to be returned is real.

D.3. Podcast transcript notes *Asylum Speakers*, Episode 37: *What's happening in Sudan? Everything you need to know and what you can do about it, with Waging Peace* of 17th January 2022

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The below transcription notes relate to the Podcast *Asylum Speakers*, episode 37 entitled [*What's happening in Sudan? Everything you need to know and what you can do about it, with Waging Peace*](#), produced by Jaz O'Hara. Speakers include:

Jaz O'Hara: Presenter

Sonja Miley: Co-Executive Director at [Waging Peace](#)

Maddy Crowther, Co-Executive Director at [Waging Peace](#)

Marwa, Sudanese journalist, TV presenter and producer

Transcription Notes:

Marwa: I'm really very sorry for people in Sudan. I believe they deserve better than what they have now. They have been struggling for democracy, for justice for long, long, long, long time. But still, this moment, they didn't get what they want. We experienced 30 years of military government that commit atrocities on Sudan. It was really a very brutal regime.

Jaz O'Hara: You're listening to *Asylum Speakers*, the podcast. I'm your host, Jaz O'Hara. And together with some very special guests, we'll be taking you on a journey across the world without you having to go anywhere. We're here to amplify voices from the people leaving their countries and everything behind them, to the volunteers working alongside them. We'll be hearing from those with lived experience of displacement and the people working on the front line, the real heroes of today. The humans behind the statistics and the headlines. Join me as we transcend borders, nationalities, religions, and languages to hear from the people with which we share this world, our worldwide tribe.

Today's episode is about a country very close to my heart, Sudan. Like most people in the UK, I grew up without any knowledge of what was happening in Sudan. In my history lessons at school, I learned about the Holocaust and the ethnic cleansing that happened during the Second World War, but I learned nothing about the current genocide in Sudan that continues to this day. It wasn't until I went to uni and I somehow blagged my way onto a scholarship program to study Mandarin in Beijing, which is definitely a story for another time. But I'm telling you this because I was sharing a room there with a now good friend of mine, Anna, who was studying the genocide in Darfur, a region in Sudan, for her degree. She was my first introduction to the situation there. She gave me the context. She told me stories about what she was reading. And I remember lying in bed one night in our room in Beijing watching a film

together called Attack on Darfur: a Hollywoodised but pretty accurate depiction of what is happening there. That film still haunts me, honestly. This is a warning for anyone who watches it. It was the most heartbreaking film that I've ever seen, but it served a very important purpose for me. Fast forward about five years or so and I found myself in the Calais Jungle refugee camp for the first time chatting to a guy there who told me that he was from Darfur. As he talked about how his village had been burnt to the ground and he showed me the scars on his legs from where bullets had hit him, I thought back to that film and those conversations with Anna, and I was grateful that I knew even just a little bit about what he was telling me. I realised though I still had a lot to learn. Since then, I've met many wonderful Sudanese people along my journey. I'm happy to call some of them very good friends of mine. You guys might remember my conversation with Awad in episode two. And I also have a Sudanese foster brother. This episode comes after many conversations with them about the best way to encourage understanding and awareness for the people of Sudan. It aims to be a comprehensive introduction into the history, but through personal stories that make the information accessible to everyone

[Cut out: Information about the partner and sponsor of this Podcast series]

Jaz O'Hara: Now let's hear from three wonderful women sharing their knowledge and stories about Sudan. First, Sonja and Maddy from an amazing organization called Waging Peace, who support the Sudanese community in the UK. Then Marwa who shares her personal experience of living in and leaving Sudan. Her testimony is an honor to be able to include and share with you.

I'd love to start by hearing how you guys are doing today. How actually are you?

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): Thank you very much for asking. For now, I'll say I'm doing really well. The sun is shining, and I'm excited and nervous to be here.

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): Yeah. No, that is a nice question and so unexpected that I don't know what to say. I feel good. I feel like we should be singing, like [...] looking at each other, clicking really harmonizing. Sonja will sing, we shall overcome.

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): It's got to be spontaneous. Maddy.

Jaz O'Hara: If it gets too heavy, that's your cue.

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): All right, I'm going to bring it on, too. And how are you?

Jaz O'Hara: I'm doing good. I feel the same. As soon as there's a blue sky, I don't mind if it's cold. I'm happy to just have a bit of sun on my face. And I'm happy that we've finally made this happen because looking back over our email thread, it goes back maybe two years, or something?

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): Yeah, it does.

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): Well, the different times that we've emailed, like, where Sudan has been on its journey, it's weird to go back to that chain and think even in the latest stage of us working this out, there's been another coup in the country. And we would not have predicted that when we were emailing even quite recently.

Jaz O'Hara: And that's something I definitely want to talk about and cover today. But maybe it makes sense to start with an introduction to Waging Peace and what you guys do.

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): Absolutely. Waging Peace is a charity based here in London. We work with Sudanese asylum seekers and refugees, and we also do campaigning, lobbying. We do media work. Anything and everything to do with Sudan.

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): We say our mission statement is to support the Sudanese community to build meaningful lives in the UK. Different people have very different ideas of what meaning is going to look like in their life. We've worked with some people who really want to raise a family here. That's their ultimate goal. Other people who really want to create change back in Sudan for their own country, their friends and family who still lived there, down to they want to receive an education, they want to run a marathon, they want to learn about history. I mean, it's all the sorts of things that would make meaning for anyone else. So we don't kind of limit ourselves to particular forms of support, like getting someone a winter jacket or a lawyer. Important though, those are we will just sort of help someone, yeah, build a life that they want to be living in the UK. And also very often that means they do want to do work on Sudan and do sort of policy and campaigning work as well. But we take that as a kind of entry point rather than anything else is what that person wants to do and achieve for themselves.

Jaz O'Hara: That's genuinely what I love so much about what you do is that it feels needs-led and community-led and based on what that person actually individually is looking for.

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): I love that you pick up on the fact that we are needs-led because that's really, really important to us. Having one size fits all, prescriptive sort of service, if you will, to anybody or any group of people, it's just not our model. We work really holistically, and it's really important to have the expertise that we've come to acquire on Sudan because that really informs how we can actually hold the individual or how we are able to really be present with that individual who might be sharing testimony that's important for their asylum claim, for us to then liaise with their lawyer, or just simply for us to be able to say, "We hear you, we see you, and we know your experience is true based on lots and lots and lots of hours and hundreds and hundreds of testimonies." Certainly, we can spot when somebody might have some inconsistencies, but we also really spot when people are pouring out their hearts and they want to share exactly what it is that they've been through and be believed.

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): Sometimes it's honestly as simple as knowing a Sudanese Arabic word or knowing where a town is in relation to something else. And we'll suddenly see someone's face light up and they go, "You know. You know about this?" And we go, "Yeah, of course we know." Every Sudanese person would know where that town is in relation to that refugee camp, for instance. And it's really disappointing that it's kind of that simple. But often we're the first person that someone has met who is British looking or American, in Sonja's case, who actually has some knowledge of Sudanese culture and basic facts about the country. Some cases, these people have been through a substantive interview, and you're thinking, "Did the Home Office not kind of give you any indication that they had that background information themselves," or it can just feel a bit disappointing.

Jaz O'Hara: I've been around when a social worker has come to my family house to visit one of the boys and got their nationality wrong, like, "Oh, you're Sudanese, right?" My Eritrean brother. And it reminds me of a moment that I had in Calais years ago when a Sudanese friend of mine had seen a headline about migrants coming here to steal our jobs or something along that rhetoric, right. And he'd been very upset that that was the idea or the perception in the UK. And he asked me, he said, "But what do people in the UK think about what's happening in Darfur?" And I remember being like, "I don't know how to tell you that the majority of people don't actually know." And that's why it's so important that we're having this conversation today and the work that you guys do, but also having you guys on the podcast because that's nobody's fault in schools. We're learning about genocides of past, but we're not learning about what's happening in Darfur right now. And it seems so important to include that. And that's why it was so great when I saw that you have that incredible resource for teachers that pack on how to teach about the genocide in Darfur. And maybe we should

actually begin for any listeners who don't know what is happening in Sudan at the moment, what is going on, what has been going on, and why it's so important to support the Sudanese community in the UK.

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): Big question. I'm just trying to organize my thoughts. I think we'll have to break this down as best we can. So Sudan, guess if we're starting from the beginning, country in Africa, that always has to be said. It used to be the biggest country. In 2011, it split, actually to create the world's newest nation. I think that's still true with South Sudan in the south. But Sudan had since 1989, up until 2019, been ruled by a dictator called Omar Albashir. He seized power and very quickly changed the country and made it have more of an Islamist bent to it, leading to massive restrictions on, for instance, women's rights, on various forms of freedom of every kind, but most notably for some of the people from marginalized backgrounds or from areas in the periphery. And one of those is Darfur. But there are, of course, other areas in the country that have suffered a similar fate, such as South Kordofan, which is in the South, Blue Nile, East and the north. So it was really a case of Bashir ruling for a central elite and a more Arabized elite and viewing with some disdain those black African groups. That kind of is acceptable language or the usual language used. But black African tribes, which more often lived in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains.

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): And as Maddy said, there's been a marginalization of certain groups, and they are usually the black Africans who did not have access to healthcare in the same way as the Arab population or the elite. People were beaten for speaking their own tribal languages. Their names were taken from them. They were given more Arabized names. People don't have access to jobs in the same way, and all of that still exists. We've been told different stories about having to have ID cards. And if your ID card shows that you're from a certain tribe, well, you're out of luck. You're not going to get a job. And that has a real impact on one's own self-worth, I suppose, as not just as an individual, but as a community and a nation if you're constantly being told that you're not worthy.

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): Eventually, there were groups, armed movements in Darfur that sprang up that were intent on claiming their rights. And when they did so, government responded incredibly violently and with scorched earth tactics. So they didn't just limit themselves to attacking an armed movement, they decided let's attack the people who support the armed movement. So that includes poisoning wells, that would include burning entire villages, bombing entire villages, and often committing just heinous atrocities. They would arm and provide resources to local militia, local Arab militias who were called the Janjaweed or the Devils on Horseback. That was about 2003, 2004 that we saw the first big waves of violence. But I think the most important thing for listeners to know is that that's never really gone away. And in fact, the Janjaweed has changed its name. It's now called the Rapid Support Forces. But the deputy in head at the top of Sudan's current government, I say that in inverted commas, but the group ruling the country in the military coup is the head of the RSF. So we've got the Janjaweed. The genocidaires are at the top of the country, and that's where we are today, and that's despite Sudan having gone through just these amazing people-led revolutions. I mean, the images of the 2018, 2019 revolution were so inspirational. Truly peaceful, people-led protest to oust a dictator where they got rid of Bashir, and then they said, "That's not enough." They kept out on the streets and they said, "We want to get rid of the whole military." And where we are today is the military is just clinging onto control, onto power. They do not want to leave. And when it looked like the balance was being tipped out of their favour, they acted and enacted a military coup and now we're back in charge. And the worry is that that's just going to create more marginalisation, more violence against periphery groups, huge repressions, and we're seeing that now.

Darfur is suffering some of the worst violence that it has, certainly in kind of my time with

Waging Peace, but also since 2004, since those beginnings, when the world did look at Sudan for a brief period and say, "Yeah, genocide is occurring there," but it's never stopped. It's been like that for decades.

The Sudanese people have been known for their tremendous ability to bring themselves forward.

I always have to kind of put it against my own age bracket, if that makes sense. Bashir came in in 1989. [...]

Imagine you've grown up in a country that has for all of its life had a dictator, had Bashir, and then to all of a sudden be part of a movement that unseats that dictator and thinks of a whole new future for your country without having ever seen it actually be practically modelled. I just think that's really inspirational [...]

Anyone who kind of has an interest in revolution, an interest in how societies build themselves up from true grassroots. Sudan's the place to look.

Jaz O'Hara: Both of you speak so eloquently about this. I could just listen to you for hours. I think it was 2019 when everyone had their blue profile pictures and suddenly Sudan was on people's radars for a short amount of time. And unfortunately, that's always the way that the news cycle works, right? Did that amplify what you were doing in any way? And was that a positive thing for you guys? And how much does awareness of the general public on Sudan kind of play a part in what you do?

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): I remember at that time, and I'm saying all this with the knowledge that I'm not Sudanese so I get that privilege of-- although I have many friends in the country, this is not my family. This is not me having to check to see if a relative has died during the revolution and the violence that people saw. But even I remember kind of waking up and seeing Rihanna had a blue profile picture or I think it was one of the Kardashians and then Gigi Hadid, I might be getting-- there's several Hadids, I don't know, one of them had a blue profile picture and feeling so seen and it gave me a small insight into if that was my country and I had fled that country, how seen it would have made me feel and it felt completely unprecedented for us. And even if it was just a gesture it really meant a lot and I think people are looking for some of that in this newest kind of revolution or stage of the revolution that people are in. They want to be seen. But I think what's always so amazing when we look at Sudanese politics is no one is waiting around for the international community to get its bum in gear. People are doing it for themselves. They are not going to stop protesting. They have set up their own kind of alternate local governance structures. They're not waiting for Britain and the US to do something. They're doing it. They just want to be witnessed and allowed the space to do it and to rule themselves and that's as simple as their messages. It's like, "We want a chance to govern ourselves. And ever since independence from Britain, our former colonial power, we haven't been given that chance yet. Give it to us. Let us do it." And so, yeah, I mean that's not to take away from if the Kardashians are listening. They want to make their profile blue, that would be great. Please do. But Sudan got it. [...]

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): Media attention and education, they are vital. They are vital to the Sudanese communities that we work with. They're vital to us too. And we tend to kind of ride the tide because we've been going for now, over 17 years, almost 18 years. We have seen attention and we have seen the attention wane and we have held tight and held firm because our commitment has been very clear from the outset and we've worked really hard maintaining this commitment but what has not waned is the requests for media, the requests for attention, the requests to be seen. And that's the only way that we can kind of presence it. And I don't know if I can just share an anecdotal story about why that's so important. Maddy

and I haven't been able to visit Darfur yet or Sudan, but we did go to South Sudan, to the north, right on the border where many, many people from South Kordofan and the Nuba Mountains have fled, and they now live in a refugee camp just over the border of Sudan in South Sudan. And we talked to many people. We talked to women, we talked to children, we talked to refugee camp leaders. But one meeting that we held, I remember the women were so passionately speaking about, "Go and tell the world how we are suffering. Please just tell them." And that to us really kind of translated into, "I want to be seen. I matter. My country matters, my family matters, where I live matters."

Jaz O'Hara: Do you guys remember the first time that somebody shared firsthand their experience, their story with you?

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): Even the question makes me a little emotional. I do, yeah. And a lot of people think in this job you have to develop a thick skin. In some way, you have to have a healthy kind of distance because you're hearing really horrible things all the time. But this first testimony was with a woman, and I remember the one piece-- she was in media and clearly not reporting on things that were okay by the standards of the Bashir regime and had a visit to her house by the Janjaweed. And she was breastfeeding her young baby, I think, weeks old. And they ripped him from her and put a hood over her head and the man handled her and took her out to be arrested. And I won't go into too much else of the story, but the image of a mother, a woman breastfeeding her child, and the trauma alone from the baby violently being ripped from his mother's breast really impacted me because that's something that's going to remain for the woman and for the child, no matter how young. That's just always stuck. [...]

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): Thanks for sharing that, Sonja. I appreciate it. I have a similar story, but I remember taking in my first few weeks of the job, two people's testimony. And similar to what Sonja described, my mind couldn't really comprehend the treatment they'd received. And this might sound flippant, but this was treatment they'd received in the UK by UK officials and I remember being so shocked. I mean, one of these people had a trauma reaction, which meant that the sound of the keys when their room was being locked brought back memories of torture and detention in Sudan. And they lost the use of their legs. They said that they couldn't walk anymore. That's how this manifested for them. They couldn't walk and they were crawling around their room. And they tried to crawl out one day into the hallway to get food or some other item and they were told by the guards, "You can crawl in your room, but don't crawl in the hallway because there's cameras there". So they knew that they weren't treating this person correctly and still said that. And in another case, there was somebody who was feeling ill and had to be hospitalised. And while they were hospitalised, they were handcuffed. And I just, I remember this is week one or two. And I was thinking, this is not pensions providers anymore. I was really shocked and ashamed that I had not known that treatment like that was happening in the UK to people. And this is aside from I now know those people very well and their full stories and know the absolute horrors they had suffered in Sudan, which in kind of, if you're looking at a hierarchy of suffering, I guess you would think of those as being the greater evils, the periods of torture, of rape, in some cases, these were terrible things done to them in Sudan. But there was something about once they reached the UK being treated in the way they were, it felt crushing to know. And I mean, it felt also very motivating in a way, because it's like, well, that I can stop. And I don't want to slip into pessimism, but it's seven years on for me, seven-plus years on. There is a kind of moment where you look around and you look at the Borders Bill, and you think, what are we doing? What's been achieved? Why is the tide turning again against the rights of this group of people?

Jaz O'Hara: Let's talk a little bit more about that, because we've talked a bit about the

situation in Sudan, how that can manifest. We have, I think, an idea of the journeys that people are taking to get to the UK, and also why I met a lot of Sudanese people that already spoke English very well, had an idea of the UK that perhaps, as you describe, not the reality. But when somebody from Sudan arrives to the UK right now, what does the process look like for them?

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): Somebody arrives and then they are sent to a facility or a hotel, which is basically glorified detention because there are certain rules. While people are in the hotels, they have to sign in, sign out, various different things. There are two interviews. One is the initial screening, and then there's the substantive more, longer interview. And we're seeing people who are languishing for a year and a half, two years without even having these interviews. So you've got a bottleneck situation. You've got a lot of people wanting to do what they can to contribute to society or to move along, get education, whatever. And they're not allowed to work. They're restricted in many different ways.

Maddy Crowther (Waging Peace): I would love to be able to say, oh, and at the end of it, though, asylum is almost guaranteed and certainly Sudan has historically had quite a high acceptance rate because of the situation in the country that the Home Office acknowledged meant that there were groups that were at such high risk. So we were in our past there were very few cases, actually, that we had to kind of go to bat for and fight and bring new evidence for, because it was just so abundantly clear that there was a violent situation in the country that was causing people to flee, especially if they were Darfuri, or as the Home Office uses the language, non-Arab Darfuri, which is complicated, but that's the words they use. And the evidence that they require is that someone's non-Arab Darfuri. But what's happened in the years since is that there's this drive to try and limit the number of successful claims. I mean, that's my assessment. I'm sure that's not how it would be presented by the Home Office, but we're seeing these real attempts to sort of say, "Look, Sudan is safe," or this is the way they do it now is, "Well, Sudan's not safe, and Darfur is not safe, but you know what? I bet you could go to Khartoum and be fine." And this is despite the fact of the coup, the violent and bloody aftermath of that coup now, because things take so long to kind of trickle down to Home Office decision-makers. But even now, we're seeing a real rise in the number of refusals. We've contributed so many times to different Home Office Country Policy and Information official guidance notes to show that there's continued risk. We've had to go to the Upper Tribunal, to country guidance case level to say, "No, people are still at risk." And it feels like it's a really hard message to get across that the situation in the country is not yet safe. And I get that the Home Office doesn't want to make a blanket assessment and say that things aren't safe. They really hate doing that for any country. But there is evidence in Sudan that it isn't, and our own Foreign Office sort of acknowledges that the situation is not safe. And yet it feels like we're constantly having to go up against the Home Office who do not want to hear that message, want to find individual reasons why someone could be safely returned. And we've had cases where someone was returned and then was met with persecution and then had to be returned back to the UK to have their case considered here because the Home Office acknowledged, "Hey, we made a big mistake." And obviously, that person was lucky enough to kind of be able to maintain links to the UK. We don't know what happens in other cases. Having to go up against this narrative all the time is exhausting, over like 18 years. When the country's situation changes, we'll be the first people to celebrate it, to party with the Home Office. Not in a kind of number 10 way. But it's not there yet. No parties, especially in COVID.

Jaz O'Hara: I actually remember reading this story maybe this time last year, actually, about a friend of yours, Sharif, who lived in Tottenham, right? And went back to Darfur and was killed last January. Do you want to share a little bit more of his story?

Sonja Miley (Waging Peace): We didn't know him personally, but we have come to know him

and his story. Such a loved man. So he survived the original genocide in Darfur 2003, 2004, and he made it to the UK. He had a wife and two children at the time, sadly and tragically they were killed. He was here in the UK was granted his asylum after failed attempt, after failed attempt, then became very much part of the community, the British community. And he wanted to continue to help his people, was from the Masalit community in Darfur and there's a big Masalit community, Sudanese community here in the UK. So was always working on different initiatives to increase awareness and education. He managed to get remarried and he went back to Darfur. His wife at the time was pregnant with their first child. And tragically again, I mean, the story is just fraught with so much tragedy, she died in childbirth. So when Sharif went back, he was going back to try and figure out how to bring his daughter here to the UK, his baby daughter. And in January 2021, as we've mentioned here already, the violence, the conflict in Darfur was still raging, has been raging ever since. And before he could bring his daughter back to the UK, Sharif was murdered and assassinated in Darfur. If anyone is really interested to kind of read more of the details, we do have a resource that speaks to his life. His family has been-- has given their blessings. Again, as we've mentioned, there is this real desire to have-- bring meaning to a person's life and to bring awareness even through these really tragic stories.

[Exchanging memories and experiences of individuals (Sudanese) they've met in the UK]

Sonja Miley: As to whether there is anything else that I think really needs to be covered at the moment I kind of want to just give a shout-out to the women of Sudan. They have been incredible throughout the protests and the revolution, being on the front lines. I'm not dismissing anybody's action whatsoever, but I am just elevating for a moment the cost it has taken for women to be out there to really change attitudes. To put their own lives and their vulnerabilities at risk. It's really quite extraordinary, and I've just given some props to Sudanese women and of course, the youth who are just so committed to seeing change in Sudan. And what they are doing is sort of a beacon of hope, constantly going back at it, really wanting peace for their country. They want peace, freedom and justice. I don't feel like that's a lot to ask.

Jaz O'Hara: Talking of the incredible women of Sudan, let's hear from one of them. Maddy and Sonja put me in contact with an old friend of theirs, Marwa. I went to her home in London, which she shares with her husband and four children, to record this powerful conversation. It's an absolute honour for me to hear these experiences firsthand and to be able to share them with you here.

Marwa: I'm from Sudan. I worked as a journalist in Sudan and national TV, Sudan, as a presenter and producer. Since I was a little girl, I pictured myself as a journalist and producer and presenter, which wasn't easy to be achieved in Sudan.

Jaz O'Hara: Yes, I can imagine, because there's not really the freedom to write about and speak about what you want to in Sudan. Is that right?

Marwa: It is right. And Besides that, you cannot go through with the career you chose unless you have been one of the supporters of the regime in Sudan. So I wasn't that supported with the regime. I stood against their policies. Chances only given at that time to people who support the regime. You were never given opportunities.

At all. At all. And even if you struggle and fight for your rights, at the end, you're going to fail because you don't have the power, the ability to fight the whole regime.

Jaz O'Hara: Is it also dangerous for you to be opposing the regime and writing about it?

Marwa: Of course, it is dangerous. For example, I don't get the chance to say my opinions. It was impossible to do that. But even writing a piece of opinion on your social media, you get

punished. In 2012, I received a call. He is one of the security forces, and we want you to come tomorrow at 7 o'clock to our office. It is [inaudible] in Khartoum that detain people and detain journalists. So he just asked me to come tomorrow at 7 o'clock. I said, "I will come." Then he said to me, "If you don't come, we know your house. We know you have three children, and we come and beat you in front of your children eyes. So it's better to come by yourself. I had no chance except to go at 7 o'clock to that office, which is security office. I got investigated about my writing, about my opinions on the regime. "Why do you say that? Why do you encourage people, through your writing, to demonstrate against the regime?" and this kind of questions. When I got back, the TV station I used to work on, they told me, you are a trouble for us. So they stopped me from working. By the way, this was the third time I got stopped from work because my opinion. Even I don't say my opinion loudly, they just feel, for example, from my dressing, they know I'm not supporting the Islamic regime because I don't normally put this scarf on and so on.

Actually, after that, become normal, [inaudible] Sometimes they get me all the day, ask me to report every day at 7 o'clock to that place. I just stay there and they release me at 07:00 PM, for 10 days. When they asked me, I told them I never done anything to undermine the regime, even my opinion. When I wrote this, I didn't encourage anyone to do anything. I think I was lucky because I have colleagues and friends who got detained and never got the chance to return back to their home. Other people I know, they got torched, beaten, and everything you can imagine. So I was lucky. They asked me, "Don't write anything about political", or "Don't show your opinion on your writing." They threaten me like this, "If you do that, you can see something that you will not like it." Actually, to be honest, I afraid to write again. I started to think to go out of Sudan anywhere. My main problem at that time was my children. I know how this regime able to do to my children without any kind of merciful. I became horrified that they kidnapped my children while they were coming from the schools. I had this kind of thoughts. So it was struggle either to live in this situation or to search another [inaudible] to live in.

Jaz O'Hara: So that was why you made the decision to actually leave [Khartoum?].

Marwa: Yeah, exactly. It was difficult decision as well, because I had to leave my children in Sudan, and I didn't know when we could meet together again. So it was a very difficult time to say goodbye to them, whereas you don't know when you're going to meet them again. We met after one year and four months. It's like a hell at that time, really. I don't want to say that I was alive because the life stopped for me since I left my children and came to UK till the moment I saw them again after one year and four months. I thank God this happened because also I see other people who migrants, who fled from their countries for trouble or war or political situation. And some of them had like two years, three years to meet their children again. So thankfully, I met my children and husband after one year and four months. And they are now settled at the schools. They are happy. They have their own ambitions for their life. So everything is fine now. I left very small one and I was pregnant when I left. I was pregnant with the fourth one.

Jaz O'Hara: Okay. I see. Wow. So you took the fourth one with you?

Marwa: Yeah, exactly. I took the fourth one with me. I delivered him maybe after three months or four months.

Jaz O'Hara: In the UK?

Marwa: In the UK, yes. It was difficult to come here and to start from scratch. I'm no longer young. I felt that I have to start my life from the beginning. You leave your career, you leave your friends, your community, you leave everything that related to yourself. I don't want to say that I'm struggling to integrate in the community here, but still, I have something missing.

I have empty part in my heart that I'm trying to fill since I came here, which is never refilled. You can say it's like homesick. Yeah, homesick, which I tried to cure myself from it and completely failed. Yeah.

Jaz O'Hara: I guess it's very different here from life in Sudan.

Marwa: It's not easy in several ways. Yeah, you can feel you are safe. This is the thing that most of migrant people searching for to be safe and secure. But there is another kind of struggle we are facing here as migrant people.

Jaz O'Hara: So tell me about that moment when after one year and four months, you are reunited with your three older children and your husband.

Marwa: This is the most favourable moments of my life. As I told you, I've been waiting for this moment for one year and four months, just crying. Imagine that someone had been crying for like 16 months or 17 months. The only thing I do was to cry. I was very happy to meet them again. I thought that we will never be reunited. And when I saw my children coming out of the airport, I started to yell and cry. I get [...]

Hysterical, yes. And nearly I was about to faint. Yeah, because it was very hard moment, yeah, to see them again. But definitely it was a very happy moment. [...]

Jaz O'Hara: Maybe we should talk a little bit about the situation in Sudan and, for civilian people, what it looks like at the moment.

Marwa: I'm really very sorry for people in Sudan. I believe they deserve better than what they have now. They have been struggling for a civil government or civilian government. They have been searching for democracy, for justice for long, long, long, long time. But still, this moment, they didn't get what they want. We experienced 30 years of military government, and it was really a very brutal regime, and they'll commit atrocities on Sudan. For 30 years, Sudan was dedicated to people just support the government. 30 years, the government repress people in Sudan. You can't express your opinion, you can't ask for your rights.

Something suddenly happened in 2018. The whole Sudanese agreed that this regime should be out. After a long time, they had the courage to go to streets and demonstrate against the regime. And thankfully, at the beginning, we, as the Sudanese people, succeeded to out this regime. And there has been a transitional government. Unfortunately, it was share between civilian and military, which is part of the old regime. They paved the way for the old regime to get back and to rule again. So we have to start again from scratch to fight against the military government because it's the same government that repressed people, detained them for expressing their points of views or asking for their rights. So it's still people in Sudan, they are fighting for democracy and justice. Till this moment, people and youth, they will be shot and die just because they go outside. I'm so sorry for this situation in Sudan.

After the revolution, I thought that things has changed, and I could go back again to Sudan to fill that empty part I told you before. But before I managed to go back to Sudan, the coup happened. So still, I can't go back to Sudan on this situation. But I believe soon or later people in Sudan would eliminate this government.

Jaz O'Hara: So you have hope for the future?

Marwa: Yes, I do have hope. Nothing except hope.