
The members of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2536 (2020) have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 2536 (2020), the final report on their work.

The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic on 20 May 2021 and was considered by the Committee on 4 June 2021.

The Panel of Experts would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Romain Esmenjaud
Coordinator

(Signed) Zobel Behalal
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(Signed) Fiona Mangan
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Summary

During the period under review, the Central African Republic entered a new crisis with renewed fighting across its territory. In December 2020, a new coalition was established, the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC), comprising the most powerful armed groups in the country, namely, Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC), Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC), Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation (3R), Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) and the two anti-balaka branches (see S/2021/87, para. 15). CPC tried to prevent the holding of the elections of 27 December 2020, and its combatants engaged in military operations in an attempt to seize power. After failure by CPC to take Bangui on 13 January, the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic (FACA), with support from Russian instructors and Rwandan forces, carried out a counter-offensive, gradually seizing major towns from the rebels.

Civilians were disproportionately targeted throughout the crisis, as documented by the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic through field missions that covered most of the areas affected by fighting. Initially the target of exactions by CPC-affiliated combatants, civilians later became victims of international humanitarian law violations by FACA soldiers and Russian instructors.

Widespread international humanitarian law violations committed by CPC-affiliated groups included the forced recruitment of children, attacks on peacekeepers, cases of sexual violence and the looting of humanitarian organizations. Those exactions were committed, inter alia, in the Ouaka Prefecture by fighters under UPC leader Ali Darassa and in the Mbomou Prefecture by fighters under FPRC member Mahamat Salleh.

International humanitarian law violations by FACA soldiers and Russian instructors included cases of excessive use of force, indiscriminate killings, the occupation of schools and looting on a large scale, including of humanitarian organizations.

The present report contains detailed information on CPC, in which former President and sanctioned individual François Bozizé (CFi.001) played a central role. Claiming that he had received guarantees of significant support from external actors, which did not materialize, Bozizé was able to bring together ex-Séléka and anti-balaka factions. He operated as the coalition’s political and military leader, relying on his inner circle and collaborating closely with sanctioned individual and FPRC leader Nourredine Adam (CFi.002).

In spite of François Bozizé’s efforts to provide leadership to the coalition, CPC remained a loose network with each group operating largely independently, including with regard to armament acquisition and funding activities. While the Bozizé clan was able to secure some deliveries of weapons and ammunition from networks in Chad and the Sudan in violation of the arms embargo, each CPC-affiliated group relied on its reserves and traditional supply routes. Those groups continued to use mainly illegal taxation over economic activities to generate revenues. For example, 3R consolidated an illegal parallel system of taxation on mining activities, including those of several companies operating in the western part of the Central African Republic. The advances of FACA soldiers, Russian instructors and Rwandan forces...
disturbed trafficking routes and funding strategies used by CPC-affiliated groups without entirely disrupting them.

In response to the military threat posed by CPC to State institutions, the Government of the Central African Republic implemented several strategies. First, deliveries of materiel in support of State security forces were observed at a pace unprecedented since the establishment of the arms embargo in 2013, some of which were non-compliant and others in violation of the embargo. Second, FACA soldiers received bilateral support from Rwandan forces and Russian instructors. The latter, in particular, played a prominent role in military operations to push back CPC combatants. Third, some officials of the Central African Republic engaged in the parallel recruitment of armed group members operating within or in support of State security forces, potentially damaging the already fragile security sector reform.

In addition to the security crisis, the country also experienced a new peak of political tension as several candidates in the presidential election of 27 December 2020, including runner-up Anicet-Georges Dologuélé, refused to recognize the re-election of Faustin Archange Touadéra. In this context of politico-military crisis, regional and international partners pushed for a new dialogue, but divergent views emerged as to whether CPC leaders should participate. While regional mediators engaged with CPC leaders to facilitate a cessation of fighting, the President launched a “republican dialogue” focusing on facilitating reconciliation among political and civil society actors. Coupled with the aggressive communication strategies of the Government portraying neighbouring States as being responsible for the crisis, those diverging approaches resulted in strained diplomatic relations between the Central African Republic and some of its neighbours.

Lastly, the report addresses the continued prevalence of gold and diamond smuggling activities, depriving the country of significant resources and creating conditions favourable to the development of criminal networks thriving regardless of the political and security situation. It identifies actors involved in illegal activities, including companies and cooperatives underreporting their production. Cameroon is also described as one of the main trafficking hubs for natural resources from the Central African Republic.
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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.
I. Background

1. On 28 July 2020, the Security Council adopted resolution 2536 (2020), by which it extended the arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze, with some exemptions, in the Central African Republic. The Council also mandated the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic to continue to assist the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic. The Panel was tasked, among other things, to collect information on the implementation of the aforementioned sanctions measures, as well as on individuals and entities that may meet the designation criteria in paragraphs 20 to 22 of resolution 2399 (2018) and extended in paragraph 5 of resolution 2507 (2020).

2. The Panel was requested to provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, a final report no later than 30 June 2021. The present report covers the period from 1 September 2020, the beginning of the Panel’s mandate, to 12 May 2021, the drafting completion date, with a focus on developments that occurred after the issuance of the Panel’s midterm report on 27 January 2021 (S/2021/87).

Cooperation

3. Over the course of its mandate, the Panel travelled to 12 of the 16 prefectures of the Central African Republic (see map in annex 1.1). It also conducted official visits to Cameroon, France and the Sudan. The Panel thanks the Governments of those countries for hosting the visits. A visit to Chad planned in March was postponed by the authorities as it coincided with an electoral period.

4. During the reporting period, the Panel addressed 52 official communications to Member States, international organizations and private entities. It received only 20 responses (see annex 1.2).

5. The Panel continued to exchange information with other panels or groups of experts established by the Security Council, in particular the panels of experts on Libya, South Sudan and the Sudan, as well as the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.


Methodology

7. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of 22 December 2006 (see S/2006/997, annex). While it aims to be as transparent as possible, in situations where identifying sources would expose those or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel intends to withhold identifying information. The Panel corroborated findings by triangulating information with independent and reliable sources.

8. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and strove to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any information in the report in relation to which those parties may be cited, for their review, comment and response, within a specified deadline.

9. The Panel safeguards the independence of its work against any effort to undermine its impartiality or create a perception of bias. The Panel approved the text,
conclusions and recommendations in the present report on the basis of consensus before its transmission by the Panel’s Coordinator to the President of the Security Council.

II. Coalition des patriotes pour le changement

10. In mid-December 2020, a new coalition was established, the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC), comprising the most powerful armed groups in the country, namely, Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC), Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC), Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation (3R), Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC), and the two anti-balaka branches (see S/2021/87, para. 15). Subsequently, CPC signatory armed groups progressed quickly across the country, moving from their bases in Nana-Grébizi, Ouaka, Nana-Mambéré, Haute-Kotto, Ouham-Pendé and Ouham Prefectures towards the southern prefectures and the target of Bangui. MINUSCA, soldiers from the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic (FACA), Russian instructors and Rwandan forces (see para. 64) repelled an attack on the capital on 13 January 2021. Subsequently, FACA, with support from Russian instructors and Rwandan forces, carried out a counter-offensive, gradually seizing major towns from the rebels, such as Boali, Bouar, Bossangoa and Bambari, with CPC often retreating ahead of their advance to avoid conflict.

11. The present section contains detailed information on CPC: its objectives, structure and functioning, methods of weapons acquisition and funding, as well as international humanitarian law violations.

A. CPC structure and functioning

A coalition forged by François Bozizé on empty promises

12. As confirmed by members of his entourage, François Bozizé was aware of the Constitutional Court’s decision to invalidate his candidacy a few days before its official announcement on 3 December 2020 (see S/2021/87, paras. 17–19). Bozizé arrived in Kaga Bandoro on 1 December, officially to support the campaign of the candidates of his party, Kwa Na Kwa (KNK), for the parliamentary elections, but he was in fact engaging in a tour to contact, recruit and organize armed group members who later joined CPC. As detailed in annex 2.1, Bozizé travelled to Kabo, Batangafo and Kambakota (Ouham Prefecture), where he held on 15 December the meeting during which the coalition was officially created (see S/2021/87, para. 15). Through their statement, CPC founding members threatened to use force to take power and denounced the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (see S/2019/145, annex, and S/2021/87, annex 2.9).

13. According to testimonies collected from CPC members, François Bozizé’s recruitment strategy for the coalition was based on three key promises. First, he told armed group leaders that he had the backing of “the West” and some neighbouring countries. Many people in the Central African Republic view the conflict in their country as a proxy war between global powers, a narrative widely spread by print and social media, as well as politicians from both the opposition and the Government in their statements. In that context, this “new cold war” argument was efficient in convincing armed group representatives who believed that external support would indeed arrive to counter the “Russian influence”. Bozizé also claimed that significant support would be provided only after CPC had demonstrated its capacity and taken Bangui; therefore, for the time being, the coalition could only count on the current capacities of its members. According to the Panel’s investigations, Bozizé’s claims
were empty promises. While he secured small deliveries of military materiel from trafficking networks operating in the region (see paras. 30–32), the coalition never received the support that he had guaranteed.

14. Once in power, François Bozizé committed to accepting all armed group leaders’ claims for military grades and positions in the administration of the Central African Republic. In addition, he promised to grant immunity to armed group leaders and their fighters, including from prosecution in international jurisdictions.

15. The UPC, MPC, 3R, and FPRC leaders, namely Ali Darassa, Mahamat al-Khatim and sanctioned individuals Abbas Sidiki (CFi.014) and Nourredine Adam (CFi.002), respectively, were convinced that a change of power would advance their agenda and protect their positions. As confirmed to the Panel by Adam and Al-Khatim, as well as 3R and UPC representatives, they believed that the Government of the President, Mr. Touadéra, was not willing to implement the peace agreement and instead, was gaining time with a view to attacking them after his re-election.

16. The historical relationships between armed group members and the Bozizé clan also helped François Bozizé to consolidate the coalition, as detailed in annex 2.2.

François Bozizé as CPC political and military leader

17. As confirmed to the Panel by Al-Khatim and Adam, as well as numerous armed groups members, the main CPC objective was to take control of Bangui and remove the President.

18. In early March 2021, a communiqué dated 18 February was issued confirming the appointment of François Bozizé as the CPC general coordinator (see annex 2.3). The document also confirmed the leadership role that he had been playing since the creation of CPC, both politically and militarily. Regarding his political role, CPC and intelligence sources confirmed that François Bozizé was defining the CPC strategic orientations in coordination with a few close associates, including his son Jean-Francis Bozizé and Nourredine Adam. Those sources indicated that François Bozizé was playing a key role in the context of regional mediation initiatives (see paras. 122–126), and approved the content of all CPC public statements. In his role as political leader, he was supported by several members of KNK, his political party, in particular Jean-Eudes Teya, who drafted CPC communiqués (see annex 2.4), and Serge Bozanga, both based in France. The latter, CPC spokesperson for Europe, and Abakar Sabone, CPC spokesperson for Africa, based in Chad, disseminated the CPC views on social networks.

19. Regarding François Bozizé’s military role, the Panel collected testimonies from members of 3R, MPC, FPRC and the anti-balaka armed groups confirming the direct involvement of the former President in the preparation, coordination and command of CPC military operations, including the offensive against Bangui of 13 January. The Panel received confirmation that Bozizé coordinated activities through phone conversations with armed group leaders and their local commanders. For example, anti-balaka and MPC members reported that Bozizé ordered them directly to seize the town of Bouca, Ouham Prefecture, and advance on the Bouca-Bogangolo-Damara road in the second part of December 2020.
A coalition of disorganization, mistrust and rivalry

A patchwork of armed groups, interests and objectives

20. After the creation of CPC, Nourredine Adam was vocal and ready to place FPRC at the centre of CPC. He explained to the Panel that François Bozizé could ensure the unity of the country and that the two leaders had agreed to base their collaboration on the terms of the so-called “Nairobi Agreement” (see S/2015/936, paras. 24–26). He confirmed that CPC political decisions were taken by him and Bozizé.

21. On the ground, however, the FPRC military faction did not fully integrate into CPC. Apart from the involvement of elements led by Mahamat “Mama” Salleh in Haute-Kotto and Mbonou Prefectures (see para. 41), FPRC did not conduct any military operations. “General” Saleh Zabadi, who signed the Kambakota statement under the instruction of Adam, did not participate or give orders to fighters under his command. Several FPRC zone commanders in Nana-Grébizi and Oum Prefectures confirmed that Zabadi was their direct superior, but that he never transmitted any instructions regarding CPC. As confirmed by armed group members from MPC and FPRC, as well as community leaders from Nana-Grébizi, Zabadi’s position could be explained by the absence of logistical support provided to him or his fighters. It was also due to the fact that, as confirmed by CPC sources, François Bozizé had named Al-Khatim as the coalition’s Chief of Staff. As a result, Zabadi, a member of the Misseriya ethnic group, was reluctant to participate in an operation that would have strengthened the position of the Salamat community through Al-Khatim. Sanctioned individual Abdoulaye Hissène (CFi.012), though leader of the military component of FPRC (the Conseil nationale de défense et de sécurité), also openly refused to join CPC (see annex 2.5), preventing FPRC elements in Bamingui-Bangoran and Vakaga Prefectures from taking part in the coalition. One exception, however, was sanctioned individual Haroun Gaye (CFi.007), who played an active role in the efforts by CPC to acquire weapons and ammunition in the Sudan (see para. 31).

22. Within MPC, rivalries and Al-Khatim’s incapacity to exercise full control over his fighters, as previously reported by the Panel (see S/2019/930, paras. 20–23), considerably weakened the armed group’s capacity to participate in operations. The “generals” around Al-Khatim carried out their own agendas through contacts with Bangui-based politicians. According to MPC members, in Damara, days before the attack of 13 January, members of the group caught one “general” using a satellite phone to give information and Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates to presidential advisers.

23. Neither UPC nor 3R fully respected the CPC chain of command. For example, confidential sources confirmed that UPC leader Ali Darassa chose to go against François Bozizé’s instructions and to prioritize a UPC objective, and his long-term goal of controlling the Bangassou-Zemio-Obo road, by ordering his fighters to support Mahamat Salleh’s FRPC group with taking Bangassou, Mbonou Prefecture. As confirmed by some 3R members, the reported death of sanctioned individual and group leader Abbas Sidiki during fighting on 18 December 2020 created confusion among the group and weakened the effectiveness of its chain of command.

24. The anti-balaka groups, lacking combat training and materiel, had very limited impact during the fighting. Moreover, anti-balaka elements and other CPC members told the Panel that tensions emerged, as they did not receive weapons or ammunition that would have allowed them to fight together with better armed and trained ex-Séléka groups. The absence of anti-balaka fighters in the Bangui attack – they were supposed

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to create incidents in Bangui to allow the CPC fighters to enter the capital – also stemmed from a lack of trust among the political actors involved in CPC.

Karim Meckassoua’s role


26. Earlier in 2020, ex-Séléka members and associates confirmed to the Panel that Meckassoua was pushing the armed groups and François Bozizé’s entourage to take military action to remove the President from power. More recently, members of MPC and FPRC, as well as some political actors, explained that Meckassoua was involved in the preparation of the attempted coup d’état of 13 January in coordination with Bozizé and his entourage, as well as Nourreddine Adam, Ali Darassa and several MPC “generals”. According to those concurring and credible testimonies, Meckassoua hoped to head a transitional government if the coup d’état by CPC succeeded. After the coup failed, according to many CPC members, Meckassoua tried to convince Darassa to bring reinforcements and pursue the offensive. He reportedly contacted an intermediary to convince Sudanese mercenaries to cross the border and protect Darassa and his troops as they advanced towards Bangui. The same sources indicated that Darassa was not convinced and refused to advance, withdrawing his troops instead.

27. Mistrust between Meckassoua and François Bozizé was a contributing factor behind the refusal of the Bangui-based anti-balaka elements to participate in the attack of 13 January (see para. 24). Bozizé and his entourage were convinced that Meckassoua was trying to double-cross Bozizé. On the day of the attack, Maxime Mokom confronted an associate of Meckassoua by phone about those suspicions.

28. Meckassoua told the Panel that he had played no role in CPC, whether in its creation or military operations, and that he had severed contact with François Bozizé once the latter created the coalition. He confirmed that Bozizé’s entourage had blamed him for the failure of the attack of 13 January but indicated that he never had any intention to take power by force.

B. CPC logistics: great expectations not matched by reality

29. Sources close to CPC leadership told the Panel that during the coalition’s founding meeting in Kambakota (see para. 12), a three-pronged approach to logistics was discussed. First, representatives of the armed group signatories discussed what they could bring to the table in terms of arms, ammunition, equipment and armed elements. Although the coalition forged and enhanced communication and coordination links among the groups, testimonies collected from armed group sources indicated that, in practice, there was little sharing of arms or ammunition among CPC-affiliated groups. Second, armed groups’ sources revealed that François Bozizé provided assurances that the CPC leadership had organized arms, ammunition and logistical support, primarily under the coordination of his son, Jean-Francis Bozizé (see paras. 30–32). Lastly, FACA and Internal Security Forces sources informed the Panel that François Bozizé and his sons had expected a significant defection of personnel from the armed services to join CPC, and believed that this would provide the coalition with access to a large quantity of arms and ammunition. While a significant number of defections and desertions occurred (see para. 63), they did not generate the expected level of material support.
CPC-coordinated weapons and ammunition deliveries, donations and purchases

30. The former President, François Bozizé, and his son Jean-Francis Bozizé led the acquisition of arms and ammunition by CPC. According to local and armed group sources, in December 2020, Jean-Francis Bozizé moved between a number of towns in the west, including Bocaranga, Kouï, Bozoum, Bossemtele (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture), Kaga Bandoro (Nana-Grébizi Prefecture) and Markounda (Ouham Prefecture), using either his father’s white Mitsubishi Pajero or his own white Toyota Hilux pickup for transport, planning and preparing arms and ammunition transfers with a number of interlocutors. Local and armed group sources explained that, at the end of January 2021, he sent a representative to Markounda to deliver payment to a Chadian supplier for a small arms and ammunition transfer that was delivered to the town of Yoruba near Ben-Zambé, Ouham Prefecture, using 18 motorcycles. At the end of February, Jean-Francis Bozizé travelled to Markounda to receive a second delivery, which, according to several sources, included one larger weapon, that is, a 12.7 mm or 14.5 mm calibre machine gun. Sources confirmed that, around the same time, he also travelled to Moyenne-Sido, Ouham Prefecture, to receive an additional larger delivery from the Chadian territory, which ultimately did not arrive.

31. According to armed group members, Jean-Francis Bozizé also worked in close coordination with sanctioned individuals and FPRC leaders Nourredine Adam and Haroun Gaye to arrange for the deliveries of arms and ammunition from the Sudan, using the Tisi-Sikikédé (Vakaga Prefecture)-Ndélé (Bamingui-Bangoran Prefecture) route. The first delivery arrived in Ndélé in mid-December 2020. According to multiple sources, a second delivery arrived on 13 January 2021 with a convoy of 14 pickups belonging to Sudanese traders, including two individuals whom locals identified as known facilitators of arms trafficking from the Sudan. Upon arrival in Ndélé, Haroun Gaye blocked attempts by the Internal Security Forces to search the vehicles and the consignment was transferred onwards to Jean-Francis Bozizé in Bossangoa. Sources close to CPC, armed groups and other local sources confirmed that a third shipment, primarily ammunition, had been expected in February but was blocked by Abdoulaye Hissène (see para. 21), in coordination with FACA. This crucial arms and ammunition trafficking route has since remained closed to CPC.

32. In March, François Bozizé reportedly travelled to Markounda to meet a Chadian individual. Sources reported that he had been promised 20 pickups mounted with weapons, ammunition and fighters. Following a meeting on the Chadian side of the border, CPC received one pickup truck with small arms and ammunition, which, according to Panel sources, was carried across the Nana Barya river. The quantity, however, was inferior to what Bozizé had expected.

Loss of significant weaponry by CPC-aligned armed groups and challenges with resupply

33. CPC-aligned armed groups have significantly depleted their weapons and ammunition stocks during fighting and lost a significant number of combatants. Crucially, some have also been driven out of their bases and have had their access to certain trafficking routes cut. Annex 2.6 contains an overview of what each CPC component used in fighting in terms of logistics and their current level of armament and capacity to resupply.
Overview of CPC-aligned armed groups, weapons and trafficking routes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPC groups</th>
<th>Armament level</th>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Transport means</th>
<th>Primary routes used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-balaka groups</td>
<td>Lightly armed</td>
<td>Artisanal weapons, some assault rifles, limited number of grenades and rocket launchers</td>
<td>Primarily on foot Some motorbikes</td>
<td>Diverse; inconsistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>Moderately armed</td>
<td>Assault rifles, grenade launchers, rocket-propelled grenades</td>
<td>Motorbikes Limited number of vehicles</td>
<td>Moyenne-Sido, Markounda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3R</td>
<td>Well armed</td>
<td>Assault rifles, grenade launchers, rocket-propelled grenades, possibly anti-tank mines, limited number of machine guns</td>
<td>On foot Motorbikes Vehiculars, including some mounted with weapons</td>
<td>Multiple routes along the borders with Cameroon and Chad, near Bocaranga, Ngaoundaye, Besson and other places, including transhumance routes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>Well armed</td>
<td>Assault rifles, grenade launchers including under-barrel grenade launchers, rocket-propelled grenades, limited number of machine guns</td>
<td>On foot Motorbikes Vehiculars, including some mounted with weapons</td>
<td>From the Democratic Republic of the Congo via Mobaye/Satema, from South Sudan via Bambouti and the south-east axis, from the Sudan via Sam Ouandja and Vakaga, and smaller flows via transhumance routes from Chad and the Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPRC (limited participation)</td>
<td>Well armed</td>
<td>Assault rifles, grenade launchers including under-barrel grenade launchers, rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns</td>
<td>Motorbikes Vehiculars, including some mounted with weapons</td>
<td>From the Sudan via Vakaga routes, from Chad via Moyenne-Sido and other routes</td>
</tr>
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C. Exactions by CPC fighters: the beginning of a new cycle of gross international humanitarian law violations

34. Renewal of fighting following the creation of CPC had a dramatic humanitarian impact. As detailed in annex 2.7, over the five-month period from December 2020 to April 2021, humanitarian indicators such as displacement and food security worsened. At the same time, all armed actors demonstrated complete disregard for international humanitarian law. Incidents against humanitarians increased to a
Congregations of fighters and parallel increase in human rights violations

35. In the first declaration of Kambakota (see para. 12), CPC-affiliated groups made overtures towards respect for international humanitarian law. However, CPC fighters continued with “business as usual”, engaging in human rights and international humanitarian law violations, and, in some locations, strengthened their positions with the arrival of additional fighters from former rival and now CPC-affiliated armed groups.

36. In Bouar, Nana-Mambéré Prefecture, which the Panel visited in February and March, some 12,500 people temporarily fled their homes after violent confrontations between CPC and FACA in January. According to humanitarian sources, during the clashes of 7 and 9 January, two FACA soldiers were killed and 17 civilians were wounded, including three children. The local anti-balaka group under “General” Marcel Ndalé and his brothers Ibrahim and Sylvain Adamou Ndalé also gained in stature with the arrival of far better trained and equipped 3R fighters in January. Both groups continued to carry out human rights and international humanitarian law violations in the town (see S/2016/694, para. 98), without fear of reprisals from the other groups. For example, according to locals and victim testimonies, in January, “General” Ndalé and his anti-balaka group killed two herders and stole their cattle, and detained and tortured individuals at their base in the Tropicana district for more than two weeks. The proliferation of 3R fighters in Mambéré-Kadéï, Nana-Mambéré and Ouham-Pendé Prefectures also saw a parallel increase in acts of sexual violence committed by their fighters, with displaced persons noted as particularly vulnerable (see also S/2021/312, para. 22). For example, in Nana-Mambéré Prefecture, in December 2020, the Panel spoke to three displaced victims of sexual violence perpetrated by fighters, believed to belong to 3R.

Violent establishment by UPC of a parallel system of justice in Bambari

37. During its missions in Bambari, Ouaka Prefecture, the Panel was informed that UPC, together with additional anti-balaka fighters from Ouaka and Haute-Kotto Prefectures, attacked and looted the prefectural administration and police and gendarmerie buildings. That attack, carried out on 21 December 2020 and in which 2 civilians died (including one minor) and 11 were injured, also weakened the rule of law for citizens across Ouaka Prefecture. In its place, in Bambari, UPC leader Ali Darassa appointed an illegal parallel administration, including a police force which carried out arbitrary arrests, killings and torture against civilians. According to local testimonies, on 1 February 2021, for example, a male civilian was shot at his house after resisting arrest by a team sent by the Darassa-appointed “police commissioner”. In January, a victim arrested by the same team was tortured and died in an UPC-run “prison”. The Panel witnessed a similar impact on access to justice following CPC attacks in other towns, such as Bangassou and Bossangoa.

CPC-affiliated groups lacking logistical capacity targeted humanitarians

38. The limited logistical capabilities of CPC (see paras. 29–33) strongly contributed to widespread international humanitarian law violations, including through the targeting of humanitarian organizations, predominantly for their vehicles

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3 Confidential report, 27 January 2021.
but also for equipment and other goods from their offices. This targeting, combined with the increased activities of the CPC-affiliated groups, reduced humanitarian access and the capacity to respond to increased needs (as detailed in annex 2.7). For example, local sources confirmed to the Panel that, in Bossangoa, on 24 February, two humanitarian organizations were targeted by CPC fighters and that items, including a car, were stolen. In Bouar and Kaga Bandoro, on 27 December, as well as in Bangassou, on 3 January (see para. 41), humanitarian premises were also targeted by CPC fighters.4

Continuous impact on children of international humanitarian law violations by CPC

39. Children were negatively affected by CPC actions. A number of schools used as polling centres were attacked and looted by CPC fighters on election day (27 December 2020). Between January and March 2021, as detailed in annex 2.8, the Panel observed or confirmed cases of school occupation across the country by all of the main CPC-affiliated groups. With regard to the recruitment of children, the Panel received reports that UPC, under the command of Ali Darassa, continued to forcibly enrol minors from the Fulani community, notably in Ippy in December 2020 and in Aigbando in March 2021.

Fatal attacks against peacekeepers

40. Despite public declarations by CPC claiming that MINUSCA was not targeted, the Panel received reports that combatants of the coalition had killed seven peacekeepers in less than one month. As confirmed during the Panel’s investigations, on 18 January, combatants under the command of Mahamat Salleh (see para. 41) shot at a MINUSCA patrol, killing two peacekeepers at Mbari Bridge (17 km west of Bangassou, Mbomou Prefecture). On 15 January, a peacekeeper was killed by CPC fighters close to Grimari, Ouaka Prefecture, while another had been killed two days earlier during the coalition’s attack on Bangui. Previously, on 25 December, in Sibut, Kémo Prefecture, CPC fighters moving towards Bangui had attacked a FACA detachment. Peacekeepers were also engaged during the incident. Three of them died and two were wounded. Annex 2.9 contains further information on all cases of attacks and threats against peacekeepers.

Mbomou: extensive looting and displacement

41. In Mbomou Prefecture, according to local sources, Mahamat Salleh, FPRC leader from Nzacko (see S/2020/662, annex 3.9), was among the main perpetrators of CPC attacks on Bakouma and Bangassou on 31 December 2020 and 3 January 2021, respectively, acting under the instructions of Nourredine Adam. He was supported by UPC “General” Guenderou (see S/2021/87, annex 4.7), Hissein Damboucha, FPRC leader from Bria (see S/2019/930, paras. 89–91), and Privat Sokomete, a local anti-balaka leader from Bakouma. CPC fighters led by Salleh targeted State institutions, such as the FACA base, the gendarmerie, the police station and prisons in Bangassou. Subsequently, they engaged in widespread looting of humanitarian organizations in the town, as well as some private traders. They also set up checkpoints to tax the population, for example, at the river crossing to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where more than 15,000 civilians had fled with the arrival of CPC, according to humanitarian sources.

Sexual violence incidents reported as armed groups pushed out of major towns

42. According to local sources, human rights and international humanitarian law violations continued to be perpetrated by Mahamat Salleh, including a case of forced marriage, and his group of fighters after they left Bangassou for Niakari (15 km from Bangassou) on 17 January 2021. In March, according to multiple local sources, two separate incidents of sexual violence perpetrated by UPC fighters on multiple victims occurred on the outskirts of Ippy, Ouaka Prefecture. The Panel collected similar testimonies of human rights and international humanitarian law violations as 3R, UPC, FPRC (led by Salleh) and anti-balaka elements withdrew from major towns (see annex 2.10).

D. CPC funding through natural resources: the case of 3R

43. The Panel did not find evidence suggesting the establishment of a specific fundraising plan in support of the creation and operations of CPC. In spite of attempts to streamline funding, for example, by entrusting that role to Jean-François Bozizé, CPC remained a loose network in which each armed group was responsible for ensuring its financial stability. Armed groups continued to use the taxation of economic activities (mainly mining) and looting in areas under their control to support their operations and the acquisition of arms (see paras. 29–33). The present section contains the findings that the Panel gathered on 3R.

Before the formalization of CPC

44. Before the launch of CPC activities, 3R was the strongest armed group in Nana-Mambéré and Mambéré-Kadéï Prefectures. It has continued to generate revenues by “taxing” cattle-related activities, as previously documented (see S/2018/1119, para. 135) and has gradually increased its control over the gold sector, which has become a central source of income.

Taxation

45. Information received by the Panel demonstrated that the group controlled the main gold production centres in the aforementioned two Prefectures and was often involved in gold mining in Ombella-Mpoko Prefecture. Several security and mining authorities told the Panel that it was dangerous for them to visit the areas under 3R control.

46. The Panel interviewed more than 20 witnesses, including transporters, miners, artisanal miners and collectors who operated at the mining sites around Abba, Niem, Yaloké, Baboua, Dilapoko, Amada-Gaza and in various areas of the border with Cameroon. Their accounts were key to understand 3R taxation practices.

47. In general, 3R imposed weekly taxes on mining actors. The level of taxes varied from one actor to another, depending on their status and revenues. For example, an artisanal miner was required to pay 25,000 CFA francs ($46), while a collector was required to pay 35,000 CFA francs ($65). According to several witnesses, 3R charged the owners of the pools between 40,000 CFA francs ($74) and 250,000 CFA francs ($458), depending on their size. The Panel could not estimate the total amount earned by the group from taxation. Based on the testimonies of six witnesses who worked at mining sites around Yidéré, Mambéré-Kadéï Prefecture, the Panel assessed that, in 2020, taxation on artisanal miners generated as much as 10 million CFA francs ($18,000) per month (based on peak activity) at sites solely around Yidéré.

48. Tax collection by 3R elements followed a well-established system. Armed elements arrived on motorbikes and divided into two teams. Each team had at least
three armed elements and one tax collector. The latter was responsible for collecting the taxation money and recording it in a notebook. Many sources told the Panel that 3R talked exclusively with the coordinators of the mining sites, who were forced to facilitate the relationship between the armed group and those working on the sites. According to the same sources, the leadership of 3R was fully aware of the details of this tax collection system. Apart from the taxation money, 3R elements also collected a percentage of the production. The Panel was not able to confirm whether this practice was in place at all mining sites controlled by 3R, but five miners at mining sites around Abba told the Panel that they had to share 25 per cent of their production with 3R. The armed group had agents among the miners who followed the production and kept its members informed.

**Private sector actors paying taxes to 3R**

49. The Panel received information that companies operating in the area controlled by 3R regularly paid “security taxes”. Several sources explained to the Panel that companies, given the failure of the Government to protect their investments, opted to cooperate with armed groups. The Panel collected testimonies confirming payments by Industrie minière de Centrafrique (IMC) in Yaloké, Ombella-Mpoko Prefecture, and Abba (see S/2021/87, paras. 65–67). Several sources also mentioned Société minière Thien Pao and HW-Lepo as making payments to armed groups.

50. Cases of racketeering of mining companies in the Abba area were previously reported by the Panel (see S/2018/729, paras. 102 and 103). The Panel’s recent investigations demonstrated that the isolated cases described in 2018 have become common practice.

51. FACA elements assigned to protect companies, as well as sources who worked for IMC in 2020 and one senior State mining official, told the Panel that 3R elements visited their sites two or three times per month. On each visit, 3R received food, fuel and money from the companies. The 3R elements arrived on four motorbikes, each with four armed elements. Several sources told the Panel that 3R received 2 million CFA francs ($3,700) from the companies on each visit.

52. As confirmed by the authorities of the Central African Republic, and in line with common practice in the country (see S/2018/729, annex 7.5), FACA soldiers are assigned to the mining companies at their request to prevent harassment from armed groups. Based on interviews with several witnesses, including with FACA elements, the Panel confirmed that that practice did not stop 3R racketeering activities. In Lami village (around Abba), for example, where IMC had a mining site, one FACA assigned to the company was attacked by 3R fighters in October 2020 and had his weapon, ammunition magazines, motorbike and clothes taken. FACA elements assigned to IMC were not allowed by 3R to carry their weapons outside company premises, except when escorting foreign employees. They were also not allowed to prevent 3R fighters from meeting with the company. FACA elements told the Panel that they received instructions from “Colonel” Djibril, 3R commander in the area.

53. The Panel presented its findings to representatives of the Ministry of Defence and Reconstruction of the Army of the Central African Republic and to those companies the names of which had been mentioned during its investigations. Representatives of the Ministry told the Panel that they had not received such information from FACA officers deployed at mining sites.

54. During a meeting with the Panel in April 2021, a representative of Société minière Thien Pao denied having made payments to 3R elements. He acknowledged that the company was harassed when they were guarded by gendarmes, but argued that, since the arrival of FACA elements, reportedly two years before, they had not
experienced any interventions by 3R. IMC and HW-Lepo did not respond to the Panel’s requests for information.

After the creation of CPC

55. When CPC launched its military operations in mid-December 2020, mining companies were targeted and looted. CPC started attacking companies in Yaloké on 13 and 14 December 2020 and subsequently moved to other mining areas. Société minière Thien Pao claimed, for example, that during the attacks on its two sites around Abba on 20 December 2020, the company lost approximately 10 billion CFA francs ($18 million) worth of equipment (see annex 2.11). While it could not confirm the value of the equipment stolen during the attacks, the Panel was able to confirm that CPC forced Société minière Thien Pao to pay a large sum of money, namely, 10 million CFA francs ($18,000) at the mining site and 1 million CFA francs ($1,900) at a CPC checkpoint in Baboua, as the convoy comprising 24 foreign employees was trying to flee to Garoua Boulaï (Cameroon).

56. Although news of the aforementioned attacks on companies spread rapidly in the Central African Republic and convinced several mining actors to leave the sites, mining activities, whether carried out by individuals or companies, continued to some extent, offering the opportunity to 3R to continue to generate revenues. Several collectors based in Cameroon told the Panel that they continued to cross the border into the Central African Republic and were still taxed by 3R elements during that time. In early January 2021, the Panel interviewed Bouar-based traders, who confirmed that they were able to trade at mining sites in Nana-Mambéré Prefecture. In April, the Panel also interviewed taxi drivers in Beloko, on the Baboua-Garoua Boulaï road, who confirmed that they had carried goods to mining sites in Niem, Baboua and Abba and were taxed by 3R and anti-balaka elements. Several refugees from the Central Africa Republic based in Cameroon told the Panel that, in January, they continued to cross the border to work at mining sites around Yidéré and Ndongori, where they paid tolls to 3R elements. Miners in Gamboula (Mambéré-Kadéï Prefecture), which was occupied by 3R in December 2020, also told the Panel that they had continued their activities.

57. The Panel confirmed that, in December 2020 and January 2021, when CPC was controlling the area, foreigners working in partnership with Cooperative minière de Yaloké (COMINYA) continued to operate in Yaloké. Government sources told the Panel that Ouiefio Mberendeh, the manager of COMINYA, was able to continue his activities owing to his financial support for CPC. In April, Mberendeh acknowledged in a letter to the Minister of Mines and Geology that he was a relative of François Bozizé but denied any links with CPC. On 29 April, in a communication to the Panel, Mberendeh explained that he had remained in Yaloké after the 3R attack because armed group elements had looted two of his vehicles and the embassy of his foreign partners had advised him to stay there until the situation improved.

58. After the CPC military operations commenced in December 2020, 3R elements, in cooperation with anti-balaka fighters, not only occupied new positions along the main axes but also deployed in new areas, such as Bouar and Gamboula. This obliged the armed group to remove some elements from mining sites. According to the Panel’s investigations, 3R put in place a recruitment strategy in the refugee camps in Cameroon to maintain its taxation capacity while its seasoned fighters were deployed on the front line.

Shift since the counteroffensive against CPC

59. At the end of January, under pressure from FACA and Russian instructors, 3R elements were pushed out of several main towns, including Bouar and Gamboula.
Some 3R elements went to the bush, moved towards the border with Cameroon or crossed it. Several security sources also told the Panel that 3R had only undertaken a tactical retreat, and that this withdrawal did not prevent the group from continuing taxation.

60. On 8 April, for example, 45 3R fighters reached Romdi, a village close to Abba, where they demanded 20,000 CFA francs ($37) from each artisanal miner. The Panel confirmed that, in April, 3R elements still controlled the Lami mining site close to Abba. Two senior mining officials told the Panel that the presence of 3R elements in Lami prevented an official delegation of the Ministry of Mines and Geology from stopping there in early April during a tour of mining sites affected by CPC attacks.

61. On 10 April, the Panel visited Dombaéké, on the road to several gold mining sites around Mbengue, Ndongori, Bakary and Yidéré. FACA elements posted at Dombaéké, as well as miners coming from the sites, told the Panel that 3R elements were still entering the sites to collect taxes.

62. The Panel confirmed that FACA soldiers and the Russian instructors had established a presence in the country’s key mining centres. The Panel is of the view that mining activities in areas recently liberated from CPC influence should be monitored.

III. Arms embargo, national defence and security forces

A. Developments in the security sector and weapons and ammunition management

Security crisis: desertions, defections, abandonment of post and associated loss of government stocks of weapons, ammunition and equipment

63. In the context of the attempted coup d’état by CPC, a significant number of FACA and Internal Security Forces elements abandoned their posts, deserted or defected to join the ranks of CPC in locations across the country. Annex 3.1 contains a detailed account of how this affected FACA, the police and the gendarmerie and of the associated loss of weapons, ammunition and equipment, which remain largely unaccounted for.

Deployment of the national defence and security forces alongside Russian instructors and Rwandan forces: operations against CPC

64. In response to instability in the run-up to the elections of December 2020, the Russian Federation and Rwanda provided security assistance to the Central African Republic pursuant to bilateral agreements between the respective Governments. On 21 December, the Russian Federation notified the Committee that it would send 300 unarmed instructors to support the training process of the FACA infantry and motorized forces in providing security in the run-up to and during the elections. On the same date, Rwanda notified the Committee of the deployment of one infantry battalion equipped with integral weapons to support Rwandan peacekeepers under attack and to assist the authorities of the Central African Republic in ensuring the peaceful holding of the elections scheduled on 27 December 2020. Since then, FACA,

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5 In April 2021, the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic interviewed three refugees from the Central African Republic in Garoua Boulai, who confirmed that they had occasionally seen 3R elements in Garoua Boulai who used to collect taxes in the Central African Republic. The Panel received information that 3R elements crossed the border with their weapons but, at the time of reporting, had not been able to confirm that information.
supported by Russian instructors and Rwandan forces, has conducted operations on
the ground countering CPC.

Role of instructors from the Russian Federation in military operations and use
of arms and equipment

65. The Russian Federation informed the Panel that its deployed instructors did not
take part in military operations carried out by FACA and that their role was limited
to: training FACA cadets at Berengo training centre, Lobaye Prefecture, and police
and gendarmerie training; transporting FACA troops to areas of operations; providing
them with advisory assistance in operational planning; supporting FACA logistically
with the delivery of ammunition, food, water and fuel; and assisting in organizing
medical evacuation and first aid for wounded FACA personnel during military
operations. The coordinator of Russian instructors told the Panel that all instructors
were of Russian nationality and were recruited by the Ministry of Defence of the
Russian Federation from an association of primarily former military officers called
the Officers Union for International Security (see annex 3.2). He emphasized that
those individuals had arrived in the Central African Republic in an official capacity
on board a military aircraft of the Russian Federation and had not been hired by a
private company, contrary to what was stated in reports of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Working Group on the use of
mercenaries and a number of media outlets. The same representative also confirmed
that close protection security provided to the President, the Prime Minister and several
Cabinet ministers were also Russian instructors who operated under the same chain
of command.

66. Although the Russian Federation notified the Committee that instructors
deployed in December 2020 would be unarmed, the Panel directly observed and
received testimonies that Russian instructors supporting FACA operations and
providing close protection security to officials of the Central African Republic were
armed (see annex 3.3). Representatives of the Russian Federation in the Central
African Republic confirmed that the instructors were armed for their own protection
and exclusively used those arms when fired upon, observing that the arms and
ammunition used came from stocks provided by the Russian Federation to the
Ministry of Defence and Reconstruction of the Army of the Central African Republic
for the needs of the security forces of that country. The Panel notes that this breaches
end-user commitments provided in writing to the Committee by the President,
Mr. Touadéra, on 31 October 2018 in the context of exempted arms and ammunition
transferred to the Central African Republic by the Russian Federation in 2018 and
2019, and an end-user certificate signed by the Minister of Defence and
Reconstruction of the Army on 2 October 2020 in the context of notified armoured
vehicles and weapons transferred to the Central African Republic in October 2020.

67. The Panel collected testimonies from a large number of local officials, FACA,
the Internal Security Forces and community-level sources in multiple locations in the
Central African Republic, who noted the active participation of Russian instructors in
combat operations on the ground, many having observed that they often led rather
than followed FACA as they advanced on different towns and villages. FACA
elements and officers extending to the rank of colonel deployed in areas of active
operations observed that the Russian instructors operated quite separately, that

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Government’s use of ‘Russian trainers’, close contacts with UN peacekeepers”, 31 March 2021;
Luke Harding and Jason Burke, “Russian mercenaries behind human rights abuses in CAR, say
UN experts”, The Guardian, 30 March 2021; and Gaël Grilhot, “En Centrafrique, les mercenaires
russes accusés d’exactions”, Le Monde, 5 April 2021.
communication could be challenging at times and that they did not perceive that they were receiving training.

68. In official correspondence with the Panel, and as confirmed by the coordinator of the Russian instructors, the Russian Federation confirmed that the number of instructors in Central African Republic was 532 as at 18 April 2021 and never exceeded 550, as instructors rotated in and out of the country. The Panel, however, noted that multiple sources estimated that figure to be significantly higher, ranging from 800 to 2,100. The Panel also received multiple testimonies from both local and FACA sources that instructors deployed included individuals who identified themselves as nationals of Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and other countries (see annex 3.4 and para. 109).

Seizure of arms and ammunition by FACA and Russian instructors in the course of operations against CPC

69. FACA soldiers and Russian instructors on the ground confirmed that they had seized weapons and ammunition from CPC in the course of military operations at multiple locations (see annex 3.5). Through a letter submitted to the Government of the Central African Republic on 8 February 2021 and official meetings with senior government and security officials, the Panel sought to gain access to the seized materiel in order to analyse and trace weapons and ammunition illicitly trafficked to the different armed groups of CPC. However, the Panel has not yet received authorization to inspect the seized weapons and ammunition.

Seizure of weapons, ammunition and military materiel in Bangui in May 2021

70. On 10 May, the Central Office for the Suppression of Banditry, a special unit of the police, detained a French national in possession of a significant quantity of arms, ammunition and military materiel (see annex 3.6). The Panel intends to send a letter to the authorities of the Central African Republic to request information on that incident, which took place at the time of drafting of the present report.

FACA training and recruitment

71. Annex 3.7 contains an overview of developments regarding FACA training and recruitment.

B. Incidents of non-compliance with and violations of the arms embargo by Member States

Deliveries of weapons and ammunition by Member States in non-compliance with or in violation of the arms embargo

72. The Panel notes that, during the reporting period, it received reports and evidence from multiple credible sources of deliveries of weapons and ammunition to Bangui M’Poko International Airport.

73. On 23, 24, and 25 January 2021, Antonov aircraft registered in the Sudan bearing registration numbers 7709 (formerly ST-ATM) and ST-ALM (possibly changed to 7710), operated by the Sudanese air force, conducted flights to Bangui M’Poko International Airport. Confidential sources informed the Panel that those flights delivered weapons, ammunition and military materiel for FACA and that the FACA Chief of Staff was present at the airport during at least two of the deliveries. The Panel also received from a confidential source a copy of an end-user certificate signed by the Minister of Defence and Reconstruction of the Army of the Central African Republic on 8 January 2021 detailing a purchase of arms on 8 October 2020 by an unlisted buyer and the Military
Industry Corporation, a State-run defence corporation in the Sudan (see annex 3.8). The timing of the purchase appears to correspond to the timing of the aforementioned non-scheduled special flights and to testimonies from confidential sources regarding materiel offloaded from those flights. The end-user certificate stated that the products listed were for the exclusive use of the Ministry of Defence and Reconstruction of the Army and included supplies of weapons and ammunition that require advance notification, such as a large quantity of pistols and Kalashnikov assault rifles, submachine guns, heavy machine guns with a calibre of 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. It also included items that require an exemption from the Committee, such as twenty 107 mm multi-barrel rocket launchers, and 1,000 SPG-9 73 mm recoilless anti-tank/anti-armour guns, thus representing a possible violation of the arms embargo. Lastly, it included a large quantity of ammunition corresponding to the weapons listed. The Panel contacted the Sudan, requesting information on those flights, but no response had been received at the time of reporting.

74. The Panel received information on three other deliveries that constituted cases of either suspected non-compliance (failure to provide advance notification) or potential violation of the arms embargo, depending on the confirmation of the calibre of the arms and ammunition concerned.

75. Two Ilyushin aircraft registered in Kazakhstan bearing registration numbers UP-I7652 and UP-I7646, leased by Jenis Air and owned by Space Cargo in the United Arab Emirates, conducted flights to Bangui M’Poko International Airport, the former arriving on 19 and departing on 21 December 2020, and the latter landing and departing on 22 December (see annex 3.9). Sources informed the Panel that military personnel and equipment were disembarked from those aircraft. The Panel notes that the airworthiness certificates of the two aircraft had expired on 19 July and 24 November 2020, respectively (see annex 3.10). The Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan informed the Panel that, since 4 December 2020, the lease agreement between Jenis Air and Space Cargo had been terminated, that State registration plates had been painted over and badges removed, and that the aircraft had been returned to the owner. Furthermore, Jenis Air confirmed that all personnel had been sent on unpaid leave following an order issued on 7 July 2020. The airline thus informed the Panel that it was not possible for Jenis Air to have performed the aforementioned flights. Space Cargo and the United Arab Emirates were contacted to provide information on those flights, but no response had been received at the time of reporting. The Panel notes that the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan revoked Jenis Air’s air operator certificate on 1 February 2021 on the basis of information received from the Security Council regarding non-compliance with the provisions of the arms embargo imposed on Libya under resolution 1970 (2011) and extended under resolution 2509 (2020) (see annex 3.11).

76. On 31 December 2020 and 1 January 2021, Boeing 737 and Boeing 727 aircraft registered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as 9S-AGD and 9S-AVV, operated by Gomair and Serve Air Congo, respectively, conducted flights to Bangui M’Poko International Airport. Confidential sources informed the Panel that those flights delivered a significant number of small arms and light weapons, ammunition cases, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, four 14.5 mm heavy machine guns, which require advance notification, and 120 mm mortar rounds, which require an exemption from the Committee, and that officials from authorities of the Central African Republic were present at the airport during the delivery. The Panel contacted the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gomair and Serve Air Congo, requesting information about the flights, but no response had been received at the time of reporting.

78. The Panel presented those cases to the authorities of the Central African Republic, which indicated that they would look into the matter.

**Provision of ground and aerial support to the national defence and security forces representing possible non-compliance with or violation of the arms embargo**

79. During the reporting period, a significant quantity of ground and aerial support was delivered to the Central African Republic, including at least 78 ground vehicles, seven helicopters, including several military helicopters, and two small aircraft, according to multiple credible sources.

80. The Panel observed and received photographic evidence and testimonies from a large number of sources of the weaponization and use in military operations of some of the ground vehicles delivered (see annex 3.13). The Panel also observed and received photographic evidence of a significant number of helicopters in use in the Central African Republic, either bearing registration numbers of that country or bearing no numbers, some of which were mounted with arms (see annex 3.14).

81. Lastly, the Panel observed and received photographic evidence that two Antonov An-28 small aircraft had arrived and were operating in the Central African Republic during the reporting period, inter alia, to deliver logistics to areas where military operations were ongoing and transport individuals understood to be conflict-related detainees. The aircraft were observed bearing registration numbers TL-KPF and TL-KFT of the Central African Republic (see annex 3.15). The Panel is not aware of any notification or exemption request submitted for the delivery of those aircraft.

**C. Increased use of suspected landmines and explosive devices indicating the changing nature of the conflict in the Central African Republic**

82. Since the first three incidents of suspected use of landmines in the Central African Republic in June and July 2020, the Panel has documented an increase in incidents involving suspected landmines and other explosives devices, with eight incidents recorded between February and May 2021, causing nine deaths and injuring six people (see annex 3.16). No immediate post-blast investigation or recovery of devices for full analysis has been possible in any of the recorded incidents.

**D. International humanitarian law violations by national defence and security forces and Russian instructors**

**Civilian victims of excessive use of force by FACA and Russian instructors**

83. In several areas visited, the Panel received confidential testimonies about excessive use of force by FACA and Russian instructors. In Grimari, Ouaka Prefecture, the Panel found evidence of excessive use of force by FACA soldiers and Russian instructors against civilians on 28 December 2020. All accounts given to the Panel concurred that, just as a commercial truck travelling to Bangui was arriving to a temporary checkpoint, FACA soldiers appeared, instructing the driver to stop. According to eyewitness accounts, as the driver was making efforts to stop, the shooting started from both sides by the FACA soldiers and from in the front of the truck by Russian instructors. In total, three civilians were killed and 15 were wounded, including six women and one minor. Many of those injured had received multiple bullet wounds. Local authorities in Grimari confirmed that no evidence of a connection with armed groups had been found in the truck. At the time of reporting, there had been no military or judicial investigation into the fatal shooting of the civilians.
84. The coordinator of the Russian instructors assured the Panel that no Russian instructors were present in Grimari at the time of the incident.

Bambari: operational objectives prioritized over international humanitarian law

85. On 15 February 2021, FACA soldiers and Russian instructors, supported by gendarme and police elements, began a two-day operation against CPC in Bambari, mainly targeting areas controlled by UPC. Early in the operations, according to the testimonies of locals, several UPC elements fleeing the oncoming FACA and Russian instructors entered Al-Takwa mosque in El Haji neighbourhood, where civilians were present. FACA soldiers and Russian instructors targeted the mosque despite the known presence of civilians and without respect for the religious nature of the building. According to eyewitnesses met by the Panel, no efforts were made to distinguish between civilians and fighters. FACA soldiers and Russian instructors entered the building and continued to shoot inside the mosque as confirmed by photographic evidence (see annex 3.17). According to local sources, there were 17 victims from the fighting, including at least one woman hit by a stray bullet. Although some of the victims were indeed UPC fighters, the Panel was also able to confirm that at least six people who died were civilians.

86. According to local community sources, by the time of the operation on 15 February, most of the UPC “generals”, including Ali Darassa, had fled, as had the anti-balaka fighters. Remaining UPC fighters were scattered around the residential districts of El Haji, Bornou and Élevage, with some firing indiscriminately into the air to cause confusion, while others were disguised in civilian clothes. This tactic of using the population as human shields has been employed by UPC before, notably during operations in May 2018 when United Nations peacekeepers temporarily pushed UPC out of Bambari (see S/2018/729, para. 92).

87. In response to a query from the Panel regarding the incident, the coordinator of the Russian instructors noted that the rebels had placed civilians in the middle of the mosque and had fired upon FACA from within the mosque walls, which had triggered the FACA intervention. However, he denied that Russian instructors had entered the mosque and fired on civilians.

88. The Panel’s investigations show that FACA soldiers and Russian instructors demonstrated similar disregard for international humanitarian law during other operations in Bambari, including at the internally displaced persons site “Élevage”, on 16 February, where fighting took place inside the medical centre. The Panel also noted that a high proportion of those wounded during the two operations were women and children (eight and nine, respectively, of the 36 wounded people in total), and that the wounded suffered from blast and bullet wounds.

Indiscriminate killings by Russian instructors

89. The Panel received numerous reports of cases of indiscriminate killings against unarmed civilians by Russian instructors and was able to confirm the following. Local sources met by the Panel testified that, in Ippy, on 21 February, Russian instructors shot and killed an unarmed male civilian after they had confronted him. Two individuals with disabilities were shot and killed by Russian instructors, one in Bodol, 25 km from Paoua, Ouahm-Pendé Prefecture, and one in Grimari, on 13 January. On all those occasions, according to community members, including eyewitnesses, the victims were civilians without weapons or uniforms.

90. The Panel also confirmed that, in Kradé, Ouaka Prefecture, on 8 March, two Fulani civilians from Gotchélé were shot by Russian instructors accompanied by several FACA soldiers. The Panel noted that, in Ouaka Prefecture in general, a large number of reported killings targeted Fulani, thereby fuelling the UPC and 3R
narratives on the need for their protection (see S/2020/662, annex 4.3). Local communities in many locations spoke to the Panel of their fear that the generalizations made by the Russian instructors during their operations, such as linking all Fulani to UPC and, to a lesser extent, those bearing scarifications\(^7\) as being anti-balaka, put male members of those communities at greater risk.

91. As detailed in annex 3.18, the Panel noted that the combination of arbitrary arrests and killings targeting civilians by FACA soldiers and Russian instructors had on some occasions led to reprisal attacks by armed groups against civilians, perpetuating the cycle of violence in the country.

**Widespread looting and theft by FACA soldiers and Russian instructors**

92. In many of the locations where FACA soldiers and Russian instructors transited or deployed, the Panel received accounts of looting of houses and buildings, which took on various forms of theft, ranging from livestock (such as chickens and goats) to household items, such as mattresses. In Bambari, Bouar and Berberati, a number of local authorities and community members confirmed to the Panel that high-value items, such as money and motorbikes, had also been taken by FACA soldiers and Russian instructors during house-to-house searches and at checkpoints, but also after civilians had been killed. In Bambari, local security forces confirmed to the Panel that such items had been taken during searches since February 2021; however, they claimed that those items were only those previously looted by CPC in December 2020.

93. Humanitarian organizations have also been the target of lootings by FACA soldiers and Russian instructors. In Bossangoa, the Panel gathered testimonies regarding the looting of one humanitarian organization on 18 March, with stolen goods including kits for victims of sexual violence worth around 1 million CFA francs ($1,850) (see annex 3.19).

**Summary executions of alleged armed group elements in the FACA base in Bangassou**

94. Between 31 December 2020 and 2 January 2021, six individuals were arrested and accused of collaboration with CPC in and around Bangassou, Mbomou Prefecture. Local sources confirmed that only two of those individuals were anti-balaka members who had joined CPC. The same sources also confirmed that, during their detention at the FACA base, two of the six had been tortured and threatened to be killed should the CPC attack Bangassou. In response, CPC fighters attacked the FACA base early in the morning of 3 January 2021. FACA, gendarmes and police elements left in several waves on United Nations peacekeeper vehicles called to evacuate wounded FACA soldiers, while Russian instructors and remaining FACA soldiers were the last to leave the base using a police vehicle. After CPC arrived at the FACA base, they found five bodies and one survivor. Photographic evidence seen by the Panel shows that the five were shot in a water tower inside the FACA base. Local State security forces confirmed to the Panel that they had arrested the six individuals, but explained that, owing to the confusion during the CPC attack on the FACA base, they were unable to provide further details on the killing of the detainees.

**Challenges in gaining access to justice**

95. In several locations in the Central African Republic, local authorities, security forces and judicial officials met by the Panel indicated that no abuses had been brought

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\(^7\) Scarification is often part of the initiation rites for new anti-balaka members (see S/2017/1023, para. 80).
to their attention. They also claimed that victims had the possibility to submit an official complaint. However, as many of the Panel’s interlocutors explained, since December 2020, individuals have disappeared without trace after being detained by national security forces and Russian instructors. As a result, victims are fearful of lodging a complaint with local authorities. Moreover, in some locations, FACA soldiers and Russian instructors have been involved in police matters. For example, in Paoua, Russian instructors physically threatened a gendarme on 27 April during discussions over the handover of 15 detainees who were held at the gendarmerie (see annex 3.20). The Panel also notes that, in a video circulated on social networks on 15 March, presidential adviser Fidèle Gouandjika said that tolerance of certain behaviours was the price to pay for Russians to help the Central African Republic to “liberate the country” (see annex 3.21).

96. In April, the Panel raised the cases of human rights and international humanitarian law violations by FACA soldiers and Russian instructors in meetings with representatives of the Minister of Defence and Reconstruction of the Army of the Central African Republic and the coordinator of the Russian instructors. They indicated that they were aware of the accusations but rejected them, saying that it was the interest of the rebels to spread those stories. On 30 April, the Minister of Communications and Media, Ange Maxime Kazagu, claimed that the Government considered a document from MINUSCA referring to human rights violations by State agents and Russian instructors to be “mere allegations”, but that the Government had instructed the Minister of Justice and Human Rights to open a judicial investigation (see annex 3.22). On 4 May, the Minister of Justice and Human Rights created an ad hoc commission to investigate allegations of human rights violations by FACA and Russian instructors (see annex 3.23).

IV. Factionalization of the security sector through parallel recruitment

97. In response to the CPC attempted coup d’état, armed group members have been recruited or instrumentalized by members of Government and security forces, creating confusion on the ground. This emerging pattern could create significant long-term damage to the security sector reform and places the State security sector at risk of splitting into factions.

98. The present section describes four case studies involving militia groups organized to operate within or in support of State security institutions. Although those groups come from different backgrounds and have different political connections, all were formed through the co-option of armed group leaders and their elements. Each militia group received support in the form of cash and, for some, military materiel diverted from official government stocks intended for FACA or the Internal Security Forces, in violation of the embargo. They were also enticed by promises of official integration into the military or the Internal Security Forces.

99. During its investigations, the Panel observed that the creation of some of those militia groups was encouraged by members of the Government looking to demonstrate their influence and strengthen their positions within the President’s Administration.

8 Confidential report, 3 May 2021.
A. Presidential guard and “requins” militia

Recruitment into the presidential guard of known armed group elements

100. The Panel continued to note the expansion of the size and role of the Groupement spécial chargé de la protection républicaine, generally referred to as the presidential guard (see also S/2020/662, paras. 72–74, and S/2019/930, para. 146). Senior FACA sources confirmed that management and recruitment of the presidential guard was handled separately from FACA management and human resources. The role and recruitment process of a presidential guard unit was not provided for in the national defence plan, nor was it coordinated as part of the ongoing security sector reform. Multiple sources, including senior FACA elements, informed the Panel that the recruitment of the presidential guard was handled discreetly rather than through an open process, and that it centred on young people from the President’s neighbourhood of Boy Rabe, in the fourth district of Bangui, and members of his church (Baptist church of Ngoubagara) and ethnic group (Mbaka-Mandja), and included known anti-balaka elements.

101. A key example was Thierry Lébéné, aka “Colonel 12 Puissances”, a former anti-balaka fighter under Patrice-Édouard Ngaïssona’s command (see S/2014/452, annex 5, para. 5). Testimonies collected by the Panel from anti-balaka members and members of the presidential guard confirmed that Lébéné was a member of the presidential guard. On his social media account, Lébéné self-identifies as a member of the presidential guard and has posted several pictures of himself “on mission” with other known former anti-balaka members, carrying weapons and wearing a presidential guard uniform (see annex 4.1).

102. The Director General of the presidential guard, General Alfred Service, confirmed the involvement of elements from the presidential guard in operations in Boali, Mbaiki and Bossembele in the context of the ongoing security crisis, but denied the involvement of armed group members in it.

“Les requins”: from Internet trolls to violent political group

103. The group “les requins” (the sharks) was created in June 2019 (see S/2019/608, para. 33) by Héritier Doneng, a public servant in the Ministry for the Promotion of Youth and Sport. The group was originally solely active on social media, spreading false information and threatening members of the political opposition. It did not engage in violent actions and announced its dissolution in July 2019 (ibid.). By the end of 2020, however, the “requins” had re-emerged and expanded in size and scope, drawing upon a roster of vigilantes, primarily former anti-balaka elements, operating within the ranks of the presidential guard.

104. According to multiple testimonies gathered by the Panel, from December 2020 onwards, the “requins” became infamous in Bangui as a shadowy force involved in extrajudicial security operations (see para. 131). Operating primarily at night, and under the cover of a government-imposed curfew established on 7 January 2021, their most common practice was to kidnap individuals from their homes or remove them from police or gendarmerie custody and bring them to an office located in Camp de Roux, a military base which houses both the FACA and the presidential guard headquarters. Victims were also sometimes transferred to the Central Office for the Suppression of Banditry (see S/2019/608, paras. 95 and 96 and annex 6.7). Annex 4.2 contains further information on human rights violations by members of the presidential guard.

105. According to multiple sources, including members of the presidential guard, the “requins” did not operate through a clear hierarchy, but rather were tasked on the basis of specific extrajudicial operations. Orders were given by a group of presidential
advisors, often using the pretext of alleged links to CPC, to conduct violent operations and, at times, advance their own personal interests. A central role was played by Thierry Lébéné (see para. 101), who coordinated a select group of presidential guard elements operating as “requins”, conducting activities in civilian attire but often using military vehicles, thus allowing them to move around the city in spite of strict curfew measures.

106. The Director General of the presidential guard clarified to the Panel that he was not aware of any involvement of elements from that unit in activities outside the scope of their work.

B. **PK5 self-defence groups: from enemy number one to auxiliary force**

107. The Panel previously described the activities of the self-proclaimed self-defence groups of the PK5 neighbourhood, which engaged in fighting against MINUSCA and the Internal Security Forces and have been involved in numerous human rights violations since 2013 (see S/2018/729, paras. 61–69). According to the Panel’s investigations, despite their historically confrontational relationship with State security forces, known elements from those groups have been discreetly recruited by government officials since January 2021 and refer to themselves as “les volontaires” (the volunteers).

108. The Panel collected testimonies from armed group members, local authorities, FACA members and recruits who described the mechanism behind the recruitment. The process began in mid-January and was conducted under the direct supervision of the Minister of the Interior and Public Security, Henri Wanzet-Linguissara, through a network of intermediaries with connections in the PK5 neighbourhood. Perhaps the most prominent recruit was Mahamat Rahama, aka “LT”, the main leader of the PK5 self-defence group since the death of “General” Nimery Matar Djamouss, aka “Force”, in June 2019. “LT” led the negotiations on the recruitments directly with the Minister of the Interior and Public Security. Although previously engaged in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration process, 58 fighters under the former’s command were recruited through that parallel recruitment process and have fought alongside FACA, the Internal Security Forces and Russian instructors against CPC since January 2021, mainly on the Bangui-Boali-Bossembele axis.

109. According to Panel sources, the new recruits were divided into three groups for deployment led by the respective individuals: “LT”, who is also recognized as the overarching “chief of staff” for the three groups; “Abakar”, a former “secretary general” for “Force”, implicated in the public denigration campaign against four MINUSCA staff in early 2020 (see S/2020/662, para. 60); and Abbas, aka “Kamatiwa”, who took over a group of PK5-based fighters formerly led by “Apo” (see S/2018/729, para. 61). Each of the three groups was provided with weapons, gendarmerie uniforms and one gendarmerie vehicle. According to several eyewitnesses, the vehicle handover took place in front of the former “Cinéma Étoile” in the PK5 neighbourhood, in mid-January. The Panel received photographic evidence of those PK5-group elements dressed in gendarmerie uniforms and in gendarmerie vehicles, and of “LT” wearing military attire and carrying military weapons (see annex 4.3). Those elements appeared alongside individuals that the Panel’s sources identified as being part of the team of Russian instructors, but who, according to some of the PK5 recruits, self-identified as Syrian and Libyan nationals and participated in combat operations alongside the recruits (see para. 68). The PK-5 recruits also explained to the Panel that one of Wanzet-Linguissara’s houses in the Gobongo

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9 The Panel notes that the gendarmerie vehicles in question bore marks indicating that they were donated by the United Nations Development Programme with funding provided by the United States of America. Their reassignment to individuals who are not official gendarmes represents a violation of the end-user commitments made by the Central African Republic as part of that donation.
neighbourhood in Bangui fourth district was used as a logistics hub and safe house when they returned from operations and to collect ammunition and payments.

110. Recruited elements confirmed to the Panel that each new recruit was paid a per diem when in operation alongside FACA soldiers: 10,000 CFA francs ($18) if they joined with their own weapon and 2,000–5,000 CFA francs ($3.5–$9) if they joined without one. Some also reported that they had been given a monthly allowance (reportedly 100,000 CFA francs ($183)). Although recruits interviewed by the Panel noted that they were promised official enrolment in the gendarmerie, they received no official document or mission order, and salary payments were made in cash.

111. In a video posted on the official social network account of the Government on 2 March, the Minister of the Interior and Public Security declared that “the former chief of the PK5 auto-defence [wa]s currently used by the Government in the field against the rebels”. The Panel understood this statement to be referring to “LT”.10 The Panel sent an official letter to the Minister to seek his views on the Panel’s findings, but no response had been received at the time of reporting. Neither the Panel nor any partners of the Government of the Central African Republic involved in disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration and security sector reform programming had been informed of any new integration plan into the security sector for former members of PK5 self-defence groups.

C. Government-affiliated militia formed in Vakaga Prefecture to block trafficking routes

112. As detailed in annex 4.4, in the aftermath of the failed coup by CPC in January, a number of politicians originally from Vakaga Prefecture organized, funded and deployed, under the leadership of the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, Arnaud Djoubaye Abazene, a militia composed of armed local young people. Their objectives were to block arms trafficking corridors used by CPC for crossing from the Sudan into the territory of the Central African Republic at the border town of Tissi (see para. 31) and to protect local communities from attacks by Sudanese Misseriya militias, similar to the one carried out in Boromata in December 2020 (see S/2021/87, paras. 37–41).

D. Anti-balaka group known for committing serious international humanitarian law violations instrumentalized as a de facto FACA auxiliary in Grimari

113. The Panel also collected evidence that FACA in Grimari provided material support and direction to a local anti-balaka armed group faction under Dmitri Ayoloma, known to have committed human rights and international humanitarian law violations across Ouaka Prefecture, including against State authorities, Fulani herders, Muslim traders, humanitarians and peacekeepers (see S/2020/662, annex 3.12).11

114. According to Panel sources, in December 2020, Ayoloma rejected requests to join CPC and instead sided with the Government, even handing over several CPC fighters to FACA. Multiple local sources in Grimari and Bambari confirmed to the Panel that, in the following months, Ayoloma’s group received weapons and uniforms

from FACA based in the area. Acts of collaboration evolved into direct tasking, with Ayoloma and his elements working in coordination with FACA.

115. For example, on 12 March 2021, after FACA soldiers and Russian instructors forces had moved through Bangao village, Kouango Sub-Prefecture, Ayoloma arrived and burned a number of houses belonging to Muslims and a mosque. Sources noted that complicity between FACA and Ayoloma emboldened another anti-balaka group in the area to commit similarly acts of violence against the Muslim population.

116. Despite this new role providing auxiliary support to State security forces, local judicial authorities confirmed that Ayoloma remained the subject of an active arrest warrant issued in 2020 for the killing of a peacekeeper in March that year.\(^{12}\)

117. The Panel could find no evidence that this strategy was endorsed by the FACA leadership in Bangui; rather, information gathered by the Panel indicates that it stemmed from decisions taken by FACA personnel based in the Grimari area. The Panel has sent a letter to the authorities of the Central African Republic to inform them about that case as well as the aforementioned case regarding the Vakaga Prefecture.

V. **Confusion over the revival of the dialogue process**

118. Two contributing factors led to the debate around the need for dialogue to appease tensions in the country. First, the withdrawal of CPC-affiliated groups from the peace agreement (see para. 12) resulted in calls to renegotiate the agreement or at least review its implementation mechanisms. Second, the results of the presidential election of 27 December 2020 were strongly contested by several opposition leaders, leaving the re-elected President in need to consolidate his legitimacy. Although the principle of a dialogue was largely supported by regional and international actors, opposing views were expressed regarding its parameters, for example, who should be around the table (should CPC members participate?), under which mediator (was a regional mediation needed?) and what should be discussed (should the peace agreement be adjusted?).

A. **Contestation of the presidential election results**

119. On 18 January, the Constitutional Court declared Mr. Touadéra winner in the first round of the presidential election, with 53 per cent of the votes cast (see annex 5.1). The poll of 27 December was, however, marked by a very low participation rate (35 per cent of registered voters). Owing to CPC operations (see S/2021/87, para. 16), more than half of the electorate could not vote, including most of those based in the north-western part of the Central African Republic, the strongholds of two of Mr. Touadéra’s main competitors, Anicet-Georges Dologuélé and Martin Ziguélé.

120. Before and after election day, opposition leaders expressed concerns over the impact of the security situation on the voters’ ability to participate and the candidates’ capacity to campaign (see S/2021/87, para. 11). They considered that, thanks to the protection provided by security forces, the President had many more opportunities to campaign outside the capital. Those leaders also pointed to several breaches of the electoral code which, according to them, cast serious doubts on the credibility of the results (see annex 5.2). This included, as noted by independent observers (see annex 5.3), a significant number of votes by proxy and the lack of distribution of voting records to candidates’ representatives in many polling stations. On 19 January,

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COD-2020, the main opposition platform (see S/2020/662, annex 2.2), which includes runner-up contender Anicet-Georges Dologuélé, refused to recognize Mr. Touadéra’s victory (see annex 5.4).

121. Annex 5.5 contains information on the legislative elections during which Mr. Touadéra’s party, Mouvement des cœurs unis (MCU), secured a relative majority of seats in the National Assembly.

B. Regional initiatives and Mr. Touadéra’s “republican dialogue”: diverging versions of the dialogue

Regional mediation initiatives

122. As early as 27 November and 26 December 2020, States members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) called for a dialogue in the Central African Republic. They also announced the designation of an ECCAS permanent mediator (who has yet to be appointed).  

123. On 8 February 2021, the President of the ECCAS Commission, Gilberto Veríssimo, accompanied by Chadian representatives, met with a CPC delegation in Moundou (Chad), in preparation for a possible dialogue gathering representatives of the Government of the Central African Republic, CPC and the political opposition. The news of that meeting triggered heavy criticism from the authorities of the Central African Republic, which considered that there should be no dialogue with CPC leaders, whom they deemed as “terrorists”. Several advisors to the President publicly expressed the view that the ECCAS initiative had not been coordinated with the Government of the Central African Republic and that, for those who joined CPC, the only solution should be judicial or military (see annex 5.6). While supporting the principle of dialogue, a number of regional and international partners met by the Panel also considered that engaging with CPC leaders, in particular François Bozizé, could run counter to the fight against impunity and be interpreted as a reward for the use of violence.

124. In response to such critics, ECCAS representatives underlined that consultations with CPC leaders were held in consultation with the authorities of the Central African Republic and in accordance with decisions taken during the aforementioned ECCAS meetings of 27 November and 26 December 2020, as well as at the mini-summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region held in Luanda on 29 January 2021. They also emphasized that those consultations mainly aimed at bringing CPC leaders to commit to a ceasefire and would not stand in the way of any judicial processes against armed group members (see annex 5.7).

125. New series of consultations with CPC leaders were subsequently conducted in southern Chad, in Moundou and in Sarh, from 21 to 24 February and in late March, respectively. According to CPC leaders and diplomatic sources, those consultations were led by representatives of Angola and Chad, in coordination with ECCAS. CPC leaders were offered to go into exile in exchange for their commitment to stopping to fight.


14 Calls for a dialogue were also expressed by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 16 February and the Security Council on 12 March 2021, see African Union document PSC/PR/COMM. (CMLXXIX) and Security Council resolution 2566 (2021).
126. Annex 5.8 contains information on reported violations of the travel ban by François Bozizé in the context of the aforementioned consultations in southern Chad.

Republican dialogue under the President

127. In April, in what was seen by most international partners as an attempt to counter regional mediation initiatives, the President engaged a national republican dialogue involving, among other people, representatives of civil society and the political opposition (see annex 5.9). Advisers to the President told the Panel that the objective of the dialogue, conducted under the President’s aegis, was not to reopen existing agreements (Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation of May 2015 (see S/2015/344) and peace agreement of February 2019), but rather to take stock of progress made and boost their implementation.

128. Advisers to the President also indicated that discussions with armed groups, which were not invited to participate in the “republican dialogue”, were to continue within the framework of the peace agreement. However, recognizing the limited implementation of the agreement, the President also initiated a review of its implementation mechanisms. The recommendations stemming from the review included a new call to specify and implement punitive measures in case of violations of the agreement, as provided in its article 35 (see also S/2019/930, para. 15, and S/2020/662, paras. 12 and 102 (b)). The review did not propose, however, to modify the leadership of the Executive Monitoring Committee, as had been recommended by several international partners (see annex 5.10).

129. At a new mini-summit held on 20 April, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region expressed support for both aforementioned approaches. Participants welcomed the “republican dialogue” initiated by the President as well as the results of the consultations led by Angola, which resulted in representatives of armed groups committing to a ceasefire.\(^\text{15}\)

C. A confrontational atmosphere on the political scene

130. The likelihood of the President’s “republican dialogue” facilitating effective national reconciliation was severely undermined by the strong tensions among political actors described below, which resulted in COD-2020 members deciding not to participate in the exercise.

131. In his New Year’s address, the President depicted the COD-2020 platform as the “CPC precursor” (see annex 5.11). In subsequent weeks, political opposition leaders expressed concerns over the targeting of politicians, especially after the state of emergency was declared on 21 January (see annex 5.12). For example, sources confirmed to the Panel that Christian Gazam-Betty, a member of Anicet-Georges Dologuélé’s party Union pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (URCA), had to hide for several weeks after escaping extrajudicial arrest attempts by the presidential guard (see para. 104).

132. Between January and April, several politicians (Catherine Samba-Panza, Martin Ziguélé, Karim Meckassoua and Anicet-Georges Dologuélé) were also prevented from leaving the Central African Republic. On 2 April, the last three of those four politicians were also the subjects of a request to waive their parliamentary immunity (see annex 5.13). Judicial authorities told the Panel that such a procedure was required

for their hearings in the context of investigations into CPC and their possible indictment as CPC sponsors.

133. The involvement in CPC of members of one COD-2020 entity, namely, François Bozizé’s Kwa Na Kwa (KNK) (see para. 18) and the electoral alliance between KNK and Dologuélé’s URCA (see S/2021/87, para. 18) fed the discourse associating political opposition members with the armed rebellion. At the same time, most regional and international partners met by the Panel expressed strong concerns that all political opposition members were being systematically treated as suspect of CPC collaboration, which they perceived as attempts by the Government to silence all political dissent.

VI. Regional tensions as a challenge to conflict resolution

134. The period under review was marked by an unprecedented increase in tensions between the Central African Republic and several of its external partners, in particular neighbouring States, and, at times, among partners themselves. This situation could, in the Panel’s view, further complicate conflict resolution efforts.

A. Peak of tensions between the Central African Republic and the Economic Community of Central African States

135. The subregional organization ECCAS has been at the forefront of conflict management efforts in the Central African Republic for almost 15 years. The aforementioned divergence of views regarding the parameters of the dialogue resulted in strained relations between ECCAS (i.e., its leadership and some of its member States) and the authorities of the Central African Republic. Following the meeting held on 8 February between CPC and ECCAS representatives (see para. 123), several demonstrations were held in Bangui against the mediation efforts of the organization, which the President of the ECCAS Commission described as “unfriendly and hostile acts” (see para. 149 and annex 5.7). In that context, the ECCAS representative in the Central African Republic was recalled for consultations.

136. Tensions between some ECCAS member States and the authorities of the Central African Republic had been latent for months. As confirmed by diplomatic sources, the involvement of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in the management of the Central African Republic crisis since January 2021 came from an attempt by President Touadéra to encourage the President of Angola, also Chair of the International Conference, to take on a leadership role.16 More precisely, the President of the Central African Republic was reluctant to see the francophone ECCAS member States continue to lead diplomatic efforts in his country, in particular the Congo, the President of which, in his capacity as ECCAS Chair, had expressed interest in becoming again mediator of the crisis.

B. Mistrust between the Central African Republic and some of its neighbours

137. On many occasions, including in meetings with the Panel or during sessions of the Executive Monitoring Committee of the peace agreement, the authorities of the

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16 Angola is a State member of both the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and ECCAS. However, Angola never played a mediation role in the Central African Republic on behalf of ECCAS. ECCAS peace efforts have been traditionally led by Chad, the Congo or Gabon. See also “Crise en Centrafrique: comment le Président angolais Lourenço reprend la médiation en main”, Jeune Afrique, 3 February 2021.
Central African Republic presented the current crisis as the result of external factors, putting the role of neighbouring countries at the centre of attention.

**Chad**

138. On the day of the attack on Bangui by CPC (13 January), the Minister of the Interior and Public Security of the Central African Republic displayed on national television an individual whom he presented as a CPC combatant from Chad (see annex 5.14). That broadcast supported the Government’s narrative portraying CPC as quasi-exclusively composed of foreign mercenaries.

139. Such discourses, which, according to the Panel’s investigations, only partly reflect the reality (see annex 2.6), contributed to an increase in tensions with neighbouring States, which interpreted them as accusations against them. On 14 January, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, African Integration and Chadians Abroad of Chad issued a communiqué expressing regrets over the involvement of Chadian nationals in armed groups operating in the Central African Republic, but also lamenting the communication strategy used by the Government of that country to portray Chad as responsible for the crisis (see annex 5.15). The communiqué also recalled the policy of Chad of non-interference in the affairs of neighbouring countries. Subsequently, in a communiqué dated 25 January, the Government of the Central African Republic denied having ever accused Chad of meddling in its affairs (see annex 5.16).

140. In meetings with the Panel, authorities of the Central African Republic also expressed frustration over CPC members obtaining weapons from Chadian territory (see paras. 30–33) or being based in Chad. For example, the judicial authorities of the Central African Republic told the Panel that, in early February, they had submitted to Chadian authorities an international arrest warrant and an extradition request against CPC spokesperson Abakar Saboune. The Panel did not have an opportunity to discuss this issue with the Government of Chad (see para. 3), but notes that Saboune has since continued to operate as the CPC spokesperson from Chadian territory.

**Sudan**

141. The authorities of the Central African Republic also expressed concerns over the presence of CPC members on Sudanese territory. They told the Panel that, in late January, they had submitted an international arrest warrant and an extradition request against CPC leader and sanctioned individual Nourreddine Adam. The reaction of the Sudan to that request is unknown to the Panel.

142. In February 2021, Sudanese authorities told the Panel that Adam’s establishment in Khartoum in 2018 (see S/2019/608, para. 18, and S/2019/930, paras. 168–171) had been endorsed by regional organizations then leading mediation efforts in the Central African Republic. Adam’s continued presence outside the Central African Republic was, according to them, a way to monitor his activities and limit his capacity to play a negative role in the conflict. They also expressed concerns that, should Adam be arrested, more radical individuals could take the lead of ex-Séléka groups.

**Neighbouring States as victims of the instability in the Central African Republic**

143. Representatives of Cameroonian, Chadian and Sudanese authorities met by the Panel all expressed frustration over the dissemination of narratives presenting neighbouring countries as responsible for the crisis in the Central African Republic. They highlighted their countries’ efforts to prevent armed groups operating in the Central African Republic from establishing rear bases on their territories and reiterated that the main impediment to more efficient border control was the limited capabilities of FACA (see S/2021/87, paras. 43–46). The Sudanese authorities told the Panel that 500 soldiers were deployed in the border area as part of the Central African Republic-
Chad-Sudan tripartite force, in addition to elements of the Rapid Support Forces in Am Dafok (on the Sudanese side of the border). They renewed their hope that the Central African Republic would be able to strengthen its contribution to the tripartite force in terms of both soldiers and logistics (ibid.). In a meeting with the Panel, Cameroonian authorities underlined their readiness to start conducting synchronized patrols with FACA, as discussed during the meeting that they had held with the Central African Republic in Garoua Boulaï (Cameroon) in September 2018 (ibid., annex 3.15).

144. Representatives of the three countries also underlined the negative impact on their countries of the limited control exerted by the authorities of the Central African Republic over their country’s own territory. Representatives of Chad and the Sudan, in particular, expressed concern over the presence of Chadian and Sudanese rebels in the Central African Republic, which they perceived as a threat to their own stability. They referred, inter alia, to the rebels located in the Sam-Ouandja area, Haute-Kotto Prefecture, who, as indicated by the Panel in its midterm report (see S/2021/87, paras. 28–31), had established themselves with the support of Zakaria Damane, an armed group leader claiming to be close to the Government of the Central African Republic.

145. In response, the authorities of the Central African Republic told the Panel that their ongoing efforts should contribute to alleviate the concerns of neighbouring countries. For example, in early March, for the first time since 2011, 30 FACA soldiers were deployed in Am Dafok (Central African Republic side of the border, Vakaga Prefecture) at the border with the Sudan, where the Panel observed them contributing to border control despite logistical and security challenges. On 16 April, a FACA patrol was attacked on the Am Dafok-Birao route, reportedly by Misserya fighters coming from the Sudan, resulting in three FACA soldiers being killed.17

Confidence-building and joint commissions

146. In the Panel’s view, in a context of mistrust among regional actors, strengthened dialogue between the Central African Republic and its neighbours should be a priority, including through joint bilateral commissions (see S/2019/608, para. 111 (b)). Regrettably, owing to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and renewed fighting in the Central African Republic, no progress was made in the activation or reactivation of joint commissions in the past few months.

C. Discord beyond the region

147. Diplomatic dissent also spread beyond the Central African region. Transborder movement of arms and fighters from Chad in support of CPC were, for example, the subject of an exchange of communiqués between the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Central African Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Integration and Chadians Abroad of Chad (see annex 5.17). The Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Bangui, who has portrayed COD-2020 members as CPC associates, also questioned the need for the President to engage in a dialogue with the opposition (see annex 5.18), countering calls by regional and international actors for a reconciliation among political actors.

17 Confidential report, 19 April 2021.
**D. Communication strategies exacerbating regional and international tensions**

148. In previous reports, the Panel emphasized the important role played by defamation campaigns in fuelling tensions and, at times, triggering violent actions in the Central African Republic (see S/2020/662, paras. 58–63).18 Recent reports by research organizations provided evidence that the Central African Republic was a playground for communication and misinformation operations on social media,19 with one documenting online efforts of networks associated with Mr. Touadéra’s party, MCU, to discredit challengers in the election context.20

149. In the past few months, the Panel observed the systematic use of communication strategies to challenge all actors considered as opposing the positions of the Government, whether national or external. First, demonstrations were held in Bangui against ECCAS in mid-February (see para. 135) and MINUSCA in April and May, with both organizations accused of forcing the Government of the Central African Republic into a dialogue with CPC leaders. Government representatives presented such actions to the Panel as spontaneous. As confirmed by the Panel’s interactions with local populations, those demonstrations did reflect the popular rejection in the Central African Republic of the CPC leaders as “foreigners” or “terrorists”. At the same time, a wide range of sources (such as Central African Republic government representatives and civil society), as well as confidential reports, confirmed that the demonstrations were sponsored by MCU members, some of whom, like Didacien Kossimatchi, publicly called for protests against MINUSCA (see annex 5.19).21 On 12 May, during an anti-MINUSCA demonstration, Galaxie nationale, a platform led by Kossimatchi, submitted a memorandum to MINUSCA containing threats of physical abuse against the mission staff (see annex 5.20). The Panel intends to further investigate this possible case of incitement to violence.

150. Second, the demonstrations were combined with defamation campaigns on social networks. The strategy of coordinated actions by a wide number of social media accounts, observed during the defamation campaign of February 2020 against MINUSCA staff (see S/2020/662, paras. 58–63), was again used in April and May 2021. In addition to spreading unfounded rumours about MINUSCA, those accounts gave enhanced publicity to public statements made by MCU members and associates severely criticizing the Mission and its head (see annex 5.21). Lastly, the Panel obtained a copy of a weekly programme of work for the period 21–25 December 2020 of an entity called the “Office for Information and Communication” (see annex 5.22). Among the key messages for that week, which the staff of the office were tasked to spread on social networks, was blaming external actors (i.e., Chad, the Congo, France and MINUSCA) for the crisis in the country. Although the Panel was not able to confirm the authenticity of the document, many sources, including from the Government, confirmed the existence of such an entity at the presidency.

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21 Confidential reports, 21 and 23 April 2021.
VII. Natural resources

151. During the period under review, the Panel investigated criminal networks involved in gold smuggling from the Central African Republic and how Cameroon was being used as a transit country to reach the international market. The present section also contains an update on diamonds.

A. Smuggling of gold involving criminal networks

152. The Panel estimated that more than 95 per cent of the gold sourced in the Central African Republic was illegally traded by individuals and entities. In the course of its investigations, the Panel collected evidence and information showing the patterns of smuggling.

153. Annex 6.1 contains information on actors involved in gold-trafficking activities, that is, companies and cooperatives underreporting their production and a smuggler known under the name of “Rachine”.

B. Cameroon as one of the trafficking hubs for natural resources of the Central African Republic

154. The Panel previously reported that, among other key regional hubs, Cameroon was a significant route for illegal exports of gold and diamonds sourced in the Central African Republic (see S/2014/762, paras. 132–134, and S/2019/608, paras. 84 and 85). During the period under review, the Panel collected further information on individuals based in Cameroon involved in the illegal production of and trade in resources from the Central African Republic. Not registered in the Central African Republic and operating in violation of its mining code, those individuals illegally transported to Cameroon gold and diamonds purchased in the Central African Republic. They include individuals with the following profiles.

155. As previously documented (see S/2018/1119, para. 99), some citizens of the Central African Republic working as miners and collectors, but living in Cameroon with refugee status, regularly crossed the border to participate in illegal mining activities and in trafficking in goods. The Panel collected several testimonies from such actors in three refugee camps and two Cameroonian cities on the border. Those individuals used to work at mining sites when they were based in the Central African Republic but, given the difficulties in finding a job in Cameroon, decided to return to the mining business in the Central African Republic while maintaining their residency in Cameroon.

156. The Panel also interviewed several Cameroonian nationals from cities in eastern Cameroon who confirmed that they were involved in mining in the Central African Republic as buyers or miners and smuggled gold into Cameroon. In Dilapoko, Gamboula and Dombaéké (Mambéré-Kadéï Prefecture), for example, the Panel witnessed the presence of several Cameroonian introduced as gold and diamond traders.

157. The Panel observed that licensed operators from the Central African Republic, that is, artisanal miners, collectors and heads of mining cooperatives, illegally traded in gold and diamonds in Cameroon arguing that the market was more lucrative there. A Gamboula-based legal gold and diamonds trader told the Panel that he declared less than 50 per cent of his stock to the authorities of the Central African Republic. The

22 Mbilé, Lolo and Timangolo.
23 Garoua Boulai and Kenzou.
remaining part was sold in Kenzou (Cameroon), where he was travelling once a week. He explained to the Panel that buyers in Cameroon offered a better price compared with those in Berberati or Bangui.

158. The Panel investigated the strategies used by smugglers to cross borders without being stopped. Many used alternative routes instead of crossing at official border points. The Panel identified, for example, five alternative routes from Gamboula to Kenzou and more than five from Cantonnier to Garoua Boulai. Smugglers confirmed that they could also count on the indulgence of Cameroonian customs agents, especially towards individuals carrying small quantities of gold or diamonds. Two Cameroon customs agents based in Kenzou and Garoua Boulai and one border police officer in Gbìtì told the Panel that they paid more attention to forbidden goods, such as drugs and weapons, than to gold, especially when they considered that the smuggler was trafficking to pay daily living expenses.

159. The two Cameroon customs agents also told the Panel that they were requested by their hierarchy to direct only those who crossed the border with large quantities of gold and diamonds to the mining office. However, they also acknowledged that it was impossible because the carriers were often accompanied by other customs officers or were working for individuals with connections to Cameroonian elites that were ready to protect them if necessary.

160. The Panel confirmed that the absence of a proper system of mineral traceability in Cameroon encouraged the laundering of illicit gold and diamonds sourced in the Central African Republic. Most of the gold and diamond buyers in the main cities in eastern Cameroon were not registered. The buyers who had licences rarely considered the origin of minerals as a criterion on which to base their decision to purchase or not. Five buyers based in Garoua Boulai, Bertoua and Kenzou told the Panel that they were more interested in making good deals than looking into the origin of gold.

161. In Bertoua, Batouri, Kenzou and Garoua Boulai (the main cities in eastern Cameroon, where the laundering of illicit minerals from the Central African Republic was taking place), the Panel observed that smelters and collectors generally operated from their private residences. Field officers from the Ministry of Mines, Industry and Technological Development of Cameroon in charge of monitoring the traceability of the traded goods told the Panel that this impeded their work.

162. Testimonies collected by the Panel confirmed that a government entity also most likely bought illicit gold smuggled from the Central African Republic. Two agents from the Centre d’appui et de promotion des activités minières, an official entity whose role is, among others, to buy gold for the Government of Cameroon, told the Panel that they did not investigate the origin of the gold that they bought.

163. The low level of official gold and diamond exports from Cameroon\textsuperscript{24} showed that the Government of Cameroon did not benefit from the taxation of illicit minerals originating from the Central African Republic.

164. In response to reports regarding the involvement of Cameroonian in the smuggling of diamonds and gold from the Central African Republic, mining authorities in Cameroon underlined the challenges that they were facing as a result of the porous border with the Central African Republic. They also repeatedly told the Panel that resources from Cameroon, especially diamonds, were also exported via the Central African Republic.

\textsuperscript{24} The Panel did not receive any response to its requests from the Cameroonian authorities but obtained estimates from a variety sources, including non-governmental organization representatives and mining officials, of 2,000 carats of diamonds and 500 kilograms of gold in 2020.
165. The Panel confirmed that, once in Cameroon, some goods were used for local consumption, but most was exported. The Panel obtained leads suggesting that international criminal networks exported natural resources from Cameroon. The Panel intends to follow those leads in cooperation with the Government of Cameroon and believes that individuals and entities part of those criminal networks, as well as transit and final markets, should be further investigated.

C. **Diamonds**

166. Annex 6.2 contains an update on diamonds.

VIII. **Recommendations**

167. The Panel makes the following recommendations:

**To the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic**

(a) Consider designating those individuals, and in particular armed group leaders, who have been involved in activities meeting the sanctions criteria defined in paragraphs 20 to 22 of resolution 2399 (2018) and extended under resolution 2536 (2020);

(b) Issue a press release calling upon: (i) armed group leaders to strictly adhere to international humanitarian law; (ii) the authorities of the Central African Republic to bring to justice those responsible for international humanitarian law violations; and (iii) the authorities of the Central African Republic and international partners to investigate and prosecute their personnel who commit international humanitarian law violations (see sects. II.C and III.D);

**To the Government of the Central African Republic**

(c) Respect its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which guarantee that, in time of State emergency, measures taken shall not be inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and shall not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin (see paras. 104, 105 and 131);

(d) Ensure accountability for crimes committed by Dmitri Ayoloma, Ali Darassa and Mahamat Salleh, including attacks against peacekeepers, as well as access to justice and protection for all victims (see paras. 37–42 and 113–117);

(e) Take appropriate measures to cease parallel recruitment to the security sector and conduct the integration of former armed group members in the security sector in accordance with the provisions of the peace agreement (see sect. IV);

(f) Reinforce its efforts to address border security and control arms trafficking to armed groups through the formal security sector and engagement with local communities, and cease the informal recruitment of militias or armed groups in this regard (see para. 112);

(g) Conduct an audit of mining companies and impose penalties, as appropriate, for the fraudulent underreporting of gold production and export (see para. 153);
(h) Ensure the physical protection, control, management, traceability and accountability of weapons, ammunition and military materiel transferred to State control (see sect. III.A);

To the Government of the Central African Republic and neighbouring States

(i) Strengthen dialogue among themselves and their efforts for enhanced border control through the (re)activation of joint commissions (see sect. VI.B);

To the Government of the Central African Republic and the guarantors of the peace agreement

(j) Clarify and implement punitive measures and sanctions in cases of violations of the peace agreement, as provided in its article 35 (see para. 128);

To the Governments of the Central African Republic and Cameroon

(k) Enhance cooperation to investigate and prosecute, as appropriate, individuals and entities involved in cross-border trafficking in natural resources illegally sourced in the Central African Republic (see sect. VII.B);

To Cameroon

(l) Report to the Committee on specific measures taken to stop natural resources illegally exported from the Central African Republic from being trafficked or sold in Cameroon (see sect. VII.B);

To all Member States

(m) Ensure compliance with the arms embargo through the timely submission of notifications or exemption requests, and, where required, ensure that notifications meet the requirement to provide detailed explanations for how the assistance provided will support the security sector reform (see sect. III).
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Annex 2.1: Details on the meetings held by François Bozizé in Ouham and Nana Gribizi Prefectures preceding the creation of the CPC / Details sur les réunions tenues par François Bozizé dans les Prefectures de l’Ouham et de Nana-Gribizi en amont de la création de la CPC.

Local armed group sources confirmed to the Panel that Bozizé’s first meeting in Kaga-Bandoro was with MPC leader Mahamat Al-Khatim. François Bozizé also met with FPRC members, including Ahmat Bahar (see S/2017/1023, paras. 194-197), and UPC representatives. From Kaga-Bandoro François Bozizé travelled to Kabo (Ouham Prefecture). There, according to eyewitnesses, his first meeting on 3 December 2020 was with FPRC and MPC local “generals” with Bozizé himself surrounded by anti-balaka fighters and around ten FACA soldiers. On 5 December, Bozizé travelled south towards Batangafo (Ouham Prefecture), his last stop before Kamba-Kotta.
Annex 2.2: Details on personal connections within the armed groups that helped Bozizé to create the CPC/ Details sur les relations personnelles entre des membres de groupes armés et François Bozizé et qui ont facilité la formation de la CPC.

Al-Khatim was among the so-called “liberators”, fighters who had supported Bozizé’s coup d’état in 2003 (see S/2014/452, para. 14), while “general” Ibrahim (part of the 3R delegation in Kamba-Kotta) was a former bodyguard of François Bozizé. Nourredine Adam had also sealed an alliance with Bozizé back in 2015 during talks in Nairobi (see S/2015/936, paras. 24-26).
Annex 2.3: Communiqué signed on 18 February 2021 confirming the appointment of François Bozizé as general coordinator of the CPC / Communiqué signé le 18 février 2021 confirmant la nomination de François Bozizé comme coordonnateur général de la CPC.

Document received by the Panel from an armed group representative on 10 March 2021.
Annex 2.4: Jean-Eudes Teya, drafter of CPC’s communiqués / Jean-Eudes Teya, rédacteur des communiqués de la CPC.

CPC members told the Panel that KNK member Jean-Eudes Teya was supporting François Bozizé in his role as political leader of the coalition. Several of them mentioned that Teya was drafting CPC communiqués, which is confirmed by the properties of the electronic versions of CPC communiqués (see screenshot below).

The Panel contacted Jean-Eudes Teya who indicated that he was not available for a meeting.
Annex 2.5: Communiqué signed on 8 January 2021 by armed group leaders, including Abdoulaye Hissène, opposing the creation of the CPC / Communiqué signé le 8 janvier 2021 par des chefs des groupes armés, dont Abdoulaye Hissène, s'opposant à la création du CPC.

Document obtained by the Panel from an armed group representative on 8 January 2021.
Délégation des Groupes Armés signataires de l’Arc en République Centrafricaine (APPR-RCA) suite à l’atrocité perpétrée par la coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC) contre le peuple centrafricain.

Depuis plusieurs décennies et en dépit de l’organisation de plus de 08 fora, la République Centrafricaine reste confrontée à un problème récurrent.

La mise en œuvre de l’APPR-RCA signé le 06 février 2019 entre le Gouvernement et 14 groupes armés dont les avancées sont visibles dans tous les secteurs a donné l’opportunité d’un retour définitif à la paix, à la stabilité et à la cohésion sociale.

Mais hélas ! A l’approche des élections générales du 27 décembre 2020, et plus précisément le 13 décembre 2020, une alliance contre-nature dénommée CPC entre certains personnages politiques associés de pouvoir et quatre (04) groupes armés signataires de l’APPR-RCA a déclenché les hostilités sur l’ensemble du territoire national dans le but d’emprisonner le peuple centrafricain d’exercer librement son droit de vote et d’être élu en espérant créer ainsi une instabilité institutionnelle.

Les groupes armés signataires de l’APPR-RCA non engagés dans cette entreprise criminalisée dénoncent la violation flagrante de l’accord par l’UPC, le MPC, les 3R, les Anti-balaka et relèvent leur attachement à l’APPR-RCA qui demeure un cadre de référence pour le règlement de notre pays et le règlement de tout différend. Les signataires de la présente déclaration demandent avec insistance:

1. Aux groupes armés concernés: d’arrêter toute violence contre la population et les humanitaires, de déposer immédiatement les armes et de suivre les procédures fixées par les dispositions de l’article 34 de l’APPR-RCA relatives au règlement de tout différend, de ne pas tomber dans le piège de ceux-là qui les traitaient hier des criminels hors la loi.

2. Au Gouvernement: de prendre toutes ses responsabilités face à l’implication de pseudo-démocrates de l’opposition politique dans cette entreprise criminalisée et face à l’introduction massive de mercenaires dans notre pays afin que le CPC ne puisse perpétuer l’exploitation illégale des ressources, le trafic d’armes, le pillage et la désestabilisation de notre pays par le biais illégaux et immoraux.

3. Aux Garants et Facilitateurs: de faire appliquer les dispositions de l’article 35 de l’APPR-RCA relatives aux sanctions, de faciliter le dialogue entre le Gouvernement et les belligérants afin que le processus électoral en cours puisse connaître un aboutissement heureux tel que souhaité et exprimé par le peuple centrafricain.

Les centrafricains ne sont pas condamnés à reproduire les erreurs du passé. Le peuple souffert et rien aujourd’hui ne peut justifier le recours aux armes pour prendre le pouvoir et revendiquer ses droits. La République Centrafricaine n’est ni à vendre, ni à partager.

Fait à Bangui, le 08 janvier 2021.

[Signatures]

Ont signé : [Liste des signatures]
Annex 2.6: Overview of CPC-affiliated armed groups in terms of arms, ammunition and ability to re-supply / Informations sur l'armement, les munitions et la capacité à se réapprovisionner des groupes armés membres de la CPC.

CPC-affiliated armed groups significantly depleted their weapons and ammunition stocks during fighting and lost a lot of fighters. Crucially, some were also driven out of their bases of operation and had their access to certain trafficking routes cut. A senior armed group source observed to the Panel that most armed groups were reliant on weapons and particularly ammunition stocks built up through slow but steady flows acquired over months and years and that their ability to re-supply in order to meet the demands of intense and consistent combat was insufficient. This annex provides an overview of what each CPC component used in fighting on behalf of the CPC in terms of logistics and their current level of armament and capacity to re-supply.

Anti-balaka groups brought significant numbers into the CPC in early stages, but sources observed that they were limited in terms of equipment, mostly armed with artisanal weapons, limited assault rifles and grenades. Most arrived and deployed on foot.

MPC were moderately well-armed with assault rifles, grenade launchers, RPGs, etc. Sources confirmed that the armed group relied upon significant reserves, having engaged in little active fighting since 2014. Key trafficking routes for MPC included axes around and small bush routes close to Moyenne-Sido (Ouham Prefecture), which had been used for occasional large and sophisticated deliveries of arms and associated ammunition, using a transhumance route running from Moyenne-Sido to Dekoa (Kémo Prefecture) to conceal the movement of materials from the border deeper into the country. Markounda (Ouham Prefecture) is also a key trafficking point for smaller but consistent transfers of small arms and light weapons.

According to local sources in north-western CAR, 3R brought significant weaponry and well-organized personnel to the CPC. Locals met by the Panel in towns and villages across the northeast, including Bocaranga, Ngaoundaye, Boguila, Nana Bakassa and Bossangoa, observed an increased number and type of armament of 3R elements from mid-December 2020 onwards. Nonetheless, 3R sources admitted to the Panel that they had suffered significant losses of weapons and personnel and had begun efforts to re-organize and re-supply following the disputed confirmation of “general” Bobbo as the new 3R President on 1 April 2021 (see Document 1 below). Crucially, 3R fighters had not lost control of their bases, including their headquarters in Koui/DeGaulle, and bases in Kollo, Kowone, Letele, Nzoro, Ngaoundaye, Borodoul, and Nzamare (Ouham Pendé Prefecture). Sources revealed that in April 2021, 3R used both main roads and small paths and transhumance routes at Zoulde, Ngouboye, Bolele, Bolere, Bezere and Borodoul (Ouham Pendé Prefecture) to re-arm using contacts—including individuals described to the Panel as Chadian military personnel—in key border towns in Chad including Ngoye, which is just 7 km from Bang, Ngoni, and Kogui (see S/2019/608, paras. 81-83). For example, sources confirmed that a significant delivery of arms, ammunition and four 12.7mm calibre machine guns were delivered to a location 6-7 km from Ngaoundaye in the forest between 17-19 April 2021. An individual, described as a Chadian army general, was identified as central in the coordination of deliveries. In mid-April, locals also noted increased 4x4 vehicle and
motorbike movement among 3R bases in the area, which sources confirmed was the re-organisation and re-positioning of 3R assets in preparation for a potential attack by FACA soldiers and Russian instructors.

UPC also contributed significant weapons and forces to the CPC and suffered significant losses. When FACA and Russian instructors conducted operations, UPC leader Ali Darassa lost strategic bases in Bambari, Ippy and his headquarters in Bokolobo (Ouaka Prefecture). As documented by the Panel, UPC has diversified trafficking routes in recent years, which had ensured a steady flow of arms and ammunition via routes from DRC via Satema/Mobaye, from South Sudan via Bambouti (Haut-Mbomou Prefecture), from the Sudan via deals with other armed groups to ensure deliveries through Vakaga Prefecture and recently through Sam Ouandja (Haute-Kotto Prefecture) (see S/2021/87, paras. 33-34), and via smaller but steady weapons deliveries with transhumance corridors. Based in the bush since late February 2021 and moving regularly as FACA and Russian instructors’ operations advanced, UPC elements found themselves faced with a logistics problem, as interlocutors using DRC and transhumance routes no longer had a clear location for delivery.

Sources reported that in December 2020, Darassa sent a senior UPC element to Nyala, the Sudan, to arrange a series of arms and ammunition deliveries using the Sam-Ouandja-Bria road. The first two deliveries arrived in Sam Ouandja on 18 December 2020 and 4 February 2021 and were delivered onwards to Bria. However, sources informed the Panel that, in advance of a third delivery on 15 February, Michel Djotodia called Ali Ousta and ordered FPRC-Goula to cease cooperation with CPC groups, including UPC. When the third delivery arrived in Sam-Ouandja, two Sudanese elements were “arrested” by FPRC “general” Alanta (see S/2021/87, paras 26-34). These individuals were later transferred to Bria, where the CAR authorities have opened an investigation into their activities. Sources confirmed that UPC and CPC’s access to arms and ammunition flows from the Sudan has remained cut in the months since.

As discussed above (see para. 21 of the body of the text), the FPRC military faction did not fully integrate into the CPC and thus contributed limited fighters and existent arms stocks to the coalition. They did, however, provide access to crucial FPRC arms trafficking networks (see S/2019/930, paras. 72-78, S/2018/1119, paras. 68-72, S/2017/639, para. 70 and annex 5.9), making sanctioned-individual Haroun Gaye a key interlocutor for Francis Bozizé as he sought to oversee top-level logistics for the CPC. According to armed group and local sources, Haroun Gaye made numerous trips to Nyala, the Sudan, the most recent of which was in mid-April 2021. According to Panel sources, he regularly interfaced with documented FPRC logistician and arms trafficker, Bashar Fadoul (see S/2019/930, paras. 72-78), who in turn was tasked by Nourredine Adam. Splits within the FPRC (see S/2019/930 paras. 46-69) and inability to rely on collaboration with other armed groups in ensuring flows of arms had, nonetheless made assuring large-scale deliveries more difficult. Compounding this, Panel sources in the Sudan and north-eastern CAR noted that intercommunity tensions in the Nyala area had also made it more difficult to find interlocutors for purchases.

While government officials, including the Minister for Public Security (see para. 139 of the body of the report), touted the large-scale involvement of foreign mercenaries in the CPC,
the Panel could find no evidence of significant recruitment or flows of new foreign elements to join the ranks of the CPC, beyond those foreign elements already counted among the ranks of armed groups in the CAR. While sources indicated that François and Francis Bozizé had anticipated the arrival of logistics and fighters from neighbour States, the Panel notes that deliveries of arms, ammunition and military materiel proved limited (see paras. 30-32 of the body of the text) and the arrival of reinforcements did not materialize.

The Panel discussed arms trafficking from the Sudan with Sudanese authorities who underlined their efforts to strengthen border control (see para. 143 of the body of the text). Due to the postponement of its mission to Chad (see para. 3 of the body of the text), the Panel could not discuss trafficking issues with the authorities of Chad. The Panel intends to share the names of Chadian individuals involved in trafficking with the authorities of Chad.
Document 1: Communiqué appointing “general Bobbo” as President of 3R, published on 2 April 2021/ Communiqué publié le 2 avril 2021 nommant le “general” Bobbo président des 3R.

Document received by the Panel on 3 April from an armed group representative.
Annex 2.7: Deterioration of the humanitarian situation / Détérioration de la situation humanitaire.

Communities have been displaced across much of the country. Although some of those populations displaced internally started to return in late April 2021, according to UNHCR, overall displacement (including both refugees and IDPs) rose from 1.25 million in October 2020 to almost 1.39 million in March 2021—far higher than previous crises.\(^1\) This large-scale displacement has increased risk for different sectors of the population: male youth have been vulnerable to summary executions with accusations of complicity with armed groups, women were at increased risk from sexual violence by armed group elements pushed out of towns (see para. 42 of the body of the text), and the Panel documented incidents of all six grave violations against children during this period: killing and maiming of children; recruitment or use of children as soldiers by armed forces or armed groups; attacks against schools or hospitals; sexual violence against children; abduction of children; and denial of humanitarian access for children.

This displacement resulting from insecurity has had an impact on food security which is likely to continue into the coming months, which corresponds to the ‘lean’ season during which food shortages are already commonplace in CAR. According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)\(^2\), the number of those in Phase 3 and Phase 4 (crisis and emergency) situations for food security for the period May to August 2021 has increased, with 48 per cent of the population in crisis and emergency situations for food security (an increase of 7 per cent).\(^3\)

\(^1\) [https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/car/location/399](https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/car/location/399)
\(^2\) This scale is a standardized scale which integrates data on food security, nutrition and livelihoods into a scale allowing decision makers to understand the severity of a crisis.

The table below was compiled by the Panel based on information from various sources as well as the Panel’s own investigations. It provides a snapshot of the impact that the most recent fighting has had on children. The table highlights attacks, looting and destruction of material in schools and educational establishments, as well as their occupation by armed groups, FACA and Russian instructors between 21 December 2020 and 7 May 2021.

Sources: Confidential sources and Panel’s own investigations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Identification of armed actor</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of primary school in Bougouyo</td>
<td>Since 2016 – until arrival of FACA/Russian instructors on 21 February 2021</td>
<td>Ippy, Ouaka</td>
<td>CPC (UPC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation of primary school in Baléssio</td>
<td>Since 2016 – until arrival of FACA/Russian instructors in March 2021</td>
<td>Baléssio, 45 km from Bambari, Ouaka</td>
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<td>Occupation of primary school</td>
<td>Long-term occupation - until arrival of FACA/Russian instructors in March 2021</td>
<td>Ngakobo, Ouaka</td>
<td>CPC (UPC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation of prefectural school in Grimari</td>
<td>Since 21 December 2021 – still occupied</td>
<td>Grimari, Ouaka</td>
<td>FACA soldiers and Russian instructors</td>
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<td>Attack and looting and destruction of materials at primary school “Manger” in Carnot (serving as a voting centre)</td>
<td>27 December 2020</td>
<td>Carnot, Mambéré-Kadéï</td>
<td>CPC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incursion by armed elements and destruction of property at the Temporary School of Learning and Child Protection (ETAPE) (serving as voting centre)</td>
<td>27 December 2020</td>
<td>Bria, Haute-Kotto</td>
<td>CPC (anti-balaka)</td>
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<td>Incursion by armed elements and destruction of school materials “College de Bamingui” in Nyango Ecofaune (serving as a voting centre)</td>
<td>27 December 2020</td>
<td>Bamingui, Bamingui-Bangoran</td>
<td>“Arab elements” – group unknown</td>
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<td>Attack and destruction of property at four schools: Ndongue Yoyo School; La Bolle School; Vakap School; and Pabouia School (serving as voting centre).</td>
<td>27 December 2020</td>
<td>Bouar, Nana-Mambéré</td>
<td>CPC (anti-balaka)</td>
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<td>Attack and looting of four schools: Mamadou school; Plateau Dimangoua school, Langandi school and Polonda school (serving as voting centres)</td>
<td>27 December 2020</td>
<td>Mobaye, Base-Kotto</td>
<td>CPC (UPC and anti-balaka)</td>
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<td>Attack against three elementary public schools: Godawa Public School; Beina 1 Public School; and Kiamo 2 Public School (serving as voting centres)</td>
<td>27 December 2020</td>
<td>Berberati, Gamboula Sub-prefecture Mambéré-Kadéi</td>
<td>CPC</td>
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<td>Primary school (Ecole Sous-préfectorale) attacked and looted by armed elements (serving as voting centre)</td>
<td>27 December 2020</td>
<td>Carnot, Mambéré-Kadéi</td>
<td>CPC (3R)</td>
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<td>Occupation of the public school of Babaza 2</td>
<td>From December to January 2021</td>
<td>Sub-prefecture of Berberati, Mambéré-Kadéi</td>
<td>Unidentified armed elements</td>
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<td>Occupation of the school in Boguila</td>
<td>From December to March 2021</td>
<td>Boguila, Ouham-Pende</td>
<td>CPC</td>
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<td>Occupation of Gralindji school</td>
<td>Early-January 2021 to mid-March 2021</td>
<td>Gralindji (45 km from Bambari), Ouaka</td>
<td>CPC (UPC)</td>
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<td>Looting of offices of the Prefecture Academic Inspection.</td>
<td>2 to 3 January 2021</td>
<td>Bambari, Ouaka</td>
<td>CPC (UPC)</td>
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<td>Threats against teachers and school officials (for allowing schools to be used as voting centres)</td>
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<td>Attack, looting and destruction by armed elements on “la liberte” school.</td>
<td>5 January 2021</td>
<td>Bossangoa, Ouham</td>
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<td>Occupation of Ouandolongo school</td>
<td>Since January 2021 to March 2021</td>
<td>Ouandolongo, 70 km from Bakala, Ouaka</td>
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<td>Occupation of Yongo school</td>
<td>Since January 2021 – until arrival of FACA/Russian instructors</td>
<td>Yongo (11 km from Bouar), Nana-Mambéré</td>
<td>CPC</td>
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<td>Occupation of the primary school of Kombélé</td>
<td>10 January to 17 February 2021</td>
<td>Kombélé (10 km Bambari-Ippy road), Ouaka</td>
<td>CPC (UPC)</td>
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<td>Occupation of Niyakari primary school</td>
<td>Since 21 January 2021 (date of departure unknown)</td>
<td>Niyakari, Mbomou</td>
<td>CPC (FPRC/Salleh)</td>
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<td>Occupation of Nangoko school</td>
<td>Since 25 January 2021 (current status unknown)</td>
<td>Nangoko 2 km from Nassole, Mambéré-Kadéi</td>
<td>CPC (3R)</td>
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<td>Closure of schools accompanied by threats against teachers and students.</td>
<td>1 February 2021</td>
<td>Baoro, Nana-Mambéré</td>
<td>CPC (anti-balaka)</td>
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<td>Prevention of students from entering three schools by armed elements:</td>
<td>1 to 3 February 2021</td>
<td>Batangafo, Ouham</td>
<td>CPC</td>
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<td>Bagga School; Ecole Conventionee Catholique; and Lycee Moderne</td>
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<td>Occupation of three schools in Bossembélé: Plateau School and Modida</td>
<td>Between 4 and 27 February 2021 (two schools)</td>
<td>Bossembélé, Ombella M’poko</td>
<td>Russian instructors</td>
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<td>school (4-27 February); Prefectural School (January-February)</td>
<td>During January and February 2021 (one school)</td>
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<td>Occupation of the house of the Director of the school Ecole Plateau</td>
<td>Since 4 February 2021 (current status unknown)</td>
<td>Bossembélé, Ombella M’poko</td>
<td>FACA soldiers</td>
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<td>(same complex as above school)</td>
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<td>Looting of the Bossangoa Prefectural School including solar panels</td>
<td>7 to 8 February 2021</td>
<td>Bossangoa, Ouham</td>
<td>Unidentified armed group elements</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Location</td>
<td>Identification of armed actor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation of two schools: Sub-prefectural School of Baoro; Camp Leclerc School</td>
<td>Since 8 February 2021 (current status unknown)</td>
<td>Baoro, Nana-Mambéré</td>
<td>FACA and Russian instructors</td>
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<td>Occupation of Bocongo school</td>
<td>21 to 26 February 2021</td>
<td>Bocongo (15 km from Bozoum), Ouham-Pendé</td>
<td>CPC (3R)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation of school playground by armed elements</td>
<td>Since 24 February 2021 (current status unknown)</td>
<td>Ngaguene (35 km Niem axis), Nana-Mambéré</td>
<td>CPC (3R)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation of school in Ippy</td>
<td>Since 21 February 2021 (still occupied)</td>
<td>Ippy, Ouaka Prefecture</td>
<td>Russian instructors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation of Primary School in Nana Bakassa (65 km North of Bossangoa)</td>
<td>Since 4 March 2021 - until arrival of FACA/Russian instructors</td>
<td>Nana Bakassa, Ouham</td>
<td>CPC (MPC, UPC, FPRC and anti-balaka)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation of Sub-prefectural school in Nana Bakassa</td>
<td>Occupied as at 26 March 2021</td>
<td>Nana Bakassa, Ouham</td>
<td>Russian instructors</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation of Malloum-Mele school</td>
<td>March 2021 (current status unknown)</td>
<td>Bakala, Ouaka</td>
<td>Russian instructors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation of Ndassima school</td>
<td>Since March 2021 - until arrival of FACA/Russian instructors</td>
<td>Ndassima, 50 km from Bambari, Ouaka</td>
<td>CPC (UPC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation of three schools: Alindao Lycee and Alindao Town Hall and Mandao school</td>
<td>Since 18 March 2021 (Mandao school freed on 5 April)</td>
<td>Alindao, Basse-Kotto</td>
<td>Russian instructors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Identification of armed actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use of rockets to dislodge CPC on administrative section of the Bessan school</td>
<td>23 March 2021</td>
<td>Yongo, 11 km from Bouar, Nana-Mambéré</td>
<td>FACA/Russian instructors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of Koumbe school</td>
<td>Since 5 April 2021</td>
<td>Koumbe, 3 km from Berberati, Mambéré-Kadéï</td>
<td>Russian instructors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Temporary occupation of two schools: Ecole Sous-Préfectorale des Garçons (8-9 April); Ecole Sous-Préfectorale des Filles (8-13 April)</td>
<td>8 to 9 April 2021 and 8 to 13 April 2021</td>
<td>Mbrès, Nana-Grébizi</td>
<td>Russian instructors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of Lycée de la Victoire de Batangafo and destruction of material property</td>
<td>11 April 2021 (current status unknown)</td>
<td>Batangafo, Ouham</td>
<td>Russian instructors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List compiled based on confidential reports and confirmed by the Panel’s investigations.

- On 7 April 2021 a MINUSCA patrol was shot at by CPC (UPC) fighters using machine guns on the Tagbara to Boyo road. No UN peacekeeper casualties were reported.
- On 1 April a MINUSCA patrol was stopped at a FACA checkpoint in Kai, 4 km south of Bouar. FACA soldiers pointed their weapons at the UN vehicles and threatened the patrol. No UN peacekeeper casualties were reported.
- On 30 March a MINUSCA patrol was stopped at a FACA/ISF checkpoint in Bouar, Nana-Mambéré Prefecture by ISF who wanted to search the vehicle. FACA soldiers threatened the MINUSCA patrol pointing their weapons at the UN peacekeepers. No UN peacekeeper casualties were reported.
- On 20 March CPC (FPRC/UPC) fighters shot at a MINUSCA patrol on the Kotto River 5 km east of Bria, Haute-Kotto Prefecture. No UN peacekeeper casualties were reported.
- On 13 March in Bambari, Ouaka Prefecture a MINUSCA convoy was stopped by FACA soldiers at a checkpoint requesting to search the vehicle. FACA soldiers threatened the MINUSCA patrol with a grenade and their weapons. No UN peacekeeper casualties were reported.
- On 25 February in Lere (30 km north of Bossangoa), Ouham Prefecture, a MINUSCA convoy was stopped at a CPC (anti-balaka, FPRC, MPC) checkpoint. The CPC fighters shot at the convoy and then stole two weapons and ammunition. No UN peacekeeper casualties were reported.
- On 19 February close to Bondiba, 130 km southwest of Bossangoa, Ouham Prefecture, CPC fighters ambushed a MINUSCA convoy. No UN peacekeeper casualties were reported.
- On 9 February a MINUSCA patrol was ambushed by armed CPC fighters 24 km from Bangassou, Mbonou Prefecture when repairing a bridge. No UN peacekeeper casualties were reported.
- On 30 January a MINUSCA convoy was fired at by armed CPC fighters (FPRC/Salleh) at Loungoumba close to Mbari Bridge (17 km from Bangassou), Mbonou Prefecture. No UN peacekeeper casualties were reported.
- On 19 January, a MINUSCA patrol was shot at by armed CPC fighters under Mahamat Salleh. There were no UN peacekeeper casualties.
- On 18 January, in Bangassou, Mbonou Prefecture, CPC armed combatants at Mbari Bridge (17 km west of Bangassou) on the Bangassou-Gambo road shot at a MINUSCA patrol killing two UN peacekeepers.
- On 15 January one UN peacekeeper was killed on the outskirts of Grimari, Ouaka Prefecture.
- On 13 January one UN peacekeeper was killed and another was injured during the attack by CPC fighters on the outskirts of Bangui.
- On 29 December 2020, Yole checkpoint (10 km east of Bouar), Nana Mambéré Prefecture, CPC fighters shot at a MINUSCA patrol. No UN peacekeeper casualties were reported.
- On 25 December, CPC fighters attacked a FACA detachment. UN peacekeepers were also engaged and during the incident **three UN peacekeepers died and two were wounded**.
- On 23 December, UPC shot at a MINUSCA patrol in Bambari, Ouaka Prefecture. There were no UN peacekeeper casualties.
- On 23 December, in Bossembélé, Ombella M’Poko Prefecture, a MINUSCA patrol engaged a CPC fighter who drew his weapon on the patrol, additional CPC fighters arrived and continued to shoot at MINUSCA. There were no UN peacekeeper casualties.
Annex 2.10: Cases of sexual violence / Cas de violence sexuelle.

After Mahamat Salleh and the CPC fighters under his command left Bangassou on 17 January 2021, they moved to Niyakari (Mbomou Prefecture). Several cases of sexual violence were reported against Salleh and his elements including a case of forced marriage involving a minor. On 20 February, Salleh and his CPC fighters left Niyakari moving between Nzacko and Yalinga (Haute-Kotto Prefecture). According to accounts received by the Panel from the local community, Salleh and the CPC elements under his command continued to threaten women with many fleeing the area or remaining in the field to avoid becoming victims.

In Mambéré-Kadéï, Ouham-Pendé and Nana-Mambéré Prefectures, cases of sexual violence by 3R fighters increased after they fled or were expelled from the main towns in these prefectures by FACÂ and Russian instructors. In Ouaka Prefecture, the Panel received reports of incidents of sexual violence perpetrated by UPC fighters around Ippy and Bambari towns after UPC fighters were pushed out of those towns in February 2021. During investigations in Bria, local sources confirmed a fall in the number of human rights violations including sexual violence perpetrated by armed group fighters in and around Bria PK3 IDP site, following the departure of local anti-balaka leader Thierry Plenga, alias “general Bokassa” (see S/2019/930 para. 88), to join the CPC coalition in Bambari in late December 2020. However, on his return to Haute-Kotto Prefecture, Bokassa and the elements under his command have installed themselves along the Bria-Ira Banda road where several cases of sexual violence have been reported since his arrival.
Annex 2.11: Losses declared by Thien Pao after CPC attacks / Pertes déclarées par Thien Pao après l’attaque de la CPC.

Document received by the panel from a confidential source in April 2021.

In the context of the CPC uprising in December 2020, a significant number of elements from the national defence and security forces abandoned their posts, deserted or defected to join the ranks of the CPC in locations across the country. Senior FACA sources explained that motivations varied from fear, lack of logistical support and operational control over deployed forces, and crucially historical loyalties and ethnic ties of some elements to CPC leader François Bozizé. Following radio communiqués issued by the FACA Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defence in December 2020 (see S/2021/87, para. 86), on 3 January 2021, the FACA Chief of Staff issued a communiqué calling all FACA to return to their barracks and that any of those absent would be considered deserters (see Document 1 below).

In January and February 2021, the Panel was informed by senior sources within the FACA that approximately 400 names had been struck off the official register of the FACA, a large majority of whom were Gbaya, the ethnic group of Bozizé. However, in the intervening months these numbers have been tempered as an investigation process was undertaken by the FACA human resources department. On 15 April, a senior FACA source confirmed that 127 FACA elements had been removed from the register for defection, including a total of eight officers, the highest ranking of whom was Colonel Francis Bozizé. A separate disciplinary council has been set up to decide upon how to sanction FACA found to have abandoned their posts but subsequently returned to work. At the time of drafting, 39 cases had been sent to the military justice prosecution service, including the case of Colonel Yabanga, the former FACA Sector West Commander in Bouar, who was accused of sharing intelligence with the CPC and orchestrating a fake ambush wherein he planned to defect to the CPC with a large amount of weapons, ammunition and vehicles. Investigations remained ongoing.

Numbers of desertions and defections were overall significantly lower within the ranks of the police and gendarmerie. Human resources and disciplinary processes were still ongoing, but the Director General of the Police informed the Panel that at least three police officers defected and had been struck off the police register, including one police commander and anti-balaka leader Maxime Mokom, who also lost his ministerial position following his defection to join the CPC. The Deputy Director of the Gendarmerie reported that approximately five or six gendarmes defected to join the CPC, including Bozizé’s sons Roderigue and Pappy Bozizé. Investigations and disciplinary processes for police and gendarmerie were ongoing, including for elements where it was unclear if they deserted or defected and whom had expressed a desire to return to work.

Senior FACA and ISF sources confirmed an associated loss of arms, ammunition, vehicles and equipment from government stocks resulting from desertions, defections and attacks by CPC. FACA sources informed the Panel that, nonetheless, no official audit to establish what weapons, ammunition, vehicles and equipment had been launched. The level of loss of materials was again significantly lower for police and gendarmerie, who were able to provide the Panel a basic accounting of equipment lost, which included a small number of motorbikes, office equipment, furniture, solar panels, and cell phones, most of which were taken when police and gendarmerie buildings were pillaged by the CPC in locations including Bouar, Baoro (Nana-Mambéré
Prefecture), Yaloke, Boali, Bossembele (Ombella M’Poko Prefecture), Bossangoa (Ouham prefecture), Bozoum (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture), Boda (Lobaye Prefecture), Bambari (Ouaka prefecture), and Bangassou (Mbomou Prefecture). The ISF did not lose any vehicles, having coordinated with UNPOL to safely store these within local MINUSCA compounds during CPC attacks and occupation.

The Inspector General of the National Army, General Izamo, informed the Panel that, in the wake of the recent security crisis, he and his team were conducting two studies focused on the FACA: one assessing the three defence zones in terms of combat readiness, personnel, logistics, armament, and infrastructure; and a second study on the numbers and underlying cause of abandonment of post, desertions and defections. It is expected that these reports will be presented to the President and the Minister of Defence.
COMMUNIQUE RADIO
(Large diffusion en Français et Sango)

Relatif au retour immédiat de tous les militaires des Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA) dans leurs casernes respectives.

Le Général de Division, Chef d’Etat-Major des Armées demande impérativement à tous les militaires des Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA) dès l’écoute du présent communiqué, de regagner leurs casernes respectives pour être consignés.

Les Chefs de Corps procéderont à un contrôle nominatif de leur personnel et tous les absents seront considérés comme des déserteurs.

Toute personne à l’écoute du présent communiqué et connaissant les intéressés est priée de leur en faire part.

Bangui, le 03 JAN 2021

Le Général de Division,
Chef d’Etat-Major des Armées

Zéphirin MAMADOU

To the UN Secretary-General
António Guterres

Open letter on cases of disinformation in the Central African Republic

Dear Secretary General,

You know that Russian instructors are on an official mission in the CAR, training the national army FACA and providing advisory and humanitarian assistance to the CAR security forces in the fight against armed criminals terrorizing the country. The FACA operation, supported by Russia and Rwanda, recently ended with a complete victory and the defeat of military-political groups. At this stage, the CAR authorities continue to implement a set of measures to maintain order and search for the remaining criminals for their capture and organization of a fair trial.

On behalf of the Officers Union for International Security – the organization representing Russian instructors in the CAR, I would like to draw your attention to the increasing cases of disinformation in some media outlets, clearly aimed at "whitewashing" murderers and robbers from the CPC armed groups, and to undermine public and international confidence in the CAR government, FACA and allies, which include both MINUSCA and Russian instructors.

At the forefront of terrorist propaganda are the online newspapers Corbeau News and Le Tsunami, funded from France and blocked in the CAR for numerous publications of false information. However, these resources are still available outside of the CAR and take advantage of foreign readers’ ignorance of the socio-political situation in the CAR to spread lies about human rights violations by the army and allies, genocide, and even the use of chemical weapons. I would like to note that none of the accusations against FACA and its allies have been reliably confirmed, and the publications of these resources are always based only on the testimony of anonymous witnesses, so they are not trustworthy.

On the contrary, all the press releases of the militants first appear on these Internet resources, and in December 2020-January 2021 it was they who strongly supported the CPC coalition and tried to discredit all the efforts of the international community and the CAR government to hold democratic elections.

Therefore, my particular concern is the fact that information published on resources closely affiliated with the militants is becoming the main source for UN Human Rights Council experts who have recently made very serious accusations against the CAR government, MINUSCA and Russian instructors. There is no doubt that such a superficial approach, unwillingness to verify biased information and, as
a result, incorrect conclusions of independent experts, undermine confidence in international institutions and the Human Rights Council in particular, as well as hinder constructive and trustful interaction between representatives of foreign states and organizations that have united to help the CAR authorities restore security and stability in the country.

I ask you to carefully consider the operational methods of the UN Human Rights Council experts and adjust them accordingly.

It is important that independent observers and experts use only verified information and reliable sources, and work closely directly with the CAR Government, MINUSCA, the Officers Union and other organizations that can provide comprehensive information about the situation in the CAR and their role in the country.

Sincerely,

Director General
Officers Union for International Security

Alexander Ivanov
To the UN Human Rights

Statement by the Officers Union for International Security

On the March 31, 2021, a statement was published by independent UN experts who accused "Russian mercenaries" of violating human rights on the territory of the Central African Republic.

On behalf of the Officers Union for International Security – an organization that represents the interests of Russian instructors in the CAR – I want to inform the experts of the UN Human Rights Council that there are no "Russian mercenaries" in the CAR and this information is not true.

According to the UN Security Council authorization received by the Russian Federation, there are 475 civilian instructors on the territory of the CAR who have received permission to carry out their activities. An additional 300 instructors arrived in the CAR at the end of December 2020 at the request of President Touadera to organize the training of additional units of the CAR army, FACA, during a period of rampant banditry in the country.

Russian instructors are exclusively engaged in the preparation and training of FACA in accordance with article 3 of the Agreement on Military-Technical Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the CAR.

The instructors strictly adhere to the goals and objectives set out in the notification sent to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee and do not take part in military operations in the territory of the CAR.

Based on the abovementioned, we demand that independent experts and other UN representatives remove the word "mercenary" from their vocabulary, which we consider incorrect, unethical and inapplicable to the civilian instructors from the Russian Federation who are in the CAR on an official mission.

The Officers Union is very attentive to all reports of human rights violations in the CAR and calls on the UN Human Rights Council to establish a joint commission and provide this commission with the facts that were the basis for the statement of the independent UN experts, that denigrates the activities of the FACA and their allies.

Sincerely,

Alexander Ivanov
Director General
Officers Union for International Security
To the Guardian chief editor
Katharine Sophie Viner

Statement by the Officers Union for International Security

The information in the article "Russian mercenaries behind human rights abuses in CAR, say UN experts", published on The Guardian website on March 30, 2021, is not true. It casts doubt on the reputation of your news outlet.

All the accusations of human rights violations levelled against Russian instructors, cited in your article with the reference to the statements of the UN Human Rights Council independent experts, are based on false data.

Russian instructors are engaged in the training of FACA based on the Agreement on Military-Technical Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Central African Republic. The instructors strictly adhere to the goals and objectives reflected in the UN Security Council notification and do not take part in military operations on the CAR territory.

According to the Declaration of Principles on the Conduct of Journalists adopted at the Second World Congress of the International Federation of Journalists in 1954: "Respect for the facts and for the right of the public to truth is the first duty of the journalist".

Taking into account the status of your outlet and with the regard to the Declaration of Principles on the Conduct of Journalists, I ask you to be objective and publish a retraction of the unconfirmed facts published in your article.

Sincerely,
Alexander Ivanov
Director General
Officers Union for International Security
Annex 3.3: Photographs of armed Russian instructors on the ground in the Central African Republic / Photographies d'instructeurs russes armés opérant sur le territoire de la République centrafricaine.

Russian instructor armed with a PK general-purpose machine gun manning checkpoint in Boguila town (Ouham Prefecture), late March 2021. Source: confidential.
Russian instructors armed with assault rifles accompany Prime Minister Ngerebada and Minister of Defence Koyara during a visit to Boali and the Bossembélé axis on 10 January 2021. Source: Prime Minister Ngerebada’s social account page. See https://www.facebook.com/search/top?q=Ngerebada%20Firmin, accessed on 10 May 2021.
Russian instructors armed with assault rifles observed boarding detainees on a plane on 27 April 2021, Bria aerodrome. Source: confidential.
Annex 3.4: Testimonies received regarding composition of Russian instructors / Témoignages reçus concernant la composition des instructeurs russes.

The Panel received multiple testimonies from FACA elements, officials and community-level sources in multiple locations across CAR that instructors deployed included individuals who identified themselves as nationals of Libya, Syria, and other countries. In the area of Sibut and Ndjoukou (Kémo Prefecture), Grimari, and Bambari (Ouaka Prefecture), the Panel received information from sources on the ground, including FACA elements, that approximately 60 exclusively Arabic-speaking instructors who predominantly self-identified as Syrian were deployed from December 2020 to early March 2021, on a three-month contract. According to information received by the Panel, the flight paths of several Russian military aircraft which conducted non-scheduled special flights to CAR between December 2020 and April 2021 to deliver instructors and associated equipment for their mission, included stops at airfields in Syria, Libya, the Sudan and South Sudan.
Annex 3.5: Seizure of arms and ammunition by the FACA and Russian instructors in the course of operations against the CPC / Saisie d’armes et de munitions par les FACA et les instructeurs russes au cours des opérations contre la CPC.

FACA soldiers and Russian instructors on the ground in multiple locations in CAR confirmed that they had seized weapons and ammunition from the CPC during military operations and through house-to-house searches conducted following their arrival in towns and villages previously occupied by the CPC. They observed that weapons seized included AK-pattern, FAL, Galil and Chinese-type assault rifles; grenade launchers (often described in CAR as “pang”) typically single shot, shoulder-fired grenade launchers such as the M79 but also six-shot, revolver-type grenade launchers such as the RG-6; anti-personnel grenades; PKM machine guns; and rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPG) of what they described as “Soviet and Chinese” origin. They confirmed that all weapons and ammunition seized was sent to Bangui for analysis and safe storage. Through a letter submitted to the CAR Government on 8 February 2021, and official meetings with senior government and security officials, the Panel sought to gain access to this seized materiel in order to analyse and trace weapons and ammunition illicitly trafficked to the different armed groups within the CPC. The Ministry of Defence, Police and Gendarmerie could not provide clarity on the location of the storage of this materiel, and access could not be provided to the Panel by the time of writing of this report. MINUSCA and the National Commission for the Small Arms and Light Weapons confirmed they were not in possession of these weapons.

On 10 May 2021, the Central Office for the Suppression of Banditry (OCRB), a special unit of the police, detained a French citizen reportedly found in possession of a large quantity of arms, ammunition and military materiel, including a shotgun, pistol, assault rifles, magazines, various types of ammunition, including bean bag rounds, cell phones, walkie-talkies and satellite phones, cash in several currencies, uniforms, medication and field equipment. The Panel intends to send a letter to the CAR authorities to request information on this incident, which took place at the time of completion of drafting of the report. The Panel will continue to investigate this matter.


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Annex 3.7: FACA training and recruitment / Formation et recrutement des FACA.

The CAR Government announced the creation of a new FACA battalion, BIT-7, on 30 January 2021. On 3 February, Presidential Security Advisor Valery Zakharov issued a Tweet indicating that PK5 self-defence groups would form the basis of elements in the BIT-7 battalion (see below). Senior FACA sources denied this, and the Panel was informed that, in fact, the BIT-7 had been formed from recent FACA recruits who completed their initial FETTA training with EUTM in 2020 (see S/2021/87, annex 5.1). As requested by the CAR Government, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) initiated training for one company of 150 FACA elements on 20 March and extended to include training for a further 150 FACA elements by May 2021. The Panel was, however, informed by senior sources that new recruits in BIT-7, who come from Bangui, were not subjected to an appropriate vetting procedure in coordination with MINUSCA in advance of commencing FETTA training in 2020, despite assurances to the contrary. By contrast, the new recruits from outside Bangui did undergo the approved vetting procedure in coordination with MINUSCA. The reasons behind this discrepancy are unclear, and the Panel intends to carry out further investigations on this issue amongst other recruitment and integration concerns.

*Tweet issued from Valery Zakharov’s Twitter account on 3 February 2021.*

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Annex 3.8: End-user certificate signed by the Minister of Defence Marie-Noëlle Koyara on 8 January 2021 for weapons from Military Industry Corporation in the Republic of the Sudan / Certificat d'utilisateur final signé par la Ministre de la défense Marie-Noëlle Koyara le 8 janvier 2021 pour des armes achetées à la Military Industry Corporation basée au Soudan.

Document provided to the Panel by a confidential source in February 2021.
Les Munitions :

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<th>NOMBRE D'UNITES</th>
<th>NOMBRE D'UNITES</th>
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<td>Minutions de calibre 9 mm</td>
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<td>Minutions à courte portée calibre 7,62-39 mm</td>
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<td>10 Pistolet Star, calibre 9 mm</td>
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Le Ministère de la Défense Nationale de la République Centrafricaine confirme que ces produits ci-dessus mentionnés seront exclusivement utilisés pour les objectifs déclarés, et ils ne seront ni réexportés, revendus ou transférés à une tierce partie sans le consentement écrit des autorités compétentes au Soudan.

La Ministre de la Défense Nationale et de la Reconstruction de l'Armée.

Marie-Noëlle KOYARA
Annex 3.9: Photographs of Kazakhstan-registered Jenis Air aircraft arriving at Bangui M’Poko International Airport on 19-21 and 22 December 2020 / Photographies des avions Jenis Air immatriculés au Kazakhstan arrivant à l’aéroport international de Bangui M’Poko les 19-21 et 22 décembre 2020.

*Photograph of arrival of UP-I7652 on 19 December 2020 at approximately 14h18. Source: confidential*

*Photographs of departure of UP-I7652 on 21 December at approximately 12h09. Source: confidential*
(Note: UP-I7652 displayed Kazakhstan flag)
Photograph of UP-I7464 parked on the civilian side of Bangui M'Poko International Airport on 22 December 2020. Source: confidential
Annex 3.10: Official Ilyushin website indicates that airworthiness certificates for the two aircraft UP-I7652 and UP-I7464 had expired / Le site Web officiel d'Ilyushin indique que les certificats de navigabilité des deux avions UP-I7652 et UP-I7464 étaient expirés.

Screenshots from ILYUSHIN design company, the only organization authorized to extend lifetime of ILYUSHIN aircraft. Source: https://www.ilyushin.org/en/airworthiness/, accessed on 10 May 2021.

Airworthiness

II-76T/TD civil aircraft fleet according to 30.04.2021

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<th>Production №</th>
<th>Service is authorized till</th>
<th>Registration numbers of forms</th>
<th>Registration stamp</th>
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<td>IL-76TD</td>
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<td>UP-I7652</td>
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Annex 3.11: Documents pertaining to two Ilyushin aircraft registered in Kazakhstan bearing registration numbers UP-I7652 and UP-I7646, which delivered military personnel and equipment to CAR / Documents relatifs à deux avions Ilyushin immatriculés au Kazakhstan portant les numéros de queue UP-I7652 et UP-I7646, qui auraient livré du personnel et du matériel militaires à la RCA.

Order to suspend for six months Jenis Air’s Operator’s License issued by the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan on 19 June 2020. Source: official Panel communications with the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan.
On January 19, 2021, the AAK received a letter from the UN Security Council Committee for ref. No. S/AC.52/2021/PE/OC.12 that two Kazakhstani cargo aircraft IL-76TD (UP-17652 and UP-17646) of the Airline flew to the Central International Airport from 19 to 22 December 2020 of the African Republic “Bangui M’Poko”. The aircraft belonged to Phoenix 2020 Airline LLP (ICAO Code: FNK), renamed from Jenis Air LLP in accordance with the letter of the UN Security Council Committee.

On the part of AAK, no changes were made to the Air Operator Certificate of Jenis Air Airline LLP.

According to clause 2 of article 60 of the Law “On the use of the airspace of the Republic of Kazakhstan and aviation activities” (hereinafter - the Law), the operation of aircraft without a valid Air Operator Certificate is prohibited.

Thus, the Airline did not comply with the certification requirements and restrictions, concealed information about the flights performed in the presence of the embargo on the transportation of military cargo to Libya, established in paragraph 9 of Resolution 1970 (2011) of the UN Security Council, and a falsified Air Operator Certificate was submitted to the Aviation Authority of the Kingdom of Jordan.

In accordance with paragraph 2 of article 16-3 of the Law, the commitment of illegal actions by an operator is a violation of the first level, which pose an immediate threat to flight safety and aviation security.

In accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 16-3 of the Law, in case of violation of the first level, the authorized organization in the field of civil aviation takes measures to revoke the certificate.

Given the above, guided by paragraph 4 of Art. 60, paragraph 5 of Article 16-3, and paragraphs. 10) clause 2 of Art. 16-9 of the Law, I ORDER:


2. Director of the Flight Operations Department Petyashin I. shall ensure the immediate notification of the operator, the air traffic services and the aviation authorities of the United Arab Emirates, as well as other actions arising from this order.

3. Director of the Department of Interaction with International Organizations Shek Zh. together with Director of the Flight Operations Department Petyashin I. from the date of signing the order to revoke the Air Operator Certificate, shall ensure that ICAO is informed within ten working days.

4. Control over the execution of this order shall be entrusted to the First Deputy of Director General I. Orlady.

5. This order comes into force from the date of its signing.

General Director

P. Griffiths
Excerpts from lease agreements signed between Jenis Air and Space Cargo Inc. UAE, indicating Space Cargo Inc. UAE as owner of UP-I7652 (MSN: 1003405167) and UP-I7646 (MSN: 1023411378), respectively. Source: official Panel communications with the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan and Jenis Air.
АКТ ПРИЕМА-ПЕРЕДАЧИ № 2
к Контракту №: 26/01/20 от 26.01.2020

«26» Января 2020 года

г. Алматы

АРЕНДОДАТЕЛЬ – «SPACE CARGO INC.» в лице Генерального Директора Махер Алсмайл

АРЕНДАТОР – TOO «АВИАКОМПАНИЯ JENIS AIR» в лице Генерального Директора Пынькова А.Д.

Подписали настоящий Акт о нижеследующем:

1. АРЕНДОДАТЕЛЬ в соответствии с КОНТРАКТОМ №: 26/01/20 от 26 Января 2020 года передаёт АРЕНДАТОР принимает принадлежащий АРЕНДОДАТЕЛЮ самолет ИЛ-76ТД, сер.№: ТУ123411378, per.№: УП-7646, с полным комплектом документации и в летной годности.

2. На самолёте установлены:
- 4 двигателя Д-30 КП-2 зав. №: 0305304302020; №: 03053029102015; №: 03053048902039; №: 03053018402023
- ВСУ TA-5A №: 0113640176

3. АРЕНДОДАТЕЛЬ и АРЕНДАТОР не имеют взаимных претензий по техническому состоянию, качеству и количеству.

4. Настоящий Акт составлен на русском языке в двух экземплярах, на одном листе, имеющих одинаковую юридическую силу, по одному экземпляру для каждой из Сторон.

АРЕНДОДАТЕЛЬ:
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SAIF Zone, Sharjah, U.A.E.
info@spacecargoinc.com
Tel.: +91 6 557 03 88
Mobile.: +91 52 961 11 10

АРЕНДАТОР:
TOO «АВИАКОМПАНИЯ JENIS AIR»
Республика Казахстан г. Талас
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Tel.: +7 (726) 54 20 32

Махер Алсмайл
Подпись
Пыньков А.Д.
Подпись
Lease termination agreement signed by Jenis Air and Space Cargo Inc UAE and Space Cargo Inc. UAE for UP-I7652 (MSN: 1003405167). Source: official Panel communications with the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan and Jenis Air.
Акт приема-передачи
к Соглашению № JA-SCI-12-2020/1 от 04.12.2020г. о расторжении Договора аренды воздушного судна
№ 24/11/19 от 24.11.2019г.

«04» Декабря 2020 года
Акаба, Иордания

АРЕНДОДАТЕЛЬ – «SPACE CARGO INC.» в лице Генерального директора Макхера Альсамия
АРЕНДАТОР – TOO «АВИАКОМПАНИЯ «JENIS AIR» в лице Генерального директора
Пьнякова А.Д.

Подписали настоящий Акт о нижеследующем:

1. АРЕНДАТОР в соответствии с Соглашением о расторжении № JA-SCI-12-2020/1 от
04.12.2020г передает, а АРЕНДОДАТЕЛЬ принимает принадлежащий АРЕНДОДАТЕЛЮ
самолёт Ил-76 ТД заводской номер 1013405167 с полным комплектом документации.
2. На самолете установлены двигатели Д-30КП-2 №№:
- 0304402112628;
- 03053048902014;
- 53049002014;
- 03053049002077;
- ВСУ ТА-6А № 14361A183
3. АРЕНДОДАТЕЛЬ и АРЕНДАТОР не имеют взаимных претензий по техническому
состоянию, качеству и количеству.
4. Настоящий Акт составлен на русском языке в двух экземплярах, на одном листе,
имеющих одинаковую юридическую силу, по одному экземпляру для каждой из Сторон.

АРЕНДАТОР:
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Макхер Альсамия
Jenis Air order from July 2020 placing all staff on unpaid leave. Source: official Panel communications with the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan and Jenis Air.
Annex 3.12: Delivery of weapons and ammunition by the Republic of the Congo in non-compliance and possible violation of the arms embargo / Livraison d'armes et de munitions par la République du Congo: un cas de non-respect et de possible violation de l'embargo sur les armes.

On 27 January 2021, an Ilyushin aircraft registered in the Republic of the Congo bearing registration number TN-AFS, operated by the national airline Lina Congo, conducted a flight to Bangui M’Poko International Airport. Confidential sources informed the Panel that metal and wooden crates, consistent with containers for the storage and delivery of weapons and ammunition, were offloaded. The Panel contacted the Republic of the Congo requesting information regarding these flights, but no response had been received by the time of writing of this report.
Annex 3.13: Photographs of vehicles observed operated by Russian instructors, and sometimes FACA, without registration plates and mounted with weapons / Photographies de véhicules utilisés par les instructeurs russes, et parfois par les FACA, sans plaque d’immatriculation et montées avec des armes.

Photograph of 4x4 vehicle mounted with weapons on l’avenue de l’Indépendance near PK0 in Bangui, 10 March 2021. Source confidential.

Photograph of 4x4 vehicle mounted with machine gun at PK0 in Bangui, 18 March 2021. Source: confidential.
Photographs of Toyota Landcruiser mounted with machine gun in Paoua (Ouham Pendé Prefecture), 29 April 2021. Source: confidential.

Photographs of Toyota Landcruiser mounted with machine gun in Paoua (Ouham Pendé Prefecture), 29 April 2021. Source: confidential.

Photograph of black Gazelle helicopter with side doors removed, which reportedly arrived in CAR on 27 January 2021. No tail number visible. Source: confidential.

Photograph of white coloured Gazelle helicopter, tail number TL-WAT mounted with two machine guns, on 2 February 2021. Source: confidential.

Photographs of white coloured helicopter which crashed in Bozoum at 08h30 on 27 February 2021, according to multiple eyewitness accounts. Source: Facebook.
Photograph of blue coloured Gazelle helicopter, on 5 March 2021. No tail number visible. Source: confidential.

Photograph of grey coloured Gazelle helicopter with red pattern on door, on 30 March 2021. No tail number visible. Source: confidential.
Photograph of black coloured Gazelle helicopter with red coloured tail rotor mounted with 12.7mm calibre machine gun, on 13 April 2021. No tail number visible. Source: confidential.

Photograph of Mi-8 helicopter over Bangui taken on 22 April 2021. No tail number visible. Source: confidential.
Annex 3.15: Images of two Antonov An-28 aircraft which were delivered to CAR / Photographies de deux Antonov An-28 délivrés en République centrafricaine.


Annex 3.16: Increased use of suspected landmines and explosive devices pose serious risk to civilians / L'utilisation accrue de mines terrestres et d'engins explosifs présumés pose de graves risques pour les civils.

The table below provides an overview of dates, types of devices suspected, location, casualties and impact on civilians. No immediate post-blast investigation or recovery of devices for full analysis has been possible in any of the recorded incidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of device suspected</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Deaths / Injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2021</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>Suspected landmine</td>
<td>Djatow - Nana-Mambéré Prefecture</td>
<td>1 dead, 1 injured (civilians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Apr</td>
<td>Suspected landmine</td>
<td>Baboua - Nana-Mambéré Prefecture</td>
<td>1 dead, 1 injured (CPC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 April</td>
<td>Explosive ordinance</td>
<td>Bondiba - Nana-Mambéré Prefecture</td>
<td>3 dead (3R/CPC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Apr</td>
<td>Suspected landmine</td>
<td>Yongo - Nana-Mambéré Prefecture</td>
<td>2 injured (civilians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Apr</td>
<td>Suspected landmine</td>
<td>Bondiba - Nana-Mambéré Prefecture</td>
<td>4 dead, incl. 1 pregnant woman &amp; 2 minors (civilians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Mar</td>
<td>Suspected explosive device</td>
<td>Nana-Bakassa - Ouham Prefecture</td>
<td>1 injured (civilian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Feb</td>
<td>Suspected landmine</td>
<td>Bossembélé - Ombella M’Poko Prefecture</td>
<td>Not known Vehicle damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Feb</td>
<td>Suspected explosive device</td>
<td>Bosali - Ombella M’Poko Prefecture</td>
<td>1 injured (civilian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2020</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July</td>
<td>2 unexploded landmines recovered - PRB-M3</td>
<td>Gedze - Nana-Mambéré Prefecture</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 July</td>
<td>Suspected landmine or IED</td>
<td>Gedze - Nana-Mambéré Prefecture</td>
<td>MINUSCA vehicle severely damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>Suspected landmine or IED</td>
<td>Kouï - Ouham Pendé Prefecture</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
injured by small explosive devices often triggered by a trip wire in areas where the CPC, FACA soldiers and Russian instructors had been or were present. According to some local sources in Grimari and Boali, local communities had been warned by FACA soldiers that Russian instructors had placed mines on the Grimari-Kouango road and near a bridge on the edge of Boali town respectively and subsequently removed them. In Grimari in March, the Panel observed a warning sign on the outskirts of town indicating the presence of mines. Other sources observed that there was no actual use of mines by the FACA or Russian instructors, but rather that they had circulated rumours regarding use of mines with the intention of deterring armed groups from using certain roads and bush routes. While the explosive devices which have detonated to date have caused only minor injuries, these incidents and warnings given to communities have created a context of fear, according to Panel investigations, leading some to limit their farming activities in their fields, for example, and in Boali, to prevent children from using the local school.

The Ministry of Defence and Russian instructors informed the Panel that they have not used mines or explosives in their operations, and accused 3R and other armed groups of doing so (see below Tweet from advisor to the President Valery Zakharov). In a conversation with the Panel and a communiqué (see below), the new President of 3R, “general” Bobbo, refuted accusations that 3R has used mines or explosives, including in the incidents in June and July 2020, claiming that “the Russians” have brought mines into CAR to justify their escalation of use of force against armed groups. The Panel intends to continue its investigations into the possible use of mines and explosive devices in CAR.

Photograph of damaged and subsequently looted sand coloured Toyota Landcruiser pick-up truck. Photo taken by a confidential source on 2 February 2021, following incident on 29 January 2021. Basic analysis of the damage to the vehicle and adjacent crater is indicative of an explosive charge that detonated while the vehicle was passing. The damage to the vehicle can be compared to that of a load of 5 to 6 kg, consistent with a PRB M3 or TC6 mine. It is not possible to confirm whether this was a mine or an explosion of an equivalent charge.
Tweet issued from Valery Zakharov’s Twitter account on 3 May 2021 warning that a Belgian mine had been found north of the town of Niem, noting that they are more and more often finding mines laid by the rebels.

Photographs and social network post from “Bangui Matin” of a FACA soldier with a mine reported to have been found and recovered north of Niem. The mine appears to be a Belgian PRB M3 mine but no access nor technical analysis could be performed by the time this report was finalized. Source: Bangui Matin, 4 May 2021.
Photographs of one vehicle, crater and body being removed from the scene of a suspected landmine incident at Djatow near Niem (Nana-Mambéré Prefecture) on 5 May 2021. One civilian was killed and another, a Catholic priest, was injured in the blast. Basic incident reports obtained by the Panel, and analysis of photographs, are indicative of an explosive charge that detonated while the vehicle was passing. The Panel is continuing to investigate this incident. Source for photographs: Facebook.
Communiqué issued by 3R on 6 May 2021 denying any use of mines and accusing the “Russian mercenaries” of laying mines in multiple locations in CAR. Source: 3R; Received by the Panel: 6 May 2021.
Annex 3.17: Photos taken after the attack on the Al-Takwa mosque in Bambari demonstrating the use of force inside and outside the mosque / Photographies prises après l’attaque de la mosquée Al-Takwa montrant l’usage de la force dedans et en dehors de la mosquée.

Source: Photos received by the Panel from a confidential source on 8 March 2021.
Annex 3.18: Reprisals and the perpetuation of the cycle of violence in CAR / Représailles et perpetuation du cycle de la violence en RCA.

The Panel noted that the combination of arbitrary arrests and killings targeting civilians by FACA soldiers and Russian instructors had on some occasions led to reprisal attacks by armed groups against civilians. In Ippy, local sources told the Panel that on 10 March, the day after the public summary execution of the Ardo (a traditional local authority for the Fulani community) by the local FACA commander, UPC fighters conducted retaliatory actions. They killed two local chiefs and three other male civilians on the Ippy-Atongo Bakari road (Ouaka Prefecture). Also, in areas which FACA and Russian instructors took over, such as Bambari, the local community was encouraged to provide information against CPC fighters which resulted in many false accusations by those wanting simply to “settle scores” with others in their community. This practice also led to reprisals by CPC fighters against those accused of providing information to the FACA soldiers and Russian instructors.
Annex 3.19: Photos showing the aftermath of looting by Russian instructors of a humanitarian organization office and adjacent guest house in Bossangoa (Ouham Préfecture) / Photographies prises après le pillage des bureaux et maison d'hôtes d'une organisation humanitaire par des instructeurs russes à Bossangoa (préfecture de l'Ouham).

Source: Photo taken by the Panel of Experts on 26 March 2021. Note. All mattresses, cushions and bedding were taken from the guesthouse. Multiple sources reported that Russian instructors were responsible.
Annex 3.20: Screenshot of a video showing the removal of detainees by Russian instructors before their transfer from Paoua to Bangui on 29 April / Capture d’ecran montrant la prise des détenus par les instructeurs russes avant leur transfert vers Bangui le 29 avril.

On 24 April 2021, 25 individuals reportedly of Chadian origin were arrested by Internal Security Forces (ISF) on motorbikes in Bozoy, 6 km south of Paoua.6 These 25 individuals were held at the Paoua Gendarmerie (15) and the Paoua Police Station (10). On 28 April, Russian instructors demanded that the ISF hand over custody of the detainees. Russian instructors threatened a gendarme with their weapons when the gendarme refused to hand over the suspects. On 29 April, Russian instructors arrived at the ISF building armed and in three vehicles. They removed 15 detainees from the gendarmerie brigade and 10 others from the police station in Paoua.

Source: Panel received the photo on 28 April 2021 from confidential sources.

The Panel received additional photos of detainees being transferred with their hands tied behind their backs, without shoes and with rice bags over their heads, demonstrating cruel and degrading treatment during their transfer from Bria to Bangui by Russian instructors on 27 April 2021. The Panel will follow up on both of the above-mentioned incidents.

6 Confidential reports, 26 April and 3 May 2021.
Photos showing the transfer of seven detainees from Bria to Bangui on 27 April 2021

Pictures received by Panel on 28 April 2021 from confidential sources.
Annex 3.21: Newspaper article from “Medias Plus”, 18 March 2021 on the content of the speech posted to social media by Fidèle Goundjika / Article publié dans le journal « Medias Plus » du 18 mars 2021 à propos de la vidéo publiée sur les réseaux sociaux par Fidèle Goundjika.

Video of Fidèle Goundjika is available on his social network profile: https://www.facebook.com/100006188490224/videos/2972258936323694/ , accessed on 1 May 2021.

Received by the Panel on 3 May 2021 from a confidential source.

Received by the Panel on 4 May 2021 from a confidential source.


SUR RAPPORT DU PROCUREUR GENERAL,

ARRETE,


Article 3 : Elle a pour mission d’interroger toute personne dont l’audition est nécessaire à la manifestation de la vérité (témoins, partie civile, société civile, etc.)


Article 5 : La Commission d’Enquête Spéciale est composée de :

- Un Président ;
- Deux (02) Vice Présidents ;
- Deux (02) Membres des Magistrats du Ministère Public des ressorts de chaque Cour d’Appel ;
- Deux (02) Membres des Droits de l’Homme ;
- Cinq Officiers de Police judiciaire dont trois (03) de la SRI et deux (02) de la Police Centrafricaine, et ;
- Deux (02) opérateurs de saisie.

Article 6 : La Commission d’Enquête Spéciale a une durée de trois (03) mois renouvelables en cas de besoin.

Article 7 : Le fonctionnement de la Commission d’Enquête Spéciale et les charges liés aux investigations sont imputés au Budget de l’État.

Article 8 : Le présent Arrêté qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature sera enregistré et publié partout où besoin sera.-

Fait à Bangui, le 03 MAI 2021

Dr. Arnaud Ouégnin ABAZENE
Ministre de la Justice, des Droits de l’Homme et Garde des Sceaux P/R

Annex 4.1: Photographs of Thierry Lébéné aka “12 Puissances” in operation in the Bossangoa area (Ouham Prefecture) and Kouango (Ouaka Prefecture) in presidential guard uniform / Photos de Thierry Lébéné alias «12 Puissances» en opération dans la région de Bossangoa (préfecture de l'Ouham) et Kouango (préfecture de la Ouaka) en tenue de la garde présidentielle.

Pictures collected by the Panel from Thierry Lébéné’s social network account.

https://www.facebook.com/thierry.lebene.1
Pictures of anti-balaka elements in presidential guard attire with Thierry Lébéné, aka “12 puissances”, wearing the hat.
Christian Madossoa; Anicet Bemara; Eric Baffio; Bruno Mandeo; Romaric Sani (at the center). Those five individuals are reportedly anti-balaka elements associated with Thierry Lébéné, aka “12 Puissances”.

The Panel spoke with a number of sources in Bangui including victims who described exactions committed by the “presidential guard” and/or “requins” (sharks). The Panel noted that victims often used these two names interchangeably when discussing incidents. The testimonies received by the Panel bore witness to a pattern of activities including extrajudicial arrests and detention, forced disappearances, sexual violence and summary executions by the presidential guard. For example, on 13 January 2021 two women were taken in PK12 by individuals whom the victims referred to as “requins” and who were wearing presidential guard uniforms and were based at PK12. These two victims were accused of providing support to the CPC coalition and then raped. The Panel noted that, like many other victims, these two women also had their personal effects confiscated by the perpetrators. As outlined in the body of the report (see para. 104), many of the incidents linked to the presidential guard and “requins” took place during the hours of curfew. For example, during the curfew on 12 February in PK13 district on the outskirts of Bangui, the presidential guard based at PK12 shot a man in his house after being called to the location by the local self-defence group who had accused the man’s son of being a member of the CPC coalition.

In a number of incidents which the Panel investigated, individuals appeared to use reporting someone to the presidential guard and “requins” to take revenge against those with whom they had a personal dispute. For example, on 16 January 2021 during an argument over a personal matter, a male victim was taken and beaten by the “requins” after another man (who had stolen his phone) called the “requins” and accused him of being complicit with Bozizé. In a number of the incidents reported to the Panel, the victims disappeared, and no bodies were found. For example, according to local sources, on 20 January a trader from PK5 was taken by the presidential guard, identified by their uniforms, and the vehicle they used. Since that day, his family have had no news from him despite their attempts to contact the authorities and locate him in official state detention centres and the prison in Bangui. According to local sources, a number of victims were picked up by the presidential guard or “requins” in their vehicles in Bangui and then killed or their bodies disposed of at the Ndress cemetery, in the 7th District of Bangui. Confidential sources testified to the appearance of a significant number of unidentified corpses in the Ndress cemetery in January 2021.
Annex 4.3: Pictures of members of the PK5 “self-defence” group in operation wearing military or ISF uniforms, carrying weapons and in some cases with known anti-balaka fighters with links to the “requins” or with Russian instructors / Photographies de membres des groupes « d’auto-défense » du PK5 en opération portant des tenues militaires ou des tenues de FSI, des armes et, dans certaines cas, avec des combattants anti-balaka liés aux « requins » ou des instructeurs russes.

Pictures collected by the Panel from armed group representatives from January to April 2021.

Pictured (left to right): “Fally” anti-balaka from Bangui who served under Thierry Lébéné, aka “12 Puissances”, Yusuf member of PK5 self-defence group, Habib member of PK5 self-defence group, Djibril member of PK5 self-defence group.
Note: Testimonies revealed that they were assigned a Gendarmerie vehicle donated to the ISF by the US through UNDP.
Pictured: Commandant of the Gendarmerie in Boali (see vehicle behind confirming location) with member of PK5 self-defence group called Ibrahim.

Pictured (left to right): anti-balaka element associate of Thierry Lébéné, aka “12 Puissances”, FACA soldier nicknamed “Bombe”, Mahamat Rahama aka “LT” head of the PK5 self-defence group, Diiye member of PK5 self-defence groups (now deceased); The photo was taken in Bossembélé the day before the group moved to Bossangoa at the end of February / start of March 2021.
Pictured: Mahamat Rahama, aka “LT”, wearing full (dark blue) gendarmerie uniform with military elements described by recruits from the PK5 “self defense groups” as Syrian nationals working as part of the teams of Russian instructors.

Pictured: Mahamat Rahama, aka “LT”, with military element described by recruits from the PK5 “self-defence groups” as a Syrian national working as part of the teams of Russian instructors.
Annex 4.4: Militia in Vakaga created by Bangui-based politicians / Milice créée dans la Vakaga par des hommes politiques basés à Bangui.

In the aftermath of the CPC’s failed attempt to take Bangui in January 2021, a number of politicians originally from Vakaga Prefecture organized, funded and deployed a militia composed of armed local youth to block arms trafficking corridors used by CPC crossing into the CAR territory at the border town of Tissi (see para. 31 in the body of the report). A further objective was to protect the local population from attacks by Sudanese Misseriya, similar to the one that took place in Boromata in December 2020 (see S/2021/87, paras 37-41). The initiative which, according to sources close to those involved, aimed to demonstrate loyalty and find favour with President Touadéra, was spearheaded by Arnaud Djoubaye Abazene, Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, a close associate of former Séléka leader Michel Djotodia, himself well-connected with Vakaga-based armed groups (RPRC, FPRC and MLCJ).

On 7 February, a small private plane rented by the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation (see document 1 below) departed Bangui for Birao with “colonel” Soumail, the MLCJ zone commander of Birao, onboard. According to confidential sources, including MLCJ and RPRC representatives, prior to the flight, Soumail was reportedly given eight million CFA francs ($14,632). As confirmed by sources in Birao, Ali Abderamane, the MLCJ Chief of Staff, was present on the Birao airstrip to collect the money upon Soumail’s arrival. The same day, RPRC “general” Mahamat Djouma deployed one of his trucks to transport youth and armed elements to Tiringoulou (Vakaga Prefecture). Panel sources revealed that FACA elements in Ndélé also received a sum of money (reportedly 10 million CFA francs ($18,000)) in February as part of a similar recruitment initiative in Bamingui-Bangoran Prefecture. Local youth were then recruited for deployment to secure known arms-trafficking routes in the area. In total, 112 elements were recruited and deployed in the Vakaga Prefecture.

During its investigations, the Panel met with many of those recruits deployed in the Vakaga Prefecture, more precisely in Tiringoulou, Gordil, Boromata and Ila Idriss. They explained that they had been promised 35,000-40,000 CFA francs ($64-73) per month, and that although the weapons used were theirs, they received ammunition from FACA elements based in Ndélé and Birao. All the recruits with whom the Panel spoke confirmed that their engagement was based on promised future integration into the ISF or the FACA through the DDRR process. In one location, the recruits explained to the Panel that they had been told by their hierarchy that they formed part of the USMS program (seeS/2021/87, para. 81). The Panel confirmed that no USMS programme had been launched in Vakaga Prefecture at the time of the drafting of this report. Sources revealed to the Panel that by mid-April 2021, some elements had also left the initiative due to delays in payment and lack of clarity around their status.

Representatives of RPRC, MLCJ and FPRC armed groups based in Birao and Bangui explained to the Panel that they were aware of this initiative. They described the initiative as being the result of political rivalry between Bangui-based politicians who hoped to increase their political standing with President Touadéra. In their view, the upcoming

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7 Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC) ; Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice (MLCJ).
formation of the new government had motivated those politicians - originally affiliated with armed groups - to portray themselves as being in control of the Vakaga Prefecture and therefore essential for the Central African State. Minister Abazene denied his involvement in the creation of this militia group and described it to the Panel as a spontaneous initiative of the Vakaga youth. The Panel noted that, according to sources, the involvement of FACA in providing payment and ammunition to youth militia elements in Vakaga Prefecture stemmed from decisions which bypassed FACA leadership, who were not aware of the actions of elements on the ground.
Document 1: Receipt for the rental of the plane addressed to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, which was used to transport Soumail to Birao / Facture de la location de l'avion adressé au Ministère des Transports et de l'Aviation Civile qui a servi au transport de Soumail vers Birao

Document received by the Panel from a confidential source on 10 April 2021.
Annex 5.1: Excerpts from the decision of the Constitutional Court of 18 January 2021 on the presidential election / Extraits de la decision de la Cour constitutionnelle du 18 janvier sur les elections presidentielles.

Full text archived at United Nations.

| Number of registered voters: | 1 858 236 |
| Number of voters: | 655 054 |
| Number of blank ballots: | 22 046 |
| Number of invalid ballots: | 19 284 |

Total voters by derogation: 14 308
Valid votes expressed: 599 416
Participation rate: 35.25%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Votes obtained</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faustin Archange Touadera</td>
<td>318 626</td>
<td>53.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anicet Georges Dologuele</td>
<td>130 017</td>
<td>21.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Ziguede</td>
<td>45 206</td>
<td>7.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire Nzanga Bilal Kolingba</td>
<td>22 157</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benderet Crepin Mboli-Goumba</td>
<td>19 271</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvain Eugene Ngakoutou Patasse</td>
<td>8 760</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustin Agou</td>
<td>8 436</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Serge Bokassa</td>
<td>7 870</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahamat Kamoun</td>
<td>7 536</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandre Ferdinand Nguedet</td>
<td>6 688</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdou Karim Meckassoua</td>
<td>5 099</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catherine Samba Panza Nee Souga</td>
<td>5 078</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elois Anquimate</td>
<td>3 710</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serge Ghislain Djorie</td>
<td>3 392</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyriaque Gonda</td>
<td>2 973</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristide Briand Reboas</td>
<td>2 454</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Tiangaye</td>
<td>2 163</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Le candidat Faustin Archange TOUADERA ayant obtenu la majorité absolue des suffrages valablement exprimés est PROCLAME ELU AU PREMIER TOUR PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE.
Annex 5.2: Communiqués by political opposition members expressing concerns over the presidential elections / Communiqués de membres de l’opposition politique exprimant des inquiétudes concernant les élections présidentielles.

Concerns over the Presidential elections were expressed through a number of communiqués and public statements. Below a letter of 2 January 2021 to the President of the Agence nationale des élections signed by nine candidates for the presidential elections (COD-2020 members, but also others such as Crépin Mboli-Goumba, Martin Ziguélé and Désiré Kolingba).
- les dépouillements des bulletins n'ont pas été faits dès la fin des votes et les urnes ont été conservées par la MINUSCA pour être dépouillées le lendemain en l'absence des représentants des candidats, en violation des articles 72, 89 et 81 du code électoral ;
- les représentants des candidats à l'élection présidentielle n'ont pu avoir les feuilles de résultat signées tel que prévu par les dispositions du code électoral (cf. art 84 et 85 du code électoral) ;
- dans certains bureaux de vote, le nombre des votants dépasse celui des inscrits ;
- des brouillages massifs des urnes, des tentatives d'intimidation des électeurs et des achats des votes des électeurs ont été signalés partout.

Fort de ce qui précède et sans préjudice des conséquences que nous pourrions tirer de toutes les irrégularités mentionnées, nous exigeons en application des dispositions de l'article 74 du Code électoral :
- la mise à disposition toutes affaires cessantes du nombre exact des certificats d'inscription et de radiation délivrés par l'ANE et les noms de leurs bénéficiaires ainsi que les bureaux de vote concernés ;
- la présentation à nos représentants des registres des dérogations retenus dans chaque bureau de vote ainsi que les procès-verbaux auxquels sont annexés les certificats d'inscription et de radiation.

Veuillez recevoir, Monieur le Président, l'expression de notre considération distinguée.

Fait à Bangui, le 03 janvier 2021

Ont signé, les Candidats

[Signatures]

[Signatures]

[Signatures]

[Signatures]

[Signatures]
On 5 January 2021, ten candidates – the nine who signed the above communiqué and former President of the Transition, Catherine Samba-Panza – issued a press communiqué requesting the cancellation of the elections.

On 7 January 2021, these ten candidates sent to the Constitutional Court an appeal for annulment of the presidential elections.

Below excerpts from the report (full report archived at the United Nations).
A l'intérieur du pays, et dans les préfectures, la situation sécuritaire est restée instable. Si dans la Wékaka, le Haut Mbomou et dans certaines localités de la préfecture de l’Ouham Pendé (Paoûa), la Kémo (Dékko et Sibut), l’Ouham (Nana Bakasa et Bouca)… le vote s’est déroulé correctement, il faut souligner que :

- Dans l’Ouham, le vote n’a pas eu lieu à Bossangoa, Batangafo, Nana-Bakassa et Markounda ;
- Dans la Nana Gribizi, il n’y a eu vote dans une partie de la Kaga Bandoro. Pas à Mbrès ;
- Dans la Nana Mambiri, il n’y a pas eu de vote à Bouar ;
- Dans la Mambéré Kadeï, le vote s’y est déroulé normalement ;
- Dans l’Ouham Pendé, il n’y a pas eu de vote à Paoûa et Kou. À Bozoum, le vote avait commencé avant d’être interrompu par des groupes armés. Il a repris par la suite avec l’intervention de la Minusca, avant d’être à nouveau interrompu ;
- Dans le Mbomou, si le vote a eu lieu à Bangassou, il n’a pas été tenu à Bakouma,
- Dans la Ouaka, il n’y a pas eu de vote à Bakala et Kousango. À Bambari, le vote qui avait commencé à 13h30 au Lycée moderne a été interrompu par des tirs d’armes à feu
- Dans la Kémo, une partie des bureaux de Sibut avait ouvert tardis que n’y avait pas de vote à Dékko et Galalondo.

En somme, la MOE-RAC note qu’une grande partie des incidents rapportés le jour du vote concerne généralement des zones du territoire national où se retrouvent une majorité de l’électorat.

b) De l’ouverture des bureaux de vote

Sur l’ensemble des bureaux ouverts à Bangui, Bimbo et Bégaoua, l’on a assisté à un retard généralisé dans l’ouverture (80,35% des cas). Ce retard est estimé entre 30 minutes et 1 heure 30 minutes. Il est imputable au retard dans la mise à disposition du matériel de vote (49% des cas) et la mise en place du personnel électoral.

Une affluence des électeurs était perceptible à l’ouverture des bureaux à Bangui, Bimbo et Bégaoua. Elle tient de la présence d’une file devant les bureaux dans 70,52% des cas.

Concernant la présence du personnel électoral et de sécurité, la MOE-RAC a noté que le personnel des bureaux de vote devait être présent à l’ouverture. Dans 60% des cas, les retards à l’ouverture étaient liés à l’absence de ce personnel. Si le dispositif sécuritaire dans la ville était impressionnant, les observateurs n’ont relevé la présence du personnel de sécurité à l’extérieur des bureaux et centres de vote que dans 64% des bureaux ouverts. Les observateurs et représentants de candidats ou de partis étaient autorisés à suivre les opérations (86% de cas).

La MOE-RAC a noté, dès l’ouverture, le non-respect généralisé des mesures qui impliquent la lutte contre la propagation de la COVID-19.

c) De l’administration des opérations de vote

Le vote s’est poursuivi dans une relative affluence pendant la journée du 27 décembre. En effet, passées les files du matin, dans environ 65% des cas il n’y avait pas d’affluence en dehors des bureaux. Les urnes étaient convenablement scellées (97% des cas). La présence des femmes dans les files d’attente pouvait être estimée à environ 44 % des votants.

Pour être admis au vote, les électeurs ont vu leur carte contrôlée par le personnel électoral et leur identité toujours croisée avec la liste du bureau de vote (100%). Dans environ 22% des cas, les électeurs se sont vus refuser l’accès au vote principalement pour défaut de carte d’électeur.

Par ailleurs, la mission du RAC a constaté un grand nombre de votes par dérogation (81,45% des cas). Ce vote s’est fait avec des certificats de radiation délivrés par l’ANE portant la signature de la Présidente sortante, madame Marie-Madeleine NKOUET NIE HOORNAERT en fin de mandat. Les observateurs n’étaient pas en mesure de se prononcer sur la régularité de ces documents.
According to political opposition members and other sources, distribution of voting records to the representatives of the candidates was much lower outside Bangui, particularly where there were no independent observers. As noted by political opposition members in their request for the cancellation of the elections to the Constitutional Court, lack of distribution of voting records undermined the transparency of the results and limited the capacities of candidates to assess the credibility of the elections’ results.

Anicet Dologuéle’s party URCA issued a communiqué with similar content on 20 January 2021.

Available at https://scontent-cdt1-1.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t1.6435-9/140282859_2543339175967005_6311697233512891646_n.jpg?_nc_cat=105&_nc_map=test-rt&ccb=1-3&_nc_sid=8fbe99&_nc_ohc=m7_DH1z2uYaAX_HmIUU&_nc_ht=scontent-cdt1-1.xx&oh=6ae9415c3ba16ceb6848c77e23055bb4&oe=60C0F26A, accessed on 5 May 2021.
Annex 5.5: Further information on legislative elections / Informations complémentaires sur les élections législatives.

The first round of the legislative elections took place on 27 December 2020, in conjunction with presidential elections. The second round (and first round in areas where voting could not be held on 27 December) took place on 14 March 2021. Where necessary, an additional round was planned to take place on 23 May.

On 3 February, several days after having announced that they did not recognize the result of the presidential elections, COD-2020 members announced their withdrawal from the electoral process and indicated that they would not take part in subsequent rounds of the legislative elections. However, several members eventually participated in the 14 March poll, including Anicet Dologuélé (URCA) who was re-elected in the Bocaranga district.

The 14 March 2021 poll took place in a more secure environment than on 27 December 2020. The results triggered less controversy than the presidential elections and showed a victory for Touadéra’s party MCU, though less important than expected. MCU obtained 24 seats of the 92 allocated. A total of 21 independent candidates were also elected with many likely to join MCU’s parliamentary group in the Assembly. Other parties obtained less than 10 seats. 48 seats remained to be allocated.⁸

On 5 May, former Prime Minister and MCU leader Simplice Mathieu Sarandji was elected Speaker of the National Assembly.

Annex 5.6: Reaction of representatives of the Government of the Central African Republic to the meeting between CPC leader François Bozizé and the President of the ECCAS Commission / Réactions de représentants du Gouvernement centrafricain à la réunion entre le leader de la CPC François Bozizé et du Président de la Commission de la CEEAC.

Screenshot from a social media account of the Government of the Central African Republic.


Screenshot of a video of Presidential adviser Fidèle Gouandjika uploaded on his social network account, in which he threatened President Touadéra of being overthrown in case he engaged in a dialogue with François Bozizé.

Annex 5.7: Statement delivered by the President of the ECCAS Commission during a videoconference attended by President Touadéra and UN, AU, EU and ECCAS representatives (2 March 2021) / Intervention du Président de la Commission de la CEEAC lors d’une vidéoconférence à laquelle participaient le Président Touadéra et des représentants de l’ONU, l’UA, l’UE et la CEEAC (2 mars 2021).

The statement was widely shared on social networks and its content was confirmed by several diplomatic sources.

INTervention de Son Excellence Monsieur l’Ambassadeur Gilberto da Piedade Verissimo à la Videoconference entre le Président Faustin Archange Touadéra et les Responsables de l’UA, la CEEAC, l’UE et les Nations Unies le 2 Mars 2021

Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République Centrafricaine
Monsieur le Secrétaire Général Adjoint des Nations Unies aux opérations de paix
Monsieur le Commissaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité de l’Union africaine
Monsieur Haut Représentant de l’Union européenne pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité

Permettez-nous d’abord de saluer l’initiative de cette vidéoconférence avec S.E. M. le Président Faustin Archange Touadéra et d’exprimer ma profonde gratitude à ceux qui l’ont rendue possible.

Le cours des événements et leur orientation la rendaient plus que nécessaires surtout au moment où l’horizon semblait se brouiller devant nos yeux.

Depuis notre dernière vidéoconférence en octobre 2020, quelques événements ont en lieu dans le paysage politique centrafricain, au nombre desquels la tenue des élections couplées du 27 décembre 2020, la dénonciation de l’APPR-RCA par les groupes armés les plus importants suivie de la création de la Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC) et du lancement le 17 décembre 2020 d’attaques à travers le pays.

Si la plupart de ces événements sont regrettables et condamnables en raison de leurs conséquences, nous pouvons toutefois tirer une consolation dans l’événement heureux qu’a constitué la réélection en premier tour de S.E. M. le Président Touadéra.

Je me fais le devoir ici, encore une fois, au nom de la Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale entière, de féliciter S.E.M. le Président Touadéra non seulement pour la tenue des élections présidentielle et législatives dans les délais légaux, mais aussi et surtout pour sa réélection.

Il est évident que nous aurions souhaité que ces élections soient organisées dans un climat meilleur que nous avions pourtant fait esperer le plan de sécurisation au sujet duquel des assurances nous avaient été données à la fois par la MINUSCA et le Gouvernement de la RCA.

Aussi nous regrettons ceci d’autant plus que nous avons assisté à plusieurs dossiers de la journée du 27 décembre un succès historique à demi-tarte, autant nous condamnons les attaques du CPC qui ont empêché le déroulement normal des élections ainsi que le sortirien politique que leur a apporté l’ancien...
Président François Bozizé malgré les assurances qu’il n’avait lui-même données lors de notre rencontre du 11 décembre 2020 à l’évêché de Bossangoa, à la demande du Gouvernement de la RCA, de la MINUSCA et des Ambassadeurs du G5.

Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République
Monsieur le Secrétaire Général Adjoint
Monsieur le Commissaire
Monsieur le Haut Représentant

Nul ici n’ignore la quasi permanence de l’instabilité et de la conflictualité dans la vie politique centrafricaine depuis près de quatre décennies et le caractère réversible des processus de sortie de crise en RCA.

La région, contrairement à ce que l’on peut penser et laisser dire, n’a jamais abandonné la RCA. Comme avec la CEMAC hier, elle est aujourd’hui à ses côtés avec le CEEAC. Des sigles comme FOMUC, MICOPAX I et MICOPAX II et des déclarations comme celles des 27 novembre et 26 décembre 2020 en témoignent suffisamment. Dans son engagement aux côtés de la RCA, la région représentée par l’organisation sous-régionale, n’a toujours eu qu’une seule préoccupation centrale : la recherche d’une paix durable en RCA.

L’histoire note, du moins en ce qui concerne la CEEAC, que pour maximiser les chances et les gains, elle a toujours collaboré avec d’autres organisations régionales et sous-régionales, notamment l’Union africaine (UA) et la Conférence Internationale de la Région des Grands Lacs (CIRGL), dans son engagement en faveur de la RCA. Aujourd’hui encore, elle reste engagée aux côtés de ces organisations dans une dynamique de recherche d’une paix durable et continuera à appuyer incidemment le processus de paix en cours en tant qu’un des garants de l’Accord politique de paix et de réconciliation (APPR) du 6 février 2019, et ce malgré les actes inamicaux et d’hostilité de ces dernières semaines à son encontre dont les instigateurs sont bien identifiés et connus. Sa réponse face à ces actes a pour l’instant été limitée au rappel en consultation de son représentant en RCA.

C’est l’occasion pour moi, en tant que Président de la Commission de la CEEAC, de rappeler que c’est conformément à son mandat et aux déclarations des réunions des Chefs d’État et de Gouvernement de la CEEAC des 27 novembre et 26 décembre 2020 auxquelles la RCA a participé au plus haut niveau que la Commission a initié des consultations en vue de la désignation d’un Médiateur Permanent. Les consultations avec les États membres de la Communauté, y compris la RCA, se déroulent dans la
transparence et font l’objet d’une information régulière de la Présidence en exercice, seule habilitée à rendre publique au moment opportun la nomination de ce Médiateur si sa désignation reste encore une nécessité pour les autorités du pays bénéficiaire.

Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République
Monsieur le Secrétaire Général Adjoint
Monsieur le Commissaire
Monsieur le Haut Représentant

J’aimerais aborder maintenant un sujet qui a fait couler beaucoup d’encre et de salve parce qu’ayant malheureusement fait l’objet d’une savante manipulation. Il s’agit des suites données par la Commission à une recommandation du dernier mini-sommet de la CIRGI, à Luanda.

Permettez-moi, à cet effet, de rappeler que la réunion de la CIRGI, du 29 janvier 2021 à Luanda, dont la CLLAC avait une importance présumée parce que c’est elle qui a présenté le rapport qui a servi de base aux échanges des Chefs d’État, a affirmé la nécessité d’un cessez-le-feu unilatéral par les agresseurs. Ce cessez-le-feu est une condition tout autant pour l’organisation des élections législatives, la médiation que le dialogue politique. Telle est la raison qui a justifié la démarche de la Commission auprès de l’ancien Président François Bozizé, en exécution du mandat reçu, et dans la perspective de faire le point aux Chefs d’État et de Gouvernement à la seconde réunion de Luanda annulée récemment à l’initiative de la RCA. La Commission ne s’est point octroyé un mandat, mais l’a reçu d’un sommet auquel la RCA a pris part et dont le Chef d’État a accepté les décisions devant ses pairs. En outre, la Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la RCA a même été informée de la période de la démarche et a reçu du Président de la Commission les avant-projets des documents qui devraient être proposés à la signature de l’ancien Président François Bozizé et au sujet desquels elle a d’ailleurs réagi. D’où l’étouffement de la Commission face à la campagne de dénigrement qui s’en est suivi.

La Commission, au nom de la Communauté, ne vise rien d’autre dans ses démarches et actions que la paix durable en RCA et la création des conditions d’une telle paix. Elle sait que celle-ci ne peut être le résultat d’une solution purement militaire qui semble être malheureusement privilégiée dans la démarche officielle du gouvernement centrafricain aujourd’hui, mais bien d’une concertation politique avec toutes les forces vives de la nation centrafricaine dans le respect du cadre de l’APPR.

Le souhait de la Communauté est que ce dialogue inclusif pour lequel des fonds ont déjà commencé à être recherchés soit considéré par les autorités centrafricaines comme une voie obligée vers la paix.
Il ne faut surtout pas se tromper et avoir clairement à l’esprit que le dialogue politique n’excuse point la poursuite des actions judiciaires contre les auteurs et commanditaires aussi bien de violences qui ont coûté la vie à des populations civiles, des humanitaires et des casques bleus non sans que des violations de droits de l’homme et du droit humanitaire international. Mais il est absolument impératif que ces actions judiciaires soient menées par une justice véritablement indépendante et impartiale sur des faits documentés et non sur des préjugés. La gouvernance démocratique, composante essentielle de l’ordre constitutionnel découlant de la Constitution du 30 mars 2016, est incompatible avec une justice aux ordres, fondée sur des préjugés et non équitable.

Il doit être souligné aussi que la Commission se préoccupe de la situation politique et sécuritaire en RCA en raison de son impact négatif sur l’environnement de paix et de sécurité et le développement de l’ensemble de la sous-région. Personne ne peut fermer les yeux face à la dramatique évolution géopolitique actuelle dans laquelle la RCA se transforme sous nos yeux en champ de bataille de puissances externes à la région et en un territoire où fleurit le “business de la guerre” dont l’expérimentation des armes de différents types.

**Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République**  
Monsieur le Secrétaire Général Adjoint  
Monsieur le Commissaire  
Monsieur le Haut Représentant

J’aimerais élever ce propos en soulignant l’intérêt et la nécessité pour le Gouvernement de la RCA de travailler ensemble avec les organisations régionales et sous-régionales ainsi que les dirigeants de la région pour une meilleure coordination et cohérence des initiatives. Tenue de la menace grandissante sur nos organisations sous-régionales et certains pays de la région, je me fais le devoir d’appeler respectueusement l’attention de S.E. M. le Président Touadera sur cette question. Je crois que des efforts doivent être fait sous votre leadership pour mettre fin à la menace ambivalente actuelle face aux organisations sous-régionales et quelques pays de la région dont certains ont autrefois consenti de louables et reçus Sacrifices en solidarité avec le peuple centrafricain.

J’aimerais encourager S.E. M. le Président Touadera à renforcer la coopération bilatérale avec les pays de la sous-région, notamment les pays voisins et facilitateurs de l’APPR. C’est la seule manière, du point de vue de la Commission, de surmonter la menace larvée actuelle à l’égard de certains d’entre eux. Le revitalisation des commissions mixtes et une collaboration sincère au sein des institutions régionales communes qui sont par ailleurs des garants de l’APPR peuvent être autant de moyens de renforcement de cette coopération et de reconstruction de la confiance.

Je vous remercie de votre aimable attention.
Annex 5.8: Information on travel ban violations involving sanctioned individual François Bozizé / Informations sur des violations de l’interdiction de voyager impliquant François Bozizé.

According to CPC members and diplomatic sources, sanctioned individual François Bozizé travelled by road from CAR to southern Chad on several occasions to participate in the consultations held in February and March 2021 (see paras. 123-125 of the body of the report). The Panel wrote to Chad and ECCAS to request confirmation, and underlined that Security Council resolutions include possibilities of exemption requests when travels relate to peace initiatives. No responses from either Chad or ECCAS had been provided by the time of drafting this report.
Annex 5.9: Terms of reference for the republican dialogue launched by President Touadéra / Termes de reference du dialogue républicain initié par le Président Touadéra.

Document obtained by the Panel from a participant in the republican dialogue on 15 April 2021.

TERMES DE REFERENCE DE LA CONSULTATION NATIONALE

CONTEXTE ET JUSTIFICATIONS

Les différents conflits politico-militaires à répétition ont sombré notre pays dans une profonde crise sans précédent et mobilisé la Communauté internationale, à travers différentes initiatives dans la recherche de solutions durables. Ces initiatives ont donné lieu à des engagements ayant permis entre autres la mise en place d’un régime de transition et l’organisation des élections présidentielle et législatives groupées de 2015-2016.

Depuis le retour à la légalité constitutionnelle avec l’élection du Président de la République, Chef de l’État, le Professeur Faustin Archange TOUADÉRA en 2016 la République Centrafricaine s’est résolument engagée sur la voie du retour définitif à la paix, la restauration de l’autorité de l’État, la réconciliation, la justice, du relèvement économique du pays.

A l’approche de l’organisation des élections présidentielle et législatives de 2020, des voix se sont élevées pour réclamer l’organisation d’un dialogue inclusif dont les sujets de préoccupations ne sont pas toujours révélées pour une meilleure appréciation.

En plus des efforts déployés par le Gouvernement à travers la mise en œuvre de l’APPR, du RCA, de la Région de la République et des États de la Sécurité, les entrepreneurs de la violence ont tenté de perturber l’organisation des élections de 2020 n’auraient pu être la mobilisation du peuple centrafricain, le soutien de la communauté internationale et l’appui des pays amis.

Relié au premier tour des élections tenus en décembre 2020, le Professeur Faustin Archange TOUADÉRA a mis un accent sur la politique qui vise à promouvoir la paix et l’inclusivité, en vue de la réconciliation nationale.

Dans cette dynamique, et sur ses instructions, le Gouvernement et les groupes armés restés fidèles à l’Accord ont déjà procédé à l’évaluation sans complaisance de l’APPR – RCA assorti des recommandations fortes dont la mise en œuvre va accélérer le DDRR et le retour à la paix.
En adéquation avec sa politique d’ouverture et de la main tendue, le Président de la République, Chef de l’État vient d’initier une approche de consultation nationale qui constitue la première étape d’un processus susceptible de conduire notre pays à un Dialogue républicain.

Objectifs

La consultation nationale qui sera menée par le Président de la République, Chef de l’État avec les institutions, les forces vives de la Nation, y compris la diaspora, vise à :
- recueillir des sujets de préoccupations d’intérêt national ;
- proposer par écrit des mesures concrètes pour l’application effective des recommandations du Forum de Bangui, du RCPCA/CEM et de l’APPR-RCA.

Résultats attendus

Toutes les préoccupations, propositions des forces vives de la Nation sont recueillies, compilées, analysées et soumises au Président de la République, Chef de l’État pour la suite du processus.

Méthodologie

Le Président de la République, Chef de l’État conduira personnellement ces consultations selon le chronogramme établi.

Les consultations seront ouvertes et les entités qui le souhaitent pourront remettre par écrit directement au Président de la République, Chef de l’État leurs contributions. La diaspora fera parvenir la sienne par écrit, par zone de résidence.


L’Équipe Technique d’Appui
Annex 5.10: Discussions around the reform of the Peace Agreement implementation mechanisms / Discussions sur la réforme des mécanismes de mise en œuvre de l’accord de paix.

Below excerpts from the recommendations made by the working group established upon President Touadéra’s instructions to conduct an assessment of the Peace Agreement implementation mechanisms. Full text archived at United Nations.

As confirmed by diplomatic sources, a number of actors had proposed more significant reforms to the mechanisms. In particular, representatives of international and regional partners, as well as some armed group leaders, had called for changes to the functioning of the Executive Monitoring Committee, co-chaired by the Prime Minister and the African Union. They requested that 1) another member of the Government with more time to dedicate to this function be appointed instead of the Prime Minister; 2) a representative of armed groups be associated to the chairmanship of the Committee. Referring to article 30 of the Agreement, the Government pushed for the continuation of the existing chairmanship system (see document below).
- Modifier la coprésidence du CES en y ajoutant un représentant des groupes armés (l'élargissement de la coprésidence du CES est contraire aux dispositions de l'article 30 de l'Accord. La coprésidence continuera d'être assurée par le Premier Ministre Chef du Gouvernement et l'Union Africaine)
- Exiger une représentation des groupes armés au niveau des chefs même des groupes, au sein du Comité Exécutif de suivi;
- Designe une personne disponible pour rendre fonctionnel le CMON;
- Assurer une bonne articulation entre les organes préfectoraux (CMOP et CTS) présidés par les Préfets et le CMON, l'organe de coordination, pour un meilleur rendement desdits organes.
- Procéder à un réajustement de la composition du Secrétariat technique du CES en donnant un rôle plus important à la CEEAC et en réduisant le nombre des membres à 7 personnes. Ce réajustement se fera par un texte administratif;

b) l'appropriation du processus:
- Sensibiliser les membres du Gouvernement sur leur rôle dans l'APPR comme étant les premiers organes responsables de la mise en œuvre;
- Poursuivre la vulgarisation auprès des groupes armés et pourvoir les responsables de moyens pour faire la restitution auprès de leurs éléments;
- Accentuer la vulgarisation auprès de la population en impliquant d'avantage les forces vives de Nation dans le processus notamment les femmes;
- Mettre en place une cellule de communication du CES et nommer un porte parole qui soient chargés de communiquer des informations actualisées sur le processus.
- Créer un site internet de l'Accord;
-Créer une collaboration étroite entre le PNDDRR, le CVR et la COMNAT ALPC pour traiter de manière holistique la question du désarmement ;
- Harmoniser les quotas d'intégration des Ex-combattant dans les Forces de défense et de Sécurité ;
- Engager rapidement le processus de rapatriement des mercenaires étrangers actifs dans des groupes armés.

e) le processus des USMS
-Créer un leadership fort et dédié au sein de l'Etat Major pour l'opérationnalisation efficace des USMS,
-Faire une synchronisation entre le DDRR et les USMS ;
- Déployer les observateurs de l'Union Africaine ;
-Evaluer le fonctionnement et le rendement des USMS conformément à leurs missions définies dans l'Accord ;
-Commencer des réflexions sur le devenir des USMS à la fin des deux années d'existence ;
-Reprendre plus en détail, les discussions sur les USMS au sein du COSTRAT pour faire le point de situation après les derniers événements.

f) le processus d'harmonisation des grades
- Revoir la composition et les missions du comité d'intégration et d'harmonisation des grades pour tenir compte du contexte actuel et le rendre plus inclusif ;
- Accélérer le fonctionnement de cette structure.

G) la sanction de l'APPF
-La déﬁnition par les garants et facilitateurs des mesures de sanctions pour les violations des engagements de l'APPF. Ceci a été également recommandé par les conclusions de la 979ème réunion du Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité
(CP5) de l’Union Africaine tenue le 16 février 2021 qui a demandé expressément à la Commission d’élaborer des mesures punitives des violations de l’APPFR-RCA et de les soumettre au CPS pour adoption.

Il s’agira de réactualiser le document déjà élaboré et présenté par les Garants et Facilitateurs au cours de la session extraordinaire du CES du 23 août 2019 ;

-L’Etat doit également faire application des mesures de justice conformément aux lois et règlements en vigueur pour les délits et crimes commis par les parties à l’Accord.

G) les autres engagements de l’Accord

- l’implication du Ministère technique concerné dans le traitement de la question de la transhumance et la tenue régulière des commissions à ce sujet pour une meilleure gestion ;

- trouver le moyen de mettre en œuvre l’engagement concernant la cessation des exploitations illicites des ressources naturelles.

L’appui multiforme à la mise en œuvre

- la poursuite du soutien politique, financier et technique de la communauté internationale à la mise en œuvre de l’APPFR ;

- la mise en place d’un mécanisme rapide de décaissement du budget de l’Etat pour le fonctionnement des organes de mise en œuvre ;

- la mobilisation des fonds nécessaires à la mise en œuvre de l’APPFR-RCA.

Tels sont les principaux points tirés du rapport final des travaux de l’Atelier de redynamisation de la mise en œuvre de l’APPFR-RCA menés par le groupe de travail mis en place par le Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement, du compte rendu de la réunion du C5 et des réunions restreintes du CES.

Le Secrétariat Technique du CES
Annex 5.11: Excerpts from President Touadéra’s New Year address (31 December 2020) / Extraits de la déclaration du Président Touadéra pour la nouvelle année (31 décembre 2020).

Full text available at https://www.facebook.com/1064875833588574/posts/3515275228548610/

[...]

Je demande donc à nos forces de défense et de sécurité de faire preuve de patriotisme, de courage, de discipline et d'esprit de sacrifice dans le combat contre l'ennemi, en vue de sauver la patrie.

Je demande aux femmes et à la jeunesse centrafricaine de se mobiliser pour barrer la route aux ennemis de la nation qui, par cette entreprise périlleuse, compromettent leur avenir.
Vous le savez, la chaîne de complicité de cette guerre asymétrique contre notre pays est longue, complexe, mais nous sommes tenus de la déterminer.

Je regrette qu'en dépit d'une mobilisation nationale et internationale pour condamner cette agression injuste contre le peuple centrafricain, l'opposition démocratique, réunie au sein de la Coalition de l'Opposition dite Démocratique, COD-20-20, précurseur de la C.P.C, observe un silence incompréhensible jusqu'à ce jour.

[...]
Annex 5.12: Expressions of concerns by political opposition members over the targeting of politicians / Expressions d’inquiétudes des membres de l’opposition politique concernant les procédures visant des politiciens.

Below an example of such reactions – i.e. a COD-2020 communiqué of 6 February 2021.

Coalition de l’Opposition Démocratique - 2020

Conférence des Présidents
Secrétariat Exécutif Permanent
Contact: 75 42 42 44 / 72 21 38 21
Email: cod.plateforme9@gmail.com

N° 0087/COD-2020/CP/SEP.21
COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE

Le 06 février 2021, l’Assemblée Nationale convoquée en session extraordinaire a voté une loi en vue de proroger de 06 mois l’état d’urgence de 15 jours initialement décrété par le Chef de l’État le 21 janvier 2021.

La COD-2020, réunie ce jour 06 février 2021 en session extraordinaire a procédé à l’analyse suivante :


Pour la COD-2020, la prorogation de 06 mois de l’état d’urgence est contraire à l’esprit et au texte de l’article 44 de la Constitution.

En effet, la durée de la prorogation ne saurait dépasser le délai initial de 15 jours consacré par la Constitution. Dans ce cas d’espèce, l’état d’urgence prendra fin en Août 2021.

2. Quoi qu’ayant décidé de son retrait du processus électoral, la COD-2020 s’interroge sur la pertinence d’une telle loi qui est en contradiction avec le nouveau chronogramme rendu public par l’Autorité Nationale des Élections (ANE) pour les 22 tour de la présidentielle et législatives allant de février à juillet 2021, alors qu’aucune manifestation publique (meetings, campagnes électorales etc.) n’est autorisée pendant la période d’état d’urgence.

3. De l’observation de la 1ère période de l’état d’urgence, il résulte que le régime en a profité pour procéder à des violations massives des Droits de l’Homme caractérisées par des arrestations arbitraires (Ali Rofiniak, NGBAYOMBO Serge etc.), des enlèvements, et des tentatives d’assassinats (Christian Gazam-Bèty, Maître Jean Louis OPALENGA...). contrains à la clandestinité, des assassinats sur la base de conviction politique et de l’appartenance ethnique (Danboy alias Saddam, Emmanuel Konate, Faradanga Tresor etc.), ainsi que par des interdictions de sortie du territoire des leaders de l’opposition et autres personnalités politiques (l’ancienne Présidente de Transition Mme Catherine SAMBA-PANZA, Monsieur Abdou KARIM MECKASSOUA, etc).

En définitive, la COD-2020 exprime ses vives préoccupations sur :

- La violation de la Constitution par cette loi de prorogation de l’état d’urgence d’une durée de 180 jours ;
- La nature liberticide de ladite loi attentatoire aux libertés publiques et individuelles ;
- La chasse aux sorcières à l’encontre des leaders des partis de l’opposition en général et de la COD-2020 en particulier.

Fait à Bangui, le 06 février 2021

Pour la Conférence des Présidents,
Président en Exercice

Mamadou KANDIYOUN

KouYa Kou (MP) - Assemblée Pour la République (APR) - KEGEBE/PS/C.L.P (KEPS) - Union pour le Renouveau Centrafricain (URCA) - Congrès Républicains pour le Progrès Social (CRPS) - Résistez ! et Ecôle (RTE) - Parti National pour un Centrisme Moderne (PNCM) - Mouvement pour la Démocratie l’Indépendance et le Progrès Social (MDIPS) - Parti Socialiste pour les États et le Développement (PSPED) - Congrès des Démocrates pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (C.D.R.C) - Parti Centristes pour l’Unité et le Développement (P.C.U.D) - Mouvement pour l’Unité et le Développement (M.U.D) - Union Nationale Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (UN.D.P.C) - Renaissance Ligue de Centrafrique (RLC) - Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain (RDC).

21-06676
Annex 5.13: Request to lift the immunity of four members of Parliament / Demande de levée d’immunité parlementaire de quatre députés.

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 9 April 2021. A similar request was sent to the Parliament by the Chamber of instruction of the Bangui Appeals Court.
Annex 5.14: Televised appearances of the Minister of Interior presenting the CPC as a group quasi-exclusively composed of foreign mercenaries / Interventions du ministre de l’intérieur présentant la CPC comme étant quasi-exclusivement composée de mercenaires étrangers.

Below a screenshot of a video uploaded on a social media account of the Government of the Central African Republic. The video showed the Minister of Interior on national television displaying an individual whom he presented as a CPC combatant from Chad.


In another TV appearance dated 20 January, also uploaded on the website of the Government of the Central African Republic, the Minister of Interior also presented the CPC as an armed group composed of foreign mercenaries.


COMMUNIQUE DU GOUVERNEMENT

Suite aux affrontements ayant opposé, le 13 janvier 2021, très tôt le matin, dans les faubourgs de Bangui, des groupes armés rebelles aux forces armées centrafricaines et leurs supplétifs, appuyées par la MINUSCA, les autorités centrafricaines ont diffusé à la télévision et sur leurs sites web officiels, des informations alléguant la présence de combattants tchadiens parmi les assaillants, laissant penser à l’implication de fait du Tchad dans les troubles sécuritaires en Centrafrique.

Le Gouvernement de la République du Tchad dénonce avec force ces fausses accusations, et réaffirme que, depuis le retrait en 2014 de son contingent de la Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine (MISCA), le Tchad n’a interféré en aucune manière dans la crise centrafricaine, si ce n’est pour appuyer les initiatives de paix et de réconciliation aux côtés de la communauté internationale.

En outre, le Gouvernement condamne l’enrôlement des ressortissants tchadiens par toutes les parties au conflit, pour les armer et les utiliser comme combattants.

À cet égard, des sources dignes de foi indiquent que des ressortissants d’origine tchadienne ont été recrutés à Bangui pour combattre comme mercenaires au sein des milices.

Le Tchad ne peut admettre que des ressortissants d’origine tchadienne soient impunément recrutés et utilisés dans le conflit, et ensuite exposés devant la presse comme moyens de preuve dans le seul but de faire porter la responsabilité de leur utilisation à leur pays d’origine.
Le Gouvernement met en garde les Tchadiens vivant en RCA contre toutes activités illicites ou comportement répréhensible, susceptibles de mettre en danger leur vie et leurs biens, ainsi que les relations entre les deux pays.

Par ailleurs, le Gouvernement tient à rappeler sa position de principe sur la crise centrafricaine, maintes fois réaffirmée par le Maréchal IDRISS DEBY ITNO, Président de la République, Chef de l’État, qui, pas plus tard que le 26 décembre dernier, en sa qualité de Président en exercice de la CEN-SAD, a condamné, dans un communiqué, toutes les formes de violences et de déstabilisation, ainsi que les ingérences extérieures visant à remettre en cause le processus électoral, tout en réaffirmant son attachement au respect de la souveraineté et de l’intégrité territoriale de la RCA.

Fidèle à ce qui précède, le Tchad lance à nouveau un appel pressant aux Nations unies, à l’Union Africaine, à la Communauté des États de l’Afrique Centrale (CEAC), et à tous les partenaires internationaux de la RCA, pour rétablir le dialogue entre les parties prenantes centrafricaines en vue d’une sortie de crise pacifique et durable.

Fait à N’Djamena, le 14 janvier 2021

Le Ministre de la Communication
Porte-Parole du Gouvernement

L’AMBI. CHERIF MAHAMAT ZENE

COMMUNIQUE DU GOUVERNEMENT

La République Centrafricaine et la République du Tchad entretiennent des relations sœurs de fraternité et de coopération, empreintes de respect mutuel, tant au niveau bilatéral que multilatéral. La cohabitation pacifique des deux pays est renforcée par leur appartenance commune aux organisations internationales, régionales, sous-régionales et communautaires, ou sein desquelles ils œuvrent inlassablement pour la sécurité, la paix et le respect du principe de la non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des États.

Les deux pays sont aussi liés par un Accord de bon voisinage, révisé en 2012, à Ndjamenâ au Tchad qui permet, entre autres outils, de lutter contre la criminalité transfrontalière, la prolifération et la circulation des armes au niveau de la frontière commune.

Depuis son élection à la Magistrature Suprême de l’État, le Professeur Faustin Archange TJOJADERA, Président de la République, Chef de l’État n’a cessé d’œuvrer de concert avec son Homologue et Frère, le Maréchal du Tchad, Son Excellence IDRISS DEBY ITNO, pour la consolidation des liens fraternels de coopération et de bon voisinage entre leurs deux peuples.

Les rencontres régulières entre les deux Chefs d’État tant à Ndjamenâ qu’au cours de différents foras internationaux ainsi que les visites de haut niveau couronnées par l’organisation de la Grande Commission Mixte centrafrico-tchadienne dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de l’Accord politique pour la paix et la réconciliation du 6 février 2019 sont des exemples tangibles de la sante de cette fraternité.

Malheureusement, les désinformations relayées sur les réseaux sociaux, consécutivement aux attaques coordonnées de la rébellion dénommée « Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement » (CPC) de l’ancien Président François BOZIZE, visant à interrompre le processus électoral et à renverser les...
institutions de la République en vue d’instaurer un régime de Transition, ont laissé croire que Gouvernement centrafricain pointait un doigt accusateur contre la République sœur du Tchad.

Il est évident que les manipulations relayées sur les réseaux sociaux visent à entamer les bonnes relations séculaires de fraternité et de coopération entre la République Centrafricaine et la République du Tchad et créer des frictions diplomatiques inutiles entre les deux pays.

Le Gouvernement centrafricain, fidèle à sa ligne diplomatique fixée par le Président de la République, Chef de l’État de non-ingérence et de coexistence pacifique, tient à préciser que la présence des mercenaires étrangers ou d’origine tchadienne dans les différentes rébellions créées par des Centrafricains mal intentionnés pour tuer leurs propres concitoyens et détruire leur pays, ne saurait être comprise comme une implication du Tchad dans les différentes crises centrafricaines.

D’ailleurs dans son communiqué daté du 14 janvier courant, le Gouvernement Tchadien a condamné sans ambages l’enrôlement des ressortissants tchadiens par toutes les parties au conflit, pour les armer et les utiliser comme combattants.

Le Gouvernement, tout en respectant la liberté de la presse, appelle à la cessation des attaques contre la République du Tchad et lance un appel à l’apaisement dans ce contexte électoral.

Le Gouvernement rassure le Gouvernement et le peuple frère tchadien de sa disponibilité à continuer à œuvrer pour le raffermissement des liens fraternels de fraternité et de coopération entre le peuple centrafricain et le peuple tchadien et à lutter contre les désinformations en vue de créer un climat propice au retour à la paix et à la sécurité entre nos deux pays.

Fait à Bangui, le 25 janvier 2021

Le Ministre de la Communication et des Média,
Porte-parole du Gouvernement

[Signature]

Ange Maxime KAZAGUI


COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE


En effet, l’ambassadeur outrepasse ses prérogatives de diplomate accrédité auprès de la RCA et s’arrove le droit de gérer les relations entre le Tchad et la RCA.

Et pourtant, le Tchad entretient de bonnes relations avec la Russie, un pays de longue tradition diplomatique, relations empruntes de respect et de solidarité.

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères condamne les propos dénués de tout fondement de cet ambassadeur.

Fait à N’Djaména, le 03 avril 2021

La Direction de Cabinet

AMBASSADE DE LA FEDERATION DE RUSSIE 
EN REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE 

N° 323/2021 

COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE 


L’Ambassadeur de Russie en République Centrafricaine n’a jamais accusé le gouvernement tchadien de quelque ce soit. En revanche, l’Ambassade de Russie en RCA compte sur le soutien de la République du Tchad dans la stabilisation de la situation en RCA et considère ce pays comme un acteur clé dans le développement de la région.

Lors de la conférence de presse qui a eu lieu le 29 mars 2021 et à laquelle ni les représentants de l’Ambassade du Tchad, ni les journalistes tchadiens n’ont été présents, Monsieur l’Ambassadeur a appelé « tous les pays voisins de la RCA à sécuriser la frontière afin de mettre fin à la circulation illégale des armes et des hommes au nom de la paix et la stabilité ».

L’Ambassade de Russie prie les autorités tchadiennes de vérifier les informations pour ne pas défigurer la réalité. Nous appelons l’attention sur le fait que c’est pas la première foi que les journalistes falsifient les paroles de l’Ambassadeur de Russie en RCA.

Il est regrettable que le Tchad, l’un des pays qui entretient de bonnes relations de longue date avec la Russie, condamne les propos que Monsieur l’Ambassadeur n’a jamais prononcés tout en croyant aveuglement en fausses nouvelles.

Félix David, le 6 avril 2021
This exchange of communiqués followed press articles reporting on a press conference held by the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Central African Republic on 29 January 2021. According to several articles, the Ambassador had questioned the willingness of the authorities of Chad to control their common border with the Central African Republic and to prevent armed groups operating in the Central African Republic from obtaining weapons and combatants from the territory of Chad.

Below a link to one of the press articles:


In the communiqué of 6 April 2021 (see above), the Embassy of the Russian Federation indicated that the Ambassador’s comments had been misrepresented by journalists.

*Communiqué of the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Central African Republic mentioning connections between COC-2020 and the CPC (28 April 2021).*
internationale et à instaurer ladite période transitoire qui a été planifiée pour ouvrir la voie vers le chaos politique. C’était par le moyen de violence que la COD-2020 cherchait à imposer à la nation son protégé. Je ne peux pas trouver une autre explication des machinations de la COD-2020 puisque à un moment crucial ses membres n’ont pas pris les armes pour défendre aux côtés de l’armée nationale la Patrie qui a été menacée par les rebelles et les mercenaires étrangers.

Le 13 janvier 2021, les leaders de la COD-2020 contemplaient, sans cacher leur joie, des tentatives des malfaiteurs d’assaillir la ville de Bangui et de massacrer la population civile comme c’était le cas en 2014. Je crois que désormais la COD-2020 a un droit moral de s’appeler des patriotes et des démocrates. Tout patriote, même si il ne partage pas les valeurs démocratiques du gouvernement légitime et celles de la majorité absolue de la population, doit défendre la Patrie contre ceux qui voulaient briser la paix qui reste toujours fragile en Centrafrique. Pourtant, c’étaient les FACA et la police centrafricaine avec l’appui des instructeurs russes et des militaires rwandais qui ont sauvé le pays d’une tentative d’imposer le régime néocolonial d’un régime fantoche.

Je réitère que je suis fier d’être l’Ambassadeur de Russie, d’un pays qui a aidé les autorités légitimes et le peuple centrafricain à sauvegarder la souveraineté, l’intégrité territoriale et l’indépendance de la République Centrafricaine. J’étais très heureux d’apprendre que l’un de vos nègres m’avait qualifié d’être plus Centrafricain que les Centrafricains qui avaient essayé de s’enfuir à l’étranger.

Maintenant, quand les FACA et leurs alliés ont vaincu les rebelles, vous essayez de relever la tête et de dicter vos conditions de la concertation nationale. Je crois que c’est absurde quand les vaincus imposent leurs conditions aux vainqueurs. Pour comprendre que vous êtes les personnages ratés, il suffit de jeter un coup d’œil sur les résultats du scrutin, beaucoup d’entre vous ont reçu moins de 1% des votes.
Le peuple centrafricain a choisi le Président F.A.Touadéra et sa vision de l’avenir de la République Centrafricaine. Mais vous ne pouvez pas vous calmer et continuez d’empoisonner l’atmosphère de paix et d’harmonie dans le pays à laquelle le Chef de l’État veut parvenir.

En ce qui concerne les accusations que la Russie intervient dans les affaires intérieures de la RCA et cherche à imposer sa volonté au gouvernement centrafricain, je vous rappelle que c’est grâce au soutien total de mon pays dans la lutte contre le colonialisme et le racisme que les pays africains, dont la Centrafrique, ont accédé à l’indépendance. C’est la politique qu’aujourd’hui la Russie poursuit sur le continent africain en défendant les gouvernements légitimes contre le complotsisme de ceux qui recourent à des forces extérieures pour assurer ses intérêts égoïstes.

Un proverbe dit que les chiens aboient, la caravane passe. Quoi que les ennemis de la RCA n’aboient, le peuple centrafricain parviendra à la paix et la prospérité.

Vive l’amitié entre la Russie et la République Centrafricaine !

Vive la coopération gagnant gagnant entre les deux peuples frères au nom de la prospérité de tous les peuples africains !


Annex 5.19: Support provided by MCU associates to anti-MINUSCA demonstrations in Bangui / Soutien apporté par des individus associés au MCU aux manifestations contre la MINUSCA.

Among MCU members who supported anti-MINUSCA demonstrations, Didacien Kossimatchi was the most vocal. Presenting himself as the national coordinator of several platforms ("Talitha Koum" or Galaxie Nationale), Didacien Kossimatchi was among the main organizers of an anti-MINUSCA protest which took place on 12 May.

Didacien Kossimatchi is a well-known member of MCU. Since November 2016, he has been spokesperson of President Touadera’s support committee; he was also a member of the MCU’s campaign directorate for the presidential election of 2020 (see document below). He works with the Ministry of Education.

In 2018, he was sanctioned by the High Council for Communication in 2018 for incitement to violence and hatred (see S/2018/729, annex 5.6). He is also a former member of anti-balaka movements (see S/2015/936, para. 33 and annex 9.17).

Below a communiqué signed by Didacien Kossimatchi calling for a demonstration against MINUSCA (document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 2 May 2021).

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Below excerpts from the decision establishing the MCU’s campaign directorate for the presidential election of 27 December 2020 (19 October 2020).
Below a transcript from an interview which Didacien Kossimatchi gave to a radio station on 14 April 2021.

Invité de la rédaction de la radio Fréquence RJDH 14/04/2021 : Didacien Kossimatchi, coordonnateur national de Talitha Coum une organisation proche du pouvoir

RJDH : Monsieur Didacien Kossimatchi

Didacien Kossimatchi : Bonjour monsieur le journaliste.

RJDH : Vous faites partie avec votre organisation Talitha coum des gens qui sont sortis pour fustiger les propos du Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire General des Nations Unies en RCA notamment sur les ondes de RFI le 09 de ce mois. Qu’est ce que vous reprochez concrètement au Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire General des Nations Unies en RCA ?

Didacien Kossimatchi : Mankeur Ndiaye a manqué du respect au peuple centrafricain parce qu’il a adjoint le gouvernement avec un ton sévère : il faut..., il faut..., c’est comme si nous sommes des petits enfants. Monsieur Mankeur Ndiaye voulait nous infantiliser or en Centrafrique nous ne somme pas des enfants, nous sommes des responsables, nous sommes des intellectuels, et je pense que nous pensons que c’est un panafricaniste mais ce qu’il a dit ça fait énerver tout le monde. Parce qu’il veut qu’on puisse encore dialoguer avec un criminel de renom qui est autre qu’Ali Darassa, qui a fait volte fasse tantôt il est avec la CPC de Bozize. Maintenant il revient encore sur ses pieds pour être encore dans l’accord de Khartoum. Ça c’est nous prendre comme des enfants, et ça c’est de la mesquinerie, ça ne marchera pas et les propos de Mankeur Ndiaye ça ne restera pas comme ça, nous allons monter des actions de grande envergure contre la MINUSCA.

RJDH : Parlons des actions.

Didacien Kossimatchi : Les actions, je pense, qu’on a mis en place des différentes commissions d’arrondissement et aussi des quartiers, aussi en province comme nous avons nos antennes là-bas au niveau des différentes préfectures et sous-préfectures. Je pense que nos leaders commencent à sensibiliser nos bases respectives. Puisque vous savez avec un travail remarquable que les FACA avec l’appui des instructeurs russes et rwandais ont fait, je pense qu’on a récupéré 80% du territoire centrafricain. Donc nous préparons ces actions pacifiques, je dis bien pacifiques, pour dire non d’abord, non à Mankeur Ndiaye, parce qu’il a manqué du respect au peuple centrafricain. En disant de dialoguer avec Ali Darassa, de dialoguer avec le prétendu général qui remplace le feu Sidiki et aussi dialoguer aux leaders de COD-2020 qui sont impliqués. La justice centrafricaine a saisi l’Assemblée Nationale pour la levée de leur immunité, c’est du manque de respect à nos morts donc nous n’allons pas rester les bras croisés, il aura des actions des grandes envergures d’ici peu de temps. Et le moment venu c’est tous les peuples centrafricains des quatre points cardinaux du nord, sud, est et ouest qui vont se lever pour dire non à la MINUSCA, non aux experts des Nations Unies avec leurs
rapports mensongers et non aussi à Mankeur Ndiaye qui a manqué du respect au peuple centrafricain.

**RJDH** : Non à la MINUSCA, la MINUSCA c'est quand même une mission multidimensionnelle. Si vous parlez de la MINUSCA, il y'a quand même la force, les civils vous ne croyez pas que c'est un tout, un tas de mélange.

**Didacien Kossimatchi** : Il n'y a pas de choix, quand le peuple se soulève c'est Dieu qui se soulève.

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 12 May 2021.

MEMORANDUM DE LA GALAXIE NATIONALE RELATIF AUX MEContEN TemENTS DE LA POPULATION CENTRAFRIQUE CONTRE LA MINUSCA ET SON REPRESENTANT AINSI QUE LA STATION RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE (RFI)

La population Centrafricaine, du Nord au Sud de l’Est à l’Ouest réunie sous la bannière de la plate-forme de la GALAXIE NATIONALE qui est la Voix des sans Voix décide ce jour du Mercredi 12 Mai 2021 :
- Considérant la grave crise politico sécuritaire que traverse la République Centrafricaine,
- Considérant que cette crise est née de la volonté manifeste de certains de nos compatriotes en l’occurrence François BOZIZE YANGOUVONDA avec son organisation criminelle de la CPC, et des mercenaires soutenus par des puissances étrangères et des pays de la sous-région bien connus qui veulent saper les efforts de redressement national entrepris avec courage et détermination par le Président Faustin Archange TOUADERA,
- Considérant l’implication de certains hommes politiques centrafricains dans l’alimentation de la crise sécuritaire en l’occurrence la CODE 20 avec ses ténors comme les MECKASSOUA, NGUENDET, TINGAYE, DOLOGUELE, KAMOUN, ZINGAS et autres qui forment la tête pensante et la branche politique de la CPC, ces mêmes qui instrumentalisent la crise sécuritaire à des fins politiciennes de prise de pouvoir par des moyens non démocratiques y compris par les armes,
- Considérant le battage médiatique grotesque, truffé de mensonges, orchestré par la Radio France Internationale dans le but visible de ternir l’image de la République Centrafricaine et ses alliés dans la lutte ardue contre les forces du mal en Centrafrique auprès de l’opinion nationale et internationale,

MEMORANDUM DE LA GALAXIE NATIONALE A LA MINUSCA ET A LA FRANCE
- Considérant la ferme volonté des Centrafricains de tourner le dos à la vieille recette de prise de pouvoir par la force, volonté clairement manifestée lors des dernières élections présidentielles qui ont porté le Président Faustin Archange Touadera à la magistrature suprême de l'Etat dès le premier tour avec un score sans appel de 53,16%,

- Considérant l'injonction directe de la MINUSCA et son Représentant Mankeur Ndiaye au gouvernement pour dialoguer avec les groupes armés contre le vœu du peuple centrafricain souverain,

- Considérant le soutien de la MINUSCA en Armes, munitions de guerre et autres ravitaillements aux groupes Armés,

- Considérant la pression de certaines puissances coloniales sur les autorités afin de dialoguer aux rebelles,

- Vu la nécessité de sauvegarder les institutions de la République et de renforcer l'unité nationale autour du Leadership éclairé du Président Faustin Archange Touadera,

- Vu que cette crise artificiellement entretenue est sous-tendue par la seule recherche d'intérêts égoïstes et mesquins notamment le trafic des richesses du sous sol de la RCA par la France, la MINUSCA et les groupes armés,

- Vu l'urgence de rompre avec l'impunité qui de manière structurelle a inculqué à une certaine classe politique en particulier celle de l'opposition et des groupes armés une culture d'incivisme, un sentiment de se voir tout permis et d'être au-dessus de la loi.

1. Réitérons notre appel pour que les auteurs, coauteurs et complices des crimes commis par la CPC et ses alliés soient
poursuivis, traduits devant les tribunaux et au besoin neutralisés et mis hors d’état de nuire pour payer le prix des crimes dont ils sont responsables contre le peuple centrafricain.

2. Disons NON au dialogue avec des criminels qui ont le sang innocent des centrafricains sur leur main et marquons notre détermination à nous opposer par tous les moyens à un tel dialogue.

3. Appelons les populations à rester mobilisées et à accroître de vigilance pour parer à toute tentative de déstabilisation des institutions républicaines d’où qu’elle provienne et à protéger notre jeune démocratie contre les vampires sanguinaires et les ennemis de la démocratie qui veulent semer le chaos en Centrafrique.

4. Exigeons le départ sans condition de Monsieur MANKEUR NDIAYE et des forces de la MINUSCA du territoire centrafricain pour haute trahison de la charte des Nations Unies, immixtion dans les affaires internes centrafricaines et pour leur collaboration directe avec les groupes armés.

5. Demandons instamment au Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies de lever l’embargo sur les armes pour permettre à l’État Centrafricain de mener à bien le combat pour la libération nationale.


7. Exigeons la suspension de la station néocoloniale RFI sur toute l’étendue du territoire nationale de la RCA.
8. Exigeons la révision de tous les accords coloniaux passés avec la FRANCE ainsi que le départ des forces françaises basées à l’aéroport Bangui M’POKO et BOUAR.

9. Nous réservons le droit de mener des actions de grandes envergures (soulèvement populaire sur toute l’étendue du territoire, sabotages, barricades et autres sévices corporels) contre la MINUSCA et la FRANCE pour faire entendre la voix de la Centrafrique profonde.

_Fait à Bangui, le 12 Mai 2021_

La Coordination de la Plateforme Galaxie Nationale

**Améliations :**
- Présidence de la République
- Assemblée Nationale
- Primature
- INSTITUTIONS DE LA REPUBLIQUE
- AMBASSADES
- Union Européenne
- Union Africaine
- CEEAC
- CEMAC
- MINUSCA
- CHRONO

Below an example of a statement issued by MCU associates criticizing MINUSCA, which was largely circulated on social media.

Document obtained from a confidential source on 10 April 2021.
aux prises avec des groupes armés qui violent pillent et sèment la désolation parmi la population.

Il convient de souligner que l’autorité de l’État et la Justice ne sauraient faire l’objet d’un marchandage ou servir permanemment de variables d’ajustement pour la paix. Il faut noter qu’en trois mois d’opérations, les Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA) et les forces spéciales russes et rwandaises ont obtenu des résultats éloquents en matière de paix, réduisant drastiquement l’arrogance des groupes armés coalisés dans la soi-disant Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC). Ce résultat contraste bien évidemment avec ceux obtenus par la MINUSCA en sept ans d’exercice.

Dans ce contexte précis, où débâcle s’entremêle avec apathie, ce serait de la diversion que d’encourager le dialogue à tout prix, des mirages que de donner de l’espérance à un peuple en procédant à un nouvel accroissement des effectifs de la MINUSCA.

Il est plutôt question de la levée immédiate et totale d’un embargo abject dont le seul effet est de servir des intérêts conspirationniste, expansionniste, et asservir les FACA. Il y a également lieu de relever un constat d’échec et de laxisme imputables à la chaine de suivi et d’incitation des garants et facilitateurs de l’Accord Politique pour la Paix et la Réconciliation (APPR), qui n’ont pas été en mesure d’actionner les mesures
répressives élémentaires prévues par les articles 34 et 35 dudit Accord.

La Jeunesse du MCU se demande : Est-il alors raisonnable d’envisager faire participer l’UPC et d’autres groupes terroristes à la table du dialogue républicain annoncé par le Président Faustin Archange TOUADÉRA, au motif fallacieux que ces terroristes se seraient retirés de la CPC, ou bien qu’ils n’auraient pas commis de crimes et qu’ils n’auraient pas attaqué des populations civiles ?

Par ailleurs, les offices de M. NDIAYE visant à obtenir du Président de la République, Chef de l’État, la possibilité pour des citoyens - fussent-ils leaders politiques - de voyager librement, doivent être respectueuses du caractère hautement judiciaire de l’affaire les concernant et du contexte d’État d’urgence en vigueur ; un État d’exception qui confère à l’autorité administrative des pouvoirs exceptionnels de police et de restrictions de libertés publiques ou individuelles.

La Jeunesse du MCU se demande : Est-il alors raisonnable d’évoquer un risque de crise supplémentaire - de nature politique selon M. NDIAYE - lorsqu’il est question de faits relevant de la justice, de l’ordre public et de la promotion de l’État de droit, et mettant en cause des acteurs politiques soupçonnés d’intelligence avec la CPC qui est une organisation terroriste ?
Au demeurant, les allégations du groupe de travail des Nations Unies rapportant de prétendues exécutions sommaires et des actes de torture par les forces spéciales russes ne sont que des campagnes de dénigrement et de manipulation de l’opinion publique nationale et internationale à des fins de récupération complotiste.

De telles entreprises ne sont pas de nature à honorer les auteurs/commanditaires, le Système de Nations Unies et la Justice internationale dont on ne cesse d’abuser. Ces campagnes malveillantes que l’ONU s’emploierait à documenter relèvent d’une nouvelle stratégie qui se fonde sur le constat d’échec d’une menée subversive, et du rejet franc et massif de l’initiative d’une parodie de dialogue que l’on a voulu imposer aux centrafricains.

La jeunesse centrafricaine n’est pas dupe demande très respectueusement à M. Mankeur NDIAYE, Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies et Chef de la MINUSCA, de se ressaisir et se ranger du côté du droit international et des valeurs universelles.

Fait à Bangui, le 09 avril 2021

Le Secrétaire Nationale à la Jeunesse

Arsène Daniel NGREPAYO

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 12 February 2021.
Annex 6.1: Actors involved in fraudulent activities in the mining sector / Acteurs impliqués dans des activités minières frauduleuses.

Cooperatives and private companies

According to Panel’s investigations, private companies and cooperatives were involved in fraudulent activities in the mining sector of CAR. This has deprived the country of resources generated by gold production and created conditions for the enrichment of criminal networks including those who contributed directly or indirectly to the destabilization of CAR.

Several sources including workers at mining companies, senior and mid-level officials from the Ministry of Mines based in Bangui and in field offices, told the Panel that across the country, gold production was under-reported by companies. Official export statistics for 2020 which indicated a total export of 401 kilograms of gold suggest that entities investigated by the Panel were involved in under reporting.

According to statistics, mining companies Thien Pao and HW-Lepo did not export gold in 2020. From the Panel’s information, although the companies were officially only conducting exploration and research, they also produced gold which should have been declared. As confirmed by sources including mining officials and individuals working for the two companies, both companies have hidden their production from the authorities. In a meeting with the Panel, a representative of Thien Pao maintained that his company was not involved in production activities. By the time of writing, the Panel had not received a response to its request for clarification sent to HW-Lepo.

IMC mining company declared an export of 19 kilograms for 2020. Two sources who worked for IMC in Yaloke (Ombella M’Poko Prefecture) told the Panel that the monthly production was rather around 20 kilograms on these sites. IMC did not provide a response to the Panel’s request for clarification.

The CAR Government has a system to monitor the activities and production through the assignment of geologists trained by the Ministry of Mines to companies. These geologists are paid by the companies and their salaries are twice as high as what they could earn if their salary came from the Government. The geologists report quarterly to the Ministry on the activities of the companies including on production and environmental issues.

The Panel confirmed the inefficiency of the system to stop the fraudulent activities by companies. Mining officials and employees of several companies told the Panel that geologists were not associated to the last phase of production. It was a technique used by companies to keep the exact production quantity secret. Geologists employed by the Ministry of Mines and who recently worked with mining companies told the Panel that, each time they have reminded companies that they had the right to monitor all the production

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11 Thien Pao for example has officially been conducting exploration activities around Abba since 2017.
12 According to a geologist currently employed by the Ministry of mines and assigned to the company, in Yaloké, IMC has two research permits and five exploitation permits through a cooperative (COMIBO) and another company (Huang Jin Wan Liang).
13 At the beginning of his career, a geologist employed by the Government earns 100,000 CFA francs ($184), whereas at the companies, his salary is equal to 250,000 CFA francs ($459).
phases, they were threatened with losing their jobs. The three mining officials added that
detailed reports on the practice have been shared with relevant authorities.

**Huang Xiang Xing, aka “Rachine”, aka “Achille”, a well-known smuggler**

During an official visit to Cameroon, authorities informed the Panel that, on 28 January
2021, Cameroon customs seized 6.9 kilograms of gold in Garoua Boulai, a town at the
border between Cameroon and CAR and arrested a transporter. The person who hand-carried
the gold introduced himself as a Chinese national named “Rachine”, born on 12 December
1984. A senior official from Cameroonian Customs told the Panel that, after the seizure, the
individual showed a CAR mining permit and mentioned that he was coming from Yaloké.
He added that the gold he carried belonged to Yaloké-based Chinese nationals. The Panel
was not able to see the permit and therefore could not confirm its authenticity. The Panel
obtained a telephone number provided by “Rachine” during his arrest, but could not contact
him. The number was actually registered under the name of an individual who told the Panel
that he did not have any contact with “Rachine”.

The Panel confirmed that “Rachine” is a well-known smuggler in CAR, where he is known
as “Achille”. Several sources told the Panel that he regularly travelled from CAR to
Cameroon with gold and diamonds, crossing at the Garoua Boulai borderpoint. A Bouar-
based mining official told the Panel that, on 27 January 2021, the day before his arrest in
Garoua Boulai, “Rachine” was in Bouar but did not declare to mining authorities that he
carried any gold. Instead, he informed mining authorities that he was going to Cameroon
for security reasons.

The Panel confirmed that the real name of the afore-mentioned individual was Huang Xiang
Xing, and that he previously led mining activities for Thien Pao in Bossangoa (Ouham
Prefecture). Huang Xiang Xing was involved in a partnership with SABICA Group and
Coopérative Minière Mère et Fils, providing financial and technical support on mining in
CAR. Huang Xiang Xing also signed a partnership agreement with Coopérative Minière de
Yaloké (COMINYA) led by Oueifio Feibonazoui Mberendeh (see para. 57 of the body of
the report). The latter who is also the manager of SABICA Group, told the Panel that the
gold seized in Garoua Boulai was produced in the framework of this partnership.14

On 7 April 2021, the CAR Government cancelled the mining permit of COMINYA (see
document below), accusing the cooperative of illicit trafficking. It is the Panel’s intention
to further investigate this issue and follow the whereabouts of gold which, by the time of
writing, was still in the hands of the authorities of Cameroon.

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14 The Panel confirmed that COMINYA had a mining permit for Yaloké.
ARRETE N°074/20/MMG/DIRCAB/DGMMG/DMCM/SDCM DU 01 JUILLET 2020
PORTANT ATtribution D‘UN (01) PERmis D‘EXPlOitation ARTISANALE SEMI-MEcanisEE A LA COOPéRATIVE MINERIE DE YALOKE (COMINYA)

LE MINISTRE DES MINES ET DE LA GEOLOGIE


SUR RAPPORT DU DIRECTEUR GENERAL DES MINES ET DE LA GEOLOGIE

ARRETE


Motifs :
- Non-respect des directives administratives ;
- Non déclaration de produits miniers à l’Administration ;
- Trafics illicites de produits miniers.

Article 2 : Il est fait retour d’office du secteur au domaine public.

Article 3 : Le Directeur Général des Mines et de la Géologie et le Commandant de la Compagnie de l’Unité Spéciale Anti-Fraude sont chargés chacun en ce qui le concerne de la stricte application des dispositions du présent Arrêté.

Article 4 : Le présent Arrêté qui abroge toutes dispositions antérieures contraires et qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature, sera enregistré et publié au Journal Officiel.

Fait à Bangui, le 07 AVR 2020

Léopold MBOLI PATRAN
Ministre des Mines et de la Géologie

Améliorations : ATCR

In 2020, CAR officially exported 52,727.51 carats of rough diamonds. These export figures were far below the expectations of the Government, which had hoped to export up to 100,000 carats. For the January-April 2021 period, the export quantities were approximately 12,000 carats. As previously mentioned (see S/2019/930, para. 153; S/2020/662, annex 7.1), the Panel is of the view that this amount is below CAR’s potential and the reality of what is currently produced in the country.

Several diamond actors including officials from the Ministry of Mines, collectors and buying houses told the Panel that the activity suffered from the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to restrictions on international travel, funders were reluctant to invest in the sector. As a consequence, for these sources, miners favoured gold mining, where the production and therefore the possibility to earn more is quicker than for diamonds. The crisis experienced by the country with the emergence of the CPC also impeded the development of the diamond sector. For example, managers of the Compagnie Minière de l’Oubangui (CCO), the buying house that made up 85% of exports of the official diamond production in CAR in 2020, told the Panel that the crisis stopped their plan to open new offices in the provinces.

The Panel observed in many areas of Mambere-Kadeï Prefecture, such as Berberati and Carnot, that diamond activity was limited. In Berberati for example, while two buying houses were operating in November 2020, only one was still active in January 2021. When the Panel visited those areas in April 2021, operators were more optimistic. For instance, three collectors told the Panel in Berberati that they had received strong promises from financial partners and were expecting funds soon.

The Panel confirmed that production activities continued in zones considered as non-compliant under the Kimberley Process, often controlled by armed groups or criminal networks and where the State has limited to no presence. For example, the Panel received convincing information concerning Bria and Nzacko (Haute Kotto and Mbomou Prefectures), located in eastern CAR where the production is known to be high and of a better quality than in the West.

While part of the production from these areas was smuggled through neighbouring countries, the rest was traded in the official chain and exported with Kimberley Process certificates. In Carnot, for example, three witnesses explained to the Panel that, in order to reach the imum required by the mining code, collectors with connections in Bria recorded in their books that diamonds from this non-compliant zone were produced in mining sites around Carnot.

The Panel confirmed that the CAR mining authorities were aware of this pratice of laundering diamonds from non-compliant production areas.

On 5 April, the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 2013) approved the removal of the company BADICA from its sanctions list.15 The Panel intends to monitor BADICA’s activities and ensure that they remain compliant with the sanctions regime.