



# Security Council

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## Situation in Mali

### Report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. By its resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2022 and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council every three months on the implementation of the resolution. The present report covers major developments in Mali since the previous report ([S/2021/519](#)) dated 1 June 2021.

#### II. Major developments

2. The reporting period was marked by a change in the leadership of the transitional Government, following the coup d'état of 24 May. On 20 July, the new President of the transitional Government, Colonel Assimi Goïta, was the target of an assassination attempt at the Great Mosque in Bamako. While the action plan of the new Government was endorsed by the National Transition Council, the parliament of the transition, on 2 August, preparations for the holding of legislative and presidential elections, scheduled to take place in February and March 2022, and bring the transition to its end were delayed. Meanwhile, there was limited progress in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, signed in 2015, as the focus of key political stakeholders appeared to shift.

##### A. Political transition

3. Following the coup d'état of 24 May, a new President and Prime Minister of the transitional Government took office. On 7 June, Colonel Assimi Goïta, the former Vice-President of the transitional Government, was sworn in as the President of the transitional Government. On the same day, he appointed the President of the Strategic Committee of the Mouvement du 5 juin-Rassemblement des forces patriotiques (M5-RFP), Choguel Kokalla Maïga, as Prime Minister of the transitional Government. These developments were met with mixed reactions. Some political actors generally welcomed the developments and expressed hope that the new authorities would surmount the challenges facing Mali and make progress towards a successful return to constitutional order, whereas other stakeholders expressed reservations and criticized the new Government.



4. On 11 June, the President signed a decree appointing a new Government of 28 members. Eleven ministers from the previous cabinet kept their portfolios, including Colonel Sadio Camara, Lieutenant Colonel Abdoulaye Maïga and Colonel Major Ismaël Wagué. Colonel Modibo Kone, who until then had been the Minister of Security, was appointed Director of State Security. M5-RFP, which had boycotted the previous Government, was allocated seven ministries. The new Government includes representatives of signatory armed groups, trade unions and civil society, of whom six are women, representing 21.4 per cent, which is well below the legal requirement of 30 per cent.

5. Some political parties and platforms criticized the new Government. The Ensemble pour le Mali, the Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali-Parti africain pour la solidarité et la justice, the Parti pour la renaissance nationale and the Rassemblement pour le Mali, criticized the composition of the Government, arguing that it was not inclusive enough. The Administrative Secretary of the largest labour union, the Union nationale des travailleurs du Mali, regretted the presence of only two trade unionists in the new Government, which, in his view, would prevent it from addressing workers' grievances. Conversely, the national civil society forum welcomed the new cabinet, especially the inclusion of its President, Bakary Doumbia.

6. After his appointment, the Prime Minister initiated consultations with national stakeholders on the establishment of a single election management body and the holding of a wide-ranging national dialogue on reform (*Assises nationales de la refondation*) long demanded by M5-RFP. In July, the Government announced the future establishment of the election management body and later confirmed plans to hold the national dialogue by the end of September.

7. On 20 July, the President was the victim of an assassination attempt at the Great Mosque of Bamako, where he was attending the celebration of Eid al-Adha. The suspect was subdued and arrested. On 21 July, authorities opened an investigation into the incident. On 25 July, the Government announced that the suspect had died while in custody, adding that the investigation would continue as the evidence gathered appear to indicate that the suspect had not acted alone.

8. On 30 July, at the request of the President and the Prime Minister of the transitional Government, the National Transition Council convened an extraordinary session during which the Prime Minister presented the Government's action plan. The plan is built around four axes articulated by the previous Government, specifically: (a) improving national security; (b) political and institutional reforms; (c) the intelligent implementation of the Agreement; and (d) the organization of credible elections. The plan was debated upon and subsequently approved by the National Transition Council on 2 August, with 102 votes in favour, 2 votes against and 9 abstentions. Overall, the plan was welcomed by political parties and civil society groups, although several political stakeholders expressed concerns regarding its feasibility given the limited timeframe and resources.

9. On 26 August, the former Prime Minister, Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga, and the former Minister of Economy and Finance, Bouare Fily Sissoko, were arrested on charges of irregularities in the purchase of a presidential jet and military equipment during the tenure of the former President, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta.

10. The local follow-up committee on the transition, composed of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and Head of MINUSMA and the representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union in Mali, held several meetings with transition authorities and national interlocutors, calling for the prioritization of reforms and the publication of an updated timeline for the elections planned in February 2022. The committee also

laid the groundwork for regional and international actors to remain engaged in support of the transition process.

11. The Special Envoy of ECOWAS and Mediator to Mali, the former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, led missions to Bamako on 8 and 9 June and 5–7 September, to assess progress in the implementation of the various decisions by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government. After meeting with transition authorities and representatives of the diplomatic community, the delegation issued a communiqué on 9 June, calling on the new transition authorities to respect their commitments regarding the implementation of the Agreement, reiterating the call for the formation of an inclusive Government and urging the transition authorities to identify priority actions to implement in the coming months, including the holding of inclusive, transparent and credible elections. During his visit in September, Mr. Jonathan and his delegation held consultations with the President and the Prime Minister of the transitional Government, members of the diplomatic corps accredited to Mali, as well as other key stakeholders, including political parties, signatory armed groups, civil society organizations and religious leaders. Discussions were focused mainly on the progress recorded within the framework of the transition, including the priority actions of the Government and preparations for elections.

12. The Mediator presented his report during a virtual extraordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government on 8 September. On 16 September, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government reiterated their demand for strict adherence to the transition timetable and for presidential and legislative elections to be held in February 2022 and decided to impose targeted sanctions against actors impeding progress in the transition.

13. On 27 August, following efforts by the local follow-up committee on the transition, the Government lifted all restrictions imposed on the former President, Bah N'Daw, and the former Prime Minister, Moctar Ouane, who had been under house arrest since May.

#### **Preparations for the holding of elections**

14. Significant challenges were faced in the preparations for presidential and legislative elections to be held in February and March 2022. The coup d'état on 24 May and its aftermath delayed key activities, including the revision and the audit of the electoral lists; however, it did not delay the conclusion, on 30 June, of the special voter registration operation, which had begun in December 2020, resulting in the enrolment of 789,403 voters. Furthermore, the coordination mechanisms established in April to reach consensus on the electoral process were suspended, as discussions on the establishment of a single independent electoral management body took precedence.

15. MINUSMA continued its support towards creating a conducive environment for elections through the organization of a series of workshops. These included workshops on electoral transparency from 17 to 30 June, on the role of the media and social media from 1 to 2 July and on human rights and the impact of social media on elections from 29 June to 8 July. In addition, the Mission provided two electoral material storage facilities in the northern regions in June and provided technical expertise to the Constitutional Court and the National Transition Council to enhance the capacities of their members. Preparations were also initiated by the diplomatic community in Bamako for its support to the electoral process.

## **B. Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali**

16. The parties to the Agreement were not able to make real progress towards its full implementation, owing mostly to their lingering differences.

17. On 29 June, the Agreement Monitoring Committee held its forty-third session in Bamako, almost six years to the day after the signing of the Agreement. The Committee called for the renewed commitment of all stakeholders to enable the Malian people to benefit from the dividends of the peace process. The Minister of National Reconciliation, who is in charge of the implementation of the Agreement, highlighted the progress made, *inter alia*, with regard to the appointment of interim authorities for Ménaka and Taoudéni Regions and the operationalization of the Achibougou and Almoustarat *cercles*; the preparations for the submission of a draft law on the creation of the territorial police to the National Transition Council; the deployment of the third company of the reconstituted army battalion to Kidal on 25 June; and the resumption of the meetings of the technical security committee on 8 June. MINUSMA briefed the Agreement Monitoring Committee on the recommendations of the International Commission of Inquiry. The signatory movements committed to working closely with the Commission, and MINUSMA will establish a mechanism to follow up on the operationalization of the body's key recommendations.

18. On 27 July, at the forty-fourth session of the Agreement Monitoring Committee, the international mediation team expressed concern about the lack of progress in the implementation of the Agreement. It reiterated its availability to support the Malian parties in the implementation of the outstanding recommendations of the Committee, including the operationalization of the reconstituted army battalions in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, and the establishment of a reconstituted company in Ménaka; the deployment of the remaining 1,265 combatants as part of the accelerated demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process; the resumption of discussions on the draft law on the creation of the territorial police; and the launch of the 16 authorized projects of the sustainable development fund.

### **Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and redeployment of the reconstituted, reformed and inclusive Malian Defence and Security Forces**

19. In spite of the ongoing efforts of MINUSMA and the international mediation team, minimal progress was made in the implementation of the security and defence aspects of the Agreement. The movements continued to link progress in this area to an agreement between the Government and signatory movements on global disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and to progress on institutional reforms.

20. On 23 June, the remaining 111 soldiers of the Kidal reconstituted battalion of the armed forces who had been integrated into the defence and security forces were redeployed from Bamako and Gao to Kidal, with the support of a MINUSMA escort convoy. On 23 August, 241 soldiers of the reconstituted Malian Armed Forces were redeployed from Bamako to Ménaka, with the support of MINUSMA, to complete that battalion.

21. As at 28 August, 2,300 combatants had gone through the accelerated demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process; 1,765 among them had been trained and integrated into the Malian Defence and Security Forces, out of the envisaged 3,000. Most of the integrated soldiers had been redeployed within the four reconstituted battalions in Gao, Kidal, Ménaka and Timbuktu. Those in Gao, Ménaka and Timbuktu were conducting regular patrols and other duties as required by the Malian Armed Forces, while the one in Kidal was yet to become fully operational. In a symbolic move, however, the reconstituted battalion in Kidal conducted its first patrol on 26 August.

22. MINUSMA continues to provide technical expertise, as well as logistical and financial support, in the implementation of security sector reform, including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration aspects of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The Mission organized training for 100 women staff of the Malian Civilian Protection Services on security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, in addition to capacity-building training sessions for Inspectors of the armed forces and Gendarmerie.

#### **Territorial police**

23. On 1 July, a draft law on the creation of the territorial police was submitted for review and adoption by the National Transition Council. Following initial discussions, the legislative body returned the document to the Government for further consultations among all stakeholders.

#### **Northern Development Zone**

24. No progress was recorded in the implementation of the nine approved projects of the Northern Development Zone. In addition, protracted negotiations on relocating the seat of the Zone from Gao to Bamako continued to impede progress on operationalizing the programme.

#### **Women's participation in peace and political processes**

25. The appointment of 15 additional women to the monitoring mechanisms of the Agreement (3 in the Agreement Monitoring Committee and 12 in the four thematic subcommittees), in compliance with the recommendations from the fifth high-level meeting of the Agreement Monitoring Committee in Kidal, is still pending, owing to unresolved disputes between the two factions of the Plateforme. Work is ongoing to establish an independent women's observatory, with a view to monitoring the participation of women in the political and peace processes and assessing the impact of the implementation of the Agreement on vulnerable populations.

### **C. Stabilization and the restoration of State authority in the centre**

26. Intercommunity violence in central Mali continued during the reporting period, with significant variations across the regions. A high number of security incidents continued to be recorded in Douentza, a significant increase in incidents was reported in Niono, an uptick was registered in both Djenné and Bankass, while a reduction in violent acts was recorded in Koro, Bandiagara and Mopti. Overall, abductions of civilians and theft of livestock, grains and goods increased, particularly in Bandiagara and Douentza Regions.

27. The security situation in Niono *cercle*, Ségou Region, remained of serious concern. In early July, the locality of Songho was encircled by violent extremist groups, who set up a blockade around the village, preventing local farmers from accessing their fields. The intensified armed conflict between traditional hunters belonging to the *dozo* community (*dozos*) and violent extremist groups forced the inhabitants of several villages in the region to flee their homes.

28. In Koro *cercle*, Mopti Region, the embargo imposed since 30 April by presumed radical armed groups on the village of Dinangourou was lifted on 18 August after successful negotiations by community leaders from a Koro-based civil society organization with the presumed radical armed groups.

29. In response to these worrying trends across central Mali, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General launched a 50-day plan for the centre and

inaugurated several MINUSMA-funded projects on 15 June for the extension of State administration and reinforcement of civil society. The plan is an initiative covering political good offices, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, intercommunity reconciliation and trust-building with the State institutions to accelerate United Nations support for the stabilization of the centre. Building on this plan, additional initiatives have been identified and are being implemented. In parallel, the Special Representative intensified his engagement with the Malian authorities in support of the elaboration of a Malian-led political strategy for the stabilization of the centre. The authorities have increased efforts to that end. In response to immediate needs, the Mission transported over 25 tons of food assistance provided by the Malian armed forces for the population of villages cut off by extremist groups. To address needs in the medium term, over 24 quick-impact projects were approved, with a total commitment of over \$925,000.

30. MINUSMA continued to support reconciliation efforts in Ogossagou, Bankass *cercle*, Bandiagara Region, between the two villages of Ogossagou Peulh and Ogossagou Dogon, where massacres occurred in March 2019 and February 2020, respectively. On 6 August, following successive peace initiatives supported by MINUSMA, representatives of Fulani and Dogon communities agreed to the establishment of local mechanisms for an amicable settlement of conflicts.

31. MINUSMA pursued its efforts to reduce community-based violence and foster reconciliation in close partnership with the regional reconciliation support teams. On 1 June, a joint mission involving the regional reconciliation support teams, MINUSMA and the United Nations country team visited Dioungani municipality, Koro *cercle*, to follow up on the reconciliation process and identify opportunities for peace dividends and returnee assistance. This paved the way for a subsequent intercommunity dialogue in Dounapen, Dioungani municipality, from 30 July to 1 August to consolidate previous reconciliation gains.

32. The MINUSMA force continued Operation Buffalo and has now planned Operation Beaver for Douentza *cercle* and Operation Badger, involving airmobile operations west of the River Niger, both jointly implemented with United Nations police to improve the protection of civilians, support the Mission's civilian components, facilitate restoration of State presence and authority, and reduce violence while creating conditions for long-term stability.

### **Restoration of State authority**

33. The re-establishment of State presence and authority in central Mali remained challenging. During the reporting period, 40 gendarmes, 70 police and 7 civil protection officers were redeployed in the region, notably in Bankass, Koro, Sofara and Somadougou. No judicial authorities were redeployed to the centre owing to continued insecurity and lack or weakness of State administrative services in the concerned areas.

34. Despite insecurity in the sector, the building of a new prison in Koro, with MINUSMA support, was completed in August. This will contribute to improving prison security and conditions.

### **Fight against impunity**

35. The authorities continued with efforts to investigate and prosecute alleged perpetrators of serious human rights violations and abuses in Mali. On 30 June, the Court of Assizes of Mopti tried the case related to the attack on Koulogon Peuhl, Bankass *cercle*, during which 37 people were killed and buildings were burned and looted. The 12 accused were found guilty of the charges against them (criminal

conspiracy and illegal possession of weapons of war) and were sentenced to death, in absentia.

36. With MINUSMA support, 42 members of the judicial authorities were trained in Mopti on military justice procedures and material jurisdiction to enhance investigations into crimes committed by the Malian armed forces and to prevent further crimes.

#### **D. Regional developments**

37. National and international forces continued their efforts against armed terrorist groups across the Sahel. However, these groups remained active and even appeared to be expanding their presence and influence, particularly in the tri-border area where frequent attacks were recorded. On 9 July, the Heads of State of the Group of Five for the Sahel and France held a summit to assess the security situation in the Sahel and follow up on the recommendations of the summit in N'Djamena, as well as to exchange views on the announced reconfiguration of Operation Barkhane. Major General Oumar Bikimo of Chad was appointed Force Commander of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, replacing Brigadier General Oumarou Namata of the Niger.

38. On 21 August, Chad announced the redeployment of 600 of its troops, part of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, from the border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger. Chadian authorities stated that the decision followed a re-assessment of the footprint of terrorist armed groups in the region and was taken in coordination with the Joint Force.

39. MINUSMA continued to coordinate with the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel through regular consultative meetings and engaged with other regional stakeholders, notably ECOWAS, the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel and the executive secretariat of the Group of Five for the Sahel.

### **III. Major security developments**

40. Against the backdrop of the announced reduction in the presence of the French Operation Barkhane in parts of northern Mali, armed terrorist groups in the region stepped up their rhetoric and attacks. The MINUSMA camp in Aguelhok, Kidal Region, was the target of an unprecedented wave of attacks. In central Mali, as reported above, the security situation deteriorated significantly in Niono *cercle*, starting in early July, as violent extremist groups put more villages under siege.

41. In a statement issued on 25 July, Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) claimed responsibility for eight attacks in northern Mali, including improvised explosive device and direct fire attacks on MINUSMA bases and convoys in Gao, Kidal, Tabrichat and Tessalit. These attacks followed increasing extremist calls to action in Mali. The recently appointed leader of The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Yazid Mubarak, issued a statement on 20 June calling for increased pressure and attacks on Malian and foreign forces. Following this call, on 9 July, AQIM and JNIM released a joint video – the first after three years without major communication – urging their fighters to continue the battle against local and international forces.

42. The MINUSMA camp in Aguelhok continued to be the target of attacks. Limited protests by some elements calling for its relocation away from the city were also recorded. The protesters argued that the camp posed a security risk to the population. On 8 and 25 July, the camp was targeted with rockets and mortars. On 11 August,

direct and indirect fire attacks against the camp resulted in the injury of three peacekeepers and three civilians. Protests for the removal of the camp stopped, following dialogue between community leaders and MINUSMA, and the situation subsequently calmed.

43. In parts of the centre, the security situation deteriorated significantly. On 3 July, extremist elements informed *dozos* in Niono *cercle*, Mopti Region, of their decision to withdraw from a ceasefire agreement, which had been in place since 14 March, leading to an uptick in violence. On 3 and 4 July, in separate incidents, four Bambara farmers were killed in Dogofri commune, Niono *cercle*. On 7 July, nearly 2,000 new internally displaced persons were registered in Dogofri commune. By 8 July, nearly a dozen villages in Diabaly commune were reportedly under threat from or surrounded by extremists. On 11 July, extremist elements killed seven *dozos* in Siribala commune, and, on 14 July, it was reported that extremist elements had set up a base outside Dogofri town, leading to an increase in harassment. The leader of Dan Nan Ambassagou, Youssouf Toloba, announced in the same month that all Fulani residents in areas under his control must declare their presence to the *dozos* or risk being assumed jihadists and killed as a result. The group also set up checkpoints around Petaka and imposed movement restrictions on the road after dark, ostensibly to improve security.

#### **A. Asymmetric and other attacks**

44. A total of 69 asymmetric attacks were carried out against national and international forces, MINUSMA and signatory armed groups, 42 of which occurred in the north, including 8 in Timbuktu, 16 in Gao, 15 in Kidal and 3 in Ménaka Regions. There were 27 attacks carried out in the centre: 24 in Mopti and 3 in Ségou. This marked an increase in attacks in central Mali as compared with the previous reporting period, in which 21 attacks had been recorded against security forces and signatory groups.

45. International forces were targeted in eight attacks, including three in Mopti, two each in Gao and Timbuktu and one in Ménaka, with one person killed and five injured.

46. There were 31 attacks against MINUSMA during the reporting period, including 15 in Kidal, 8 in Gao, 4 in Mopti, and 2 each in Ménaka and Timbuktu, resulting in 48 persons injured. One MINUSMA contractor died from injuries sustained in an attack against a logistics convoy on 30 June in Gao region. This marked an increase in the number of attacks compared with the previous period, in which 14 attacks against MINUSMA had been reported, resulting in 4 peacekeepers killed and 50 injured.

47. The Malian Defence and Security Forces were targeted in 31 attacks, including 17 in Mopti, 6 in Gao, 3 in Ségou, 4 in Timbuktu and 1 in Ménaka, with 40 persons killed, including 25 members of the Malian Armed Forces, 14 police and gendarmes and 1 member of the National Guard, and 72 persons injured, including 47 members of the Malian Armed Forces and 25 police and gendarmes.

48. The deadliest attack occurred on 19 August, when a complex attack against Malian Defence and Security Forces was carried out approximately 69 km east of Douentza in Hairé commune, Douentza *cercle*, Mopti Region, killing 4 members of the Malian Armed Forces and 13 police and gendarmes and injuring 17 members of the Malian Armed Forces and 25 police and gendarmes.

## **B. Support for Malian defence and security institutions**

49. MINUSMA continued to support the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Group of Five for the Sahel, Operation Barkhane and the European Union training mission in Mali with logistics, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions and standing technical agreements.

50. During the reporting period, 898 officers of the Malian security forces, 129 of them women, were trained, including 93 in central Mali, 12 of whom were women. United Nations police conducted one training session on post-blast investigation in the Mopti Region. Two training sessions were organized on the electoral process in partnership with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and the European Union capacity-building mission in Mali.

## **C. Small arms, light weapons and explosive threat mitigation**

51. In support of the redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces in the centre and the north of Mali, MINUSMA continued to enhance the national capacity to mitigate explosive threats, notably through training of response teams of the Malian Defence and Security Forces in explosive search and detection activities.

## **IV. Rule of law**

52. MINUSMA continued to provide support to Mali in the area of rule of law. On 15 and 16 June, the Mission organized ethics and integrity training for 50 members of the judiciary to contribute to reinforcing the trust and confidence of the population in State institutions.

53. MINUSMA continued to provide technical and material assistance to reinforce prison security, including through the rehabilitation of the Gao prison. In June, the Mission also enhanced coordination among 382 representatives of defence and security forces through simulation exercises in five prisons in northern and central Mali to allow for optimum implementation of their respective security plans. MINUSMA further supported the implementation of the national policy on the prevention of and fight against violent extremism and terrorism in the country's prisons, including through the promotion of non-violence in prisons, the adoption of a national policy on the social integration of prisoners and the drafting of an action plan. It also supported the training in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) and the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules) for 136 newly recruited prison officers.

54. MINUSMA and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime continued to support the Specialized Judicial Unit against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime, including through the organization of capacity-building for trial and appeal magistrates to enhance the effective handling of terrorism-related cases, on 21 to 22 June.

## **V. Protection of civilians**

55. Between 26 May and 26 August, a total of 326 attacks against civilians had been reported, an increase compared with the period between the end of March and the end of May, during which there had been 307 attacks. The latest attacks resulted in 181 civilians killed, 145 injured and 178 abducted. As indicated above, the overall

security situation remained volatile in the centre, where the majority of attacks against civilians were recorded. Civilians continued to suffer from direct violence (killings and abduction) and indirect violence (threats, intimidation and improvised explosive devices). However, some positive developments were reported from Djenné and Koro cercles, which have seen a sustained reduction in attacks against civilians in recent months.

56. In Gao and Timbuktu Regions, the main threat to civilians remained the activities of violent extremist groups, including abduction and intimidation, illegal taxation, criminality linked to illegal goldmining and attempts to impose their own interpretation of sharia law. The Gourma area was affected by numerous attacks on civilian villages accused of supporting opposing violent extremist groups. Several civilians were killed in such attacks and houses were burned, leading to forced displacements towards nearby localities. The Mission also continued to receive reports of local communities forced to accept the imposition of a rigid version of sharia law in exchange for guarantees of safety and security.

57. Security in Ménaka Region deteriorated sharply. There was a significant surge in armed banditry, which was compounded by the continuing absence of justice authorities and the antagonizing role played by signatory armed groups. Local initiatives to secure Ménaka town, through the “Ménaka without weapons” initiative, had only short-lived successes. In addition, violent extremist groups seemed to be gaining ground and were effectively asserting control over the main road axes. Extremist elements often infiltrated the local populations, extorting or, as punishment for resistance, forcibly displacing them. Similarly, regular clashes between violent extremist groups for control over territory and, possibly, smuggling routes further increased the humanitarian crisis in Ménaka town with the arrival of new waves of internally displaced persons fleeing violence.

58. In response to these trends, the Mission continued to undertake a series of initiatives aimed at enhancing its support to the Malian authorities in protecting civilians. In Timbuktu Region, the MINUSMA force, United Nations police and the Malian Defence and Security Forces coordinated patrols to secure populations in hotspots and to protect civilians at risk. In Gao Region, the Mission’s civilian components continued to rely on temporary operating bases to gain access and conduct activities. Elsewhere, including in central Mali, the Mission’s civilian staff used temporary operating bases as staging points and were able to access remote areas that would otherwise be out of reach, gathering critical information for follow-up by MINUSMA and the United Nations country team. While these crucial efforts helped to prevent a further deterioration of the security situation in parts of central Mali and its negative impact on civilians, without additional capacity, the Mission’s efforts will remain limited.

59. During the reporting period, 23 civilians were killed and 13 were injured in six incidents involving improvised explosive devices in the Koulikoro, Mopti and Gao Regions, marking an increase in fatalities, while the number of incidents remained similar to the previous reporting period.

60. In the central regions of Mali, 1,300 cases of gender-based violence were recorded during the past six months, including 186 cases of rape, with the most cases recorded in Mopti.

## **VI. Human rights situation**

61. The human rights situation continued to worsen, owing largely to an intensification of violence involving extremist groups, community-based armed

groups and militias. Issues of particular concern included an increase in killings, abductions, cases of violations against children, conflict-related sexual violence and concerns around slavery. In some instances, counter-terrorism or military operations conducted by national or regional forces also had an adverse impact on human rights.

62. In this respect, MINUSMA documented 725 human rights violations (159) and abuses (566), 303 more than in the previous reporting period. These included extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions (17), other killings (198), injuries (176), abductions and enforced or involuntary disappearances (210), torture or ill-treatment (5), illegal arrests and detentions, including notably prolonged detentions and violations of due process guarantees in terrorism-related cases (119), instances of death threats and intimidation, destruction and looting of civilian property and forced displacement of civilians.

63. Most of these violations and abuses were documented in central Mali, including in the Regions of Bandiagara (105), Douentza (82), Mopti (68) and Ségou (89). Violations and abuses were also documented in the Regions of Bougouni (20), Gao (121), Kayes (42), Kidal (3), Koulikoro (6), Koutiala (3), Ménaka (31), Nara (2), Sikasso (1) and Timbuktu (28), as well as in Bamako (124). These violations or abuses were perpetrated by national forces (36), regional forces (4), signatory and compliant armed groups (6), community-based armed groups and militias (171), and extremist armed groups (389). Judicial authorities also failed to respect the due process rights of 119 individuals suspected or accused of involvement in terrorism-related offences.

64. On 8 August, alleged elements of Islamic State in the Greater Sahara conducted simultaneous attacks on at least two villages in Ouattagouna commune, Gao Region, close to the border with the Niger. A MINUSMA human rights investigation established that at least 42 civilians, including a 10-year-old child, were killed and 11 others were wounded. The investigation also identified at least 17 individuals who reportedly participated in these attacks. The findings of this investigation will be shared with the Malian authorities to support their efforts in holding the perpetrators accountable.

65. Cases of abductions continued to be perpetrated by various armed groups in the north and the centre, mainly to intimidate civilians into supporting their cause or raise funds by seeking ransoms. Humanitarian and medical personnel were also victims of abductions.

66. In the central regions, members of JNIM attacked several villages primarily to compel inhabitants to engage in local peace agreements with the armed group, leading to civilian casualties and destruction. In addition, local “peace or reconciliation agreements” championed by extremist groups were often inconsistent with fundamental freedoms, especially as they relate to the situation of women, and a breakdown in the agreements often led to a sudden outbreak of violence, as has been witnessed in Ségou Region between elements of JNIM and *dozo* traditional hunters since 2 July.

67. Insecurity continued to spread in some areas of the southern regions, which had a negative impact on human rights, with MINUSMA documenting attacks on schools perpetrated by extremist groups and a series of attacks on victims of contemporary forms of slavery conducted by pro-slavery elements.

68. Civilians continued to suffer harm during some military or counter-terrorism operations conducted by national or regional forces. For example, on 31 July, members of the Malian armed forces, reportedly accompanied by elements of the Dan Nan Ambassagou militia, summarily executed two adult male shepherds from the Fulani community in Goro village, Bandiagara Region, with one of the victims killed in front of his 12- and 14-year-old sons.

69. The United Nations recorded an increase in grave violations against children. During the reporting period, 228 violations committed against 158 children were verified, compared with 172 violations against 126 children during the previous period. Most of the verified violations were attributed to unidentified armed elements (177), with others attributed to Katiba Macina (19), Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad (10), JNIM (8), *dozo* traditional hunters (7), national forces (5), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (1) and international forces (1). Most of the violations were verified in the central regions (145), with others in Gao (33), Timbuktu (17), Kidal (17), Ménaka (12), Koulikoro (3) and Bamako (1). Fifty-five children (37 boys, 12 girls and 6 of sex unknown) were killed (20) and maimed (35). Eighty-two children (74 boys and 8 girls) aged between 14 and 17 years were recruited by armed groups; 66 of these children have subsequently been separated from the armed groups and handed over to civilian child protection actors.

70. The upward trend in the number of schools closed owing to insecurity has been consistent over the year: from 1,344 schools closed in January 2021 (403,000 students affected) to 1,595 schools in June 2021 (478,500 students affected). Initially confined to the central and northern regions, school closures have also affected the southern areas, including Sikasso (115 schools and 34,500 students affected) and Koulikoro (92 schools and 27,600 students affected).

71. Through the monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements, MINUSMA documented three cases of conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated against four women and girls, one more case than in the previous reporting period. These included the gang rape of one woman and her 16-year-old sister by four armed men on 23 July, the rape of a 14-year-old girl by an armed individual on 25 July (both incidents occurring in Ménaka) and the gang rape of a 30-year-old woman by armed men on 25 August in Gao. In the last case, the perpetrators falsely claimed to be affiliated with MINUSMA and had initially promised the woman a non-existent "job" in the Mission. The one-stop centres (United Nations-supported centres providing holistic care for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence) in Mopti and Gao reported 26 cases of such violence, including 6 perpetrated by Malian Defence and Security Forces and 20 perpetrated by non-State armed groups. On 18 July, MINUSMA and the National Police signed an agreement for the integration of a conflict-related sexual violence module in the police academy's curriculum, aimed at enhancing the capacity of police officers to prevent and adequately respond to cases of such violence. The first training sessions were delivered between 6 and 10 September for 700 police officers.

72. Regarding the fight against impunity, MINUSMA continued its active engagement with key judicial actors, including the Minister of Justice and Human Rights, to advocate for accountability for serious crimes under applicable domestic and international laws as a critical tool in stemming the cycle of violence and the spread of violent extremism, particularly in central Mali.

73. As at 6 September, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Mali had registered 22,507 depositions from victims and witnesses and investigated 14 emblematic cases of serious human rights violations and abuses. MINUSMA continues to support the Commission.

74. Consistent with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, MINUSMA conducted 10 risk assessments before applicable assistance was provided to non-United Nations forces in support of the implementation of the Agreement and stabilization efforts in the centre.

## VII. Humanitarian situation

75. The humanitarian situation in Mali continued to deteriorate. The blockade of villages by armed groups, restrictions on the freedom of movement of civilians, the denial of access to basic social services and livelihoods have become increasingly common warfare tactics, especially in intercommunal conflicts in the centre of the country, with worrisome humanitarian consequences exacerbated by limited humanitarian access. As a result, forced population movements increased within and outside Mali, further increasing the need for humanitarian assistance.

76. The unstable security context continued to trigger large population movements. Internal displacement figures had almost quadrupled in two years to exceed 386,000 people, as at June 2021. Moreover, while 154,000 Malian refugees remained in neighbouring countries of asylum, Mali hosted and provided protection and assistance to nearly 48,000 refugees, including 13,000 from Burkina Faso, 17,000 from the Niger and 16,000 from Mauritania.

77. Access restrictions and protection remained significant concerns generated by the activities of armed groups, the presence of improvised explosive devices or mines and the security vacuum. These issues affected civilians, in particular the most vulnerable in society. In addition, access to rural areas required localized community acceptance and negotiated mobility for humanitarian actors.

78. Despite ongoing efforts, the nutritional situation was alarming: one in four children continued to suffer from chronic malnutrition, and 10 per cent of children under 5 years of age were acutely malnourished.

79. The challenge of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic persisted, with 14,803 officially reported cases and 537 officially recorded deaths as at 26 August. To date, 267,620 people have been vaccinated through the immunization campaign.

80. Of the 1.3 million people to be assisted through the lean season response in 2021, 600,000 people have received assistance to date through a vouchers programme. In addition, to address the socioeconomic effects of COVID-19, a safety net intervention is being implemented for 181,800 vulnerable people. As at August 2021, the humanitarian response plan is 21.7 per cent funded, with clusters such as protection, food security and education poorly funded, thereby hindering the ability to meet acute and basic humanitarian and social needs in 2021.

## VIII. Economic development

81. The COVID-19 crisis has reversed much of the progress made in poverty reduction in Mali over the past decade. Between 2011 and 2019, 1 million people rose above the poverty line. In 2020, nearly 900,000 people were estimated to have become poor. The economic toll of the pandemic and the slowdown in international trade have dampened domestic revenues. The country's budget deficit increased to 5.5 per cent of gross domestic product in 2020, up from 1.7 per cent in 2019.

82. At the conclusion of the 2020/21 fiscal year on 30 June, MINUSMA had fully committed its \$4.8 million annual quick-impact project budget. Of the 100 projects that the Mission supported, 71 covered infrastructure and basic needs, 17 capacity-building and training, and 12 livelihood and income generation. During the reporting period, 24 projects were approved, including 18 as part of the Special Representative's 50-day priority plan.

83. Seven projects under the trust fund were approved, totalling \$3.5 million, including initiatives to: support the preparation of the 2022 electoral process; enhance

Malian Armed Forces defence infrastructure in Ansongo; support the intervention and surveillance platoon of the Gendarmerie in Gao; construct and equip community spaces to welcome victims of sexual and gender-based violence and local security committees; and support the construction of dormitories for female personnel in three police stations and three gendarmerie brigades in Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu Regions.

## **IX. External communications**

84. MINUSMA increased its communication, enhancing the Mission's political and military engagements, successes and achievements through articles, social media and radio productions, as well as initiatives with Malian artists, with the objective of engaging Malian cultural entities to publicize the Mission's work and disseminate messages of reconciliation. MINUSMA also increased communication on its role in and support to the electoral process and the Malian political transition. Outside the capital, Bamako, outreach sessions disseminated multilingual campaigns and products targeting specifically youth, women and vulnerable groups of society. The Mission continued to promote inter-community dialogue with tailored radio and outreach programmes in several languages.

## **X. Capacities of the Mission**

### **Military**

85. As at 15 September, 12,789 military personnel had been deployed, corresponding to 96.2 per cent of the authorized strength of 13,289 personnel, including 518 staff officers and 12,271 contingent personnel. Women accounted for 3.82 per cent of military personnel.

### **Police**

86. As at 15 September, 1,745 United Nations police personnel had been deployed, corresponding to 90.8 per cent of the authorized strength of 1,920 personnel, including 296 individual police officers and 1,449 formed police unit personnel. Women accounted for 22.29 per cent of individual police officers and 13.94 per cent of formed police unit personnel.

### **Civilian personnel**

87. As at 1 September, 93 per cent of all MINUSMA civilian staff had been deployed, including 43 per cent of international staff, 10 per cent of United Nations Volunteers and 47 per cent of national staff. Women accounted for 29 per cent of international posts, 42 per cent of United Nations Volunteers positions and 19 per cent of national staff posts.

### **Implementation of the adaptation plan**

88. MINUSMA continued to implement its adaptation plan. Through its mobile task force, the MINUSMA force has improved its mobility across its operational area and its ability to respond more quickly. The ability of the mobile task force units to deploy quickly and respond to security situations throughout the theatre of operations has significantly enhanced the way that the MINUSMA force operates. Its agility and flexibility to intervene in remote areas has contributed to reassuring the local population and deterring the activities of terrorist armed groups.

89. The mobile task force conducted the following operations: Operation Meerkat, a security and protection operation in the Ansongo-Intellit-Tessit area south of Gao;

Operation Mongoose III, phase II, as a supplementary security and protection operation supporting Sector East; Operation Mongoose III, phase III, acting as theatre reserve for Sector West; and Operation Boni, an airlanding operation to provide security for a MINUSMA human rights investigation team in Boni. These operations are aimed at enhancing the understanding of the security dynamics in the area of operation, as well as facilitate civilian-led activities.

#### **Efforts to optimize performance**

90. MINUSMA continued to implement measures to mitigate threats against convoys, including by integrating air support over identified hotspots, allocating additional forces to convoy protection.

91. In addition to the new operations in Sector Centre, two new operations in Sector West have been developed: Operation Wyvern and Operation Wildebeest. As a result, both Sector West and Sector Centre have ongoing operations covering key areas that will allow continuous assessment to constantly refine and adapt to changing circumstances, as required.

92. As part of ongoing efforts to ensure the preparedness and safety of peacekeepers, the two MINUSMA explosive ordnance disposal companies are now delivering explosive ordnance disposal and improvised explosive device disposal training to their personnel prior to deployment.

#### **Safety and security of United Nations personnel**

93. In the light of the resumption of large-scale terrorist attacks, including direct and indirect fire, as well as the frequent use of unidentified unmanned aerial vehicles flying over MINUSMA camps, the security of United Nations premises underwent maintenance, improvements and the deployment of innovative technical solutions. Security and defence systems were enhanced at MINUSMA camps in Aguelhok, Ber, Douentza, Gao, Goundam, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu.

94. COVID-19 protection and prevention measures continued to be applied throughout the Mission, including self-isolation upon return from abroad. As at 31 July, MINUSMA had administered 25,410 doses of the COVID-19 vaccine (13,694 individuals had their first dose and 11,716 their second dose).

#### **Conduct and discipline**

95. One allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse was recorded during the period under review. MINUSMA continued to implement its strategy to prevent misconduct, particularly sexual exploitation and abuse, by delivering online induction and refresher trainings to all categories of personnel, as well as conducting risk assessments aimed to provide recommendations for mitigating measures in its areas of operations. MINUSMA also continued to conduct outreach activities, including awareness-raising for local populations, and provided assistance to the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. MINUSMA and the United Nations country team continued to address sexual exploitation and abuse in a coordinated manner through the mechanism of protection against sexual exploitation and abuse.

#### **Environmental issues**

96. MINUSMA continued to ensure environmental monitoring of camps and contractor facilities. Sessions were held to raise staff members' awareness of the Mission's environmental mandate and promote good environmental stewardship. The Mission also completed its environmental data submission as part of its

environmental risk and performance management framework for the 2020/21 fiscal period.

## **XI. Observations**

97. A year ago, the military seized political power and committed to undertake a major overhaul of the State, fight corruption and impunity, tackle security challenges facing the northern and central regions, conduct political and institutional reforms, implement the Agreement, and hold credible and transparent elections leading to the return to constitutional order. While the transitional authorities continue to reaffirm their resolve to carry forward their agenda, progress has been limited and the situation remains fragile, with a need for more determined efforts to address the challenges at hand. Delayed action will fuel political and social instability and allow extremist groups to continue to expand their control over swathes of Malian territory. I call upon the Malian stakeholders to seize the moment.

98. I note with great concern the delays in the preparations for the holding of general elections and the completion of the political transition by March 2022. The preparations for the constitutional referendum set for 31 October to adopt key institutional and political reforms are also behind schedule. I urge the Government of Mali and other national stakeholders to reach a compromise, through dialogue, on the necessary reforms and measures required to conclude the transition in a timely and constructive manner. The United Nations will continue to work closely with the African Union and ECOWAS in support of Malian stakeholders towards ensuring that the political transition is brought to a peaceful and timely conclusion.

99. I am concerned about the increasing territorial control and violent activities of extremist groups. I strongly condemn the brutal and cowardly killing of at least 42 civilians and the wounding of several others in Ansongo *cercle* on 8 August. I am also appalled by the illegal and inhumane blockades imposed by extremist elements on villages in the central regions, resulting in human rights abuses and a dire humanitarian situation. These heinous acts must be brought to a halt, and the perpetrators must be swiftly prosecuted and punished. Impunity for serious human rights violations and abuses undermines the fight against violent extremism. I encourage the Government of Mali to deploy the required defence and security forces and allocate the financial resources necessary to ensure the return of the civilian authorities and the provision of basic socioeconomic services throughout the country, particularly in the north and the centre.

100. Increasing attacks by extremist groups on MINUSMA camps in northern Mali over the past months are unacceptable and should stop immediately. I condemn the repeated attacks against the MINUSMA camp in Aguelhok. I call upon the local population and leaders to work closely with MINUSMA in the implementation of its mandate in Aguelhok and other northern regions, and note the progress made in this respect, including the commitment of key stakeholders to facilitate the Mission's work on the ground. I count on the support of the Security Council in taking the measures necessary to address the actions of spoilers.

101. I take note of the decision of the Government of France to restructure the presence of the Operation Barkhane force in the Sahel and close three outposts in northern Mali by January 2022. I also note the partial withdrawal of Chadian troops of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel from the Liptako-Gourma area. I commend the efforts of Chadian and French forces in addressing the threat posed by extremist groups in the Sahel region. The fresh wave of violence unleashed on civilians by extremist elements in Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger over the past months requires sustained international engagement. I call upon all stakeholders to

continue to closely coordinate these restructuring and drawdown processes with a view to preventing any security vacuum that could be exploited by armed groups and terrorists.

102. The human rights and humanitarian situations remain of deep concern. I urge the transitional Government to take urgent action on emblematic cases of human rights violations and abuses. The United Nations stands ready to provide the necessary support to this effect. I am encouraged by progress made by the parties to the conflict to address issues related to sexual violence in conflict and children in armed conflict. I welcome, in this regard, the signing by leaders of the Plateforme of action plans to curb the recruitment and use of children. I call upon donors and partners to provide much-needed financial and material assistance to address the acute humanitarian situation in the central and northern regions of Mali. National and international support is also required to deal with the increasingly concerning situation of school closures.

103. MINUSMA faces complex challenges, particularly in central Mali where civilians and critical infrastructure are increasingly at risk. In this context, scaling up the Mission's uniformed personnel capacity, as recommended in my recent report on the adaptation and authorized strength of MINUSMA (S/2021/657), coupled with a comprehensive Malian strategy to address the challenges at hand, would greatly enhance the Mission's ability to protect civilians, support the restoration of an effective State presence and improve the safety and security of peacekeepers. I also reiterate my call to troop-contributing countries to provide MINUSMA with the urgently needed armed helicopter capacity. I urge countries in the region to ensure full cooperation with the United Nations for the deployment of contingent-owned equipment. Delays in supplying equipment affect the performance of troops and the implementation of the mandate. Crucially, I call upon the Malian authorities to continue to extend their cooperation to MINUSMA. The partnership between the country's civilian and military leadership is central to the Mission's ability to fully implement its mandate and assist the Malian people.

104. I wish to express my gratitude to my Special Representative, the uniformed and civilian personnel of MINUSMA and members of the United Nations country team for their commendable contributions to peace, security, humanitarian and development initiatives in an extremely hostile security environment. I appreciate the continued commitment of international and regional actors, donors and troop- and police-contributing countries to stabilization efforts in Mali. I also thank civil society and non-governmental organizations, including humanitarian actors, for their active role in the quest for multidimensional responses to the crisis facing Mali.

## Annex I

**United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization  
Mission in Mali: military and police strength as at  
15 September 2021**

Country	Military			Police								
	Experts on mission, staff officers and units			Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total police		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Armenia	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Australia	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Austria	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bangladesh	1 071	42	1 113	1	–	1	217	63	280	218	63	281
Belgium	6	3	9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Benin	236	25	261	19	–	19	132	8	140	151	8	159
Bhutan	5	–	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Burkina Faso	959	22	981	11	17	28	129	11	140	140	28	168
Burundi	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Cambodia	266	23	289	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Cameroon	2	1	3	7	–	7	–	–	–	7	–	7
Canada	5	2	7	8	5	13	–	–	–	8	5	13
Chad	1 398	41	1 439	13	2	15	–	–	–	13	2	15
China	426	14	440	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Côte d'Ivoire	773	31	804	20	5	25	–	–	–	20	5	25
Czechia	3	1	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Denmark	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Egypt	1 063	3	1 066	2	–	2	144	14	158	146	14	160
El Salvador	165	11	176	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Estonia	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ethiopia	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Finland	4	–	4	4	–	4	–	–	–	4	–	4
France	21	–	21	9	4	13	–	–	–	9	4	13
Gambia	5	1	6	4	1	5	–	–	–	4	1	5
Germany	437	32	469	3	4	7	–	–	–	3	4	7
Ghana	136	18	154	4	–	4	–	–	–	4	–	4
Guatemala	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Guinea	624	42	666	9	3	12	–	–	–	9	3	12
Indonesia	9	–	9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ireland	12	–	12	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Italy	2	–	2	3	–	3	–	–	–	3	–	3
Jordan	391	–	391	16	–	16	–	–	–	16	–	16

Country	Military			Police								
	Experts on mission, staff officers and units			Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total police		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Kenya	9	3	12	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Latvia	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Liberia	146	16	162	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Lithuania	42	3	45	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Luxembourg	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mauritania	7	–	7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mexico	4	–	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Nepal	196	5	201	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Netherlands	6	–	6	4	–	4	–	–	–	4	–	4
Niger	868	5	873	19	6	25	–	–	–	19	6	25
Nigeria	65	13	78	2	4	6	104	36	140	106	40	146
Norway	12	1	13	4	–	4	–	–	–	4	–	4
Pakistan	215	–	215	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Portugal	62	5	67	2	–	2	–	–	–	2	–	2
Romania	4	1	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Senegal	965	35	1 000	18	5	23	279	34	313	297	39	336
Sierra Leone	16	3	19	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Spain	1	–	1	1	1	2	–	–	–	1	1	2
Sri Lanka	242	–	242	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sweden	177	10	187	2	–	2	–	–	–	2	–	2
Switzerland	6	1	7	5	2	7	–	–	–	5	2	7
Togo	878	53	931	20	4	24	244	36	280	264	40	304
Tunisia	83	3	86	14	2	16	–	–	–	14	2	16
Turkey	–	–	–	6	1	7	–	–	–	6	1	7
Ukraine	10	–	10	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	238	18	256	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
United States of America	9	–	9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Zambia	2	1	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
<b>Total</b>	<b>12 301</b>	<b>488</b>	<b>12 789</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>1 249</b>	<b>202</b>	<b>1 451</b>	<b>1 479</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>1 774</b>

# Annex II

## Map

