

Daily Report 36/2021


15 February 2021¹

Summary


- Between the evenings of 12 and 14 February, the SMM recorded 17 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 20 ceasefire violations in the region.
- Between the evenings of 12 and 14 February, the Mission recorded 13 ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded four ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and again saw containers inside and near the southern edge of the area near Zolote.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable repairs and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at three entry-exit checkpoints and four corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission monitored the security situation in south-east Kherson region.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at checkpoints of the armed formations near Starolaspa, Shevchenko and Lukove, southern Donetsk region.

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³



Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 14 February 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational, and weather conditions limited the observational capabilities of some of the other cameras.

³ Including explosions.


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 13-14 February 2021



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 15/02/2021

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 12 and 14 February, the SMM recorded 17 ceasefire violations, including four explosions (three undetermined and one impact of an undetermined weapon). All but one ceasefire violation occurred in areas north of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 20 ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 12 and 14 February, the Mission recorded 13 ceasefire violations, including two undetermined explosions, all of which occurred at south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the SMM recorded four ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 9,561 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 3,252 explosions, 1,106 projectiles in flight, 101 muzzle flashes, 60 illumination flares and at least 5,042 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

On 13 and 14 February, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern edge of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On both days, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM again saw five containers inside a fenced perimeter south of the area’s southern edge, on the southern edge of the road leading eastwards towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk). On 13 February, the Mission saw five workers operating a steam roller and a truck to unload concrete tiles with a crane inside the fenced perimeter, as well as another truck nearby.

Inside the area, it again saw a container about 60–70m north of the other containers, and another one about 350m north of the area’s southern edge, both on the western edge of road T-1316. About 10–30m north of the former container, the Mission again saw six concrete blocks placed in three rows across both lanes of the same road.

On both days, the SMM again saw a container, which was previously located about 30m north of the area’s southern edge, on the area’s southern edge.

Also on both days, the Mission also saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), three of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned, accompanied by an ambulance carrying three people in medical protective gear on the former day and two people on the latter day.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

On 13 February, while positioned on the northern edge of the area, the SMM also saw ten people (five de-miners of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, two workers and three officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC)), walked inside the area to about 300m south of its northern edge, take measurements on the eastern and western edges of road T-1316 and exit the area again (see below).

On 13 February, while positioned about 4km north-north-east of the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission saw for the first time two red markers assessed as mine hazard signs about 150m north-west of its position.

On 14 February, while positioned on the western edge of Petrivske, the SMM saw a man in military-type clothing walking westwards towards Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk). While positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM observed a civilian car with a man (in his thirties) in military-type clothing driving northwards towards Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk) and returning 20 minutes later with a passenger (man in his thirties), also in military-type clothing.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

The SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and four armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region (for further information, see the table below).

SMM facilitation of repairs and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

On 13 and 14 February, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

On 13 February, the SMM continued to monitor the security situation near the pumping station close to Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

It also monitored adherence to a localized ceasefire to enable a geodetic survey of the roadbed inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote (see above).

It additionally facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable demining activities in agricultural fields near government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

On 14 February, in Donetsk region, the Mission noted that the checkpoints of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) were closed.

On 13 February, in Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska was open, with people passing through in both directions. On 14 February, between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m., the SMM saw about 550 people queuing to enter and about 500 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas. A representative of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS) told the SMM that the digital document control system had not been operational since 7:00 a.m. Between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., and at 1:20 p.m., the SMM saw people passing through in both directions. On both days, the SMM observed a golf cart operating between the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the EECP.

On both days, the SMM also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open but did not observe any people passing through, and that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

On 13 February, during its presence at the checkpoint of the armed formations 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia, the SMM also observed a civilian vehicle (dark red with Russian Federation license plates) parked on the northern edge of the checkpoint, with three men wearing light brown military-style clothing inside the vehicle (all of whom exited the car for about 10 minutes before re-entering it). On 9 February, the SMM saw the same car stationary at the same location.

Border areas outside government control

On 14 February, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM observed four cars with “DPR” plates.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the Mission saw six cars (including four with “DPR” plates), four covered cargo trucks (including three with “DPR” plates), one bus and 23 pedestrians (mixed genders and mixed ages) entering Ukraine. It also observed 17 cars (including ten with “DPR” plates), 17 covered cargo trucks (including 11 with “DPR” plates), four buses (including two with “DPR” plates) and 20 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages, including two children) exiting Ukraine.

Also on the same day, the SMM monitored border areas near Kosharne (61km south-east of Donetsk), Vasylivka (65km south-east of Donetsk), Katerynivka (79km south-east of Donetsk), Manych (76km east of Donetsk) and Kalynove (72km east of Donetsk), and observed a calm situation.

Security situation in south-east Kherson region

On 12 and 13 February, the SMM observed a calm situation in south-east Kherson region at checkpoints near Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson), Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson); at an SBGS post in Valok (188km south-east of Kherson); and in and near Henichesk (176km east of Kherson).

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 9 February 2021](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denial:

- On 13 February, at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), a visibly armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westwards towards Novolaspa (non-government controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), citing “ongoing engineering works” and “the Mission's safety.”
- On the same day, at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), a visibly armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westwards towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk), citing “the need to check with superiors” and “demining activities in the area”. While at the checkpoint, the Mission observed civilian cars passing through in different directions.
- Also on the same day, at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Lukove (non-government controlled, 72km south of Donetsk), a visibly armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage southwards towards Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 86km south of Donetsk), citing “demining activities in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:⁷

⁷ For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV's position.

- On 13 February, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, on three occasions while flying over areas in and near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk).

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁸

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
14/02/2021	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	In a compound in Pavlopil (84km south of Donetsk)	Patrol
Non-government-controlled areas				
12/02/2021	2	Armoured combat vehicle (one probable)	Near Novokyivka (25kmeast of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)		
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB variant)		
	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck		


⁸ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 14 February 2021⁹

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	13-Feb, 19:18
	5-7km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Impact, subsequent to previous event	N/K	13-Feb, 19:18
	3-5km N	Recorded	3	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	13-Feb, 19:22
	3-5km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	13-Feb, 19:24
	3-5km N	Recorded	5	Projectile	WNW to ESE	N/K	13-Feb, 23:18
	3-5km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	13-Feb, 23:24
	3-5km N	Recorded	4	Projectile	WNW to ESE	N/K	13-Feb, 23:26
	5-7km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	14-Feb, 18:43
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	2-4km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	14-Feb, 09:56
SMM camera on N edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)	2-4km SE	Recorded	2	Projectile	In vertical flight	N/K	14-Feb, 18:49
	2-4km SE	Recorded	2	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	14-Feb, 18:49
	4-6km SE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	14-Feb, 18:50
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	14-Feb, 18:51
	2-4km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	14-Feb, 18:51
	3-5km SSE	Recorded	4	Projectile	NE to SW	N/K	14-Feb, 18:51
	2-4km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	14-Feb, 18:52
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	14-Feb, 18:52

⁹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹⁰



¹⁰ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).