

SUDAN




1. REPORT SUMMARY

The formation of Sudan’s Transitional Government in 2019, following the dismissal of President Omar al-Bashir, opened up the protection space in Sudan. It allowed for discussions on issues such as GBV, human rights and child protection. In 2020, several armed actors signed the Juba Peace Agreement (DPA), allowing them to join the transitional government. Nevertheless, these positive developments did not ultimately endure. By 2021, the protection landscape changed significantly with the departure of UNAMID and the military coup d’état on 25th October 2021. In the same year, IOM DTM reported the displacement of 450,000 IDPs in the country. The current levels of violence in Darfur have been unseen since the mid-2000s. There is also a marked increase in violence in the South Kordofan and, to some extent, in the Blue Nile States.


Within this landscape, the Sudan Protection Sector responds to armed conflict settings, intercommunal violence, forced displacement, loss of property, human rights violations, grave child rights violations, climate change, sexual violence and criminal activity amid political fragility and uncertainty. Significant protection risks faced by civilians include the right to life, displacement, secondary displacement, GBV and denial and impediments to access to services.

This Protection Analysis Update analyses priority protection risks and recommendations. The findings are based on the analysis of protection monitoring actors and assessments by the Protection Sector, its AoRs, protection partners and reports produced by other agencies. The document uses both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Humanitarian access issues and limited coverage of protection actors contribute to information gaps such as data on civil documentation, GBV and housing, land and property.


3.7.3 Gender-Based Violence




3.7.1 Protection



3.7.4 Mine Action



3.7.2 Child Protection



2. CONTEXT OVERVIEW


After the coup, a political agreement signed on 21 November 2021 resulted in the dissolution of the civilian component of the Transitional Government. Though the political agreement allowed for the reinstatement of Prime Minister Hamdok, other political actors, including the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), the National Umma Party and the Sudanese Congress Party, condemned it. On 22 November, 12 FFC government ministers also presented their resignations.¹

In the absence of a political agreement, increased violence and political fragmentation, Prime Minister Hamdok publicly announced his resignation on January 2, 2022. In response to the end of civilian rule and the Prime Minister's resignation, the Sudanese people continue to protest and engage in civil disobedience. In some locations, protests and civil unrest reportedly were responded to with arbitrary arrest and detention of civilians, journalists and activists, further compounding the overall security environment². These political developments ultimately derail the achievements made during the transition, including the peace process compromising the future of the Sudanese transition.

On 8 January 2022, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) announced the launch of an UN-facilitated intra-Sudanese political process to design a way out of the political crisis and forge a sustainable path forward towards democracy and peace.

¹ Report of the Secretary-General "Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan", 2 March 2022.

Severe levels of insecurity and violence



In conflict-affected areas, civilians are widely exposed to insecurity and violence. The capacity constraints of State institutions and law enforcement entities create an environment of impunity and lawlessness. Over the course of 2021, the number of hotspot localities identified by the Protection Sector increased from 43 to 73. In 2021, the Protection Sector recorded the killing of over 1,256 individuals and injuries to 1,153 individuals. In the first quarter of 2022, the number of hotspot localities remained the same, and 156 killings and 132 injuries have been recorded.

Key Figures



*the exact number of hotspot sites in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States is subject to verification due to access problems.

The Protection Sector recorded 296 intercommunal violence and factional fighting incidents in all Darfur states, South Kordofan and Blue Nile throughout 2021, which resulted in the displacement or secondary displacement of 440,000 civilians and IDPs, bringing the total number of IDPs in Sudan to over three million.

Multidimensional impact on population vulnerabilities and coping capacities

Disputes over power-sharing, land ownership, competition over resources and criminality are fueling continuous intercommunal clashes and factional fighting. The Central, North and West and Darfur states and the South Kordofan have witnessed the most escalation in conflict in 2021. Though not to the same extent as other

² Report of the Secretary-General, 3 December 2021

states, Blue and White Nile states also witnessed violence in 2021. In Darfur, the departure of UNAMID in 2020 created a security vacuum. Despite some efforts by the Government of Sudan, clashes between herders and farmers continue with impunity. Following outbreaks of violence, nomadic tribes or unidentified armed groups forcefully evict IDPs and vulnerable local populations from their land. This fragile situation has been exacerbated by the gradual return of Libya-based Darfuri fighters and the deployment of armed forces of parties to the Juba Peace Agreement.

Ongoing clashes and conflict, compounded by the political and economic crisis, are having dire effects on the Sudanese population's capacity to cope and earn basic livelihoods. The situation interrupts access to markets and income-earning opportunities. Market activities and trade flows have been reduced. While slightly decreasing from November 2021, inflation is still high at 259.8 per cent in January 2022. Due to the increased demand for United States dollars, the Sudanese pound decreased its value by more than 5% on the black market (January 2022). Staple food prices surged across Sudan (at least 200 % compared to 2021, 400 % compared to five years ago).

The high prices of cereals are being driven additionally by lower-than-expected harvests together with high production and an increase in transportation costs.³ Livestock prices remain stable but are still around 200 % above prices in 2021. Electricity tariffs increased up to 600 per cent in January 2022.⁴

Higher prices and supply shortages of basic goods, including medicine, wheat, fuel, and agricultural inputs, are thus drastically reducing purchasing power, increasing food insecurity, and deepening the population's overall vulnerability. Poor pastoral and urban households are amongst the most impacted in terms of food access.⁵

Amidst this complex environment, heavy rains and floods affected 314,500 persons, with 15,000 houses destroyed and 46,000 damaged. COVID-19 cases continue to affect the population with over 3,300 associated deaths, and as of 17 April 2022, there are 4,494 active cases. COVID-19 cases are highly underreported due to the weak surveillance system. By 15 October 2021, the Federal Ministry of Health had reported 1,822,868 cases of malaria compared with 1,456,413 during the same period in 2020. The number of cases exceeded threshold levels in many States. Over 1,860 cases of hepatitis E were also registered in Sudan between June and December 2021.

Access and security challenges

The recurring incidents of inter-communal violence and the inability of the authorities to protect civilians pose a severe challenge to the effectiveness and sustainability of protection responses. The intense levels of insecurity and violence impede humanitarian access throughout Darfur, South Kordofan and conflict-affected areas of White and Blue Nile states. Local authorities also cannot provide security escort in a timely manner due to their engagement with other activities and limited capacity on the ground. Humanitarian actors are also concerned about the varying amounts of the payment requested by security actors per soldier per day. Some protection NGOs operate in these areas, but they do not have any working relationship with the Sudan Protection Sector.

From 28 to 30 December 2021, looters entered three WFP warehouses in El Fasher town (North Darfur) with over 5,000 metric tons of food and dismantled warehouse structures. The looting of WFP warehouses deprived nearly two million people of food and nutrition support. From 10 to 12 January 2022, looters targeted the former UNAMID log base, stealing the remaining 123 vehicles and 300 containers.

³ Famine Early Warning Systems Network Key Message Update February 2022

⁴ Report of the Secretary-General, 2 March 2022

⁵ Report of the Secretary-General, 2 March 2022




Figure 1 Hotspot Localities as of 2022

3. PRIORITY PROTECTION RISKS

The events before and following October 2021 directly impacts the population’s capacity to cope and increases the myriad protection threats to the population. The threats include unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, abduction, torture, and other forms of ill-treatment; GBV; separated families and children; grave child rights violations, including recruitment of children; the prevalence of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW); inter-communal conflict and forced displacement. These rights violations occur in an environment of general impunity where police do not have the capacity to respond. In the conflict-affected areas, IDPs and the host community do not have confidence in local authorities, armed forces and/or JPA signatories.

RISK 1: Right to Life, Attacks on Civilians and Civilian Infrastructure

Civilians, including IDPs and returnees, are continuously facing threats to their right to life in conflict-affected areas. Allegedly, armed nomadic groups and other unidentified armed groups deliberately kill and injure civilians. Motivated by a combination of different factors, including political and economic, these actors benefit from a limited presence of a judiciary and police system.




Figure 2 Number of Protection of Civilian Incidents in 2021

The presence of landmines and ERW in urban and rural areas also have a devastating impact on local communities, IDPs, and returnees in all five Darfur states and South Kordofan, West Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Per UNMAS, as of 31 December 2021, 136.7 km² (84%) out of recorded 162 km² of contaminated land has been released.

Below are figures from 2021. From November 2021 to January 2022, UNITAMS documented 161 alleged incidents of human rights violations and abuses involving 778 victims, including 22 children. Violations of the right to life accounted for 368 victims (295 men, 63 women and ten children), violations of physical integrity accounted

for 366 victims (340 men and 26 women), and abductions accounted for 14 victims (including ten women).⁶





Figure 3 Number of Casualties Per State in 2021

RISK 2: Displacement and Secondary Displacement due to Violence and Conflict

The total number of internally displaced persons in Sudan is over 3.08 million⁷, with over 89,000 newly displaced persons in Darfur from October 2021 to January 2022. In South Kordofan, renewed inter-communal conflict resulted in the displacement of 40,000 individuals to Abu Jubaiha in December 2021. All other hotspot localities witnessed small numbers of new displacement in 2021.



Map 1: IDP Population Density


Figure 4 Map IDP Concentrations in Sudan

The majority of the IDP caseload in Sudan is protracted, with over 1.7 million displaced between 2003 to 2010 and an additional 1.07 million displaced between 2011 and 2017. Secondary displacement of the protracted and newer caseloads is an issue. In 2021, systemic violence displaced at least 440,000 persons, primarily IDPs, to 200 locations. Additionally, around 18,000 individuals fled to Chad. Of the 180,000, 104,432 remain secondarily displaced in West Darfur. Secondary displacement weakens existing coping mechanisms and increases the risk of adverse coping mechanisms such as child marriage and survival sex.

⁶ Report of the Secretary-General, 2 March 2022

⁷ According to third round of IOM DTM report, January 2022.

Presence of IDPs per State - January 2022



The continued presence of armed actors forces many IDPs, especially women and girls, to limit their movement outside camps, where security is more stable and predictable.

Efforts to support durable solutions for IDPs, their local integration, and the reintegration of returnees, do not bring concrete results due to recurring violence. IDP returnees face challenges with respect to accessing land, firewood collection points and water.

Certain locations are difficult to reach due to insecurity associated, notably due to the widespread proliferation of arms and constant threats of violence.

RISK 3: Denial and impediments to access to services

The civilian population face the brunt of the macro-economic effect of the political instability and conflict in Sudan in forms of the increased cost of living (200% increase in staple food prices, 318% inflation, 600% in electricity tariffs, etc.), reduction of livelihood and

economic capacities to cope (disruption of harvesting, increased input costs, etc.), limited access to services, disruption of general social cohesion and the consequent severing of social ties. Civilians, including IDPs in the conflict-affected areas, are severely restricted in the realisation of their rights to assistance and the rights to work, social security and adequate standards of living, housing, health and education. The protracted nature of the crisis has left the population with limited means of livelihood or social or economic opportunities to address their own situation.

About 9.8 million people in Sudan may experience Crisis—IPC 3—or worse levels of acute food insecurity in 2022 due to below-average crop yields, continued conflict and displacement, increasing food prices, and reduced household purchasing power.⁸

As of mid-January 2022, the 2021/22 harvest is complete. However, the outbreak of conflict in parts of Darfur and Kordofan regions, shortages and the high cost of resources delayed the harvest. Overall, the harvest is expected to be lower than that of 2021. Fuel shortages and high electricity costs have negatively impacted wheat planting. Farmers are limited in hiring enough labour due to increased wages (around 300% compared to 2020). The area cultivated is expected to be lower than last year and the five-year average.⁹

Intercommunal fighting between the local population, IDPs and returnees is rising due to the tensions on land use and several cases of crop destruction (around 1000 farms were destroyed in the conflict between farmers and pastoralists).¹⁰

Access to services is severely compromised by the widespread violence, conflict, and lack of access to remedies. Health always remains a challenge for IDPs and returnees in remote areas due to a lack of health centres or shortages of medicines and staff. Health

⁸ IPC

⁹ Famine Early Warning Systems Network Key Message Update February 2022

¹⁰ Report of the Secretary-General, 2 March 2022

facilities are recently subject to deliberate attacks and looting, thereby restricting health care access for civilians, exacerbating health needs amid an ongoing surge in coronavirus disease (COVID-19) cases. WHO had distributed more than 850 rapid response kits to cover approximately 1.1 million people for three months.¹¹

The cost of education remains an obstacle for IDP children specifically. Schools lack feeding programs and classrooms and generally do not offer a safe environment.

The World Bank launched a family support program (cash-transfer) launched in February 2021 and is expanding in the states of Western, Northern and Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, Eastern Darfur and Central Darfur. Despite eight million people registered, challenges to the registration and payment systems have delayed roll-outs. The program has now suspended registration after the World Bank paused its activities in Sudan due to the political situation.

Notwithstanding the collective efforts of humanitarian and political actors to bring the attention of authorities and institutions to the urgent need to reverse these downward and negative trends, no substantial progress has been observed. The population of Sudan is facing the day-to-day risk of being denied services, opportunities and resources.

RISK 4: Gender-based violence

While the Government made a landmark decision to outlaw Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) in July 2020, legislation in Sudan continues to have significant shortcomings concerning the prevention of GBV. Rape legislation was amended in 2015, removing previous legislation that equated crimes of rape and adultery. While Article 149 of the Criminal Act provides a more substantive definition of rape, a lack of clarity remains about the age of consent due to the existence of

conflicting laws, including the Criminal Act of 1991, wherein adulthood is defined in reference to puberty, and the Child Act of 2010, which defines a child as any person under 18 years of age. In addition, existing legislation does not outlaw marital rape, and Sudan does not have domestic violence legislation. Furthermore, traditional social norms often center blame for abuse on survivors themselves, providing impunity for perpetrators. Due to a lack of resources, underfunded police forces and judicial actors are often unable to implement investigations or conduct criminal proceedings to bring perpetrators to justice. Creating safe services to ease GBV survivors' access to justice or medical attention remains challenging for both national and international service providers.

Pervasive Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) continues to be regularly reported by the Protection Sector partners. Women and girls suffer disproportionately from GBV while collecting firewood, engaging in farm work, fetching water, or travelling. The widespread social stigma associated with GBV can create barriers for survivors in accessing services, leading to social exclusion, isolation and self-blaming. The underreporting of GBV is also attributed to this social stigma and the inability of authorities to bring perpetrators to justice and provide legal remedies and recovery services.

4. RESPONSE

The Protection Sector in Sudan comprises General Protection, Child Protection, GBV and Mine action AoRs. There is also active Housing Land and Property and Durable Solutions Working groups that work closely with Protection Cluster. These structures meet every month at the national and state level (five Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile). The Protection Sector developed its strategy and work plan. The Sector developed the Protection of Civilians' Incidents Tracking tool in consultation with other agencies. It also publishes maps of

¹¹ "In a statement on January 11, WHO Regional Director for the Eastern Mediterranean Dr. Ahmed Al-Mandhari condemned the threats against

health care providers and called on Sudanese authorities to enforce international", Report of the Secretary-General, 2 March 2022

hotspot areas and regularly issues protection of civilians' advocacy briefs. The Sector also disseminates monthly updates and daily and weekly updates in times of crisis.

Funding situation permitted, the UN protection agencies, Protection Cluster, its AoRs, and their partners implemented activities mentioned under funding data.

While most of these activities were conducted in response to several emergencies in Darfur, South, West Kordofan and Blue Nile states, some activities were also implemented in the areas of protracted displacement.

The Protection Sector and its AoRs also actively supported the development of the One UN Protection of Civilians strategy and support plan for the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians (NPPOC). Before the military coup of 25 October 2021, the Sector was preparing to organise a joint national and several workshops at the state level to develop further and prioritise proposed activities. The Protection Sector and AoRs also actively advocated for establishing the state-level protection of civilians' committees and working relationships with the National Mechanism on the Protection of Civilians.

Furthermore, these actors and concerned government counterparts provided their inputs and contributed to the development of a durable solutions strategy for Sudanese IDPs and refugees and supported the works of the HLP and DSWGs.

4.1- Funding data

The total funding requirement for **HRP 2021** of Sudan was **USD 1.94bn**, out of which **USD 149,928,919 was planned for protection activities**. However, **only 20%** (USD 30,559,006) was provided, and USD 116,369,913 remained unmet. **The same amount of USD 1.94bn is the funding requirement for HRP 2022, with USD 161,917,433 for protection activities that includes General**

Protection, Child Protection and GBV. However, as of 05 April 2022, only 1,705,350 in funding has been received.

If the funding situation continues as such, and the government does not take concrete steps towards the implementation of the NPPOC, protection agencies and actors will not be able to provide effective assistance, including under:

a) protection: conduct protection assessments, protection monitoring by presence and remotely, referrals to specialised services, provide legal assistance, psycho-social support, emergency cash assistance, awareness-raising, implement community support projects, support community-based protection networks, capacity building of service providers, conduct advocacy, protective accompaniment under.

b) child protection: individuals with awareness-raising and community engagement activities on child protection issues, reaching girls and boys with structured and sustained child protection and psychosocial support activities, providing girls and boys with specialised child protection services, such as case management and support to national child protection actors, and facilitating leadership in coordination such as technical task forces, place and support Unaccompanied and Separated Children in Alternative care, provide family tracing and reunification services, provide rehabilitation and reintegration activities of children released from armed groups and armed forces, legal assistance (detention representation), on civil documentation including birth certificates and other documents, conduct capacity building activities, including mentoring and coaching, for government, NGO staff and community based child protection structures, child protection assessments or child protection monitoring missions, assistance to children with Disabilities, support community based protection networks.

c) GBV: establish, rehabilitate women centres, support their operational costs, provide Case Management and referral services, establish or construct semi-permanent safe spaces/multi-purpose (child and adolescent), procure and distribute tents for emergency Child-Friendly Spaces, provide their running cost, furniture, stationaries and equipment (Solar Power System, computer), procure and distribute recreation PSS and dignity kits tents for emergency response, support women & girls with startup capital for Income Generating Activities and vocational skills, conduct training for community members involved in GBV prevention and response, training on GBV for Non-GBV service providers, trainings on GBV for specialised GBV service providers, provide dignity kits, specialized GBV response services and conduct GBV assessments.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Protection Sector seeks advocacy support for the following points required for the protection of civilians:

1) It is critical to implement the NPPOC fully, considered an official document by the UNSC. Apart from the formation of joint security forces, the plan includes activities in the following nine thematic areas: 1) addressing the issues of displaced persons and refugees; 2) the rule of law and human rights; 3) disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; 4) combating violence against women and children; 5) humanitarian action; 6) strengthening conflict avoidance and resolution mechanisms; 7) issues involving nomads and herdsmen; 8) reconstruction, development and basic services; and 9) water and sanitation. To ensure the implementation of the NPPOC, the GoS has to re-establish the National Mechanism and state-level Protection of Civilians Committees with clear ToRs and National-level civil and military support and strong advice to coordinate closely with the humanitarian and development actors.

2) Safeguarding the civilian character of the IDP camps, villages of displacement and return is essential as there are reports on the

presence of armed groups in and around such areas by SAF, armed nomads, and other armed movements signatory to JPA, violating the fundamental humanitarian principles and increasing the potential for large-scale violence in these areas as well as possible child recruitment. It is also vital to implement the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration process of the Juba Peace Agreement, which will allow protection actors and partners to maintain critical and life-saving activities based on the international humanitarian principles of 'impartiality', 'neutrality', and 'independence'.

3) The ability of humanitarian agencies to deliver services is directly linked to the ability and willingness of the authorities to assure the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and assets, including through the provision of security escort to unsafe areas. Any acts of violence against humanitarian organisations and their personnel constitute a direct attack on the most vulnerable populations. Without the guarantee of security, humanitarian service provision is at risk of halting.

4) Immediate stepping-up of efforts by regional and national authorities and the law enforcement to prevent and investigate the upsurging security incidents, crimes, and human rights abuses, including gender-based violence, is essential to de-escalate intercommunal tensions, prevent displacement and control the security situations by bringing perpetrators to justice ensuring law and order. Strengthened governance and state protection are essential to regain the trust and confidence in government institutions at the state level.

5) The Protection Sector also draws attention to the funding situation of humanitarian actors, protection in particular, and strongly recommends supporting the implementation of planned activities under the 2022 HRP. The Sector also encourages the Humanitarian Country Team to consider adding protection as a standing agenda item of their meetings.