

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction

OCT 30
2019

QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS





The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-181) established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).

SIGAR's oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the independent and objective

- conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
- leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in such programs and operations.
- means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operation and the necessity for and progress on corrective action.

Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.


As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018 (Pub. L. No. 115-91), this quarterly report has been prepared in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

Source: Pub.L. No. 110-181, "National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008," 1/28/2008, Pub. L. No. 115-91, "National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018," 12/12/2017.

(For a list of the congressionally mandated contents of this report, see Appendix A.)

Cover photo:

Workers at Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission tabulate results from the September 28 presidential election. (UNAMA photo)





SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

I am pleased to submit to Congress, and to the Secretaries of State and Defense, SIGAR's 45th quarterly report on the status of reconstruction in Afghanistan.

This quarter marked the 18th anniversary of the U.S. intervention to ensure that Afghanistan is never again used as a haven for terror attacks on the United States as it was on September 11, 2001. International reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan have been underway since 2002.

After months of talks between U.S. and Taliban negotiators, Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad on August 31, 2019, reported that the two sides were "at the threshold of an agreement" for moving forward to intra-Afghan negotiations and a peace agreement. However, on September 7, President Donald J. Trump suspended further talks after the Taliban admitted to an attack in Kabul that killed a U.S. soldier. Meanwhile, on September 28, Afghanistan held its fourth presidential election.

Since 2011, SIGAR has raised concerns that inaccurate and unreliable personnel data for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) puts U.S. taxpayer dollars at risk. To its credit, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) at that time took steps to develop the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS), a new, computerized system to more accurately count, track, and generate payroll information for ANDSF personnel. For the second consecutive quarter, CSTC-A is reporting ANDSF assigned force-strength numbers to include only those ANDSF personnel who have been biometrically enrolled and have other required identifying information in APPS. SIGAR is encouraged by CSTC-A's confidence that the new force-strength numbers reflect what they say is the most accurate count of ANDSF personnel to date. In light of our longstanding concern over this issue, we look forward to working with CSTC-A over the coming months to fully understand the ramifications of the new force-strength numbers for past and future expenditures.

As discussed in Section One of this report, SIGAR released its seventh Lessons Learned Program report, *Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*. The report examines the five main post-2001 reintegration efforts in Afghanistan and assesses their effectiveness. Further, it examines several past local security agreements and whether they provided an opening for reintegration. The report found that none of the reintegration programs succeeded in enabling any significant number of ex-combatants to socially and economically rejoin civil society. Programs specifically targeting Taliban insurgents did not weaken the insurgency to any substantial degree or contribute meaningfully to parallel reconciliation efforts. SIGAR also initiated a new lessons-learned report this quarter on U.S. efforts to advance and empower women and girls in Afghanistan.

This quarter, SIGAR issued 14 products. SIGAR work to date has identified approximately \$2.6 billion in savings for the U.S. taxpayer.

SIGAR issued two performance audit reports this quarter, reviewing the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC) project, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (USACE) Local National Quality Assurance Program. SIGAR also issued three inspection reports that examined USACE-funded projects: the \$39.5 million Pul-e Alam power substation in the North East Power System (NEPS), the \$6.9 million Afghan National Army garrison at South Kabul Afghanistan International Airport, and the \$4.5 million Ghulam Khan road project in Khost Province.

SIGAR completed six financial audits of U.S.-funded contracts to rebuild Afghanistan. They identified \$498,840 in questioned costs as a result of internal-control deficiencies and noncompliance issues. To date, SIGAR's financial audits have identified more than \$428.5 million in questioned costs, plus interest, and other amounts payable to the U.S. government.

SIGAR's Office of Special Projects issued two reports. They reviewed the Afghan Children Read Program, and inspections of USAID-funded schools. The office also issued one inquiry letter on equipment acquisitions.

During the reporting period, six defendants investigated by SIGAR in the United States were sentenced to a total of 120 months' prison time, 240 months' supervised probation, and \$18.1 million in criminal forfeitures and restitutions. In addition, one criminal information and two indictments were obtained. SIGAR initiated nine new cases and closed 17, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 158.

SIGAR's suspension and debarment program referred two individuals for suspension or debarment based on evidence developed as part of investigations conducted by SIGAR in Afghanistan and the United States. These referrals bring the total number of individuals and companies referred by SIGAR since 2008 to 971, encompassing 532 individuals and 439 companies.

My staff and I look forward to working with Congress and other stakeholders to protect U.S. tax dollars as the U.S. mission in Afghanistan continues to evolve.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'John F. Sopko', with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Respectfully,
John F. Sopko

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report summarizes SIGAR's oversight work and updates developments in the five major areas of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan from July 1 to September 30, 2019.* It includes an essay highlighting the findings in SIGAR's recently released Lessons Learned Program report, *Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*. This reporting period, SIGAR issued 14 audits, inspections, reviews, and other products assessing U.S. efforts to build the Afghan security forces, improve governance, facilitate economic and social development, and combat the production and sale of narcotics. During the reporting period, SIGAR criminal investigations produced six sentencing, two indictments, one criminal information, 120 months' prison time, 240 months' supervised probation, and a combined total of \$18.1 million in criminal forfeitures and restitutions.

SIGAR OVERVIEW

AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS

This quarter, SIGAR issued two performance audits, six financial audits, and three inspection reports.

The **performance audit reports** examined:

- the effectiveness of USAID's implementation and oversight of the \$861.7 million Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC) project from August 2011 through March 2019
- the impact of the more than \$90 million spent by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) on a personal-services contract with Versar Inc. to hire Afghan engineers and specialists to help oversee construction projects.

The six **financial audit reports** identified \$498,840 in questioned costs as a result of internal-control deficiencies and noncompliance issues.

The **inspection reports** found:

- construction deficiencies, contractor noncompliance, and poor oversight at the \$39.5 million Pul-e Alam power substation in the North East Power System, including increased safety risks to residents living near transmission lines
- safety hazards and maintenance issues at the Afghan National Army Garrison at South Kabul International Airport, including elevated manholes that could damage vehicles driving over them
- five construction deficiencies posing safety hazards to motorists, pedestrians, and cyclists on the Ghulam Khan road project.

SPECIAL PROJECTS

This quarter, SIGAR's Office of Special Projects issued an **inquiry letter** concerning equipment acquisitions, in addition to two **reviews** concerning:

- textbooks and materials distributed to primary schools through USAID's Afghan Children Read (ACR) program
- observations from SIGAR site visits to 171 USAID-funded Afghan schools across 10 provinces

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

LESSONS LEARNED

SIGAR's Lessons Learned Program released its seventh **lessons-learned report**, *Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*. The report examines and assesses the five main post-2001 reintegration efforts in Afghanistan. It also examines several past local security agreements for efforts on reintegration. The report found that none of the reintegration programs enabled any significant number of ex-combatants to socially and economically rejoin civil society. Programs targeting Taliban insurgents did not substantially weaken the insurgency or contribute meaningfully to parallel reconciliation efforts.

The Lessons Learned Program has four projects in development: U.S. government support to elections; monitoring and evaluation of reconstruction contracting; advancing and empowering women and girls; and police and corrections.

INVESTIGATIONS

During the reporting period, SIGAR investigations resulted in six sentencing, 120 months' prison time, 240 months' supervised probation, and a combined total of \$18.1 million in criminal forfeitures and restitution. In addition, one criminal information and two indictments were obtained. SIGAR initiated nine new cases and closed 17, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 158. SIGAR's suspension and debarment program referred two individuals for suspension or debarment based on

evidence from investigations conducted by SIGAR in Afghanistan and the United States. **Investigations** highlights include:

- The former owner of a now-defunct marble mining company in Afghanistan, Adam Doost, was sentenced to 54 months' imprisonment, 36 months' supervised probation, and 250 hours' community service. He was further ordered to forfeit \$8,940,742 and pay \$8,940,742 in restitution. Doost was found guilty in September 2018 for his role in defrauding the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and defaulting on a \$15.8 million loan from OPIC.
- A former U.S. Army Special Forces member, Joseph Russell Graff, was sentenced to 52 months' imprisonment and three years' supervised probation, in addition to \$150,000 forfeiture from the proceeds of the sale of a house he purchased with questionable funds. Graff smuggled illegally obtained weapons from Afghanistan during his 2012–2013 military deployment, and smuggled an additional estimated \$350,000 in illegal proceeds.
- A former CEO of two U.S. government contractors, James O'Brien, was sentenced to six months' imprisonment, four months' home confinement, and three years' supervised release. O'Brien pleaded guilty in June 2019 for making false statements that increased his companies' competitiveness.

* As provided in its authorizing statute, SIGAR may also report on products and events occurring after September 30, 2019, up to the publication date of this report. Unless otherwise noted, all afghani-to-U.S. dollar conversions used in this report are derived by averaging the last six months of exchange-rate data available through Da Afghanistan Bank (www.dab.gov.af), then rounding to the nearest afghani. Data is as of September 24, 2019.

TABLE OF CONTENTS



SECTION 1

1 REINTEGRATING FORMER FIGHTERS

- 5 SIGAR's New Report On Reintegration
- 8 What The Reintegration Report Found
- 9 What The LLP Report Recommends
- 10 Conclusion



SECTION 2

13 SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

- 16 Audits
- 26 Inspections
- 29 Special Projects
- 33 Lessons Learned
- 34 Investigations
- 37 Other SIGAR Oversight Activities
- 39 SIGAR Budget
- 39 SIGAR Staff



SECTION 3

41 RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE

- 42 Reconstruction In Brief
- 45 Status of Funds
- 67 Security
- 103 Governance
- 131 Economic and Social Development
- 159 Counternarcotics

TABLE OF CONTENTS



SECTION 4

179 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

182 Completed Oversight Activities

187 Ongoing Oversight Activities



APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES CONTENTS

194 Appendix A: Cross-Reference of Report
to Statutory Requirements

200 Appendix B: U.S. Funds for Afghanistan Reconstruction

202 Appendix C: SIGAR Written Products

207 Appendix D: SIGAR Investigations and Hotline

214 Appendix E: SIGAR Data Call Questions That Received Classified
or Unclassified but Not Publicly Releasable Responses

218 Appendix F: Abbreviations and Acronyms

225 Endnotes

“If there is ever to be a true, sustainable peace in Afghanistan, reintegration of the Taliban and other combatants will be a necessary component of that process, whether that process begins days— or years—from now.”

—*Inspector General John Sopko, SIGAR*

1 REINTEGRATING FORMER FIGHTERS



ESSAY CONTENTS

SIGAR's New Report On Reintegration	5
What The Reintegration Report Found	8
What The LLP Report Recommends	9
Conclusion	10

Photo on previous page

A district governor in Uruzgan Province meets with a reintegrated Taliban commander to provide supplies for the former fighter's village as part of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, 2012. SIGAR's new lessons-learned report concludes that none of several such programs achieved long-lasting or significant results. (NATO Special Operations photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Matthew Leistikow)


REINTEGRATING FORMER FIGHTERS

The United States' goal in Afghanistan is a comprehensive peace agreement between the elected Afghan government and the Taliban. If the parties to the conflict succeed in this critical and daunting task, then Afghans will face the need to reintegrate thousands of former fighters into a society torn by decades of war; riven by ethnic, tribal, and ideological strife; beset by corruption, poverty, high unemployment, sluggish economic growth, weakness in the rule of law and respect for human rights; and hobbled by limited institutional capacity for carrying out basic tasks of governance.¹

Reintegration has proven a challenge in other conflicts, and seems certain to be a challenge for Afghanistan as well. A new 136-page report from the Lessons Learned Program (LLP) of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), *Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*, explains the issues, reviews lessons from previous reintegration efforts, and offers recommendations to lawmakers and policy makers for boosting prospects for success.

The new report defines “reintegration” as the long-term process of an ex-combatant gaining acceptance from his or her community and finding a sustainable livelihood. It notes that the stakes are high: “If the Afghan government and Taliban reach a peace agreement, an estimated 60,000 Taliban fighters—or possibly up to 150,000—will need to find a new livelihood. Any efforts to demobilize and reintegrate members of other armed groups who have been fighting the Taliban, or to reform the Afghan army and police, would further add to the pool of ex-combatants. If ex-combatants are not able to reintegrate, they may be more vulnerable to recruitment by criminal groups or terrorist organizations like the Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K), the local branch of the Islamic State active in eastern Afghanistan.”²

Reintegration of former fighters into society therefore must entail a complex and long-term process with social, economic, political, security, humanitarian, and financial dimensions if Afghanistan is to achieve lasting peace and stability.



SIGAR's latest lessons-learned report.
(SIGAR photo)

REINTEGRATING FORMER FIGHTERS



Inspector General John Sopko presents SIGAR's *Reintegration of Ex-Combatants* report at a launch event at the United States Institute of Peace. (SIGAR photo)

As Special Inspector General John F. Sopko writes in his introductory letter to the new report,

U.S. policymakers must consider under what conditions the United States should support reintegration efforts, and if so, determine the best approach. U.S. agencies would also need to take into account several risks to the execution of a reintegration program, including corruption, the difficulty of monitoring and evaluation, vetting challenges, and security issues. As this report lays out, these problems have plagued Afghan reintegration efforts since 2001.³

For now, the way out of conflict and the time for and manner of reintegration efforts in Afghanistan remain uncertain.

For nearly a year, a path to peace in Afghanistan seemed to be faintly visible amid the smoke and wrath of war. Beginning in October 2018, representatives of the United States and the Taliban insurgency met repeatedly in Doha, Qatar—though without official participation by the elected government in Kabul, which the Taliban does not recognize. In their talks, the antagonists discussed a framework for intra-Afghan dialogue directed toward a settlement.⁴ Topics included conditions for withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan and for preventing international terrorists from again using Afghanistan as a platform for planning and launching international terror attacks.

In March 2019, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, a former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, announced that an agreement “in draft” had been reached on those issues, and reports in late summer indicated that negotiators were “close” to an agreement.⁵

However, after a Taliban attack in Kabul caused fatalities including a U.S. soldier, President Donald Trump called off on September 7 what he described as planned, separate meetings with Taliban representatives and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani at the Camp David presidential retreat and said of the talks, “As far as I’m concerned, they’re dead.” He added he was still thinking about drawing down U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan from its level at the time of about 14,000.⁶ During an October 20 visit to Kabul, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said, “The aim is still get a peace agreement at some point, a political agreement.”⁷

In any case, talk about peace talks continued apart from the United States effort. Shortly after Trump’s announcement, Taliban representatives met with Russian officials in Moscow. The Russian Foreign Ministry said the Taliban had confirmed their interest in resuming talks with the United States, and that Russia thought resuming talks was important.⁸ Secretary of State Pompeo said he hoped talks could be started up again, though “It will ultimately be up to the Taliban.”⁹ And at the United Nations, the organization’s top envoy to Afghanistan, Tadamichi Yamamoto, called for direct talks between the Taliban and the Kabul government “as soon as possible.”

REINTEGRATING FORMER FIGHTERS

He told a meeting of the UN Security Council that “conflict can only be resolved by direct talks between the Afghan people.”¹⁰

Even if intra-Afghan talks produce an agreement, and even if reintegration programs are undertaken, other complications can arise. For example, some Taliban fighters may decide they want no part of a peace agreement. Citing various experts, the Financial Times recently reported that “Taliban hardliners angry about negotiations with the US over a troop withdrawal in exchange for counter-terrorism pledges have joined [IS-K] in droves,” boosting its strength, already estimated at 5,000–14,000 fighters in Afghanistan. The Financial Times also noted that al-Qaeda members and other jihadists from Afghanistan and Pakistan are turning to IS-K for shelter.¹¹

Further, even if a peace agreement covering all insurgents in Afghanistan were reached, failure to reintegrate former fighters may simply produce an interval between bouts of violence. In 2012, for example, the government of Colombia reached a peace agreement with the leftist guerilla-terrorist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC in its Spanish acronym) to end a conflict that began in the early 1960s and left at least 220,000 people dead. In August 2019, however, FARC rebels claimed the government had betrayed them in its promises for protection from hostile groups and for reconstruction in poor, isolated rural communities, and said they would again take up arms.¹²



Taliban fighters in Herat Province.
(Voice of America photo)

SIGAR'S NEW REPORT ON REINTEGRATION

SIGAR unveiled its new LLP report on reintegration during a September 19 special event at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, DC. USIP Vice President Andrew Wilder opened the session, saying there is much uncertainty about the outlook for peace in Afghanistan, “but what is certain is that the topic of today’s conversation on reintegration of ex-combatants is going to remain highly relevant if and when we get a peace process.”¹³

Special Inspector General John F. Sopko gave the keynote address at the event, followed by a panel discussion among other subject-matter experts. In his remarks, Sopko said, “If there is ever to be a true, sustainable peace in Afghanistan, reintegration of the Taliban and other combatants will be a necessary component of that process ... This is why today’s report by SIGAR is so important—it is the first independent, public, official U.S. government report on the trials and tribulations of reintegrating the Taliban and other combatants into Afghan society.”¹⁴

The goal of the new report, he explained, is “to help U.S., Afghan, and other coalition policymakers and agencies as they prepare for the daunting task of assisting with the reintegration of an estimated 60,000 full-time Taliban fighters, as well as numerous other non-Taliban combatants, in the event that the Afghan government and the Taliban enter negotiations to reach a political settlement.” He said the 14-month project—encouraged by

SIGAR's Lessons Learned Program

SIGAR created its Lessons Learned Program (LLP) in 2014 at the urging of former International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan commander General John Allen, former U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and other senior government officials who noted that SIGAR was the only U.S. government agency with the statutory mandate to take a “whole of government” look at approaches to reconstruction in Afghanistan. Seven LLP reports based on SIGAR's own oversight work and input from many other sources have followed. Setting out narrative context, making findings, drawing conclusions, and offering recommendations, the reports have examined U.S. anticorruption efforts in Afghanistan, reconstruction of Afghan security forces, private-sector development initiatives, stabilization activities, counternarcotics, security-sector assistance, and now, reintegration of ex-combatants. Additional reports are in development.

The project team for the new reintegration report comprised Kate Bateman, project lead; Mariam Jalalzada and Matthew Rubin, senior analysts; and Jordan Schurter, student trainee. The Lessons Learned Program Director is Joseph Windrem. The project was also supported by staffers from other SIGAR components, and benefitted from information and guidance supplied by current and former officials, academics, and reviewers.

All of SIGAR's published LLP reports are posted on the agency's website, <https://www.sigar.mil>.

General John W. Nicholson Jr., then commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan John R. Bass¹⁵—relied on 51 interviews of current and former U.S., Afghan, and other government officials and academics; research in public and private documents, and academic material; and peer review. The final product includes 14 findings, 10 lessons, and 15 recommendations for policymakers.¹⁶

A critical conclusion of the report, Sopko said, is that “Any major reintegration effort is very likely to fail in the absence of an agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban on terms for the reintegration of former fighters,” including high-level commitment and mutual trust that fighters will be allowed to participate.” Otherwise, former fighters and their families “face enormous risks of retribution” with likely little protection from the government.¹⁷

Apart from the difficulty of carrying out reintegration programs during wartime, he added, a weak economy has offered few licit livelihood opportunities for those who lay down their arms. In addition, the Afghan government has had limited capacity for administering programs, and the U.S. military has in the past maintained working relationships with militias that might otherwise have been disbanded. In other words, “We found that past programs did not lead to any significant number of former fighters reintegrating into society, did not weaken the insurgency, and did not reduce violence. If they had, we would be reading a lot less about Afghanistan these days.”¹⁸

The LLP report notes that five main reintegration programs have occurred in Afghanistan since the U.S. military intervention of 2001, targeting both the Taliban and state-aligned militias. Since 2002, the United States has spent roughly \$65 million on programs with reintegration objectives, while total international expenditures on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in Afghanistan are estimated at \$359 million.¹⁹

After the defeat of the Taliban regime in 2001, some form of an internationally supported reintegration program was in place from 2003 to 2016. Following the 2001 Bonn Agreement that established a new, internationally recognized government in Kabul, two DDR programs sought to disband state-allied militias and illegal armed groups. These early programs did not include defeated Taliban forces.

But after the Taliban regrouped and launched an insurgency against the newly established Afghan government and the foreign military forces operating under United Nations auspices, the government launched a new reintegration program in 2005 that aimed to persuade the Taliban to stop fighting. Particularly from 2009 to 2012, reintegration was a core component of U.S. military strategy and of the Afghan government's peace efforts with the Taliban.

Unfortunately, the LLP report observes, “None of these reintegration programs succeeded in enabling any significant number of ex-combatants to socially and economically rejoin civil society,” while “programs

REINTEGRATING FORMER FIGHTERS



Taliban fighters in Herat Province, 2016. (Voice of America photo)

specifically targeting Taliban insurgents did not weaken the insurgency to any substantial degree or contribute meaningfully to parallel reconciliation efforts.” In fact, the Afghan government found that violence and insecurity had increased during its most expensive and ambitious peace-and-reintegration program.²⁰

British experience about midway through the current war illustrates some of the difficulty of attempting reintegration while fighting continues. According to a 2012 report by London’s Sunday Telegraph newspaper, British officials said an 18-month, \$7 million (nearly \$9 million in current U.S. dollars) reintegration effort had attracted only 19 insurgents in Helmand Province, while 200 insurgents were dropped from the program in Sar-e Pul Province “because checks subsequently found they were not genuine fighters but instead imposters seeking cash handouts.” The article also quoted Major General David Hook, who led NATO support for the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, saying some insurgents who might genuinely wish to reintegrate “don’t want to come in, because they are afraid that coming in to us exposes them to the threat of the Taliban” taking revenge.²¹

At the time of its release, the LLP report notes, “There is no established formal reintegration program in Afghanistan.” An equitable and sustainable peace agreement could greatly reduce the violence that threatens the international reconstruction effort in Afghanistan—and by extension, any new reintegration program. The report adds, “And yet, as highlighted by SIGAR’s *2019 High-Risk List*, a peace agreement would not in itself end insecurity, corruption, or weak government capacity, nor would it magically produce the economic growth needed to create jobs for ex-combatants and thousands—if not millions—of Afghan refugees who are expected to return to the country.”²²

The current lack of a reintegration plan and the documented and prospective difficulties of executing a plan underscore the importance of understanding the background of earlier efforts.



The LLP report team: from left, editor Tracy Content, program manager Nikolai Condee-Padunov, project lead Kate Bateman, senior analyst Mariam Jalalzada, and Lessons Learned Program Director Joseph Windrem. Not shown: senior analyst Matthew Rubin and student trainee Jordan Schurter. (SIGAR photo)

WHAT THE REINTEGRATION REPORT FOUND

The LLP report makes 14 major findings from analyzing prior Afghan reintegration efforts, case studies from Colombia and Somalia, and the broader literature on reintegration.²³ Some of the most critical findings are:

- The absence of a comprehensive political settlement or peace agreement was a key factor in the failure of prior Afghan reintegration programs that targeted Taliban fighters.
- Other important factors in the failure of Afghan reintegration programs were insecurity and threats facing program participants, a weak economy offering few legal economic opportunities, and limited government capacity for program implementation.
- The U.S. government saw prior reintegration efforts targeting the Taliban primarily as a tool to fracture and weaken the insurgency, which undermined the potential for those efforts to promote peace and reconciliation.
- Prior monitoring and evaluation systems were inadequate for measuring the outcomes or effectiveness of reintegration programs in Afghanistan.
- The current environment of ongoing conflict is not conducive to a successful reintegration program.

The report's 10 lessons to inform future reintegration efforts in Afghanistan include the "high risk of failure in the absence of a political

settlement or peace agreement,” the need for physical security to induce former combatants to participate, the importance of extensive monitoring and evaluation systems, and the importance of community participation.²⁴

The last two points cited deserve special notice. Without effective monitoring and evaluation protocols, previous reintegration programs in Afghanistan could not assess whether former insurgents gained acceptance from the communities to which they returned, or what happened to them over time. In turn, the lack of baseline data and program evaluation prevented tailoring assistance to the individual, adjusting strategies midcourse, and gauging long-term impact.²⁵ Meanwhile, failing to involve communities in planning and executing a reintegration program that benefits both former combatants and the communities that receive them can create perceptions of favoritism, fueling community resentment and derailing the reintegration process.²⁶



Taliban negotiators in Qatar, August 2019.
(Radio Free Europe photo)

WHAT THE LLP REPORT RECOMMENDS

SIGAR’s reintegration report concludes with recommendations—four for the undesirable situation in which reintegration is attempted without a peace agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban, five recommending steps to be taken for reintegration after a peace agreement, and six “matters for consideration for the Afghan government.”²⁷ The U.S.-focused recommendations are intended for Congress; the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury; and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

The first two recommendations recognize the difficulty of attempting reintegration in a conflict setting. “In the current environment of an ongoing Taliban insurgency,” the report suggests, “the Congress may wish to consider not funding a program for the reintegration of ex-combatants because the Afghan government and the Taliban have not agreed to terms for reintegration.”²⁸ Similarly, “because of the difficulty in vetting, protecting, and tracking combatants who claim they want to stop fighting Afghan and coalition forces, DOD, State, and USAID should not implement a reintegration program amid the ongoing insurgency.”²⁹

If a peace agreement is concluded, however, another recommendation is that “because a wider post-conflict recovery strategy is essential to successful reintegration of ex-combatants, the Congress may wish to consider funding broad post-settlement development programs in Afghanistan.”³⁰ This would be consistent with expressed U.S. intentions to continue reconstruction in Afghanistan near current levels for some years to come.

Under matters for Afghan government consideration, the LLP report suggests that “reintegration efforts should be directed at not only former Taliban fighters, but also members of state-aligned militias and illegal armed groups.”³¹ The report notes that this recommendation presents a challenge for both Afghan and U.S. officials: “In a post-settlement context, major powerbrokers within and outside the Afghan government may agree to

REINTEGRATING FORMER FIGHTERS



Reintegrees in a 2010 program enter an Afghan base. (ISAF photo)

demobilize and reintegrate their private militias. A reintegration program should be designed to accommodate these groups. Failing to do so would give the Taliban a rationale for not participating, as they would likely seek to protect themselves against former rivals.” Meanwhile, “given the fluidity of the conflict and the difficulty of determining true allegiances, it is possible that an Afghan-led reintegration program may accept a certain number of former members of terrorist groups. U.S. agencies should be thinking now about what their legal response would be to this scenario.”³²

CONCLUSION

The research on display in SIGAR’s new Lessons Learned Program report on reintegrating former combatants makes a compelling case that the time is not ripe for attempting another big program. But as no one can predict when or how the war might end, prudence demands that serious thought be given to “the day after,” when tens of thousands of former Taliban, government soldiers and police, militia members, and even terrorists may be casting about for sources of income and a peaceful role in their troubled society. Careless or ad hoc policy responses to the challenge of reintegration could invite continuing disaster for Afghanistan and the world.

REINTEGRATING FORMER FIGHTERS



From left, Scott Worden, Kate Bateman, Erica Gaston, and Johnny Walsh discuss the new LLP report. (SIGAR photo)

Comments on *Reintegration of Ex-Combatants*

Following Inspector General Sopko's remarks at the United States Institute of Peace launch event for the new LLP report, a panel of subject-matter experts offered their initial reactions. USIP Director of Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs Scott Worden moderated the discussion.³³ Worden noted that the LLP report "is the only U.S. government independent report of this area," and is a valuable resource for policy makers who have no personal experience of early efforts.

SIGAR's Kate Bateman, project lead for the LLP report, said earlier programs that sought reintegration had three main problems: (1) vetting to determine who was actually a fighter and actually intended to stop fighting, (2) protecting reintegrees and their families, and (3) tracking and monitoring—"It's very hard to know if they have stayed out of the fight, or indeed if they ever left the fight."

Joining in remotely, Timor Sharan, Afghanistan's Deputy Minister for Policy and Technical Affairs in the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, called the report "fundamentally solid," and suggested only "some fine-tuning." He stressed that reintegration programs must not be a resource-distribution mechanism, and that a community-based approach with local people involved was important because Afghans' sense of honor and dignity extends collectively to the family, community, and tribe.

Erica Gaston, a non-resident fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute, also cautioned that past reintegration programs had become "just another source of aid spoils," fueling patronage networks. She said earlier programs "had a lot of faux fighters coming in" to collect benefits, and warned that "Nobody thinks that all of the estimated 40,000 to 60,000 Taliban fighters will take part in a disarmament process. A lot of them will continue fighting on. In addition, there are any number of armed groups who are not part of that [anticipated] peace deal."

Johnny Walsh, USIP Senior Expert for Afghanistan, observed that past attempts to use reintegration to undermine the insurgency ran into the reality that "The Taliban are an extremely cohesive movement" with great power to assassinate enemies and high resistance to attempts to divide them.

“Corruption, government malfeasance, record-high opium production, and criminalization of the economy continue to be the greatest threats to the sustainability of what Afghans, the United States, and our partners have sacrificed to achieve in Afghanistan.”

—*Acting Assistant Secretary of State Alice G. Wells*

2 SIGAR OVERSIGHT



SIGAR OVERSIGHT CONTENTS

Audits	16
Inspections	26
Special Projects	29
Lessons Learned	33
Investigations	34
Other SIGAR Oversight Activities	37
SIGAR Budget	39
SIGAR Staff	39

Photo on previous page

Inspector General Sopko, center, talks with Brigadier General William D. Taylor, senior U.S. advisor to the Afghan Ministry of Defense, during an October 2019 inspection visit to a U.S.-funded renovation project at an Afghan National Army aircraft hangar. (SIGAR photo)

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

This quarter, SIGAR issued 14 products. SIGAR work to date has identified approximately \$2.6 billion in savings for the U.S. taxpayer.

On September 19, 2019, SIGAR released its seventh Lessons Learned Program report, *Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*. The report examines the five main post-2001 reintegration efforts in Afghanistan and assesses their effectiveness. Further, it examines several past local security agreements and whether they provided an opening for reintegration. The report found that none of the reintegration programs succeeded in enabling any significant number of ex-combatants to socially and economically rejoin civil society. Programs specifically targeting Taliban insurgents did not weaken the insurgency to any substantial degree or contribute meaningfully to parallel reconciliation efforts.

SIGAR issued two performance audit reports this quarter, reviewing USAID's Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC) project, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (USACE) Local National Quality Assurance Program. SIGAR also issued three inspection reports. They examined three USACE-funded projects: the \$39.5 million Pul-e Alam power substation in the North East Power System (NEPS), the \$6.9 million Afghan National Army garrison at South Kabul Afghanistan International Airport, and the \$4.5 million Ghulam Khan road project in Khost Province.

SIGAR completed six financial audits of U.S.-funded contracts to rebuild Afghanistan. These financial audits covered a range of topics including the Department of State's support of the Afghanistan Legal Education Project, USAID's Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems Program in Afghanistan, and the Department of State's Demining and Munitions Clearance Projects in Afghanistan. These financial audits identified \$498,840 in questioned costs as a result of internal-control deficiencies and noncompliance issues. To date, SIGAR's financial audits have identified more than \$428.5 million in questioned costs, interest, and other amounts payable to the U.S. government.

This quarter, SIGAR's Office of Special Projects issued two reports. They reviewed the Afghan Children Read Program, and inspections of USAID-funded schools. The office also issued one inquiry letter on equipment acquisitions.

COMPLETED PERFORMANCE AUDITS

- Audit 19-57-AR: USAID's Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project: The Project is Behind Schedule, and Questions Remain about the Afghan Government's Ability to Use and Maintain the New Power Infrastructure
- Audit 19-60-AR: USACE's Local National Quality Assurance Program: USACE Used Qualified Personnel to Monitor Construction in Afghanistan and Is Taking Steps to Improve Contractor Reporting

COMPLETED FINANCIAL AUDITS

- Financial Audit 19-52-FA: USAID's Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems Program In Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred by Management Sciences for Health Inc.
- Financial Audit 19-54-FA: Department of State's Support of the Afghanistan Legal Education Project: Audit of Costs Incurred by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
- Financial Audit 19-56-FA: USAID's Support of the Grain Research and Innovation Project in Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred by Michigan State University
- Financial Audit 20-01-FA: USAID's Afghanistan Workforce Development Program: Audit of Costs Incurred by Creative Associates International Inc.
- Financial Audit 20-02-FA: USAID's Afghan Ministry of Women's Affairs Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment Program: Audit of Costs Incurred by The Asia Foundation
- Financial Audit 20-04-FA: Department of State's Demining and Munitions Clearance Projects in Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred by the Demining Agency for Afghanistan

Continued on the next page

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Continued from previous page

COMPLETED INSPECTION REPORTS

- Inspection Report 19-50-IP: Afghanistan's North East Power System Phase I: Construction Deficiencies, Contractor Noncompliance, and Poor Oversight Resulted in a System that May Not Operate Safely or At Planned Levels
- Inspection Report 19-53-IP: Afghan National Army Garrison at South Kabul Afghanistan International Airport: New Construction and Upgrades Generally Met Contract Requirements, but a Safety Hazard and Maintenance Issues Exist
- Inspection Report 19-55-IP: Afghanistan's Ghulam Khan Road Project: Construction of the Road Generally Met Contract Requirements, but Deficiencies Have Created Safety Hazards for Users

COMPLETED SPECIAL PROJECTS

- Inquiry Letter 19-51-SP: Acquisition & Disposal of High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
- Review 19-59-SP: Afghanistan Children Read Program: Books Distributed Were Received and Used But Problems Existed With Printing, Distribution, and Warehousing
- Review 20-03-SP: Summary of School Inspections in Afghanistan: Observations from Site Visits at 171 Afghan Schools Funded by USAID

COMPLETED LESSONS LEARNED REPORT

- Lessons Learned Report 19-58-LI: Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan

COMPLETED PERFORMANCE AUDITS

- Audit 19-57-AR: USAID's Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project: The Project is Behind Schedule, and Questions Remain about the Afghan Government's Ability to Use and Maintain the New Power Infrastructure
- Audit 19-60-AR: USACE's Local National Quality Assurance Program: USACE Used Qualified Personnel to Monitor Construction in Afghanistan and Is Taking Steps to Improve Contractor Reporting

During the reporting period, SIGAR investigations resulted in six sentencing, 120 months' prison time, 240 months' supervised probation, and a combined total of \$18.1 million in criminal forfeitures and restitutions. In addition, one criminal information and two indictments were obtained. SIGAR initiated nine new cases and closed 17, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 158.

This quarter, SIGAR's suspension and debarment program referred two individuals for suspension or debarment based on evidence developed as part of investigations conducted by SIGAR in Afghanistan and the United States. These referrals bring the total number of individuals and companies referred by SIGAR since 2008 to 971, encompassing 532 individuals and 439 companies.

AUDITS

SIGAR conducts performance and financial audits of programs and projects connected to the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Since its last report to Congress, SIGAR has issued two performance audits and six financial audits. This quarter, SIGAR has 12 ongoing performance audits and 38 ongoing financial audits.

Performance Audit Reports Issued

SIGAR issued two performance audit reports this quarter. They reviewed USAID's Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project (PTEC), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (USACE) Local National Quality Assurance Program. A list of completed and ongoing performance audits can be found in Appendix C of this quarterly report.

Performance Audit 19-57-AR: USAID's Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project

The Project is Behind Schedule, and Questions Remain about the Afghan Government's Ability to Use and Maintain the New Power Infrastructure

USAID initiated its \$861.7 million Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC) project in 2011 with the goal of expanding and improving Afghanistan's power grid.

SIGAR assessed USAID's implementation and oversight of the PTEC project from its inception in August 2011 through March 2019. The objectives of this audit were to determine the extent to which USAID (1) ensured that Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), Afghanistan's national power utility, achieved USAID's intended deliverables for PTEC—such as transmission lines and substations built, and hardware and software installed—and met those deliverables on schedule; (2) measured PTEC's progress in meeting USAID's intended project purpose and goals; (3) provided oversight and accountability for the Afghan government's commitments to USAID and

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

SIGAR Sets High Standards for Quality Control and Assurance

Since 2010, SIGAR has implemented a robust quality-control and assurance system to reinforce the principles of transparency and accountability, conduct high-quality audits, and provide leadership for other Offices of Inspector General (OIG) seeking to improve their quality control processes and procedures.

Recently, the Government Accountability Office updated the professional standards for audits in its *Government Auditing Standards, 2018 Revision*. The revised standards—commonly referred to as generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS)—provide the foundation for government auditors to lead by example and a framework for performing high-quality audit work with competence, integrity, objectivity, and independence. The revised GAGAS includes guidance that government auditors adopt many practices that SIGAR has been incorporating in its work for years. For example, the revised standards specifically require OIGs to establish a process that includes the internal review of audit documentation and reports.

Since 2010, SIGAR's Quality Control Directorate—staffed by analysts with decades of audit expertise from other government oversight agencies—has been conducting quality-control reviews to ensure that SIGAR's audits comply with professional standards and that reported findings are properly supported by sufficient and appropriate evidence. In addition, GAGAS now requires OIGs to obtain written affirmation of staff compliance with their policies and procedures on independence, a practice that SIGAR has required since its inception in 2009.

Although some OIGs have added quality-assurance specialists and directors to their organizations in recent years, SIGAR is one of the few that has had such an office. Further, the organizational placement of the QC Directorate outside of the audit organizational structure ensures independent oversight and reporting. Finally, SIGAR is the only OIG required by legislation to certify that all work—including inspections, special projects, lessons learned, and quarterly reports—comply with the standards set forth in Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation (also known as the “Blue Book”), published by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. SIGAR continues to address this requirement with policies and procedures and a monitoring system uniquely designed for its various products to ensure their compliance with these standards.

CIGIE Recognition for SIGAR Over 10 Years

The IG community has recognized SIGAR's work on numerous occasions. In its 10-year history, SIGAR has been honored with 28 awards from the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), for SIGAR's excellence in audits (8), investigations (7), and one each for excellence in evaluations and multiple disciplines. SIGAR has also received the distinguished special-category Sentner Award for Dedication and Courage four times, in 2011, 2013, 2014, and 2015; and the Glen/Roth Award for Exemplary Service in 2018. Of the six special-act awards SIGAR received, three were for Quarterly Reports, two were for Lessons Learned reports, and one was for SIGAR's Financial Audit Program.

implementation of PTEC activities; and (4) assessed whether PTEC infrastructure would be necessary and sustainable.

SIGAR's first major finding was that PTEC activities are behind schedule, and that PTEC's commercialization activities that have ended did not achieve all of USAID's intended deliverables, as specified in its implementation letters with DABS.

SIGAR's second major finding was that of the 14 original indicators used to measure PTEC's progress toward achieving its project purpose and goals, USAID changed four and dropped eight without explanation; set baselines for only 10 of the original 14 indicators and set baseline targets for only eight; and did not validate the data it sourced from DABS for four of the six indicators it was still using as of 2018.

SIGAR's third major finding was that USAID continued to provide on-budget funding to DABS for construction and commercialization activities despite concerns about DABS's internal controls, management of public finances, and vulnerabilities to corruption. In addition, DABS and USAID

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES



A solar power substation built through the Power Transmission and Connectivity Project. (SIGAR photo)

did not provide consistent oversight of the commercialization contractors, creating openings for waste, fraud, and abuse.

SIGAR's fourth major finding was that USAID did not assess the necessity and sustainability of seven of 10 capital projects funded by PTEC—each valued at more than \$5 million—despite being required to do so by Section 1273 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.

SIGAR made four recommendations to the USAID Administrator to improve USAID's performance measurement, implementation, and oversight of PTEC: (1) update or implement, as required by USAID/Afghanistan Mission Order 201.05, PTEC multi-tiered monitoring plans to include three separate sources of data for each ongoing activity, or document in the plan why using three tiers is not possible; (2) condition the \$128.8 million in on-budget assistance still obligated to DABS on its addressing USAID's concerns about its internal controls, management of public finances, and vulnerabilities to corruption; (3) develop and submit to Congress, in compliance with the requirements of Section 1273 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, necessity and sustainability assessments covering the seven capital projects that USAID has yet to submit, and revise the assessments covering the three projects that did comply, but whose analyses may now be out of date; and (4) determine whether to deobligate funds for these capital projects based on the results of the new or revised assessments.

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES



Two Afghan quality-assurance employees inspecting a fuse box at a USACE construction project. (SIGAR photo)

Performance Audit 19-60-AR: USACE's Local National Quality Assurance Program

USACE Used Qualified Personnel to Monitor Construction in Afghanistan and Is Taking Steps to Improve Contractor Reporting

From September 2012 through July 2017, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) spent more than \$90 million on a personal-services contract with Versar Inc. to help oversee USACE construction projects in Afghanistan. The contract required Versar to hire qualified local Afghan engineers and specialists, known as local national quality assurance (LNQA) employees, to perform oversight activities normally carried out by USACE employees.

SIGAR found that Versar met its personal-services contract requirements by hiring qualified LNQA personnel and submitting required documents and reports to USACE, including its quality-control plan. Additionally, USACE conducted required oversight of Versar's performance. However, USACE did not have all required construction contractor quality-control documentation for each of the 16 projects SIGAR reviewed. SIGAR also found that USACE conducted oversight of Versar in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations and USACE requirements.

While SIGAR did not identify problems with the performance of Versar or the LNQAs, the audit did find that USACE's construction contractors in Afghanistan did not fully comply with reporting requirements. USACE requires its construction contractors to use a three-phase inspection system. USACE's construction quality-assurance guidance states that work will not proceed on a task nor will USACE make payments for work that it has not validated through its three-phase inspection system.

For the 16 construction projects SIGAR reviewed, SIGAR found that USACE did not have minutes for more than 80% of the preparatory and initial meetings required by its three-phase inspection system. As a result,

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

USACE could not confirm that (1) its contractors were conducting the preparatory and initial phases completely, (2) its LNQAs were attending the meetings, and (3) the contractors were prepared to begin or continue construction on the task. SIGAR determined that the documentation for the follow-up phase complied with USACE requirements. SIGAR has reported this lack of documentation to USACE twice since 2017; USACE agreed to address it in each case.

SIGAR made one recommendation to USACE. To determine whether USACE's actions are improving contractors' documentation of the three-phase inspection system and increasing USACE's enforcement of construction contract requirements, the USACE Commanding General and Chief of Engineers should assess whether the actions USACE has taken since November 2018 have increased construction contractors' documentation of their three-phase inspection system meetings, and determine if additional actions are needed to ensure that USACE complies with its own oversight requirements.

TABLE 2.1

SIGAR'S FINANCIAL AUDIT COVERAGE (\$ BILLIONS)	
146 completed audits	\$7.62
40 ongoing audits	0.92
Total	\$8.54

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Coverage includes auditable costs incurred by recipients of U.S.-funded Afghanistan reconstruction contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements.

Source: SIGAR Audits and Inspections Directorate.

Questioned amounts: the sum of potentially unallowable questioned costs and unremitted interest on advanced federal funds or other revenue amounts payable to the government.

Questioned costs: costs determined to be potentially unallowable. The two types of questioned costs are (1) ineligible costs (violation of a law, regulation, contract, grant, cooperative agreement, etc. or an unnecessary or unreasonable expenditure of funds); and (2) unsupported costs (those not supported by adequate documentation or proper approvals at the time of an audit).

Financial Audits

SIGAR launched its financial-audit program in 2012, after Congress and the oversight community expressed concerns about oversight gaps and the growing backlog of incurred-cost audits for contracts and grants awarded in support of overseas contingency operations. SIGAR competitively selects independent accounting firms to conduct the financial audits and ensures that the audit work is performed in accordance with U.S. government auditing standards. Financial audits are coordinated with the federal inspector-general community to maximize financial-audit coverage and avoid duplication of effort.

SIGAR has 40 ongoing financial audits with over \$922 million in auditable costs, as shown in Table 2.1. A list of completed and ongoing financial audits can be found in Appendix C of this quarterly report.

This quarter, SIGAR completed six financial audits of U.S.-funded contracts to rebuild Afghanistan. These audits help provide the U.S. government and the American taxpayer reasonable assurance that the funds spent on these awards were used as intended. The audits question expenditures that cannot be substantiated or are potentially unallowable.

SIGAR issues each financial-audit report to the funding agency that made the award(s). The funding agency is responsible for making the final determination on **questioned amounts** identified in the report's audit findings. Since the program's inception, SIGAR's financial audits have identified more than \$428 million in **questioned costs** and \$364,907 in unremitted interest on advanced federal funds or other revenue amounts payable to the government. As of September 30, 2019, funding agencies had disallowed more than \$27 million in questioned amounts, which are thereby subject to collection. It takes time for funding agencies to carefully consider audit findings and

recommendations. As a result, final disallowed-cost determinations remain to be made for several of SIGAR's issued financial audits. SIGAR's financial audits have also identified and communicated 485 compliance findings and 521 internal-control findings to the auditees and funding agencies.

Financial Audits Issued

This quarter, SIGAR completed six financial audits of U.S.-funded contracts to rebuild Afghanistan. These audits identified \$498,840 in questioned costs because of internal-control deficiencies and noncompliance issues, such as incorrectly applied indirect cost rates and contractors not providing evidence of predeployment medical clearance before deploying to Afghanistan.

Financial Audit 19-54-FA: Department of State's Support of the Afghanistan Legal Education Project

Audit of Costs Incurred by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University

On January 12, 2010, the Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs awarded a two-year grant to the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University (Stanford) totaling \$1,269,575 in support of the Afghanistan Legal Education Project (ALEP). The grant's objective was to develop and expand legal education programs in Afghanistan. State issued a second grant on September 11, 2012, awarding Stanford an additional \$9,016,701 to extend its work on ALEP over a five-year period. Together these two grants totaled almost \$10.3 million, and covered more than a seven-year period. State amended these two grants nine times, which reduced total funding from about \$10.3 million to about \$9.2 million, and extended the period of performance to December 31, 2017.

SIGAR's financial audit, performed by Conrad LLP, reviewed \$7,325,489 charged to the two grants from January 15, 2010, through December 31, 2017. Conrad's audit identified three significant deficiencies and two other deficiencies in Stanford's internal controls, and four instances of non-compliance with the terms of the grants, applicable laws, and regulations. Conrad identified \$289,693 in questioned costs charged to the contract related to these issues.

Financial Audit 19-52-FA: USAID's Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems Program In Afghanistan

Audit of Costs Incurred by Management Sciences for Health Inc.

On August 29, 2011, USAID awarded a cooperative agreement to Management Sciences for Health Inc. (MSH) to implement the Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems program in Afghanistan. The agreement's purpose was to improve the pharmaceutical industry's regulatory functions, supply chain management, human resources, pharmaceutical

COMPLETED FINANCIAL AUDITS

- Financial Audit 19-54-FA: Department of State's Support of the Afghanistan Legal Education Project: Audit of Costs Incurred by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
- Financial Audit 19-52-FA: USAID's Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems Program In Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred by Management Sciences for Health Inc.
- Financial Audit 20-02-FA: USAID's Afghan Ministry of Women's Affairs Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment Program: Audit of Costs Incurred by The Asia Foundation
- Financial Audit 20-04-FA: Department of State's Demining and Munitions Clearance Projects in Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred by the Demining Agency for Afghanistan
- Financial Audit 19-56-FA: USAID's Support of the Grain Research and Innovation Project in Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred by Michigan State University
- Financial Audit 20-01-FA: USAID's Afghanistan Workforce Development Program: Audit of Costs Incurred by Creative Associates International Inc.

services, and information systems. The initial period of performance was from August 29, 2011, through August 27, 2015, with an estimated cost of \$24,449,936. USAID modified the cooperative agreement 16 times, increasing the total estimated cost to \$37,010,919 and extending the period of performance through December 28, 2017.

SIGAR's financial audit, performed by Conrad LLP, reviewed \$7,790,072 in costs incurred by MSH for the period of July 1, 2016, through December 28, 2017. Conrad identified two significant deficiencies and three deficiencies in MSH's internal controls, and four instances of noncompliance with the terms of the cooperative agreement or applicable laws and regulations. Conrad identified \$118,385 in questioned costs charged to the contract related to these issues.

Financial Audit 20-02-FA: USAID's Afghan Ministry of Women's Affairs Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment Program

Audit of Costs Incurred by The Asia Foundation

On December 20, 2012, USAID awarded a \$14.8 million cooperative agreement to The Asia Foundation (TAF) to support the Afghan Ministry of Women's Affairs Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment program. The program's goals were to strengthen the ministry's ability to advocate on behalf of Afghan women, conduct outreach and public awareness campaigns, and provide technical assistance to other ministries. After four modifications, the agreement's total funding decreased to \$11.35 million, and the period of performance was extended from December 9, 2015, through December 19, 2016.

SIGAR's financial audit, performed by Williams, Adley & Company-DC LLP (Williams Adley), reviewed \$2,535,384 in costs charged to the agreement from December 20, 2015, through December 19, 2016. Williams Adley identified one material weakness in TAF's internal controls and one instance of noncompliance with the terms and conditions of the agreement. Williams Adley identified \$35,539 in questioned costs charged to the cooperative agreement related to these issues.

Financial Audit 20-04-FA: Department of State's Demining and Munitions Clearance Projects in Afghanistan

Audit of Costs Incurred by the Demining Agency for Afghanistan

Between 2013 and 2017, the Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement awarded nine grants worth a total of \$9,843,000 to the Demining Agency for Afghanistan to support various demining and munitions clearance projects throughout Afghanistan. The period of performance of the grants spanned from March 15, 2013, through September 24, 2018. There were 29 modifications made to the grants, increasing the total approved budget to \$17,010,146 and extending the period of performance for six of the nine grants.

SIGAR's financial audit, performed by Conrad LLP, reviewed \$15,882,954 of costs incurred from March 15, 2013, through September 28, 2018. Conrad identified one deficiency, two significant deficiencies, and three instances of noncompliance with the terms of the task order and applicable laws and regulations. Conrad identified \$19,194 in questioned costs charged to the contract related to these issues.

Financial Audit 19-56-FA: USAID's Support of the Grain Research and Innovation Project in Afghanistan

Audit of Costs Incurred by Michigan State University

On March 11, 2013, USAID awarded Michigan State University (MSU) a five-year, \$24.9 million cooperative agreement in support of MSU's Global Center for Food System Innovation. USAID modified the cooperative agreement nine times, increasing the total funding to \$34.5 million, and extending the period of performance to September 30, 2022. The focus of this audit is the ninth modification that set aside \$19.5 million for the Grain Research and Innovation (GRAIN) project. GRAIN's objective is to help build Afghan researchers' abilities to conduct and manage research on wheat and cereals.

SIGAR's financial audit, performed by Conrad, reviewed \$1,370,438 charged to the cooperative agreement for the GRAIN project, from March 13, 2017, through March 12, 2018. Conrad identified two significant deficiencies in MSU's internal controls, and two instances of noncompliance with the terms of the cooperative agreement, applicable laws, and regulations. Conrad identified \$18,661 in questioned costs charged to the contract related to these issues.

Financial Audit 20-01-FA: USAID's Afghanistan Workforce Development Program

Audit of Costs Incurred by Creative Associates International Inc.

On April 5, 2012, USAID awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to Creative Associates International Inc. (CAII) to support the Afghanistan Workforce Development program. The program's goal was to increase employment opportunities and compensation for Afghan men and women through training, business development support, and job placement services. The original contract had a base period of 18 months and two option periods with an estimated cost of \$22.7 million. USAID modified the contract 17 times, increasing the budget to \$44.8 million and extending the completion date from April 4, 2015, to June 30, 2018.

SIGAR's financial audit, performed by Williams, Adley & Company-DC LLP, reviewed \$18.5 million in expenditures that CAII reported from October 1, 2015, through June 30, 2018. Williams Adley identified \$16,368 in questioned costs charged to the contract relate to these issues.



At head of table, IG Sopko, right, talks with Acting Afghan Minister of Defense Asadullah Khalid. (SIGAR photo)

IG SOPKO MAKES ANOTHER WORKING VISIT TO KABUL

During his latest trip to Afghanistan, October 12–20, Inspector General John F. Sopko met with more than 60 officials and other principals from the Afghan, U.S., and other Coalition-member governments, as well as SIGAR staff and members of private and nongovernmental organizations, to share views and concerns about the reconstruction effort and oversight issues.

At any given time, SIGAR maintains about 25 staff at Embassy Kabul and Bagram Air Field to support its audits, investigations, and inspections work, with additional staff working in-country on short-term assignments. Regular working visits by SIGAR senior leaders are a way to sharpen visibility into the agency's field work and to maintain high-level relations with key stakeholders in the reconstruction mission.

Sopko met with U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan John Bass and the commanders of U.S.



IG Sopko, left, confers with Acting Afghan Minister of Interior Affairs Mohammad Massoud Andarabi. (SIGAR photo)

Forces-Afghanistan, the NATO Resolute Support Mission, and the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan. He also met with ambassadors and heads of mission from 16 donor nations at an event hosted by the Czech ambassador. Topics of discussion there included SIGAR's *2019 High-Risk List* of threats to reconstruction programs, especially regarding obstacles to promoting women's rights and to continuing effective oversight, and

SIGAR's ongoing examination of U.S.-supported international trust funds involved in various reconstruction initiatives in Afghanistan.

Sopko's visit included meetings with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, the ministers of defense and interior, and other Afghan ministers and presidential appointees. He also attended a session of the National Procurement Commission, a body created and chaired by President

Ghani to centralize decisions on high-value government contracting. SIGAR has a regular observer presence at Commission meetings by invitation of President Ghani.

Sopko also inspected a \$2.9 million project of the U.S. Train, Advise, Assist Command-Air, managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to rebuild and renovate an Afghan National Army hangar and other facilities that had been damaged by a previous Taliban attack. He was accompanied by the Acting Afghan Minister of Defense and other Afghan and U.S. officials on this inspection, and discussed reconstruction and security developments with them. Sopko also examined multiple construction deficiencies identified by SIGAR staff and suggested that the Corps of Engineers require its contractors to correct the deficiencies while the project is still under warranty to avoid additional costs to the U.S. or Afghan governments. Prior SIGAR oversight work has documented a number of projects in which U.S. officials did not conduct timely inspections, signed off on uninspected or faulty work, or did not seek corrections until after contractor warranties had expired, relieving the contractors of financial responsibility for repairs or rework.

While Sopko was at the hangar, a U.S. contractor employee came forward to alert him to a problem. The employee had read about some of SIGAR's previous discoveries of defective or counterfeit fire extinguishers at several reconstruction projects, and told Sopko that the new hangar had received fire extinguishers



Civilian contractor shows IG Sopko counterfeit fire extinguishers. (SIGAR photo)

falsely represented as being made by the established Alabama manufacturer Amerex Corporation. SIGAR welcomes such information, and maintains email and phone hotlines to help people report concerns about waste, fraud, and abuse. SIGAR will analyze the provision of fire extinguishers and other aspects of the TAAC-Air hangar project as part of its inspection there.

Missing, defective, or counterfeit fire extinguishers and fire doors are not only matters of contract performance and fraud, but can have lethal consequences in case of a fire. Unfortunately, they are recurring problems in Afghanistan. A SIGAR inspection report earlier this year found counterfeit extinguishers and unrated fire doors at the Marshal Fahim National Defense University. Inspections in 2018 found counterfeit extinguishers and fire-door issues at an Afghan National Army base and

at the Zarang Border Crossing Point. In 2017, a SIGAR inspection detected counterfeit extinguishers and unlabeled or falsely labeled fire doors at the Kabul Military Training Center. A 2016 inspection of the new women's dormitory at Herat University found all 39 fire extinguishers there lacked a date-of-manufacture stamp, and 30 of them had the same serial number. The full reports are posted at www.sigar.mil.

Sopko also participated in an anticorruption task force meeting co-chaired by ambassadors from the UK and the European Union. In attendance were ambassadors from several other donor nations, including France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden. Sopko discussed SIGAR's second congressionally mandated review of Afghan government progress against corruption, as well as other ongoing SIGAR work.

COMPLETED INSPECTION REPORTS

- Inspection Report 19-50-IP: Afghanistan's North East Power System Phase I: Construction Deficiencies, Contractor Noncompliance, and Poor Oversight Resulted in a System that May Not Operate Safely or At Planned Levels
- Inspection Report 19-53-IP: Afghan National Army Garrison at South Kabul Afghanistan International Airport: New Construction and Upgrades Generally Met Contract Requirements, but a Safety Hazard and Maintenance Issues Exist
- Inspection Report 19-55-IP: Afghanistan's Ghulam Khan Road Project: Construction of the Road Generally Met Contract Requirements, but Deficiencies Have Created Safety Hazards for Users

INSPECTIONS

Inspection Reports Issued

This quarter, SIGAR issued three inspection reports that examined three USACE-funded projects: the \$39.5 million Pul-e Alam power substation in the North East Power System (NEPS), the \$6.9 million Afghan National Army garrison at South Kabul Afghanistan International Airport, and the \$4.5 million Ghulam Khan Road Project in Khost Province. A list of completed and ongoing inspections can be found in Appendix C of this quarterly report.

Inspection Report 19-50-IP: Afghanistan's North East Power System Phase I

Construction Deficiencies, Contractor Noncompliance, and Poor Oversight Resulted in a System that May Not Operate Safely or At Planned Levels

The North East Power System (NEPS) is intended to expand the high-voltage power system in Afghanistan. NEPS Phase I (NEPS I), is expected to provide electricity to about 30,000 Afghans in Kabul and Logar Provinces. In August 2014, USACE awarded a \$39.5 million firm-fixed-price contract to Assist Consultants Incorporated (ACI) to design and construct a new power substation at Pul-e Alam, 247 transmission towers, and 44 miles of 220 kV power transmission lines from the Arghandi substation to the new Pul-e Alam substation. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan transferred the transmission towers and lines, and the Pul-e Alam substation to the Afghan government in January and August 2018, respectively, at which point the government assumed full responsibility for operating and maintaining the system. The one-year warranty for the transmission towers and lines expired in January 2019, while the warranty for the substation expired in August 2019.

SIGAR found that ACI had completed the transmission towers and lines and built the Pul-e Alam substation. However, SIGAR found four instances of contract noncompliance, which increase safety risks for Afghans living along the transmission route and working at the Pul-e Alam substation. SIGAR also found that USACE conducted poor oversight of the NEPS I project. USACE did not document these construction deficiencies or confirm that ACI corrected them during its three-phase inspection process, which was intended to ensure that contractors comply with contract requirements. USACE also did not provide evidence to show that NEPS I has been tested at its maximum power capacity as the contract required. As a result, it is not known whether there are defects in the system or if it will function safely and as intended.

SIGAR made four recommendations to USACE. To protect the U.S. taxpayers' investment in NEPS I, and enhance safety for Afghans living near NEPS I, the USACE Commanding General and Chief of Engineers should: (1) work with the Afghan Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) to ensure

that the Afghan government has developed plans to determine ownership of undocumented land along the NEPS I transmission line, obtain the legal right to access all land required for the operation and maintenance of the NEPS I transmission line, and address dangers posed by transmission lines running near residences and other structures; (2) work with the MEW to issue notices to residents living along the NEPS I transmission line route, informing them of the safety hazards associated with living within the clear zone along the transmission lines, and include guidance about how to deal with emergencies involving the lines that could occur; (3) work with the MEW to examine all of the transmission towers to ensure that the concrete and soil compaction were completed in accordance with the contract and develop corrective actions for the ministry to consider taking if a tower foundation is noncompliant; and (4) direct ACI to replace the noncompliant fire doors or seek reimbursement from ACI for any price difference, before the warranty expired in August 2019.



An improperly built manhole which poses a safety hazard to motorists. (SIGAR photo)

Inspection Report 19-53-IP: Afghan National Army Garrison at South Kabul Afghanistan International Airport

New Construction and Upgrades Generally Met Contract Requirements, but Safety Hazard and Maintenance Issues Exist

On December 25, 2014, USACE awarded a \$6.9 million firm-fixed-price contract to Assist Consultants Inc. (ACI), an Afghan company, to complete the design work, build new facilities, and upgrade some existing utility infrastructure at the ANA garrison. The new facilities included a well house, wastewater treatment plant, and pump house; the upgraded infrastructure included the garrison's water-distribution system, generator, and two water storage tanks. The contract also required ACI to upgrade existing sewer lines, transformers, underground and overhead electric lines, lift station, and well houses.

SIGAR found that the construction and upgrades generally met contract requirements. However, SIGAR identified one construction deficiency that resulted from ACI's noncompliance with contract requirements: ACI installed three sewer manholes at elevated heights in the road instead of in the sidewalks. Rising almost eight inches above the road surface, these manholes are a safety hazard because they could damage vehicles driving over them. SIGAR also found that ACI installed control panels that complied with the contract, but had unauthorized "Underwriters Laboratories" markings on the product labels. USACE did not discover the deficiencies prior to approving the completed work. SIGAR found that the support facilities and utility infrastructure upgrades ACI constructed at the ANA garrison are being used, but maintenance issues exist. The Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and IDS International Government Services (IDS), a U.S. company, work together to maintain the facilities and upgrades, but a booster pump, mixer pump, and storage tank's water-level gauge were not

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES



Ghulam Khan road culvert missing required protective walls. (SIGAR photo)

functioning. In addition, another booster pump is leaking water, an electrical transformer is leaking oil, and some tree branches are touching utility poles and transmission lines, which could cause a fire.

SIGAR made one recommendation to Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). SIGAR recommended that the Commander of CSTC-A notify the MOD of the six maintenance issues at the garrison—the nonfunctioning booster pump, mixer pump in well house No. 101, and water-level gauge on water storage tank no. 100A; the leaking booster pump and electrical transformer; and the trees surrounding the electrical poles and transmission lines—so the MOD can direct IDS to fix them.

Inspection Report 19-55-IP: Afghanistan's Ghulam Khan Road Project

Construction of the Road Generally Met Contract Requirements, but Deficiencies Have Created Safety Hazards for Users

In September 2015, USACE awarded a \$4.5 million firm-fixed-price contract to Batoor Design and Construction Incorporated (BDCI), an Afghan company, to design and construct a 4.3-mile paved asphalt road from Gurbuz District to Khost City in Khost Province. The contract also required BDCI to construct 21 culverts under the roadway, a 13.1-foot-wide, one-lane bridge, and a 4.9-foot-wide sidewalk on both sides of the bridge. The project was completed in July 2017, and the construction warranty expired in July 2018.

SIGAR found that BDCI generally built the Ghulam Khan road and bridge according to contract requirements and technical specifications. However, SIGAR identified five construction deficiencies, four of which involved the bridge spanning the Kaitu River. Specifically, the bridge's concrete support beams had honeycombing, and BDCI did not build the bridge's stone foundation barriers, retaining walls, and protective railings to required heights. Three of these deficiencies could impact the bridge's structural integrity. In addition, BDCI did not construct protective walls around two of the 21 road culverts. All five deficiencies create safety hazards for motorists, pedestrians, and cyclists using the road and bridge. The deficiencies resulted from BDCI's noncompliance with contract requirements and technical specifications, and USACE's inadequate oversight during the construction and the final and warranty inspections.

SIGAR found that motorists were using the Ghulam Khan road and bridge, and that pedestrians and bicyclists were using the sidewalks along the bridge. However, five of the road's 21 culverts were not being maintained. Poor maintenance of these culverts may lead to their deterioration over time, which could shorten the road's useful life and create a safety hazard.

SIGAR made one recommendation to U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A): The Commander of USFOR-A should notify the Afghan

Ministry of Public Works of the deficiencies and maintenance issues with the road and bridge—specifically, support beams with honeycombing; shorter-than-required stone barriers, protective retaining walls and railings; missing protective walls around culverts; and broken stone masonry and uncleared debris around culverts—so the ministry can take action to correct them.

Status of SIGAR Recommendations

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires SIGAR to report on the status of its recommendations. This quarter, SIGAR closed five recommendations contained in 13 performance audit, inspection, and financial audit reports.

From 2009 through September 2019, SIGAR issued 352 audits, alert letters, and inspection reports, and made 1,005 recommendations to recover funds, improve agency oversight, and increase program effectiveness.

SIGAR has closed 865 of these recommendations, about 86%. Closing a recommendation generally indicates SIGAR's assessment that the audited agency has either implemented the recommendation or has otherwise appropriately addressed the issue. In some cases where the agency has failed to act, SIGAR will close the recommendation as "Not Implemented"; this quarter, SIGAR closed seven recommendations in this manner. In some cases, these unimplemented recommendations will be the subject of follow-up audit or inspection work.

SIGAR is also required to report on any significant recommendations from prior reports on which corrective action has not been completed. This quarter, SIGAR continued to monitor agency actions on 140 open recommendations. Of these recommendations, 72 have been open more than 12 months; these remain open because the agency involved has not yet produced a corrective-action plan that SIGAR believes would resolve the identified problem, or has otherwise failed to appropriately respond to the recommendation(s).

For a complete list of open recommendations see www.sigar.mil.

SPECIAL PROJECTS

SIGAR's Office of Special Projects was created to quickly obtain and access information necessary to fulfill SIGAR's oversight mandates; examine emerging issues; and deliver prompt, actionable reports to federal agencies and the Congress. Special Projects reports and letters focus on providing timely, credible, and useful information to Congress and the public. The directorate comprises a team of analysts supported by investigators, lawyers, subject-matter experts, and other specialists who can quickly and jointly apply their expertise to emerging problems and questions. The

COMPLETED SPECIAL PROJECTS

- Review 19-59-SP: Afghanistan Children Read Program: Books Distributed Were Received and Used But Problems Existed With Printing, Distribution, and Warehousing
- Review 20-03-SP: Summary of School Inspections in Afghanistan: Observations from Site Visits at 171 Afghan Schools Funded by USAID
- Inquiry Letter 19-51-SP: Acquisition & Disposal of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles

team conducts a variety of assessments, producing reports on all facets of Afghanistan reconstruction.

This quarter, SIGAR's Office of Special Projects issued two review reports. They reviewed the Afghan Children Read Program, and inspections of USAID-funded schools. The office also issued one inquiry letter on equipment acquisitions. A list of completed Special Projects can be found in Appendix C of this quarterly report.

Review 19-59-SP: Afghanistan Children Read Program Books Distributed Were Received and Used But Problems Existed With Printing, Distribution, and Warehousing

This report was conducted in response to a Ministry of Education Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment completed in October 2017 by the Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring & Evaluation Committee (MEC). The MEC report identified numerous concerns with the printing and distribution of textbooks procured through USAID's Afghan Children Read (ACR) program. ACR entailed the printing, distribution, and warehousing of hundreds of thousands of student textbooks/workbooks and teacher guide/assessment books, which collectively are referred to as Teaching and Learning Material (TLM), for students in grades 1–3.

SIGAR visited 77 schools in four provinces that the program targeted initially to determine whether the TLMs were printed and delivered to the schools and were being used for their intended purposes. These inspections found that the books ordered and shipped were received by the schools and that school officials found them very useful and incorporated them into their curriculum. However, SIGAR found deficiencies in the quality of these books, such as loose or blank pages, misspellings, and low-quality paper. Principals and teachers at one quarter of the schools inspected stated that the books were no longer in usable condition.

SIGAR also identified distribution problems. At the five warehouses where ACR TLMs were being stored, over 150,000 textbooks had been in storage for up to two years. Four of the five warehouse managers also stated that they had no plans to distribute any of these books in the near future.

SIGAR made three recommendations to USAID: (1) assess the printing contractor's compliance with contract specifications; (2) inspect the storage facilities for an accurate accounting of the books and to determine if the storage facilities are adequate to both safeguard and maintain the books in good condition; and (3) develop a plan with the Ministry of Education to determine how best to utilize the books in storage. USAID agreed with the recommendations and stated that they will share the report with their implementing partner and request that they: (1) provide USAID with a current status report and milestone plan with proposed actions within 10 business days from receipt of the final SIGAR report; and (2) fully



Primary school students in Herat Province using ACR-provided learning materials.
(SIGAR photo)

resolve SIGAR recommendations within three months from receipt of the final report.

Review 20-03-SP: Summary of School Inspections in Afghanistan

Observations from Site Visits at 171 Afghan Schools Funded by USAID

This report summarizes findings from SIGAR site visits to USAID-funded schools across 10 provinces in Afghanistan. Between 2003 and 2013, USAID built or rehabilitated 566 schools across all 34 Afghan provinces.

The lack of resources to sustain this large investment, along with the harsh climate and continued insurgency have resulted in significant deterioration of the U.S. investment and may hinder the achievement of education goals. SIGAR visited 171 schools in 10 provinces throughout Afghanistan and issued 10 reports and four alert letters addressing the condition of those schools. These reports found that while 168 of the 171 schools (98.25%) were open and in generally usable condition, some of the schools had structural issues that could pose risks to the schools' students and staff.

In four instances, SIGAR issued alert letters to notify USAID of unsafe conditions at specific schools that required immediate attention to ensure the safety of the teachers and children. Additionally, SIGAR inspections found that many of the schools had structural deficiencies (e.g., showed signs of settlement or deterioration, cracks or large holes in their roofs, and damaged or removed windows and doors) that could potentially impact



A USAID-funded high school in Bamyan Province. (SIGAR photo)

safety and the delivery of education. Finally, SIGAR observed that only 86 of 171 (approximately 50%) schools had enough tables and chairs for students, and 61 of the 171 schools (approximately 36%) did not have signage showing that USAID built or rehabilitated the schools, as required by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

Inquiry Letter 19-51-SP: Acquisition & Disposal of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles

In response to a congressional request to investigate allegations of questionable requirements decisions at CSTC-A, SIGAR inquired about CSTC-A's rationale to replace, rather than repair, the M1114 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) with the M1151A1 variant, and about its choice of Gunner Protection Kits for the new vehicles.

SIGAR specifically asked if CSTC-A directed the vehicle maintenance contractor to discontinue maintenance on the M1114 and whether it was based on a cost-benefit analysis. The letter also inquired about the type of gunner protection kit they were installing on the M1151A1 HMMWVs and whether it included overhead protection and the gunner elevation kit. Finally, the letter requested that CSTC-A explain how HMMWV replacement requirements were determined.

DOD responded that CSTC-A developed a vehicle strategy that resulted in pure-fleeting, in which the entire force uses the same equipment, with the goal of reducing costs due to streamlined logistics and maintenance. They said no formal cost-benefit analysis was done because the decision to cease maintenance on M1114s was based on the belief that a pure fleet of M1151s and M1152s would reduce costs due to streamlined logistics and maintenance. In response to the questions related to the type of gunner protection kits on the M1151A1s and whether they intended to equip the Afghans with the latest version that included overhead protection and the elevation kit, DOD stated that they were installing the "Frag Kit 5" and had no plans to upgrade. DOD explained that the "Frag Kit 7"—which includes the overhead protection and elevation kit—must be installed/retrofitted to reinforce the HMMWV roof, with other supplements needed to handle the additional weight. In response to the question on how replacement requirements are determined, DOD stated that CSTC-A's strategy developed in 2015 to replace HMMWVs every 7.5 years was simply too expensive to sustain and that they currently use the 2010 U.S. Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy, which directs planning and programming for HMMWV sustainment expectancy at 20 years.

LESSONS LEARNED

SIGAR's Lessons Learned Program was created to identify lessons and make recommendations to Congress and executive agencies on ways to improve current and future reconstruction efforts. To date, the program has issued seven reports. Four reports are currently in development on: U.S. government support to elections; monitoring and evaluation of reconstruction contracting; efforts to advance and empower women and girls; and a report on police and corrections.

Issued lessons-learned reports and their companion interactive versions are posted on SIGAR's website, www.sigar.mil.

Lessons Learned Report 19-58-LL: Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan

On September 19, SIGAR issued its seventh Lessons Learned Program report, *Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*. The report examines the five main post-2001 reintegration efforts in Afghanistan and assesses their effectiveness. Further, it examines several past local security agreements and whether they provided an opening for reintegration. The report also examines opportunities and constraints for reintegration efforts now and in the future, includes case studies of reintegration in Colombia and Somalia, and reviews the broader literature.

The report identifies lessons to inform U.S. policies and actions regarding the reintegration of ex-combatants. These lessons are relevant for Afghanistan, where the United States will likely remain engaged in the coming years, and for reintegration efforts in other conflict-affected countries. The report also provides recommendations to the Congress and executive branch agencies for improving such efforts, as well as matters for consideration for the Afghan government.


SIGAR's findings highlight the difficulty of reintegrating ex-combatants during an active insurgency in a fragile state. In Afghanistan, the report found that the absence of a comprehensive political settlement or peace agreement was a key factor in the failure of prior reintegration programs targeting Taliban fighters. Other important factors were insecurity and threats facing program participants, a weak economy offering few legal economic opportunities, and limited government capacity to implement a program. None of the reintegration programs succeeded in enabling any significant number of ex-combatants to socially and economically rejoin civil society. Programs specifically targeting Taliban insurgents did not weaken the insurgency to any substantial degree or contribute meaningfully to parallel reconciliation efforts.

COMPLETED LESSONS LEARNED REPORT

- Lessons Learned Report 19-58-LL: Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan

FIGURE 2.1

SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS: NUMBER OF OPEN INVESTIGATIONS, AS OF OCTOBER 2, 2019



Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 10/2/2019.

INVESTIGATIONS

During the reporting period, SIGAR's criminal investigations resulted in six sentencings, 120 months' prison time, 240 months' supervised probation, and a combined total of \$18.1 million in criminal forfeitures and restitutions. In addition, one criminal information and two indictments were obtained. SIGAR initiated nine new cases and closed 17, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 158.

To date, SIGAR investigations have resulted in a cumulative total of 137 criminal convictions. Criminal fines, restitutions, forfeitures, civil settlements, and U.S. government cost savings and recoveries total nearly \$1.6 billion.

Former Owner of Marble Mining Company Sentenced for Scheme to Defraud U.S. Government Agency, Leading to Default on a \$15.8 Million Loan

On September 19, 2019, Adam Doost was sentenced to 54 months' imprisonment, 36 months' supervised probation, and 250 hours' community service. He was ordered to forfeit \$8,940,742 and pay \$8,940,742 in restitution. After a seven-day trial in September 2018, the former owner of a now-defunct marble mining company in Afghanistan was found guilty for his role in defrauding the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a U.S. government agency, and defaulting on a \$15.8 million loan.

While working at his company, Equity Capital Mining LLC, Doost and his brother obtained a \$15.8 million loan from OPIC for the development, maintenance, and operation of a marble mine in Afghanistan. The loan proceeds were paid directly by OPIC to the alleged vendors for their services, as reported to OPIC by Doost or his consultant.

Doost was required to deal with these companies in arms-length transactions or, to the extent any transactions were other than arms-length, he was required to report to OPIC any affiliation he had with a vendor. Doost informed OPIC that he had no affiliation with any of the vendors with whom he dealt, when in fact he had financial relationships with several of them. His business partner was listed on bank accounts for a number of the vendors. Significant amounts of the funds received from OPIC were transferred to Doost's associates, or to pay his debts.

Doost and his brother failed to repay any of the principal on the OPIC loan, paid only a limited amount of interest, and ultimately defaulted on the loan.

SIGAR and the FBI investigated the case.

Former U.S. Army Soldier Sentenced for Unlawful Possession of Illegal Firearms

On September 27, 2019, in the Eastern District of North Carolina, former U.S. Army Special Forces member Joseph Russell Graff was sentenced to

52 months' imprisonment, followed by three years' supervised probation. In lieu of a restitution, the judge accepted a forfeiture of \$150,000 from the proceeds of the sale of a house he had purchased with questionable funds. The sentence was based on his plea to one count of unlawful possession of an illegal firearm. This was count 30 of a previously reported 33-count indictment filed against Graff.

Graff smuggled illegally obtained weapons from Afghanistan during his 2012–2013 military deployment. In addition, while in the process of decommissioning the Special Forces compound within a forward operating base, Graff allowed U.S. military equipment to be stolen and sold on the black market. He smuggled his illegal proceeds, estimated at \$350,000, inside his personal belongings and transferred the money to various U.S. banks to avoid bank reporting requirements. Graff used the money for a down payment on a home, an in-ground pool, and vehicles.

The investigation was conducted by SIGAR, the FBI, DCIS, and U.S. Army CID.

Former CEO of Two U.S. Government Contractors Sentenced for Falsifying Government Documents

On September 16, 2019, in the Middle District of Florida, James O'Brien was sentenced to six months' imprisonment, four months' home confinement and three years' supervised release. On June 18, 2019, O'Brien pleaded guilty to making false statements to increase his companies' competitiveness.

From 2013 to 2015, O'Brien was CEO of Tamerlane Global Services and Artemis Global, which were awarded a logistics contract issued by the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) in Afghanistan. Deployed contractors must have letters of authorization (LOAs) issued by the government agency responsible for the deployment. The LOAs serve as the contractors' authorization to be deployed, and set forth the U.S. government-provided benefits that contractors may utilize at no cost while deployed. LOAs authorizing government benefits are known as "provisioned LOAs," and are factored into the cost of a contract. TRANSCOM issued deploying Tamerlane and Artemis employees with unprovisioned LOAs. O'Brien then altered the unprovisioned LOAs, including his own, to make them appear as though they were provisioned. He provided the altered LOAs to his employees who used them to utilize government provided benefits in Afghanistan at no cost to the company.

SIGAR conducted the investigation.

U.S. Government Contractor Sentenced for Involvement in Fraudulent Scheme

On September 30, 2019, in the District of South Carolina, former U.S. government contractor Antonio Jones was sentenced for one count of making



Illegally obtained weapons smuggled from Afghanistan. (SIGAR photo)

false statements. He was ordered to serve 60 months' probation, 450 hours' community service, and pay \$20,000 in criminal fines.

To help an individual secure a lucrative job handling hazardous material (HAZMAT) in Afghanistan, Jones created and used a fake Department of Transportation HAZMAT training certificate. A South Carolina-based contractor accepted the fake HAZMAT certificate as proof that Jones' client had attended a training course prescribed by federal regulation when in fact the client had not. Jones and a co-conspirator purported to offer job-placement services to individuals seeking employment in Afghanistan and elsewhere. They created fake training certificates and false resumes to make their clients appear more qualified than they actually were, and used the false documents to apply for jobs on their clients' behalf.

SIGAR, the FBI, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) investigated this case.

U.S. Military Member Sentenced for Involvement in Embezzlement Scheme

On July 9, 2019, in the Eastern District of North Carolina, U.S. Army Sergeant First Class (SFC) Cleo Autry was sentenced to three years' federal probation, and ordered to pay \$40,000 in restitution and a forfeiture of \$40,000. Although the federal sentencing guidelines called for a higher sentence for Autry's criminal activities, a downward departure from the guidelines was agreed to due to his prior cooperation and testimony of a co-conspirator.

SFC Autry, SFC Deric Harper, and SFC Jeffrey Cook were deployed with the U.S. Army 3rd Special Forces Group under the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force at FOB Jalalabad in Afghanistan. During their deployment, they conspired to embezzle funds from the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and from funds used by Special Forces Groups to support counterterrorism operations. Over time, they stole cash, purchased a substantial number of \$1,000 money orders, and sent the funds to their spouses, to electronic bank accounts, or to various vendors.

Suspensions and Debarments

This quarter, SIGAR's suspension and debarment program referred two individuals for suspension or debarment—actions taken by U.S. agencies to exclude companies or individuals from receiving federal contracts or assistance because of misconduct—based on evidence developed as part of investigations conducted by SIGAR in Afghanistan and the United States. These referrals bring the total number of individuals and companies referred by SIGAR since 2008 to 971, encompassing 532 individuals and 439 companies to date.

As of September 30, 2019, SIGAR's efforts to utilize suspension and debarment to address fraud, corruption and poor performance in Afghanistan have resulted in a total of 141 suspensions and 557 finalized debarments/special entity designations of individuals and companies engaged in U.S.-funded reconstruction projects. An additional 24 individuals and companies have entered into administrative compliance agreements with the U.S. government in lieu of exclusion from contracting since the initiation of the program. During the fourth quarter of FY 2019, SIGAR's referrals resulted in two finalized debarments. Three individuals and one additional company are currently in proposed debarment status, awaiting final adjudication of a debarment decision by agency suspension and debarment officials.

Suspensions and debarments are an important tool for ensuring that agencies award contracts only to responsible entities. SIGAR's program addresses three challenges posed by U.S. policy and the contingency contracting environment in Afghanistan: the need to act quickly, the limited U.S. jurisdiction over Afghan nationals and Afghan companies, and the vetting challenges inherent in the use of multiple tiers of subcontractors. SIGAR continues to look for ways to enhance the government's responses to these challenges through the innovative use of information resources and investigative assets both in Afghanistan and the United States.

SIGAR makes referrals for suspensions and debarments based on completed investigations that SIGAR conducts or participates in. In most cases, SIGAR's referrals occur in the absence of acceptance of an allegation for criminal prosecution or remedial action by a contracting office and are therefore the primary remedy to address contractor misconduct.

In making referrals to agencies, SIGAR provides the basis for a suspension or debarment decision by the agency as well as all of the supporting documentation needed for an agency to defend that decision should it be challenged by the contractor at issue. Based on the evolving nature of the contracting environment in Afghanistan and the available evidence of contractor misconduct and/or poor performance, on occasion SIGAR has found it necessary to refer individuals or companies on multiple occasions for consideration by agency suspension and debarment officials.

OTHER SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Inspector General Sopko Unveils SIGAR Lessons Learned Report: *Reintegration of Ex-Combatants* at U.S. Institute of Peace

On September 19, 2019, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) hosted Inspector General John Sopko for the public release of SIGAR's seventh lessons-learned report, *Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S.*

OTHER SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

- Inspector General Sopko Unveils SIGAR Lessons Learned Report: "Reintegration of Ex-Combatants" at U.S. Institute of Peace
- Deputy Inspector General Aloise Discusses Lessons Learned in Police Training from Afghanistan at NATO Event
- Deputy Inspector General Aloise Speaks at 11th International Conference of Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces

Experience in Afghanistan. Inspector General Sopko was the keynote speaker at the event and discussed how the report examines post-2001 reintegration efforts in Afghanistan, and the opportunities and constraints for reintegration now and in the future. He outlined some of the key lessons identified in the report, as well as recommendations to the U.S. Congress and executive branch for how the United States can best advance reintegration goals.

Following the Inspector General's remarks, USIP hosted a panel discussion to discuss the report and related reintegration issues. Participants included Kate Bateman, SIGAR's Project Lead for Reintegration; Erica Gaston, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute; Timor Sharan, Deputy Minister for Policy and Technical Affairs at the Independent Directorate of Local Governance in Afghanistan; and Johnny Walsh, Senior Expert at USIP.

Deputy Inspector General Aloise Discusses Lessons Learned in Police Training from Afghanistan at NATO Event

On October 8, 2019, Deputy Inspector General Gene Aloise spoke at the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence in Vicenza, Italy, at the NATO Stability Policing Lessons Learned Conference and Workshop entitled "Assessment of Spoiler Threats: A Shared Requirement." Deputy Inspector General Aloise's remarks focused on the findings from SIGAR's lessons learned reports on the training of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and how the ANP's training has been impaired by both endemic corruption and a lack of coordination amongst, and within, NATO partners, including the United States. Conference attendees included representatives from the UN Department of Peace Operations, the European Union Civilian Conduct Planning Capability, NATO Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation Office, NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, the African Union Peace Support Operations Division, and other notable civilian and military officials.

Deputy Inspector General Aloise Speaks at 11th International Conference of Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces

Deputy Inspector General Aloise planned to speak at the 11th Annual Conference of Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces, in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, on October 28, 2019. The conference, cosponsored by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance and the Parliamentary Military Commissioner of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this year focused on "Building Resilient and Sustainable Ombuds Institutions," specifically how ombuds institutions can develop stronger internal capacities so that they are able to withstand threats and adapt to changing and challenging environments, including how ombuds institutions can avoid politicization and attacks against their impartiality and independence,

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

without compromising their mandate. Deputy Inspector General Aloise's planned remarks focused on SIGAR's need to be flexible and adaptable in order to provide effective oversight in an active combat zone, as well as how SIGAR protects its independence from various government and nongovernmental stakeholders. The conference was supported by the German Federal Foreign Office, the Office of the Norwegian Parliamentary Ombudsman for the Armed Forces, and the Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands.

SIGAR BUDGET

SIGAR is funded through September 30, 2020, under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, H.J. Res. 31, which provides the agency full funding based on the FY 2019 amount of \$54.9 million. The budget supports SIGAR's oversight activities and products by funding SIGAR's Audits and Inspections, Investigations, Management and Support, and Research and Analysis Directorates, as well as its Office of Special Projects and the Lessons Learned Program.

SIGAR STAFF

SIGAR's staff count remained steady since the last report to Congress, with 182 employees on board at the end of the quarter: 18 SIGAR employees were at the U.S. Embassy Kabul and one was at Bagram Airfield. SIGAR employed five Afghan nationals in its Kabul office to support the Investigations and Audits Directorates. In addition, SIGAR supplements its resident staff with personnel assigned to short-term temporary duty in Afghanistan. This quarter, SIGAR had eight employees on temporary duty in Afghanistan for a total of 100 days.

“Right now, it’s our judgment that the Afghans need support to deal with the level of violence that is associated with the insurgency today. If an agreement happens in the future, if the security environment changes, then obviously our posture may adjust.”

—*Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*
General Joseph Dunford

3 RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE



RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE CONTENTS

Reconstruction in Brief	43
Status of Funds	44
Security	66
Governance	102
Economic and Social Development	130
Counternarcotics	158

Photo on previous page

Workers at Zainullah Ironsmiths make doors, wheelbarrows, axes, and other steel products.
(UNDP Afghanistan photo by Omer Sadaat)



RECONSTRUCTION IN BRIEF

Section 3 of this quarterly report summarizes the key events of the reporting period as well as programs and projects concerning Afghanistan reconstruction across five sectors: Funding, Security, Governance, Economic and Social Development, and Counternarcotics.

U.S.-TALIBAN TALKS SUSPENDED

- President Donald J. Trump suspended U.S.-Taliban peace negotiations on September 7, 2019.
- Prior to the suspension, there had been nine rounds of talks between U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad and the insurgent group.
- At the conclusion of the last round of talks on August 31, Ambassador Khalilzad had described the situation as being “at the threshold of an agreement.”

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HELD

- Afghanistan held its fourth presidential election on September 28, 2019.
- Based on initial turnout results from 79% of the polling centers, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) said that only 2.2 million of 9.67 million registered Afghans voted.
- President Ghani attributed the low turnout to the failure of Afghanistan’s unity government to implement reforms and improve the living situation of Afghans.
- Results had not been announced at the time this report was published.

HEAVY FIGHTING RESULTS IN HIGH CIVILIAN AND COMBAT CASUALTIES

- The elite Afghan Special Security Forces conducted more operations against the Taliban and other insurgents in January–September 2019 than in all of 2018.
- U.S. and Coalition air missions released more munitions in Afghanistan in September 2019 than in any month since October 2010.
- The Taliban increased both its overall and “effective” (casualty-producing) attacks against the ANDSF and Coalition this quarter.
- Both Resolute Support (RS) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded significant increases in civilian casualties this summer compared to last summer.

THE AFGHAN ECONOMY CONTRACTS

- Afghanistan’s gross domestic product contracted by 0.2% in 2018, including opium-poppy cultivation, according to the country’s statistical authority.
- Afghan government revenues grew by just 3.2% over the first eight months of FY 1398 (December 22, 2018–December 21, 2019), year-on-year.
- An additional \$5.2 billion in economic and social development funds may be required to sustain a potential Afghan political settlement, the World Bank said in a draft plan.

OPIUM-POPPY CULTIVATION DECLINES

- Afghanistan opium-poppy cultivation declined 20% between 2017 and 2018, largely as a result of a drought, but was still at the second-highest level since the UN Office on Drugs and Crime began tracking in 1994.
- The country is also dealing with a growing methamphetamine-production problem.

U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019

- Cumulative appropriations for reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan since FY 2002 totaled approximately \$132.6 billion.
- \$114.2 billion, or 86%, was appropriated to the nine largest active reconstruction funds.
- Of the amount appropriated to the nine largest active funds since FY 2002, approximately \$6.58 billion remained to be disbursed.
- The Department of Defense reported in its latest “Cost of War Report,” dated June 30, 2019, that cumulative obligations for Afghanistan including warfighting had reached \$764.5 billion. The cost of Afghanistan reconstruction equaled 16% of this amount at that date.

STATUS OF FUNDS CONTENTS

U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Afghanistan	46
U.S. Cost of War and Reconstruction in Afghanistan	48
Afghanistan Reconstruction Funding Pipeline	49
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund	50
Commander's Emergency Response Program	54
Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities	55
Economic Support Fund	56
Food For Peace: Title II and IDA Programs	57
Foreign Disaster Assistance: IDA Programs	58
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	59
Migration and Refugee Assistance	60
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs	61
International Reconstruction Funding for Afghanistan	62

STATUS OF FUNDS


In accord with SIGAR's legislative mandate, this section details the status of U.S. funds appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. As of September 30, 2019, the United States had appropriated approximately \$132.55 billion for reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan since FY 2002. Total Afghanistan reconstruction funding has been allocated as follows:

- \$82.55 billion for security (including \$4.57 billion for counternarcotics initiatives)
- \$34.46 billion for governance and development (including \$4.37 billion for counternarcotics initiatives)
- \$3.85 billion for humanitarian aid
- \$11.70 billion for civilian operations

Figure 3.1 shows the nine largest active U.S. funds that contribute to these efforts. Prior to January 2019, SIGAR reported on seven major funds; the current nine-fund format reflects appropriations that have placed significant amounts in other funds.

FIGURE 3.1

U.S. APPROPRIATIONS SUPPORTING AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS (\$ BILLIONS)




Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: Details of accounts, including sources of data, are provided in Appendix B to this report.

ASFF: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
CERP: Commander's Emergency Response Program
DICDA: Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities
ESF: Economic Support Fund
TITLE II: Public Law No. 480 Title II
IDA: International Disaster Assistance
INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
MRA: Migration and Refugee Assistance
NADR: Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

STATUS OF FUNDS



The amount provided to the nine largest active U.S. funds represents more than 86.1% (over \$114.13 billion) of total reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan since FY 2002. Of this amount, over 91.3% (more than \$104.21 billion) has been obligated, and nearly 87.7% (nearly \$100.09 billion) has been disbursed. An estimated \$5.60 billion of the amount appropriated for these funds has expired and will therefore not be disbursed.

U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN


The amount provided to the nine largest active U.S. funds represents more than 86.1% (nearly \$114.17 billion) of total reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan since FY 2002. Of this amount, over 92.9% (nearly \$106.11 billion) has been obligated, and nearly 89.2% (nearly \$101.80 billion) has been disbursed. An estimated \$5.80 billion of the amount appropriated for these funds has expired and will therefore not be disbursed.

As of September 30, 2019, cumulative appropriations for reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan totaled approximately \$132.55 billion, as shown in Figure 3.2. This total can be divided into four major categories of reconstruction and related funding: security, governance and development, humanitarian, and oversight and operations. Approximately \$8.94 billion of these funds support counternarcotics initiatives that crosscut the security (\$4.57 billion) and governance and development (\$4.37 billion) categories. For complete information regarding U.S. appropriations, see Appendix B.

President Donald J. Trump signed the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019 into law on September 28, 2018, providing appropriations for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), and the Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DICDA) accounts for FY 2019. The President subsequently signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019 into law on February 15, 2019. The joint resolution

FIGURE 3.2

CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019 (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: Details of accounts, including sources of data, are provided in Appendix B to this report.

STATUS OF FUNDS

includes the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019, providing appropriations for the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The U.S. Congress, State, and the Office of Management and Budget have not yet agreed on final allocations to specific countries, including Afghanistan, for the global foreign-assistance accounts, principally the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account and the Economic Support Fund (ESF). The FY 2019 appropriation amount shown in Figure 3.3 will increase when this process is completed.

Since 2002, the United States has provided more than \$15.32 billion in on-budget assistance to the government of Afghanistan. This includes about \$9.97 billion provided to Afghan government ministries and institutions, and about \$5.35 billion to three multinational trust funds—the World Bank’s Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the United Nations Development Programme’s Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA), and the Asian Development Bank’s Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF). Table 3.1 shows U.S. on-budget assistance disbursed to the Afghan government and multilateral trust funds.

TABLE 3.1


U.S. ON-BUDGET ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN, SINCE 2002 (\$ MILLIONS)	
Disbursements	
Total On-Budget Assistance	\$15,323.04
Government-to-Government	9,971.65
DOD	9,140.93
USAID	745.54
State	85.19
Multilateral Trust Funds	5,351.39
ARTF	3,527.68
LOTFA	1,670.04
AITF	153.67

Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Sources: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019; State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/18/2018; DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/18/2019 and 10/19/2018; World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of July 22, 2019 (end of 7th month of FY 1398), accessed 10/4/2019; UNDP LOTFA Receipts 2002–2019 Updated October 10, 2019, response to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2019.

FIGURE 3.3

ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: Details of accounts, including sources of data, are provided in Appendix B to this report.

STATUS OF FUNDS


U.S. COST OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN

Reconstruction costs for Afghanistan equal about 16% of all funds obligated by the Department of Defense for Afghanistan since 2001. DOD reported in its “Cost of War Report” as of June 30, 2019, that it had obligated \$764.5 billion for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel in Afghanistan, including the cost of maintaining U.S. troops in Afghanistan. (By comparison, the report gave the cost of Iraq operations as \$769.0 billion.)³⁴

The comparable figures for Afghanistan reconstruction, consisting of obligations (appropriated funds committed to particular programs or projects for disbursement) of the DOD, Department of State, USAID, and other agencies was \$121.7 billion at that date. Note that the DOD contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan is contained in both the \$764.5 billion Cost of War and \$121.7 billion Cost of Reconstruction figures. Figure 3.4 presents the annual and cumulative costs for war and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

FIGURE 3.4

AFGHANISTAN COST OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION, ANNUAL AND CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS FY 2002 TO FY 2019 Q3 (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Cumulative obligations through June 30, 2019, differ markedly from cumulative appropriations through September 30, 2019, as presented elsewhere in the Status of Funds section, because the former figures do not include unobligated appropriations and DOD Cost of War reporting lags by one quarter.

Source: DOD, Cost of War Monthly Report, Total War-related Obligations by Year Incurred, data as of June 30, 2019. Obligation data shown against year funds obligated. SIGAR analysis of annual obligation of reconstruction accounts as presented in SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 7/30/2019. Obligation data shown against year funds appropriated.

STATUS OF FUNDS

AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING PIPELINE

Since 2002, Congress has appropriated more than \$132.55 billion for reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan. Of this amount, nearly \$114.17 billion (86.1%) was appropriated to the nine largest active reconstruction accounts, as shown in Table 3.2.

As of September 30, 2019, approximately \$6.58 billion of the amount appropriated to the nine largest active reconstruction funds remained for possible disbursement, as shown in Figure 3.5. These funds will be used to train, equip, and sustain the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF); complete on-going, large-scale infrastructure projects, such as those funded by the AIF and ESF; combat narcotics production and trafficking; and advance the rule of law, strengthen the justice sector, and promote human rights.

TABLE 3.2


CUMULATIVE AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED, OBLIGATED, AND DISBURSED FY 2002–2019 (\$ BILLIONS)				
	Appropriated	Obligated	Disbursed	Remaining
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)	\$77.15	\$71.75	\$70.90	\$3.16
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	20.50	19.60	17.02	2.58
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	5.25	5.09	4.42	0.63
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)	3.70	2.29	2.29	0.00
Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DICDA)	3.26	3.26	3.25	0.01
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	1.42	1.42	1.40	0.02
Public Law 480 Title II Emergency (Title II)	1.10	1.10	1.10	0.00
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	0.97	0.94	0.77	0.18
Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related (NADR)	0.80	0.67	0.67	0.00
Total Nine Largest Accounts	114.17	106.11	101.80	6.58
Other Reconstruction Funds	6.69			
Civilian Operations	11.70			
Total	\$132.55			

Note: Numbers have been rounded. The amount remaining reflects the total disbursement potential of the nine largest active reconstruction accounts after deducting approximately \$5.80 billion that has expired. Expired funds equal the amount appropriated but not obligated after the period of availability for obligation has ended and thereafter includes amounts deobligated and canceled. The amount remaining for potential disbursement for Other Reconstruction Funds equals approximately \$110 million; for Civilian Operations the amount can not be determined but likely equals less than one-half of the most recent annual appropriation.


Source: SIGAR analysis of appropriation laws and obligation and disbursement data provided by DOD, State and USAID, 10/19/2019.

FIGURE 3.5

STATUS OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS, NINE LARGEST ACTIVE ACCOUNTS (\$ BILLIONS)



STATUS OF FUNDS



ASFF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND

Congress created the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to provide the ANDSF with equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding for salaries, as well as facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction.³⁵ The primary organization responsible for building the ANDSF is the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A).³⁶ A Financial and Activity Plan (FAP) must be approved by the Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC), concurred in by the Department of State, and prior notification provided to the U.S. Congress before ASFF funds may be obligated.³⁷

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2019, enacted on September 28, 2018, provided an appropriation for the ASFF of \$4.92 billion for FY 2019. This amount was reduced by \$604.00 million, to \$4.32 billion, by DOD through Reprogramming Action FY 19-02 RA on May 10, 2019, as shown below in Figure 3.6.³⁸ As of September 30, 2019, cumulative appropriations for ASFF stood at \$77.15 billion, with \$71.75 billion in funding having been obligated, and \$70.90 billion having been disbursed, as shown in Figure 3.7. DOD reported that cumulative obligations increased by nearly \$1.24 billion during the quarter ending September 30, 2019, and that cumulative disbursements increased by nearly \$1.31 billion.³⁹

FIGURE 3.6

ASFF APPROPRIATED FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ BILLIONS)





FIGURE 3.7

ASFF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data reflects reprogramming actions and rescissions. DOD reprogrammed \$1 billion of FY 2011, \$1 billion of FY 2012, \$178 million of FY 2013, and \$604 million of FY 2019 out of the ASFF to fund other DOD requirements. DOD reprogrammed \$230 million into FY 2015 ASFF. Pub. L. No. 115-141 rescinded \$100 million from FY 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-31 rescinded \$150 million from FY 2016. Pub. L. No. 113-6 rescinded \$1 billion from FY 2012. Pub. L. No. 113-235 rescinded \$764.38 million from FY 2014. Pub. L. No. 114-113 rescinded \$400 million from FY 2015.

Source: DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019," 10/18/2019; DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts June 2019," 7/18/2019; Pub. L. Nos. 115-141, 115-31, 114-113, 113-235, 113-76, and 113-6; OSD Comptroller, 16-22 PA: Omnibus 2016 Prior Approval Request, 6/30/2016.

ASFF Budget Activities

DOD budgeted and reported on ASFF by three Budget Activity Groups (BAGs) through the FY 2018 appropriation. These BAGs consisted of:

- Defense Forces (Afghan National Army, ANA)
- Interior Forces (Afghan National Police, ANP)
- Related Activities (primarily Detainee Operations)

Funds for each BAG are further allocated to four subactivity groups (SAGs): Sustainment, Infrastructure, Equipment and Transportation, and Training and Operations.⁴⁰ The AROC must approve the requirement and acquisition plan for any service requirements in excess of \$50 million annually and for any nonstandard equipment requirement in excess of \$100 million.⁴¹

As of September 30, 2019, DOD had disbursed nearly \$69.22 billion from the ASFF appropriations for FY 2005 through FY 2018. Of this amount, more than \$47.43 billion was disbursed for the ANA, and more than \$21.40 billion was disbursed for the ANP.

As shown in Figure 3.8, the largest portion of the funds disbursed for the ANA—more than \$23.44 billion—supported ANA troop and equipment sustainment. Of the funds disbursed for the ANP, the largest portion—nearly \$9.55 billion—also supported sustainment of ANP forces, as shown in Figure 3.9.⁴²

Budget Activity Groups: categories within each appropriation or fund account that identify the purposes, projects, or types of activities financed by the appropriation or fund

Subactivity Groups: accounting groups that break down the command's disbursements into functional areas

Source: DOD, Manual 7110.1-M Department of Defense Budget Guidance Manual, accessed 9/28/2009; Department of the Navy, Medical Facility Manager Handbook, p. 5, accessed 10/2/2009.

FIGURE 3.8

**ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA
BY SUBACTIVITY GROUP,
FY 2005 TO FY 2018 APPROPRIATIONS
THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2019 (\$ BILLIONS)**





FIGURE 3.9

**ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP
BY SUBACTIVITY GROUP,
FY 2005 TO FY 2018 APPROPRIATIONS
THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2019 (\$ BILLIONS)**



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Excludes the ASFF FY 2019 appropriation, which is presented by four Budget Activity Groups, consisting of the ANA, ANP, AAF, and ASSF.

Source: DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019," 10/18/2019.

New ASFF Budget Activity Groups for FY 2019

DOD revised its budgeting framework for ASFF beginning with its ASFF budget request for FY 2019, submitted to Congress in February 2018, and through its reporting beginning on October 1, 2018. The new framework restructures the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) budget activity groups (BAGs) to better reflect the ANDSF force structure and new budget priorities. In FY 2018 and previous years, all costs associated with the Afghan Air Force (AAF) fell under the ANA BAG and costs for the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) were split between the ANA and ANP BAGs. Beginning with the FY 2019 ASFF appropriation, the ANDSF consists of the ANA, ANP, AAF, and ASSF BAGs.

Table 3.4 on the opposite page compares the ASFF FY 2020 budget request that was submitted by DOD to Congress in March 2019 with the ASFF FY 2019 budget that was revised through Financial and Activity Plan 19-2 (FAP 19-2) in June 2019. This budget revision reduced the original ASFF FY 2019 appropriation of \$4.92 billion by \$604.00 million pursuant to DOD Reprogramming Action 19-02 RA, notified to Congress in May 2019, and further realigned \$48.6 million in funds between the Equipment and Training SAGs within the budget for the ASSF. Table 3.3 below presents the obligation and disbursement activity for the ASFF FY 2019 appropriation by its four BAGs, which as previously mentioned differs from the reporting of ASFF FY 2005 to FY 2018 by its two BAGs.

TABLE 3.3

ASFF FY 2019 BUDGET, OBLIGATIONS, AND DISBURSEMENTS THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2019 (\$ MILLIONS)			
Budget Activity Groups	Revised Budget (FAP 19-2)	Obligations	Disbursements
Afghan National Army	\$1,360.99	\$670.05	\$470.43
Afghan National Police	609.06	295.68	189.49
Afghan Air Force	1,656.36	723.65	674.89
Afghan Special Security Forces	689.58	320.27	313.95
Total	\$4,316.00	\$2,009.65	\$1,648.75

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Disbursements total excludes undistributed disbursements of \$30.89 million.

Source: DOD, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Financial and Activity Plan, Fiscal Year 2019, 19-2 (FAP 19-2), 6/2019; AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019, 10/18/2019.

NATO ANA Trust Fund

The NATF has contributed more than \$1.57 billion to ASFF for specific projects funded by donor nations, and ASFF has returned more than \$382.22 million of these funds following the cancellation or completion of these projects. DOD has obligated nearly \$848.14 million and disbursed more than \$678.75 million of NATF-contributed funds through ASFF as of May 31, 2019.⁴³ These amounts are not reflected in the U.S. government-funded ASFF obligation and disbursement numbers presented in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.

STATUS OF FUNDS


TABLE 3.4

ASFF FY 2019 REVISED BUDGET (FAP 19-2) AND FY 2020 BUDGET REQUEST		
(\$ MILLIONS)		
	FY 2019 Revised Budget (FAP 19-2)	FY 2020 Budget Request
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Total	\$4,316.00	\$4,803.98
Afghan National Army, Total	1,360.99	1,589.66
Sustainment, Total	1,023.99	1,313.05
Personnel	423.16	539.84
Ammunition	64.88	93.93
Communications & Intelligence	157.00	116.55
Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants	109.97	170.90
All Other	268.97	391.81
Infrastructure, Total	136.63	37.15
Equipment and Transportation, Total	56.47	120.87
Training and Operations, Total	143.90	118.59
Afghan National Police, Total	609.06	660.36
Sustainment, Total	425.38	422.81
Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants	76.88	88.77
All Other	348.50	334.03
Infrastructure, Total	16.85	2.36
Equipment and Transportation, Total	7.95	127.08
Training and Operations, Total	158.87	108.11
Afghan Air Force, Total	1,656.36	1,825.52
Sustainment, Total	842.13	893.83
Personnel	12.14	31.45
Ammunition	71.68	95.81
Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants	19.98	26.54
Aircraft Contracted Support	724.29	716.91
All Other	14.04	23.13
Infrastructure, Total	24.85	8.61
Equipment and Transportation, Total	531.46	566.97
Aircraft	523.70	561.37
Other Equipment and Tools	7.75	5.60
Training and Operations, Total	257.92	356.11
Afghan Special Security Forces, Total	689.58	728.45
Sustainment, Total	376.61	437.91
Aircraft Sustainment	177.19	134.39
Personnel	63.23	115.56
All Other	136.18	187.96
Infrastructure, Total	41.59	21.13
Equipment and Transportation, Total	69.37	153.81
Training and Operations, Total	202.02	115.60

Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: DOD, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Financial and Activity Plan, Fiscal Year 2019, 19-2 (FAP 19-2), 6/2019; Fiscal Year 2019, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Line Item Detail, last modified 6/21/2019; Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year 2020, Justification for FY 2020 Overseas Contingency Operations, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 3/2019.

STATUS OF FUNDS



CERP FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

COMMANDER'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM

The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) enables U.S. commanders in Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in their areas of responsibility by supporting programs that will immediately assist the local population. Funding under this program is intended for small projects estimated to cost less than \$500,000 each.⁴⁴ CERP-funded projects may not exceed \$2 million each.⁴⁵

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2019, increased the annual appropriation for CERP from \$5.00 million in FY 2018 to \$10.00 million in FY 2019, bringing total cumulative funding to more than \$3.70 billion. Notably, CERP annual appropriations had equaled or exceeded \$400.00 million per year during the FY 2008 to FY 2012 period, as shown in Figure 3.10; nearly \$1.12 billion in appropriations from this period expired without being disbursed. DOD reported that CERP cumulative appropriations, obligations, and disbursements stood at approximately \$3.70 billion, \$2.29 billion, and \$2.29 billion, respectively, at both June 30, 2019, and September 30, 2019, as shown in Figure 3.11.⁴⁶

FIGURE 3.10

CERP APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)





FIGURE 3.11

CERP FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)




Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers. Analysis includes data from a draft DOD financial report because the final version had not been completed when this report went to press.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019 and 7/15/2019; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2013; Pub. L. Nos. 115-141, 115-31, 114-113, 113-235, 113-76, 113-6, 112-74, 112-10.

DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITIES

The Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DICDA), Defense appropriation provides funding for efforts intended to stabilize Afghanistan by combating the drug trade and related activities. The DOD Counterdrug group allocates this funding to support the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan units (mentored by the DEA and U.S. Army Special Forces unit) who investigate high-value targets and conduct drug-interdiction operations. Funding is also provided to the Afghanistan Special Mission Wing (SMW) to support their fleet of rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. The SMW's aircraft provide air mobility to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations aimed at counterdrug and counterterrorism operations in country.⁴⁷

DOD Counterdrug reprograms appropriated DICDA funds from the Central Transfer Account (CTA) to the military services and defense agencies, which track obligations of the transferred funds. The group allocated funding to Afghanistan programs and transferred \$132.36 million to the CTA in the quarter ending March 31, 2019, but withdrew \$122.18 million of these funds in the quarter ending September 30, 2019, which resulted in a net amount transferred of \$10.18 million for FY 2019.⁴⁸ Figure 3.12 shows DICDA appropriations by fiscal year, and Figure 3.13 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts appropriated and transferred from the CD CTA.⁴⁹



DICDA FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

FIGURE 3.12

DICDA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)





FIGURE 3.13

DICDA FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)




Note: Numbers have been rounded. DOD reprogrammed \$125.13 million out of FY 2015 DICDA due to several requirements for the Afghanistan Special Mission Wing being funded from the ASFF instead of DICDA.

^a DOD reprograms all DICDA funds to the military services and defense agencies for obligation and disbursement.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2019 and 7/9/2019; OSD Comptroller, 15-23 PA: Omnibus 2015 Prior Approval Request, 6/30/2015, p. 42.

STATUS OF FUNDS



ESF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

Economic Support Fund (ESF) programs are intended to advance U.S. interests by helping countries meet short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs. ESF programs support counterterrorism; bolster national economies; and assist in the development of effective, accessible, independent legal systems for a more transparent and accountable government.⁵⁰

The ESF was allocated \$500.00 million for Afghanistan for FY 2018 through the Section 653(a) consultation process between Congress and the Department of State concluding in the quarter ending September 30, 2018. The allocation to Afghanistan for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriation for FY 2019 enacted on February 15, 2019, has not been completed. Cumulative funding for the ESF stands at nearly \$20.50 billion, of which more than \$19.60 billion had been obligated and nearly \$17.02 billion had been disbursed as of September 30, 2019.⁵¹ Figure 3.14 shows ESF appropriations by fiscal year, and Figure 3.15 shows cumulative appropriations, obligations, and disbursements as of June 30, 2019, and September 30, 2019.

FIGURE 3.14

ESF APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ BILLIONS)





FIGURE 3.15

ESF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data reflects the following transfers from AIF to the ESF: \$101 million for FY 2011, \$179.5 million for FY 2013, and \$55 million for FY 2014. FY 2016 ESF for Afghanistan was reduced by \$179 million and put toward the U.S. commitment to the Green Climate Fund.


Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/16/2019, 7/11/2019, and 10/15/2018; State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/11/2017, 5/4/2016, 10/20/2015, 4/15/2015, and 4/15/2014.

FOOD FOR PEACE: TITLE II AND IDA PROGRAMS

USAID's Office of Food for Peace administers Public Law 480 Title II and International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account resources that are requested and appropriated on a contingency basis to meet humanitarian needs worldwide, with a focus on emergency food and nutrition assistance. Food for Peace Title II resources are authorized by the Food for Peace Act and appropriated under the Agriculture appropriations bill, while IDA resources are authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act and Global Food Security Act and appropriated under the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriation.⁵²

The Office of Food for Peace obligates funding for emergency food-assistance projects when there is an identified need and local authorities do not have the capacity to respond. More than three decades of war, population displacement and returns, civil unrest, insurgent activity, and recurring natural disasters have contributed to chronic humanitarian need in Afghanistan.⁵³

The Office of Food for Peace reports that it obligated nearly \$74.00 million through IDA funds (\$69.78 million) and Title II Emergency funds (\$4.22 million) to provide vulnerable, food-insecure Afghan households with emergency food and nutrition assistance in FY 2018; and it obligated nearly \$101.15 million in IDA funds in FY 2019.⁵⁴ Figure 3.17 indicates that nearly \$1.10 billion in Title II funds have been appropriated and transferred to Afghanistan programs from 2002 through September 30, 2019, and Figure 3.16 presents annual appropriations over this period.⁵⁵



TITLE II FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

FIGURE 3.16

TITLE II APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)





FIGURE 3.17

TITLE II FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)




Note: Numbers have been rounded. No FY 2019 appropriations have yet occurred.

^a Title II Emergency account resources are requested and appropriated on a contingency basis to meet unmet humanitarian needs.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019 and 7/18/2019.

STATUS OF FUNDS



IDA FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE: IDA PROGRAMS

USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) teams with the Office of Food for Peace (FFP) to administer International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funds.⁵⁶ OFDA is responsible for leading and coordinating the U.S. government response to disasters overseas. Its major programs include Relief Commodities & Logistics Support, Shelter & Settlements, Humanitarian Coordination & Information Management, Health, Protection, and WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene). OFDA works closely with international partners such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations World Health Organization (WHO), and others to deliver goods and services to assist conflict- and disaster-affected populations in Afghanistan.⁵⁷

USAID reported that nearly \$973.83 million in IDA funds had been allocated to Afghanistan from 2002 through September 30, 2019, with obligations of more than \$943.36 million and disbursements of more than \$765.49 million reported as of that date. Separately, OFDA reported that nearly \$518.11 million in IDA funds had been awarded to programs in Afghanistan from 2002 through September 30, 2019, with more than \$50.88 million obligated in FY 2019.⁵⁸ Figure 3.18 presents annual appropriations of IDA funds to Afghanistan. Figure 3.19 presents cumulative appropriations, obligations, and disbursements.⁵⁹

FIGURE 3.18

IDA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)





FIGURE 3.19

IDA FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)




Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers.
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/16/2019 and 7/11/2019.

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

The Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) manages the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account which funds projects and programs for advancing the rule of law and combating narcotics production and trafficking. INCLE supports several INL program groups, including police, counternarcotics, and rule of law and justice.⁶⁰

The INCLE account was allocated \$160.00 million for Afghanistan for FY 2018 through the Section 653(a) consultation process between Congress and the Department of State concluding in the quarter ending September 30, 2018. The allocation to Afghanistan for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriation for FY 2019 enacted on February 15, 2019, has not been completed. Cumulative funding for INCLE stands at more than \$5.25 billion, of which nearly \$5.09 billion has been obligated and more than \$4.42 billion has been disbursed as of September 30, 2019. Figure 3.20 shows INCLE appropriations by fiscal year, and Figure 3.21 shows cumulative appropriations, obligations, and disbursements as of June 30, 2019, and September 30, 2019.⁶¹



INCLE FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

FIGURE 3.20

INCLE APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)






FIGURE 3.21

INCLE FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers.

Source: State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/10/19 and 7/11/2019.



MRA FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

The Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) administers the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account that funds programs to protect and assist refugees, conflict victims, internally displaced persons, stateless persons, and vulnerable migrants. Through MRA, PRM supports the work of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), other international organizations, and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan to support Afghan refugees throughout the region and upon their return to Afghanistan.⁶²

The MRA allocation for Afghan refugees, internally displaced persons, and returnees was nearly \$77.19 million for FY 2018 and nearly \$85.40 for FY 2019. Cumulative appropriations since 2002 totaled more \$1.42 billion as of September 30, 2019, with cumulative obligations and disbursements reaching nearly \$1.42 billion and nearly \$1.40 billion, respectively, on that date. Figure 3.22 shows MRA appropriations by fiscal year, and Figure 3.23 shows cumulative appropriations, obligations, and disbursements as of June 30, 2019, and September 30, 2019.⁶³

FIGURE 3.22

MRA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)





FIGURE 3.23

MRA FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)




Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers.
Source: State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/16/2019 and 7/12/2019.

NONPROLIFERATION, ANTITERRORISM, DEMINING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS

The Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account plays a critical role in improving the Afghan government's capacity to address terrorist threats, protect its borders, and remove dangerous explosive remnants of war.⁶⁴ The majority of NADR funding for Afghanistan is funneled through two subaccounts, Antiterrorist Assistance (ATA) and Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD), with additional funds going to Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) and Counterterrorism Financing (CTF).⁶⁵

The Department of State and the U.S. Congress agree on the country-by-country allocation of annual appropriations for the foreign-assistance accounts, including NADR, through the Section 653(a) allocation process. The Office of Foreign Assistance Resources makes allocated funding available to relevant bureaus and offices that obligate and disburse these funds.⁶⁶ The allocation to Afghanistan was \$36.60 million for FY 2018, while the allocation for FY 2019 remains pending until the Section 653(a) process is completed this year. Figure 3.24 shows annual allocations to the NADR account, and Figure 3.25 shows that the cumulative total of NADR funds appropriated and transferred stood at \$804.54 million as of June 30, 2019, and also September 30, 2019.⁶⁷



NADR FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

FIGURE 3.24

NADR APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)





FIGURE 3.25

NADR FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ MILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded.

^a State and Congress agree on the country-by-country allocation of annual appropriations for the foreign assistance accounts, including NADR, through the Section 653(a) process. The Office of Foreign Assistance Resources makes allocated funding available to relevant bureaus at State that obligate and disburse these funds.

Source: State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/5/2018.

STATUS OF FUNDS

INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN


The international community provides significant funding to support Afghanistan relief and reconstruction efforts. A large share of the international funding is administered through multilateral trust funds. The four main multilateral trust funds are the World Bank-managed Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-managed Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), the NATO-managed Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund (NATO ANA Trust Fund or NATF), and the Asian Development Bank-administered Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF). The UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) leads emergency appeals and annual or multi-year humanitarian response plans for Afghanistan, and provides timely reporting of humanitarian assistance provided by donors to facilitate funding of targeted needs.

Contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

The largest share of international contributions to the Afghan government's operational and development budgets comes through the ARTF. From 2002 to July 22, 2019, the World Bank reported that 34 donors had paid in more

FIGURE 3.26

CUMULATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO ARTF, UN OCHA-COORDINATED PROGRAMS, LOTFA, AND NATO ANA TRUST FUND BY 10 LARGEST DONORS (\$ MILLIONS)



Note: Amounts under \$200 million are not labeled. The chart does not include the Asian Development Bank's Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF), which had disbursed \$275 million to projects as of March 31, 2019 through contributions from its development partners the NATO ANA Trust Fund, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Source: World Bank, ARTF: Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of July 22, 2019 (end of 7th month of FY 1398) at www.artf.af, accessed 10/4/2019; UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service at <https://fts.unocha.org>, accessed 9/30/2019; UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2019 and LOTFA MPTF Receipts 2002–2019, updated through 10/10/2019, in response to SIGAR data call 10/13/2019; NATO, Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund, Status of Contributions Made as of 30 September 2019, in response to SIGAR data call 10/10/2019; ADB, AITF Development Partners and Commitments to AITF as of 31 March 2019, in response to SIGAR data call 7/23/2019.

than \$11.64 billion.⁶⁸ Figure 3.26 shows the five largest donors over this period as the United States, the UK, the European Union, Germany, and Canada. Figure 3.27 shows that these five sources were also the largest donors to the ARTF for Afghan FY 1397 (December 22, 2017–December 21, 2018). The ARTF received contributions of \$1.02 billion in Afghan FY 1397, marking the second-highest annual amount of contributions received by the fund in its 17-year history.

Contributions to the ARTF are divided into two funding channels, the Recurrent Cost (RC) Window and the Investment Window.⁶⁹ The RC Window is used to assist the Afghan government with recurrent costs such as civil servants' salaries.⁷⁰ To ensure that the RC Window receives adequate funding, donors to the ARTF may not "preference" (earmark) more than half of their annual contributions.⁷¹ As of July 22, 2019, according to the World Bank, nearly \$5.05 billion of ARTF funds had been disbursed to the Afghan government through the RC Window.

The Investment Window supports development programs. As of July 22, 2019, according to the World Bank, nearly \$5.59 billion had been committed through the Investment Window, and more than \$4.67 billion had been disbursed. The Bank reported 36 active projects with a combined commitment value of more than \$2.54 billion, of which nearly \$1.63 billion had been disbursed.⁷²


Contributions to UN OCHA-Coordinated Humanitarian Assistance Programs

The UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) leads emergency appeals and annual or multi-year humanitarian response plans for Afghanistan, and provides timely reporting of humanitarian assistance provided by donors to facilitate funding of targeted needs. Donors have contributed nearly \$9.35 billion to humanitarian-assistance organizations from 2002 through September 30, 2019, as reported by OCHA. OCHA-led annual humanitarian response plans and emergency appeals for Afghanistan accounted for nearly \$6.28 billion, or 67.2%, of these contributions.

The United States, Japan, and the European Union have been the largest contributors to humanitarian assistance organizations in Afghanistan since 2002, as shown in Figure 3.26; and the United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union were the largest contributors in 2018, when the international community contributed \$534.13 million to these organizations, as shown in Figure 3.28. The World Food Programme (UN WFP), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) have been the largest recipients of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan, as shown in Table 3.5 on the following page.⁷³

FIGURE 3.27

ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR, AFGHAN FY 1397 (PERCENT)




Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. "Others" includes 10 donors.

Source: World Bank, ARTF: Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of July 22, 2019 (end of 7th month of FY 1398) at www.artf.af, accessed 10/4/2019.

FIGURE 3.28

UN OCHA-COORDINATED CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR, CALENDAR YEAR 2018 (PERCENT)



Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. "Others" includes 23 national governments and 12 other entities.

Source: UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service at <https://fts.unocha.org>, accessed 9/30/2019.

STATUS OF FUNDS

TABLE 3.5

LARGEST RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHANISTAN UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (OCHA) CUMULATIVE RECEIPTS 2002 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2019 (\$ MILLIONS)	
United Nations Organizations	Receipts
World Food Programme (WFP)	\$2,975.24
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	1,183.70
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	474.15
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)	333.34
International Organization for Migration (UN IOM)	254.39
Food and Agricultural Organization (UN FAO)	196.80
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)	139.73
World Health Organization (WHO)	106.04
Nongovernmental Organizations	
International Committee of the Red Cross	707.79
Norwegian Refugee Council	167.14
HALO Trust	111.03
Save the Children	91.33
All Other and Unallocated	2,604.68
Total Humanitarian Assistance Reported by OCHA	\$9,345.36

Source: UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service at <https://fts.unocha.org>, accessed 9/30/2019.

Contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan

The UNDP had historically administered the LOTFA to pay ANP salaries and build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior (MOI).⁷⁴ Since 2015, UNDP had divided LOTFA support between two projects: the Support to Payroll Management (SPM) project, and the MOI and Police Development (MPD) project. The SPM project has aimed to develop the capacity of the Afghan government to independently manage all nonfiduciary aspects of its payroll function for the ANP and Central Prisons Directorate (CPD) staff. Almost 99% of SPM project funding goes toward ANP and CPD staff remuneration. The MPD project focused on institutional development of the MOI and police professionalization of the ANP. The project concluded on June 30, 2018.

The LOTFA Steering Committee, composed of Afghan ministries, international donors, and the UNDP, approved restructuring the fund and changing its scope of operations on November 25, 2018. The organization

has expanded its mission beyond managing the SPM project to include the entire justice chain (police, courts, and corrections), and thereby cover all security and justice institutions, with an increased focus on anticorruption. A new multilateral trust fund, the LOTFA Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), was launched to fund this expanded mission; donations of more than \$85.07 million have been received from six donors, led by Canada, Denmark, the UNDP, and the UK (but without financial participation from the United States).⁷⁵


Donors have paid in nearly \$5.71 billion to the two LOTFA funds from 2002 through October 10, 2019. Figure 3.26 shows the fund's two largest donors on a cumulative basis have been the United States and Japan. Figure 3.29 shows the largest donors to the LOTFA in 2018. Annual contributions to LOTFA have been halved since 2016, from nearly \$565.02 million to nearly \$294.53 million in 2018, the lowest level of support since 2008. The United States contributed \$114.40 million in 2016, but only \$1.04 million in 2018 and \$0.95 million in 2019.⁷⁶

Contributions to the NATO ANA Trust Fund

The NATO ANA Trust Fund supports the Afghan National Army and other elements of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces through procurement by the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA).⁷⁷ The Fund has received contributions from 29 NATO members, including the United States, and from six other Coalition partners totaling more than \$2.87 billion through September 30, 2019.⁷⁸ Figure 3.26 shows Germany, Australia, and Italy as the three largest contributors to the fund. The United States made its first contribution in FY 2018 to support two projects under an existing procurement contract.⁷⁹

FIGURE 3.29

LOTFA CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR, CALENDAR YEAR 2018 (PERCENT)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. "Others" includes the United States and seven other countries that made contributions to the two LOTFA funds.

Source: UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2019 and LOTFA MPTF Receipts 2002–2019, updated October 10, 2019, in response to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2019.

SECURITY CONTENTS

Key Issues and Events	67
United States Forces-Afghanistan	76
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces	77
Afghan National Army	87
Afghan Air Force	91
Afghan National Police	95
Removing Unexploded Ordnance	99

SECURITY

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

This quarter saw heavy fighting among all parties to the Afghan conflict, as President Donald J. Trump called off peace negotiations with the Taliban after the insurgents claimed an attack that killed a U.S. soldier on September 5, and as the Afghan government carried out its late-September presidential election.⁸⁰

United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) told SIGAR this quarter that Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) efforts to secure the Afghan presidential election on September 28 resulted “in less violence than expected” and emphasized that the ANDSF’s provision of security enabled the election to go forward. However, Taliban efforts to violently subvert the election resulted in low voter turnout, and over 1,000 polling places were reportedly closed due to security concerns.⁸¹ The Taliban targeted election facilities and candidates’ political rallies in several fatal attacks.⁸² The insurgents also attacked key transportation, telecommunications, and power infrastructure to impede election preparations and civilian participation.⁸³


This quarter’s security activity caused civilian casualties to spike. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported a record high number of civilian casualties from July through September (4,313), representing a 42% increase compared to the same period in 2018. Resolute Support (RS) also reported a 39% increase in civilian casualties from June–September 2019, compared to the same period in 2018. Both UNAMA and RS said the increase in civilian casualties was due to a high number of terrorist and insurgent attacks prior to the presidential elections that included the use of improvised explosive devices.⁸⁴

Operations by all the parties to the conflict this quarter also led to high combat casualties. According to RS, the NATO command in Afghanistan, from June 1 through August 31, 2019, ANDSF total casualties increased by approximately 5% when compared to the same period last year.⁸⁵ Additionally, according to the Department of Defense (DOD), seven American service members were killed in action (KIA) in Afghanistan from July 16 to October 16, bringing the 2019 total to 17 KIA and 124 wounded in action, the highest annual number of U.S. combat casualties in Afghanistan in the last five years.⁸⁶



Secretary of Defense Mark Esper meets with President Ashraf Ghani in Kabul in October. (DOD photo)

FIGURE 3.30



Note: Fatalities are estimates and only include the number of the opposing party (or civilians when indicated) killed.

Source: ACLED, South Asia 2016–Present dataset, 7/17/2019–10/12/2019, available online at <https://www.acleddata.com/>; SIGAR, analysis of ACLED data, 10/2019; New York Times, “Afghan Village of 70 Families Faces Ruin With Mosque Massacre,” 10/19/2019.

For a list of this quarter’s major high-casualty incidents, see Figure 3.30.

Insurgent casualties have also reportedly been high. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo stated that U.S. and Afghan operations inflicted 1,000 insurgent casualties from August 28 to September 8, and President Ashraf Ghani reported 2,000 from September 6 to 13.⁸⁷ However, SIGAR cannot verify these figures nor provide a reliable number for insurgent casualties inflicted over the quarter. USFOR-A said an increase in Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) ground operations and U.S. air strikes heightened insurgent casualties this quarter.⁸⁸

According to NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), the 2,531 ground operations conducted by ASSF from January–September 2019 have already outpaced the total for all of 2018 (2,365).⁸⁹ Additionally, U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) reported that September 2019 saw more munitions released (948) during U.S. and Coalition air missions than in any month since October 2010. The numbers of munitions released January through September 2019 (5,431) increased by 4% compared to the same period last year.⁹⁰

The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) continued to report on changes to ANDSF personnel strength as it supports the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) transition to using the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) to better manage, generate payroll for, and account for ANDSF personnel. According to CSTC-A, as of July 28, 2019, there were 162,415 personnel in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 91,435 in the Afghan National Police (ANP), for a total 253,850 ANDSF personnel in APPS. These figures reflect 18,454 fewer ANA and 161 fewer ANP than the assigned strength numbers reported to SIGAR last quarter.⁹¹ CSTC-A said this decrease in strength reflects the number ANDSF personnel biometrically enrolled and eligible for pay in APPS and that “changes in personnel eligible for pay from one quarter to another do not directly translate to a change in actual ... strength of the ANDSF.” The APPS-based reporting of ANDSF strength will continue to change as the MOD, MOI, and CSTC-A work to correct and complete key personnel data in APPS.⁹² For more information about ANDSF strength and APPS changes this quarter, see pages 77–82.

ANDSF Data Classified or Not Publicly Releasable

USFOR-A continued to classify or otherwise restrict from public release the following types of data, due to Afghan government classification guidelines or other restrictions (mostly since October 2017):⁹³

- most ANDSF casualties, by force element and total
- unit-level ANA and ANP authorized and assigned strength
- performance assessments for the ANDSF
- information about the operational readiness of ANA and ANP equipment

- some Special Mission Wing (SMW) information, including the number and type of airframes in the SMW inventory, the number of pilots and aircrew, and the operational readiness (and associated benchmarks) of SMW airframes
- some information about the misuse of Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) by the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior

The classified annex for this report includes the information USFOR-A classified or restricted from public release.

U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Security

As of September 30, 2019, the U.S. Congress had appropriated nearly \$82.55 billion to help the Afghan government provide security in Afghanistan. This accounts for 62% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002. Of the nearly \$4.32 billion appropriated for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in FY 2019 (net of the \$604 million reprogramming action described on page 52), nearly \$2.01 billion had been obligated and nearly \$1.65 billion disbursed as of September 30, 2019.⁹⁴

In 2005, Congress established the ASFF to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all forces under the MOD and MOI. A significant portion of ASFF is used for Afghan Air Force (AAF) aircraft maintenance, and for ANA, AAF, ASSF, and Afghan Local Police (ALP) salaries. The ALP falls under the authority of the MOI, but is not included in the authorized ANDSF force level that donor nations have agreed to fund; only the United States and Afghanistan fund the ALP. The rest is used for fuel, ammunition, vehicle, facility and equipment maintenance, and various communications and intelligence infrastructure. Detailed ASFF budget breakdowns are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 on pages 52–53.⁹⁵

ASFF funds are obligated by either CSTC-A or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Funds that CSTC-A provides to the Afghan government to manage (on-budget) are provided directly to the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance then transfers those funds to the MOD and MOI based on submitted funding requests.⁹⁶


Unlike with the ANA, a significant share of ANP personnel costs is paid through the United Nations Development Programme’s multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), to which the United States has historically been, but is no longer, the largest contributor.⁹⁷ A discussion of on-budget (Afghan-managed) and off-budget (U.S.-managed) expenditures of ASFF is found on pages 115–117.

Security-Incident Data

Every quarter, SIGAR tracks and analyzes security-incident data from different sources to provide a robust account of the security situation

FIGURE 3.31

COMPARING 2018 AND 2019 RS-REPORTED ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS



Note: RS provided the caveat that a small proportion of EIA and EEIA are not included in these totals due to a lag in Afghan operational reporting.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call 9/19/2019.

in Afghanistan and activity between the parties to the conflict. This data shows trends including where security-related activity is concentrated in the country and at what levels it is occurring over certain periods of time.

Each type of incident data has advantages and limitations: RS-reported enemy-initiated attack data is the only remaining unclassified data from an official source tracking security trends in Afghanistan. It is unclassified only at the provincial level and does not include U.S. and Coalition-initiated attacks on the enemy. Open-source Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) event data can be disaggregated to the district level, to a variety of security-incident types, and to all parties to the conflict, but depends almost entirely on media reporting of political and security-related incidents. For consistency with RS's enemy-initiated attacks data, SIGAR presents its analysis of ACLED's data at the provincial level and during RS's reporting period.

Enemy-Initiated Attacks


This quarter's **enemy-initiated attacks (EIA)** data show that enemy violence in Afghanistan increased this summer compared to last summer.

Enemy-initiated attacks (EIA): are "all attacks (direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, IED, and mine explosions, etc.) initiated by insurgents that the ANDSF and RS consider to be [significant activities] (SIGACTs)."

Source: RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2019.

FIGURE 3.32

RS-REPORTED EFFECTIVE ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS IN 2019



Note: The date range of the data is January 1–August 31, 2019. The total EEIA for that period was 7,839. RS provided the caveat that a small proportion of EEIA are not included in this total due to a lag in Afghan operational reporting.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019; SIGAR analysis of RS-provided data, 10/2019.

RS reported 7,183 EIA this quarter (June 1–August 31, 2019), with most attacks occurring in the south, west, and northwest of the country. Seen in Figure 3.31, this period’s figures reflect a 19% increase compared to the same period in 2018, and an 11% increase from the preceding three months (March 1–May 31, 2019).⁹⁸

Roughly half of the 3,495 EIA this quarter (49% from June 1–August 31) were considered “effective” **enemy-initiated attacks (EEIA)** that resulted in ANDSF, Coalition, or civilian casualties. Enemy attacks have been more effective this quarter than they were during the preceding months of this year (42% effective from January–May 2019). EEIAs this quarter increased by 10% compared to the same period in 2018 and by 24% compared to last quarter (March 1–May 31, 2019).⁹⁹

The geographic distribution so far this year shows that most EEIA occurred in the south as well as the north and west. As seen in Figure 3.32, Helmand Province had the most EEIA (1,056), followed by Kandahar (533), Farah (449), Balkh (401), and Herat (395) Provinces.¹⁰⁰ The most common methods of EEIA in 2019 have been direct fire (76%), followed by IED explosions (17%), and indirect fire (5%), and mine strikes (2%). This is in

Effective enemy-initiated attacks (EEIA):

enemy-initiated attacks that result in combat-related ANDSF, Coalition force, or civilian casualties and are reported as SIGACTs. Effective enemy-initiated attacks are a subset of all reported enemy-initiated attacks.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2019.

line with trends reported last quarter and last year. RS provided the caveat that a small proportion of EIA and EEIA are not included in the reported totals due to a lag in Afghan operational reporting.¹⁰¹

What is ACLED?

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) is “a disaggregated conflict collection, analysis, and crisis-mapping project” funded by the State Department. The project collects the dates, actors, types of violence, locations, and fatalities of all political violence, protest, and select nonviolent, politically important incidents across several regions, as reported from open, secondary sources. ACLED aims to capture the modes, frequency, and intensity of political violence and opposition as it occurs.

ACLED considers the event data it collects as falling into three categories and six subcategories: “violent events,” including battles, explosions/remote violence, and violence against civilians; “demonstrations,” including protests and riots; or “nonviolent actions,” including strategic developments (agreements, arrests, or looting/property destruction).

Source: ACLED, “About ACLED: What is ACLED?” and “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook (2019),” 4/2019, pp. 6–7, accessed online on 4/22/2019, available at <https://www.acleddata.com>.

ACLED-Recorded Incidents

ACLED-recorded 4,005 political-violence and protest incidents this quarter (June 1–August 31, 2019), a 61% increase compared to the same period last year, with incidents concentrated in southern and eastern Afghanistan.¹⁰² The data show that this significant year-on-year change was mainly driven by an increase in the number of battles recorded this quarter: 2,530 versus 1,579 recorded during June–August 2018. ACLED defines a battle as “a violent interaction between two politically organized armed groups at a particular time and location,” such as armed clashes or the government or non-state actors taking territory. Battles can occur between armed and organized state, non-state, and external groups, or in any such combination.¹⁰³

Unlike RS’s EIA and EEIA data, ACLED incidents include the violent and nonviolent activity of all the parties to the conflict, though violent activity made up 98% of the recorded incidents this quarter (battles, 63%; explosions/remote violence, 32%; violence against civilians, 3%). Comparatively, violent activity made up 93% of the recorded incidents during the same period last year.¹⁰⁴


The geographical distribution of ACLED-recorded incidents thus far in 2019 shows the provinces with the most incidents shifted slightly compared to the same period in 2018. As shown in Figure 3.33, in 2019 (through August 31), Helmand Province has had the most incidents (935), followed by Kandahar (773), Ghazni (770), Nangarhar (465), and Zabul (434); the same period last year saw Nangarhar with the most incidents (853), then Ghazni (536), Helmand (447), Uruzgan (329), and Faryab (275). RS’s enemy-initiated attacks and ACLED’s incident data align in that they show Helmand and Kandahar as having the most EEIA and incidents, respectively, from January through August 2019.¹⁰⁵

Civilian Casualties

SIGAR analyzes Afghan civilian-casualty data from two different sources, UNAMA and RS. These organizations use different methodologies to collect civilian-casualty data, with the result that RS consistently reports fewer civilian casualties than UNAMA. However, comparing both sources, including the overall increase or decrease of civilian casualties, the breakdown of casualties by type, and the breakdown of casualties by party attribution, can provide helpful insights into civilian-casualty trends over similar reporting periods.

FIGURE 3.33

ACLED-RECORDED INCIDENTS IN 2019



Note: The date range of the data is January 1–August 31, 2019. The total incidents for that period was 8,527.

Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), South Asia 2016 Present dataset, 1/1/2019–8/31/2019, available online at <https://www.acleddata.com>; SIGAR, analysis of ACLED data, 10/2019.

UNAMA: Civilian Casualties

UNAMA documented a higher number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan from July 1 through September 30, 2019, than in any quarter since documentation began in 2009. In July, UNAMA documented the highest number of civilian casualties that the Mission has ever recorded in a single month. The 4,313 civilian casualties that UNAMA reported during this period represent a 42% increase compared to the same period in 2018. The casualties included 1,174 deaths and 3,139 injuries.¹⁰⁶

UNAMA's civilian-casualty data this quarter reflects the high level of violence surrounding the September 28 presidential election, particularly from Taliban attacks targeting election-related sites and activities. However, the higher level of overall civilian casualties this year was not solely due to **election-related violence**. UNAMA found that civilian casualties were “significantly lower” during this year's election compared to the 2018 parliamentary elections, but higher than on the polling days for the first and second round of the presidential election in 2014.¹⁰⁷

Election-related violence this year caused 458 civilian casualties (85 deaths and 373 injuries), including 277 civilian casualties (28 deaths

UNAMA Collection Methodology

According to UNAMA, data on civilian casualties are collected through “direct site visits, physical examination of items and evidence gathered at the scene of incidents, visits to hospital and medical facilities, still and video images,” reports by UN entities, and primary, secondary, and third-party accounts. Information is obtained directly from primary accounts where possible. Civilians whose noncombatant status is under “significant doubt,” based on international humanitarian law, are not included in the figures. Ground-engagement casualties that cannot be definitively attributed to either side, such as those incurred during crossfire, are jointly attributed to both parties. UNAMA includes an “other” category to distinguish between these jointly-attributed casualties and those caused by other events, such as unexploded ordnance or cross-border shelling by Pakistani forces. UNAMA's methodology has remained largely unchanged since 2008.


Source: UNAMA, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 3/6/2018, i-ii; 1/2010, p. 35; 2/11/2009, pp. 4–5; and 8/2015, p. 4.

Election-related violence: UNAMA defines “election-related violence” as “incidents of the armed conflict in which the target of the attacks are individuals engaged in or objects related to election processes.” The civilian casualties they attribute to election-related violence were collected from the beginning of the “top-up” voter registration period on June 8 through September 30, 2019, two days after polling day. These casualties were verified according to UNAMA's usual civilian casualty methodology, which requires a minimum of three different, independent source types.


Source: UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Special Report: 2019 Election-Related Violence, 10/2019, p. 2.

FIGURE 3.34

RS CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY PARTY ATTRIBUTION



UNAMA CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY PARTY ATTRIBUTION



Note: Data is from January 1 through September 30, 2019. Casualties include dead and wounded. "Other/unknown" for UNAMA data includes civilian casualties resulting from crossfire. "Progovernment militia" includes casualties attributed to unknown and multiple progovernment forces. "Unknown insurgent" includes casualties attributed to undetermined antigovernment elements. "Other/unknown" for RS data civilian casualties caused by undetermined elements, local militia, and the Pakistani military.

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019 and 6/21/2019; RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019; UNAMA, Quarterly Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January through 30 September 2019, 10/17/2019, p. 12; SIGAR, analysis of UNAMA and RS-provided data, 10/2019.

and 249 injured) on polling day. UNAMA reported its particular concern that over one-third of all civilian casualties on polling day in 2019 were children. They attributed to the Taliban more than 80% of total civilian casualties of election-related violence in 2019, and 95% of civilian casualties from violence on polling day.¹⁰⁸

UNAMA attributed the majority of this year's overall civilian casualties from January 1 through September 30 to antigovernment elements (62%, or 5,117 casualties). There was a notable increase in casualties attributed to the Taliban as opposed to other groups. UNAMA attributed 3,823 civilian casualties (46% of the total) to the Taliban in the first nine months of 2019, an increase of 31% from the same period in 2018. However, comparing just this reporting period (July, August, and September) to the same period in 2018, civilian casualties attributed to the Taliban more than tripled.¹⁰⁹

The significant increase in civilian casualties this quarter was attributed to suicide and non-suicide IED attacks by antigovernment elements, primarily the Taliban. During the months of July, August, and September, UNAMA documented an alarming 72% increase in civilian casualties caused by IEDs compared to the same period in 2018.¹¹⁰

RS Civilian Casualties Data

RS said Afghanistan experienced 4,554 civilian casualties, a 39% increase in the number of civilian casualties from June 1 through September 30, 2019, compared to the same period last year, reversing the decline reported earlier this year.¹¹¹ Like UNAMA, RS said the increase in civilian casualties was due to a high number of terrorist and insurgent attacks prior to the presidential elections that included the use of improvised-explosive-devices (IEDs).¹¹²

RS reported that the majority of the civilian casualties from June through September have been caused by IEDs (60%), followed by direct fire (21%), and indirect fire (9%), compared to trends for the preceding months of 2019 that showed the causes as IEDs (43%), direct fire (25%), and indirect fire (13%).¹¹³

This quarter's figures bring RS-reported civilian casualties in 2019 (January 1–September 30) to 7,260. This reflects a 6% increase compared to civilian casualties incurred during the same period in 2018.¹¹⁴ According to RS, July and September were the most violent months so far this year, which saw 1,437 and 1,292 civilian casualties, respectively.¹¹⁵ This quarter's figures shifted the provinces with the highest civilian casualties this year when adjusted for population. Table 3.6 shows that Zabul, Logar, and Nangarhar have been the most dangerous for civilians thus far in 2019 (last quarter it was Helmand, Nuristan, and Nangarhar).¹¹⁶

RS attributed about 91% of the casualties from January 1 through September 30 to antigovernment elements (48% to unknown insurgents, 35.5% to the Taliban, and 7% to IS-K). Only 5% were attributed to

TABLE 3.6

RS-REPORTED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: JANUARY–SEPTEMBER 2019

Province	Population	Total Casualties	Casualties Per Thousand	Province	Population	Total Casualties	Casualties Per Thousand
Zabul	374,440	221	0.59	Ghor	845,018	159	0.19
Logar	481,271	222	0.46	Parwan	817,955	140	0.17
Nangarhar	1,864,582	762	0.41	Herat	2,326,261	395	0.17
Laghman	552,694	205	0.37	Wardak	729,983	103	0.14
Kunar	551,469	181	0.33	Badghis	607,825	81	0.13
Farah	620,552	186	0.30	Sar-e Pul	690,566	85	0.12
Kapisa	540,051	155	0.29	Paktika	532,953	65	0.12
Paktiya	677,465	193	0.28	Takhar	1,208,745	118	0.10
Helmand	1,112,152	313	0.28	Balkh	1,633,048	151	0.09
Kandahar	1,512,293	417	0.28	Nimroz	202,488	16	0.08
Khost	704,149	187	0.27	Samangan	475,655	37	0.08
Kabul	5,452,652	1435	0.26	Jowzjan	656,187	51	0.08
Ghazni	1,507,262	393	0.26	Daykundi	561,651	27	0.05
Baghlan	1,120,511	284	0.25	Badakhshan	1,165,960	25	0.02
Kunduz	1,237,001	283	0.23	Panjshir	187,856	4	0.02
Nuristan	173,222	38	0.22	Bamyan	549,243	5	0.01
Faryab	1,226,475	240	0.20	Total	33,329,050	7,260	Average 0.22
Uruzgan	429,415	83	0.19				

Note: Casualties include killed and wounded. Population data is from LandScan 2016 data provided by RS in its last district-stability assessment (October 22, 2018).

Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019 and 12/20/2018; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 10/2019.

progovernment forces (2% to Coalition forces and 3% to the ANDSF) and 4% to other or unknown forces. As seen in Figure 3.34, while both UNAMA and RS attribute the majority of this year's civilian casualties to antigovernment elements, they disagree on the proportion of casualties attributed to progovernment elements.¹¹⁷

USFOR-A commented this quarter: "Preventing civilian casualties remains a top priority for U.S. forces. USFOR-A takes extraordinary measures to reduce and mitigate civilian casualties. USFOR-A recognizes and respects its moral, ethical, and professional imperative to reduce and mitigate these casualties, consistent with the law of war. USFOR-A uses reports of civilian casualties to determine if and how such losses of life could have been averted and to evaluate and improve upon its ability to protect civilians in the future."¹¹⁸

RS Collection Methodology

According to DOD, the RS Civilian Casualty Management Team relies primarily upon operational reporting from RS's Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs), other Coalition force headquarters, and ANDSF reports from the Afghan Presidential Information Command Centre to collect civilian-casualty data. DOD says that RS's civilian-casualty data collection differs from UNAMA's in that RS "has access to a wider range of forensic data than such civilian organizations, including full-motion video, operational summaries, aircraft mission reports, intelligence reports, digital and other imagery ... and other sources."

Source: DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 12/2017, p. 27 and 6/2019, p. 27.

UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN

U.S. Force Manning

According to DOD, as of October 23, 2019, there are approximately 13,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan “supporting complementary missions to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces under the NATO Resolute Support Mission and to conduct counterterrorism operations.” DOD said that around 8,500 of those personnel serve under the RS mission.¹¹⁹ The 13,000 assigned-strength number reflects a 1,000-person decrease from the 14,000 number cited for over a year. This change was reported after RS commander General Austin Scott Miller stated on October 21 that “unbeknownst to the public, as part of our [force] optimization over the last year ... we’ve reduced our authorized strength by 2,000 here.”¹²⁰ The exact authorized strength of U.S. forces in Afghanistan remains classified. DOD said “While the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan fluctuates regularly due to troop rotations and conditions on the ground, there have been no changes to DOD’s mission or to our commitment to our security partnership with the Government of Afghanistan.”¹²¹

Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said on October 19 that any larger troop withdrawal would be “conditions based” and that he is “confident that we can go down to 8,600 [troops] without affecting our [counterterrorism] operations.” When asked whether DOD would draw troop levels down to 8,600 with or without a peace deal, Secretary Esper said, “I don’t want to get ahead of the diplomats on that front. I’m just saying I know what we can go down to and feel confident based on reports I’ve gotten from the commander on the ground.”¹²²

U.S. and Coalition Forces Casualties and Insider Attacks

According to DOD, seven U.S. military personnel were killed in action (KIA) and 64 were wounded in action (WIA), and one service member died in non-hostile circumstances in Afghanistan this reporting period (July 16, 2019–October 16, 2019). As of October 16, 2019, a total of 80 U.S. military personnel have died in Afghanistan (60 were KIA and 20 died in non-hostile circumstances) and 491 military personnel were WIA since the start of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel on January 1, 2015. Since the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan in October 2001, 2,429 U.S. military personnel have died (1,906 were KIA and 523 died in non-hostile circumstances) and 20,638 have been WIA.¹²³

USFOR-A reported two confirmed insider attacks in which ANDSF personnel attacked U.S. and Coalition forces this quarter (June 1–August 31, 2019) that resulted in two military casualties. That brings this year’s total to three attacks that have resulted in four casualties. This is two more attacks and one more casualty compared to January 1–August 26, 2018. This year’s attacks and casualties are still fewer than the six insider attacks

that occurred during roughly the same period in 2017, in which there were 13 casualties.¹²⁴

AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

ANDSF Force Manning

ANDSF Personnel Strength

According to CSTC-A, as of July 28, 2019, there were 162,415 MOD and 91,435 MOI personnel, for a total ANDSF assigned strength of 253,850 personnel reported in the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS). This does not include roughly 18,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP). This quarter's figures reflect a decrease of 18,615 reported personnel (18,454 fewer MOD and 161 fewer MOI) than the 272,465 APPS-derived ANDSF assigned strength reported for May 28, 2019 (also not including the ALP).¹²⁵

Because this quarter's strength reflects the number of ANDSF personnel biometrically enrolled that also have other information in APPS required for pay, CSTC-A said the quarter-to-quarter decrease "do[es] not directly translate to a change in actual ... strength of the ANDSF."¹²⁶

The decrease this quarter specifically was due to an MOD *shura* (conference) that involved a data-cleansing effort to improve the accuracy of MOD personnel (ANA, AAF, and ANA special forces) data in APPS. The *shura*

Assigned vs. Authorized Strength

Assigned strength is the reported number of personnel serving in a force, whereas authorized strength indicates the number of personnel authorized to serve in a force. MOD strength figures mainly include the ANA, Afghan Air Force (AAF), Afghan Border Force (ABF), Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF), and ANA special forces. MOI strength figures include the ANP and ANP special forces.

APPS is the computerized personnel and payroll system from which CSTC-A now draws ANDSF assigned-strength numbers. It is designed to more accurately manage, generate payroll information, and account for ANDSF personnel. Since December 2018, DOD has reported APPS-based strength numbers to Congress in its semiannual report on *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*. CSTC-A informed SIGAR last quarter that they switched to reporting the ANDSF's assigned strength as the number of personnel biometrically enrolled that also have other information in APPS required for pay rather than the number of personnel reported on-hand by ANDSF components, as it had done previously.

Since June 2019, only those ANDSF personnel who have the following requirements are counted toward the ANDSF assigned-strength figure:

- biometric enrollment (fingerprints, iris, and face scans stored separate from APPS in the Afghan biometric system)
- assignment to an authorized position in APPS
- other identifying data in their APPS records (biometric number, name, father's name, grandfather's name, ID card number, date of birth, and actual rank).

As CSTC-A, MOD, and MOI work to improve the accuracy of the ANDSF personnel records in APPS to ensure all active personnel have complete APPS records and all inactive and nonexistent personnel records are removed from APPS, assigned-strength numbers will not reflect the actual size of the force.

Source: DOD, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1120.11, 3/17/2015, pp. 11–12; DOD, *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 6/2019, p. 33; OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting, 10/17/2019; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019; DOD OIG, "Audit of the Planning and Implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System," i-ii; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/21/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/17/2019; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.

led to processing a backlog 25,000 personnel actions such as removing personnel killed or wounded in action, personnel absent without leave, or retirements. CSTC-A reports that the process of updating and validating the records in APPS will continue, and that an APPS shura to improve the accuracy of MOI personnel is ongoing.¹²⁷ As a result of the recent data-cleansing efforts, CSTC-A says they are confident that “the number of personnel reported in APPS is the most accurate it has ever been.”¹²⁸ More information about APPS and this quarter’s shuras are available in the following section.

According to CSTC-A, the ANDSF’s total authorized strength is 351,729, a slight change from the long-reported 352,000 (due to the implementation of a new MOD tashkil on July 1, 2019). The Ministry of Interior Affairs’ authorized force level includes an additional 30,000 ALP funded only by the United States and the Afghan government.¹²⁹ Table 3.7 shows this quarter’s ANDSF assigned strength at 72% (roughly 98,000 personnel short) of its authorized strength.¹³⁰


Seen in Figure 3.35, ANDSF personnel strength numbers sourced from APPS are lower than the Afghan-provided strength data previously reported, which is significant because assigned-strength numbers help inform CSTC-A’s decision-making on how much money to provide to the Afghan government for ANDSF salary and incentive payments.¹³¹ CSTC-A said last quarter it “does not expect that the APPS-reported data will ever equal the amount that was self-reported [by the Afghans]” and that it “cannot categorize the excess individuals as ‘ghost’ (non-existent) personnel, because it is not known why the Afghan reported numbers are higher” than those reported from APPS.¹³² This quarter’s APPS-sourced assigned strength (not including the ALP) reflects 58,478 fewer personnel than what was reported using the old reporting method during the same period in 2018, and roughly 70,000 fewer compared to the same period in 2017.¹³³ CSTC-A has been gradually transitioning to using APPS-based strength numbers to inform funding decisions on salary and incentive payments.¹³⁴

DOD said in December 2018 that “it will likely take several more months to complete enrollment into the APPS system, and the true overall size of the ANDSF is likely to fall between the Afghan-reported numbers and the numbers accounted for in APPS.” DOD said this quarter that “APPS is a major shift in the ministries’ traditional way of managing pay and personnel, and challenges are expected. APPS will take time to mature, but the current assigned-strength reporting from APPS represents another step towards improved accountability of personnel and is a reflection of continued efforts by the MOD and MOI to implement APPS.”¹³⁵

In light of SIGAR’s longstanding concern over this issue, we look forward to working with CSTC-A over the coming months to fully understand the ramifications of the new force-strength numbers for past and future expenditures.

FIGURE 3.35

ANDSF ASSIGNED STRENGTH SINCE 2015



Note: Quarterly reports of assigned-strength data usually reflect a three-month reporting lag. This quarter's data is as of July 28, 2019. ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. ANA strength numbers include the AAF and trainees, transfers, holdees, and student personnel. No civilians are included. ANP strength numbers do not include "standby" personnel, generally reservists, personnel not in service while completing training, or civilians. 2017 figures were rounded because exact figures for ANDSF strength were classified for that period. The change in the individual strengths of the ANA and ANP from 2017 to 2018 is due to the transfer of two force elements from MOI to MOD in early 2018, but this change did not impact the overall strength of the ANDSF. The change in strength numbers from 2018 to 2019 is due to the transition of strength reporting from the number reported on-hand by the ANDSF to reporting from the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS). The strength numbers reported here should not be viewed as exact.

Source: CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/2013, 10/30/2014, 10/30/2015, 10/30/2016, 10/30/2017, and 10/30/2018; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 10/2019.

TABLE 3.7

ANDSF ASSIGNED AND AUTHORIZED STRENGTH					
ANDSF Component	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	% of Target Authorization	Difference Between Assigned and Authorized	
				Assigned and Authorized	Difference
ANA including AAF	227,103	162,415	71.5%	(64,688)	(28.5%)
ANP	124,626	91,435	73.4%	(33,191)	(26.6%)
ANDSF Total without Civilians	351,729	253,850	72.2%	(97,879)	(27.8%)

Note: Data is as of July 28, 2019. ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police. CSTC-A notes that the 253,850 assigned personnel number provided represents those individuals who are biometrically enrolled that also have other information in APPS required for pay. There are additional personnel who are biometrically enrolled in the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS), however, they are not yet assigned to an authorized position and are therefore not included in the assigned strength number. Therefore, the ANDSF is closer to their authorized strength than is reflected by the current assigned strength number. As the ANDSF continue to assign all personnel against authorized positions, the difference between assigned strength and authorized strength will decrease.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call 9/19/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019 and 10/28/2019; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 10/2019.



Inspector General Sopko and SIGAR staff meet with ANA officers. (SIGAR photo)

ANDSF Personnel Accountability

CSTC-A had planned for APPS to be fully implemented by MOD in July 2018 and MOI in November 2018. However, this quarter the Department of Defense's Office of the Inspector General (DOD OIG) completed an audit which found that neither ministry was using APPS as intended to generate payroll data (as of April 2019), and CSTC-A had paid \$26.2 million for a system that "does not accomplish [its] stated objective of reducing the risk of inaccurate personnel records or fraudulent payments through the use of automated controls." DOD OIG said APPS failed to reduce the risk of inaccurate records and fraudulent payments because there is no link between the two systems to validate the authenticity of the biometric number recorded in APPS. Therefore the system still relies on manual input of the biometric identification numbers and the same manually intensive human-resource and payroll processes that the system was designed to streamline. This ultimately means that DOD cannot have definitive assurance that each APPS personnel record reflects an actual ANDSF employee and is still at risk of funding payroll based on fraudulent personnel records.¹³⁶

CSTC-A told SIGAR this quarter that it has begun addressing the concerns presented in the DOD OIG audit, and in partnership with the MOD and MOI have "made monumental progress towards deploying APPS for use in areas such as generating payroll data, providing personnel reporting, and ensuring personnel actions such as promotions, assignments, and retirements can be better managed" by the responsible MOD and MOI offices. CSTC-A also reported that as of July 2019, MOD began generating payroll data using APPS. There were a number of issues identified in this first attempt and MOD has been given three months to address them. CSTC-A

said this quarter that MOI does not currently use APPS for payroll, and it continues to work with MOI and UNDP to transition MOI to using APPS for payroll.¹³⁷

As of September 1 2019, MOD, MOI, and CSTC-A continue to undertake three efforts to ensure accurate ANDSF personnel data exist in APPS: (1) “slotting” or matching ANDSF personnel to authorized positions in the system; (2) “data cleansing” or correcting and completing key personnel data; and (3) physically accounting for personnel through personnel asset inventories (PAI) and personnel asset audits (PAA).¹³⁸

This quarter, CSTC-A reported that MOD and MOI were conducting two extended APPS shuras (conferences) aimed at cleansing existing and slotting records in APPS rather than conducting PAIs to physically account for personnel. CSTC-A said the primary purpose of the shuras was to establish validated MOD and MOI APPS data baselines that could assist future force planning.¹³⁹

The MOD shura (June 10–July 3, 2019) resulted in 2,919 **Inherent Law** retirements, 25,214 records unslotted due to attrition (KIA, AWOL, DFR, or separation status), and 805 individuals assigned out of the active reserves. CSTC-A stressed that “while there is still progress to be made in updating and validating the ANA records in APPS, the current ANA APPS baseline is the most accurate it has ever been.”¹⁴⁰

The MOI shura began July 27 and is expected to end on October 31, 2019. It is being conducted in four groups due to the large number of provincial police headquarters (PHQs). As of September 1, the shura has resulted in 310 Inherent Law retirements, 1,281 scheduled reassignments, and 1,301 completed promotion processes in APPS. The new MOI tashkil will take effect on or about October 31, so a key objective of the shura is to ensure that individuals not assigned against an authorized position in the new tashkil are scheduled for reassignment prior to this date. As with the MOD, CSTC-A says that the MOI APPS shura will provide ANP leadership with the most accurate APPS baseline that they have had to date in order to provide a foundation on which the ANP can schedule promotions, assignments, and retirements that can all be validated.¹⁴¹

With regard to physically accounting for ANDSF personnel, CSTC-A reiterated that the continued issuance of ID cards to ANDSF personnel will remain the primary way of physically accounting for personnel. The cards have chips that link to biometric record numbers. The biometric data itself (iris, face, and fingerprint scans) are kept separate from APPS in the Afghan biometric system. The cards are valid for three years, at which point they can be reissued in-person.¹⁴² In addition, CSTC-A’s APPS Program Management Office has recently conducted several physical spot checks and personnel-accountability audits (PAAs) to verify whether all soldiers and officers entered into APPS were present at each location. CSTC-A reported that this quarter’s PAAs occurred at units within the ANA’s 201st,

Inherent Law: a law that lowers mandatory retirement ages, time-in-service maximums (e.g., 40 years for generals), and time-in-grade limits (e.g., 8 years for generals). This effort opens senior leadership positions for merit-based promotions of the next generation of ANDSF leaders.

Source: DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, p. 10.



U.S. advisors hold a key leader engagement with senior ANA officers in Laghman Province. (U.S. Army photo)

203rd, and 205th Corps, the Afghan National Police Academy, and the General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU).¹⁴³

The results show that the ANP PAAs resulted in the enrollment of 771 previously unenrolled ANP personnel into APPS, but the ANA PAA results showed that at best 10%, and at worst 60%, of the personnel reported to exist in those ANA units were not present for duty at the time of the audit. CSTC-A noted that “not present” can mean a number of things, including absent without leave, dropped from rolls, killed in action, wounded, transferred, separated from the force, retired, out on mission, assigned temporary duty elsewhere, or on leave.¹⁴⁴ CSTC-A said continuing to conduct PAAs will be “determined on a case-by-case basis depending on internal staffing levels and force-protection statuses.” CSTC-A also said it will look at alternative methods to assess the validity of APPS enrollments instead of performing high-security-risk PAAs.¹⁴⁵

Attrition: unplanned and planned total losses, including losses resulting from personnel dropped from the rolls, killed in action, separated from the force, and other losses (disappearance/captured, disability, death (not in action), retirement, exempted (e.g., absence without leave, permanent medical issue, or transferred to another part of the force) losses.

ANDSF Attrition – Some Data Classified

USFOR-A continued to classify all but limited ANDSF attrition information this quarter at the request of the Afghan government. SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF attrition can be found in Appendix E. A detailed analysis of attrition by ANDSF force element is provided in the classified annex of this report.

According to CSTC-A, ANA monthly attrition rates this quarter averaged approximately 2.8%, a slight increase from, but largely in line with the 2.6% recorded over the previous quarter.¹⁴⁶ ANP monthly attrition rates this quarter averaged approximately 3%, a slight increase from the 2.4% recorded over the previous quarter.¹⁴⁷ These percentages account for pure attrition alone—unadjusted for new recruits or returnees—and not the net decrease in force strength. CSTC-A reported that attrition figures are calculated by taking an average of monthly ANA and ANP attrition rates over the last three months.

Source: DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, p. 40.

WHY ANDSF NUMBERS MATTER: SIGAR'S WORK ON STRENGTH AND SALARY PAYMENTS

SIGAR has for years raised concerns regarding the processes for collecting and verifying the accuracy of ANDSF personnel and payroll data. As Inspector General John F. Sopko testified in 2015, this data informs DOD's decision-making on funding for hundreds of millions of dollars of salary and incentive payments for the ANDSF. Those concerns also extend to the Afghan government's capacity to manage and account for these funds, which are provided through direct assistance and multi-donor trust funds. After SIGAR's Research and Analysis Directorate (RAD) raised questions regarding the accuracy of ANDSF strength numbers, SIGAR issued its first audit report on ANDSF personnel and payroll systems in 2011, followed by two more audits in 2015. These reports found that despite many years and several billion dollars spent on salary assistance, there was still no assurance that the ANDSF data informing funding levels was accurate.

After those and other oversight agencies' reports determined that Afghan personnel and payroll systems in place created opportunities for corruption—including the creation of and payment to ghost soldiers—in early 2016, CSTC-A began to develop APPS to address these deficiencies. RAD has in the intervening years tracked ANDSF strength numbers and CSTC-A's gradual implementation of APPS. Recent SIGAR work continues to find issues with the system that signal it may still be vulnerable to the fraud and corruption APPS was intended to prevent.

As of October 2019, SIGAR's Investigations Directorate found:

- Government officials within the MOD and MOI, and at various provincial police headquarters throughout Afghanistan, fraudulently created payroll records to receive payments to nonexistent ANDSF personnel.
- Several hundred personnel records in WEPS (the UN's system for paying ANP), and potentially in APPS, may have been tampered with and require further investigation for being linked to ghost personnel.
- Some MOD and MOI personnel records created in APPS before November 2018 relied on data entry through the previous human resource system—the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS)—and WEPS. SIGAR found that these prior records may still reflect fraudulent police and soldier data.
- According to SIGAR sources, Afghan government auditors responsible for oversight of MOI funding and documentation have been negligent in their assigned duties and have resisted when follow-up audits were attempted.

SIGAR is coordinating with CSTC-A to continue to analyze APPS and WEPS (though a transition to APPS for MOI payroll is possible) to identify vulnerabilities in the systems and management practices that puts U.S. funds at risk of waste, fraud, or abuse. Part of the focus will be to build on DOD OIG's 2019 audit finding that the lack of system interfaces between APPS and the Afghan biometric and financial systems may allow for fraud in APPS personnel records.

SIGAR Investigators are identifying Afghan-led auditing entities and mechanisms for increasing oversight and are expanding SIGAR's criminal intelligence-collection efforts by strengthening partnerships with Afghanistan's regulatory entities and with Afghan and U.S. law-enforcement agencies. SIGAR's investigative efforts and support to Afghan anticorruption institutions have also enabled Afghan prosecutors to identify and arrest several individuals receiving fraudulent salary payments for departed or nonexistent ANDSF personnel. SIGAR will continue to collaborate with the Afghan government to remove corrupt actors or enablers within the ANDSF while they are being investigated.

Source: SIGAR, Written Statement of John F. Sopko Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform U.S. House of Representatives, "Why ANSF Numbers Matter: Inaccurate and Unreliable Data, and Limited Oversight of On-Budget Assistance Put Millions of U.S. Taxpayer Dollars at Risk," 4/29/2015, pp. 2–3; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2011, p. 53; SIGAR, Audit-11-10, Despite Improvements in MOI's Personnel Systems, Additional Actions Are Needed to Completely Verify ANP Payroll Costs and Workforce Strength, 4/25/2011, Executive Summary; SIGAR, Audit 15-54-AR, Afghan National Army: Millions of Dollars At Risk Due to Minimal Oversight of Personnel and Payroll Data, 4/23/2015, Executive Summary and p. 9; SIGAR, Audit 15-26-AR, Afghan National Police: More than \$300 Million in Annual, U.S.-funded Salary Payments Is Based on Partially Verified or Reconciled Data, 1/7/2015, Executive Summary and p. 6; DOD OIG, Audit of the Planning for and Implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System, 8/15/2019, i; SIGAR, Investigations Directorate, memorandum and correspondence, 10/6/2019 and 10/19/2019.

CSTC-A noted this figure was calculated from Afghan-owned and -reported data provided by the MOD and MOI and is not independently verified.¹⁴⁸

ANDSF Casualties

USFOR-A continued to classify most ANDSF casualty data this quarter at the request of the Afghan government. SIGAR's questions about ANDSF casualties can be found in Appendix E of this report. Detailed information about ANDSF casualties is reported in the classified annex of this report.

RS provided a general, unclassified assessment of ANDSF casualties this quarter. From June 1 through August 31, 2019, there was an approximately 5% increase in ANDSF total casualties when compared to the same period last year. RS also said that about 60% of ANDSF casualties during this period occurred in defensive operations and 40% in offensive operations.¹⁴⁹

ANDSF Insider Attacks

According to USFOR-A, the ANDSF experienced 30 insider attacks from June 1 through August 31, 2019—nearly double the number reported last quarter (from February 20 through May 31, 2019)—that resulted in 87 ANDSF casualties. That brings the total for this year to 49 attacks, resulting in 167 casualties. While there have been three fewer attacks this year compared to the same period last year, there were 56 more ANDSF casualties. There have been five more attacks and 30 more casualties than roughly the same period in 2017.¹⁵⁰

ANDSF Performance – Most Data Classified

USFOR-A continued to classify most assessments of ANDSF performance at the request of the Afghan government.¹⁵¹ SIGAR's questions about ANDSF performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. Detailed ANDSF performance assessments are reported in the classified annex for this report.


Women in the ANDSF

According to the RS Gender Advisor Office, this quarter the ANDSF had 6,395 female personnel, an increase of 933 women since last quarter and about 1,900 women compared to roughly the same period in 2018. The increase since last quarter includes 721 women in the ANP and 212 in the ANA.¹⁵² The vast majority of ANDSF female personnel (4,371) are in the ANP, including 165 women in the General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU). There are 2,024 female personnel in the ANA, including 110 in the AAF and 20 in the ASSF.¹⁵³

Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) continued to account for the greatest number of females in the ANDSF (2,032), followed by soldiers and police (1,726), commissioned officers (1,485), and civilians (999). Currently 153 female cadets are serving at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (74), the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (32), and the Kabul

FIGURE 3.36

ANDSF WOMEN STRENGTH SINCE 2015



Note: Quarterly reports of female assigned-strength data usually reflect a reporting lag; the data here were provided to SIGAR in the fourth quarter of the years above. This quarter's ANA data is as of June 2019 and the ANP data is as of August 2019. The 2017 and 2018 numbers are rounded because exact numbers remain classified. ANA = Afghan National Army; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. All ANA numbers include Afghan Air Force women. ANA and ANP numbers include Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) women serving under both forces.

Source: CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019; SIGAR, Quarterly Reports to the United States Congress, 10/30/2015, 10/30/2016, 10/30/2017, and 10/30/2018; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 10/2019.

Military Training Center (47).¹⁵⁴ For a historical record of ANDSF female strength since 2015, see Figure 3.36.

This quarter, the RS Gender Advisor Office told SIGAR that MOD is currently in the process of executing its Sexual Harassment and Assault Prevent Policy (SHAPP) Implementation Plan that was signed in March 2019. The SHAPP outlines a harassment and assault complaint-reporting process and has specific language about creating an inclusive environment for women in the ANA. As part of the plan, the MOD will conduct a training workshop for victim advocates, commanders, and supervisors by the end of 2019. Attendees will then be required to provide the training they received to ANDSF personnel throughout the various levels of the organization.¹⁵⁵

Additionally, under a new MOI Gender Policy signed in April 2019, a recently appointed MOI director of human rights, women's affairs, and children has begun planning for a nationwide awareness training program (similar to MOD's) on guidance and procedures for handling sexual harassment and sexual assault. MOI's gender policy is broad, and the initial implementation will focus on the training program and the development of a more specific sexual harassment-prevention policy. MOI also issued

guidelines about use of ANDSF facilities designated for women this quarter. They require female ANDSF personnel to have access to safe, secure, and private facilities, and prohibit the misuse of female facilities by male ANDSF personnel.¹⁵⁶

RS gender advisors commented that restrictive “cultural norms” surrounding women’s participation in the workplace (particularly in non-traditional roles such as the security forces), and the tacit acceptance of sexual harassment of women in some areas of the country, mean it will take time to implement the new ANDSF policies. In the meantime, advisors continue to train and advise both Afghan security ministries on the importance of addressing sexual harassment and assault of ANDSF women. They added that “every success along the way, no matter how small, is a step in the right direction.”¹⁵⁷

ANDSF Medical Personnel and Health Care

Consistent shortages of staff, reassignment to non-medical fields, retention difficulties, and lack of required training are enduring challenges for ANDSF medical professionals. As of July 31, 2019, there were 891 physicians and 2,840 other medical staff (nurses, medics, dental, radiology, laboratory technicians, etc.) serving in the ANDSF. Medical staff vacancies remain an issue for the ANDSF, with 16% of required doctors (174 positions) and 26% of other medical staff (972 positions) remaining unfilled. However, the number of medical personnel has increased since January, with 10 more doctors and an additional 371 other medical personnel reported this quarter.¹⁵⁸

Additionally, CSTC-A reported medical-supply delivery delays and other complications in its medical logistics arrangements with the NATO Supply Procurement Authority (NSPA). The Afghan government’s inability to supplement NATO’s medical-procurement activities further exacerbates this challenge. CSTC-A said delays in the delivery of medical supplies continue to adversely affect the ANDSF medical system.¹⁵⁹ The total cost of CSTC-A-procured medical items for the ANDSF from January 1 through July 31, 2019, was \$35.6 million, an increase from \$29.5 million SIGAR last reported in January 2019. These funds were used to purchase medic bags, first-aid kits, and a variety of basic medications, among other items.¹⁶⁰

CSTC-A also reported some improvements over the last several months, particularly in the management of preventive medicine, casualty evacuation, and point-of-injury care. Routine casualty-evacuation times have dropped significantly, from 1–1.5 days to 8–12 hours. ANDSF response-time standards are now meeting Coalition standards. The ANA is revising its national curriculum for point-of-injury care with the help of advisors with the aim of updating its national training manual by the end of 2019. The new training manual is also being designed for seamless integration into the ANP system.¹⁶¹



An Afghan commando stands beside a mobile strike force vehicle. (RS photo)

Ministry Performance Assessments – Most Data Classified

USFOR-A continued to classify most information about MOD and MOI performance at the request of the Afghan government.¹⁶² SIGAR's questions about the ministries' performance can be found in Appendix E of this report. SIGAR will report on the MOI and MOD performance assessments in the classified annex of this report.

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated nearly \$47.7 billion and disbursed more than \$47.4 billion of ASFF funds from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA, AAF, and parts of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). These force elements constituted the ANA budget activity group (BAG) for reporting purposes through the FY 2018 appropriation.¹⁶³

ANA Sustainment

As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated \$23.7 billion and disbursed \$23.4 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF **sustainment**.¹⁶⁴ For more information about what these costs include and the amount U.S. funds appropriated for ANA sustainment in FY 2019, see pages 51–52 of this report.

This quarter, CSTC-A reported the total amount expended for on-budget MOD elements' sustainment requirements thus far for Afghan FY 1398

Sustainment: Sustainment is defined in Joint Publication 3-0 as “The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission completion.” ASFF funds several types of sustainment costs: “personnel sustainment,” which includes salaries and incentive pay; food; the Afghan Personnel Pay System; “logistics sustainment” such as fuel, the CoreIMS inventory management system, and transportation services; “combat sustainment,” including organizational clothing and individual equipment, ammunition, and weapons repair parts; and “general operational sustainment services,” such as vehicle, facility, and equipment sustainment (operations and maintenance costs).

Source: DOD, Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, Justification for FY 2019 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), 2/2018, pp. 15, 22–23, 28, 30; OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019.

TABLE 3.8

MAJOR EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO THE ANA, JUNE 1–AUGUST 15, 2019				
Equipment Type	Equipment Description	Units Issued in Quarter	Unit Cost	Total Cost
Aircraft	UH-60 Helicopter	6	\$10,295,000	\$61,770,000
Aircraft	MD-530 Helicopter	7	6,301,000	44,107,000
Vehicle	M1151 HMMWV (Humvee)	156	237,094	36,986,664
Vehicle	M1152 HMMWV (Humvee)	49	237,094	11,617,606
Ammunition	60mm Mortar Cartridge (M768)	27,648	313	8,653,824
Ammunition	.50 Caliber Ball Cartridge	2,688,000	3.20	8,601,600
Ammunition	High-Explosive Rocket (2.75")	4,320	890	3,844,800
Weapon	M2 Machine Gun (12.7 mm)	250	12,685	3,171,250
OCIE	Field Pack Frame	18,886	148	2,795,128
Weapon	M9 Semi-Automatic Pistol (9 mm)	3,023	636	1,922,628
Total			\$183,470,500	

Note: The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value equipment provided to the ANA this quarter. The “unit costs” listed reflect the average costs paid for items procured under multiple Foreign Military Sales cases; “total costs” were the actual amount spent for each item which may differ slightly from simply totaling average unit costs.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.

(December 2018–August 2019) was about \$438.7 million. This includes \$427 million for ANA sustainment, \$3.7 million for AAF sustainment, and \$7.9 million for ANA Special Operations Corps (ANASOC) sustainment. The U.S. contribution to the MOD sustainment is almost entirely for salaries and incentive pay (\$398 million, of which \$147 million is incentive pay).¹⁶⁵

Roughly \$40.7 million was spent on nonpayroll sustainment requirements for the ANA, the costliest of which were office equipment and computers (\$6 million), energy-generating equipment (\$5.6 million), and domestic travel (\$4.4 million).¹⁶⁶

CSTC-A said this quarter the total estimated funding required for ANA, AAF, and ANASOC base salaries, bonuses, and incentives for Afghan FY 1398 is \$534.8 million, the same amount reported last quarter.¹⁶⁷

ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately \$13.7 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF equipment and transportation costs.¹⁶⁸

Seen in Table 3.8, CSTC-A reported that the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANA, AAF, and ANASOC this quarter (June 1 through August 31, 2019) included six UH-60 helicopters (\$61.8 million), 205 HMMWVs (two variants) valued at a total of \$48.6 million, and seven MD-530 helicopters (\$44.1 million).¹⁶⁹

TABLE 3.9

HMMWVS PROVIDED TO THE ANDSF IN 2019									
	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	Total
ANA	175	297	298	238	0	0	156	49	1,213
ANP	78	166	127	40	0	24	179	147	761
Monthly Total	253	463	425	278	0	24	335	196	1,974

Note: August numbers are only through August 15, 2019. ANA = Afghan National Army; ANP = Afghan National Police.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call 9/18/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019; OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/4/2019.

DOD said that several hundred HMMWVs provided to the ANDSF this quarter represent “the tail end of a roughly three-year surge of HMMWV buys (totaling about 6,000) that were made to implement the 2016 vehicle strategy.” DOD said about one-fourth of the HMMWVs provided were refurbished U.S. Army vehicles; the rest were new purchases. See Table 3.9 for the total number of HMMWVs provided to the ANDSF in 2019.¹⁷⁰

ANA Equipment Operational Readiness – Data Classified

This quarter, USFOR-A continued to classify data on ANA equipment readiness at the request of the Afghan government.¹⁷¹ SIGAR’s questions about ANA equipment readiness can be found in Appendix E of this report. ANA equipment readiness is reported in the classified annex of this report.

ANA Infrastructure

The United States had obligated and disbursed \$6.0 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF infrastructure projects as of September 30, 2019.¹⁷²

This quarter, CSTC-A continued to report that the estimated U.S.-funded annual facilities-sustainment costs for all ANA facility and electrical-generator requirements for FY 2019 will be \$110.8 million. According to CSTC-A, of the \$110.8 million, \$74.7 million will be provided directly to the Afghan government and \$36.1 million will be spent by CSTC-A on behalf of the Afghan government.¹⁷³

As of August 12, 2019, the United States completed 474 ANA, AAF, and ANASOC infrastructure projects in Afghanistan at a total cost of \$5.4 billion. CSTC-A reported that four projects were completed this quarter, costing roughly \$15 million. Another 31 projects (\$234.8 million total cost) were ongoing, three projects were awarded (\$49.5 million), and 39 projects (\$491.7 million) were being planned.¹⁷⁴

The projects above include one ongoing \$2.6 million project, a women’s training center at MOD headquarters in Kabul (funded by the NATO ANA Trust Fund), and a completed women’s and pediatric health clinic at Kabul National Military Hospital (\$8.5 million).¹⁷⁵

SECURITY

TABLE 3.10

HIGHEST-COST ANA INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS				
Project Description	Project Location	Agency / Contractor	Estimated Cost	Estimated Completion Date
Awarded Projects				
ANA Parwan Prison Modular Detainee Housing Unit	Parwan Province	USACE/ACI	\$41,972,977	4/15/2022
AAF Aviation Enhancement, Kandahar Airfield Life Support Area, Phase II	Kandahar, Kandahar Province	USACE/Omran Holding Group	6,513,623	12/15/2020
General Support Kandak, Central Darulaman	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE/State Women's Corp.	971,211	10/8/2020
Ongoing Projects				
Northern Electrical Interconnect, Camp Shaheen	Marmal, Balkh Province	USACE/Venco-Imtiaz Construction Company	27,692,414	10/21/2019
Special Operations Brigade North, Camp Pratt Forward Operating Center	Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province	USACE/Builttek Construction	25,353,848	2/26/2021
AAF Aviation Enhancement, Mazar-e Sharif Airfield Operations and Life Support Area*	Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province	USACE/Omran Holding Group	24,203,141	8/1/2021
Completed Projects				
Pediatrics, Obstetrics, and Gynecology Clinic at Kabul National Military Hospital	Kabul, Kabul Province	NSPA/Makro Mechanics	8,500,000	6/15/2019
ANA TAAC Air Joint Airfield Demo/New Structure	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE/Assistant Consultants	2,896,365	5/30/2019
ANA Kabul National Military Hospital Entry-Control Points	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE/MVL	2,471,106	6/8/2019
Planned Projects				
Special Mission Wing Ramp Growth, Kandahar Airfield	Kandahar, Kandahar Province	N/A	15,900,000	N/A
Special Mission Wing Ramp Growth, Kabul Airfield	Kabul, Kabul Province	N/A	13,600,000	N/A
5th Special Operations Kandak Relocation	Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province	N/A	2,800,000	N/A

Note: The reporting period for this data is May 16–August 12, 2019.

* Partially funded by the multilateral NATO ANA Trust Fund (not all U.S. ASFF funds).

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.

See Table 3.10 on the following page for descriptions and information about the highest-value awarded, ongoing, completed, and planned infrastructure projects this quarter.

ANA Training and Operations

As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately \$4.3 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANA, AAF, some ASFF, and MOD training and operations.¹⁷⁶

At the request of DOD, SIGAR will await the completion of the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) forthcoming audit on the cost of ASFF-funded ANDSF training contracts before reporting on the status of those contracts. For more information about this and other GAO audits related to Afghanistan, see Section 4.



An Afghan Air Force UH-60 Blackhawk piloted by an Afghan and an American pilot. (U.S. Air Force photo)

AFGHAN AIR FORCE

U.S. Funding

As of August 31, 2019, the United States had appropriated approximately \$7.9 billion to support and develop the AAF (including the SMW) from FY 2010 to FY 2019. This amount decreased by \$328.4 million compared to what SIGAR reported last quarter due to DOD's recent decision that fitting and funding the AAF's future force will require less than originally submitted for DOD's FY 2019 funding justification to Congress. Nearly \$1.7 billion of the \$7.9 billion were funds appropriated for FY 2019, a \$71.9 million decrease compared to what SIGAR reported last quarter.¹⁷⁷ The AAF appropriation of U.S. funds in FY 2019 (adjusted for DOD's change to funds authorized) was more than any other ANDSF force element; its allocation was \$295.4 million more than the funds for ANA ground forces.¹⁷⁸

As in previous years, a large portion of the AAF's FY 2019 funds has been designated for AAF sustainment costs (\$842.1 million, or 51%). These funds are primarily used to pay for contractor-provided maintenance, major and minor repairs, and procurement of parts and supplies for the AAF's in-country inventory of seven air platforms: UH-60, MD-530, and Mi-17 helicopters; A-29, C-208, and AC-208 fixed-wing aircraft; and C-130 transport aircraft. DOD allocated \$531.5 million (32%) of the AAF's FY 2019 funds for equipment and transportation costs.¹⁷⁹

ONGOING SIGAR AUDIT OF THE AAF

SIGAR's audit will evaluate the extent to which DOD and the Afghan Ministry of Defense have identified the challenges associated with creating a professional, credible, and sustainable AAF and Special Mission Wing (SMW) and have taken steps to address these challenges.

Nearly \$5.5 billion had been obligated for the AAF and SMW from FY 2010 through August 31 of FY 2019. About \$1 billion of those funds were obligated in FY 2018, and \$661.8 million has been obligated thus far in FY 2019. A substantial portion of these funds (\$2.5 billion) has been obligated for AAF sustainment, which accounts for 46% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft (\$1.8 billion) at 31%.¹⁸⁰

Aircraft Inventory and Status

The AAF's current in-country inventory, as of October 1, 2019, includes 183 aircraft (158 of which are operational).¹⁸¹

TAAC-Air reported that the AAF received three A-29 aircraft this quarter that were transferred from Moody Air Force Base, where they were being used for training. Two UH-60s and seven MD-530 were also delivered to Afghanistan this quarter. Several aircraft were deemed unusable this quarter: three Mi-17s (out of service until overhauled) and one C-208 (taken out of service for maintenance training). TAAC-Air said the United States has purchased and is preparing to field five more MD-530s and five UH-60s before the end of 2019.¹⁸² SIGAR asked TAAC-Air about the anticipated end-state for the AAF's air fleet this quarter, which is also reported in Table 3.11. When asked about the continued decrease in the number of Mi-17s in the AAF's inventory, TAAC-Air clarified this quarter that the plan is to continue maintaining the AAF's aging Mi-17 fleet through 2021. As the aircraft need to go into overhaul maintenance, they will be transferred to the SMW and taken off the AAF's aircraft inventory.¹⁸³

AAF Operations and Readiness

The AAF increased flight hours for four of its six airframes (not yet including the AC-208); it is also noted that readiness decreased for all of its airframes this quarter compared to last quarter. TAAC-Air said this was due to increased advisor security concerns this quarter and RS restricting AAF advising efforts. The consequent reduction in the presence of contractors who provide aircraft maintenance and repair broken aircraft lead to longer aircraft down time.¹⁸⁴ According to TAAC-Air, the AAF's average monthly flight hours this quarter (July 1 through September 30, 2019) increased by about 19% compared to the last reporting period (April 1 through June 30, 2019). The AAF flew 11,737 hours from July 1 through September 30, 2019, an average of roughly 3,912 hours per month.¹⁸⁵

This quarter for the first time, the AAF flew more hours on its MD-530 helicopters than any other airframe in its inventory, surpassing the Mi-17. The AAF has a history of overusing its oldest and most familiar aircraft, the Russian-made Mi-17. The MD-530 is one of the aircraft in its inventory intended to help transition away from the Mi-17s. The MD-530 flew an average of 1,049 hours per month, followed by the Mi-17 (953 hours), and the C-208 (760 hours).¹⁸⁶ Of all the AAF's airframes, only the Mi-17 continued

TABLE 3.11

AFGHAN AVIATION SUMMARY, AS OF OCTOBER 2019							
Aircraft	Usable	Total	End State	Assigned Pilots	Assigned Other Aircrew	Authorized Pilots	Authorized Other Aircrew
A-29	15	15	25	10	16	17	16
Mi-17	23	47	0	69	0	74	0
UH-60	40	40	34	46	24	84	24
MD-530	44	44	55	41	28	44	28
C-130	3	3	4	11	9	14	9
C-208	23	24	23	23	39	30	39
AC-208	10	10	10	12	4	16	4
Total	158	183	151	212	120	279	120

Note: Only fully mission-qualified pilots and aircrew are listed in the assigned pilots and aircrew categories of this table. Some personnel assigned but unable to fly at this time, mainly due to medical reasons, are also included in the assigned pilots and aircrew figures. "Pilots" now include command pilots, copilots, navigators, and instructor pilots. "Other Aircrew" include loadmasters, aerial gunners, air-technology coordinators, equipment technicians, and others, and vary by airframe. These figures do not include the aircraft or personnel for the Special Mission Wing, which are classified. One C-208 in the total is listed because it is used for maintenance training purposes, but it is not tasked for operations.

Source: TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and response to DOD OIG data call, 10/5/2019; TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2019; SIGAR, analysis of TAAC-Air-provided data, 10/2019.

to exceed its recommended flight hours this quarter. The Mi-17's average of 953 hours per month far surpassed its recommended flying time of 575 hours per month.¹⁸⁷ As in the past, the AAF's flight-hours data include all hours flown by all aircraft, whether for operations, maintenance, training, or navigation.¹⁸⁸

All of the AAF's airframes saw decreases in their readiness since last quarter, which TAAC-Air tracks using **mission-capable (MC) rates**. Three of six airframes failed to meet their MC benchmarks this quarter (the MD-530, C-208, and A-29), two more than last quarter. This is the third consecutive quarter the MD-530 has failed to meet its readiness benchmark: the airframe has a 75% MC benchmark and its average MC rate this quarter fell to 61.3%. The C-208 had an average MC rate of 71.4% against a 75% benchmark, and the A-29 a 69% average against a 75% benchmark. The other three airframes (Mi-17, C-130, and UH-60) exceeded their MC benchmarks.¹⁸⁹

As of September 2019, the AAF continues to rely heavily on contractor-provided maintenance to maintain six of its seven air platforms (C-130, AC-208, C-208, A-29, MD-530, and UH-60), the same as last quarter. By contrast, the AAF is able to perform most of the routine maintenance required for its Mi-17s (85%, with contractors completing the rest).¹⁹⁰

AAF Manning

TAAC-Air continued to provide information on the number of fully mission-qualified aircrew and pilots the AAF has for each of its airframes, as shown in Table 3.11. As of October 1, 2019, the AAF had 212 pilots, instructor pilots, and copilots, 76% of its authorized strength of 279. TAAC-Air also

Mission-capable (MC) rates: Mission-capable rates reflect the readiness of each airframe. MC rates are calculated by taking the number of fully mission capable (available for tasking) aircraft divided by the total of aircraft for that airframe (both fully mission capable and non-mission capable).

Source: TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2019.

reported that it currently has 120 “other aircrew,” including loadmasters, aerial gunners, and other personnel, 100% of its authorized strength for other aircrew.¹⁹¹

The Special Mission Wing – Some Data Classified

This quarter, NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) continued to provide a general update on the Special Mission Wing (SMW). NSOCC-A also continued to classify detailed performance and other data on the Special Mission Wing (SMW). SIGAR’s questions about the SMW can be found in Appendix E of this report; information about the SMW is reported in the classified annex for this report.

SMW Funding

The United States has obligated a total of roughly \$2.4 billion for the SMW from FY 2012 through FY 2019 (through August 31, 2019) from the ASFF and the DOD-Counternarcotics Fund (DOD-CN). The total obligated funds (\$2.4 billion) includes \$182.1 million spent on the SMW in FY 2018 and \$69.5 million thus far in FY 2019. Last quarter, SIGAR reported that U.S. spending on the SMW was somewhat higher (\$2.5 billion) and was on track to increase substantially in FY 2019; however this was due to an error in NSOCC-A’s reporting on SMW funding. NSOCC-A now expects expenditures in FY 2019 to be similar to FY 2018.¹⁹² A substantial portion of the funding obligated since FY 2012 was for SMW sustainment (\$1.2 billion), which accounts for 49.4% of obligated funds, followed by equipment and aircraft (\$991.1 million) at 41.4%.¹⁹³

SMW Operations

The SMW is an AAF component whose mission is to support the ASSF with counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations. About 90% of SMW operations are focused on counterterrorism (the same as last quarter), with only one operation this quarter in support of a “counternexus” (counterterrorism and counternarcotics) mission, none solely supporting counternarcotics missions, and about 9% of operations characterized as “general support” or “misuse.”¹⁹⁴

In recent quarters, NSOCC-A said the SMW continues to be tasked by the ANA and ANP to support conventional ground forces, a possible misuse of the special-purpose force. Non-core-mission tasking had declined, but NSOCC-A reported this quarter that as a result of political pressure ahead of the September 28 presidential election, the formal tasking process had been frequently circumvented by high-level MOD officials. NSOCC-A said the amount of SMW misuse and general-support missions have directly undermined its ability to conduct counternarcotics missions. Because SMW conducts decisive support operations that require precision, increased skill, and unique capabilities not found in the regular Afghan Air Force

(AAF), demand for SMW support remains high across the ANDSF. The SMW receives many mission taskings that are better tailored for the AAF, but fall to the Special Mission Wing due to Afghan leadership's confidence in the unit.¹⁹⁵

NSOCC-A said this quarter that assessing financial penalties against MOD for SMW misuse has had a limited effect in discouraging inappropriate SMW missions. Therefore, NSOCC-A's leadership continues to advise MOD on appropriate use of the SMW.¹⁹⁶

Despite the recent resurgence of SMW misuse, the SMW continues to successfully support ASSF and develop a number of capabilities. For example, during a July 1 high-profile attack in Kabul, SMW aircraft unilaterally utilized their fast-rope insertion and exfiltration system to deploy police commandos onto a rooftop near the attack location. Additionally, the SMW has been conducting more medical evacuations using their Mi-17 aircraft. The SMW medical section has trained with Critical Response Unit (CRU) 222 medics to initiate a collaborative medical evacuation process. Medical trauma treatment begins on the ground with CRU 222 medics, then is handed off to SMW flight medics, who continue treatment aboard the aircraft. SMW flight medics have also been teaching other SMW personnel first aid to improve casualty treatment.¹⁹⁷

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated nearly \$21.7 billion and disbursed more than \$21.4 billion of ASFF funds from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP and some ASSF. These force elements comprised the ANP budget activity group (BAG) for reporting purposes through FY 2018 appropriation.¹⁹⁸

ANP Sustainment

As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated approximately \$9.7 billion and disbursed approximately \$9.5 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP and some ASSF **sustainment**.¹⁹⁹ For more information about what these costs include and the amount U.S. funds appropriated for ANP sustainment in FY 2019, see pages 52–53 of this report.

Unlike the ANA, a significant share of ANP personnel costs (including ANP salaries) are paid through the United Nations Development Programme's multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).²⁰⁰ This quarter, CSTC-A reported that the total amount expended for on-budget MOI elements' sustainment requirements thus far for Afghan FY 1398 (December 2018–August 31, 2019) was \$135.8 million. The vast majority of these funds was the \$102.7 million U.S. contribution for ANP sustainment (\$99.5 million for ANP goods and services, \$2.2 million for

Sustainment: Sustainment is defined in Joint Publication 3-0 as “The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission completion.” ASFF funds several types of sustainment costs: “personnel sustainment,” which includes salaries and incentive pay; food; the Afghan Personnel and Pay System; “logistics sustainment” such as fuel, the CoreIMS inventory management system, and transportation services; “combat sustainment,” including organizational clothing and individual equipment, ammunition, and weapons repair parts; and “general operational sustainment services,” such as vehicle, facility, and equipment sustainment (operations and maintenance costs).

Source: DOD, Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, Justification for FY 2019 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), 2/2018, pp. 15, 22–23, 28, 30; OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019.

salaries and incentives, and about \$1 million for assets such as facilities). Most of the other \$33 million was for Afghan Local Police (ALP) and GCPSU salaries.²⁰¹

The total amount reported for MOI elements' sustainment this quarter represents a \$70.3 million increase compared to the same period in 2018. A large portion of this increase is \$38.6 million of "contract carryover," which CSTC-A says are contracts that were awarded during FY 1397 for which CSTC-A had not yet reimbursed MOI. These contracts are for a range of requirements such as operations and maintenance of equipment and buildings, drilling wells, security improvements, and other minor projects.²⁰²

The \$102.5 million spent on goods and services sustainment for MOI elements thus far in FY 1398 reflects an increase of about \$86 million compared to roughly the same period in Afghan FY 1397 (through August 17, 2018). CSTC-A increased the funds it provided to the ANP to spend on goods and services sustainment this year because they said the ANP improved the execution of its procurement process due to targeted CSTC-A advising efforts. The ANP has improved their ability to award on-budget contracts and process payments to vendors in a timely manner.²⁰³ The costliest goods and services contributing to this increase are contract carryovers from the previous fiscal year (\$38.6 million), domestic fuel (\$14.5 million), and the Delegated Authority Fund (\$14.4 million).²⁰⁴ CSTC-A said the Delegated Authority Fund is a small allotment of funding made available the ANP for emergency or emerging requirements without going through the longer approval process.²⁰⁵

CSTC-A said this quarter that the total estimated funding required for MOI elements' base salaries, bonuses, and incentives for Afghan FY 1398 is \$56.3 million (which includes ALP salaries only), the same as last quarter.²⁰⁶ For more information about what these costs generally include and the amount U.S. funds appropriated for ANP sustainment in FY 2019, see page 53 of this report.

ANP Equipment and Transportation

As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated and disbursed approximately \$4.8 billion and disbursed approximately \$4.7 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP equipment and transportation costs.²⁰⁷

Seen in Table 3.12, CSTC-A reported that the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANP this quarter (June 1 through August 31, 2019) included 350 HMMWVs (two variants) valued at a total of about \$83 million, radio systems (\$3.5 million), and about 64,000 grenades (\$2.2 million).²⁰⁸

ANP Equipment Operational Readiness – Data Classified

This quarter USFOR-A continued to classify the data concerning the ANP's equipment readiness at the request of the Afghan government.²⁰⁹ The

TABLE 3.12

MAJOR EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO THE ANP, JUNE 1–AUGUST 15, 2019				
Equipment Type	Equipment Description	Units Issued in Quarter	Unit Cost	Total Cost
Vehicle	M1152 HMMWV (Humvee)	224	\$237,094	\$53,109,056
Vehicle	M1151 HMMWV (Humvee)	126	237,094	29,873,844
Communications	Base Station/Receiver for Portable Radios	289	12,030	3,476,670
Ammunition	40mm Grenade (Bounding VOG-25P)*	64,480	34.95	2,218,626
Weapon	M2 Machine Gun (12.7mm)	150	12,685	1,902,750
Vehicle	Medium Tactical Vehicle Truck	8	150,814	1,206,512
Weapon	M4 Rifle (5.56mm)	1,000	1,137	1,137,440
Ammunition	7.62mm x 54mm Cartridge*	880,000	0.71	642,800
Ammunition	12.7mm x 108mm Ball Cartridge*	168,000	3.82	641,760
Ammunition	Ground Illumination Signal (M195)	7,536	60	452,160
Total Cost of Equipment			\$94,661,618	

Note: * = non-NATO standard equipment. The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value equipment provided to the ANP this quarter. The "unit costs" listed reflect the average costs paid for items procured under multiple Foreign Military Sales cases; "total costs" were the actual amount spent for each item which may differ slightly from simply totaling average unit costs.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.

questions SIGAR asked about ANP equipment readiness can be found in Appendix E of this report. ANP equipment readiness is reported in the classified annex of this report.

ANP Infrastructure

The United States had obligated and disbursed approximately \$3.2 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP and some ASSF infrastructure projects as of September 30, 2019.²¹⁰

This quarter, CSTC-A continued to report that estimated U.S.-funded annual facilities-sustainment costs for all ANP facility and electrical-generator requirements for FY 2019 will be \$78.8 million, the same amount reported last quarter. According to CSTC-A, of the \$78.8 million, \$45.4 million will be provided directly to the Afghan government and \$33.4 million will be spent by CSTC-A for the Afghan government.²¹¹

As of August 12, 2019, the United States completed 780 ANP infrastructure projects in Afghanistan valued at roughly \$3 billion. CSTC-A reported that five projects were completed this quarter, costing \$7.2 million. Another 10 projects (valued at \$119 million) were ongoing and 14 projects (valued at \$78.8 million) were being planned.²¹² See Table 3.13 on the following page for descriptions and information about the highest-value awarded, ongoing, completed, and planned infrastructure projects.

Included in these projects are eight projects designated for ANP women, valued at a total of about \$67.3 million, comprising three ongoing projects (\$60.1 million), and five recently completed projects (\$7.2 million). As noted

The ANP's Non-NATO-Standard Weapons

Over the last few quarters, CSTC-A reported it was providing the ANP with some non-NATO weapons and ammunition. There have been reports of complications due to the ANP having a mix of NATO and non-NATO-standard weapons, including problems with the lack of interchangeability of weapons and ammunition during joint ANA-ANP operations.

This quarter, CSTC-A said the ANP still possesses a large stock of non-NATO weapons. While CSTC-A had initially planned to gradually transition the ANP to NATO-standard weapons, the MOI and ANP expressed reservations and preferred to retain their current weapon systems. According to CSTC-A, a transition to NATO weapons would take until FY 2022 and would "incur an initial capital expense" of about \$95 million to purchase 78,000 M4 rifles.

CSTC-A reported the following advantages for transitioning to NATO weapons:

- fewer types of ammunition to manage or procure
- weapons interchangeability with ANA
- fewer repair parts for weapons in the supply system
- ability to purchase all repair parts through NATO-approved vendors

CSTC-A continues to advise MOI to transition to NATO standard weapon sets, but said the decision ultimately rests with the Afghan government.

Source: New York Times, "Taliban Kill More Than 200 Afghan Defenders on 4 Fronts: 'A Catastrophe'," 8/12/2018; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019; CSTC-A, response to DODIG data call, 10/12/2019; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.

SECURITY

TABLE 3.13

HIGHEST-COST ANP INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS				
Project Description	Project Location	Agency/Contractor	Estimated Cost	Estimated Completion Date
Ongoing Projects				
ANP Kabul Surveillance System Camera and Security Upgrade and Expansion	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE/Xator Corporation	\$32,992,327.00	5/1/2021
WPP Police Town, Phase II*	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE/Macro Vantage Levant DMCC	32,831,000.00	5/23/2021
WPP Police Town, Phase I*	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE/Macro Vantage Levant DMCC	23,646,225.00	11/21/2020
Completed Projects				
Kabul Police Academy Phase II	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE/Macro Vantage Levant DMCC	6,411,165.00	6/29/2019
Family Response Unit Police District 17	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE/Assist Consultants	219,912.00	8/12/2019
Family Response Unit Police District 4	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE/Assist Consultants	214,711.00	8/12/2019
Planned Projects				
WPP Police Town, Phase III	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE/Macro Vantage Levant DMCC	35,000,000.00	6/30/2021
WPP Police Town, Phase IV	Kabul, Kabul Province	USACE/Macro Vantage Levant DMCC	31,000,000.00	8/30/2021

Note: The reporting period for this data is May 16–August 12, 2019.

*Funded by the multilateral NATO ANA Trust Fund (not U.S. ASFF funds).

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.

in the table, the highest-cost projects are being funded by international donors to the NATO ANA Trust Fund.²¹³

ANP Training and Operations

As of September 30, 2019, the United States had obligated \$4.1 billion and disbursed \$3.9 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appropriations for ANP and some ASSF training and operations.²¹⁴

At the request of DOD, SIGAR will await completion of GAO's forthcoming audit on the cost of ASFF-funded ANDSF training contracts before reporting on the status of those contracts. For more information about this and other GAO audits related to Afghanistan, see Section 4.

Afghan Local Police

ALP members, known as “guardians,” are usually local citizens selected by village elders or local leaders to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions. While the ANP's personnel costs are paid via the LOTFA, DOD funds the ALP, including its personnel and other costs. Funding for the ALP's personnel costs is provided directly to the Afghan government. Although the ALP is overseen by the MOI, its personnel are not counted toward the ANDSF's authorized end strength.²¹⁵ NSOCC-A reported the estimated amount of ASFF needed to fund the ALP for FY 2019 (assuming an ALP force authorization of 30,000 personnel) is about \$60 million.²¹⁶

NSOCC-A reported that according to the ALP Staff Directorate, the ALP had roughly 28,000 guardians on hand as of July 17, 2019, roughly 23,500 of whom were fully trained, the same as last quarter.²¹⁷ The ALP continues its efforts to enroll personnel into APPS and to transition ALP salary payments to an electronic funds-transfer process. According to NSOCC-A, as of August 4, 2019, about 74% of ALP personnel reported to be on-hand have been slotted into APPS, with 67% meeting the minimum data-entry requirements in APPS to be paid. Both figures reflect slight improvements from last quarter.²¹⁸

SIGAR inquired this quarter about ALP attrition trends. NSOCC-A continued to note that it is unable to maintain consistent situational awareness of ALP operations outside of the capital region, making it difficult to determine ALP attrition for reasons other than casualties. The ALP Staff Directorate reported to NSOCC-A that from October 1, 2018, through July 16, 2019, approximately 21 ALP personnel were killed in action per week on average.²¹⁹

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

According to the United Nations, Afghanistan is riddled with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) such as live shells and bombs.²²⁰ Although contamination originates from legacy mines laid before 2001, the cause of most casualties today are mines and other ERW dating from after the arrival of international forces.²²¹

In recent years, increased casualties have been reported from ordnance exploding in areas formerly used as firing ranges by Coalition forces.²²² From a low of 36 per month in 2012, casualties from mines and ERW increased to 191 per month in 2017. The National Disability Survey of Afghanistan, conducted in 2005, estimated at least 2.7% of the population were severely disabled, including 60,000 landmine and ERW survivors. The UN assumes the number is appreciably higher today.²²³

The Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has provided \$391.1 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan (an additional \$11.6 million was provided between 1997 and 2001 before the current U.S. reconstruction effort). As of June 30, 2019, PM/WRA has obligated \$11.1 million in FY 2018 funds.²²⁴

The Afghan government was granted an extension in 2012 until 2023 to fulfill its obligations under the Ottawa Treaty to achieve mine-free status. Given the magnitude of the problem and inadequate financial support, the country will not reach this objective in time.²²⁵ According to State, the drawdown of Coalition forces in 2014 was concurrent with a drawdown of international donor funds to the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan

SECURITY

TABLE 3.14

DEMINEING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE METRICS, FISCAL YEARS 2010–2019						
Fiscal Year	Minefields Cleared (m ²)	AT/AP Destroyed	UXO Destroyed	SAA Destroyed	Fragments Cleared	Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m ²) ^a
2010	39,337,557	13,879	663,162	1,602,267	4,339,235	650,662,000
2011	31,644,360	10,504	345,029	2,393,725	21,966,347	602,000,000
2012	46,783,527	11,830	344,363	1,058,760	22,912,702	550,000,000
2013	25,059,918	6,431	203,024	275,697	10,148,683	521,000,000
2014	22,071,212	12,397	287,331	346,484	9,415,712	511,600,000
2015	12,101,386	2,134	33,078	88,798	4,062,478	570,800,000
2016	27,856,346	6,493	6,289	91,563	9,616,485	607,600,000
2017	31,897,313	6,646	37,632	88,261	1,158,886	547,000,000
2018	25,233,844	5,299	30,924	158,850	N/A	558,700,000
2019 ^b	9,476,017	1,927	25,147	161,218	N/A	662,700,000
Total	271,461,480	77,540	1,975,979	6,265,623	83,620,528	

Note: AT/AP = antitank/antipersonnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition. N/A = not applicable.

Fragments are reported because clearing them requires the same care as other objects until their nature is determined. There are about 4,047 square meters (m²) to an acre.

^a Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey work identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

^b Partial fiscal year results (10/1/2018–6/30/2019).

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/23/2019.

(MAPA). From a 2010 peak of \$113 million, MAPA's budget decreased to \$51 million in 2018. The Afghan government will request another 10-year extension to meet its treaty obligations.²²⁶

State directly funds seven Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), six international NGOs, and one U.S.-based higher-education institution to help clear areas in Afghanistan contaminated by ERW and by conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs).²²⁷ From 1997 through June 30, 2019, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 271.5 million square meters of land (104 square miles, or 1.7 times the land area of the District of Columbia) and removed or destroyed over eight million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives. Table 3.14 shows conventional weapons destruction figures, FY 2010–2019.²²⁸

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate: clearance activities reduce the extent of hazardous areas, but ongoing surveys find new contaminated land. At the beginning of the calendar year, there were 619.3 square kilometers (239.1 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields. As of June 30, the total known contaminated area was 662.7 square kilometers (255.9 square miles) in 3,847 hazard areas. PM/WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines; a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.²²⁹

USAID's Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC) is a \$40 million, five-year, nationwide program that began in March 2018. It supports Afghan victims and their families who have suffered losses from military operations against the Taliban or from insurgent attacks. COMAC provides assistance to Afghan civilians and their dependent family members who have experienced loss due to:²³⁰

- military operations involving the U.S., Coalition, or ANDSF against insurgents, criminals, terrorists, or illegal armed groups
- landmines, improvised explosive devices (IED), unexploded ordnances, suicide attacks, public mass shootings, or other insurgent or terrorist actions
- cross-border shelling or cross-border fighting

COMAC provides in-kind goods sufficient to support families affected by conflict for 60 days. Additional assistance includes referrals for health care and livelihood service providers, and economic reintegration for families impacted by loss or injury.²³¹ During the second fiscal quarter, COMAC launched its online incident case-management system through which assistance packages are distributed. The incident-management system includes biometric registration capabilities to identify beneficiaries.²³² Between April and June 2019, COMAC distributed over 1,700 assistance packages to eligible families.²³³

GOVERNANCE CONTENTS

Key Issues and Events	103
U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Governance	104
Reconciliation and Reintegration	104
Presidential Elections	107
Mutual Accountability	110
U.S. Assistance to the Afghan Government Budget	111
National Governance	117
Subnational Governance	118
Rule of Law and Anticorruption	120
Refugees and Internal Displacement	127
Women's Advancement	128

GOVERNANCE

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

President Donald J. Trump suspended U.S.-Taliban peace negotiations this quarter after nine rounds of talks between U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad and the insurgent group.²³⁴

The U.S. government and the Taliban had concluded the most recent round of peace talks in Doha, Qatar, on August 31, 2019. Ambassador Khalilzad described the situation then as being “at the threshold of an agreement.”²³⁵ However, on September 7, President Trump announced that after the Taliban admitted to an attack in Kabul that killed a U.S. soldier, he canceled previously unannounced, separate secret meetings he had planned to hold with the Taliban and President Ashraf Ghani at Camp David in Maryland.²³⁶ Two days later, President Trump reiterated to reporters that the talks were over, saying, “as far as I’m concerned, they’re dead.”²³⁷ Still, on September 25, President Trump told the UN General Assembly that “we will never stop working to make peace [in Afghanistan] a reality.”²³⁸ On October 3, the Taliban and the Pakistan government called for the resumption of the peace process.²³⁹

On September 28, Afghanistan held its fourth presidential election. According to initial turnout results from 79% of the polling centers, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) said only 2.2 million of the 9.67 million registered Afghans voted.²⁴⁰ President Ghani attributed the low turnout to the failure of Afghanistan’s unity government to implement reforms and improve the living situation of Afghans.²⁴¹ According to the IEC, preliminary election results were not due until October 19 (they missed this target), and the final results are set to be announced on November 7. Nonetheless, both the Ghani campaign and rival Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah predicted victory soon after the balloting closed.²⁴² If no candidate receives more than 50% of the vote, the IEC will likely hold a second vote on or about November 23, depending on the resolution of any electoral complaints.²⁴³

This quarter, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) told SIGAR in a written response to a data call that it would be counterproductive to impose any conditions-based financial penalties on the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOI) as a means to drive positive behavior change. However, CSTC-A

commander Lieutenant General James E. Rainey and his senior staff subsequently clarified in a meeting with Inspector General Sopko in Kabul that CSTC-A was still utilizing conditionality, but through an incentive-based approach rather than through commitment letters.²⁴⁴

U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR GOVERNANCE

As of September 30, 2019, the United States had provided nearly \$34.5 billion to support governance and economic development in Afghanistan. Most of this funding, nearly \$20.5 billion, was appropriated to the Economic Support Fund (ESF) administered by the State Department (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).²⁴⁵

RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION

U.S.-Taliban Talks Suspended

After nine rounds of negotiations, President Trump announced the suspension of U.S. peace talks with the Taliban on September 7. According to State, the U.S. government is reviewing options for moving ahead.²⁴⁶

President Trump said the Camp David talks were canceled after the Taliban admitted to an attack in Kabul that killed a U.S. soldier, which he interpreted as an attempt to gain leverage in the negotiations.²⁴⁷ As Secretary Pompeo described it, the Taliban “overreached” and failed to live up to a series of commitments they had made. However, Secretary Pompeo acknowledged that the United States also sought to pressure the Taliban while “fighting and talking,” claiming that over 1,000 Taliban had been killed in 10 days.²⁴⁸

A week prior to the suspension, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad described the talks as being “at the threshold of an agreement.”²⁴⁹ Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo elaborated, saying the Taliban told U.S. negotiators that it would publicly and permanently break with al-Qaeda and that the Taliban would meet in Oslo, Norway, to begin reconciliation talks with fellow Afghans.²⁵⁰ The U.S.-Taliban talks had not included official representation from the elected government in Kabul.²⁵¹

Reacting to the canceled meeting at Camp David, President Ghani said he had not expected more than a symbolic meeting where the Taliban and the Afghan government would formally commit to a political solution and ending the violence.²⁵²

A more comprehensive discussion of State’s perspectives on the peace talks is presented in the classified addendum of this report.

Proposals for Post-Peace Foreign Assistance

Recently, the World Bank and the U.S. and Afghan governments have publicly offered their views on the possible role of foreign assistance in a post-peace Afghanistan. While all three institutions agree that foreign assistance should continue, each emphasized a different rationale. For example, the World Bank described its proposed post-settlement suite of programs as “signaling change” that peace delivers a short-term, noticeable improvement in living standards, increasing the chance of sustaining peace.²⁵³ Acting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Alice G. Wells said post-peace foreign assistance could provide the international community with “substantial amount of leverage” over the Taliban.²⁵⁴ Meanwhile, the Afghan government says “economic reintegration of ex-combatants and other parties is critical to maintaining peace.”²⁵⁵

This quarter, the World Bank publicly released its draft proposal for a package of post-settlement economic support to Afghanistan. The World Bank developed the proposal in response to the November 2018 Geneva Conference that called on the international community to develop a specific action plan for a program of economic initiatives related to the socio-economic requirements for peace.²⁵⁶ The World Bank estimates that it would cost around \$5.2 billion in “new and additional public financing [...] none of which has so far been programmed” to fund the full set of its proposed initiatives through 2024.²⁵⁷ (In comments to SIGAR, USAID criticized SIGAR’s description of the World Bank’s estimated funding requirements as requiring “new” donor funding as “extremely misleading” because “we [USAID] understand that this [\$5.2 billion] funding is not additive, but rather already existing resources.”²⁵⁸) The Bank says the best method to achieve immediate impact would be to use existing implementation mechanisms/programs.²⁵⁹ (For more detail on the proposed suite of programs, see page 135 of this report.)

Nearly 60% of the additional \$5.2 billion proposed by the World Bank would go towards bolstering existing initiatives such as expanding Citizen’s Charter, the Afghan government’s flagship program to build state legitimacy and end fragmentation, and extending access to health and education to more geographical areas, including formerly insecure areas.²⁶⁰ Despite the Afghan government’s concern about the economic reintegration of ex-combatants and other parties, the Bank specifically notes that its proposed suite of programs does not include disarming or demobilizing former combatants. Instead, it says its proposal will benefit former combatants indirectly through “expanding broad opportunities” for all Afghans.²⁶¹

State has not publicly specified the particular suite of foreign assistance programs it envisages in a post-peace Afghanistan. But it has reportedly led an interagency effort to plan for potential post-settlement economic assistance and has contemplated how foreign aid could enable the United States to support stabilization and self-reliance and continue influencing

a post-peace Afghanistan. USAID told SIGAR that the U.S. government participated in developing the World Bank's draft proposal and believes the World Bank proposal reflects its potential post-political settlement programs.²⁶² According to State, a joint statement issued at a July intra-Afghan dialogue event in Doha speaks to the Taliban's interest in the continuation of foreign assistance. According to this statement, participants—including senior Taliban officials—called for “support and assistance from donor countries post peace agreement based on the new cooperation and relations.”²⁶³ Further, as Ambassador Wells told the members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in September, the Taliban say they want to be a legitimate part of the international community and have “learned lessons from the isolation that Afghanistan experienced under [their] rule in the late 1990s and early 2000s.” According to Ambassador Wells, the Taliban's desire for foreign investment and assistance would give the U.S. substantial leverage in a post-peace Afghanistan.²⁶⁴

In a July 2019 presentation to donors, the Afghan government offered an ambitious four-year program intended to “saturate” 120 target districts with services to create institutional and community resiliency and reconciliation following a peace agreement.²⁶⁵ The Afghan government's proposal includes:

- Increase the coverage of Citizen's Charter to an additional 120 districts beyond the 123 rural districts and four major cities that constitute the first phase of Citizen's Charter (Phase I is planned to run from 2017 to 2021).²⁶⁶ One goal would be to deliver short-term jobs in all target districts to rebuild and maintain critical infrastructure.²⁶⁷ The proposed beneficiaries would include all ex-combatants (regardless of affiliation), internally displaced persons, and returnees.²⁶⁸
- Establish mobile courts/units to deliver “swift and fair” dispute resolution, provide information, and implement government administrative functions (such as issuing government documents).²⁶⁹
- Develop a body within the first year of a peace program to adjudicate property rights by determining the evidence of claims, establishing linkages between informal and formal justice systems, enforcing decisions, and providing compensation and restitution.²⁷⁰

According to the Afghan government, this proposed “day-after peace program” could form the basis of concrete commitments negotiated within a peace agreement.²⁷¹ However, while the Afghan government did not propose a budget for this program, it does observe that “overpromising and under achieving can significantly undermine state legitimacy and threaten to further destabilise the country.”²⁷²

U.S. Support to Peace and Reconciliation

On July 27, President Ghani signed a decree dissolving the High Peace Council (HPC) Executive Secretariat, the operational arm of the HPC established by former President Hamid Karzai in 2010 to negotiate with elements of the Taliban. According to State, this action was not unexpected given the HPC's poor results. Two days later, the U.S. and other donors decided to end the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP's) support to the HPC. For over 20 months, UNDP had provided support to the HPC through a series of temporary projects. The total amount of U.S. funds allocated for HPC support since September 2017 was \$10.1 million. State said it may be able to recover some of the unspent funds.²⁷³

Prior to the dissolution of the HPC, the Afghan government created the Ministry of Peace Affairs in June 2019. In August, the U.S. Embassy told the new Minister of Peace Affairs that previous assistance to the HPC would not be available for the ministry.²⁷⁴

This quarter, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) told SIGAR that it is exploring a program to support the Afghan peace process. While the scope of the program is still under development, OTI anticipates it will include analytical work to better understand needs and dynamics in areas where there would be a reduction in violence. These efforts would include communications and education regarding a peace agreement, potential small-scale community trust-building activities, and possible support to the Afghan government's Citizens' Charter program.²⁷⁵ According to USAID, OTI is tasked with providing fast, flexible, short-term assistance to take advantage of windows of opportunity to build democracy and peace.²⁷⁶ Since 2001, OTI has opened and closed two transition-programming phases in Afghanistan: 2002–2005 and again 2009–2016.²⁷⁷

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

On September 28, Afghanistan held its fourth presidential election. Of the approximately 9.67 million registered voters, at least 2.2 million voted according to an IEC statement made on September 29.²⁷⁸

The day before the election, the IEC announced that they would count votes only from biometrically registered and photographed voters.²⁷⁹ According to the Afghanistan Analysts Network, the IEC refused to allow women to vote if they refused to have their photograph taken as part of the biometric verification as an anti-fraud measure after elections in 2009 and 2014 ended in disputes over rampant ballot stuffing. However, according to Reuters, prior to the election, 18 Afghan women's-rights groups wrote the IEC that the measure would stop many women from voting because they believed it was un-Islamic or culturally inappropriate to allow themselves to be photographed by men.²⁸⁰



President Ashraf Ghani having his picture taken by Independent Election Commission staff on election day. (Afghan government photo)

Days before the election, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo appeared to express frustration with the Afghan government, writing on September 18 that the United States had “called repeatedly for the Afghan government and electoral institutions to make preparations for a credible and transparent presidential election.” He warned all parties, including the Taliban, against any attempt to intimidate, coerce, or buy voters as this would be “an attack on democracy.”²⁸¹ The following day, Secretary Pompeo announced what was reported as \$160 million in cuts and changes to some U.S. assistance to Afghanistan in response to concerns about corruption. When asked what message he was sending President Ghani in his announcement regarding reductions and/or changes to certain U.S. foreign assistance to Afghanistan, the Secretary responded that the United States desired free and fair elections in Afghanistan.²⁸²

According to the UN Secretary-General, there were persistent indications prior to the election that Afghan government resources were being improperly used for electioneering purposes. On August 1, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) issued a written warning to both President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah for violating electoral campaign regulations, including by using Afghan government facilities and financial resources for campaign purposes. In its warning, the ECC cited the use of government vehicles and government equipment in campaign activities, as well as the participation of high-ranking government officials at electoral gatherings.²⁸³

Days before the election, the Taliban said that it was directing its fighters to neutralize the election “by making use of everything at their disposal.” The Taliban warned Afghans to stay home.²⁸⁴

According to the UN, the level of election-related violence remained relatively low in the months leading up to the September 28 election. The UN documented 100 election-related incidents with civilian casualties on election day. The UN’s preliminary figures indicated that 458 civilian casualties (85 deaths and 373 injured) were caused by attacks targeting the electoral process. Of these casualties, 277 civilian casualties (28 deaths and 249 injured) occurred on election day. Overall, civilian casualties figures were significantly lower in 2019 as compared to the October 2018 parliamentary elections, the UN said. However, civilian casualty levels were higher than the April and June 2014 presidential election days.²⁸⁵

It is unclear which specific factors (such as threats of violence, changes to biometric voter verification, or a general pessimism) drove the low turnout. A recent Gallup poll found that Afghans in 2018 rated their lives more poorly than in any other country based on the pollster’s decade of tracking the measure. Meanwhile, in 2018 a record-high portion (41%) of its sample of approximately 1,000 Afghans interviewed said they would leave Afghanistan if they could.²⁸⁶

A more comprehensive discussion of State’s perspectives on the elections is presented in the classified addendum of this report.

U.S. Funding Support to Elections

The U.S. government provided financial support to Afghan parliamentary and presidential elections in 2018 and 2019 through a grant of up to nearly \$79 million to the UNDP. Through this grant, UNDP provides support to Afghanistan’s electoral management bodies, the IEC and the ECC.²⁸⁷

The Afghan government estimated that the presidential elections would cost \$149 million, with the Afghan government committing \$90 million and donors providing the remaining \$59 million through the UNDP.²⁸⁸

As shown in Table 3.15, USAID had three active elections-related programs this quarter, the largest of which is support to the UNDP.²⁸⁹

On August 8, 2018, USAID signed a three-year, \$14 million cooperative agreement with the Consortium for Elections and Political Process

TABLE 3.15

USAID ELECTION-RELATED PROGRAMS

Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2019
Electoral Support Activity (ESA)	5/20/2015	12/31/2019	\$78,995,000	\$59,935,457
Strengthening Civic Engagement in Elections in Afghanistan Activity (SCEEA)	8/9/2018	8/8/2021	18,253,000	6,039,886

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.

Strengthening (CEPPS)—representing the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute—to support domestic Afghan election observation of the 2018 parliamentary elections, the 2019 presidential elections, and to promote longer-term electoral reforms.²⁹⁰

MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Afghanistan Compact

This quarter State said there were no updates on the Afghan government's progress in meeting the Afghanistan Compact's benchmarks because the Afghan government and the U.S. Embassy had suspended their periodic Compact meetings until after the election.²⁹¹

The U.S. and Afghan governments announced the launch of the Afghanistan Compact in 2017.²⁹² The Compact is an Afghan-led initiative designed to demonstrate the government's commitment to reforms. The Afghan government appears to face no direct financial consequences if it fails to meet the Afghanistan Compact reform commitments. Instead, the principal motivation for the Afghan government officials tasked with achieving the Compact benchmarks appears to be avoiding embarrassment, State said.²⁹³

Civilian Assistance Review Between Afghan and U.S. Governments

In August 2019, the U.S. and Afghan governments finished a joint review of U.S. government civilian assistance to Afghanistan that began in May. According to State, the joint review focused on strategic results, alignment with Afghan government development priorities, and identification of challenges and successes.²⁹⁴ State said this review recommended an adjustment in the number of U.S.-supported projects. Further, the remaining activities should be focused on (1) supporting the Afghan peace process and preserving the flexibility to support implementation of an eventual peace settlement; (2) preserving state stability, including through support for democratic governance, in order to guard against conditions that would enable terrorist safe havens; and (3) assisting the transition to Afghan self-reliance by supporting private sector growth and civil society support for core functions customarily provided by government.

State anticipates that some existing programs will come to an end based on their intended period of performance. For instance, State said there are plans to completely phase out road construction, and (as has been the case for the last few years) the U.S. government will not underwrite any new major infrastructure.²⁹⁵

While USAID told SIGAR that the Ministry of Finance had no comments on USAID's summary report finalizing the civilian-assistance review,²⁹⁶ in an interview days before the election, President Ghani said "USAID is one of the incompetent donors." He complained that "from each American dollar, the people of Afghanistan don't get more than 10 cents of it."²⁹⁷ This statement prompted the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, John Bass, to respond that he was disappointed that President Ghani overlooked the "excellent work of USAID" in Afghanistan.²⁹⁸

For more background on the U.S.-Afghan discussions on foreign assistance, see the classified addendum of this report.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT BUDGET

Summary of Assistance Agreements

At the Brussels Conference in October 2016, the United States and other international participants confirmed their intention to provide \$15.2 billion between 2017 and 2020 in support of Afghanistan's development priorities.²⁹⁹ At the November 2018 Geneva Conference on Afghanistan, international donors reaffirmed their intention to provide \$15.2 billion for Afghanistan's development priorities up to 2020 and to direct continuing but gradually declining financial support to Afghanistan's social and economic development up through 2024.³⁰⁰

According to the World Bank, the planned 2020 expiration of major donor pledges means that the future trajectory of foreign grant assistance is highly uncertain.³⁰¹ However, the World Bank believes that if a growing proportion of donor funds is delivered **on-budget**, the current donor commitments should be sufficient to fund existing levels of service delivery as well as some additional infrastructure investments.³⁰²

In several conferences after the 2010 Kabul Conference, the United States and other international donors supported an increase to 50% in the proportion of civilian development aid delivered on-budget through the Afghan government or multidonor trust funds to improve governance, cut costs, and align development efforts with Afghan priorities.³⁰³ USAID later updated its position, saying in December 2018 that it does not target or commit to specific percentage of funds to be used for on-budget programming.³⁰⁴

On July 11, 2018, participants in the NATO Brussels Summit committed to extend "financial sustainment of the Afghan forces through 2024." The public declaration did not specify an amount of money or targets for the on-budget share of assistance.³⁰⁵

At the November 2018 Geneva Conference on Afghanistan, the Afghan government proposed that donors commit to delivering 60% of aid

On-budget assistance: encompasses donor funds that are aligned with Afghan government plans, included in Afghan government budget documents, and included in the budget approved by the parliament and managed by the Afghan treasury system. On-budget assistance is primarily delivered either bilaterally from a donor to Afghan government entities, or through multidonor trust funds. (DOD prefers the term "direct contributions" when referring to Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) monies executed via Afghan government contracts or Afghan spending on personnel.)

Off-budget assistance: encompasses donor funds that are excluded from the Afghan national budget and not managed through Afghan government systems.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 7/30/2014, p. 130; Ministry of Finance, "Aid Management Policy for Transition and Beyond," 12/10/2012, p. 8; State, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/14/2016; DOD, OSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2018.



Inspector General John F. Sopko, seated next to National Procurement Authority Director Alham Omar Hotaki (left) and acting Finance Minister Mohammad Humayon Qayoumi, attends a meeting of the National Procurement Commission chaired by President Ghani. (Afghan government photo)

on-budget.³⁰⁶ However, international donors committed only to continue channeling aid on-budget “as appropriate” with no specific target.³⁰⁷

In his September 19 statement on transparency and anticorruption, Secretary Pompeo highlighted a lack of transparency surrounding procurement decisions by the Afghan government’s National Procurement Authority (NPA) as an area of great cause for concern.³⁰⁸ The NPA reviews proposed contracts, and recommends approval, disapproval, or other action to the National Procurement Commission (NPC), whose members are President Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah, the second vice president, and the ministers of finance, economy, and justice. President Ghani chairs the NPC.³⁰⁹ By singling out the NPA for critique and by noting its plans to direct \$100 million in funds for a large energy-infrastructure project from on-budget to an off-budget mechanism, State told SIGAR it is signaling a greater level of scrutiny and calling on the Afghan government to take corruption more seriously.³¹⁰ Further, State appears to be raising broader concerns for the future of civilian on-budget assistance.

As shown in Table 3.16 on the following page, USAID’s active, direct bilateral-assistance programs have a total estimated cost of \$75 million. USAID also expects to contribute \$2.7 billion to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) from 2012 through 2020 in addition to

TABLE 3.16

USAID ON-BUDGET PROGRAMS					
Project/Trust Fund Title	Afghan Government On-Budget Partner	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2019
Bilateral Government-to-Government Projects					
Textbook Printing and Distribution	Ministry of Education	9/15/2017	12/31/2019	\$75,000,000	\$0
Multi-Donor Trust Funds					
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) (current award)*	Multiple	3/31/2012	6/30/2020	2,700,000,000	2,155,686,333
Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF)	Multiple	3/7/2013	3/6/2023	153,670,184	153,670,184

Note: *USAID had a previous award to the ARTF that concluded in March 2012 and totaled \$1,371,991,195 in disbursements. Cumulative disbursements from all ARTF awards is currently \$3,527,677,528.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.

\$1.37 billion disbursed under the previous grant agreement between USAID and the World Bank (2002–2011). USAID has disbursed \$154 million to the Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF).³¹¹

Civilian On-Budget Assistance

USAID has provided on-budget civilian assistance in two ways: bilaterally to Afghan government entities, and through contributions to two multidonor trust funds, the World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Asian Development Bank-administered Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF).³¹² According to USAID, all bilateral-assistance funds are deposited in separate bank accounts established by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) for each program.³¹³

The ARTF provides funds to the Afghan government's operating and development budgets in support of Afghan government operations, policy reforms, and national-priority programs.³¹⁴ The AITF coordinates donor assistance for infrastructure projects.³¹⁵

As of July 2019, the United States remains the largest cumulative donor to the ARTF (30.3% of actual, as distinct from pledged, contributions paid in); the next-largest donor is the United Kingdom (17.3% of pledged contributions paid in).³¹⁶

ARTF Recurrent-Cost Window

The ARTF recurrent-cost window supports operating costs, such as Afghan government non-security salaries and operation and maintenance expenses. The recurrent-cost window is also the vehicle for channeling reform-based incentive funds, such as the Incentive Program Development Policy Grant (IP DPG).³¹⁷

As of July 2019, the ARTF recurrent-cost window has cumulatively provided the Afghan government approximately \$2.6 billion for wages,

\$600 million for operations and maintenance costs, \$1.1 billion in incentive program funds, and \$762 million in ad hoc payments since 2002.³¹⁸

In July 2019, the World Bank's contracted monitoring agent for the recurrent-cost window submitted its review of the Afghan fiscal year (FY) 1397 (December 2017–December 2018). The Afghan government submitted \$1.3 billion in expenditures for the year, but the monitoring agent verified only \$922 million (71.9%) as eligible for reimbursement. The three most frequent types of ineligibility found by the monitoring agent were noncompliance with procurement procedures (22.7%), military-related payments (16.5%), and invalid expenditures (15.1%).³¹⁹

U.S. “Withholds” \$60 Million in Not-Yet-Due ARTF Incentive Funds

In 2018, the Afghan government, World Bank, and ARTF donors agreed to restructure the recurrent-cost window to make the provision of funds contingent upon policy reforms and fiscal stability-related results through the 2019 Incentive Program Development Policy Grant (IP DPG).³²⁰

The United States is the only ARTF donor to have specified that the World Bank should dedicate a portion of its contributions to the IP DPG, having provided \$210 million for that purpose as of July 2019.³²¹

The 2019 IP DPG consists of 11 reform-based tranches. The first tranche of \$100 million comes from non-ARTF World Bank monies. The remaining 10 tranches are each worth \$30 million in ARTF funds, with disbursement tied to the Afghan government's achievement of specific conditions before November 15, 2019. Tranches are penalized 10% per month if conditions are not met by the deadline.³²²

On September 19, State issued a statement on accountability and anticorruption in Afghanistan that announced, among other items, the withholding of \$60 million in planned U.S. assistance. According to State, the withholding was due to the Afghan government's failure to meet unspecified benchmarks for transparency and accountability in public financial management.³²³

Upon further inquiry, USAID informed SIGAR that the Afghan government had failed to meet two IP DPG public financial management-related benchmarks. These benchmarks require the Afghan government to (1) publish fortnightly revenue reports on its website and (2) publish the minutes of the cash-management committee meetings.³²⁴ However, as these benchmarks are not due until November 2019, USAID may still provide the World Bank with the full \$60 million for transfer to the Afghan government if the Afghan government meets the deadline. As of September 26, USAID reported to SIGAR that the Afghan government had already met six IP DPG benchmarks and was on track to meet the remaining seven benchmarks (including the two public financial management-related benchmarks).³²⁵

USAID officials told SIGAR the announced withholding of the IP DPG funds was intended to send a message to the Afghan government about the importance of ensuring transparency and accountability in their financial management.³²⁶

ARTF Fiduciary Review Finds Weaknesses in Ministry of Education's Internal Controls

In July, the World Bank briefed the ARTF Strategy Group, including nine ARTF donors, on the results of an education fiduciary review. According to the World Bank, the review began in December 2017, after allegations were made about possible corruption cases in the education sector and problems in the fiduciary arrangements of the Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP II) project.³²⁷ (EQUIP II was an ARTF-funded project that ran from 2008 to 2017 that aimed to increase equitable access to quality basic education.³²⁸) According to the World Bank, SIGAR's recommendations were one of the factors that motivated the in-depth review.³²⁹

The World Bank-hired consultants reviewed a sample of \$156.5 million out of the total \$418 million in EQUIP II transactions. The World Bank validated the draft consultant report and identified the following control weaknesses: inadequate documentation (totaling \$21.9 million, representing 14% of the sample); noncompliance with rules and regulations (\$2.2 million, 1% of the sample); and potential fraud (\$37.2 million, 24% of the sample).³³⁰

According to USAID, as of September 26, the review has prompted the World Bank to request the Afghan government to reimburse it \$2.2 million. The remaining EQUIP II questioned-costs balance is being further investigated. SIGAR and USAID OIG are collaborating in this investigation.³³¹

On-Budget Assistance to the ANDSF

Approximately 70% of total U.S. on-budget assistance goes toward the requirements of the Afghan security forces.³³² According to a recent World Bank estimate, Afghan government security expenditures—including **off-budget** security costs—were equivalent to 29% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2018. By contrast, the average low-income country spends 3% of GDP on security-related costs, according to the Bank.³³³

DOD provides on-budget assistance to the Afghan government through direct contributions from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to the Afghan government to fund a portion of Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) requirements, and through ASFF contributions to the multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).³³⁴

According to DOD, most of the ASFF appropriation is not on-budget because it is spent on equipment, supplies, and services for the Afghan security forces using DOD contracts.³³⁵ UNDP administers LOTFA primarily to fund Afghan National Police salaries and incentives.³³⁶ The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) provides

direct-contribution funding to the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which allots it incrementally to the MOD and MOI.³³⁷

For Afghan fiscal year (FY) 1398 (December 2018–December 2019), CSTC-A plans to provide the Afghan government up to the equivalent of \$707.5 million to support the MOD and \$137.3 million to support the MOI.³³⁸

As of August 31, CSTC-A had provided the Afghan government the equivalent of \$415.9 million to support the MOD for FY 1398. Almost all of these funds (91%) paid for salaries.³³⁹ Additionally, as of August 31, CSTC-A had provided the equivalent of \$128.7 million to support the MOI. Of these funds, none were delivered via the LOTFA.³⁴⁰

CSTC-A has moved away from the LOTFA in the past few years. In 2016, for example, the United States contributed \$114.40 million to LOTFA, but only \$1.04 million in 2018.³⁴¹ According to CSTC-A, their reduced LOTFA contributions allow other donors (such as those that are prohibited from providing funds directly to the Afghan government) to contribute to the MOI costs through the UNDP-administered fund. Despite the significant reduction in contributions, CSTC-A believes the 2019 LOTFA donations are sufficient to meet the Afghan police salary requirements.³⁴²

CSTC-A No Longer Believes Conditions-based Financial Penalties are Effective

CSTC-A said this quarter that it would be counterproductive to impose financial penalties on the MOD and MOI for failing to meet conditions. However, CSTC-A commander Lieutenant General James E. Rainey and his senior staff subsequently clarified in a meeting with Inspector General Sopko in Kabul that CSTC-A was still utilizing conditionality, but through an incentive-based approach rather than through commitment letters.³⁴³

For the past three quarters, CSTC-A reported to SIGAR that it did not assess the MOD or MOI as meeting (or not meeting) the conditions outlined in the commitment letters for Afghan years 1397/1398. CSTC-A is able to issue fines and penalties if it determines that the MOD or MOI have not complied with the terms of these commitment letters. However, CSTC-A did not issue any financial penalties for those three quarters.³⁴⁴

Previously, CSTC-A viewed the commitment-letter conditions as a means to drive behavior change in the MOD and MOI by ensuring these institutions complied with various Afghan legal regulations, the Afghanistan Compact, and the U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement. The first commitment letters were implemented in 2014. As the commander of CSTC-A at that time, Major General Todd Semonite, told SIGAR, this was a reaction to his observation that “in 2013, we had no conditions” for on-budget funds to support the MOD and MOI. CSTC-A would apply financial and nonfinancial penalties (levers) when it observed noncompliance with commitment-letter conditions.³⁴⁵ One example of a nonfinancial lever included withholding

fuel allocations. According to CSTC-A in the past, exercising these levers improved Afghan reporting and added rigor to certain Afghan procedures.³⁴⁶

In lieu of applying conditions-based financial levers, CSTC-A said it currently “leverages” multiple assessment tools to track Afghan security force progress. In conjunction with the Advisor Network, CSTC-A reportedly uses the Afghan security forces’ “Top 10 Challenges/ Opportunities.” According to CSTC-A, these alternative assessments guide their train, advise, and assist efforts and include metrics for corruption cases, contract completion, and Afghan security-force casualties from checkpoint operations. CSTC-A said the new tool is still being evaluated and awaits final approval.³⁴⁷

NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Civil Society and Media

As shown in Table 3.17, USAID funds programs to support broader human and institutional capacity building of civil-society organizations and the media.

The Afghan Civic Engagement Program’s (ACEP) goal is to promote civil-society and media engagement that enables Afghan citizens to influence policy, monitor government accountability, and serve as advocates for political reform. Starting in June 2018, ACEP’s goals included expanding civic and voter education and engagement for the scheduled parliamentary and presidential elections.³⁴⁸ In its first five years, ACEP awarded \$9.2 million in grants to local institutions and civil-society organizations (CSO). Its current portfolio includes an additional \$2.1 million in grants.³⁴⁹

USAID’s \$9 million Rasana program provides support to women journalists and women-run or women-owned media organizations. The program has four program areas: (1) support and training for women journalists, (2) investigative journalism initiatives, (3) advocacy and training for the protection of journalists, and (4) expanding the outreach of media through small grants for content production in underserved areas.³⁵⁰

Rasana supports women-run and women-owned media organizations to produce three to five minute-long women-focused radio programs.³⁵¹ Between April and June 2019, these organizations broadcast 226 radio stories, including a campaign encouraging the use of reusable tote bags

TABLE 3.17

USAID CAPACITY-BUILDING PROGRAMS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2019
Afghan Civic Engagement Program (ACEP)	12/4/2013	12/4/2019	\$79,120,000	\$76,927,077
Rasana (Media)	3/29/2017	3/28/2020	9,000,000	6,268,335

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.

GOVERNANCE

to improve the environment in Jowzjan Province; the female karate team in Takhar Province; financial problems created by the increasing sums for dowries in Helmand and Takhar Provinces; a bicycle-riding contest for young women in Balkh Province; and the role of women in peace talks.³⁵²

SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Afghanistan's National Security Advisor Hamdullah Mohib said this quarter that the Afghan government has classified 60 of Afghanistan's 400 districts as "high" threat districts. According to Mohib, the Afghan government is present and provides services in all but 10 of these high-threat districts. Further, he clarified that these districts are not facing a high threat of collapse. Instead, the Taliban are able to easily launch attacks or hinder road transport in these districts. According to Mohib, an additional 90 districts are medium or low threat.³⁵³

Provincial and Municipal Programs

USAID has two subnational programs focused on provincial centers and municipalities: the Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations (ISLA) and Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience (SHAHAR). Table 3.18 summarizes total program costs and disbursements to date.

Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations

The \$48 million ISLA program is meant to enable the Afghan government to improve provincial governance in the areas of fiscal and development planning, representation of citizens, and enhanced delivery of public services. ISLA aims to strengthen subnational systems of planning, operations, communication, representation, and citizen engagement, leading to services that more closely respond to all citizens' needs in health, education, security, justice, and urban services.³⁵⁴

According to USAID, ISLA saw improvement in a core problem: the poor integration of provincial priorities into Afghanistan's national budget plans.³⁵⁵ For the Afghan fiscal year (FY) 1398 (December 2018–December

TABLE 3.18

USAID SUBNATIONAL (PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL) PROGRAMS

Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2019
Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience (SHAHAR)	11/30/2014	5/29/2020	\$72,000,000	\$57,054,252
Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations (ISLA)	2/1/2015	7/30/2020	48,000,000	39,478,616
Citizens' Charter Afghanistan Project (CCAP)*	3/31/2012	6/30/2020	N/A	34,314,589

Note: *This includes USAID contributions to ARTF with an express preference for the Citizens' Charter Afghanistan Project.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.

2019), ISLA found that 14.2% of community-proposed provincial development-plan (PDP) projects from 16 ISLA-supported provinces found their way into the national budget plan. This was an increase from the previous budget, when the Afghan government adopted only 11% of PDP projects.³⁵⁶ Despite these improvements, ISLA failed to meet its target for this indicator for the third year in a row. For FY 1398, the target was 24.2% of PDP projects being included in the national budget.³⁵⁷ ISLA does not appear to track whether the projects included in the budget are actually implemented.

Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience

The objective of the \$72 million SHAHAR program is to create well-governed, fiscally sustainable Afghan municipalities capable of meeting the needs of a growing urban population. SHAHAR partners with municipalities to, among other things, deliver capacity-building for outreach and citizen consultation, improved revenue forecasting and generation, and budget formulation and execution.³⁵⁸

As of July, 14 SHAHAR-supported municipalities reported a 20% reduction in total revenues collected for Afghan fiscal year (FY) 1398 (December 2018–December 2019) (compared to the same period of time in the prior year). According to SHAHAR, the Ministry of Finance began collecting a fee that was a significant source of municipal revenues. Without the MOF fees, these municipalities would have registered an 18% revenue increase year-on-year.³⁵⁹

Citizen's Charter Afghanistan Project

In October 2018, USAID began explicitly contributing a portion of its ARTF funds to the Citizen's Charter Afghanistan Project (CCAP) for the first time since the program began in 2016. USAID requested that \$34 million of its \$300 million contribution to the World Bank's ARTF be spent on CCAP.³⁶⁰ Both the World Bank and Afghan government have proposed expanding CCAP in the event of peace.³⁶¹

According to the Afghan government, CCAP is the centerpiece of the government's national inclusive development strategy for rural and urban areas. As of November 1, 2018, the Afghan government reported that CCAP had been rolled out in 10,000 communities (700 urban and 9,300 rural) in all 34 provinces. CCAP works through Community Development Councils (CDC) to implement community projects. CCAP defines a suite of minimum basic services for each community covering health, education, and a choice of infrastructure investments (such as road access, electricity, or small-scale irrigation for rural communities) and seeks to provide them.³⁶²

RULE OF LAW AND ANTICORRUPTION

Summary of Rule of Law and Anticorruption Programs

As shown in Table 3.19, the United States supports a number of active rule-of-law and anticorruption programs in Afghanistan.

Support to the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC)

On September 19, State announced that the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) is “incapable of being a partner in the international effort to build a better future for the Afghan people.” As a result, State said the United States would stop providing funding to the MEC by the end of 2019.³⁶³ USAID decided to end its funding to the MEC in December 2019 after concluding that the challenges faced by the MEC would not be overcome. Further, USAID said it saw no evidence of the Afghan government institutionalizing the MEC despite commitments to do so.³⁶⁴

The MEC was established in 2011 to monitor and evaluate the Afghan government’s progress fighting internal corruption.³⁶⁵ Since 2015, USAID has had a cooperation arrangement with the UK’s Department for International Development to fund the MEC. USAID funds the MEC’s monitoring, analysis, and reporting activities, including its vulnerability-to-corruption assessments.³⁶⁶

State and USAID did not say why the United States had changed its position on the MEC. In 2016, USAID described the MEC as a “key actor” in the fight against corruption and that USAID funding was critical for continuity of MEC’s operations. Further, USAID then said that the MEC’s ministry-wide vulnerability to corruption assessments play an integral role in ensuring critical vulnerabilities to corruption are identified and mitigated.³⁶⁷

TABLE 3.19

RULE OF LAW AND ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAMS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2019
Assistance for Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency (ADALAT)	4/18/2016	4/17/2021	\$68,163,468	\$26,138,276
Afghanistan's Measure for Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT)	8/23/2017	8/22/2022	31,986,588	5,284,446
Corrections System Support Program (OASIS CSSP) Option Year 2*	6/1/2019	5/31/2022	13,713,301	1,501,320
Justice Sector Support Program OASIS Contract*	8/28/2017	8/28/2022	27,772,896	17,287,391
Continuing Professional Development Support (CPDS)*	2/6/2018	4/6/2020	7,938,401	7,938,401
Delegated Cooperation Agreement (DCAR) with the Department for International Development (DFID) for Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC)	5/19/2015	8/31/2020	4,600,000	2,400,000

Note: *Disbursements as of 9/18/2019.

Source: State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.

Moreover, as discussed below, USAID's own anticorruption program drew upon MEC work in its own assessments this quarter. USAID provided SIGAR a letter documenting their reasons for not funding the MEC beyond December 2019.³⁶⁸

Afghanistan's Measure for Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT)

In August 2017, USAID awarded the contract for Afghanistan's Measure for Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT) program to support the Afghan government's efforts to reduce and prevent corruption in government public services.³⁶⁹ According to USAID, AMANAT supports select Afghan government institutions with technical assistance to plan for and implement recommended procedural reforms.³⁷⁰

This quarter, AMANAT finalized a number of political-economy assessments of several Afghan government ministries, some of which drew upon the MEC's previous reporting on corruption. For example, in its review of the Ministry of Education (MOE), AMANAT reported that corruption is rampant in every aspect of the education sector including teacher recruitment, procurement, school construction, publication and distribution of textbooks, and certification of degrees. AMANAT's support for this statement was the MEC's 2017 vulnerability-to-corruption assessment of the MOE.³⁷¹ While AMANAT reported that their own interviewees for the political-economy analysis felt the MEC's 2017 report did not consider the feasibility of its proposed reforms and underreported the ministry's efforts to combat corruption, AMANAT said every ministry official said the report created serious pressures to implement the recommendations and propelled a number of anticorruption measures.³⁷²

Similarly, in its assessment of the Ministry of Public Health, AMANAT wrote that corruption is evident in every aspect of the public-health sector, including petty bribes paid to access health care, recruitment, procurement, distribution of health service delivery contracts, pharmaceutical imports and quality control, drug and vaccine delivery, oversight of private health care providers, and health care specialist accreditation. Again, the source for this statement is a previous MEC report.³⁷³ Further, AMANAT acknowledges that its own report is not definitive or representative of the views of all ministry staff and suggests the reader consult the MEC's reporting or ministry self-assessments.³⁷⁴

Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency (ADALAT)

In April 2016, USAID launched the \$68 million Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency (ADALAT) program. ADALAT aims to (1) increase the effectiveness and reach of the formal justice sector, (2) strengthen the linkages between the formal and

traditional justice sectors, and (3) increase “citizen demand for quality legal services.”³⁷⁵ ADALAT collaborates with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) Department of the Huquq (“rights”). Huquq offices provide citizens the opportunity to settle civil cases within the formal system before beginning a court case.³⁷⁶ ADALAT’s efforts to increase demand for quality legal services includes providing grants to (1) civil-society organizations to promote legal awareness and legal rights, and (2) private universities to prepare future “practical problem-solvers” within formal and traditional dispute resolution institutions.³⁷⁷

Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP)

State’s Justice Sector Support Program is the largest rule-of-law program in Afghanistan. JSSP was established in 2005 to provide capacity-building support to the Afghan justice system through training, mentoring, and advisory services. The current JSSP contract began in August 2017 and has an estimated cost of \$23 million. The previous JSSP contract, which began in 2010, cost \$280 million. JSSP provides technical assistance to Afghan justice-sector institutions to: (1) build the capacity of justice institutions to be professional, transparent, and accountable; (2) assist the development of statutes that are clearly drafted, constitutional, and the product of effective, consultative drafting processes; and (3) support the case-management system so that Afghan justice institutions work in a harmonized and interlinked manner and resolve cases in a transparent and legally sufficient manner.³⁷⁸

JSSP advises various Afghan government offices on the U.S.-funded Case Management System (CMS). CMS is an online database that tracks the status of criminal cases in Afghanistan, across all criminal-justice institutions, from the moment a case is initiated to the end of confinement.³⁷⁹ As of August 31, 2019, the CMS had recorded 482,215 criminal cases and 92,993 civil cases.³⁸⁰

As part of its support to legislative capacity building, JSSP assisted the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA) in reviewing women’s inheritance rights contained in the Law on Elimination of Violence Against Women (LEVAW). According to JSSP, some MOWA participants argued that the inheritance provision in the law discriminates against women. For example, a wife with children is entitled to one-eighth of the property of her husband upon his death (whereas a husband is entitled to one-fourth of the wife’s property). If the marriage did not produce children, the wife is entitled to one-fourth of the property (whereas a husband is entitled to half). A daughter will receive half the share a son would. The MOWA chair of the meeting rejected the proposal to revise the law, saying the contested provisions are based on Sharia law and cannot be changed.³⁸¹ (According to Article Three of the 2004 Afghan constitution, “No law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan.”³⁸²)

SIGAR AUDIT

As directed by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, SIGAR will submit an updated assessment of the Afghan government’s implementation of its national anticorruption strategy to Congress this year that includes an examination of whether the Afghan government is making progress toward achieving its anticorruption objectives.

Continuing Professional Development Support (CPDS)

In February 2018, State launched the \$8 million Continuing Professional Development Support (CPDS) program. According to State, CPDS responds to an urgent need by the Afghan government to train legal professionals on the newly revised penal code and build the organizational capacity of the nascent professional training departments of Afghan legal institutions.³⁸³

According to the most recent reporting, CPDS has developed a data-collection tool to measure the change in work-place behavior of graduates from CPDS-funded training courses. CPDS evaluators are visiting participants at their place of work in 11 provinces, interviewing and observing participants (and speaking to supervisors when available), and evaluating documents in case files using the data collection tool. According to CPDS, case file documents should demonstrate whether prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges are applying key concepts and knowledge learned during the training courses.³⁸⁴ SIGAR plans to report on the findings of this assessment in the future.

Corrections System Support Program (CSSP)

State's Corrections System Support Program (CSSP) provides mentoring and advising support, training assistance, leadership capacity-building initiatives, infrastructure assistance and nationwide case management for correctional facilities.³⁸⁵

This quarter, State highlighted the adoption of the electronic CMS by the Panjshir provincial prison as a successful pilot project. According to State, they have worked since 2014 to implement CMS throughout the Afghan prison system.³⁸⁶

CSSP recently finalized an assessment of their Afghan government counterpart entities in the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centers (GDPDC).³⁸⁷ According to the assessment, a number of their GDPDC counterparts continue to face difficulties in their core functions despite CSSP assistance. For example, the court communications office—which is responsible for maintaining all data and records related to incarcerated individuals—reportedly continues to be unable to complete basic tasks related to CMS data entry and system usage. In CSSP's assessment, this is due to a lack of commitment by GDPDC leadership as evidenced by the lack of performance accountability, constant staff rotation, and the assigning of staff who do not have the necessary skills to use the CMS. Further, CSSP reported that the office does not rely on information extracted from CMS to generate reports despite having migrated to the electronic CMS in 2016.³⁸⁸



IG Sopko, center; the Czech ambassador, Petr Stepanek, on the IG's left; and Pierre Mayaudon, ambassador of the European Union, on the IG's right; attend monthly working session of European mission heads in Kabul on anticorruption initiatives. (SIGAR Photo)

Anticorruption

This quarter, DOJ told SIGAR that recent events indicate the Afghan government has improved its commitment and capacity to prosecute major crime and public corruption cases. When asked for an assessment of the Afghan government's political will to pursue major crimes and corruption cases, DOJ responded that it "has no opinion on political will."³⁸⁹ However, DOJ does offer an assessment of the Afghan government's political will in its quarterly reporting to State.³⁹⁰ For DOJ's staff observations in their report to State, including perspectives on the Afghan government's political will to pursue major crimes and corruption cases, see the classified addendum of this report.

On August 15, President Ghani's office ordered the release of the imprisoned former Kabul Bank chief executive Khalilullah Ferozi. He was placed on house-arrest status, purportedly due to a severe diabetic condition, DOJ said. Ferozi was previously released from prison in 2015 under what DOJ described as "questionable circumstances," until press coverage prompted his return to prison. Presidential candidate and former intelligence director Rahmatullah Nabil claimed in a tweet that Ferozi's release was in exchange for a \$30 million campaign contribution. A Ghani spokesman challenged Nabil to produce evidence.³⁹¹

Anti-Corruption Justice Center

In May 2016, President Ghani announced the establishment of a specialized anticorruption court, the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC). At the ACJC, elements of the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) investigators,



Inspector General John Sopko meets with President Ashraf Ghani to discuss anticorruption issues. (Afghan government photo)

AGO prosecutors, and judges work to combat serious corruption. The ACJC's jurisdiction covers major corruption cases in any province involving senior officials (up to the deputy minister), generals, and colonels, or cases involving substantial monetary losses. Substantial losses are defined as a minimum of five million afghani—approximately \$73,000—in cases of bribes, money laundering, selling of historical or cultural relics, illegal mining, and appropriation of Afghan government property; or a minimum of 10 million afghani—approximately \$146,000—in cases of embezzlement.³⁹²

This quarter, the ACJC took the following actions:

- Convicted three members of the Paktika provincial council of using false documents. All three were found guilty, sentenced to 14 months' confinement, and fined the approximate equivalent of between \$23,800 and \$29,400.³⁹³
- Convicted the former chairs of the IEC and ECC, along with eight election commissioners, with illegally changing the recorded vote count during the October 2018 parliamentary election. The court sentenced each of the defendants to five years' imprisonment.³⁹⁴
- Convicted six employees of the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation to two years' imprisonment for crimes associated with approximately \$451,000 in procurements.³⁹⁵

This quarter, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence of Major General Ahmad Zia Yaftali from six to three months' imprisonment. In May 2019, the ACJC appellate court had convicted for abuse of authority Yaftali and nine others who had mismanaged the Dawood Military Hospital between 2005 and 2010, when \$150 million worth of medical supplies were pilfered. However, CSTC-A reported that Yaftali openly attended parliamentary

meetings as a member while he appealed his conviction. The ACJC had sentenced each defendant to six months' confinement and collectively fined them the approximate equivalent of \$220,800. According to DOJ, the corruption at the military hospital caused "horrendously inhumane conditions that were described as Auschwitz-like." Yaftali's codefendants also had their sentences reduced to three months.³⁹⁶

Afghan Government Recovers Less than 1% of ACJC-issued Financial Penalties

As shown in Table 3.20, less than 1% of the financial penalties the ACJC primary court has imposed on convicted criminals have been collected and deposited in the AGO bank account.³⁹⁷

As of August 27, the ACJC's primary court convicted 10 deputy ministers (two from security ministries and eight from civilian ministries), 16 general officers (one lieutenant general, seven major generals, and eight brigadier generals), one governor, seven members of province councils (including two chairs), and two mayors.³⁹⁸

Afghanistan Security Forces

According to CSTC-A, the largest area of corruption (in monetary terms) in the Afghan security forces are fuel-related theft and contract fraud. CSTC-A has also observed contract fraud and theft of other commodities, including food, clothing, equipment, ammunition, medical supplies, and spare parts. These schemes occur below the level of the more heavily overseen national- and operational-level logistics centers, CSTC-A says.³⁹⁹

CSTC-A believes that its collaboration with the new ministers of interior and defense has been helpful in driving increased countercorruption efforts. According to CSTC-A, these ministers have shown personal interest in removing corrupt actors. Further, CSTC-A has observed "aggressive" prosecutions of MOD personnel in Helmand Province, something CSTC-A cites as evidence of increased Afghan government reforms.⁴⁰⁰

Among the MOD and MOI elements tasked with reducing corruption, CSTC-A highlighted the work of the MOD Inspector General (MOD IG) for uncovering issues at the Kabul Military Training Center. Specifically, the MOD IG concluded that five of the training center's leaders should be removed for alleged illegal and corrupt acts.⁴⁰¹

Despite this, CSTC-A believes the MOD IG and the MOI Inspector General (MOI IG) do not take the initiative to conduct inspections and accurately report unfavorable findings in their reports. Further, CSTC-A believes the ministers of defense and interior are slow to act on the reports that are completed and often ignore substantiated findings. CSTC-A told SIGAR that more directive and aggressive ministers of defense and interior would result in more effective inspectors general.⁴⁰² According to CSTC-A, there is no contradiction in the ministers of defense and interior being assessed

TABLE 3.20

STATUS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION JUSTICE CENTER PRIMARY COURT-ISSUED FINANCIAL PENALTIES, AS OF AUGUST 27, 2019

ACJC-Issued Financial Penalties^a	Approximate Value of Financial Penalties^b	Amount Fully Recovered^c
2,345,042,567 afghani	\$30,455,098	0.34%
153,140,821 USD	153,140,821	0.18
299,500 Pakistani rupees	2,045	100
3,090,000,000 Iranian rials	73,392	0
6,701,000 Saudi riyals	1,786,933	0
100,000 United Arab Emirates dirhams	27,229	0
15,000 euros	16,855	0
Total	\$185,198,267	0.21%

Note:

^a Includes orders for cash fines, restitution, compensation, and confiscation.

^b Conversions of currencies to approximate U.S. dollar values based on the average of the average monthly exchange rates for April, May, and June 2019.

^c This is the amount of the penalties that has been enforced, recovered, and deposited into the Attorney General Office's bank account.

Source: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Attorney General's Office, Office of Database Management, "Primary Court's Financial Order" and "Financial Orders Enforced, Recovered and Deposited into AGO's Account," 8/2019.

as "highly focused on the removal of corrupt actors" and yet slow to act on MOD IG and MOI IG reports.

CSTC-A views the removal of corrupt actors by the ministers as a sign of progress in the face of a "long-standing culturally acceptable norm." However, CSTC-A attributes the ministers' failure to act in a timely manner on MOD IG and MOI IG reports to their view that inspectors general are "a concept that goes against traditional Afghan culture," leading to insufficient cohesion between the inspectors general and their parent ministries. CSTC-A hopes that as the MOD IG and MOI IG begin to report substantial findings, their relationship with the ministers of defense and interior will improve, and they will become more effective.⁴⁰³

CSTC-A attributed the following MOD and MOI actions to its train, advise, and assist efforts for anti- and counter-corruption:⁴⁰⁴

- an MOD investigation into contaminated aviation fuel in Mazar-e Sharif
- the MOI's decision to replace 27 of 34 provincial chiefs of police with "trusted officers"
- the MOI's inclusion of anticorruption lessons (such as ethics, rule of law, and methods for identifying corruption) in training classes for new province and deputy province chiefs of police, criminal investigative directorate personnel, and urban police officers
- MOI's publication of a gender policy which promotes equality between male and female officers although it is unclear how this relates to anti- or counter-corruption
- an MOI order for a complete inventory of all province and district equipment

The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) is an MOI unit chartered to investigate corruption by senior government officials and organized criminal networks, and high-profile kidnappings committed throughout Afghanistan.⁴⁰⁵ According to CSTC-A, the MCTF is making steady progress towards improving its effectiveness. However, CSTC-A reports that the MCTF lacks the technical equipment and systems necessary to conduct proper investigations.⁴⁰⁶

According to CSTC-A, the MCTF struggles with its political will as some personnel put their personal interest before that of the organizations. Despite these internal challenges, CSTC-A believes that the MCTF has consistently demonstrated the political will to resist undue influence. CSTC-A also said the MCTF no longer reports directly to the interior minister, reversing a December 2018 presidential decree that CSTC-A then saw as helping the MCTF resist outside influence.⁴⁰⁷

REFUGEES AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

According to State, starting in the summer of 2018, the Afghan Customs Department, an arm of the Ministry of Finance, began impounding humanitarian imported goods for nonpayment of customs duties, citing a discrepancy between Afghan tax laws and laws on nongovernmental organization. The U.S. government responded by creating a Compact benchmark to pressure the Afghan government to release all impounded goods and to resolve the discrepancy to ensure an efficient process for clearing humanitarian assistance at the border without the Afghan government imposing fees.⁴⁰⁸

While this issue was resolved and all obstructed goods were eventually released, State said that the Afghan government intervention caused a six-month delay for critical emergency humanitarian assistance, including medical supplies for trauma care and demining equipment.⁴⁰⁹

Afghan Refugees

As of June 29, 2019, the UNHCR reported that 6,133 refugees have voluntarily returned to Afghanistan in 2019. The majority (4,497) of these refugee returns were from Pakistan.⁴¹⁰

Undocumented Afghan Migrant Returnees

As of September 21, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) reported that 332,641 undocumented Afghans returned from Iran and 16,229 undocumented Afghan migrants returned from Pakistan in 2019.⁴¹¹

Conflict-induced Internal Displacement

Conflict-induced internal displacement numbers this year are similar to 2018. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Refugees are persons who are outside their country of origin for reasons of feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order and, as a result, require international protection. According to the UNHCR, refugees have the right to safe asylum and should receive at least the same rights and basic help as any other foreigner who is a legal resident.

Migrants are persons who change his or her country of usual residence, irrespective of the reason for migration or legal status. According to the UN, there is no formal legal definition of an international migrant.

Source: United Nations, "Refugees and Migrants: Definitions," 2019; UNHCR, "Protecting Refugees: questions and answers," 2/2002.

Affairs (OCHA), as of September 22, conflicts in 2019 had induced 294,298 Afghans to flee their homes. The office recorded 294,548 displaced Afghans in the same period last year.⁴¹²

WOMEN'S ADVANCEMENT

In July 2013, then-USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah described the Promote partnership in a public speech as “the largest investment USAID has ever made to advance women in development.”⁴¹³ According to USAID, Promote aims to strengthen women’s participation in civil society, boost female participation in the economy, increase the number of women in decision-making positions within the Afghan government, and help women gain business and management skills.⁴¹⁴

USAID has committed \$280 million to Promote.⁴¹⁵ Table 3.21 shows the current Promote programs.

As of June 30 (the latest data available), USAID said that of the 68,622 total Promote beneficiaries, 21,523 Promote beneficiaries have been hired. Of these, 1,490 have been employed by the Afghan government and 10,913 have secured permanent employment in the private sector. There are also 9,120 Promote beneficiaries holding private-sector internships.⁴¹⁶

The three Afghan government entities with the largest number of Women in Government (WIG) beneficiary employees (as of June 2019) included the IEC (with 106 WIG beneficiaries employed), the Ministry of Education (with 62 employed), and the Ministry of Public Health (with 30 employed). In total, WIG beneficiaries constitute 614 of the 1,490 Promote beneficiaries to secure employment with the Afghan government.⁴¹⁷

TABLE 3.21

USAID GENDER PROGRAMS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2019
Promote: Women in the Economy	7/1/2015	6/30/2020	\$71,571,543	\$52,533,869
Promote: Women’s Leadership Development	9/23/2014	9/22/2019	41,959,377	40,873,539
Promote: Women in Government	4/21/2015	4/20/2020	37,997,644	34,095,624
Promote: Women’s Rights Groups and Coalitions	9/2/2015	9/1/2020	29,534,401	20,400,893
Promote: Rolling Baseline and End-line Survey	2/21/2017	10/20/2020	7,577,638	5,231,232
Combating Human Trafficking in Afghanistan	1/11/2016	8/31/2020	7,098,717	6,944,820
Gender Based Violence (GBV)	7/9/2015	7/8/2020	6,667,272	6,667,272
Countering Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) II - Empowerment and Advocacy to Prevent Trafficking	1/10/2018	1/9/2020	1,483,950	1,113,950
Promote: Scholarships	3/4/2015	3/3/2020	1,247,522	1,247,522

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTENTS

Key Issues and Events	131
U.S. Support for Economic and Social Development: Theory, Objectives, And Funding	132
Economic Profile	133
Quarterly Highlight: Sustaining a Political Settlement Could Cost Billions	135
Banking and Finance	142
Economic Growth	144
Agriculture	146
Infrastructure and Essential Services	148
Education	152
Health	155

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

An additional \$5.2 billion in economic development funds may be required to consolidate and sustain a future Afghan political settlement, the World Bank said in a draft plan released this quarter.⁴¹⁸ The additional funds would finance expanding existing programs and implementing new projects for five years following a peace agreement.⁴¹⁹ The Bank's plan is consistent with SIGAR's *2019 High-Risk List*, which emphasized that peace would not be cost-free.⁴²⁰ For more on the Bank's draft plan, see pages 135–137.

The U.S. government returned \$81.4 million to the U.S. Treasury that was intended for a large power-infrastructure project, USAID informed SIGAR this quarter.⁴²¹ Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo initially said that up to \$100 million would be returned in a September 19, 2019, statement that cited Afghan government corruption and financial mismanagement as the cause.⁴²² While the press widely characterized this as a new development, SIGAR reported in April 2018 that these funds were likely to expire.⁴²³ The power project, which aims to expand the Afghan electric grid, will still be implemented, but off-budget (with procurement and implementation managed by the United States, not by Afghan officials).⁴²⁴

Secretary Pompeo also announced that \$60 million in planned assistance to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) would be withheld (but not returned to the U.S. Treasury) due to the Afghan government's failure to meet unspecified reform benchmarks for transparency and accountability in public financial management.⁴²⁵ USAID later clarified that the benchmarks, which were not yet due at the time of the Secretary's statement, require the Afghan government to publicly publish revenue data and cash management decisions made by the MOF.⁴²⁶ The Secretary took specific issue with Afghanistan's National Procurement Authority—the secretariat of the National Procurement Commission (NPC), a centralized government procurement body consisting of President Ashraf Ghani and his cabinet officials.⁴²⁷ No further details were provided in the Secretary's statement.⁴²⁸ USAID has told SIGAR that the NPC may suffer from corruption.⁴²⁹ However, it has not provided SIGAR with evidence for this claim.⁴³⁰

Including opium-poppy cultivation, Afghanistan's economy contracted by 0.2% in 2018, according to Afghanistan's National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA).⁴³¹ A 20% decline in opium-poppy cultivation appeared to

account for the hit to growth.⁴³² The NSIA said the economy grew by 2.7% in 2018, excluding opium-poppy.⁴³³ Other sources' estimates for Afghanistan's 2018 GDP growth vary (p. 133).

The Afghan government's revenue growth through the first eight months of Fiscal Year 1398 (December 22, 2018, to December 21, 2019) slowed to just 3.2%, year-on-year, SIGAR analysis of Afghan government-provided data showed this quarter.⁴³⁴ The slower pace represented a departure from recent trends: revenues grew by 14% from 2017–2018.⁴³⁵ Expenditures, meanwhile, rose by 11.1%, outpacing revenue growth.⁴³⁶

U.S. SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: THEORY, OBJECTIVES, AND FUNDING


The United States continues to emphasize the importance of economic development in its policy planning for Afghanistan. The U.S. government's current Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Afghanistan states that efforts to prevent further terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland cannot be sustained without a growing licit Afghan economy.⁴³⁷ Economic prosperity in Afghanistan, the ICS states, depends upon the ability to advance private-sector-led export growth and job creation, and to bolster gains in health, education, and women's empowerment.⁴³⁸

The ICS is linked to USAID's Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Afghanistan.⁴³⁹ The objectives of the CDCS are to:⁴⁴⁰

- accelerate private-sector-driven, export-led economic growth
- advance social gains in health, education, and gender equality
- increase the Afghan government's accountability to its citizens

FIGURE 3.37

USAID DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS, AS OF OCTOBER 8, 2019
(\$ MILLIONS)



Note: USAID Mission-managed funds. Numbers are rounded. USAID gender programs managed by the agency's Office of Gender are presented as a separate category. Agriculture programs include Alternative Development. Infrastructure programs include power, roads, extractives, and programs that build health and education facilities. OFM activities (e.g. audits and pre-award assessments) included under Program Support funds.

*Unpreferred funds are U.S. contributions to the ARTF that can be used for any ARTF-supported initiatives.

Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2019; SIGAR analysis of World Bank, ARTF, Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of July 22, 2019, 9/3/2019.

It may be difficult for the U.S. government to make as much progress as desired toward these goals. Licit economic growth remains low and poverty is increasing.⁴⁴¹ Some social-development indicators are stagnating.⁴⁴² The proportion of Afghans who perceive corruption as a major issue in Afghanistan, meanwhile, has actually increased modestly since 2006.⁴⁴³

As of September 30, 2019, the U.S. government has provided approximately \$34.5 billion to support governance and economic and social development in Afghanistan since 2002. Most of these funds—nearly \$20.5 billion—were appropriated to USAID’s Economic Support Fund (ESF). Of this amount, \$19.6 billion has been obligated and \$17.0 billion has been disbursed.⁴⁴⁴ Figure 3.37 shows USAID assistance by sector.

ECONOMIC PROFILE

Despite extraordinary donor efforts since 2002 to raise Afghanistan’s long-term growth prospects, the country remains poor, conflict-affected, and heavily aid-dependent. The probability that these circumstances will change in the near- or mid-term appears very low: poverty is likely to have become more widespread, civilian deaths reached a record high in 2018, and donor grants continue to finance approximately 75% of total public expenditures, the World Bank said.⁴⁴⁵

Estimates of Afghanistan’s real GDP growth rate for 2018 varied widely (see Table 3.22), but all pointed to a relatively stagnant economic picture.⁴⁴⁶ The most recently released estimate indicated Afghanistan’s licit economy may have grown by just 1.8% in 2018.⁴⁴⁷ This rate contrasts with a very high overall growth rate (7%) in South Asia, which the Bank described as “the world’s fastest growing region.”⁴⁴⁸

TABLE 3.22

ESTIMATES OF AFGHANISTAN’S ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE IN 2018 VARY WIDELY

Growth Rate	Source	Date Published	Poppy Cultivation Included?
(0.2%)	NSIA	6/10/2019	Yes
1.0	World Bank	4/2/2019	No
1.8	World Bank	7/21/2019	No
2.7	NSIA	3/2019	No
2.7	IMF	6/7/2019	No

Note: For undated documents, document properties were used to establish a publication date. The publication date for the NSIA’s licit (2.7%) estimate for growth in 2018 is based on information presented on page 2 of the World Bank’s July 2019 Afghanistan Development Update.

Source: World Bank, “Afghanistan Overview,” 4/2/2019, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview>, accessed 9/18/2019; NSIA, “Growth-Rate-of-GDP,” 6/10/2019; World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, p. 2; NSIA, “Economic Growth [sic],” no date, <https://nsia.gov.af/home>, accessed 9/17/2019; IMF, Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, 5/15/2019, p. 5; SIGAR, communications with NSIA officials, 10/17/2019 and 10/16/2019.

Assessments of Afghanistan’s Economic Performance are Incomplete without Accounting for Narcotics

GDP growth figures that account for the opium economy can be higher or lower than those reported by the IMF and the World Bank. Reflecting the significant (approximately 90%) growth of opium production in 2017, Afghanistan’s statistical authority reported that GDP growth including the opium economy in that year was 7.2%. Afghanistan’s licit GDP growth rate in 2017, by contrast, was 2.7%, according to the World Bank and IMF.

Opium contributed far less to GDP growth in 2018: high levels of supply from the previous year caused prices to fall, while a widespread drought disrupted agricultural production throughout the country. Accounting for opium-poppy cultivation, Afghanistan’s economy contracted by 0.2% in 2018, the NSIA said. That figure differs substantially from the NSIA’s licit growth rate figure of 2.7%. Unlike the NSIA, neither the IMF nor the World Bank attempt to account for the narcotics economy in their GDP growth estimates.

Source: NSIA, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2017–2018, 8/2018, p. 110; World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, p. 18; IMF, Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, 5/15/2019, p. 24; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2019, pp. 150, 152; UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Cultivation and Production, 11/2018, pp. 5, 8; NSIA, “Growth-Rate-of-GDP,” 6/10/2019; NSIA, “Economic Growth [sic],” no date, <https://nsia.gov.af/home>, accessed 9/17/2019; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2019, p. 151.



A vendor selling dried fruits and nuts meets with an Afghan exporter at the USAID-supported Passage to Prosperity Trade and Investment Show in September 2019. USAID believes that increasing exports will boost Afghanistan's GDP growth. (USAID photo)

The end of a severe drought rendered growth prospects for 2019 more favorable, according to both the World Bank (which projected 2.5% growth for 2019) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF, which projected 3% growth).⁴⁴⁹ With population growth outstripping licit economic growth, per-capita GDP was expected to decline from \$513 in 2018 to \$485 in 2019.⁴⁵⁰ Large numbers of returnees, particularly from Iran, could exacerbate the projected decline in per-capita incomes.⁴⁵¹

“Substantial downside risks,” including violence and political instability, could dampen the short-term outlook, according to the Bank.⁴⁵² While the IMF projected that growth would rise to 5% by 2023, that projection assumed no significant deterioration in security, continued Afghan government reforms, and sustained aid inflows.⁴⁵³ These assumptions may prove to be invalid, as Table 3.23 shows.

TABLE 3.23

ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING IMF PROJECTIONS FOR HIGHER ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POTENTIAL COMPLICATIONS

Assumption	Potential Complication
No significant deterioration in security.	Violence may increase in the wake of suspended peace talks.
The Afghan government continues to implement reforms.	Reforms stalled in the previous presidential election year, according to the IMF.
Aid flows are sustained.	Donor grants are expected to decline over the next several years.

Source: IMF, Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, 5/15/2019, p. 8; New York Times, “Trump Declares Afghan Peace Talks With Taliban ‘Dead,’” 9/9/2019; Military Times, “Top US general for NATO expects violence will rise before Afghans vote on new president,” 9/16/2019; World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, ii.

SUSTAINING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT COULD COST BILLIONS

An additional \$5.2 billion in economic development funds may be required to consolidate and sustain a peace settlement, the World Bank said in a draft plan released this quarter.⁴⁵⁴ This estimate considers a substantial expansion of existing programs, as well as the introduction of new projects over a five-year period following the signing of a peace agreement.⁴⁵⁵ Costs would increase over that time period from approximately \$500 million in the year an agreement is reached to approximately \$1 billion in the third year of implementation.⁴⁵⁶

The draft plan emerged from the November 2018 donor conference on Afghanistan in Geneva, Switzerland. A joint communiqué released at the conclusion of the conference stressed the importance of developing a package of economic initiatives that could be implemented after a political settlement was reached.⁴⁵⁷ The Bank's plan follows SIGAR's *2019 High-Risk List*, which emphasized that peace would not be cost-free.⁴⁵⁸

Whether the Plan's Primary Purpose is to Stimulate Growth or Reduce Poverty is Unclear

The purpose of the package, the communiqué said, is to advance the return of Afghan financial capital to the country, increase investment, create jobs, and enhance regional economic integration.⁴⁵⁹ Some initiatives in the plan could directly contribute to these objectives, such as a proposed \$48 million project to further develop Afghan agribusinesses by establishing food processing hubs, and a separate project that would scale up financial services for small and medium enterprises.⁴⁶⁰

However, the primary goal of other initiatives described in the draft plan, like a \$250 million to \$300 million cash-transfer scheme that would target up to a million vulnerable households, seems more akin to poverty relief than to investment facilitation or job creation (though cash could theoretically catalyze the growth of household wealth and therefore provide an indirect path).⁴⁶¹ Among high-priority initiatives, direct cash-transfer schemes could constitute 29% of costs.⁴⁶² Figure 3.38 on the following page presents a breakdown of high-priority initiatives by sector.


Many Proposed Projects Harken Back to Old Ideas

Claiming “there is no need to reinvent the wheel,” the draft plan does not contemplate a serious departure from past programming.⁴⁶³ Numerous large projects currently being implemented would be significantly expanded.⁴⁶⁴

The size of the Bank's flagship education project—Education Quality Reform in Afghanistan—would more than double, requiring an additional \$330 million in funding to improve 6,000 schools and provide basic education to an additional one million students.⁴⁶⁵ And the centerpiece of the plan—a scale-up of the Bank's \$628 million Citizens' Charter project, a governance-focused initiative that aims to improve the delivery of core infrastructure and social services to local communities—would, if fully implemented under the plan, nearly triple in size, potentially requiring more than \$1 billion in additional funding.⁴⁶⁶

FIGURE 3.38

FUNDING SHARES OF HIGH-PRIORITY INITIATIVES IN THE WORLD BANK'S DRAFT POST-PEACE ECONOMIC PLAN



Note: In cases where the anticipated cost of projects is expressed as an annual amount in the Bank's draft plan, the implementation period is assumed to be six years, unless otherwise specified by the Bank.

Source: SIGAR analysis of Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019.

Moreover, certain projects not currently being implemented by the Bank (and therefore nominally “new”) are reminiscent of previous donor efforts. For example, a proposed \$100 million regional trade-facilitation program that would support trade deals, improve infrastructure at border-crossing points, and introduce procedural reforms (among other activities) appears very similar to USAID's \$78 million Afghanistan Trade and Revenue (ATAR) project. ATAR, which concluded in 2017, supported trade and transit agreements, attempted to implement electronic payment infrastructure, and aimed to streamline customs procedures.⁴⁶⁷ A SIGAR Special Project found ATAR did not achieve tangible results related to the implementation of the e-payment system, which accounted for less than 1% of custom duties collected at the time the report was published in August 2017.⁴⁶⁸

Donors Must Carefully Weigh How to Commit Funds

No initiatives proposed in the draft plan are currently funded.⁴⁶⁹ Financing could come from either increases in development grants or from the reprioritization of existing initiatives (the latter of which would reduce the amount of additional financing required to fund the package).⁴⁷⁰ Acknowledging that the future of grant support was highly uncertain, the Bank's analysis assumes a steady decline in donor support over the next five years.⁴⁷¹

Yet, unless donors are willing to tolerate the risk of state collapse, they will likely have to continue providing the Afghan government with significant financial support and avoid a sudden disruption or abrupt halt of aid.⁴⁷² Should a peace settlement eventually emerge, donors will have to decide how much funding to commit and what projects to support.

The Afghan Government is Attempting to Advance its Own Post-Peace Development Agenda

Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance (MOF) is circulating its own post-peace economic and social development plan—the Afghanistan Self-Reliance Accelerator Package (ASAP). ASAP imagines an initial \$8.6 billion investment, funded by loans from private-sector lenders, in agriculture, electricity transmission, and urban housing and commercial properties.

It is unclear whether implementing ASAP is feasible given the Afghan government's limited capacity to manage debt and its commitment to avoid taking on higher-interest loans (the government's current, limited amount of debt carries very low interest rates). Overall, donors have demonstrated little enthusiasm for ASAP.

Source: Government of Afghanistan, MOF, The Afghanistan Self-Reliance Accelerator Package (ASAP), 7/2019, pp. 1–2; IMF, Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, 5/15/2019, pp. 10, 14, 17, 36, 53.

When that time comes, they would do well to mitigate known risks by posing the seven key questions originally presented by SIGAR in its January 2013 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* to help guide decision makers as they consider how best to use remaining reconstruction funds.⁴⁷³

- Does the project or program make a clear and identifiable contribution to our national interests or strategic objectives?
- Do the Afghans want it and need it?
- Has it been coordinated with other U.S. implementing agencies, with the Afghan government, and with other international donors?
- Do security conditions permit effective implementation and oversight?
- Does it have adequate safeguards to detect, deter, and mitigate corruption?
- Do the Afghans have the financial resources, technical capacity, and political will to sustain it?
- Have implementing agencies established meaningful, measurable metrics for determining successful project outcomes?

Even after a Peace Settlement, Many Challenges Will Remain and Oversight Will be Key

A potential political settlement will not immediately eliminate many of the fundamental obstacles to achieving U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. Gains from U.S. reconstruction investment are likely to continue to face multiple threats: the possibility of continued insecurity, endemic corruption, weak Afghan institutions, and the insidious impact of the narcotics trade.⁴⁷⁴

But amid the slew of uncertainties, SIGAR in its *2019 High-Risk List* identified one fact that lies at least somewhat within donors' control: the continuing need for oversight to ensure that taxpayer funds are spent efficiently and effectively. Should reductions in foreign personnel occur without accompanying improvement in Afghanistan's governance, even the best-laid post-peace plans may go awry.⁴⁷⁵ Similarly, failure to ensure proper documentation of expenditures or to put in place other anticorruption control measures, would raise the risk of waste, fraud, and abuse—particularly if the proportion of on-budget grants increases, as the Bank's plan projects.⁴⁷⁶

But if donors take seriously their responsibility to carefully prioritize post-peace initiatives, implement proper control measures, and most importantly, avoid the temptation to spend too much, too fast, they will increase the probability that an eventual future settlement will succeed.

Sustainable Domestic Revenues:

According to Afghanistan MOF officials, these are revenues like customs, taxes, and nontax fees. Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF use reports of these revenues to judge the Afghan government's fiscal performance. Sustainable revenues contrast with one-off revenues, which are nonrecurring and arise from one-time transfers of funds, such as central bank profits, to the Afghan government.

Source: SIGAR, communications with MOF officials, 8/21/2017; SIGAR, communications with IMF officials, 9/7/2017.

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

A SIGAR Special Project released in July 2019 found that the Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority (ACAA) had raised overflight fees from \$400 in early 2015 to \$700 in late 2017 (a 75% increase) and helped promote an increase in overflights from 81,326 in 2016 to 95,257 in 2018 (a 17% increase). The result was an 89% increase in overflight revenues from approximately \$56 million in 2015 to approximately \$106 million in 2018. However, the closure of Pakistani airspace for approximately five months in 2019 appears to have significantly decreased overflight fee revenues this year.

Source: SIGAR, Afghanistan's Civilian Aviation: Capacity Has Improved But Challenges Remain, Including Reliance on Donor Support for Operations, 7/2019, p. 10.

Fiscal Situation: Revenue Gains Begin to Slow

Afghanistan's **sustainable domestic revenues** grew by just 3.2% over the first eight months of FY 1398 (December 22, 2018, to December 21, 2019), year-on-year, SIGAR analysis of Afghan government accounting data showed.⁴⁷⁷ As SIGAR emphasized in its *2019 High-Risk List*, strengthening Afghanistan's fiscal capacity will be key to sustaining the infrastructure and institutions that will be vital to economic growth as the Afghan government is asked to assume a more prominent role in its own development in the coming years.⁴⁷⁸ Slowing revenue growth is therefore a significant concern.

Lower growth through month 8 was driven primarily by a 9.8% decrease in administrative fees, which fell by AFN 1.8 billion (\$23.8 million).⁴⁷⁹ The Afghan government earns administrative fees in exchange for certain services it provides, such as issuing national identity cards and visas.⁴⁸⁰ A 51.8% drop in overflight revenues accounted for the majority of the overall decline in the administrative fees category. Overflight revenues, earned when commercial aircraft transit through Afghan airspace, decreased by AFN 1.5 billion (\$20.1 million) during the period.⁴⁸¹ Pakistan closed its airspace from February 27, 2019, to July 16, 2019, which likely contributed to the decline.⁴⁸²

A second and more significant factor driving lower revenue growth was a sharp drop in "Other Revenue," a catchall category for revenues not listed elsewhere in the MOF's chart of accounts.⁴⁸³ Within this category, revenues that had not yet been classified fell by AFN 3.4 billion (\$44.4 million), or 73%.⁴⁸⁴ According to MOF officials, these unclassified revenues are later reconciled and recategorized.⁴⁸⁵

Figure 3.39 compares monthly sustainable domestic revenue collection from FY 1397 (December 22, 2017, to December 21, 2018) with monthly revenue collection from FY 1398. While aggregate revenues grew by 11.4% over the first eight months of the year, the increase was driven by a large (AFN 9.0 billion, or \$116.8 million) transfer of central bank profits rather than revenue categories generally considered to be more sustainable (see the next sub-section for more).⁴⁸⁶


Outpacing sustainable (but not aggregate) domestic revenues, expenditures grew by 11.1%.⁴⁸⁷ Spending through the first four months of FY 1398 was considerably higher than in FY 1397, but the pace of expenditure growth has since slowed significantly.⁴⁸⁸ Month-to-month, year-on-year expenditures decreased in three of four months from April 22, 2019, to August 22, 2019.⁴⁸⁹ Figure 3.40 shows cumulative spending increases by month through month 8.

Depreciation of the Afghani and One-Off Central Bank Transfer May Be Distorting the Revenue Growth Picture for 2019

After adjustments accounting for the depreciation of the afghani (AFN) against the U.S. dollar and a one-time central bank transfer, there was "little

FIGURE 3.39

CUMULATIVE SUSTAINABLE REVENUE GAINS (FY 1397-1398)



Source: SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 10/8/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019.


Afghan Government May Miss its FY 1398 Revenue Target

Given slowing revenue growth, the Afghan government may have difficulty meeting the AFN 188 billion (\$2.4 billion) sustainable domestic revenue target established by its FY 1398 budget. At its current rate of collection, revenues would fall short of the target by AFN 19.3 billion (\$250.9 million). While the government did collect more than 40% of its FY 1397 revenues in the final four months of the year, uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the September 2019 Afghan presidential election could adversely affect collections through the remainder of FY 1398. Data from month 8 of FY 1398, as well as preliminary figures from month 9, appear to show that sustainable domestic revenues are contracting.

SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 10/8/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019; IMF, Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, 5/15/2019, pp. 8-9.

FIGURE 3.40

CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE INCREASES (FY 1397-1398)



Source: SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 10/7/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019.

Domestic Revenue Mobilization

(DRM): The generation of government revenue from domestic resources. Among other measures, DRM involves the implementation of sustainable tax reforms and addressing governance issues, such as corruption, that undermine those reforms.

Source: European Commission, "Domestic Resource Mobilisation," no date, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/financing-development/domestic-resource-mobilisation_en, accessed 9/21/2019.

Slowing Revenue Growth Casts a Shadow

Donors and commentators have considered Afghanistan's strong revenue growth over the last several years to be a significant success story. Domestic revenues reached a record high of \$2.6 billion in 2018, the World Bank said in a July 2019 macroeconomic update. That figure was equivalent to 13.4% of licit GDP, well above the 8.5% level of 2014, according to the IMF.

Yet both the Bank and the IMF warn that revenue growth could moderate in 2019 due to the exhaustion of revenue potential squeezed from an amnesty scheme for overdue taxes and an expected hit to customs receipts due to weakened governance and increased political instability. While the Afghan government's cash reserves (more than \$1.0 billion as of June 2019, according to a former World Bank economist and a former MOF official) are reportedly strong, slowing revenue growth presents sustainability challenges for the Afghan government at a time when donor grants are expected to decline.

Source: USIP, "Afghan Government Revenue, Critical for Peace, Grows in 2019," 8/15/2019; World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, ii–iii, p. 25; IMF, Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, 5/15/2019, pp. 9, 39; World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, ii.

or no" underlying growth in Afghan government revenues in first half of 2019, a former World Bank economist and a former Ministry of Finance (MOF) official wrote this quarter.⁴⁹⁰ While the former officials described revenue growth in nominal afghani terms as "robust" over the first six months of the year, they noted that the 9% depreciation of the afghani between the first half of 2018 and the first half of 2019 artificially inflated customs receipts and produced a profit transfer from the central bank that was attributable to gains from foreign-exchange transactions and asset valuations.⁴⁹¹

Accounting for currency depreciation by converting customs receipts denominated in afghani to U.S. dollars and subtracting the one-time AFN 8.9 billion (~\$117.0 million) transfer of central bank profits from total revenues, the former officials said, effectively negated underlying growth.⁴⁹² In their view, revenue growth in the first half of 2019 was the result of an "extraneous, one-time" event (currency depreciation) rather than the **domestic revenue mobilization** efforts of the Afghan government.⁴⁹³ While SIGAR has not independently evaluated this narrative, it dovetails with the World Bank's July 2019 warning that prospects for revenue mobilization appeared weaker than in the past.⁴⁹⁴

Slowing Export Growth Raises Questions about USAID's Strategy


One of the pillars of USAID's current strategy for Afghanistan is to accelerate merchandise export growth.⁴⁹⁵ But export growth has decelerated in 2019, SIGAR analysis of Afghan trade data shows.⁴⁹⁶ In fact, exports contracted by 2.4% from the second quarter of 2018 to the second quarter of 2019 (Figure 3.41 shows Afghanistan quarter-to-quarter, year-on-year, export growth.).⁴⁹⁷ While USAID pointed out that the closure of Pakistani airspace from February 27, 2019, to July 16, 2019, may have had exogenous, adverse effects on Afghan exports to India, the contraction occurred despite generous subsidies (up to 83% of air freight costs) provided by the Afghan government for goods exported by air.⁴⁹⁸ Moreover, as SIGAR pointed out last quarter, air exports contribute less to Afghanistan's export performance (as reflected in the official Afghan figures traditionally analyzed by SIGAR) than USAID has previously suggested.⁴⁹⁹

As USAID was developing its current strategy in December 2017, the agency told SIGAR it expected to "bridge [Afghanistan's] massive trade deficit" over "the next three to five years."⁵⁰⁰ Current data show that is highly unlikely to happen: the World Bank expected the trade deficit would be equivalent to 36.4% of GDP in 2019, an increase over 2018.⁵⁰¹ The Bank expected the deficit to be equivalent to 32.3% of GDP by 2022, essentially unchanged from the time at which USAID made this statement to SIGAR.⁵⁰²

It is also unlikely Afghanistan's trade situation will improve any time soon. The country's landlocked geography (which significantly raises the costs of trade, relative to countries with direct access to commercial sea routes), low

FIGURE 3.41

AFGHANISTAN'S EXPORT PERFORMANCE, 2017-2019 (\$ MILLIONS)



Source: SIGAR analysis of NSIA quarterly and annual export data, 2017–2018, accessed 9/22/2019, 6/21/2019, 3/23/2019, 12/20/2018, and 9/25/2018.

levels of infrastructure and institutional capacity, and persistent, decades-long conflict have stunted trade expansion. For Afghanistan, high energy costs and limited access to electricity and finance also pose major challenges.⁵⁰³

Additional U.S. Sanctions on Iran Announced as Afghanistan Continues to Feel Secondary Effects

Approximately 571,000 Afghans were expected to return to Afghanistan from Iran in 2019, State told SIGAR in September, as President Donald J. Trump announced new sanctions on Iran's central bank and sovereign wealth fund.⁵⁰⁴ The additional sanctions target what Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin described as “the last remaining source of funds” for Iran's government.⁵⁰⁵ They follow previous rounds of sanctions on Iran's oil industry and financial institutions, and the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.⁵⁰⁶ While it was not yet clear what the tangible repercussions of the new sanctions might be for Iran (and by implication for Afghanistan), much of the damage to Iran's economy may have already occurred: the Iranian rial has stabilized somewhat from its free fall of the first half of 2018, State said.⁵⁰⁷

Exports to India Increase Despite Closure of Pakistani Airspace

USAID said that Pakistan's decision to close its airspace earlier this year due to clashes with India “undermined the air corridor with India and impeded air exports.” However, SIGAR analysis of official Afghan government trade data shows that merchandise exports from Afghanistan to India increased by a robust 17.4% in the first two quarters of 2019, compared to the first two quarters of 2018—even as overall exports increased by just 2.1% over the same time period.

Source: USAID, OEG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019; SIGAR analysis of quarterly NSIA trade data, accessed 3/23/2019, 6/21/2019, and 9/22/2019.

Still, State reported that Afghanistan continued to feel the secondary effects of the sanctions, including an uptick in the return of unaccompanied minors and single women, approximately 45,600 of whom have returned to Afghanistan from Iran since 2018.⁵⁰⁸ Many of these vulnerable returnees face severe sexual and other physical abuse in detention centers before crossing the border, State said.⁵⁰⁹ The confluence of the ongoing conflict, a severe drought in 2018, and the influx of more than 950,000 returnees since January 2018 has burdened western Afghanistan with heavy economic and social costs.⁵¹⁰ Current humanitarian-response measures provide scant relief: due to limited funding, the United Nations' International Organization for Migration, an intergovernmental entity that aims to alleviate the negative effects of large-scale migration, assisted just 4% of Afghans who returned from Iran in 2018, said State.⁵¹¹

BANKING AND FINANCE

Reflecting high levels of uncertainty around Afghanistan's presidential election, the future of security assistance funding, and a possible settlement between the U.S. and the Taliban, credit to the private sector declined by four percentage points in 2018, the World Bank said.⁵¹² With levels of credit equal to just 12.8% of total bank assets, excess liquidity among banks remained high, reaching 63% of total assets.⁵¹³ While Afghanistan's central bank has taken steps to increase the supply of credit, such as expanding the list of eligible collateral, it has not yet been enough to reduce "massive" amounts of excess reserves, the Bank said.⁵¹⁴ Foreign-exchange-denominated loans are decreasing due to the substantial depreciation of the afghani against the U.S. dollar, suggesting that capital flight may be occurring amid declining confidence in the banking sector, the Bank added.⁵¹⁵

Overall, Afghanistan's still-nascent financial sector, which consists of just 12 banks (three state-owned, seven private, and two foreign-owned), remains weak and underdeveloped.⁵¹⁶ Just 15% of Afghan adults have an account at a bank or **mobile money provider**.⁵¹⁷ Informal financial services continue to flourish in Afghanistan, Afghanistan's central bank said this quarter, and many Afghans still use the **hawala** system to transfer funds.⁵¹⁸

Treasury Technical Assistance to Afghan Banking Sector Ends

The U.S. Treasury Department's interagency agreement with USAID to support Afghanistan's public financial-management systems and oversight of its financial sector concluded this quarter.⁵¹⁹ The assistance, which began in March 2015, ended with a series of five training sessions in Dubai for Afghan central bank staff covering subjects ranging from corporate governance to internal auditing.⁵²⁰ Earlier assistance under the agreement focused on effective fiscal budgeting and on building capacity to combat financial crimes, among other topics.⁵²¹

Mobile money providers allow account holders to store and transfer funds through a mobile phone.

Hawala: A centuries-old broker system based on trust, found throughout South Asia, the Arab world, and parts of Africa, Europe, and the Americas. It allows customers and brokers (called hawaladars) to transfer money or value without physically moving it, often in areas of the world where banks and other formal institutions have little or no presence.

There is no clear division between hawala networks and the formal financial system: many hawalas use the formal banking sector for day-to-day operations and to settle balances with other hawalas both domestically and abroad.

Source: World Bank, The Global Findex Database 2017: Measuring Financial Inclusion and the Fintech Revolution, 5/2/2018, p. 1; State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume II Money Laundering, 3/2019, pp. 11, 36.

Treasury's penultimate training session addressed **correspondent banking relationships**.⁵²² Afghanistan is considered a high-risk jurisdiction for such relationships because poor implementation and poor enforcement of the country's anti-money-laundering/combating financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) laws leave its financial system vulnerable to abuse.⁵²³ Although the **Financial Action Task Force** no longer lists Afghanistan as a jurisdiction with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, the European Union does: Afghanistan was included in a February 2019 EU list of high-risk third-party countries.⁵²⁴ The State Department also continues to list Afghanistan as a major money-laundering jurisdiction.⁵²⁵

Architect of Afghanistan's Most Notorious Banking Scandal Gets Early Release from Prison

Khalilullah Ferozi, the former chief executive officer of Kabul Bank, which nearly collapsed in 2010 after almost \$1 billion was stolen by a group of politically connected executives and shareholders, was released from prison this quarter.⁵²⁶ Ferozi, who was transferred to house arrest purportedly due to a severe diabetic condition, is considered one of the chief perpetrators of a fraud and money-laundering scheme that severely stressed the Afghan financial system and led to an \$825 million bailout from the Afghan government (an amount equivalent to approximately 5–6% of the country's GDP at the time).⁵²⁷ Ferozi's chief partner in the theft, former Kabul Bank Chairman Sherkhan Farnood, died last summer while serving a sentence at Bagram Prison.⁵²⁸

Ferozi's release was quickly followed by criticism from prominent quarters: U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan John R. Bass said on Twitter that he was "disturbed" by the news, emphasizing that it "call[ed] into question the government's commitment to combating corruption and making [the] best use of donors' support."⁵²⁹ Casting an unverified allegation at his political rival, President Ghani, Afghan presidential candidate and former head of the National Directorate of Security Rahmatullah Nabil accused Ferozi of contributing \$30 million to Ghani's reelection campaign in return for his release.⁵³⁰ Quick to respond, presidential spokesman Sediq Sediqqi characterized Nabil's accusation as "misleading," with "no truth in it."⁵³¹ Seddiqi said Ferozi had been placed "under severe house arrest."⁵³² The Afghan government told State that, under this arrangement, Ferozi would be allowed visitors, but could only leave his home to receive medical treatment.⁵³³

This is not the first time Ferozi, who is serving a 10-year sentence, has benefitted from a lenient interpretation of "detention."⁵³⁴ Under former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Ferozi frequently patronized Kabul's upscale restaurants while meeting with friends and former business partners under the pretense of attempting to recover their money so that they could repay stolen funds, according to the Afghanistan Analysts Network.⁵³⁵ In 2011, Ferozi sat down with a reporter from the Guardian over "shisha

Correspondent Banking Relationship:

A relationship established between two financial institutions that allows one bank to provide services—such as facilitating business transactions or wire transfers—on behalf of another. Correspondent banking relationships can provide financial institutions access to foreign markets without having to open a branch abroad.

Financial Action Task Force: an

intergovernmental body that aims to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. FATF no longer lists Afghanistan as a major money-laundering jurisdiction because FATF believes Afghanistan has made "significant progress" in addressing AML/CFT deficiencies.

Source: Investopedia, "Correspondent Bank Definition," revised 4/20/2019, <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/correspondent-bank.asp>, accessed 6/18/2019; FATF, "Who We Are," n.d., <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/>, accessed 6/18/2019; FATF, "Outcomes of the Plenary Meeting of the FATF, Valencia, 21–23 June 2017," 6/23/2017.

and several plates of rice and kebab” while he was nominally under house arrest.⁵³⁶ In 2015, without prior announcement, Ferozi showed up as an apparent guest of honor at a stone-laying ceremony for a real-estate project ostensibly conceived as a means of repaying his debt.⁵³⁷ The project, which quickly devolved into scandal, was hastily canceled.⁵³⁸

It is not yet clear what impact Ferozi’s latest detention arrangement will have on recovering the funds he stole.⁵³⁹ Ferozi entered into an agreement with the Kabul Bank Receivership (KBR), which was established to manage the bank’s bad assets, that requires him to repay 50% (\$68.6 million) of the funds he stole (\$137.2 million, which does not include accumulated interest valued at \$59.4 million) within six months from the date of his transfer to house arrest.⁵⁴⁰ Since the Afghan government announced that Kabul Bank would be put into receivership in April 2011, Ferozi has paid back \$14.5 million in cash, meaning that, per the terms of the agreement, he would have to repay an additional \$54.1 million within the required six-month timeframe.⁵⁴¹ No cash has been recovered from Ferozi in the last year, the KBR told SIGAR, although some of his collateralized property will be transferred to the Afghan government.⁵⁴² Overall, 59.6% (approximately \$588.2 million) of the \$987 million loan portfolio remained unrecovered, as of September 20, 2019.⁵⁴³

ECONOMIC GROWTH

USAID’s objective to accelerate private-sector-driven, export-led growth means that the agency’s Office of Economic Growth (OEG) could play an important role in the agency’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS).⁵⁴⁴ In support of that strategy, OEG’s efforts seek to:⁵⁴⁵

- strengthen trade connections between Afghanistan and its neighbors
- increase firm-level competitiveness by supporting export-ready Afghan businesses
- raise employment levels through that firm-level support and through the creation of a more favorable enabling environment for businesses

Conflict and uncertainty, however, may prevent USAID from achieving its goal of accelerating Afghanistan’s economic growth rate. With peace talks on hold, violence levels have increased as the U.S. and Taliban seek leverage over one another.⁵⁴⁶ Uncertainty, meanwhile, runs high: investment confidence has deteriorated amid anxiety over the future international security presence, presidential elections, and (now-suspended) peace negotiations.⁵⁴⁷ A SIGAR lessons-learned report on private-sector development and economic growth found that it is not realistic to expect robust and sustainable economic growth in an insecure and uncertain environment.⁵⁴⁸

USAID’s active economic-growth programs have a total estimated cost of \$139 million and can be found in Table 3.24.

TABLE 3.24

USAID ACTIVE ECONOMIC-GROWTH PROGRAMS

Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2019
Multi-Dimensional Legal Economic Reform Assistance (MELRA)	2/7/2018	2/6/2023	\$19,990,260	\$3,371,197
Extractive Technical Assistance by USGS	1/1/2018	12/31/2022	18,226,206	4,640,492
INVEST	9/28/2017	9/27/2020	15,000,000	3,991,565
Afghanistan Investment Climate Reform Program	3/27/2015	3/26/2020	13,300,000	6,131,266
Commercial Law Development Program	3/1/2014	9/30/2019	13,000,000	10,213,725
Carpet and Jewelry Value Chains	2/1/2019	3/31/2023	9,941,606	982,488
Goldozi Project	4/5/2018	4/4/2022	9,718,763	2,292,579
Livelihood Advancement for Marginalized Population (LAMP)	8/1/2018	7/31/2022	9,491,153	569,468
Establishing Kabul Carpet Export Center (KCEC)	6/6/2018	6/5/2021	9,416,507	3,203,000
Recycling Plant Value Chain in Northern Afghanistan	6/5/2019	6/4/2023	7,250,000	110,819
Trade Show Support (TSS) Activity	6/7/2018	12/6/2020	6,921,728	4,295,508
Development Credit Authority (DCA) with Ghazafar Bank	9/1/2018	8/30/2025	2,163,000	40,015
Afghanistan International Bank Guarantee Agreement	9/27/2012	9/27/2020	2,000,000	520,800
Development Credit Authority (DCA) with FINCA, OXUS, and First Microfinance Banks	9/25/2014	9/24/2020	1,958,000	142,100
Afghanistan Loan Portfolio Guarantee	9/27/2017	9/26/2023	665,820	732
Total			\$139,043,043	\$40,505,755

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2019.

Commerce Department Tries to Help Bring Afghanistan Back into Compliance with Extractives Transparency Standards

The U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) is trying to help bring Afghanistan back into line with global extractives-sector transparency standards, officials from the DOC's Commercial Law and Development Program (CLDP) said this quarter.⁵⁴⁹ Afghanistan made inadequate progress toward meeting those standards, which are promulgated by the Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an international body that aims to increase transparency in the natural-resources sector. Afghanistan was suspended from the EITI in January 2019.⁵⁵⁰

CLDP, which provides technical assistance in commercial law to the governments and private sectors of developing countries, agreed to sponsor the attendance of Afghan representatives at EITI-organized training workshops in 2020.⁵⁵¹ The sponsorship will be provided through USAID's Multi-Dimensional Economic Legal Reform Assistance Program (MELRA), implemented by CLDP.⁵⁵² MELRA is a \$20 million project that provides high-level policy and legal advice in areas deemed essential for fostering

Many Donors Do Not Hold Themselves to EITI Standards

The U.S. withdrew from the EITI as an implementing country in 2017, citing conflict with U.S. laws. However, the U.S. still supports the initiative and believes that Afghanistan will benefit from embracing EITI standards. As USAID said, "Afghanistan is in desperate need of transparency in all sectors, especially the mining sector."

Several other donors supporting reforms in the Afghan extractives sector are also non-EITI-implementing countries, including Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.

Source: USAID, OEG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019; U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Natural Resources Revenue, Letter to Mr. Fredrik Reinfeldt, Chair, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Board, 11/2/2017, pp. 1–2.

economic growth, including information communications technology, mining, and trade.⁵⁵³

EITI standards aim to reduce corruption by requiring implementing countries to reconcile revenue data from mining.⁵⁵⁴ Such reconciliation, which attempts to uncover discrepancies between taxes and royalties paid by firms and revenues collected by governments, is believed to reduce corruption.⁵⁵⁵ The U.S. withdrew from the EITI as an implementing country in 2017 because U.S. laws conflicted with EITI standards (meaning those laws allowed U.S. companies to be less transparent than those in EITI-compliant countries).⁵⁵⁶ Although the Afghan government had reportedly committed to bring Afghanistan back into EITI compliance by the summer of 2019, it remained suspended as of September 25, 2019.⁵⁵⁷

AGRICULTURE

Afghanistan remains heavily reliant on the agricultural sector, which employs approximately 40% of its total labor force and is expected to contribute nearly one-fifth of the country's GDP in 2019 (excluding opium-poppy cultivation), according to the World Bank.⁵⁵⁸ Historically, agriculture has been the base of Afghanistan's licit, formal economy, making substantial contributions to Afghanistan's licit economic growth. However, its significance to growth has diminished somewhat since the U.S.-led intervention in 2001.⁵⁵⁹ Due to anticipated recovery from a severe drought in 2018, the Bank expected licit agriculture to contribute approximately 0.84 percentage points (out of 2.5 percentage points) of GDP growth in 2019.⁵⁶⁰

In addition to licit agricultural activity supported by international donors, illicit opium-poppy cultivation thrives in Afghanistan. As many as 507,000 Afghans worked in opium-poppy cultivation in 2018, making the illegal industry one of the country's largest employers (larger than the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces), a May 2019 paper from the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit said.⁵⁶¹

Since 2002, USAID has disbursed more than \$2.2 billion to improve agricultural production, increase access to markets, and develop income alternatives to growing poppy for opium production.⁵⁶² USAID's active agriculture programs have a total estimated cost of \$444 million and can be found in Table 3.25. The Counternarcotics section of this report provides updates for many of these programs.

USAID's SWIM Project Lags on Several Performance Indicators

USAID's \$87.9 million Strengthening Watershed and Irrigation Management (SWIM) project was behind on several key performance indicators, the latest quarterly report from project implementer AECOM International Development said.⁵⁶³ A five-year project that began in December 2016, SWIM aims to improve agricultural water use, resource management, and regulations.⁵⁶⁴

TABLE 3.25

USAID ACTIVE AGRICULTURE PROGRAMS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2019
Strengthening Watershed and Irrigation Management (SWIM)	12/7/2016	12/6/2021	\$87,905,437	\$19,839,817
Regional Agriculture Development Program (RADP North)	5/21/2014	5/20/2019	78,429,714	72,107,745
Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP)	2/1/2010	12/31/2019	71,292,850	67,079,806
Afghanistan Value Chains-Livestock Activity	6/9/2018	6/8/2021	55,672,170	8,429,409
Afghanistan Value Chains-High Value Crops	8/2/2018	8/1/2023	54,958,860	6,441,571
Regional Agriculture Development Program- East (RADP East)	7/21/2016	7/20/2021	28,126,111	14,260,267
Grain Research and Innovation (GRAIN)	3/13/2017	9/30/2022	19,500,000	9,150,000
Promoting Value Chain-West	9/20/2017	9/19/2020	19,000,000	10,877,945
ACE II (Agriculture Credit Enhancement II)	6/23/2015	6/30/2019	18,234,849	17,906,171
Catalyzing Afghan Agricultural Innovation	5/28/2018	5/27/2023	8,000,000	1,614,315
SERVIR	9/14/2015	9/30/2020	3,100,000	1,877,059
Total			\$444,219,991	\$229,584,104

Note: Some of the USAID programs listed receive both Alternative Development and Agriculture Development funds.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2019.

AECOM's report, which covered activities from April through June 2019, showed that AECOM had informed zero people about appropriate water and natural resource management during the quarter, compared to a target of 2,125 people.⁵⁶⁵ USAID said the target was missed because the Afghan government took longer than expected to provide input on a concept note for planned outreach.⁵⁶⁶ USAID added that the concept note was finally approved and that 5,300 people had been trained on sustainable natural-resource management, as of October 10, 2019.⁵⁶⁷ However, this number was still below the third-year project target of 8,500 people.⁵⁶⁸

The report also showed that AECOM had failed to restore a single hectare of upland watershed, compared to a target of 3,741 hectares.⁵⁶⁹ The 3,741 hectares are covered by two separate watersheds in Jowzjan Province.⁵⁷⁰ USAID said that restoration of this land was delayed because AECOM had submitted watershed-management plans that were insufficiently detailed and that required new tables of contents.⁵⁷¹ Implementation of this aspect of the project will now commence in early 2020.⁵⁷² Consequently, the year-three target for this indicator is now zero and has been transferred to year four.⁵⁷³

A third quarterly target missed by AECOM was the number of hectares under new or improved irrigation or drainage service as a result of U.S. government assistance. The goal for the quarter was 9,108 hectares; the result was zero.⁵⁷⁴

A combination of factors appears to account for these missed targets. AECOM said that flooding, labor shortages (for both low-skilled laborers and engineers), cold weather and heavy windstorms, and security challenges impacted the rehabilitation of several canals.⁵⁷⁵ The implementer also said that a major training course, scheduled to conclude in March 2019, had been delayed and that a new trainer for the course had not yet been hired.⁵⁷⁶ That training was eventually completed in September 2019, six months behind schedule.⁵⁷⁷ In more positive developments, AECOM said it had created approximately 60 full-time-equivalent (FTE) jobs, compared to a quarterly target of 20 FTE jobs.⁵⁷⁸

In response to a draft version of this report, USAID said it had taken several actions to ensure AECOM met its annual targets. Those actions include a requirement for monthly construction-progress reports and a revised quality-assurance plan.⁵⁷⁹

INFRASTRUCTURE AND ESSENTIAL SERVICES

The U.S. has provided funds to build roads and bridges, construct and improve health and education facilities, and increase the electricity supply in Afghanistan since 2002.⁵⁸⁰ USAID alone has disbursed more than \$4.4 billion for infrastructure projects.⁵⁸¹

While funding levels for infrastructure have decreased in recent years as the U.S. has moved away from large capital projects like road construction, and although the U.S. does not plan to bilaterally underwrite any new major infrastructure moving forward, several high-dollar projects are still being implemented.⁵⁸² This section focuses specifically on remaining power-infrastructure projects.

Access to Electricity Remains a Stubborn Development Challenge

Lack of access to reliable and affordable electricity fundamentally constrains economic growth in Afghanistan, USAID said in a comprehensive February 2018 assessment of Afghanistan's energy sector.⁵⁸³ Although nearly 98% of Afghans report having access to some form of electricity, just 31% have access to grid-based electricity, according to Afghanistan's statistical authority.⁵⁸⁴

The majority of rural Afghans use distributed solar-power systems rather than connections to an electric grid for their energy needs.⁵⁸⁵ However, these systems lack the capacity and availability required to be the primary source of power for commercial enterprises, USAID said, implying that current levels of available electricity are not sufficient to bolster economic growth in rural areas.⁵⁸⁶

Many barriers to expanding electricity access persist. USAID said the set of challenges includes Afghanistan's near-complete (80%) dependence on

electricity imports (which reduces its bargaining power to negotiate favorable power-purchase rates), insecurity (particularly with respect to crossfire incidents), a poorly functioning national utility (Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, or DABS), insufficient transmission and distribution networks, and weak sector governance.⁵⁸⁷

Growing the National Power Grid Has Been a Major Emphasis of U.S. Economic Development Efforts

Expanding and connecting Afghanistan's "islanded" power grids has been a top U.S. development priority. Remaining work in the Afghan power sector therefore consists primarily of large-scale infrastructure projects. Both USAID and DOD have been working to connect Afghanistan's North East Power System (NEPS) with its southeastern counterpart, the South East Power System (SEPS).⁵⁸⁸ USAID is funding the construction of a 470-kilometer transmission line that, when complete, will connect the two networks.⁵⁸⁹ USAID is also working to expand the SEPS network.⁵⁹⁰

Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) monies appropriated by Congress in Fiscal Years (FYs) 2011–2014 fund DOD and USAID power-infrastructure projects. The Economic Support Fund also covers some USAID project costs.⁵⁹¹ No additional AIF funds have been appropriated since FY 2014.⁵⁹² However, up to \$50 million of Title IX Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds appropriated in later acts may be used to complete these projects.⁵⁹³ Both DOD and USAID projects have faced substantial delays over the years.⁵⁹⁴

DOD's Power-Infrastructure Projects are Complete

DOD reported that it had completed the last of its power-infrastructure projects this quarter. The final project involved the construction of substations and a transmission line from Sangin to Lashkar Gah in Afghanistan's restive Helmand Province and the improvement of three substations in SEPS. The transmission line was turned over to the Afghan government in late September 2019, DOD said. Approximately \$65.4 million has been obligated for this project, of which \$55.2 million has been disbursed. In total, \$601.0 million has been obligated for DOD's AIF-funded power infrastructure projects (including \$141.7 million for "bridging solution" for power in Kandahar City that concluded in September 2015), with \$583.1 million disbursed.⁵⁹⁵ Figure 3.42 on the following page shows the current status of U.S. funded power-infrastructure projects.

Five USAID Power-Infrastructure Projects Remain Ongoing; All are Delayed


USAID currently has five ongoing power-infrastructure projects. Those projects include the construction of:⁵⁹⁶

SIGAR AUDIT

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) used qualified local-national personnel to monitor its construction projects in Afghanistan and is taking steps to improve contractor reporting, a SIGAR audit released this quarter found. USACE was responsible for implementation of DOD's power-infrastructure projects.

FIGURE 3.42

STATUS OF U.S.-FUNDED POWER-INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS: NEPS & SEPS



Note: Map is illustrative and does not depict every feature of Afghanistan's energy infrastructure.

Source: Afghan Energy Information Center, Afghanistan Energy Map, "Afghanistan Current & Future Power System up to Year 2032 (1410)," n.d., <http://aiec.af/en/ppi>, accessed 10/9/2019; USFOR-A, JENG, "Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund Program FY 11 through FY 14," 9/20/2019; USAID, OI, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; SIGAR, Supplement to October 2018 Quarterly Report to Congress: Power Infrastructure Map, "U.S.-Funded Power-Infrastructure Projects: Current Status, as of September 2018," 10/30/2018; SIGAR, communications with DOD official, 10/9/2019.

- the Salang substation (completion date: January 2, 2020), located near a strategic pass between Baghlan and Parwan Provinces
- a 10 megawatt solar-power plant near Kandahar City in southern Afghanistan (completion date: December 29, 2019, an additional three-month delay since last quarter)
- a transmission line between Ghazni and Kandahar Provinces (completion date: December 2020)
- substations along the transmission line from Ghazni to Kandahar (completion date: July 30, 2023, approximately six months later than reported last quarter)

- transmission lines and substations in SEPS (completion date: July 30, 2023, approximately six months later than previously reported)

All five projects are delayed.⁵⁹⁷ Cumulatively, USAID has disbursed more than \$1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds since 2002 to build power plants, substations, and transmission lines, and to provide technical assistance in the power sector.⁵⁹⁸ USAID's active energy projects have a total estimated cost of \$788 million and are presented in Table 3.26.

USAID Awards Contract to Construct Substations from Ghazni to Kandahar and Complete SEPS

After long delay, USAID awarded a \$159.8 million contract for five substations between Ghazni and Kandahar and a 114-kilometer transmission line, with new or improved substations, that will complete the SEPS system, the agency informed SIGAR this quarter.⁵⁹⁹ Contracts for the projects—known as the NEPS-SEPS Connector Substations and SEPS Completion, both of which were originally to be completed on-budget—were initially awarded by the Afghan government in January 2015 and August 2016.⁶⁰⁰

Both of these prior contracts failed amidst allegations of corruption and mismanagement at DABS.⁶⁰¹ Consequently, in October 2017, USAID paused all on-budget energy construction projects and conducted an assessment of its energy-sector program and the Afghan government's ability to perform under the on-budget model. The result of the assessment led USAID to cancel \$400 million of on-budget (Afghan-managed) funds designated for DABS energy projects and reallocate them through off-budget (U.S.-managed) mechanisms. As a result of the delays caused by failed Afghan government contracts, approximately \$81.4 million in AIF funding will cancel at the end of September and

SIGAR AUDIT

A SIGAR audit released in September 2019 found that USAID's Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC) project was behind schedule and faced possible sustainability challenges. PTEC's main objective is to connect Kabul's and Kandahar's respective power grids by building new transmission lines and substations.

TABLE 3.26

USAID ACTIVE ENERGY PROJECTS

Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2019
Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC)	1/1/2013	12/31/2023	\$316,713,724	\$245,553,052
SEPS Completion and NEPS-SEPS Connector Substations	7/3/2019	7/30/2023	159,794,733	0
Contributions to the Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF)	3/7/2013	3/6/2023	153,670,184	153,670,184
Engineering Support Program	7/23/2016	1/22/2020	125,000,000	66,094,199
Design and Acquisition of SEPS Completion and NEPS-SEPS Connector	3/7/2018	6/27/2022	20,151,240	2,098,988
Kandahar Solar Project	2/23/2017	12/29/2019	10,000,000	9,000,000
Spare parts for Tarakhil Power Plant	8/14/2019	11/13/2019	2,136,850	0
Power Sector Governance and Management Assessment	1/12/2019	3/2/2019	567,330	567,330
Total			\$788,034,061	\$476,983,754

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2019.

return to the U.S. Treasury.⁶⁰² Secretary of State Pompeo referred to these funds in his statement of September 19, 2019, which overstated the number.⁶⁰³ USAID reported that all canceled AIF funds would be replaced by Economic Support Fund monies in order to complete the project.⁶⁰⁴

The cancellation of these AIF funds was anticipated in early 2018 and is therefore not a new or unexpected development.⁶⁰⁵ However, USAID reported that, in addition to the return of these monies to the U.S. Treasury, project costs were lower than anticipated, resulting in an estimated \$100 million cost savings to the U.S. Government.⁶⁰⁶

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

A SIGAR review of USAID's five-year, \$69.5 million Afghan Children Read (ACR) project found that textbooks distributed through ACR were received and used by schools. However, the review also found problems with the printing, distribution and warehousing of textbooks—including the warehousing of more than 150,000 books, many of which may not be distributed.

EDUCATION

Decades of conflict had decimated Afghanistan's education system prior to the U.S.-led military intervention in 2001. Since then, donors have generally highlighted Afghanistan's progress in the education sector as a significant achievement.⁶⁰⁷ However, poor data quality makes it difficult to ascertain the extent of that success, although more children are in school than under the Taliban regime, when girls were forbidden to attend. For example, figures for the number of children and youth in school vary widely.⁶⁰⁸ Afghan government enrollment data cannot be used to determine attendance rates directly because Afghanistan's Ministry of Education (MOE) counts students who have been absent for up to three years as enrolled under the premise that they may return to school.⁶⁰⁹

The education sector is beset by numerous challenges. They include shortages of school buildings and textbooks, rural access issues, poor data reliability, insecurity, and the alleged appointment of teachers on the basis of cronyism and bribery.⁶¹⁰

USAID, which aims to improve access to and quality of education in Afghanistan, as well as build capacity at the MOE, has disbursed more than \$1.1 billion for education programs in Afghanistan, as of October 8, 2019.⁶¹¹ USAID's education programs aim to increase access to education, as well as to improve the quality and relevance of, and to bolster the management capacity of Afghanistan's education system.⁶¹² The agency's active education programs have a total estimated cost of \$520 million and can be found in Table 3.27.

Review of Flagship World Bank Education Program Points to Possible Corruption

A fiduciary review of the World Bank's \$418 million second Education Quality Improvement Project (EQUIP II) revealed significant weaknesses in the MOE's record-keeping practices and identified several instances of potential procurement fraud that warrant further investigation, the Bank said in a brief shared with SIGAR this quarter.⁶¹³ Out of a sample of \$156.5 million project expenditures, \$21.9 million (14.0%) lacked adequate

documentation, \$2.2 million (1.4%) did not comply with World Bank procedures, and \$37.2 million (23.8%) in procurement contracts were identified as potentially fraudulent.⁶¹⁴ The possibly fraudulent contracts involved a local nongovernmental organization that was supposed to provide teacher training services.⁶¹⁵ The expenditures for which there was inadequate documentation all related to salary payments made to teacher trainers.⁶¹⁶

The sample of examined expenditures represented 37.4% of the total project cost and the total amount of potentially compromised expenditures was 39.2% of the sample.⁶¹⁷ Although the Bank emphasized that the results could not be extrapolated to all project expenditures because sample expenditures were not randomly selected, the Bank noted that if expenditures for the entire project had been inadequately documented at the same rate, the total amount of compromised funds would be approximately \$165.0 million.⁶¹⁸

The objective of EQUIP II was to increase equitable access to education, especially for girls, through school grants, teacher training, and institutional capacity building.⁶¹⁹ The review, which covered the project's entire nine-year implementation period (January 2008 to December 2017) was prompted in part by a 2018 SIGAR audit of the Bank's Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.⁶²⁰

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

This quarter, SIGAR released a report summarizing its findings from site visits to 171 schools across 10 provinces in Afghanistan. The visits were conducted between October 2015 and October 2018. SIGAR found that while 168 of the 171 schools (98.3%) were open and in generally usable condition, some of the schools had structural issues that could pose risks to the school's students and staff.

TABLE 3.27

USAID ACTIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS

Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2019
Afghanistan University Support and Workforce Development Program	1/1/2014	9/30/2019	\$93,158,698	\$91,864,195
Support to the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF)	8/1/2013	5/31/2020	90,681,844	70,375,170
Increasing Access to Basic Education and Gender Equality	9/17/2014	12/31/2019	77,402,457	77,402,457
Textbook Printing and Distribution II	9/15/2017	12/31/2019	75,000,000	0
Afghan Children Read (ACR) Program	4/4/2016	4/3/2021	69,547,810	38,616,504
Strengthening Education in Afghanistan (SEA II)	5/19/2014	9/30/2020	44,835,920	35,150,406
Let Girls Learn Initiative and Girls' Education Challenge Programme (GEC)	6/29/2016	6/28/2021	25,000,000	15,000,000
Capacity Building Activity at the Ministry of Education	2/1/2017	1/31/2022	23,212,618	13,691,418
Afghanistan's Global Partnership for Education	10/11/2012	9/30/2019	15,785,770	15,167,871
Financial and Business Management Activity with AUAF	7/5/2017	3/4/2020	4,384,058	3,056,720
PROMOTE Scholarships PAPA	3/4/2015	3/3/2020	1,247,522	1,247,522
Total			\$520,256,697	\$361,572,263

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2019.

Education Service Delivery in Taliban-Controlled Areas

The Taliban periodically disrupt the education system in Afghanistan. In September 2019, the insurgent group reportedly forced dozens of schools in Logar Province to close, according to provincial officials. The closures, which the Taliban said would end once the presidential election was held, were in response to newly established government checkpoints. Afghanistan also suffered from a wave of school attacks in 2018, when schools were used as voter registration and polling centers for parliamentary elections, according to the United Nations.

However, although SIGAR is unable to verify them, other reports paint a more complicated portrait of negotiation and compromise between the Afghan government and its adversary. A June 2018 report published by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), a British think tank, found that Taliban officials emphasized the extent to which they worked with, rather than against, the Afghan government when it came to issues of education (though the report also framed the relationship as one of cooptation). According to the ODI report, “In Taliban areas teachers turned up to work, children attended class, books and supplies did not go missing and there was more order in the classroom. Beyond that, however, not a great deal has actually changed.”

Source: 1TVnews, “Taliban Force Schools In Central Afghan District To Close,” 9/21/2019; UNICEF, “Afghanistan sees three-fold increase in attacks on schools in one year,” 5/28/2019; Overseas Development Institute, *Life under the Taliban shadow government*, 6/2018, pp. 5, 12, 14, 32.

More than Half of Graduates Apparently Still Unemployed as USWDP Project Comes to an End

Fewer than half the graduates of universities supported by USAID’s \$93.2 million University Support and Workforce Development Program (USWDP) were employed, a survey commissioned by project implementer Family Health International (FHI) 360 suggested.⁶²¹ While FHI 360 cautioned that the survey results allowed for inferences only rather than definitive judgements, this figure was well below the end-project target of 75%.⁶²² USAID’s nearly six-year USWDP project, which concluded in September 2019, assisted the Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) and 11 public universities to support the establishment of higher education programs that were deemed most relevant to the Afghan job market, and linked universities to potential employers.⁶²³

Because one of USWDP’s goals was to assist the MOHE with implementing programs that ensure employment opportunities for students, one of the project’s more notable performance indicators attempts to track the number of individuals with new or better employment as a result of the project.⁶²⁴ In USWDP’s latest quarterly report, which covered activities conducted from April through June 2019, implementers acknowledged that tracking this indicator represents a “formidable task” in a place like Afghanistan. The implementers added, “USWDP cannot provide the exact number of people who have better employment opportunities.”⁶²⁵

While this indicator was not yet available in the latest report, a similar survey conducted one year ago suggested that graduates were *less* likely to be employed than their non-USWDP counterparts.⁶²⁶ However, the same survey indicated that the employment gap between the two groups narrowed over time and that, among those respondents who were employed, USWDP graduates generally had higher salaries.⁶²⁷

USAID Commits Additional Funds to AUAF, Linking Financial Controls to Further Support

USAID increased the total estimated cost of its current support to the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF) from \$72.2 million to \$90.7 million (an increase of \$18.5 million), the agency informed SIGAR this quarter.⁶²⁸ USAID also obligated an additional \$6.7 million and extended the timeframe of its assistance from November 30, 2019, to May 31, 2020.⁶²⁹ AUAF has faced substantial scrutiny for mismanaging donor money: a joint investigation between SIGAR and USAID’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) concluded that AUAF could not account for more than \$63 million of U.S. government funds. The problems were so severe that SIGAR and USAID OIG brought them to the attention of USAID Administrator Mark Green in July 2018.⁶³⁰

As a result of this work, additional USAID funds provided to AUAF this quarter come with tighter financial controls and additional oversight

measures, including no further programmatic or physical expansions of AUAF programs or “centers” and, at USAID’s discretion, the addition of a USAID representative or USAID designee on AUAF’s board of trustees.⁶³¹ The tighter controls were imposed as part of a contract modification that codified an administrative agreement between AUAF and the USAID suspension and debarment official. That agreement incorporated many of the concerns raised with Administrator Green by SIGAR and USAID OIG.⁶³²

According to its website, AUAF is “Afghanistan’s only nationally accredited, private, not-for-profit, nonpartisan and coeducational university.”⁶³³ Since its first assistance agreement with AUAF commenced in 2008, USAID’s support for the university has exceeded \$100 million.⁶³⁴

HEALTH

While data limitations preclude a precise evaluation of the extent of improvement, Afghanistan appears to have made progress in key health indicators since 2001.⁶³⁵ For example, the Bank said that Afghanistan’s under-five mortality rate fell from 97 per 1,000 live births in 2010 to 55 per 1,000 live births in 2015.⁶³⁶ Even with this progress, however, Afghanistan’s health outcomes remain worse than most countries’: according to the CIA *World Factbook*, Afghanistan has the lowest life expectancy (52.1 years) in the world.⁶³⁷

While USAID believes that “healthy people and health[y] communities are the bedrock of a peaceful and stable nation” (suggesting that making people healthier can produce security), insecurity has risen even as key health indicators have ticked up, the World Bank said in 2018.⁶³⁸ USAID has also asserted that continuing to improve health outcomes will help achieve stability by bolstering Afghans’ confidence in the government’s capacity to deliver services.⁶³⁹ However, there is reason to doubt this theory of change. Although unverified by SIGAR, some reports indicate that the Taliban coopt Afghan government health services delivered in areas under their control, thereby potentially legitimizing their own capacity and authority, not the Afghan government’s.⁶⁴⁰ Despite the dislocation from security outcomes, improving health conditions remains a key pillar of USAID’s programming in Afghanistan.⁶⁴¹

U.S. on- and off-budget assistance to Afghanistan’s health sector totaled more than \$1.3 billion as of October 8, 2019.⁶⁴² USAID’s active health programs have a total estimated cost of \$284 million, and are listed in Table 3.28 on the following page.

USAID’s IHSAN Project Continues Efforts to Improve Basic Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition

USAID’s \$75.5 million Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition (IHSAN) project printed thousands of documents, sent 500,000 text



Children wash their hands while taking a break from classes at an Afghan school. (USAID photo)

TABLE 3.28

USAID ACTIVE HEALTH PROGRAMS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2019
Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition (IHSAN)	5/11/2016	5/10/2021	\$75,503,848	\$33,065,219
Helping Mothers and Children Thrive (HEMAYAT)	1/7/2015	1/6/2020	60,000,000	56,795,155
Disease Early Warning System Plus (DEWS Plus)	7/1/2014	6/30/2022	54,288,615	28,988,615
Health Sector Resiliency (HSR)	9/28/2015	9/27/2020	27,634,654	19,563,246
Medicines, Technologies and Pharmaceuticals Services (MTaPS)	9/20/2018	9/20/2023	20,000,000	30,335
Challenge Tuberculosis	1/1/2015	9/29/2019	16,886,357	13,889,395
Enhancing Community Access & Utilization of Zinc and ORS for the Management of Childhood Diarrhea	7/21/2015	7/20/2020	13,000,000	13,000,000
Sustaining Health Outcomes through the Private Sector (SHOPS) Plus	10/11/2015	9/30/2020	12,500,000	9,596,443
Central Contraceptive Procurement (CCP)	4/20/2015	4/19/2020	2,343,773	256,227
Global Health Supply Chain Quality Assurance (GHSC-QA)	1/2/2015	12/31/2019	1,500,000	1,348,802
TB Data, Impact Assessment and Communications Hub (TB DIAH)	9/24/2018	9/24/2023	600,000	0
Global Health Supply Chain Management (GHSCM-PSM)	4/20/2015	4/19/2020	176,568	176,568
4 Children	9/15/2014	9/16/2019	20,000	20,000
Total			\$284,453,815	\$176,730,007

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2019.

messages, and upgraded or constructed more than 53,000 latrines over the course of its latest reporting period (April to June, 2019), implementer FHI 360 said.⁶⁴³ Additionally, 1,311 communities were declared open-defecation free.⁶⁴⁴ Implemented over a five-year period (2016 to 2021), IHSAN aims to assist the Afghan government, civil society organizations, and the private sector to implement and scale hygiene and nutrition interventions in order to improve the health of women and young children.⁶⁴⁵

Amidst these activities, implementer FHI 360 said that poor security continued to adversely affect implementation at several project sites.⁶⁴⁶ FHI 360 reported that a drone strike conducted in Farah Province in May had destroyed a field office of a subcontractor, killing two members of the subcontractor's staff.⁶⁴⁷ Other teams in Farah were disrupted by unspecified additional security incidents.⁶⁴⁸ FHI 360 added that operations in insurgent strongholds continued to face temporary delays that are typically resolved by the intervention of community elders.⁶⁴⁹

In January 2019, USAID told SIGAR that it had issued a corrective notice to FHI 360 due to FHI 360's poor performance and its failure to achieve the majority of essential nutrition and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) indicators in fiscal years 2017 and 2018.⁶⁵⁰ This quarter, SIGAR followed up

with USAID to see how FHI 360 was performing in response to the notice. USAID said FHI 360 was on track to meet these performance indicators in 2019.⁶⁵¹

Polio: 16 Cases in 2019

As of September 23, 16 new cases of polio had been reported in Afghanistan in 2019.⁶⁵² Thus far, the rate of new cases in 2019 is approximately the same as in 2018, when 21 cases were reported—substantially higher than the 13 cases seen in 2016 and 14 more in 2017.⁶⁵³ USAID has obligated \$36.6 million for polio-related programs since 2003, of which \$32.5 million has been disbursed.⁶⁵⁴

Afghanistan is one of only three countries in the world in which polio remains **endemic**, along with Pakistan and Nigeria.⁶⁵⁵ Afghanistan and Pakistan share a 1,500-mile border and large-scale population movements between the two countries increase cross-border transmission risk. Complicating vaccination outreach, the Pakistani Taliban have issued by a fatwa targeting polio workers.⁶⁵⁶

Although the Afghan Taliban have reportedly voiced strong support for polio vaccinations over the past decade, they too at times disrupt vaccination efforts.⁶⁵⁷ Claiming that vaccinators were collecting intelligence on local Taliban leaders, the group's central leadership implemented a ban on polio vaccination in Helmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar, and Ghazni Provinces in 2018, reporting from the Afghanistan Analysts Network indicates.⁶⁵⁸

Similarly, the Taliban instituted a ban on polio vaccinations carried out by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) in April 2019, citing unspecified “suspicious activities” on the part of vaccinators.⁶⁵⁹ After clarifying their conditions—which reportedly included securing the Taliban's permission before hiring vaccination workers and carrying out vaccinations only in health centers—the Taliban lifted its ban on the ICRC on September 15, 2019, and on the WHO on September 25, 2019.⁶⁶⁰ While it was unclear whether the WHO and ICRC had agreed to all of these conditions, Schaerer Juan-Pedro, the head of the ICRC delegation in Afghanistan, said ICRC and the Taliban had reached a “common understanding” regarding ICRC's work.⁶⁶¹ Meanwhile, Richard Peepers, the WHO's Afghanistan representative, said the WHO would “with partners, . . . start health facility-based campaigns in the previously banned areas.”⁶⁶²

Although the WHO welcomed the Taliban's announcement, it remained concerned that “more children [had] become vulnerable to poliovirus,” and that, as a result of the previous ban, “we will see more Afghan children paralyzed.”⁶⁶³

Risks to Effective Polio Vaccination

According to Afghanistan's Ministry of Public Health, the greatest risk to polio vaccination is the Taliban's ban on house-to-house vaccinations in major areas of southern Afghanistan. USAID/Afghanistan's Office of Health and Nutrition shares this view.

Source: Government of Afghanistan, MOPH, National Emergency Operation Center, Framework for change: fast-track to zero polio cases, 10/27/2018, p. 2; USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR data call, 6/20/2019.

Endemic: refers to the constant presence and/or usual prevalence of a disease or infectious agent in a population within a geographic area.

Source: CDC, Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health Practice, Third Edition An Introduction to Applied Epidemiology and Biostatistics, “Lesson 1: Introduction to Epidemiology,” <https://www.cdc.gov/ophss/csels/dsepd/ss1978/lesson1/section11.html>, accessed 10/16/2018.

COUNTERNARCOTICS CONTENTS

Key Issues and Events	159
U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Counternarcotics	159
Treatment and Prevention	166
Alternative Development	168

COUNTERNARCOTICS

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

Although Afghanistan's area under opium-poppy cultivation fell by 20% in 2018, it remained at the second-highest level since the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) began monitoring it in 1994.⁶⁶⁴ Reduced precipitation during the 2017–2018 wet season caused the decline, which resulted in lower income for farmers. According to UNODC, the Afghan opiate economy fell by two-thirds between 2017 and 2018, but still accounted for 6 to 11% of the country's GDP and exceeded the value of the country's official (licit) exports of goods and services.⁶⁶⁵

Afghan law enforcement also faces a growing methamphetamine production problem. Afghan drug producers likely learned how to manufacture methamphetamine from Iran, where methamphetamine production has been a problem for law enforcement and health professionals since the mid-2000s.⁶⁶⁶

According to Afghan government officials, the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOI) will review and prepare the country's new counternarcotics plan now that the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) is being dissolved.⁶⁶⁷

As of September 30, 2019, total U.S. appropriations for counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan were \$8.94 billion.⁶⁶⁸

U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS


As of September 30, 2019, the United States has appropriated \$8.94 billion for counternarcotics (CN) efforts in Afghanistan since FY 2002. Congress appropriated most of the CN funds for Afghanistan through the Department of Defense's Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DICDA) account (\$3.26 billion), the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) (\$1.31 billion), the Economic Support Fund (\$1.46 billion), and a portion of the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account (\$2.36 billion). CN cumulative funding amounts are lower this quarter due to a decrease in DICDA funding for the Special Mission Wing and a reduction in INCLE allocations, but not obligations, for counternarcotics and aviation funding.⁶⁶⁹

ASFF is primarily used to develop the Afghan National Army and Police, including the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and the

COUNTERNARCOTICS

FIGURE 3.43

COUNTERNARCOTICS APPROPRIATIONS BY AGENCY, AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019 (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: *DEA funds the salary supplements of the Afghan specialized units annually.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 9/30/2019, Appendix B.

Special Mission Wing (SMW), which support the counternarcotics efforts of the Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior Affairs (MOI).⁶⁷⁰

As shown in Figure 3.43, DOD is the largest contributor, in support of CN efforts followed by INL.

THE SIREN CALL OF OPIUM POPPIES

Opium-poppy cultivation has become a crucial element in the livelihood of many Afghans. Significantly, more Afghans engage in cultivation, work in poppy fields, or are involved in the illicit drug trade, than the total estimated personnel strength of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).

Poppies can grow on low-quality land and thrive in harsh climates. However, its cultivation is labor intensive, costly, and requires workers with specialized skills. According to responses to the annual UNODC survey, Afghan farmers in 2018 employed the equivalent of roughly 190,700 full-time workers to help them weed and harvest opium-poppy, but that number is probably higher as the figure does not include family members engaged in such activities. In 2018, the combined wages for opium-poppy labor amounted to \$270 million or 44% of the farmers' income from opium over the year.

Among the most vital workers in this process are the "lancers" who cut the seedpods of mature poppies and collect the gum that oozes out, according to UNODC. The 2018 survey was the first time the MCN/UNODC surveyed lancers to understand the extent of their reliance on poppy cultivation, and their impact on the wider economy.

On average, lancers reported working for 15 days and harvesting opium for two farmers over the course of the season. They reported an average daily wage of \$12 in 2018, equivalent to \$170 per season.

In contrast, farmers gave a lower estimate of the salaries they offered lancers, at \$7.70 per day, which did not include payments in opium reported by some 20% of lancers. Nonetheless, UNODC says even this lower estimate is almost double the wages for other farming-related jobs, and substantially more than those of construction workers, who can expect to be paid \$4.80 per day. According to the UN, 80% of Afghans live on less than \$1.25 per day.

Approximately 16% of farmers reported that they also worked as lancers to earn extra money. Lancers, like poppy farmers and other workers, tend to use their opium income to buy food, settle debts, and pay medical bills. Few invest in property, education, or other activities that could offer alternatives to poppy cultivation.

UNODC says reducing opium production in Afghanistan will require more than the rural development and counternarcotics policies that donors and the Afghan government have implemented to date. Most of the demand for opiates comes from other countries and most of the profit from the trade flows beyond Afghanistan's borders. According to UNODC, this problem requires a concerted international effort targeting both supply in Afghanistan and demand in countries of destination.

Source: UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Challenges to Sustainable Development, Peace and Security, 7/2019, pp. 3-4, 7.

Ministry of Counter Narcotics Dissolution Update

President Ashraf Ghani issued a presidential decree in January 2019 dissolving the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) and establishing a committee to oversee the transition of the MCN's duties.⁶⁷¹ The committee issued a transition plan that is making its way through the Afghan government approval process.⁶⁷² According to the State Department, the latest version of the transition plan is under review by the office of the Afghan president.⁶⁷³ However, President Ghani issued another decree in July 2019 terminating the integration of MCN's responsibilities into other Afghan ministries.⁶⁷⁴ SIGAR is seeking further clarification on the current status of the MCN transition.

Afghan government officials informed SIGAR that the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOI) will now review and prepare the country's updated counternarcotics plan since the MCN has been dissolved.⁶⁷⁵ Another presidential decree in June 2019 transferred the MCN's facilities to the Attorney General's (AGO) office and Afghan officials say the main challenge after the transition of the MCN's responsibilities will be this transfer of infrastructure and equipment to the AGO.⁶⁷⁶

Also, the annual opium surveys previously conducted by the MCN and UNODC will henceforth be done in partnership with another Afghan government entity: the Afghanistan National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA), which along with UNODC, is conducting the opium survey of the 2019–2020 season.⁶⁷⁷ More information on the transition is available in SIGAR's July 2019 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* on page 168.

Afghan Counter Narcotics Police Organization and Funding

Funded by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) leads Afghan law-enforcement personnel in counternarcotics efforts. The CNPA, authorized at 2,632 personnel, are located in all 34 provinces and comprise regular police as well as specialized units.⁶⁷⁸ Specialized units include the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and the UK-supported Intelligence and Investigation Unit (IIU).⁶⁷⁹

The NIU conducts interdiction operations and seizures, serves arrest warrants, and executes search warrants in high-threat environments. The NIU receives mentoring from DEA and U.S. Special Operations Forces.⁶⁸⁰ The NIU maintains forward-based personnel in Kandahar, Kunduz, and Herat.⁶⁸¹

The SIU's mission is to identify significant drug-trafficking and narcoterrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan and dismantle them through the Afghan criminal-justice system.⁶⁸² The Technical Investigative Unit (TIU) consists of 100 staff who collect and analyze evidence in support of SIU/

NIU investigations.⁶⁸³ Another SIU component has four officers responsible for administrative management of court orders obtained by SIU investigators to conduct Afghan judicially authorized intercepts.⁶⁸⁴ Other Afghan law-enforcement elements, such as the General Command of Police Special Units, execute high-risk arrests and operations including counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and counter-organized crime.⁶⁸⁵ The Afghan Uniform Police and Afghan Border Police (ABP) also participate in counternarcotics activities.⁶⁸⁶ The ABP collaborate closely with the counternarcotics elements of the Anti-Crime Police and Ministry of Finance, national and international intelligence agencies, as well as border police of neighboring states.⁶⁸⁷

The Special Mission Wing (SMW) is a rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft force that supports NIU missions as well as counterterrorism missions conducted by Afghan special security forces. The SMW is the only Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) organization with night-vision, rotary-wing air assault, and fixed-wing intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance capabilities. The SMW structure consists of assault squadrons in Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e Sharif.⁶⁸⁸ Since its establishment in 2012, the SMW has been used to conduct counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions. In recent years, counterterrorism missions have dominated.⁶⁸⁹

This quarter, DOD reported that due to political pressure ahead of the presidential election, high-level Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials frequently circumvented the tasking process set up for the SMW and misused SMW assets for tasks unrelated to their core mission of fighting terrorism and narcotics production. The SMW received many taskings better suited to the Afghan Air Force. DOD said that penalties assessed to the MOD had minimal effect on curbing the problem and the misuse of these assets undermined the SMW's ability to conduct counternarcotics missions.⁶⁹⁰ The misuse of the SMW is an ongoing problem, as SIGAR has reported in previous quarterly reports.⁶⁹¹

More information on the SMW is available in the Security section on pp. 94–95.

Funding for Afghan Counternarcotics Elements

INL estimates that it funds approximately \$21 million per year for NIU and SIU operations and maintenance. Costs directly attributable to NIU and SIU include \$6 million to support an evidence-gathering platform under an interagency agreement with the DEA, \$9.56 million in other interagency agreement support, and \$825,000 per year for NIU salary supplements. SIU salary supplements are funded separately by DEA, which disbursed \$126,124 in FY 2019.⁶⁹² Salary supplements are used to attract and retain the most qualified and highly trained officers to the specialized units.

COUNTERNARCOTICS

Supplements are provided to all NIU officers, from police officers to unit commanders based on rank.⁶⁹³

Interdiction Results

Between June 27 and September 18, 2019, DOD reported 27 operations resulting in 160 detentions and seizures of 877 kilograms (kg) (1,929 lbs) of opium, 565 kg (1,243 lbs) of heroin, 500 kg of hashish (1,100 lbs), 31,419 kg (69,122 lbs) of chemicals, and 318 kg (700 lbs) of methamphetamine by Afghan security forces.⁶⁹⁴ Table 3.29 contains interdiction results provided by DOD.

DOD said security remains poor, hindering the access of government forces in areas where the drug trade is concentrated, particularly in southern regions of the country where the majority of opium is grown, and where drug products are transported, processed, and sold.⁶⁹⁵

The United Nations reported that law-enforcement authorities conducted a total of 773 counternarcotics operations between June 1 and July 30, 2019, leading to seizures of 600 kg (1,320 lbs) of heroin; 5,000 kg (11,000 lbs) of morphine; 23,130 kg (50,886 lbs) of opium; 4,040 kg (8,888 lbs) of hashish; 13,900 tablets of methamphetamine; 111,500 kg (245,300 lbs) of solid precursor chemicals; 75,250 liters of liquid precursor chemicals; and 72,420 kg (159,324 lbs) of poppy seeds. In total, 56 laboratories (55 heroin and one methamphetamine) were dismantled and four drug stockpiles were destroyed. The operations led to the arrest of 879 suspects and related seizures of 120 vehicles, 61 weapons, and four radios. Seven CNPA officers were killed and eight were wounded while carrying out their law-enforcement operations.⁶⁹⁶

TABLE 3.29

INTERDICTION RESULTS, FISCAL YEARS 2010–2019											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019¹	TOTAL
Number of Operations	263	624	669	518	333	270	190	157	194	130	3,348
Detainees	484	862	535	386	442	394	301	152	274	160	3,990
Hashish seized (kg)	25,044	182,213	183,776	37,826	19,088	24,785	123,063	227,327	42,842	144,476	1,010,440
Heroin seized (kg)	8,392	10,982	3,441	2,489	3,056	2,859	3,532	1,975	3,242	3,203	43,171
Morphine seized (kg)	2,279	18,040	10,042	11,067	5,925	505	13,041	106,369	10,127	1,746	179,141
Opium seized (kg)	49,750	98,327	70,814	41,350	38,379	27,600	10,487	24,263	23,180	12,566	396,716
Precursor chemicals seized (kg)	20,397	122,150	130,846	36,250	53,184	234,981	42,314	89,878	22,863	81,182	834,045
Methamphetamine² (kg)	N/A	50	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	9	30	86	602	777
Amphetamine (kg)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	17	N/A	N/A	1,990	2,007

Note: The significant difference in precursor chemicals total seizures between 2014 and 2015 is due to a 12/22/2014 seizure of 135,000 kg of precursor chemicals.

¹ Results for period 10/1/2018–9/18/2019.

² In crystal or powder form.

Source: DOD(CN), response to SIGAR data call, 7/29/2015, 7/20/2017, 9/24/2018, 9/20/2019, and 9/26/2019.

This quarter UNAMA released the results of a four-month investigation of a series of USFOR-A airstrikes in May 2019 on methamphetamine labs in Farah and Nimroz Provinces. UNAMA concluded that 39 civilian casualties occurred during that operation, 17 of whom were working in the drug labs. This was the first time UNAMA had received reports of so high a number of civilian casualties resulting from airstrikes on reported drug labs. UNAMA also received “reliable and credible,” but yet-to-be verified reports of an additional 37 casualties from these airstrikes, the majority being women and children.⁶⁹⁷

USFOR-A disputed the findings, saying it disagreed with the characterization of the individuals present in the facilities as civilians. USFOR-A said it considered them to be Taliban combatants.⁶⁹⁸ According to UNAMA, the drug production facilities targeted by USFOR-A were owned and operated by criminal groups linked to international drug-trafficking networks.⁶⁹⁹ SIGAR has previously raised the issue of risks to civilians from aerial bombing campaigns.⁷⁰⁰

Despite the strong performance of Afghan specialized units and their improved capabilities over the years, the number of seizures and arrests they have conducted have had minimal impact on the country’s opium-poppy cultivation and production. For example, cumulative opium seizures since the start of the reconstruction effort in 2002 are equivalent to approximately 8% of the country’s 6,400 metric tons of opium production for the single year of 2018, as reported by UNODC.⁷⁰¹

Afghan law-enforcement forces also face a growing methamphetamine production problem. Afghan workers who apparently learned how to produce methamphetamine in Iran have now brought the process home. Unlike Iran, however, Afghan producers have been able to lower their costs by using the common ephedra bush, a natural local plant known as *oman* that grows in the mountains of Wardak, Ghor, Helmand, Uruzgan, and Ghazni Provinces.⁷⁰² Before discovering that *oman* was useful to produce methamphetamine, producers used decongestants in syrup or tablet form imported from Pakistan and Iran as their source of pseudoephedrine.⁷⁰³ Some lab owners in Afghanistan say they have reduced their methamphetamine production costs by half using the ephedra bush.⁷⁰⁴ Cooks extract 12 kg (26.5 lbs) of ephedrine from 450 kg (992 lbs) of *oman*; from 12 kg (26.5 lbs) of ephedrine, they can produce 8 kg (17.6 lbs) of methamphetamine.⁷⁰⁵

The *oman* crop is dried, threshed, packed and transported on trucks to be processed into *sheesha* or “glass”-like shards later to be crushed, smoked, or injected.⁷⁰⁶ In Ghor Province, an adult can harvest up to 45 kg (99 lbs) a day earning approximately \$30 daily during the harvest season.⁷⁰⁷ A typical harvester in Taywara District in Ghor Province reportedly works 30 to 40 days over the harvest season, alongside up to 12 people from the same village. Harvesting up to 45 kg (99 lbs) a day, one village could harvest as much as 22 MT (48,502 lbs) of *oman* per year, enough to produce 390 kg (860 lbs) of meth.⁷⁰⁸

Traders conduct their business in the mountain foothills purchasing anywhere from 100 to 300 kg (220.5 to 661.4 lbs) of fresh opium daily.⁷⁰⁹ According to research by David Mansfield, an expert on the Afghanistan drug trade, in Taywara in Ghor where the opium trade is flourishing, the Taliban tax \$0.07 per kg. The crop is worth \$3.20 per kg once it reaches the Farah Province district center of Bakwa. Insurgents can earn as much as \$1,000 per truck when the tax is levied on a 15 MT (33,069 lbs) load in Bakwa.⁷¹⁰ Mansfield's research shows that Afghan authorities also participate in the trade, demanding \$100–\$150 per truck along its journey through Farah and Nimroz. A driver taking a load from Taywara to Bakwa can earn \$1,125 to \$1,150.⁷¹¹

The opium economy took a downturn in 2018.⁷¹² Mansfield reports that the kilogram price has fallen from \$700 to \$250 in a year.⁷¹³ Raids by Afghan authorities on the Bakwa bazaar may have had an impact, but those involved in the trade blame economic problems in Iran and the devaluation of its currency.⁷¹⁴ Still, new labs are appearing and numerous trucks are transporting opium and other products to opium labs in Bakwa.⁷¹⁵ The rise in methamphetamine seizures and drug use are worrying given Afghanistan's already high drug addiction rate and dependence on the opium economy.⁷¹⁶ The UN plans to conduct satellite and ground surveys of the opium crop similar to those done for opium poppy.⁷¹⁷



A field of opium-poppy plants in Marjah, Afghanistan. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Michael P. Snody)

Eradication Results

Governor-Led Eradication


Under the Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) program that began in 2005, INL reimbursed provincial governors \$250 toward the eradication costs of every UNODC-verified hectare of eradicated poppy.⁷¹⁸ This year, the dissolution of the MCN coincided with the eradication-planning period. Consequently, minimal eradication planning took place for 2019.⁷¹⁹ UNODC reported the eradication of 406 hectares during 2018, a 46% decrease from 2017. No eradication took place in Helmand, the highest poppy-cultivating province, between 2016 and 2018.⁷²⁰ INL has disbursed \$6.9 million since 2008.⁷²¹ INL informed SIGAR that a new Afghan administration will address eradication once the function has been reassigned. The new Afghan administration will also need to establish a new opium-poppy eradication agreement with the United States since the most recent agreement from 2015 was with the now defunct MCN.⁷²²

As Figure 3.44 illustrates on the following page, eradication efforts have had minimal impact on curbing opium-poppy cultivation. According to INL, eradication results had been declining prior to the announcement of the MCN's elimination. The Afghan government has struggled to perform eradication due to the security challenges in poppy-growing areas.⁷²³ Since 2008, on average, annual eradication efforts resulted in eradicating only 2% of the total yearly opium-poppy cultivation.⁷²⁴

COUNTERNARCOTICS

FIGURE 3.44

AFGHAN OPIUM-POPPY CULTIVATION, ERADICATION, AND PRODUCTION SINCE 2008



Source: UNODC, *World Drug Report 2019, Booklet 3: Depressants*, 6/2019, pp. 79, 81, 83.

Good Performers Initiative

The Good Performers Initiative (GPI) has ended with the transfer of its last two projects—an irrigation intake in Balkh Province and a school construction in Parwan Province—to the Afghan government on June 30, 2019.⁷²⁵ The Good Performers Initiative sought to incentivize provincial governors' counternarcotics and supply-reduction activities by supporting sustainable, community-led development projects in provinces that significantly reduced or eliminated poppy cultivation.⁷²⁶ GPI projects included schools, roads, bridges, irrigation structures, health clinics, and drug-treatment centers.⁷²⁷ No new GPI projects have been approved since April 30, 2016.⁷²⁸

According to INL, the program was deemed “ineffectual at curbing opium cultivation” in those provinces receiving awards. MCN's inability to adequately manage the program was also a factor in INL's phasing it out. INL has spent \$127 million over the life of the program.⁷²⁹ Additional information on the program is available in SIGAR's July 2019 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* on pages 175–176.

TREATMENT AND PREVENTION

INL works closely with international partners to coordinate and execute capacity building and training activities for Afghan service providers in drug prevention, treatment, and recovery.⁷³⁰ The INL-funded 2015 Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey conservatively estimated that roughly 11% of the

population would test positive for one or more drugs, including 5.3% of the urban population and 13% of the rural population.⁷³¹ According to UNODC, the global prevalence of drug use for populations aged 15 to 64 was 0.71% in 2017.⁷³² Drug use among women and children is among the highest documented worldwide, and 38.5% of rural households tested positive for some form of illicit drug.⁷³³ According to the UNODC, opium remains the predominant opioid used in Afghanistan, with nearly 70% of opioid users reporting using opium, but there is also significant use of heroin and nonmedical use of pharmaceutical opioids.⁷³⁴

According to INL, the MCN's dissolution will have little impact on drug-demand-reduction programs since the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) is currently responsible for implementing drug-demand-reduction policy.⁷³⁵ The Afghan government has not determined whether any policy or coordination role regarding drug treatment previously carried by the MCN will transfer to the Ministry of Interior Affairs.⁷³⁶ The United States and the Afghan government are finalizing a plan to transfer some U.S.-funded drug-treatment centers (DTCs) to the Afghan government.⁷³⁷ Since 2015, INL has transitioned 27 DTCs to the Afghan government and 21 additional centers will transition in 2021.⁷³⁸ INL is completing the transition plan to include the modifications from a December 2018 bilateral workshop with the **Colombo Plan** held in Jakarta⁷³⁹ and any updates from the September 2019 Stakeholders Meeting held in Dubai with representatives from various Afghan government ministries, NGOs, the Colombo Plan, and the UNODC.⁷⁴⁰ At the September meeting, the financial aspects of the transition plan were finalized.⁷⁴¹

INL has gradually reduced funding to DTCs since 2015.⁷⁴² The MOPH is confident that it can manage the transition of the treatment centers, provided it receives sufficient funding from its own government and the international community.⁷⁴³ In December 2018, INL signed a \$2.8 million agreement to fund drug-treatment centers under its control. INL will provide additional funds through a future agreement to support the treatment centers until December 31, 2020.⁷⁴⁴

Most patients at the 86 drug-treatment centers currently supported by INL are adult males. Of the 86 facilities, 67 are inpatient centers and 19 are outpatient; 24 are dedicated to women, adolescents, and children and are operated by NGOs.⁷⁴⁵ Forty-four of the residential treatment centers offer homebased services, with six providing services to adult females.⁷⁴⁶ INL developed a software tool to monitor inventory and procurement at INL-funded drug treatment centers. In September 2018, INL used the tool to monitor DTCs in Kabul.⁷⁴⁷ According to INL, the demand for treatment and prevention services far exceeds the capacity of the centers, most of which have extensive waiting lists for new patients.⁷⁴⁸

The Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Programme (DAP) implements a program providing scholarships and fellowships to Afghan students at Asian

The Colombo Plan: Instituted as a regional intergovernmental organization to further economic and social development, it was conceived at a conference held in Colombo, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), in 1950 with seven founding-member countries. The organization has since expanded to include 26 member countries. INL supports the Colombo Plan's Universal Treatment Curriculum, a national-level training and certification system for drug-addiction counselors aimed at improving the delivery of drug treatment services in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Source: Colombo Plan Secretariat website, "History," www.colombo-plan.org, accessed 7/1/2017; INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, 3/2018, p. 19.

University for Women (AUW). The program's aim was to develop a successful MCN to advance counternarcotics priorities and promote gender integration within the Afghan government.⁷⁴⁹ Though a presidential decree dissolved the MCN in January, the ministry continues to function since other ministries have not yet completely taken over its responsibilities and the AUW fellowship program there continues.⁷⁵⁰ DAP established agreements with the MOPH, MOI, and Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) during the second 2019 calendar quarter to implement a women's leadership-fellowship project. DAP assumes these new partnerships will improve the retention of female employees in Afghan government entities.⁷⁵¹

The \$2 million program has five new fellows who began internships in July 2019. Four of the previous AUW fellows with internships at the MCN resigned at the end of June 2019.⁷⁵² Since the fellowship's inception in 2017, six fellows have completed the program successfully: five are working for various international NGOs and private companies; one is pursuing an advanced academic degree.⁷⁵³

INL has obligated and disbursed approximately \$159.7 million to the Colombo Plan since 2008 for drug-demand-reduction programs in Afghanistan.⁷⁵⁴

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT

The United States is currently implementing alternative-development initiatives, within the framework of the Afghanistan Integrated Country Strategy, to reduce illicit drug production and promote sustainable agriculture-led economic growth.⁷⁵⁵ The U.S.-funded programs listed in Table 3.30 are discussed in this section of the report.

Boost Alternative Development Intervention Through Licit Livelihoods

The State Department-funded Boost Alternative Development Interventions through Licit Livelihoods (BADILL) project, implemented by UNODC, aims to strengthen and diversify licit livelihoods of small and marginal farmers through alternative development methods. The project supports and strengthens selected **value chains** in production, processing, quality control, and market linkages across the following 13 target provinces: Helmand, Uruzgan, Nimroz, Samangan, Jowzjan, Takhar, Bamyān, Wardak, Parwan, Panjshir, Paktiya, Paktika, and Nangarhar.⁷⁵⁶

From April to June 2019, the project's main activities centered on monitoring and evaluation visits, distribution of inputs such as poultry, greenhouses and orchards, and support for market linkages.⁷⁵⁷ The implementer established 10 greenhouses, 61 hectares of new fruit orchards, and constructed 1,350 poultry farms. Over 800 hectares of land were brought under licit cultivation generating \$1.2 million in income. The greenhouses

Value chain: the range of goods and services necessary for an agricultural product to move from the farm to the final customer or consumer. It encompasses the provision of inputs, actual on-farm production, post-harvest storage and processing, marketing, transportation, and wholesale and retail sales.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2015.

COUNTERNARCOTICS

TABLE 3.30

ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD PROGRAMS					
Project Title	U.S. Implementing Agency	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2019
Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program (CHAMP)	USAID	2/1/2010	12/31/2019	\$71,292,850	\$67,079,806
Afghanistan Value Chain-Livestock (AVC-L)	USAID	6/9/2018	6/8/2021	55,672,170	8,429,409
Afghanistan Value Chain-High Value Crops (AVC-HVC)	USAID	8/2/2018	8/1/2023	54,958,860	6,441,571
Regional Agricultural Development Program-East (RADP-E)	USAID	7/21/2016	7/20/2021	28,126,111	14,260,267
Community-Based Agriculture and Alternative Development-West (CBARD-West)	INL	9/1/2016	4/18/2020	24,368,607	24,368,607
Community-Based Agriculture and Alternative Development-East (CBARD-East)	INL	11/11/2017	11/11/2020	22,128,683	22,128,683
Boost Alternative Development Intervention Through Licit Livelihoods (BADILL)	INL	8/12/2016	8/12/2020	20,000,000	20,000,000
Promoting Value Chains-Western Afghanistan (PVC-W)	USAID	9/20/2017	9/19/2020	19,000,000	10,877,945
Total				\$295,547,281	\$173,586,288

Source: State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/20/2019; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.

produced 356 metric tons (784,846 lbs) of fresh vegetables; the poultry and dairy farms produced 4.5 million eggs and over 1,800 metric tons (3,968,321 lbs) of milk with a combined value of \$1 million.⁷⁵⁸

Monitoring visits took place in Nimroz, Uruzgan, and Wardak Provinces during April and May 2019. The team confirmed that recommendations from the previous monitoring mission were implemented.⁷⁵⁹ To address the impact of the 2017–2018 drought, and protect against future ones, the project is promoting crops requiring low water in Jowzjan, Samangan, and Takhar Provinces. These drought-tolerant plants were harvested during the July–August 2019 season. The project also provided water conservation training in Helmand and Uruzgan Provinces, and established irrigation structures in Nimroz Province, as well as canals and dams in the provinces of Paktika, Takhar, and Jowzjan.⁷⁶⁰

Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development

The Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development (CBARD) program works to improve household income while reducing dependency on illicit poppy cultivation, for selected communities in 12 high-poppy-cultivating districts in Badghis, Farah, and Nangarhar Provinces. Projects aim to develop and strengthen community-based agribusiness infrastructure, such as irrigation, transportation, and storage facilities. CBARD is funded by the State Department and implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).⁷⁶¹

COUNTERNARCOTICS

Though security remains a challenge in areas targeted by both CBARD projects, all beneficiaries have signed commitments not to grow poppy and CBARD farmers are gaining access to regional markets and implementing projects in some of the most challenging areas of the country.⁷⁶² INL informed SIGAR this quarter that the preliminary analysis for CBARD's mid-term evaluation suggests that the project is succeeding, as "there has been a (larger) reduction on opium poppy cultivation in the villages receiving INL funded project interventions ("treatment" villages) compared to the villages not receiving the interventions ("control" villages)."⁷⁶³ INL is amending its alternative development projects and extending CBARD until April 2022 with no budget increase.⁷⁶⁴ However, SIGAR's lessons-learned report on counternarcotics found that interventions such as CBARD to reduce poppy cultivation with conditionality agreements failed to have a lasting impact on poppy cultivation.⁷⁶⁵ Information about the CBARD projects is available in Table 3.31.

Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development-East

TABLE 3.31

COMMUNITY-BASED AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Implementing Partner	Total Cost
CBARD-East	11/2017	12/2020	UNDP	\$22,128,683
CBARD-West	11/2016	4/2020	UNDP	24,368,607
TOTAL				\$46,497,290

Note: All funds have been disbursed.

Source: INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/13/2017; State, INL, Letter of Agreement with UNDP, 11/09/2017; State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/20/2019.

The \$22 million, State Department-funded Community-based Agriculture and Rural Development-East (CBARD-E) project strengthens community-based local production and marketing of high-value crops in 100 communities in Nangarhar Province. CBARD-E will assess alternative livelihoods to opium cultivation in communities and expects to directly benefit approximately 28,500 households (199,500 individuals). In addition to building capacity in these communities, State said CBARD-E strengthens public and private agribusiness infrastructures such as value-chain facilities, irrigation, and transportation.⁷⁶⁶

From April to June 2019, 345 farmers were trained on post-harvest techniques, and equipment was distributed for cultivation and processing of vegetables into pickles, jams, and other products enabling participating households to earn an average of AFN 10,000 (\$130) per month in extra income.⁷⁶⁷ CBARD-E also completed construction on 170 new commercial greenhouses expected to earn farmers an average of AFN 758,250

(\$9,847) annually beginning the second year. Since January 2019, vegetables grown in these greenhouses have earned farmers a total income of AFN 841,736 (\$10,931).⁷⁶⁸

Community Based Agriculture and Rural Development-West

The State-Department-funded \$24 million Community Based Agriculture and Rural Development-West (CBARD-W) project strengthens community-based local production and marketing of high-value crops in 63 communities in Farah and Badghis Provinces. CBARD-W will assess alternative livelihoods as alternatives to opium cultivation in communities and directly benefit approximately 33,240 households (232,680 individuals). In addition to building capacity in treatment communities, State said CBARD-W strengthens public and private agribusiness infrastructures such as value-chain facilities, irrigation, and transportation.⁷⁶⁹

The CBARD-W project also completed a mid-term evaluation in 2019, which prompted changes in implementation approaches, project activities, and scope. These updates are nearly finalized and awaiting approval by the State Department.⁷⁷⁰ The most significant changes are extending the CBARD program through April 2022 and substituting the “access to finance” component with “market linkages.”⁷⁷¹

Between April and June, CBARD-W completed construction of 33 commercial greenhouses, 27 **micro-greenhouses**, six raisin houses, and 10 cold storage units occupying a total of 11.79 ha (about 29 acres) of land. Farmers are expected to earn an average of AFN 758,250 (\$9,847) annually from the greenhouses beyond their second year. Since January 2019, vegetables grown in these greenhouses have earned farmers a total income of AFN 5,079,680 (\$65,970).⁷⁷²

Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program

USAID’s \$71.3 million Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program (CHAMP) works with leading Afghan processing and export firms to enhance the supply chain, marketing, and export promotion of Afghan fruits and nuts. CHAMP supports traders through its trade offices in India, the United Arab Emirates, and Kazakhstan to boost Afghan agricultural exports.⁷⁷³ In June, CHAMP hosted the “Made in Afghanistan: Nature’s Best” Exhibition in Mumbai, India. CHAMP coordinated the event in partnership with the MAIL, the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the USAID-funded Regional Agricultural Development Project East, Promoting Value Chains-West, and Afghanistan Value Chains-High Value Crops and Afghanistan Value Chains-Livestock projects. The event resulted in over \$123 million in signed and potential deals for Afghan agribusinesses.⁷⁷⁴

Of the 11 performance indicators, CHAMP has met and exceeded all but the following four indicators during the third quarter of fiscal year 2019.⁷⁷⁵

Micro-greenhouses: 60-square-meter greenhouses given primarily to women for income diversification and production at the household level. They are often close to the homes to allow access for women to produce seedlings for commercial greenhouses.

Source: State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2019.

- Though the project did not meet its quarterly target of 1,209 households who have benefited by agriculture and alternative development in targeted areas, CHAMP exceeded the target by nearly 2,100 households in the first quarter of fiscal year 2019. The project met its 100 households target the previous quarter.
- The project failed to support any agriculture-related enterprises with interventions.
- For two consecutive quarters, the project failed to link any micro, small, and medium enterprises to large firms (the quarterly target is two firms).
- The project did not report results for the indicator “percentage of female participants in USG-assisted programs designed to increase access to economic resources (assets, credit, income, or employment).” The annual target for this indicator is 38% and the program reported an 11% target for the first fiscal quarter.

CHAMP exceeded its quarterly 2,330 MT target of agricultural commodities exports by nearly 400 MT (881,849 lbs). CHAMP reports that it consistently meets its exports target. The cumulative target for FY 2019 is 17,230 MT (nearly 38 million pounds) in agricultural exports and CHAMP has exported 23,101 MT (50.9 million lbs) as of June 30, 2019. CHAMP has been successful in promoting Afghan agricultural products and supporting their export to international markets.⁷⁷⁶ The project has also exceeded its target for job creation for the past three fiscal quarters: as of June 30, 2019, there were 910 full-time equivalent positions created, well above the FY 2019 annual target of 581 positions.⁷⁷⁷

According to USAID, the absence of business linkages between the small to medium and large firms stems from the lack of awareness of its importance, limited access to credit, and the absence of proper business development services. CHAMP has worked with these firms to fill the gap by facilitating business-to-business linkages between farmers, between small firms and large agribusinesses, and also linking large agribusinesses with international markets. The implementer provided trainings to agribusiness firms on business development services such as accounting, record keeping, and invoicing. USAID said all these efforts help the agribusinesses improve their business operations, expand linkages, and boost their sales. According to USAID, the trade offices in India, the United Arab Emirates, and Kazakhstan play a crucial role in connecting the large businesses with the international market.⁷⁷⁸

To address access to credit limitations, the program has linked firms with financial institutions and the Agriculture Development Fund (ADF). CHAMP has launched a short-term loan for exporters with the ADF called “Short-Term Wakala Financing.” (*Wakala* is a contract term used in Islamic

finance.) This product provides seasonal loans to exporters to expand their export sales.⁷⁷⁹

Afghanistan Value Chains Programs

The Afghanistan Value Chains programs cover the regions previously targeted by three now-inactive Regional Agricultural Development Programs (RADP).⁷⁸⁰ The objective of RADP, discussed on pages 176–177, was to help Afghan farmers achieve sustainable economic growth. RADP projects focused on strengthening farmers’ productivity in wheat, high-value crops, and livestock. Using a value-chain approach, these projects worked with farmers and agribusinesses to overcome obstacles hindering production, processing, sales, and overall development of agricultural value chains.⁷⁸¹ The Afghanistan Value Chains (AVC) programs similarly plan activities along high-value crops and livestock value chains.⁷⁸² Table 3.32, provides program value, duration, and expenditures to date.

Afghanistan Value Chains-High Value Crops

USAID’s \$33.5 million Afghanistan Value Chains-High Value Crops (AVC-HVC) is a three-year project with a two-year option to reverse market failures, strengthen linkages, spur growth and job creation for men, women, and youth along value chains for fruit, nuts, high-value horticulture, spices, and medicinal crops.⁷⁸³ The project targets “anchor firms”—which USAID defines as firms with the willingness and potential to create systemic change in their entire value-chain—and important value-chain service providers such as financial institutions, shipping and transport companies, and management consultant firms.⁷⁸⁴

During the third fiscal quarter, AVC-HVC established partnerships with 45 agribusiness firms. The project supported 12 companies (including five women-owned) to participate in two exhibitions: the China Nuts and Roasted Seeds Industry Exhibition and the Mumbai “Made in Afghanistan: Nature’s Best” Exhibition. According to USAID, this resulted in \$60.6 million worth of export contracts: \$29.5 million in potential deals with Chinese firms and \$31.2 million from the Mumbai trade mission. Of the total deals signed in Mumbai, \$17.8 million are confirmed.⁷⁸⁵ The project has met or exceeded some of its performance indicators but is failing on others.

TABLE 3.32

AFGHANISTAN VALUE-CHAINS (AVC) PROGRAM					
Project Title	Implementing Agency	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2019
Afghanistan Value Chain-Livestock (AVC-L)	USAID	6/9/2018	6/8/2021	\$55,672,170	\$8,429,409
Afghanistan Value Chain-High Value Crops (AVC-HVC)	USAID	8/2/2018	8/1/2023	54,958,860	6,441,571
Total				\$110,631,030	\$14,870,980

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.

For instance, the target for “facilitating investment advisory services for anchor firms” is \$7 million but only \$1.4 million had been recorded by July 30, 2019. AVC-HVC is coordinating with the ADF to expedite disbursements and requested an extension for this target, approved by USAID, to October 30, 2019.⁷⁸⁶

The project implementer reported that it has been unusually successful at integrating women and youth in project activities and exceeded its FY 2019 target. The project has achieved 25.5% female participation in its programs, above the FY 2019 target of 20%.⁷⁸⁷ During the April to June period, 106 women participated in several business-to-business events resulting in linkages among women-owned anchor firms, women producers, and other businesses.⁷⁸⁸ Women-owned companies that participated in the Mumbai exhibition signed \$6.5 million in deals for fresh and dried fruit, and spices, of which \$1.9 million has been confirmed.⁷⁸⁹ Figure 3.45 shows the provinces where project activities are being implemented.

Afghanistan Value Chains–Livestock

USAID’s three-year, \$34.7 million Afghanistan Value Chains–Livestock (AVC-L) will work with anchor firms in the poultry, small ruminants, dairy products, and other livestock value chains.⁷⁹⁰ The AVC-L contract includes a two-year option that would bring its total five-year cost to \$55.7 million should USAID decide to exercise the option.⁷⁹¹

During the third FY 2019 quarter, AVC-L submitted 26 new **deal notes** with anchor firms to USAID. AVC-L facilitated the participation of four livestock anchor firms at international trade shows that secured more than \$3.4 million in direct sales and confirmed potential deals. AVC-L linked several livestock agribusinesses with financial institutions and referred loan applications of \$6.4 million to the ADF, out of which six loan applications valued at \$2.8 million were approved; a \$128,750 loan was disbursed to two anchor firms. Several livestock agribusinesses secured deals worth over \$51,000 for their honey and fresh milk products.⁷⁹²

USAID introduced quarterly outcome indicators in the program’s periodic performance reports out of concern the implementing partner might not achieve its targets (only annual targets were necessary). The implementer is seeking a time extension for meeting deliverables after discussions with USAID. According to the implementer, the difficult business-operating environment and credit access affect the timetable for achieving targets and increasing sales.⁷⁹³

Promoting Value Chains–Western Afghanistan

The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) implements USAID’s \$19 million Promoting Value Chains–Western Afghanistan (PVC-W) program.⁷⁹⁴ PVC-W aims to promote “inclusive growth” and create jobs in the


The **deal note** is a strategy co-designed with the anchor firm. It specifies activities and investments carried out by both parties: the project and anchor firm. Deal notes also outline the type of interventions and include a budget specific to the co-investment agreement.

Source: USAID, Afghanistan Value Chains–Livestock, Quarterly Performance Report, April–June 2019, 7/30/2019, p. 4.

COUNTERNARCOTICS

FIGURE 3.45

GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF USAID AFGHANISTAN VALUE CHAINS HIGH-VALUE CROPS PROGRAM



Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.

agriculture sector by strengthening the capabilities of producers and private enterprises in:⁷⁹⁵

- increasing wheat productivity
- improving production and productivity of high-value crops
- enhancing technology utilization in the livestock industry
- building institutional capacity at provincial and district levels

Of the 12 performance indicators, the project met or exceeded all three semiannual indicators for the period October 1, 2018, to March 31, 2019. For instance, 15 private agribusinesses fulfilled quality and hygiene standards certifications. Of the five quarterly indicators (quarterly period ending March 31, 2019), the project exceeded one indicator (109%) but not the

remaining four. Nonetheless, the project is close to meeting the quarterly target of full-time equivalent jobs created (84%).⁷⁹⁶

More information on PVC-W is available in SIGAR's July 30, 2019, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* on page 189.

Regional Agricultural Development Program

USAID's Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP), initiated in 2013 in the country's southern region, is intended to help Afghan farmers achieve more inclusive and sustainable economic growth. RADP projects have ended in the western, northern, and southern regions, but continue in the eastern region of Afghanistan. The remaining projects focus on strengthening farmers' productivity in wheat, high-value crops, and livestock. Using a value-chain approach, these projects work with farmers and agribusinesses to overcome obstacles hindering production, processing, sales, and overall development of agricultural value chains.⁷⁹⁷

As shown in Table 3.33, USAID funding for all RADP programs, targeting various regions of the country, amounts to approximately \$283.6 million and USAID has spent \$221.2 million as of October 8, 2019.⁷⁹⁸

Regional Agricultural Development Program—East

USAID's five-year, \$28.1 million RADP-East program seeks to expand sustainable economic growth through the agriculture sector in eight provinces: Ghazni, Kapisa, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Parwan, Wardak, and Kabul. Its goal is to increase the sale of agricultural goods by at least \$57 million by the end of the program in July 2021.⁷⁹⁹

During the third fiscal quarter, RADP-East exceeded quarterly targets in 17 indicator results. The implementer reported nearly 18,200 households with an estimated 140,000 members benefiting from project interventions; the project affected 746,000 Afghans living mainly in rural areas.⁸⁰⁰ RADP-East also managed a portfolio of 32 active grants, having launched 15 new grants during the quarter. As of June 30, 2019, RADP-East has awarded 61 grants since the beginning of the project with a combined value of nearly \$3 million: 25 grants have been completed and 36 are either active or about to start.⁸⁰¹

During the quarter, RADP-East also designed and hosted nine business-to-farmer and six business-to-business events linking suppliers, farmers, and food processors, resulting in 111 signed contracts valued at \$300,000.⁸⁰² According to the implementer, uncertainty about the outcome of the Afghan peace process and continuing violence are having a negative impact on the country's business climate. Businesses become more risk-averse and favor savings over expansion plans. Project partners and beneficiaries perceive long-term planning and investments, particularly in rural areas, as precarious without any guarantee of stability or continuity.⁸⁰³

COUNTERNARCOTICS

TABLE 3.33

USAID REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (RADP)				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 10/8/2019
RADP-South*	10/7/2013	11/20/2017	\$111,414,339	\$108,475,771
RADP-North*	5/21/2014	5/20/2019	78,429,714	72,107,745
RADP-West*	8/10/2014	10/25/2016	65,629,170	26,394,196
RADP-East	7/21/2016	7/20/2021	28,126,111	14,260,267
Total			\$283,599,335	\$221,237,979

Note: * Denotes concluded programs

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.

USAID informed SIGAR that it has no plans to make strategic adjustments in the event that the U.S.-Taliban or intra-Afghan peace talks affect the business climate. However, RADP-East has identified additional districts in the provinces where they work that could be included in the event of a change in the operating environment.⁸⁰⁴

4 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT



OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT CONTENTS

Photo on previous page

A security-forces member conducts a perimeter sweep at Kandahar Air Field, August 2019.
(U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Keifer Bowes)

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

SIGAR's enabling legislation requires it to keep the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully informed about problems relating to the administration of Afghanistan reconstruction programs, and to submit a report to Congress on SIGAR's oversight work and on the status of the U.S. reconstruction effort no later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal quarter. The statute also instructs SIGAR to include, to the extent possible, relevant matters from the end of the quarter up to the submission date of its report.

Each quarter, SIGAR requests updates from other agencies on completed and ongoing oversight activities. This section compiles these updates. Publicly available copies of completed reports are posted on the agencies' respective websites.

The descriptions appear as submitted, with minor changes to maintain consistency with other sections of this report: acronyms and abbreviations in place of full names; standardized capitalization, punctuation, and preferred spellings; and third-person instead of first-person construction.

These agencies perform oversight activities in Afghanistan and provide results to SIGAR:

- Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DOD OIG)
- Department of State Office of Inspector General (State OIG)
- Government Accountability Office (GAO)
- U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA)
- U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Table 4.1 lists seven oversight reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction that participating agencies completed this quarter. USAID OIG issued an additional seven financial audits this quarter.

TABLE 4.1

RECENTLY COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES, AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019			
Agency	Report Number	Date Issued	Report Title
DOD OIG	DODIG-2019-115	8/15/2019	Audit of the Planning for and Implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System
DOD OIG	DODIG-2019-110	8/8/2019	Evaluation of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators, Air Liaison Officers, and Afghan Air Targeting Officers
State OIG	AUD-MERO-19-40	9/20/2019	Audit of the Execution of Security-Related Construction Projects at U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan
State OIG	AUD-MERO-19-33	9/20/2019	Audit of Cost Management of Embassy Air in Afghanistan and Iraq
State OIG	AUD-MERO-19-37	8/22/2019	Audit of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations Commissioning of Diplomatic Housing at U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan
State OIG	ESP-19-04	7/26/2019	Evaluation of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Aegis Construction Contract at Camp Eggers
USAID OIG	FF1C0216	7/24/2019	Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's New Development Partnership

Source: DOD OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; State OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; GAO, response to SIGAR data call, 9/20/2019; USAID OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/17/2019; USAAA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019.

U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

During this quarter, DOD OIG released two reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

Audit of the Planning and Implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System

DOD OIG determined that the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) did not validate the accuracy of the personnel records for the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) personnel added to the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) and did not verify whether the contractor developed the system in accordance with contract requirements. As a result, CSTC-A paid \$26.2 million, as of December 2018, to the APPS software development contractor for a system that could not communicate directly with Afghan systems, required the same manually intensive human resource and payroll processes that the system was designed to streamline, and did not accomplish the stated objective of reducing the risk of inaccurate personnel records or fraudulent payments through the use of automated controls.

In addition, MOD and MOI were not using APPS to generate payroll data as of April 2019, even though CSTC-A officials stated that they would fund salaries based on APPS-generated payroll data when the system was designated fully operational for the MOD in July 2018 and MOI in November 2018. Furthermore, because APPS did not have an interface with the Afghan

biometric system and required manual input of the biometric identification number, there was no link between the two systems to validate the authenticity of the biometric number recorded in APPS. Therefore, DOD did not have definitive assurance that APPS personnel records were biometrically linked and DOD remained at risk of funding payroll for fraudulent personnel records.

Evaluation of U.S. Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators, Air Liaison Officers, and Afghan Air Targeting Officers

DOD OIG determined that the U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators (ATAC), air liaison officers, and air targeting officers did not fully meet operational objectives for the ATACs to provide independent air-to-ground integration support to Afghan ground forces with minimal casualties and fratricide.

Specifically, Train, Advise, Assist, Command-Air (TAAC-Air) did not meet its objective to develop ATACs capable of coordinating airdrop operations with Afghan Air Force pilots to resupply Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) ground units. This occurred because TAAC-Air ATAC advisors made a decision not to train ATACs on coordinating airdrops, although airdrop training was in the training curriculum. Additionally, TAAC-Air did not have a detailed training curriculum for Afghan air liaison officers. This occurred because TAAC-Air did not provide adequate oversight of the contracted advisors to verify that the contracted advisors developed a detailed curriculum for training Afghan air liaison officers. Furthermore, TAAC-Air and NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) advisors did not track the operational effectiveness of deployed ATACs and targeting officers. This occurred because TAAC-Air operations and intelligence sections collected operational data on Afghan Air Force airstrikes, but did not disseminate that data to TAAC-Air and NSOCC-A air-to-ground integration advisors. Furthermore, NSOCC-A did not have a plan with objectives and milestones to develop ATACs and targeting officers within Afghan Special Security Forces units.

The inability to coordinate airdrop operations increases the risk that ANDSF units operating in areas without airfields or helicopter-landing zones will not receive critical supplies. Additionally, the lack of a detailed training curriculum for air liaison officers increases the risk that the ANDSF will have unqualified air liaison officers, which could result in an increase in unsuccessful air-to-ground missions, as well as an increased risk of civilian casualties and fratricide. Further, without tracking operational effectiveness data, neither TAAC-Air nor NSOCC-A advisors could measure progress or adjust training and advising efforts to meet operational objectives.

U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General-Middle East Regional Operations

During this quarter, State OIG completed four reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

Audit of the Execution of Security-Related Construction Projects at U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan

State OIG conducted this audit to determine whether the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) had addressed previously identified limitations in executing security-related construction projects at Embassy Kabul. Building on reports issued earlier by State OIG and the Government Accountability Office, State OIG selected six security-related construction projects executed between 2013 and 2018, three managed by OBO and three managed by DS.

State OIG found that despite having taken steps to respond to the needs of high-threat posts, OBO continues to face challenges in expediting physical security projects in Kabul. Specifically, State OIG found that physical security projects managed by OBO faced long timelines caused by multiple levels of review and approval. State OIG found that the Regional Security Officer (RSO), acting under the authority of DS, has managed some security-related construction projects in Kabul, in part because of the need to complete physical security upgrades quickly. However, State OIG found that despite successes with relatively simple security projects, the RSO lacks construction expertise leading to some projects facing deficiencies. Moreover, State had not developed standardized designs for temporary physical security structures in conflict environments, contributing to long project timelines for some projects. Finally, State OIG found that the State Department has been inconsistent in its approach to planning for the development of the Embassy Kabul compound and surrounding properties since 2010. The need for a comprehensive master plan for the compound and surrounding properties is underscored by the significant cost, complexity, and size of a facility with major construction efforts on multiple properties occurring in a dynamic and dangerous environment.

State OIG made 13 recommendations intended to address the deficiencies identified in State's approach to executing physical security upgrades in Kabul. Six recommendations were directed to OBO, three to Embassy Kabul, two to DS, and two to the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services. On the basis of the responses received from Department of State bureaus and the embassy to which the recommendations were directed, State OIG considered five recommendations unresolved and eight recommendations resolved pending further action at the time the report was issued.

Audit of Cost Management of Embassy Air in Afghanistan and Iraq

The State Department's Embassy Air program was established in 2009 to provide aviation support to Embassies Kabul, Afghanistan, and Baghdad, Iraq. Since 2012 in Afghanistan and 2011 in Iraq, Embassy Air operations have been funded via the Aviation Working Capital Fund, which is overseen by the Aviation Governing Board. For FY 2019, the estimated costs of Embassy Air services totaled approximately \$321.7 million, almost \$170 million in Afghanistan and \$152 million in Iraq. State OIG conducted this audit to determine the extent to which Embassy Air services were managed to effectively support embassy operations.

State OIG found that despite having the authority to operate the Aviation Working Capital Fund on either a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis, the Aviation Governing Board incrementally increased Embassy Air ticket fees with the goal of covering a larger percentage of operational costs via ticket fee collections. The Aviation Governing Board's decision to raise prices caused ridership to decline. To avoid paying the higher prices, some passengers who were able to do so used other means of transportation such as military air or commercial aviation, causing Embassy Air services to become significantly underused. Moreover, the higher cost of ticket fees harmed embassy operations: some officials stated that their bureaus couldn't afford ticket fees and that, as a result, they were unable to conduct site visits of projects and programs under their purview. Finally, State OIG found that the frequency of Embassy Air flights and the number of aircraft in-country were not routinely adjusted to align with demand. Until this is done, State will continue to pay for significant costs associated with Embassy Air operations that are underused in addition to paying the costs associated with alternative modes of transportation.

State OIG made three recommendations to the Aviation Governing Board intended to help ensure ticket fees, flight schedules, and Embassy Air aviation assets in Afghanistan and Iraq are routinely reviewed and adjusted to provide effective support to embassy operations. The Under Secretary for Management, responding on behalf of the Aviation Governing Board, concurred with all three recommendations and State OIG considered all three recommendations resolved pending further action at the time the report was issued.

Audit of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations Commissioning of Diplomatic Housing at U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan

State OIG conducted this audit to determine whether (1) the Department's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) commissioning of Staff Diplomatic Apartments (SDA) buildings 2 and 3 was done in accordance with all applicable policies and procedures, (2) documentation associated

with the commissioning process was maintained in accordance with State requirements, and (3) Integrated System Tests for both buildings were conducted in accordance with State guidance.

State OIG found that OBO adhered to its policies and procedures in commissioning SDA-2 and SDA-3 because of the latitude it has in deciding when building can be declared substantially complete. This latitude allowed OBO to accede the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan's January 2019 request that OBO expedite occupancy because of security threats. As a result, substantial completion was declared and occupancy allowed even though commissioning of eight of 22 building systems was not complete. Occupying buildings before commissioning is complete increases the risk that deficiencies in building construction and system may not be identified before warranties expire. Regarding commissioning documentation, State OIG found that most, but not all, requirements were fulfilled; the contracting officer's representative acted outside of his authority and instructed the contractor that delivery of some documents was not required. Finally, State OIG found that Integrated System Tests, the purpose of which is to verify that building systems function reliably after a power outage, were not conducted for these buildings because the broader construction contract for Embassy Kabul was awarded in 2010, before OBO made such tests mandatory for all construction contracts starting in 2015.

State OIG made five recommendations to OBO to improve the commissioning process and to strengthen contract administration. OBO concurred with all five recommendations and State OIG considered all five recommendations resolved pending further action at the time the report was issued.

Evaluation of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Aegis Construction Contract at Camp Eggers, Afghanistan

In response to a referral from the Deputy Secretary of State, State OIG evaluated whether the Department complied with relevant guidelines for the construction project at Camp Eggers. Specifically, State OIG examined how Aegis Defense Services, LLC, was selected for the construction of Camp Eggers; why State continued using Aegis after noncompliance concerns were identified shortly after the project was awarded; and what State received after spending \$103.2 million on construction at Camp Eggers under this contract.

State Department construction projects are typically managed by the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), but in this instance, the project was awarded on September 30, 2014, using a task order to an existing security contract with Aegis managed by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). When the project began, DS estimated that the project would be completed by March 2016, but delays began almost immediately and persisted throughout. Although the Bureau of Administration's Office of Acquisitions Management (AQM) was responsible for administering the

contract, AQM failed to take meaningful corrective action against Aegis even as Aegis missed milestones and disregarded contract requirements. In January 2017, State terminated the project for convenience after very little work had been accomplished. State OIG found that concerns about urgency frequently dominate decision-making to the exclusion of other considerations and that State did not effectively use what leverage it had, leading to expenditures of \$103.2 million without any discernible benefit.

State OIG made three recommendations to State to ensure that the construction clause in the contract is used appropriately, to ensure remedies for inadequate contractor performance, and to review the decision to expend \$103.2 million on the Camp Eggers construction project. State did not concur with the first two recommendations but did agree with the third recommendation. At the time the report was issued, two recommendations were unresolved and one recommendation was considered resolved pending further action.

Government Accountability Office

GAO completed no reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction this quarter.

U.S. Army Audit Agency

The USAAA completed no audits related to Afghanistan reconstruction this quarter.

U.S. Agency for International Development Office of the Inspector General

USAID OIG issued one performance audit report and seven financial audit reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction this quarter.

Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's New Development Partnership

USAID OIG conducted this audit to determine if USAID/Afghanistan had adopted internal policies and procedures to adequately verify the achievement of New Development Partnership indicators contained in the July 25, 2015, NDP results framework. It further reviewed whether USAID/Afghanistan adequately verified the achievement of completed indicators under the New Development Partnership for any payments made to date.

ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

As of September 30, 2019, the participating agencies reported 15 ongoing oversight activities related to reconstruction in Afghanistan. These activities are listed in Table 4.2 and described in the following sections by agency.

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

TABLE 4.2

ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES, AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019			
Agency	Project Number	Date Initiated	Project Title
DOD OIG	D2019-DEV0PD-0192.000	8/26/2019	Evaluation of DOD Processes to Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices
DOD OIG	D2019-D000RJ-0175.000	6/24/2019	Audit of the Core Inventory Management System Implementation
DOD OIG	D2019-DISPA2-0051.000	2/6/2019	Evaluation of U.S. Central Command Kinetic Targeting Processes and Reporting Procedures
DOD OIG	D2019-D000RH-0082.000	1/22/2019	Audit of the Army Contracting Command-Afghanistan's Policies and Procedures for Contingency Contracting Risks
DOD OIG	D2019-DISPA5-0101.000	1/16/2019	Evaluation of Military Services Counterintelligence Workforce Capability Development
DOD OIG	D2019-DISPA5-0015.000	1/7/2019	Evaluation of Force Protection Screening, Vetting, and Biometric Operations in Afghanistan
DOD OIG	D2018-D000RG-0170.000	6/25/2018	Audit of the National Maintenance Strategy Contract in Afghanistan
State OIG	19AUD078	9/3/2019	Audit of the Approach Used to Adjust the Size and Composition of Missions Afghanistan and Iraq
State OIG	19AUD047	6/25/2019	Audit of Global Engagement Center's Execution of its Mandate to Coordinate Federal Government Efforts to Counter Disinformation and Propaganda Designed to Undermine the United States
GAO	103066	10/29/2018	Advise and Assist Mission in Afghanistan
GAO	103076	10/1/2018	Afghanistan Reconstruction Projects—Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
GAO	102793	6/18/2018	Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
USAAA	OIR0347/OFS0232	8/21/2018	Reach-Back Contracting Support and Expeditionary Contracting Material Weakness
USAID OIG	881F0119	9/30/2019	Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Risk Management and Project Prioritization
USAID OIG	8F1C0217	5/11/2016	Follow-Up Audit of USAID's Multi-Tiered Monitoring Strategy in Afghanistan

Source: DOD OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; State OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; GAO, response to SIGAR data call, 9/20/2019; USAID OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/17/2019; USAAA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019.

U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

DOD OIG has seven ongoing projects this quarter that relate to reconstruction or security operations in Afghanistan.

Evaluation of DOD Processes to Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices

The evaluation objectives are For Official Use Only.

Audit of the Core Inventory Management System Implementation

DOD OIG is determining whether DOD's implementation of the Core Inventory Management System improved weapons and vehicle accountability.

Evaluation of U.S. Central Command Kinetic Targeting Processes and Reporting Procedures

DOD OIG is evaluating CENTCOM's target development and prosecution processes, as well as post-strike collateral damage and civilian casualty assessment activities.

Audit of the Army Contracting Command-Afghanistan's Policies and Procedures for Contingency Contracting Risks

DOD OIG is determining whether the Army Contracting Command-Afghanistan's award and administration of contracts mitigate contingency contracting risks, such as nonperformance and improper payments specific to Afghanistan.

Evaluation of DOD Counterintelligence Workforce Capability Development

The objectives for this evaluation are marked For Official Use Only.

Evaluation of Operation Freedom's Sentinel Screening, Vetting, and Biometric Operations in Afghanistan

DOD OIG is determining whether U.S. Forces-Afghanistan have developed and implemented screening, vetting, and biometric processes for force protection in Afghanistan.

Audit of the National Maintenance Strategy Contract in Afghanistan

DOD OIG is determining if the Army developed the National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Systems contract requirements to meet user needs to maintain and sustain the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces' vehicles.

U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General-Middle East Regional Operations

State OIG has two ongoing projects this quarter related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

Audit of the Approach Used to Adjust the Size and Composition of Missions Afghanistan and Iraq

The audit will examine the procedures used by the State Department in adjusting the size and compositions of U.S. embassies in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Audit of Global Engagement Center's Execution of its Mandate to Coordinate Federal Government Efforts to Counter Disinformation and Propaganda Designed to Undermine the United States

This is an audit of the Global Engagement Center's execution of its mission to coordinate U.S. government efforts to counter disinformation and propaganda against the United States in a number of countries, including Afghanistan.

Government Accountability Office

GAO has three ongoing projects this quarter related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

Advise and Assist Mission in Afghanistan

In August 2017, the President announced a new South Asia strategy that was accompanied by an increase of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops in Afghanistan to support renewed efforts to advise and assist Afghan forces in the NATO Resolute Support Mission. As part of the increase, the U.S. Army deployed a Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB), a new unit created in October 2016 to advise and assist foreign military forces, including the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Development of ANDSF has been a central element of successive U.S. strategies in Afghanistan.

GAO will review the extent to which DOD, in conjunction with NATO, has defined advisor team missions, goals, and objectives, and the extent to which advisors were trained and equipped for their specific missions in Afghanistan. GAO will also review the ability of the Army's Security Force Assistance Brigade to meet current and future advisor requirements in Afghanistan and elsewhere; what adjustments, if any, are being made to the manning, training and equipping, and deployment of the second and third SFABs; and any other issues the Comptroller General determines appropriate with respect to the advise and assist mission in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Reconstruction Projects – Waste, Fraud, and Abuse

The U.S. government has funded numerous reconstruction projects in Afghanistan since September 2001. Costs for U.S. military, diplomatic, and reconstruction and relief operations have exceeded \$500 billion, and GAO has issued about 90 reports focused in whole or in part on Afghanistan since that time. GAO received a request to review past work assessing reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and identify the dollar value of any waste, fraud, or abuse uncovered during the course of those reviews.

GAO will review prior work conducted on reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan that identified waste, fraud, and abuse, and will assess the

overall dollar amount of waste, fraud, and abuse uncovered through these efforts.

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) was created for DOD to provide assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan to include the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation and construction, and funding. The Senate Appropriations Committee has expressed concerns about the costs of training contracts awarded under ASFF, citing recent reports from both SIGAR and other auditing agencies that found deficiencies that resulted in tens of millions of dollars potentially lost to fraud, waste, and abuse.

GAO will review DOD's ASFF Training Contracts to include researchable questions on the budgets, funding sources, and transactions for all ASFF Training Contracts during FY 2017–2019 and the extent to which DOD has processes and procedures to ensure that ASFF training contracts' pricing and costs are reasonable.

U.S. Army Audit Agency

This quarter the USAAA has one ongoing report related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

Reach-Back Contracting Support and Expeditionary Contracting Material Weakness

The USAAA is currently working on preparing a draft report addressing reach-back support related to expeditionary contracting within the U.S. Army's Expedition Contracting Command (ECC).

The objectives of this audit are to determine whether the Army has an effective plan, procedures, and organizational structure in place to directly provide contracting support during contingency/expeditionary operations. No work on this audit was done in Afghanistan, but the results could have an impact because ECC provides reach-back support related to contracting in Afghanistan.

U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General

This quarter, USAID OIG has two ongoing reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Risk Management and Project Prioritization

The objectives of this audit are to determine to what extent USAID/Afghanistan has a risk-management process in place to identify and mitigate risks in the face of potential staff and program reductions that could impact

its development programs; how programs recommended for reduction or elimination were determined; and what impact recommended changes would have on USAID/Afghanistan's current and future programs and related risk management.

Follow-Up Audit of USAID's Multi-Tiered Monitoring Strategy in Afghanistan

The objectives of this audit are to determine the extent to which USAID has used its multi-tiered monitoring strategy in Afghanistan to manage projects and to serve as the basis for informed decision-making. The entrance conference was held August 9, 2017.

APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES CONTENTS

Appendix A	194
Appendix B	200
Appendix C	202
Appendix D	207
Appendix E	214
Appendix F	218
Endnotes	225

The Official Seal of SIGAR

The official seal of SIGAR represents the coordination of efforts between the United States and Afghanistan to provide accountability and oversight of reconstruction activities. The phrases in Dari (top) and Pashto (bottom) on the seal are translations of SIGAR's name.

APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES



APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

CROSS-REFERENCE OF REPORT TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

This appendix cross-references the sections of this report to the quarterly reporting and related requirements under SIGAR's enabling legislation, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1229 (Table A.1), and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, §1521. (Table A.2)

TABLE A.1

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229			
Public Law Section	SIGAR Enabling Language	SIGAR Action	Report Section
Purpose			
Section 1229(a)(3)	To provide for an independent and objective means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for and progress on corrective action	Ongoing; quarterly report	Full report
Supervision			
Section 1229(e)(1)	The Inspector General shall report directly to, and be under the general supervision of, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense	Report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense	Full report
Duties			
Section 1229(f)(1)	OVERSIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION – It shall be the duty of the Inspector General to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the treatment, handling, and expenditure of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and of the programs, operations, and contracts carried out utilizing such funds, including subsections (A) through (G) below	Review appropriated/ available funds Review programs, operations, contracts using appropriated/ available funds	Full report
Section 1229(f)(1)(A)	The oversight and accounting of the obligation and expenditure of such funds	Review obligations and expenditures of appropriated/ available funds	SIGAR Oversight Funding
Section 1229(f)(1)(B)	The monitoring and review of reconstruction activities funded by such funds	Review reconstruction activities funded by appropriations and donations	SIGAR Oversight
Section 1229(f)(1)(C)	The monitoring and review of contracts funded by such funds	Review contracts using appropriated and available funds	Note
Section 1229(f)(1)(D)	The monitoring and review of the transfer of such funds and associated information between and among departments, agencies, and entities of the United States, and private and nongovernmental entities	Review internal and external transfers of appropriated/ available funds	Appendix B
Section 1229(f)(1)(E)	The maintenance of records on the use of such funds to facilitate future audits and investigations of the use of such fund[s]	Maintain audit records	SIGAR Oversight Appendix C Appendix E

Continued on the next page

APPENDICES

TABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229			
Public Law Section	SIGAR Enabling Language	SIGAR Action	Report Section
Section 1229(f)(1)(F)	The monitoring and review of the effectiveness of United States coordination with the Governments of Afghanistan and other donor countries in the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy	Monitoring and review as described	Audits
Section 1229(f)(1)(G)	The investigation of overpayments such as duplicate payments or duplicate billing and any potential unethical or illegal actions of Federal employees, contractors, or affiliated entities, and the referral of such reports, as necessary, to the Department of Justice to ensure further investigations, prosecutions, recovery of further funds, or other remedies	Conduct and reporting of investigations as described	Investigations
Section 1229(f)(2)	OTHER DUTIES RELATED TO OVERSIGHT – The Inspector General shall establish, maintain, and oversee such systems, procedures, and controls as the Inspector General considers appropriate to discharge the duties under paragraph (1)	Establish, maintain, and oversee systems, procedures, and controls	Full report
Section 1229(f)(3)	DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978 – In addition, ... the Inspector General shall also have the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978	Duties as specified in Inspector General Act	Full report
Section 1229(f)(4)	COORDINATION OF EFFORTS – The Inspector General shall coordinate with, and receive the cooperation of, each of the following: (A) the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, (B) the Inspector General of the Department of State, and (C) the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development	Coordination with the inspectors general of DOD, State, and USAID	Other Agency Oversight
Federal Support and Other Resources			
Section 1229(h)(5)(A)	ASSISTANCE FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES – Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance from any department, agency, or other entity of the Federal Government, the head of such entity shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing law, furnish such information or assistance to the Inspector General, or an authorized designee	Expect support as requested	Full report
Section 1229(h)(5)(B)	REPORTING OF REFUSED ASSISTANCE – Whenever information or assistance requested by the Inspector General is, in the judgment of the Inspector General, unreasonably refused or not provided, the Inspector General shall report the circumstances to the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, and to the appropriate congressional committees without delay	Monitor cooperation	N/A

APPENDICES

TABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229			
Public Law Section	SIGAR Enabling Language	SIGAR Action	Report Section
Reports			
Section 1229(i)(1)	QUARTERLY REPORTS – Not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal-year quarter, the Inspector General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report summarizing, for the period of that quarter and, to the extent possible, the period from the end of such quarter to the time of the submission of the report, the activities during such period of the Inspector General and the activities under programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Each report shall include, for the period covered by such report, a detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Afghanistan, including the following –	Report – 30 days after the end of each calendar quarter Summarize activities of the Inspector General Detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures, and revenues	Full report Appendix B
Section 1229(i)(1)(A)	Obligations and expenditures of appropriated/donated funds	Obligations and expenditures of appropriated/donated funds	Appendix B
Section 1229(i)(1)(B)	A project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of the costs incurred to date for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, together with the estimate of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development, as applicable, of the costs to complete each project and each program	Project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of costs. List unexpended funds for each project or program	Funding Note
Section 1229(i)(1)(C)	Revenues attributable to or consisting of funds provided by foreign nations or international organizations to programs and projects funded by any department or agency of the United States Government, and any obligations or expenditures of such revenues	Revenues, obligations, and expenditures of donor funds	Funding
Section 1229(i)(1)(D)	Revenues attributable to or consisting of foreign assets seized or frozen that contribute to programs and projects funded by any U.S. government department or agency, and any obligations or expenditures of such revenues	Revenues, obligations, and expenditures of funds from seized or frozen assets	Funding
Section 1229(i)(1)(E)	Operating expenses of agencies or entities receiving amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan	Operating expenses of agencies or any organization receiving appropriated funds	Funding Appendix B
Section 1229(i)(1)(F)	In the case of any contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism described in paragraph (2)*– (i) The amount of the contract or other funding mechanism; (ii) A brief discussion of the scope of the contract or other funding mechanism; (iii) A discussion of how the department or agency of the United States Government involved in the contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism identified and solicited offers from potential contractors to perform the contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism, together with a list of the potential individuals or entities that were issued solicitations for the offers; and (iv) The justification and approval documents on which was based the determination to use procedures other than procedures that provide for full and open competition	Describe contract details	Note

Continued on the next page

APPENDICES

TABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229			
Public Law Section	SIGAR Enabling Language	SIGAR Action	Report Section
Section 1229(i)(3)	PUBLIC AVAILABILITY – The Inspector General shall publish on a publicly available Internet website each report under paragraph (1) of this subsection in English and other languages that the Inspector General determines are widely used and understood in Afghanistan	Publish report as directed at www.sigar.mil Dari and Pashto translation in process	Full report
Section 1229(i)(4)	FORM – Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if the Inspector General considers it necessary	Publish report as directed	Full report
Section 1229(j)(1)	Inspector General shall also submit each report required under subsection (i) to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense	Submit quarterly report	Full report

Note: Although this data is normally made available on SIGAR's website (www.sigar.mil), the data SIGAR has received is in relatively raw form and is currently being reviewed, analyzed, and organized for future SIGAR use and publication.

* Covered "contracts, grants, agreements, and funding mechanisms" are defined in paragraph (2) of Section 1229(i) of Pub. L. No. 110-181 as being—
"any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism that is entered into by any department or agency of the United States Government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan with any public or private sector entity for any of the following purposes:
To build or rebuild physical infrastructure of Afghanistan.
To establish or reestablish a political or societal institution of Afghanistan.
To provide products or services to the people of Afghanistan."

TABLE A.2

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 115-91, § 1521			
Public Law Section	NDA Language	SIGAR Action	Report Section
Section 1521(e)(1)	(1) QUALITY STANDARDS FOR IG PRODUCTS—Except as provided in paragraph (3), each product published or issued by an Inspector General relating to the oversight of programs and activities funded under the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund shall be prepared— (A) in accordance with the Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards/Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS/GAS), as issued and updated by the Government Accountability Office; or (B) if not prepared in accordance with the standards referred to in subparagraph (A), in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (commonly referred to as the "CIGIE Blue Book")	Prepare quarterly report in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), commonly referred to as the "CIGIE Blue Book," for activities funded under the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund	Section 1 Reconstruction Update (Section 3)
Section 1521(e)(2)	(2) SPECIFICATION OF QUALITY STANDARDS FOLLOWED— Each product published or issued by an Inspector General relating to the oversight of programs and activities funded under the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund shall cite within such product the quality standards followed in conducting and reporting the work concerned	Cite within the quarterly report the quality standards followed in conducting and reporting the work concerned. The required quality standards are quality control, planning, data collection and analysis, evidence, records maintenance, reporting, and follow-up	Inside front cover Appendix A

APPENDICES

APPENDIX B

U.S. FUNDS FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Table B.1 lists funds appropriated for Afghanistan reconstruction by agency and fund per year, and Table B.2 lists funds appropriated for counternarcotics initiatives, as of September 30, 2019.

TABLE B.2

COUNTERNARCOTICS (\$ MILLIONS)	
Fund	Cumulative Appropriations Since FY 2002
ASFF	\$1,311.92
DICDA	3,260.64
ESF	1,456.49
DA	77.72
INCLE	2,356.86
DEA ^a	476.66
Total	\$8,940.29

Table B.2 Note: Numbers have been rounded. Counternarcotics funds cross-cut both the Security and Governance & Development spending categories; these funds are also captured in those categories in Table B.1. Figures represent cumulative amounts committed to counternarcotics initiatives in Afghanistan since 2002. Initiatives include eradication, interdiction, support to Afghanistan's Special Mission Wing (SMW), counternarcotics-related capacity building, and alternative agricultural development efforts. ESF, DA, and INCLE figures show the cumulative amounts committed for counternarcotics initiatives from those funds. SIGAR excluded ASFF funding for the SMW after FY 2013 from this analysis due to the decreasing number of counternarcotics missions conducted by the SMW.

^a DEA receives funding from State's Diplomatic & Consular Programs account in addition to DEA's direct line appropriation listed in Appendix B.

Table B.2 Source: SIGAR analysis of counternarcotics funding, 10/19/2019; State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/10/2019; DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2019; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019; DEA, response to SIGAR data call, 10/7/2019.

Note: Numbers have been rounded. DOD reprogrammed \$1 billion from FY 2011 ASFF, \$1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF, \$178 million from FY 2013 ASFF, and \$604 million from FY 2019 ASFF to fund other DOD requirements. DOD reprogrammed \$230 million into FY 2015 ASFF. ASFF data reflects the following rescissions: \$1 billion from FY 2012 in Pub. L. No. 113-6, \$764.38 million from FY 2014 in Pub. L. No. 113-235, \$400 million from FY 2015 in Pub. L. No. 114-113, and \$150 million from FY 2016 in Pub. L. No. 115-31. DOD transferred \$101 million from FY 2011 AIF, \$179.5 million from FY 2013 AIF, and \$55 million from FY 2014 AIF to the ESF to fund infrastructure projects implemented by USAID.

Source: DOD, responses to SIGAR data calls, 10/18/2019, 10/17/2019, 10/9/2019, 10/12/2017, 10/22/2012, 10/14/2009, and 10/1/2009; State, responses to SIGAR data calls, 10/16/2019, 10/10/2019, 10/5/2018, 1/10/2018, 10/13/2017, 10/11/2017, 5/4/2016, 10/20/2015, 4/15/2015, 4/15/2014, 6/27/2013, 10/5/2012 and 6/27/2012; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2017; OMB, responses to SIGAR data calls, 4/16/2015, 7/14/2014, 7/19/2013 and 1/4/2013; USAID, responses to SIGAR data calls, 10/17/2019, 10/16/2019, 10/8/2018, 10/15/2010, 1/15/2010, and 10/9/2009; DOJ, response to SIGAR data call, 10/7/2019, 6/30/2017 and 7/7/2009; OPIC, response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2019; USAGM, response to SIGAR data call, 9/11/2019; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/2009; DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019," 10/18/2019; OSD Comptroller, 16-22 PA: Omnibus 2016 Prior Approval Request, 6/30/2016; Pub. L. Nos. 115-31, 114-113, 113-235, 113-76, 113-6, 112-74, 112-10, 111-212, 111-118.

TABLE B.1

U.S. FUNDS FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION (\$ MILLIONS)			
U.S. Funding Sources	Agency	Total	FY 2002-07
Security			
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)	DOD	\$77,148.18	10,309.53
Train & Equip (DOD)	DOD	440.00	440.00
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	State	1,059.14	1,059.14
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	State	18.33	4.35
Voluntary Peacekeeping (PKO)	State	69.33	69.33
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA)	DOD	550.00	550.00
Drug Interdiction & Counter-Drug Activities (DICDA)	DOD	3,260.64	695.36
Total - Security		82,545.61	13,127.71
Governance & Development			
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)	DOD	3,704.00	600.00
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)	DOD	988.50	0.00
Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO)	DOD	822.85	0.00
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	USAID	20,499.44	4,229.19
Development Assistance (DA)	USAID	886.50	735.07
Child Survival & Health (CSH + GHAI)	USAID	554.63	270.82
Commodity Credit Corp (CCC)	USAID	34.95	8.80
USAID (Other)	USAID	53.73	5.50
Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related (NADR)	State	804.54	258.69
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	State	5,254.53	1,473.67
Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF)	State	12.29	0.71
U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM)	USAGM	256.50	0.00
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)	OPIC	320.39	179.72
Treasury Technical Assistance (TTA)	Treasury	4.65	3.23
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)	DOJ	267.25	67.97
Total - Governance & Development		34,464.74	7,833.39
Humanitarian			
P.L. 480 Title II	USAID	1,095.68	436.65
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	USAID	973.83	298.30
Transition Initiatives (TI)	USAID	37.54	32.58
Migration & Refugee Assistance (MRA)	State	1,424.65	408.80
Emergency Refugee & Migration Assistance (ERMA)	State	25.20	25.00
USDA Programs (Title I, §416(b), FFP, FFE, ET, PRTA)	USDA	288.26	227.52
Total - Humanitarian		3,845.16	1,428.85
Civilian Operations			
Oversight		592.12	2.50
Other		11,106.43	866.42
Total - Civilian Operations		11,698.55	868.92
TOTAL FUNDING		\$132,554.07	23,258.87

APPENDICES

	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019
	2,750.00	5,606.94	9,166.77	10,619.28	9,200.00	4,946.19	3,962.34	3,939.33	3,502.26	4,162.72	4,666.82	4,316.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	1.66	1.40	1.76	1.56	1.18	1.42	1.50	1.05	0.86	0.80	0.80	0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	192.81	230.06	392.27	379.83	472.99	255.81	238.96	0.00	138.76	135.61	118.01	10.18
	2,944.47	5,838.40	9,560.80	11,000.67	9,674.16	5,203.43	4,202.80	3,940.38	3,641.88	4,299.12	4,785.62	4,326.18
	488.33	550.67	1,000.00	400.00	400.00	200.00	30.00	10.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	10.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	299.00	400.00	145.50	144.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.00	14.44	59.26	239.24	245.76	138.20	122.24	3.72	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	1,399.51	2,077.48	3,346.00	2,168.51	1,836.76	1,802.65	907.00	831.90	633.27	767.17	500.00	0.00
	149.43	0.40	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.35	0.00	0.95	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	63.04	58.23	92.30	69.91	0.00	0.25	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	10.77	4.22	4.22	3.09	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.95	1.52	0.00
	21.96	2.81	3.45	6.25	7.10	1.84	0.80	0.82	2.91	0.29	0.00	0.00
	29.72	59.92	70.74	69.30	65.32	52.60	43.20	43.50	37.96	37.00	36.60	0.00
	307.56	493.90	589.00	400.00	357.92	593.81	225.00	250.00	210.00	184.50	160.00	9.17
	1.30	1.18	1.29	0.60	1.98	1.63	0.10	0.99	0.76	0.75	1.00	0.00
	0.00	15.50	27.40	24.40	21.50	21.50	22.10	22.70	23.90	25.90	25.70	25.90
	18.48	6.85	60.25	40.25	3.00	0.00	10.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.85	0.00
	0.75	0.47	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	40.59	18.88	19.20	18.70	18.70	17.00	18.70	9.05	3.31	11.03	11.11	13.01
	2,531.43	3,304.95	5,273.40	3,739.24	3,358.41	2,975.52	1,523.16	1,173.68	917.10	1,033.60	742.78	58.08
	154.73	73.01	58.13	112.55	59.20	46.15	65.97	53.73	26.65	4.69	4.22	0.00
	16.84	27.13	29.61	66.23	56.00	21.50	28.13	24.50	39.78	93.84	119.64	152.35
	0.00	0.75	0.84	1.08	0.62	0.32	0.82	0.49	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00
	44.25	76.79	80.93	65.00	99.56	76.07	107.89	129.27	84.27	89.24	77.19	85.40
	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	42.95	17.79	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	258.77	195.67	169.51	244.85	215.38	144.04	202.82	207.99	150.74	187.76	201.05	237.75
	14.30	25.20	34.40	37.20	59.00	58.70	62.65	68.60	62.37	55.74	55.67	55.81
	435.51	1,052.76	1,747.00	893.50	1,407.02	1,260.44	838.45	888.60	795.20	781.75	77.52	62.26
	449.81	1,077.96	1,781.40	930.70	1,466.02	1,319.14	901.10	957.20	857.56	837.49	133.19	118.06
	6,184.47	10,416.98	16,785.10	15,915.46	14,713.97	9,642.14	6,829.87	6,279.25	5,567.28	6,357.97	5,862.64	4,740.07

APPENDICES

APPENDIX C

SIGAR WRITTEN PRODUCTS*

SIGAR Audits

Completed Performance Audit Reports

SIGAR completed two performance audit reports during this reporting period.

COMPLETED SIGAR PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORTS

Report Identifier	Report Title	Date Issued
SIGAR 19-57-AR	USAID's Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project: The Project is Behind Schedule, and Questions Remain about the Afghan Government's Ability to Use and Maintain the New Power Infrastructure	9/2019
SIGAR 19-60-AR	USACE's Local National Quality Assurance Program: USACE Used Qualified Personnel to Monitor Construction in Afghanistan and Is Taking Steps to Improve Contractor Reporting	9/2019

New Performance Audits

SIGAR initiated four new performance audits during this reporting period.

NEW SIGAR PERFORMANCE AUDITS

Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Initiated
SIGAR 137A	ANA Trust Fund	10/2019
SIGAR 136A	DOD's End Use Monitoring	9/2019
SIGAR 135A	U.S. Investments in Afghan Energy	9/2019
SIGAR 134A	DOD Women's Infrastructure Projects	9/2019

Ongoing Performance Audits

SIGAR had eight ongoing performance audits during this reporting period.

ONGOING SIGAR PERFORMANCE AUDITS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019

Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Initiated
SIGAR 133A	Building a Professional AAF and SMW	5/2019
SIGAR 132A-2	Counternarcotics/Counter Threat Finance (Full Report)	2/2019
SIGAR 132A-1	Counternarcotics/Counter Threat Finance (Letter Response to Drug Caucus)	2/2019
SIGAR 131A	American University of Afghanistan	9/2018
SIGAR 130A	Anticorruption Strategy Update	8/2018
SIGAR 127A	ANA ScanEagle	8/2018
SIGAR 125A	USAID Food Assistance	7/2018
SIGAR 124A	Business Taxes	4/2018

* As provided in its authorizing statute, SIGAR may also report on products and events occurring after September 30, 2019, up to the publication date of this report.

Completed Financial Audit Reports

SIGAR completed six financial audit reports during this reporting period.

COMPLETED SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS

Report Identifier	Report Title	Date Issued
SIGAR 19-52-FA	USAID's Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems Program In Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred by Management Sciences for Health Inc.	8/2019
SIGAR 19-54-FA	Department of State's Support of the Afghanistan Legal Education Project: Audit of Costs Incurred by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University	8/2019
SIGAR 19-56-FA	USAID's Support of the Grain Research and Innovation Project in Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred by Michigan State University	8/2019
SIGAR 20-01-FA	USAID's Afghanistan Workforce Development Program: Audit of Costs Incurred by Creative Associates International Inc.	10/2019
SIGAR 20-02-FA	USAID's Afghan Ministry of Women's Affairs Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment Program: Audit of Costs Incurred by The Asia Foundation	10/2019
SIGAR 20-04-FA	Department of State's Demining and Munitions Clearance Projects in Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred by the Demining Agency for Afghanistan	10/2019

New Financial Audits

SIGAR initiated eight new financial audits during this reporting period.

NEW SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS

Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Initiated
SIGAR-F-190	International Rescue Committee Inc.	9/2019
SIGAR-F-189	Save the Children Federation Inc.	9/2019
SIGAR-F-188	Associates in Rural Development	9/2019
SIGAR-F-187	Blumont Global Development Inc.	9/2019
SIGAR-F-186	Roots of Peace	9/2019
SIGAR-F-185	Counterpart International Inc.	9/2019
SIGAR-F-184	Development Alternatives Inc.	9/2019
SIGAR-F-183	Tetra Tech ARD	9/2019

Ongoing Financial Audits

SIGAR had 32 financial audits in progress during this reporting period.

ONGOING SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019

Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Initiated
SIGAR-F-182	Raytheon Technical Services Company LLC	5/2019
SIGAR-F-181	Support Systems Associates Inc.	5/2019
SIGAR-F-180	AAR Government Services Inc.	5/2019
SIGAR-F-179	Science and Engineering Services LLC	5/2019
SIGAR-F-178	Redstone Defense Systems	5/2019
SIGAR-F-177	Janus Global Operations	5/2019
SIGAR-F-176	TigerSwan LLC	5/2019
SIGAR-F-175	University of Washington	5/2019
SIGAR-F-174	ABT Associates Inc.-SHOPS Plus	3/2019

Continued on the next page

APPENDICES

ONGOING SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019 (CONTINUED)

Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Initiated
SIGAR-F-173	Futures Group International LLC–Health Sector Resiliency (HSR)	3/2019
SIGAR-F-172	Checchi and Company Consulting Inc. (CCCI)–Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency (ADALAT)	3/2019
SIGAR-F-171	Creative Associates International–Afghan Children Read (ACR)	3/2019
SIGAR-F-170	Ideal Innovations Incorporated–Afghanistan Automated Biometric Identification System (AABIS)	10/2018
SIGAR-F-169	CH2M HILL Inc.–Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP)	10/2018
SIGAR-F-168	Alutiq Professional Training LLC–Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA)	10/2018
SIGAR-F-167	The Colombo Plan–Drug Demand Reduction Project	10/2018
SIGAR-F-166	Mercy Corps–Introducing New Vocational Educational Skills Training (INVEST 3)	10/2018
SIGAR-F-165	HALO Trust–Weapons Removal and Mine Clearing	10/2018
SIGAR-F-164	MDC–Demining Projects	10/2018
SIGAR-F-162	New York University–Assessment of Learning Outcomes and Social Effects in Community-Based Education	10/2018
SIGAR-F-161	KNCV Tuberculosis Foundation–Challenge Tuberculosis	10/2018
SIGAR-F-160	Chemonics International Inc.–Regional Agriculture Development Program–South (RADP–South)	10/2018
SIGAR-F-159	Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS)–Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC)	10/2018
SIGAR-F-158	ITF Enhancing Human Security–Various Demining Projects	6/2018
SIGAR-F-156	International Rescue Committee–Supporting Livelihoods and Protection for Afghan Returnees, Internally Displaced People (IDPS) and Vulnerable Host Communities	6/2018
SIGAR-F-154	Science and Engineering Services LLC–Utility Helicopter Program Office (UHPO) UH-60A Enhanced Phase Maintenance Inspection (PMI) Program Afghanistan	6/2018
SIGAR-F-153	Leidos Innovations Corporation (previously Lockheed Martin)–Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft (NSRWA) Contractor Logistics Sustainment (CLS), Afghanistan	6/2018
SIGAR-F-150	Tetra Tech Inc.–Engineering Support Program	5/2018
SIGAR-F-148	Development Alternatives Inc.–Women in the Economy (WIE)	5/2018
SIGAR-F-147	Aga Khan Foundation U.S.A.–Multi-Input Area Development Global Development Alliance (MIAD-GDA)	5/2018
SIGAR-F-145	FHI 360–Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition (IHSAN)	5/2018
SIGAR-F-144	Development Alternatives Inc.–Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan (ALBA)	5/2018

SIGAR Inspections

Completed Inspection Reports

SIGAR completed three inspection reports during this reporting period.

COMPLETED SIGAR INSPECTION REPORTS

Product Identifier	Report Title	Date Issued
SIGAR 19-50-IP	Afghanistan's North East Power System Phase I: Construction Deficiencies, Contractor Noncompliance, and Poor Oversight Resulted in a System that May Not Operate Safely or At Planned Levels	8/2019
SIGAR 19-53-IP	Afghan National Army Garrison at South Kabul Afghanistan International Airport: New Construction and Upgrades Generally Met Contract Requirements, but a Safety Hazard and Maintenance Issues Exist	8/2019
SIGAR 19-55-IP	Afghanistan's Ghulam Khan Road Project: Construction of the Road Generally Met Contract Requirements, but Deficiencies Have Created Safety Hazards for Users	8/2019

Ongoing Inspections

SIGAR had 11 ongoing inspections during this reporting period.

ONGOING SIGAR INSPECTIONS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019

Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Initiated
SIGAR-I-064	MOI HQ Entry Control Points, Parking, and Lighting	10/2019
SIGAR-I-063	ANA MOD HQ Infrastructure & Security Improvements	10/2019
SIGAR-I-062	NEI Kunduz Expansion Project	10/2019
SIGAR-I-061	Kandahar 10MW Solar Power Plant	7/2019
SIGAR-I-060	Pol-i-Charkhi Prison Wastewater Treatment	6/2019
SIGAR-I-059	Ministry of Commerce and Industries Building-Kunduz	11/2018
SIGAR-I-058	ANA NEI in Pul-e Khumri	10/2018
SIGAR-I-057	ANA TAAC Air JAF I Demo/New Structure	10/2018
SIGAR-I-056	Women's Compound at ANP RTC Herat	10/2018
SIGAR-I-055	AIF Kajaki Dam Tunnel	10/2018
SIGAR-I-051	PTEC Ghazni-Sayadabad Substations	10/2017

Ongoing Evaluations

SIGAR had two ongoing evaluations during this reporting period.

ONGOING SIGAR EVALUATIONS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019

Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Initiated
SIGAR-E-002	Fuel Follow-Up	10/2019
SIGAR-E-001	DOD Recommendation Follow-up	10/2019

APPENDICES

SIGAR Special Projects

Completed Special Projects Reports

SIGAR completed two special projects reports and one inquiry letter during this reporting period.

COMPLETED SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECTS

Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Issued
SIGAR 19-51-SP	Inquiry letter on the Acquisition & Disposal of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles	7/2019
SIGAR 19-59-SP	Afghanistan Children Read Program: Books Distributed Were Received and Used But Problems Existed With Printing, Distribution, and Warehousing	9/2019
SIGAR 20-03-SP	Summary of School Inspections in Afghanistan: Observations from Site Visits at 171 Afghan Schools Funded by USAID	10/2019

SIGAR Lessons Learned Program

Completed Lessons Learned Report

SIGAR released one lessons-learned report this quarter.

COMPLETED SIGAR LESSONS LEARNED PROJECTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019

Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Issued
SIGAR 19-58-LL	Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan	9/2019

Ongoing Lessons Learned Report

SIGAR has four ongoing lessons-learned projects this reporting period.

ONGOING SIGAR LESSONS LEARNED PROJECTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019

Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Initiated
SIGAR LL-14	Empowering Afghan Women and Girls	10/2019
SIGAR LL-13	Police and Corrections	9/2019
SIGAR LL-11	U.S. Support for Elections	9/2018
SIGAR LL-10	Contracting	8/2018

APPENDIX D


SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINE

SIGAR Investigations

This quarter, SIGAR opened nine new investigations and closed 17, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 158. Of the closed investigations, most were closed due to criminal declination (a federal prosecutor's decision not to pursue prosecution), unfounded allegations, or lack of investigative merit, as shown in Figure D.1. Of the new investigations, most were related to procurement and contract fraud and theft, as shown in Figure D.2.

FIGURE D.1

SIGAR'S CLOSED INVESTIGATIONS, JULY 1–SEPTEMBER 30, 2019



Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 10/2/2019.

FIGURE D.2

SIGAR NEW INVESTIGATIONS, JULY 1–SEPTEMBER 30, 2019




Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 10/2/2019.

SIGAR Hotline

The SIGAR Hotline (866-329-8893 in the USA, 0700107300 via cell phone in Afghanistan) received 48 complaints this quarter, as shown in Figure D.3. In addition to working on new complaints, the Investigations Directorate continued its work this quarter on complaints received prior to July 1, 2019. This quarter, the directorate processed 123 complaints, most of which are under review or were closed, as shown in Figure D.4.

FIGURE D.3


SOURCE OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS, JULY 1–SEPTEMBER 30, 2019



Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 10/1/2019.

FIGURE D.4

STATUS OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS: JULY 1–SEPTEMBER 30, 2019



Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 10/1/2019.

SIGAR SUSPENSIONS AND DEBARMENTS

Table D.1 is a comprehensive list of finalized suspensions, debarments, and special entity designations relating to SIGAR’s work in Afghanistan as of September 30, 2019. SIGAR lists its suspensions, debarments and special entity designations for historical purposes only. For the current status of any individual or entity listed herein as previously suspended, debarred or listed as a special entity designation, please consult the System for Award Management, www.sam.gov/SAM/.

Entries appearing in both the suspension and debarment sections are based upon their placement in suspended status following criminal indictment or determination of non-responsibility by agency suspension and debarment official. Final debarment was imposed following criminal conviction in U.S. Federal District Court and/or final determination by agency suspension and debarment official regarding term of debarment.

APPENDICES

TABLE D.1

SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019

Special Entity Designations		
Arvin Kam Construction Company	Noh-E Safi Mining Company	Saadat, Wakil
Arvin Kam Group LLC, d.b.a. "Arvin Kam Group Security," d.b.a. "Arvin Kam Group Foundation," d.b.a. "Arvin Global Logistics Services Company"	Noor Rahman Company	Triangle Technologies
Ayub, Mohammad	Noor Rahman Construction Company	Wasim, Abdul Wakil
Fruzi, Haji Khalil	Nur Rahman Group, d.b.a. "NUCCL Construction Company," d.b.a. "RUCCL Rahman Umar Construction Company," d.b.a. "Rahman Trading and General Logistics Company LLC	Zaland, Yousef
Muhammad, Haji Amir	Rahman, Nur, a.k.a. "Noor Rahman, a.k.a. "Noor Rahman Safa"	Zurmat Construction Company
Haji Dhost Mohammad Zurmat Construction Company	Rhaman, Mohammad	Zurmat Foundation
Jan, Nurullah		Zurmat General Trading
Khan, Haji Mohammad Almas		Zurmat Group of Companies, d.b.a. "Zurmat LLC"
		Zurmat Material Testing Laboratory
Suspensions		
Al-Watan Construction Company	Autry, Cleo Brian	Farouki, Abul Huda
Basirat Construction Firm	Chamberlain, William Todd	Farouki, Mazen
Naqibullah, Nadeem	Cook, Jeffrey Arthur	Maarouf, Salah
Rahman, Obaidur	Harper, Deric Tyron	ANHAM FZCO
Robinson, Franz Martin	Walls, Barry Lee, Jr.	ANHAM USA
Aaria Middle East	International Contracting and Development	Green, George E.
Aaria Middle East Company LLC	Sobh, Adeeb Nagib, a.k.a. "Ali Sobh"	Tran, Anthony Don
Aftech International	Stallion Construction and Engineering Group	Vergez, Norbert Eugene
Aftech International Pvt. Ltd.	Wazne Group Inc., d.b.a. "Wazne Wholesale"	Bunch, Donald P.
Albahar Logistics	Wazne, Ayman, a.k.a. "Ayman Ibrahim Wazne"	Kline, David A.
American Aaria Company LLC	Green, George E.	Farouki, Abul Huda
American Aaria LLC	Tran, Anthony Don	Farouki, Mazen
Sharpway Logistics	Vergez, Norbert Eugene	Maarouf, Salah
United States California Logistics Company	Bunch, Donald P.	ANHAM FZCO
Brothers, Richard S.	Kline, David A.	ANHAM USA
Rivera-Medina, Franklin Delano		
Debarments		
Farooqi, Hashmatullah	McCabe, Elton Maurice	Atal, Waheed
Hamid Lais Construction Company	Mihalczo, John	Daud, Abdullilah
Hamid Lais Group	Qasimi, Mohammed Indress	Dehati, Abdul Majid
Lodin, Rohullah Farooqi	Radhi, Mohammad Khalid	Fazli, Qais
Bennett & Fouch Associates LLC	Safi, Fazal Ahmed	Hamdard, Mohammad Yousuf
Brandon, Gary	Shin Gul Shaheen, a.k.a. "Sheen Gul Shaheen"	Kunari, Haji Pir Mohammad
K5 Global	Espinoza-Loor, Pedro Alfredo	Mushfiq, Muhammad Jaffar
Ahmad, Noor	Campbell, Neil Patrick*	Mutallib, Abdul
Noor Ahmad Yousufzai Construction Company	Navarro, Wesley	Nasrat, Sami
Ayeni, Sheryl Adenike	Hazrati, Arash	National General Construction Company
Cannon, Justin	Midfield International	Passerly, Ahmaad Saleem
Constantino, April Anne	Moore, Robert G.	Rabi, Fazal
Constantino, Dee	Noori, Noor Alam, a.k.a. "Noor Alam"	Rahman, Atta
Constantino, Ramil Palmes	Northern Reconstruction Organization	Rahman, Fazal
Crilly, Braam	Shamal Pamir Building and Road Construction Company	Roshandil, Mohammad Ajmal
Drotteff, Christopher	Wade, Desi D.	Saber, Mohammed
Fil-Tech Engineering and Construction Company	Blue Planet Logistics Services	Safi, Azizur Rahman
Handa, Sdharth	Mahmodi, Padres	Safi, Matullah
Jabak, Imad	Mahmodi, Shikab	Sahak, Sher Khan
Jamally, Rohullah	Saber, Mohammed	Shaheed, Murad
Khalid, Mohammad	Watson, Brian Erik	Shirzad, Daulet Khan
Khan, Daro	Abbasi, Shahpoor	Uddin, Mehrab
Mariano, April Anne Perez	Amiri, Waheedullah	Watson, Brian Erik

* Indicate that the individual or entity was subject to two final agency actions by an agency suspension and debarment official, resulting in a suspension followed by final debarment following the resolution of a criminal indictment or determination of non-responsibility by agency suspension and debarment official.

APPENDICES

TABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)

SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019 (CONTINUED)

Debarments (continued)

Wooten, Philip Steven*	Safiullah, a.k.a. "Mr. Safiullah"	Hightower, Jonathan
Espinoza, Mauricio*	Sarfarez, a.k.a. "Mr. Sarfarez"	Khan, Noor Zali, a.k.a. "Wali Kahn Noor"
Alam, Ahmed Farzad*	Wazir, Khan	Saheed, a.k.a. "Mr. Saheed," a.k.a. "Sahil," a.k.a.
Greenlight General Trading*	Akbar, Ali	"Ghazi-Rahman"
Aaria Middle East Company LLC*	Crystal Construction Company, d.b.a. "Samitullah Road	Weaver, Christopher
Aaria Middle East Company Ltd. - Herat*	Construction Company"	Al Kaheel Oasis Services
Aaria M.E. General Trading LLC*	Samitullah (Individual uses only one name)	Al Kaheel Technical Service
Aaria Middle East*	Ashna, Mohammad Ibrahim, a.k.a. "Ibrahim"	CLC Construction Company
Barakzai, Nangialai*	Gurvinder, Singh	CLC Consulting LLC
Formid Supply and Services*	Jahan, Shah	Complete Manpower Solutions
Aaria Supply Services and Consultancy*	Shahim, Zakirullah a.k.a. "Zakrullah Shahim", a.k.a. "Zikrullah	Mohammed, Masiuddin, a.k.a. "Masi Mohammed"
Kabul Hackle Logistics Company*	Shahim"	Rhoden, Bradley L., a.k.a. "Brad L. Rhoden"
Yousef, Najeebullah*	Alyas, Maiwand Ansunullah a.k.a. "Engineer Maiwand Alyas"	Rhoden, Lorraine Serena
Aaria Group*	BMCSC	Royal Super Jet General Trading LLC
Aaria Group Construction Company*	Maiwand Haqmal Construction and Supply Company	Super Jet Construction Company
Aaria Supplies Company LTD*	New Riders Construction Company, d.b.a. "Riders	Super Jet Fuel Services
Rahimi, Mohammad Edris*	Construction Company," d.b.a. "New Riders Construction and	Super Jet Group
All Points International Distributors Inc.*	Services Company"	Super Jet Tours LLC, d.b.a. "Super Jet Travel and Holidays LLC"
Hercules Global Logistics*	Riders Constructions, Services, Logistics and Transportation	Super Solutions LLC
Schroeder, Robert*	Company	Abdullah, Bilal
Helmand Twinkle Construction Company	Riders Group of Companies	Farmer, Robert Scott
Waziri, Heward Omar	Domineck, Lavette Kaye*	Mudiyansele, Oliver
Zadran, Mohammad	Markwith, James*	Kelly, Albert III
Afghan Mercury Construction Company, d.b.a. "Afghan	Martinez, Rene	Ethridge, James
Mercury Construction & Logistics Co."	Maroof, Abdul	Fernridge Strategic Partners
Mirzali Naseeb Construction Company	Qara, Yousef	AISC LLC*
Montes, Diyana	Royal Palace Construction Company	American International Security Corporation*
Naseeb, Mirzali	Bradshaw, Christopher Chase	David A. Young Construction & Renovation Inc.*
Martino, Roberto F.	Zuhra Productions	Force Direct Solutions LLC*
Logiotatos, Peter R.	Zuhra, Niazi	Harris, Christopher*
Glass, Calvin	Boulware, Candice a.k.a. "Candice Joy Dawkins"	Hernando County Holdings LLC*
Singleton, Jacy P.	Dawkins, John	Hide-A-Wreck LLC*
Robinson, Franz Martin	Mesopotamia Group LLC	Panthers LLC*
Smith, Nancy	Nordloh, Geoffrey	Paper Mill Village Inc.*
Sultani, Abdul Anas a.k.a. "Abdul Anas"	Kieffer, Jerry	Shroud Line LLC*
Faqiri, Shir	Johnson, Angela	Spada, Carol*
Hosmat, Haji	CNH Development Company LLC	Welventure LLC*
Jim Black Construction Company	Johnson, Keith	World Wide Trainers LLC*
Arya Ariana Aryayee Logistics, d.b.a. "AAA Logistics," d.b.a.	Military Logistic Support LLC	Young, David Andrew*
"Somo Logistics"	Eisner, John	Woodruff and Company
Garst, Donald	Taurus Holdings LLC	Borcata, Raul A.*
Mukhtar, Abdul a.k.a. "Abdul Kubar"	Brophy, Kenneth Michael*	Close, Jarred Lee*
Noori Mahgir Construction Company	Abdul Haq Foundation	Logistical Operations Worldwide*
Noori, Sherin Agha	Adajar, Adonis	Taylor, Zachery Dustin*
Long, Tonya*	Calhoun, Josh W.	Travis, James Edward*
Isranuddin, Burhanuddin	Clark Logistic Services Company, d.b.a. "Clark Construction	Khairullah, Gul Agha
Matun, Navidullah, a.k.a. "Javid Ahmad"	Company"	Khalil Rahimi Construction Company
Matun, Wahidullah	Farkas, Janos	Momand, Jahanzeb, a.k.a. "Engineer Jahanzeb Momand"
Navid Basir Construction Company	Flordeliz, Alex F.	Yar-Mohammad, Hazrat Nabi
Navid Basir JV Gagar Baba Construction Company	Knight, Michael T. II	Walizada, Abdul Masoud, a.k.a. "Masood Walizada"
NBCC & GBCC JV	Lozado, Gary	Alzai, Zarghona
Noori, Navid	Mijares, Armando N. Jr.	Aman, Abdul
Asmatullah, Mahmood, a.k.a. "Mahmood"	Mullakhiel, Wadir Abdullahmatin	Anwari, Laila
Khan, Gul	Rainbow Construction Company	Anwari, Mezhgan
Khan, Solomon Sherdad, a.k.a. "Solomon"	Sardar, Hassan, a.k.a. "Hassan Sardar Inqilab"	Anwari, Rafi
Mursalin, Ikramullah, a.k.a. "Ikramullah"	Shah, Mohammad Nader, a.k.a. "Nader Shah"	Arghandiwal, Zahra, a.k.a. "Sarah Arghandiwal"
Musafer, Naseem, a.k.a. "Naseem"	Tito, Regor	Azizi, Farwad, a.k.a. "Farwad Mohammad Azizi"
Ali, Esrar	Brown, Charles Phillip	Bashizada, Razia
Gul, Ghanzi	Sheren, Fasela, a.k.a. "Sheren Fasela"	Coates, Kenneth
Luqman Engineering Construction Company, d.b.a. "Luqman	Anderson, Jesse Montel	Gibani, Marika
Engineering"	Charboneau, Stephanie, a.k.a. "Stephanie Shankel"	Haidari, Mahboob

APPENDICES

TABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)

SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019 (CONTINUED)

Debarments (continued)

Latifi, Abdul	Intermaax, FZE	Wardak, Khalid
McCammon, Christina	Intermaax Inc.	Rahmat Siddiqi Transportation Company
Mohibzada, Ahmadullah, a.k.a. "Ahmadullah Mohebzada"	Karkar, Shah Wali	Siddiqi, Rahmat
Neghat, Mustafa	Sandman Security Services	Siddiqi, Sayed Attaullah
Qurashi, Abdul	Siddiqi, Atta	Umbrella Insurance Limited Company
Raouf, Ashmatullah	Specialty Bunkering	Taylor, Michael
Shah, David	Spidle, Chris Calvin	Gardazi, Syed
Touba, Kajim	Vulcan Amps Inc.	Smarasinghage, Sagara
Zahir, Khalid	Worldwide Cargomasters	Security Assistance Group LLC
Aryubi, Mohammad Raza Samim	Aziz, Haji Abdul, a.k.a. "Abdul Aziz Shah Jan," a.k.a. "Aziz"	Edmondson, Jeffrey B.*
Atlas Sahil Construction Company	Castillo, Alfredo, Jr.	Montague, Geoffrey K.*
Bab Al Jazeera LLC	Abbasi, Asim	Ciampa, Christopher*
Emar-E-Sarey Construction Company	Muturi, Samuel	Lugo, Emanuel*
Muhammad, Pianda	Mwakio, Shannel	Bailly, Louis Matthew*
Sambros International, d.b.a. "Sambros International LTD," d.b.a. "Sambros-UK JV"	Ahmad, Jaweed	Kumar, Krishan
Sambros JV Emar-E-Sarey Construction Company, d.b.a. "Sambros JV ESCC"	Ahmad, Masood	Marshal Afghan American Construction Company
Antes, Bradley A.	A & J Total Landscapes	Marshal, Sayed Abbas Shah
Lakeshore Engineering & Construction Afghanistan Inc., d.b.a. "Lakeshore General Contractors Inc."	Aryana Green Light Support Services	Masraq Engineering and Construction Company
Lakeshore Engineering Services Inc.	Mohammad, Sardar, a.k.a. "Sardar Mohammad Barakzai"	Miakhil, Azizullah
Lakeshore Engineering Services/Toltest JV LLC	Pittman, James C., a.k.a. "Carl Pittman"	Raj, Janak
Lakeshore Toltest - Rentenbach JV LLC	Poaipuni, Clayton	Singh, Roop
Lakeshore Toltest Corporation, d.b.a. "Lakeshore Group," d.b.a. "LTC Newco d.b.a. "LTC CORP Michigan," d.b.a. "Lakeshore Toltest KK"	Wiley, Patrick	Stratton, William G
Lakeshore Toltest Guam LLC	Crystal Island Construction Company	Umeer Star Construction Company
Lakeshore Toltest JV LLC	Bertolini, Robert L.*	Zahir, Mohammad Ayub
Lakeshore Toltest RRCC JV LLC	Kahn, Haroon Shams, a.k.a. "Haroon Shams"*	Peace Thru Business*
Lakeshore/Walsh JV LLC	Shams Constructions Limited*	Pudenz, Adam Jeff Julius*
LakeshoreToltest METAG JV LLC	Shams General Services and Logistics Unlimited*	Green, Robert Warren*
LTC & Metawater JV LLC	Shams Group International, d.b.a. "Shams Group International FZE"*	Mayberry, Teresa*
LTC Holdings Inc.	Shams London Academy*	Addas, James*
LTC Italia SRL	Shams Production*	Advanced Ability for U-PVC*
LTC Tower General Contractors LLC	Shams Welfare Foundation*	Al Bait Al Amer*
LTCCORP Commercial LLC	Swim, Alexander*	Al Iraq Al Waed*
LTCCORP E&C Inc.	Norris, James Edward	Al Quraishi Bureau*
LTCCORP Government Services-OH Inc.	Afghan Columbia Constructon Company	Al Zakoura Company*
LTCCORP Government Services Inc.	Ahmadi, Mohammad Omid	Al-Amir Group LLC*
LTCCORP Government Services-MI Inc.	Dashti, Jamsheed	Al-Noor Contracting Company*
LTCCORP O&G LLC	Hamdard, Eraj	Al-Noor Industrial Technologies Company*
LTCCORP Renewables LLC	Hamidi, Mahrokh	California for Project Company*
LTCCORP Inc.	Raising Wall Construction Company	Civilian Technologies Limited Company*
LTCCORP/Kaya Djibouti LLC	Artemis Global Inc., d.b.a. "Artemis Global Logistics and Solutions," d.b.a. "Artemis Global Trucking LLC"	Industrial Techniques Engineering Electromechanically Company*
LTCCORP/Kaya East Africa LLC	O'Brien, James Michael, a.k.a. "James Michael Wienert"	Pena, Ramiro*
LTCCORP/Kaya Romania LLC	Tamerlane Global Services Inc., d.b.a. "Tamerlane Global LLC," d.b.a. "Tamerlane LLC," d.b.a. "Tamerlane Technologies LLC"	Pulsars Company*
LTCCORP/Kaya Rwanda LLC	Sherzai, Akbar Ahmed*	San Francisco for Housing Company
LTCORP Technology LLC	Jean-Noel, Dimitry	Sura Al Mustakbal*
Toltest Inc., d.b.a. "Wolverine Testing and Engineering," d.b.a. "Toledo Testing Laboratory," d.b.a. "LTC," d.b.a. "LTC Corp," d.b.a. "LTC Corp Ohio," d.b.a. "LTC Ohio"	Hampton, Seneca Darrell*	Top Techno Concrete Batch*
Toltest/Desbuild Germany JV LLC	Dennis, Jimmy W.	
Veterans Construction/Lakeshore JV LLC	Timor, Karim	
Afghan Royal First Logistics, d.b.a. "Afghan Royal"		
American Barriers		
Arakozia Afghan Advertising		
Dubai Armored Cars		
Enayatullah, son of Hafizullah		
Farhas, Ahmad		
Inland Holdings Inc.		

APPENDICES

TABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)

SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019 (CONTINUED)		
Debarments (continued)		
Albright, Timothy H.*	Khalil, Son of Mohammad Ajan	Wali Eshaq Zada Logistics Company; d.b.a. "Wali Ashqa Zada Logistics Company"; d.b.a. "Nasert Nawazi Transportation Company"
Insurance Group of Afghanistan	Khan, Mirullah	Ware, Marvin*
Ratib, Ahmad, a.k.a. "Nazari"	Khan, Mukamal	Belgin, Andrew
Jamil, Omar K.	Khoshal, Son of Sayed Hasan	Afghan Bamdad Construction Company, d.b.a. "Afghan Bamdad Development Construction Company"
Rawat, Ashita	Malang, Son of Qand	Areeb of East Company for Trade & Farzam Construction Company JV
Qadery, Abdul Khalil	Masom, Son of Asad Gul	Areeb of East for Engineering and General Trading Company Limited, d.b.a. "Areeb of East LLC"
Casellas, Luis Ramon*	Mateen, Abdul	Areeb-BDCC JV
Saber, Mohammad a.k.a. "Saber," a.k.a. "Sabir"	Mohammad, Asghar	Areebel Engineering and Logisitcs - Farzam
Zahir, Shafiullah Mohammad a.k.a. "Shafiullah," a.k.a. "Shafie"	Mohammad, Baqi	Areebel Engineering and Logistics
Achiever's International Ministries Inc., d.b.a. "Center for Achievement and Development LLC"	Mohammad, Khial	Areeb-Rixon Construction Company LLC, d.b.a. "Areeb-REC JV"
Bickersteth, Diana	Mohammad, Sayed	Carver, Elizabeth N.
Bonview Consulting Group Inc.	Mujahid, Son of Abdul Qadir	Carver, Paul W.
Fagbenro, Oyetayo Ayoola, a.k.a. "Tayo Ayoola Fagbenro"	Nangiali, Son of Alem Jan	RAB JV
Global Vision Consulting LLC	Nawid, Son of Mashoq	Ullah, Izat; a.k.a. "Ezatullah"; a.k.a. "Izatullah, son of Shamsudeen"
HUDA Development Organization	Noorullah, Son of Noor Mohammad	Saboor, Baryalai Abdul; a.k.a. "Barry Gafari"
Strategic Impact Consulting, d.b.a. "Strategic Impact KarKon Afghanistan Material Testing Laboratory"	Qayoum, Abdul	Stratex Logistic and Support, d.b.a. "Stratex Logistics"
Davies, Simon	Roz, Gul	Jahanzeb, Mohammad Nasir
Gannon, Robert, W.	Shafiq, Mohammad	Nasrat, Zaulhaq, a.k.a. "Zia Nasrat"
Gillam, Robert	Shah, Ahmad	Blevins, Kenneth Preston*
Mondial Defence Systems Ltd.	Shah, Mohammad	Banks, Michael*
Mondial Defense Systems USA LLC	Shah, Rahim	Afghan Armor Vehicle Rental Company
Mondial Logistics	Sharif, Mohammad	Hamdard, Javid
Khan, Adam	Waheedullah, Son of Sardar Mohammad	McAlpine, Nebraska
Khan, Amir, a.k.a. "Amir Khan Sahel"	Wahid, Abdul	Meli Afghanistan Group
Sharq Afghan Logistics Company, d.b.a. "East Afghan Logistics Company"	Wais, Gul	Badgett, Michael J.*
Hafizullah, Sayed; a.k.a. "Sadat Sayed Hafizullah"; a.k.a. "Sayed Hafizullah Delsooz"	Wali, Khair	Miller, Mark E.
Sadat Zohori Construction and Road Building Company; d.b.a. "Sadat Zohori Cons Co."	Wali, Sayed	Anderson, William Paul
Abdullah, Son of Lal Gul	Wali, Taj	Kazemi, Sayed Mustafa, a.k.a. "Said Mustafa Kazemi"
Ahmad, Aziz	Yaseen, Mohammad	Al Mostahan Construction Company
Ahmad, Zubir	Yaseen, Son of Mohammad Aajan	Nazary, Nasir Ahmad
Aimal, Son of Masom	Zakir, Mohammad	Nazanin, a.k.a. "Ms. Nazanin"
Ajmal, Son of Mohammad Anwar	Zamir, Son of Kabir	Ahmadzai, Sajid
Fareed, Son of Shir	Rogers, Sean	Sajid, Amin Gul
Fayaz Afghan Logistics Services	Slade, Justin	Elham, Yaser, a.k.a. "Najibullah Saadullah"*
Fayaz, Afghan, a.k.a. "Fayaz Alimi," a.k.a. "Fayaz, Son of Mohammad"	Morgan, Sheldon J.*	Everest Faizy Logistics Services*
Gul, Khuja	Dixon, Regionald	Faizy Elham Brothers Ltd.*
Habibullah, Son of Ainuddin	Emmons, Larry	Faizy, Rohullah*
Hamidullah, Son of Abdul Rashid	Epps, Willis*	Hekmat Shadman General Trading LLC*
Haq, Fazal	Ethad Hamidi Group; d.b.a. "Ethad Hamidi Trading, Transportation, Logistics and Construction Company"	Hekmat Shadman Ltd., d.b.a. "Hikmat Shadman Ltd."*
Jahangir, Son of Abdul Qadir	Ethad Hamidi Logistics Company; d.b.a. "Ethad Hamidi Transportation, Logistic Company Corporation"	Hikmat Shadman Construction and Supply Company*
Kaka, Son of Ismail	Hamidi, Abdul Basit; a.k.a. Basit Hamidi	
	Kakar, Rohani; a.k.a. "Daro Khan Rohani"	
	Mohammad, Abdullah Nazar	
	Nasir, Mohammad	

APPENDICES

TABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)

SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2019 (CONTINUED)

Debarments (continued)

Hikmat Himmat Logistics Services Company*

Hikmat Shadman Logistics Services Company,
d.b.a. "Hikmat Shadman Commerce Construction
and Supply Company," d.b.a. "Hikmat Shadman
Commerce Construction Services"*

Saif Hikmat Construction Logistic Services and
Supply Co.*

Shadman, Hikmatullah, a.k.a. "Hikmat Shadman,"
a.k.a. "Haji Hikmatullah Shadman," a.k.a.
"Hikmatullah Saadulah"*

Omonobi-Newton, Henry

Hele, Paul

Highland Al Hujaz Co. Ltd.

Supreme Ideas – Highland Al Hujaz Ltd. Joint
Venture, d.b.a. SI-HLH-JV

BYA International Inc. d.b.a. BYA Inc.

Harper, Deric Tyrone*

Walls, Barry Lee, Jr.*

Cook, Jeffrey Arthur*

McCray, Christopher

Jones, Antonio

APPENDICES

APPENDIX E

SIGAR DATA CALL QUESTIONS THAT RECEIVED CLASSIFIED OR UNCLASSIFIED BUT NOT PUBLICLY RELEASABLE RESPONSES

Every quarter, SIGAR sends U.S. implementing agencies in Afghanistan a list of questions about their programs. This quarter, United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) classified, or designated unclassified, but not publicly releasable, its responses to the bolded portions of nine questions from SIGAR's data call (below). As authorized by its enabling statute, SIGAR will publish a classified annex containing the classified and publicly unreleasable data.

SECURITY	
Question ID	Question
Oct-Sec-01	1. Please provide the following classified information on ANA strength as of the latest available date (month-end): a. the most recent three ANA APPS month-end reports with “as of” dates on each. b. monthly attrition rates for the last three months for the ANA by Corps, Division, SOF, and AAF with “as of” dates provided. 2. Please provide the following unclassified information on ANA strength as of the latest available date (month-end): a. the topline strength of the ANA, with the total number of officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel broken out (with “as of” date provided). b. a description of general ANA attrition trends over the last quarter.
Oct-Sec-04	a. Please provide a recent assessment of the ANDSF elements below the ministerial level. The assessment can be general or anecdotal, but please cover key performance areas such as reporting, training, planning, operational readiness, and leadership. b. Please provide the latest, classified “RS ANDSF Operational Overview” PowerPoint slides (given to us via SIPR in response to Apr-Sec-04c) c. Please provide an update on the ANA 217th Corps. For example, is the 217th now capable of independent administrative, operational, and reporting processes? 2. Please provide CSTC-A's new, streamlined ministry-development tracker that measures performance progress using various types of metrics. If the tracker is not yet available, please provide a narrative update on its status and estimated completion date.
Oct-Sec-08	1. Please provide the following classified information on ANP strength as of the latest available date (month-end): a. the most recent three ANP APPS month-end reports with “as of” dates on each. b. monthly attrition rates for the last three months for the entire ANP and by ANP component with “as of” dates provided. 2. Please provide the following unclassified information on ANA strength as of the latest available date (month-end): a. the topline strength of the ANP, with the total number of officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel broken out (with “as of” date provided). b. a description of general ANP attrition trends over the last quarter.

Continued on the next page

APPENDICES

Oct-Sec-23	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Please provide information on insider attacks against Coalition Forces from June 1, 2019 to the latest possible date (month-end): <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. the number of insider attacks against U.S. and Coalition military personnel b. the number of U.S. and Coalition military personnel wounded or killed from insider attacks c. the number of insider attacks against ANDSF d. the number of ANDSF personnel wounded or killed as a result of insider attacks 2. Please provide the classified CIDNE Excel file export of all ANDSF casualties from January 1, 2018 through the latest available date (month-end). It is not necessary to filter the CIDNE export, but, at a minimum, these data should include the unit (lowest level available), location (highest fidelity possible), and date for all casualties. 3. Per AAG's response to DOD OIG's 19.2 OPS-General-85 question in April 2019, please provide us a response to the following: "In an unclassified, publicly releasable format, describe how ANDSF casualty rates during the quarter compare to casualty rates during the same quarter one year ago. Differentiate between casualties that occurred during offensive operations and those that occurred during defensive operations." 4. Per our SVTC on 5/20/19, please describe any data quality issues or organizational changes that have affected the quality of these data so that SIGAR can appropriately caveat these data in its report (i.e. the move of location and the downsizing of personnel working on CIDNE data). If there is an increased margin of error or time period lag in the data, please explain what the change is and why it occurred.
Oct-Sec-26	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Please provide a recent, comprehensive update of the SMW as of the latest possible date. b. Please identify each type of aircraft in the SMW inventory and the number of each. If aircraft became usable during this reporting period, please indicate when and the reason for each. c. Please provide the number of aircraft purchased but not yet fielded and what the anticipated dates are for fielding. d. Please complete the attached ANDSF spreadsheet/SMW tab, or provide the applicable data. (Sec-26 tab Data Call Attachment Spreadsheet) e. What percentage of the SMW sorties are in support of counternarcotics? of counterterrorism? or, counterterrorism (CN & CT)? f. How many aircrew members does the SMW currently have, by crew position and airframe? Please break out their level of mission qualification (e.g. Certified Mission Ready (night-vision qualified), the daytime equivalent, etc.): <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mi-17 Pilots and Pilot Trainers 2. Mi-17 Flight Engineers 3. Mi-17 Crew Chiefs 4. PC-12 Pilots 5. PC-12 Mission System Operators g. Please provide the operational readiness rate of the SMW and what the achievement benchmarks are in this area. h. How many and what type of aircraft maintainers are currently assigned / authorized? Are these SMW personnel or contractors? If contractors, are they Afghan or international contractors? i. Provide the cost of aircraft maintenance being paid with ASFF or money from other countries.
Oct-Sec-38	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Please provide the following information pertaining to the Afghan Personnel and Payroll System (APPS) with the as of dates: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Have all existing ANA/AAF/ANASOC personnel been enrolled into APPS? If not, what percentage of the ANA/AAF/ANASOC have been enrolled into APPS? Please provide a status update for how MOD plans to enroll any remaining personnel/units that have not yet been enrolled (not including new recruits). b. Have all existing ANP personnel been enrolled into APPS? If not, what percentage of the ANP have been enrolled into APPS? Please provide a status update for how MOI plans to enroll any remaining personnel/units that have not yet been enrolled (not including new recruits). c. Have there been any changes to the processes described last quarter (in the data call response and in vetting comments) to continue to validate ANDSF personnel enrolled in APPS? d. Please provide a list of the ANDSF "spot-check" personnel asset inventories (PAIs) that occurred since last quarter and the CSTC-A APPS PMO's personnel asset audits (PAAs) that have occurred since last quarter (as described in last quarter's response) that includes dates, locations, and ANDSF force elements audited/spot-checked. e. Of the PAIs and PAAs identified in subquestion d, please provide the results of those efforts, including how many personnel in each ANDSF element/at each location were present and accounted for versus the number reported to be on-hand, and how many in each ANDSF element were newly enrolled during these PAA/PAIs?

Continued on the next page

APPENDICES

Oct-Sec-40	<p>a. Please provide the ANA Corps' equipment operational readiness (OR) rates.</p> <p>b. Please provide the goal OR rate for each ANA corps, and the reasoning for that OR benchmark.</p> <p>c. If the OR rate is below the benchmark for some corps, please explain why for each corps and what actions are being taken to support the ANDSF to increase the OR rate.</p> <p>d. Please provide the OR rate or similar metric for the ANP by zone or PHQ, including the benchmark OR rates by zone/PHQ. If the rates are below benchmark, please explain why by zone/PHQ.</p>
Oct-Sec-61	<p>1. Provide a spreadsheet documenting all concluded ANDSF CONOPs for offensive operations conducted from the date of the last response through the latest complete month for which data is available (e.g. May 31, 2019) (each concluded operation should be its own row). For our purposes, an operation involves (1) at least one ANA kandak or (2) a combination of units from at least two Afghan security entities (MOI, MOD, and/or NDS). For each operation, we request the following information:</p> <p>a. the district in which the operation primarily occurred (District name)</p> <p>b. the province in which the operation primarily occurred (Province name)</p> <p>c. the start date of the operation (YYYY-MM-DD)</p> <p>d. the end date of the operation (YYYY-MM-DD)</p> <p>e. whether AAF A-29s or AC-208 provided direct support during the operation (Yes/No)</p> <p>f. whether AAF MD-530s, UH-60, or Mi-17 provided direct support during the operation (Yes/No)</p> <p>g. whether ANASOC MSFVs provided direct support during the operation (Yes/No)</p> <p>h. whether the operation involved ANA units (Yes/No)</p> <p>i. whether the operation involved MOI units (Yes/No)</p> <p>j. whether the operation involved NDS units (Yes/No)</p> <p>k. whether the operation involved ANASOC units (Yes/No)</p> <p>l. whether the operation was enabled by U.S. or Coalition air support (Yes/No)</p> <p>m. whether the operation was enabled by U.S. or Coalition ground support (Yes/No)</p> <p>n. whether any U.S. or Coalition military aircraft provided medical evacuation support (Yes/No)</p>
Oct-Sec-70	<p>1. Please provide the following information about the ASSF, as published in the unclassified 1225 reports:</p> <p>a. The number of ground operations ASSF conducted monthly from May 1, 2019, (data date from last quarter's response), to the latest available date (month end).</p> <p>b. For the operations listed in subquestion a, the breakdown of the monthly ASSF operations that SOJTF-A components advised, provided Coalition enablers, and those which the ASSF executed independently.</p> <p>c. A narrative assessment providing an update on ANASOC, GCPSU, and SMW misuse by MOD and MOI</p> <p>d. Please provide the amount of fines CTSC-A enforced and waived against MOD and MOI for ASSF misuse from the date of last quarter's response, to the latest available date (month end).</p>

APPENDICES

APPENDIX F

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION	DEFINITION
AAF	Afghan Air Force
ABP	Afghan Border Police
ACAA	Afghanistan's Civil Aviation Authority
ACEP	Afghan Civic Engagement Program
ACJC	Anti-Corruption Justice Center
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
ADALAT	Assistance for Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency
ADF	Agricultural Development Fund
AFCENT	U.S. Air Force Central Command
AFMIS	Afghan Financial Management Information System
AFN	afghani (currency)
AGO	Attorney General's Office
AGO	Attorney General's Office (Afghan)
AHRIMS	Afghan Human Resource Information Management System
AIF	Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund
AITF	Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund
ALP	Afghan Local Police
AMANAT	Afghanistan's Measure for Accountability and Transparency
AML/CFT	Anti-money-laundering/ combating financing of terrorism
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANASOC	ANA Special Operations Corps
ANDSF	Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
ANP	Afghan National Police
AO	abandoned ordnance
AOR	area of responsibility
APPS	Afghan Personnel and Pay System
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASFF	Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
ASSF	Afghan Special Security Forces
AVC-HVC	Afghanistan Value Chains-High Value Crops
AVC-L	Afghanistan Value Chains-Livestock

Continued on the next page

APPENDICES

ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION	DEFINITION
BADILL	Boost Alternative Development Intervention through Licit Livelihoods
BAG	Budget Activity Group
CBARD	Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development Project
CBARD-E	Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development- East
CBARD-W	Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development- West
CCAP	Citizen's Charter Afghanistan Project
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CENTCOM	U. S. Central Command
CEPPS	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CHAMP	Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program
CID	U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
CIGIE	Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CMS	Case Management System
CN	Counternarcotics
CNJC	Counter Narcotics Justice Center
CNPA	Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
COIN	counterinsurgency
COMAC	Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians
CoreIMS	Core Information Management System
CPDS	Continuing Professional Development Support
CSO	civil-society organization
CSSP	Corrections System Support Program
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
CTF	Counterterrorism Financing
DAB	Da Afghanistan Bank
DABS	Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat
DAI	Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI Global Inc.)
DAP	Drug Advisory Programme
DCA	Development Credit Authority
DCAR	Delegated Cooperation Agreement
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S.)
DEWS Plus	Disease Early Warning System Plus
DFID	Department for International Development
DHS	Department of Homeland Security

Continued on the next page

APPENDICES

ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION	DEFINITION
DICDA	Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (U.S.)
DIG	Deputy Inspector General
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense (U.S.)
DOD OIG	Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
DOJ	Department of Justice (U.S.)
DTC	drug-treatment centers
ECC	Electoral Complaints Commission
EEIA	effective enemy initiated attacks
EIA	Enemy-Initiated Attacks
ERW	explosive remnants of war
ESF	Economic Support Fund
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
FAP	Financial and Activity Plan
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FY	fiscal year
GAO	Government Accountability Office (U.S.)
GCPSU	General Command of Police Special Units
GDP	gross domestic product
GEC	Girls' Education Challenge Program
GIROA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GLE	Governor-Led Eradication
GPI	Good Performer's Initiative
GRAIN	Grain Research and Innovation
HAZMAT	hazardous materials
HEMAYAT	Helping Mothers and Children Thrive
HMMW+A1:A205V	high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (commonly known as a humvee)
HPC	High Peace Council
HQ	headquarters
HSR	Health Sector Resiliency
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICS	Integrated Country Strategy

Continued on the next page

APPENDICES

ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION	DEFINITION
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IEC	Independent Election Commission (Afghan)
IED	improvised explosive device
IG	inspector general
IHSAN	Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition
IIU	Intelligence and Investigation Unit (Afghan)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
INCLE	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (U.S.)
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (U.S.)
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP DPG	Incentive Program Development Policy Grant
IS-K	Islamic State-Khorasan
ISLA	Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations Program
IWA	Integrity Watch Afghanistan
JSSP	Justice Sector Support Program (State)
KBR	Kabul Bank Receivership
KCEC	Kabul Carpet Export Center
kg	kilogram
KIA	killed in action
LLP	Lessons Learned Program
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (Afghan)
MAPA	Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan
MCN	Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (Afghan)
MCTF	Major Crimes Task Force
MEC	Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (Afghan)
MOD	Ministry of Defense (Afghan)
MOE	Minister of Education (Afghan)
MOEc	Ministry of Economy (Afghan)
MOF	Ministry of Finance (Afghan)
MOHE	Ministry of Higher Education (Afghan)
MOI	Ministry of Interior (Afghan)
MOI CID	Ministry of Interior (Afghan) Criminal Investigation Directorate
MOI IG	Ministry of Interior (Afghan) Inspector General
MOJ	Ministry of Justice (Afghan)

Continued on the next page

APPENDICES

ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION	DEFINITION
MOMP	Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (Afghan)
MOPH	Ministry of Public Health (Afghan)
MOWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Noncommissioned officers
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDS	National Directorate of Security (Afghan)
NEPS	Northeast Power System
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIU	National Interdiction Unit (Afghan)
NPA	National Procurement Authority
NSIA	National Statistics and Information Authority (Afghan)
NSOCC-A	NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan
NSPA	NATO Support and Procurement Agency
O&M	operations and maintenance
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OEG	Office of Economic Growth (USAID)
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OFS	Operation Freedom's Sentinel
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OTA	Office of Technical Assistance (U.S. Treasury)
PAI	Personnel Asset Inventory
PDP	Provincial Development Plans
PM/WRA	Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (State)
PRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (U.S. State)
PTec	Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity
PVC-W	Promoting Value Chains-Western Afghanistan
RADP	Regional Agriculture Development Program
RS	Resolute Support
SEPS	Southeast Power System
SFC	Sergeant first class
SHAHAR	Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience
SIU	Sensitive Investigative Unit (Afghan)

Continued on the next page

APPENDICES

ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION	DEFINITION
SME	subject-matter expert
SMW	Special Mission Wing (Afghan)
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SRAR	Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation
State OIG	Department of State Office of the Inspector General
SWIM	Strengthening Watershed and Irrigation Management
TAA	train, advise, and assist
TAAC	train, advise, and assist command
TAF	The Asia Foundation
TIU	Technical Investigative Unit
TRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAAA	U.S. Army Audit Agency
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID OIG	USAID Office of the Inspector General
USD	U.S. dollar
USFOR-A	U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
USGS	United States Geological Survey
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
UXO	unexploded ordnance
WASH	water, sanitation and hygiene
WHO	World Health Organization
WIA	Wounded in Action
WPP	Women's Participation Program
WTO	World Trade Organization

APPENDICES

ENDNOTES

1. The narratives in Section 3 of each SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress provide overviews and updates on these issues.
2. SIGAR, *Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*, (hereafter, *Reintegration*), Lessons Learned Program report, 9/2019, p. 1.
3. SIGAR, *Reintegration*, i.
4. Congressional Research Service, *Afghanistan: Issues for Congress and Legislation 2017–2019*, updated 9/3/2019, pp. 2–3.
5. Congressional Research Service, *Afghanistan: Issues for Congress and Legislation 2017–2019*, updated 9/3/2019, p. 3.
6. Reuters, “Trump says as far as he is concerned, Afghanistan talks are dead,” [reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-trump/trump-says-as-far-as-he-is-concerned-afghanistan-talks-are-dead-idUSKCN1VU256](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-trump/trump-says-as-far-as-he-is-concerned-afghanistan-talks-are-dead-idUSKCN1VU256), 9/9/2019.
7. Reuters, “Pentagon chief in Afghanistan as U.S. looks to kick-start Taliban talks,” 10/20/2019.
8. Wall Street Journal, “Taliban Negotiators Meet With Russian Officials After Trump Ends Talks,” [wsj.com/articles/taliban-negotiators-meet-with-russian-officials-after-trump-ends-talks-11568458659](https://www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-negotiators-meet-with-russian-officials-after-trump-ends-talks-11568458659), 9/14/2019.
9. Wall Street Journal, “Trump Declares U.S.-Taliban Talks Dead, Makes New Threat,” [wsj.com/articles/trump-declares-u-s-taliban-talks-dead-makes-new-threat-11568068803](https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-declares-u-s-taliban-talks-dead-makes-new-threat-11568068803), 9/9/2019.
10. Voice of America, “UN: Direct Talks Needed Between Afghan Government, Taliban,” [voanews.com/south-central-asia/un-direct-talks-needed-between-afghan-government-taliban](https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/un-direct-talks-needed-between-afghan-government-taliban), 9/10/2019.
11. Financial Times, “ISIS gains traction in Afghanistan as US talks collapse,” [ft.com/content/ae7cd2c2-ce26-11e9-99a4-b5ded7a7fe3f](https://www.ft.com/content/ae7cd2c2-ce26-11e9-99a4-b5ded7a7fe3f), 9/16/2019.
12. National Public Radio, “Former FARC Leaders Announce ‘New Stage Of Fighting,’ Upending Colombia’s Peace Deal,” [npr.org/2019/08/29/755425619/former-farc-leaders-announce-new-stage-of-fighting-upending-colombia-s](https://www.npr.org/2019/08/29/755425619/former-farc-leaders-announce-new-stage-of-fighting-upending-colombia-s), 8/29/2019; Case studies of reintegration efforts in Colombia and Somalia appear in Chapter 4 of SIGAR’s new LLP report, pp. 67–75.
13. USIP, “Reintegrating Taliban Fighters in Afghanistan,” video, 9/19/2019. Transcript not yet available. Comments are from SIGAR staff notes on video posted at YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=SSIQ28CrwcA.
14. SIGAR, “Prepared Remarks of John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,’” at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 9/19/2019, p. 1. Posted at <https://www.sigar.mil/>
15. SIGAR, *Reintegration*, x.
16. SIGAR, “Prepared Remarks of John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,’” at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 9/19/2019, p. 1. Posted at <https://www.sigar.mil/>
17. SIGAR, “Prepared Remarks of John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,’” at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 9/19/2019, p. 3. Posted at <https://www.sigar.mil/>
18. SIGAR, “Prepared Remarks of John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,’” at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 9/19/2019, p. 3. Posted at <https://www.sigar.mil/>
19. SIGAR, *Reintegration*, viii.
20. SIGAR, *Reintegration*, viii.
21. Sunday Telegraph (London), “The truth about Taliban ‘reintegration,’” 2/11/2012.
22. SIGAR, *Reintegration*, ix.
23. The following discussion draws on the list of findings in SIGAR, *Reintegration*, pp. 92–93.
24. SIGAR, *Reintegration*, pp. 94–98.
25. SIGAR, *Reintegration*, p. 98.
26. SIGAR, *Reintegration*, p. 98.
27. SIGAR, *Reintegration*, pp. 98–106.
28. SIGAR, *Reintegration*, p. 98.
29. SIGAR, *Reintegration*, p. 100.
30. SIGAR, *Reintegration*, p. 102.
31. SIGAR, *Reintegration*, p. 104.
32. SIGAR, *Reintegration*, p. 104.
33. Comments are drawn from the USIP video, “Reintegrating Taliban Fighters in Afghanistan,” 9/19/2019. Transcript not yet available. SIGAR staff notes were made from video posted at YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=SSIQ28CrwcA.
34. Department of Defense, *Cost of War Monthly Report*, Data as of June 30, 2019, provided in response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2019.
35. Pub. L. No. 111-32, 6/24/2009.
36. DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2009.
37. Pub. L. No. 112-74, Section 9009, 12/23/2011; Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC) memorandum,” 8/3/2011; Pub. L. No. 115-245, 9/28/2018.
38. DOD, *Reprogramming Action FY 19-02 RA*, Support for DHS Counter-Drug Activity Reprogramming Action, 5/9/2019.
39. DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019,” 10/18/2019; DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts June 2019,” 7/18/2019.
40. DOD OIG, *Distribution of Funds and the Validity of Obligations for the Management of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund - Phase I*, Report No. D-2008-012, 11/5/2007, p. 2.
41. Pub. L. No. 112-74, Section 9009 and Deputy Secretary of Defense, *Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC) memorandum*, 8/3/2011.
42. DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019,” 10/18/2019.
43. DOD response to SIGAR data call 10/18/2019 and 7/18/2019.
44. DOD, “Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP),” DOD Financial Management Regulation Vol. 12, Ch. 27, 1/2009, p. 27-3.
45. Pub. L. No. 113-235, 12/16/2014.
46. DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.
47. DOD, response to SIGAR data call 1/18/2019.
48. DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/9/2019 and 10/9/2019.
49. DOD, response to SIGAR data call 7/9/2019.
50. USAID, *U.S. Foreign Assistance Reference Guide*, 1/2005, p. 6.
51. USAID, response to SIGAR data call 10/16/2019.

ENDNOTES

52. USAID, response to SIGAR data call 1/22/2019.
53. USAID, response to SIGAR data call 1/22/2019.
54. USAID, response to SIGAR data call 10/16/2019.
55. USAID, response to SIGAR data call 10/16/2019 and 7/18/2019.
56. USAID, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, profile last updated on July 18, 2017 on www.usaid.gov website.
57. USAID, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, "Afghanistan-Complex Emergency, Fact Sheet #4, FY 2017," posted on www.usaid.gov.
58. USAID/OFDA, response to SIGAR data call, 10/16/2019.
59. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/16/2019 and 7/11/2019.
60. State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2009.
61. State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/10/2019 and 7/11/2019.
62. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, FY 2019, Released February 12, 2018, pp. 44–52; and State, response to SIGAR data call, 4/17/2019.
63. State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/16/2019 and 7/12/2019.
64. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, FY 2019, Released February 12, 2018, p. 423.
65. State, response to SIGAR data call 3/29/2013.
66. State, response to SIGAR data call 3/29/2013.
67. State, response to SIGAR data calls, 10/5/2018 and 10/10/2017.
68. World Bank, ARTF: Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of July 22, 2019 (end of 7th month of FY 1398) at www.artf.af, accessed 10/4/2019, p. 4.
69. World Bank, Quarterly Country Update: Afghanistan, 4/2011, p. 16.
70. World Bank, ARTF: Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of July 22, 2019 (end of 7th month of FY 1398) at www.artf.af, accessed 10/4/2019, p. 2.
71. World Bank, Quarterly Country Update: Afghanistan, 4/2011, p. 16.
72. World Bank, ARTF: Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of July 22, 2019 (end of 7th month of FY 1398), p. 13.
73. UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service at <https://fts.unocha.org>, accessed 9/30/2019.
74. EC, "Afghanistan: State of Play, January 2011," 3/31/2011, p. 7.
75. UNDP, "Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, Terms of Reference, 22 November 2018," and "Trust Fund Factsheet, Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan," at <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/LTF00>, accessed 7/21/2019.
76. UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2019 and LOTFA MPTF Receipts 2002–2019, updated through October 10, 2019, in response to SIGAR data call 10/13/2019.
77. DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2018.
78. NATO, Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund, Status of Contributions Made as of 30 September 2019, response to SIGAR data call, 10/10/2019.
79. DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/18/2019.
80. New York Times, "After Trump Calls Off Talks, Afghanistan Braces for Violence," 9/8/2019; RS, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2019; NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2019; AFCENT, Airpower Summaries, 9/30/2019, p. 1; SIGAR, analysis of RS, AFCENT, and NSOCC-A data, 10/2019; New York Times, "U.S. Soldier Whose Death in Afghanistan Upended Peace Talks 'Loved His Country'," 9/9/2019.
81. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019; Reuters, "Suicide Bomber and Gunmen Hit Eastern Afghanistan Gov't Office," 9/18/2019; Reuters, "Afghanistan Bolsters Security as Taliban Threatens Presidential Poll," 9/26/2019; Washington Post, "Taliban Threats, Poll Closures Raise Fears for Credibility of Afghan Elections, 9/23/2019; BBC, "Afghanistan Presidential Election: Rivals Declare Victory after Record Low Turnout," 9/30/2019.
82. Voice of America, "Afghanistan's Ghani Escapes Election Violence That Killed 24," 9/17/2019; UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Special Report: 2019 Election-Related Violence, 10/2019, p. 1.
83. ToloNews, "Damaged Power Lines Cause Severe Electricity Cut in 11 Provinces," 9/15/2019; Khaama Press, "Taliban Warns to Target the Sites, Employees and SIM Card Holders of Salaam Telecom," 8/26/2019; Pahjwok Afghan News, "Security Forces Reopen Kabul-North Highway in Baghlan," 9/5/2019.
84. UNAMA, Quarterly Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 September, 2019, 10/17/2019, p. 3; RS, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2019; SIGAR, analysis of UNAMA and RS-provided data, 10/2019.
85. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
86. DOD, "U.S. Military Casualties—Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), Casualty Summary by Casualty Category;" DOD, "U.S. Military Casualties—Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), Casualty Summary by Month;" DOD, "U.S. Military Casualties—Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Casualty Summary by Casualty Category," accessed 10/21/2019 and 7/16/2019; SIGAR, analysis of DOD data, 10/2019.
87. Voice of America, "Afghan President: More Than 2,000 Taliban Fighters Killed Last Week," 9/13/2019; New York Times, "After Trump Calls Off Talks, Afghanistan Braces for Violence," 9/8/2019.
88. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2019.
89. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2019, 9/18/2019, and 3/20/2019; NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2019; SIGAR, analysis of NSOCC-A-provided data, 10/2019.
90. AFCENT, Airpower Summaries, 9/30/2019 and 1/31/2014, p. 1; SIGAR, analysis of AFCENT data, 10/2019.
91. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 9/2019.
92. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
93. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
94. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019," 10/18/2019.
95. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019," 10/18/2019.
96. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 8/27/2016; OSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2018, 1/12/2019, and 10/10/2019; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2018, p. 75; OUSD-P, email to SIGAR, 1/13/2017.

ENDNOTES

97. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 8/27/2016; OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2018; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2018, p. 75.
98. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 10/2019.
99. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 10/2019.
100. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 10/2019.
101. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 10/2019.
102. ACLED, South Asia 2016–Present dataset, 6/1/2019–8/31/2019, available online at <https://www.acleddata.com>; SIGAR, analysis of ACLED data, 10/2019.
103. ACLED, South Asia 2016–Present dataset, 6/1/2019–8/31/2019, available online at <https://www.acleddata.com>; ACLED, “ACLED Codebook (2019),” 4/2019, p. 7; SIGAR, analysis of ACLED data, 10/2019.
104. ACLED, South Asia 2016–Present dataset, 6/1/2019–8/31/2019, available online at <https://www.acleddata.com>; SIGAR, analysis of ACLED data, 10/2019.
105. ACLED, South Asia 2016–Present dataset, 1/1/2019–8/31/2019, available online at <https://www.acleddata.com>; SIGAR, analysis of ACLED data, 10/2019.
106. UNAMA, Quarterly Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 September 2019, 10/17/2019, p. 3.
107. UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians Special Report: 2019 Election Violence, 10/2019, p. 1.
108. UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians Special Report: 2019 Election Violence, 10/2019, p. 1.
109. UNAMA, Quarterly Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 September 2019, 10/17/2019, pp. 3–4.
110. UNAMA, Quarterly Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 September 2019, 10/17/2019, pp. 3–4.
111. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019 and 6/21/2019; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 10/2019.
112. RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2019.
113. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019 and 6/21/2019; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 10/2019.
114. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 10/2019.
115. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 10/2019.
116. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019 and 6/21/2019; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 10/2019.
117. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019; UNAMA, Quarterly Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 September, 2019, 10/17/2019, p. 3; SIGAR, analysis of UNAMA and RS-provided data, 10/2019.
118. RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2019.
119. OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/23/2019.
120. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, p. 3; DOD, “Remarks by Secretary Esper in a Joint Press Conference With Senior Afghan Officials and Resolute Support Mission Commander,” 10/21/2019.
121. OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/23/2019.
122. DOD, “Secretary of Defense Esper Media Engagement En Route to Afghanistan,” 10/19/2019.
123. DOD, “U.S. Military Casualties–Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS), Casualty Summary by Casualty Category,” and “U.S. Military Casualties–Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Casualty Summary by Casualty Category,” accessed 10/17/2019 and 7/16/2019; SIGAR, analysis of DOD data, 10/2019.
124. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019, 9/20/2018, and 9/2/2017; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 9/2019.
125. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/14/2019; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 10/2019.
126. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
127. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
128. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
129. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019 and 10/14/2019; DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, p. 33; OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/17/2019.
130. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019 and 10/14/2019; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 9/2019; DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, p. 33.
131. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 9/2019.
132. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019.
133. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019, 9/20/2018, and 9/2/2017; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 9/2019.
134. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/17/2019.
135. OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2019.
136. DOD OIG, Audit of the Planning for and Implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System, 8/15/2019, i-ii.
137. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019 and 10/17/2019.
138. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 11/26/2016; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/15/2016 and 1/12/2019; OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/14/2018; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
139. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2018 and response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019.
140. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2018.
141. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2018.
142. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2018 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/17/2019.
143. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2018.
144. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2018; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 9/2018.
145. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
146. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/21/2019, 3/20/2019, and 6/20/2018.
147. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019.
148. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/21/2019, 3/20/2019, and 6/20/2018.
149. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
150. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019, 6/21/2019, 9/20/2018, and 9/2/2017; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019.
151. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019.

ENDNOTES

152. MOD data is as of 6/30/2019, and MOI data is as of 8/31/2019. RS Gender Advisory Office, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019, 6/21/2019, and 9/20/2018; RS Gender Advisory Office, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 9/2018.
153. RS Gender Advisory Office, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 9/2019.
154. RS Gender Advisory Office, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
155. RS Gender Advisory Office, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
156. RS Gender Advisory Office, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
157. RS Gender Advisory Office, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
158. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 12/20/2018.
159. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
160. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019.
161. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
162. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019.
163. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019," 10/18/2019.
164. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019," 10/18/2019.
165. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 9/20/2018; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 9/2019.
166. CTSC-A reported \$6.4 million spent on domestic travel last quarter, but about \$2 million of that was refunded this quarter. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 9/2019.
167. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019.
168. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019," 10/18/2019.
169. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
170. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019; OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/4/2019.
171. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019.
172. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019," 10/18/2019.
173. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
174. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
175. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
176. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019," 10/18/2019.
177. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 9/2019; TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
178. DOD, FY 2019 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) Financial Activity Plan (FAP 19-2), 6/2019; OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019.
179. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 9/2019.
180. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/21/2019; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 6/2019.
181. TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019 and 6/21/2019; TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019; SIGAR, analysis of TAAC-Air-provided data, 10/2019.
182. TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019; TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2019.
183. TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019; TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2019.
184. This quarter, TAAC-Air began providing operational data on the new AC-208 aircraft, but because there is no point of comparison for this data this quarter, SIGAR will begin reporting on it next quarter. TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019 and 6/21/2019; TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019 and 10/15/2019; SIGAR, analysis of TAAC-Air-provided data, 10/2019.
185. TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019 and 6/21/2019; TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019; SIGAR, analysis of TAAC-Air-provided data, 10/2019.
186. TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019 and 6/21/2019; TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019; SIGAR, analysis of TAAC-Air-provided data, 10/2019; DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, p. 32.
187. TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019 and 6/21/2019; TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019; SIGAR, analysis of TAAC-Air-provided data, 10/2019.
188. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2018.
189. TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call, 6/21/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019; SIGAR, analysis of TAAC-Air-provided data, 7/2019.
190. TAAC-Air, response to DOD OIG data call, 10/5/2019 and 7/4/2019.
191. TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call, 10/3/2019 and 6/21/2019; SIGAR, analysis of TAAC-Air-provided data, 10/2019.
192. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2019 and 6/21/2019; NSOCC-A, correspondence with SIGAR, 9/30/2019; SIGAR, analysis of NSOCC-A-provided data, 10/2019; NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/15/2019.
193. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2019; SIGAR, analysis of NSOCC-A-provided data, 10/2019.
194. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019.
195. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019; DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019.
196. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019; NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
197. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
198. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019," 10/18/2019.
199. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019," 10/18/2019.
200. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 8/27/2016; OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2018; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2018, p. 75.

ENDNOTES

201. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 9/2019.
202. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 9/20/2018; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 9/2019.
203. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
204. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 9/20/2018; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 9/2019.
205. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
206. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019.
207. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019,” 10/18/2019.
208. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
209. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019.
210. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019,” 10/18/2019.
211. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
212. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
213. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
214. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2019,” 10/18/2019.
215. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 8/27/2016; OSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2018; USIP, Special Report 322, Police Transition in Afghanistan, 2/2013; DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2017, p. 33.
216. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/21/2019 and 3/20/2019; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019.
217. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019.
218. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 6/21/2019; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019 and 10/10/2019.
219. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
220. Fondation Suisse de Déminage website, “Afghanistan,” <https://fsd.ch/en/project/afghanistan/>, accessed 4/1/2019.
221. E-Mine/UN Mine Action website, “Portfolio on Mine Action,” Afghanistan Country Portfolio, 2018, <https://mineaction.org/en/portfolio-of-mine-action-projects>, accessed 7/1/2019.
222. The New York Times, Mujib Mashal, “Left-Behind Explosives Taking Deadlier Toll on Afghan Children, U.N. Says, 2/6/2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/world/asia/afghanistan-war-civilian-casualties-un-report.html>, accessed 10/18/2019.
223. E-Mine/UN Mine Action website, “Portfolio on Mine Action,” Afghanistan Country Portfolio, 2018, <https://mineaction.org/en/portfolio-of-mine-action-projects>, accessed 7/1/2019.
224. State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/23/2019.
225. E-Mine/UN Mine Action website, “Portfolio on Mine Action,” Afghanistan Country Portfolio, 2018; State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/11/2019.
226. PM/WRA, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/11/2019.
227. PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/23/2019.
228. PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/23/2019; U.S. Census Bureau, “Quick Facts: District of Columbia,” <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/dc/LND110210#viewtop>, accessed 10/4/2018.
229. State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/23/2019; NIST, The United States and the Metric System: A Capsule in History, 1997, p. 8, <https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pml/wmd/metric/1136a.pdf>, accessed 10/6/2018.
230. USAID, Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC), Implementation Plan—Year 1, FY2018–19: March 12, 2018 to March 11, 2019, 8/8/2018, p. 1; USAID, OAPA–17–JULY–AFG–0037, Initial Environmental Examination, 7/5/2017.
231. 218. USAID, Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC), Quarterly Report, Q1–FY 2019 (October 1 to December 31, 2018), 2/11/2019, p. 6.
232. USAID, Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC), Quarterly Report, Q2–FY 2019 (January 1–March 31, 2018, 5/12/2019, p. 8; USAID, Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC), Quarterly Report, Q1–FY 2019 (October 1 to December 31, 2018), 2/11/2019, p. 6.
233. Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC) Quarterly Report, FY 2019 Quarter 3 (April 1–June 30, 2019), 7/30/2019, p. 8.
234. Alice G. Wells, “The Trump Administration’s Afghanistan Policy,” testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 9/19/2019; Trump, Donald. @realDonaldTrump, “Unbeknownst to almost everyone, the major Taliban leaders and, separately, the President of Afghanistan, were going to secretly meet with me at Camp David on Sunday. They were coming to the United States tonight. Unfortunately, in order to build false leverage, they admitted to..,” 9/7/2019, <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1170469619154530305>; State, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2019.
235. Khalilzad, Zalmay. (@US4AfghanPeace), “We are at the threshold of an agreement that will reduce violence and open the door for Afghans to sit together to negotiate an honorable & sustainable peace and a unified, sovereign Afghanistan that does not threaten the United States, its allies, or any other country,” 8/31/2019, <https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/status/1167945304290672642>.
236. Trump, Donald. @realDonaldTrump, “Unbeknownst to almost everyone, the major Taliban leaders and, separately, the President of Afghanistan, were going to secretly meet with me at Camp David on Sunday. They were coming to the United States tonight. Unfortunately, in order to build false leverage, they admitted to..,” 9/7/2019, <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1170469619154530305>.
237. New York Times, “Trump Declares Afghan Peace Talks With Taliban ‘Dead,’” 9/9/2019.
238. State, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2019.
239. Reuters, “Pakistan and Taliban call for U.S. to resume Afghan peace talks,” 10/3/2019.
240. Reuters, “Afghan election set to see big drop in voter numbers,” 9/29/2019; Washington Post, “Afghan presidential vote spared major violence, but turnout sharply lower,” 9/28/2019.
241. Spiegel Online, “Afghan President Ghani: ‘The Taliban Miscalculated Massively on All Fronts,’” 10/7/2019.
242. Voice of America News, “Ghani, Abdullah Claim Victory in Afghan Presidential Election,” 9/30/2019.

ENDNOTES

243. IEC, "Presidential Election 28 Sep 2019," 5/21/2019; New York Times, "Both Afghan Candidates Claim the Lead Even Before Votes Are Tallied," 9/30/2019; State, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2019.
244. DOD, CSTC-A, CJ3-5/7, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2019, p. 118.
245. See Appendix B.
246. Alice G. Wells, "The Trump Administration's Afghanistan Policy," testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 9/19/2019; Trump, Donald. (@realDonaldTrump), "Unbeknownst to almost everyone, the major Taliban leaders and, separately, the President of Afghanistan, were going to secretly meet with me at Camp David on Sunday. They were coming to the United States tonight. Unfortunately, in order to build false leverage, they admitted to..," 9/7/2019, <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1170469619154530305>.
247. Trump, Donald. (@realDonaldTrump), "Unbeknownst to almost everyone, the major Taliban leaders and, separately, the President of Afghanistan, were going to secretly meet with me at Camp David on Sunday. They were coming to the United States tonight. Unfortunately, in order to build false leverage, they admitted to..," 9/7/2019, <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1170469619154530305>.
248. Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, interview with George Stephanopoulos, 9/8/2019, <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-22-19-secretary-mike-pompeo-gen/story?id=65778332>.
249. Khalilzad, Zalmay. (@US4AfghanPeace), "We are at the threshold of an agreement that will reduce violence and open the door for Afghans to sit together to negotiate an honorable & sustainable peace and a unified, sovereign Afghanistan that does not threaten the United States, its allies, or any other country," 8/31/2019, <https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/status/1167945304290672642>.
250. Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, interview with George Stephanopoulos, 9/8/2019, <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-22-19-secretary-mike-pompeo-gen/story?id=65778332>.
251. Hamdullah Mohib, "A Conversation with National Security Advisor Hamdullah Mohib of Afghanistan," event hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/1/2019.
252. Spiegel Online, "Afghan President Ghani: 'The Taliban Miscalculated Massively on All Fronts,'" 10/7/2019.
253. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, 3/26/2019, p. 4.
254. Alice G. Wells, "The Trump Administration's Afghanistan Policy," testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 9/19/2019.
255. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan; Day After Peace Program-Towards an Inclusive, Sustainable & Equitable Peace, 7/2019, p. 3.
256. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, 3/26/2019.
257. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, 3/26/2019, p. 28.
258. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
259. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, 3/26/2019, p. 4.
260. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, 3/26/2019, pp. 10, 28; Government of Afghanistan, A Roadmap for Subnational Reform: Citizen-Centered Governance, 7/2018, p. 11.
261. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, 3/26/2019, p. 5.
262. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
263. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019.
264. Alice G. Wells, "The Trump Administration's Afghanistan Policy," testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 9/19/2019.
265. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan; Day After Peace Program-Towards an Inclusive, Sustainable & Equitable Peace, 7/2019, pp. 3, 8, 27.
266. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan; Day After Peace Program-Towards an Inclusive, Sustainable & Equitable Peace, 7/2019, pp. 8–10.
267. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan; Day After Peace Program-Towards an Inclusive, Sustainable & Equitable Peace, 7/2019, p. 4.
268. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan; Day After Peace Program-Towards an Inclusive, Sustainable & Equitable Peace, 7/2019, p. 9.
269. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan; Day After Peace Program-Towards an Inclusive, Sustainable & Equitable Peace, 7/2019, p. 4.
270. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan; Day After Peace Program-Towards an Inclusive, Sustainable & Equitable Peace, 7/2019, pp. 4–5.
271. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan; Day After Peace Program-Towards an Inclusive, Sustainable & Equitable Peace, 7/2019, p. 3.
272. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan; Day After Peace Program-Towards an Inclusive, Sustainable & Equitable Peace, 7/2019, p. 5.
273. For examples of previous HPC efforts, see page 104 of the July 30, 2019, SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019; Afghanistan Analysts Network, Afghan Reactions to the High Peace Council, 10/14/2010.
274. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019.
275. USAID, OTI, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
276. USAID, "Working in Crises and Conflict: Political Transition Initiatives-Background," 5/2/2016.
277. USAID, "Working in Crises and Conflict: Political Transition Initiatives-Where We Work-Closed Programs-Afghanistan," 12/1/2017.
278. Reuters, "Afghan election set to see big drop in voter numbers," 9/29/2019; Washington Post, "Afghan presidential vote spared major violence, but turnout sharply lower," 9/28/2019.
279. ToloNEWS, "Only Biometric-Confirmed Votes Will Be Counted: IEC," 9/25/2019.
280. Afghanistan Analysts Network, "Afghanistan's 2019 Election (11): A first look at how E-Day went," 9/28/2019; Reuters,

ENDNOTES

- “Afghan women fear mandatory poll photos could stop them from voting,” 9/25/2019.
281. Michael R. Pompeo, “Press Statement: On Afghanistan’s Upcoming Presidential Election,” 9/18/2019.
 282. Michael R. Pompeo, “Remarks to the Traveling Press,” 9/19/2019.
 283. UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, report of the Secretary-General, 9/3/2019, p. 3.
 284. VOA, “Ignoring UNAMA, Taliban Threaten Afghan Elections Again,” 9/26/2019.
 285. UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians Special Report: 2019 Election Violence, 10/2019.
 286. Gallup, “Inside Afghanistan: Nearly Nine in 10 Afghans Are Suffering,” 9/16/2019; Gallup, “Inside Afghanistan: Nearly Half of Afghan Women Want to Leave,” 9/23/2019.
 287. USAID, AID-306-I0-15-00006: Modification 08, 4/29/2018.
 288. UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, report of the Secretary-General, 9/3/2019, p. 2.
 289. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.
 290. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018; NDI, Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening, 2017.
 291. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019.
 292. For background information on the Afghanistan Compact, see pages 120–121 of SIGAR’s April 30, 2018, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.
 293. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2019, p. 114.
 294. State, Joint Statement Regarding the U.S.-Afghanistan Civilian Assistance Review, 5/14/2019; State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019.
 295. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019; State, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2019.
 296. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
 297. Reuters, “U.S. ambassador rebukes Afghan president over aid agency criticism,” 9/27/2019.
 298. Bass, John. @USAmbKabul, “We are disappointed that President @ashrafghani has overlooked the excellent work of @USAID and the details of our #enduringpartnership to improve the lives of Afghans throughout the country,” 9/26/2019, <https://twitter.com/USAmbKabul/status/1177297139283714048>.
 299. Council of the EU, “Brussels Conference on Afghanistan: main results,” 10/5/2016, p. 1.
 300. UNAMA, “Geneva Conference on Afghanistan: Joint Communiqué,” 11/28/2018, pp. 1, 5–6.
 301. World Bank, 2019 Incentive Program Development Policy Operation (P168446): Program Document, 5/23/2019, p. 13.
 302. World Bank, 2019 Incentive Program Development Policy Operation (P168446): Program Document, 5/23/2019, p. 14.
 303. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/13/2014; USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2017; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Communiqué: Conference Outcomes, Contributions and Participants,” 1/28/2010, p. 5; “The Tokyo Declaration: Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan from Transition to Transformation,” 7/8/2012; USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/13/2014; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF), 9/5/2015, p. 6; USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/10/2018.
 304. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018 and 3/21/2019; USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
 305. NATO, “Brussels Summit Declaration,” 7/11/2018.
 306. Ministry of Finance, “The Pathway to Self-Reliance: Reform Progress and Priorities for Growth and Development,” 11/2018, p. 13.
 307. “Geneva Conference on Afghanistan: Joint Communiqué,” 11/28/2018, p. 6.
 308. State, “Statement on Accountability and Anti-Corruption in Afghanistan,” 9/19/2019.
 309. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2017, pp. 9–10.
 310. State, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2019.
 311. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.
 312. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR data call, 12/30/2013.
 313. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR data call, 6/30/2014.
 314. USAID, “Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF),” 8/26/2013.
 315. USAID, “U.S. government contributed \$105 million to Asian Development Bank Infrastructure Fund for Afghanistan,” 3/18/2014.
 316. World Bank, “Administrator’s Report on Financial Status,” 7/22/2019, p. 4.
 317. World Bank, “Recurrent Cost Window,” 2019.
 318. World Bank, “Administrator’s Report on Financial Status,” 7/22/2019, p. 2; World Bank, “Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: Strategy and Finances,” 2019.
 319. World Bank, ARTF Brief, 7/2019, p. 3.
 320. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2019, p. 117.
 321. World Bank, “Administrator’s Report on Financial Status,” 7/22/2019, p. 6.
 322. For the full list of 2019 incentive benchmarks, see pp. 114–115 of SIGAR’s July 2019 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. World Bank, 2019 Incentive Program Development Policy Operation (P168446): Program Document, 5/23/2019, p. 7.
 323. State, “Statement on Accountability and Anti-Corruption in Afghanistan,” 9/19/2019.
 324. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
 325. USAID, SIGAR communications, 9/26/2019.
 326. USAID, SIGAR communications, 9/26/2019.
 327. World Bank, “Strategy Group Ad Hoc Meeting on Fiduciary Risk in the ARTF Portfolio,” 7/24/2019; World Bank, “EQUIP II in-depth fiduciary review–FAQs,” 7/25/2019.
 328. World Bank, Afghanistan - Second Education Quality Improvement Program, 8/31/2019.
 329. World Bank, “EQUIP II in-depth fiduciary review–FAQs,” 7/25/2019.
 330. World Bank, “Strategy Group Ad Hoc Meeting on Fiduciary Risk in the ARTF Portfolio,” 7/24/2019.
 331. USAID, SIGAR communications, 9/26/2019.
 332. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2019, p. 53.

ENDNOTES

333. World Bank, 2019 Incentive Program Development Policy Operation (P168446): Program Document, 5/23/2019, p. 7.
334. DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2017; DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018.
335. DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2017; DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018.
336. DOD, CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 7/1/2014.
337. DOD, CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 4/4/2014.
338. CSTC-A, "CSTC-A Funding Authorization Letter for the Ministry of Defense (MoD)," 1/3/2019, p. 1; DOD, "CSTC-A Funding Authorization Letter for the Ministry of Interior (MoI)," 1/11/2019, p. 1.
339. DOD, CSTC-A, RM, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
340. DOD, CSTC-A, RM, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
341. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 7/30/2019, p. 61.
342. DOD, CSTC-A, RM, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
343. DOD, CSTC-A, CJ3-5/7, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
344. For examples of the conditions that led CSTC-A to impose financial penalties, see pages 131–133 of SIGAR's April 30, 2017, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. DOD, CSTC-A, CJ3-5/7, response to SIGAR data call, 3/21/2019, 6/20/2019, and 9/18/2019; DOD, USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
345. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 7/30/2015, p. 3.
346. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2019, p. 118.
347. DOD, CSTC-A, CJ3-5/7, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
348. Counterpart International, Afghan Civic Engagement Program (ACEP): Quarterly Report–PY6 | January–March 2019, 4/30/2019, p. 5.
349. Counterpart International, Afghan Civic Engagement Program (ACEP): Quarterly Report–PY6 | January–March 2019, 4/30/2019, p. 6.
350. USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/10/2018; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/11/2019.
351. Internews Network, Rasana: Quarterly Report: January 01, 2019–March 31, 2019, n.d.
352. Internews Network, Salam Watandar Production Report April–June 2019, n.d.
353. Hamdullah Mohib, "A Conversation with National Security Advisor Hamdullah Mohib of Afghanistan," event hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/1/2019.
354. Tetra Tech ARD, Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations in Afghanistan (ISLA) Project) Monthly Report, February 2015, 3/15/2015, ii; USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/22/2016; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.
355. Tetra Tech, USAID Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations: Monthly Report, 4/30/2019.
356. Tetra Tech, USAID Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations: Monthly Report, 4/30/2019.
357. Tetra Tech, USAID Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations: Quarterly Report, 7/30/2019, p. 38.
358. Development Alternatives Inc., Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience (SHAHAR): Monthly Report February 2015, 3/15/2015, p. 4; USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2017; USAID, "Modification 07/REQM-306-1 7-000434," 11/28/2017, p. 1; DAI, Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience (SHAHAR) Monthly Report # 38, 2/15/2018, p. 6; USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/10/2019.
359. DAI, USAID Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience (SHAHAR): Monthly Report # 56, 8/15/2019, pp. 15, 18–19.
360. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2019, p. 124.
361. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, 3/26/2019, pp. 10, 28; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan: Day After Peace Program-Towards an Inclusive, Sustainable & Equitable Peace, 7/2019, pp. 8–10.
362. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2019, p. 124.
363. State, "Statement on Accountability and Anti-Corruption in Afghanistan," 9/19/2019.
364. USAID, SIGAR communications, 9/26/2019.
365. USAID, "Support to Afghanistan's Independent Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC)," 3/11/2019.
366. USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR data call, 6/25/2015; USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2015.
367. USAID, Action Memorandum: Amendment to MEC DCAR with DFID, 11/17/2016.
368. USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
369. Management Systems International, Afghanistan's Measure for Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT): Quarterly Performance Report: FY 2018, Quarter 3, 7/31/2018, pp. 1–2.
370. USAID, "Fact Sheet: Afghanistan's Measure for Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT)," 3/11/2019.
371. Management Systems International, Ministry of Education Institutional Political Economy Analysis of Corruption, 7/26/2019, p. 1.
372. Management Systems International, Ministry of Education Institutional Political Economy Analysis of Corruption, 7/26/2019, pp. 6–7.
373. Management Systems International, Ministry of Public Health Institutional Political Economy Analysis of Corruption, 7/26/2019, p. 1.
374. Management Systems International, Ministry of Public Health Institutional Political Economy Analysis of Corruption, 7/26/2019, p. 2.
375. USAID, Contract AID-OAA-I-13-0034/AID-306-TO-16-00007, 4/16/2016, pp. 1, 8; USAID, Contract AID-OAA-I-13-0034/AID-306-TO-16-00007: Modification 01, 7/31/2016, p. 3; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.
376. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2017, p. 138.
377. Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency (ADALAT) Annual Work Plan April 2019–March 2020, 4/8/2019, pp. 14–15.
378. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2019, pp. 124–125.
379. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2018, p. 142.
380. Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program, Bi-Weekly Report # 15 (Option Year 1) August 16-31, 2019, 8/31/2019, p. 4.

ENDNOTES

381. Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program, Bi-Weekly Report # 15 (Option Year 1) August 1-15, 2019, 8/15/2019, p. 4.
382. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, The Constitution of Afghanistan, 1/26/2004.
383. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/23/2018 and 10/17/2019.
384. IDLO, Quarterly Reporting for US/INL Funded Projects, 7/31/2019, p. 2.
385. PAE, CSSP Baseline Needs Assessment, 6/16/2019, p. 8.
386. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
387. PAE, CSSP Baseline Needs Assessment, 6/16/2019, p. 9.
388. PAE, CSSP Baseline Needs Assessment, 6/16/2019, p. 38.
389. DOJ, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
390. DOJ, Department of Justice/Office of the Deputy Attorney General-INL Inter-Agency Agreement (December 30, 2016) Amendment One Counter-Corruption, Major Crimes, Counter-narcotics, and National Security Investigation and Prosecution Program Quarterly Progress Report Second Quarter, FY 2019 (April 2019–June 2019), n.d., p. 10.
391. DOJ, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
392. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2019, pp. 126–127.
393. DOD, CSTC-A ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
394. AGO, “Ex-Chairmen Of IEC & ECC And Eight Commissioners Jailed For Five Years,” 9/3/2019.
395. AGO, “Six Of The Employees Of The MORR Sentenced To Two Years Of Custodial Imprisonment,” 9/21/2019.
396. DOD, CSTC-A ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 7/30/2019, p. 128.
397. SIGAR analysis of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Attorney General’s Office, Office of Database Management, “Primary Court’s Financial Order” and “Financail [sic] Orders Enforced, Recovered and Deposited into AGO’s Account, [sic]” 8/27/2019.
398. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Attorney General’s Office, Office of Database Management, “Military - Rank Based Conviction” and “Civilians - Rank Based Conviction,” 8/27/2019.
399. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL and TAO, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
400. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL and TAO, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
401. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL and TAO, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
402. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL and TAO, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
403. DOD, USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
404. DOD, CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
405. DOD, CSTC-A, EF3, response to SIGAR data call, 12/1/2017 and 3/22/2018.
406. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
407. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
408. State, PRM, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/9/2019.
409. State, PRM, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/9/2019.
410. SIGAR analysis of UNHCR, “Number of Afghan refugees returning to Afghanistan (1 Jan to 02 October 2019),” 10/2/2019.
411. IOM, “Return of Undocumented Afghans Weekly Situation Report,” 9/21/2019, p. 1.
412. SIGAR analysis of UN, OCHA, “Summary of conflict induced displacements (1 Jan to 04 Aug 2019),” 9/22/2019; SIGAR analysis of UN, OCHA, “Summary of conflict induced displacements (1 Jan to 31 Dec 2018),” 1/28/2019.
413. USAID, “Remarks by Administrator Rajiv Shah at the U.S. Institute of Peace Regarding Afghanistan Promote,” 7/18/2013.
414. USAID, “Promote,” 12/17/2018.
415. USAID, OG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2016.
416. USAID, OG, response to SIGAR data call, 6/20/2019.
417. Chemonics International Inc., USAID Promote: Women in Government Quarterly Progress Report FY 2019 Quarter 3: April–June 2019, 7/30/2019, pp. 19–20.
418. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, i–ii. (The date noted is the latest version of the Bank’s plan; it was released on August 22, 2019).
419. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, i, p. 10.
420. SIGAR, 2019 High-Risk List, 3/27/2019, p. 30.
421. SIGAR, communications with USAID official, 9/30/2019; State, “Statement on Accountability and Anti-Corruption in Afghanistan,” Press Statement, 9/19/2019.
422. SIGAR, communications with USAID official, 9/30/2019; State, “Statement on Accountability and Anti-Corruption in Afghanistan,” Press Statement, 9/19/2019.
423. New York Times, “U.S. Cuts \$100 Million in Aid to Afghanistan, Citing Government Corruption,” 9/19/2019; Washington Post, “U.S. withdrawing \$100 million in aid to Afghanistan amid corruption concerns,” 9/19/2019; Al Jazeera, “Incapable of being a partner: US cuts \$160m aid to Afghanistan,” 9/19/2019; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2019, pp. 149, 167–168.
424. State, “Statement on Accountability and Anti-Corruption in Afghanistan,” Press Statement, 9/19/2019.
425. State, “Statement on Accountability and Anti-Corruption in Afghanistan,” Press Statement, 9/19/2019.
426. USAID, OPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019; SIGAR, communication with USAID official, 9/26/2019.
427. State, “Statement on Accountability and Anti-Corruption in Afghanistan,” Press Statement, 9/19/2019. SIGAR, USAID’s Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project: The Project is Behind Schedule, and Questions Remain about the Afghan Government’s Ability to Use and Maintain the New Power Infrastructure, SIGAR-19-57-AR, 9/2019, pp. 7–8;
428. State, “Statement on Accountability and Anti-Corruption in Afghanistan,” Press Statement, 9/19/2019.
429. SIGAR, communications with USAID officials, 1/2/2018.
430. SIGAR, communications with USAID officials, 1/2/2018.
431. NSIA, “Growth-Rate-of-GDP,” 6/10/2019; NSIA, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2017–18, 8/2018, p. 110; SIGAR analysis.
432. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018 Cultivation and Production, 11/2018, p. 5.
433. NSIA, “Economical Growth [sic],” n.d., <https://nsia.gov.af/home>, accessed 9/17/2019; World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, p. 2.

ENDNOTES

434. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 10/8/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019.
435. IMF, Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, 5/15/2019, p. 26; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2019, p. 43.
436. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 10/7/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019.
437. State, Integrated Country Strategy: Afghanistan, 9/27/2018, pp. 2–3.
438. State, Integrated Country Strategy: Afghanistan, 9/27/2018, p. 4.
439. State, Integrated Country Strategy: Afghanistan, 9/27/2018, p. 4.
440. USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategy, 3/31/2019, p. 26.
441. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, pp. 2, 6.
442. NSIA, Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016–17, 8/2018, xxix.
443. The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2018, 11/2018, p. 117.
444. See Appendix B for a breakdown of U.S. reconstruction funding since 2002.
445. The term “public expenditures” includes both on and off-budget spending. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, pp. 1, 5, 19.
446. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, i; IMF, Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, 5/15/2019, p. 24; NSIA, “Economical Growth [sic],” n.d., <https://nsia.gov.af/home>, accessed 9/17/2019; NSIA, “Growth-Rate-of-GDP,” 6/9/2019; SIGAR analysis.
447. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, i.
448. World Bank, “South Asia: Overview,” last updated 4/5/2019, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/overview>, accessed 6/27/2019.
449. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, i, p. 18; IMF, Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, 5/15/2019, p. 8; IMF, “IMF Staff Completes 2019 Article IV and Sixth ECF Review Mission to Afghanistan,” 10/11/2019.
450. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, p. 31.
451. SIGAR conclusion based on data presented in World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, p. 5.
452. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, iii.
453. IMF, Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, 5/15/2019, p. 8.
454. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, i–ii (The date noted is the latest version of the Bank’s plan; it was released on August 22, 2019).
455. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, i, pp. 10, 29.
456. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, ii.
457. UNAMA, “Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Peace, Self-Reliance and Connectivity,” 11/28/2018, p. 4.
458. SIGAR, 2019 High-Risk List, 3/27/2019, p. 30.
459. UNAMA, “Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Peace, Self-Reliance and Connectivity,” 11/28/2018, p. 4.
460. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, pp. 17, 20.
461. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, i–ii, p. 10.
462. SIGAR analysis of World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019.
463. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, p. 5.
464. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, pp. 10–11.
465. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, p. 10; World Bank, “Projects and Operations: EQRA,” n.d., <http://projects.worldbank.org/P159378?lang=en>, accessed 9/26/2019.
466. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, p. 11; World Bank, “Projects and Operations: EQRA,” n.d., <http://projects.worldbank.org/P159378?lang=en>, accessed 9/26/2019.
467. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, p. 25; USAID, OEG, “Afghanistan Trade and Revenue Project (ATAR),” 5/2019, pp. 1–2.
468. SIGAR, USAID’S Afghan Trade and Revenue: Program Has Failed to Achieve Goals for Implementation Of E-Payment System to Collect Customs Revenues, SIGAR-17-61-SP, 8/2017, p. 7.
469. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, i–ii, p. 12.
470. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, p. 12; USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
471. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, p. 29.
472. USIP, “Afghan Government Revenue, Critical for Peace, Grows in 2019,” 8/15/2019; World Bank, Post-Settlement

ENDNOTES

- Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, p. 3.
473. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2013, iv–v.
474. SIGAR, 2019 High-Risk List, 3/27/2019, ii.
475. SIGAR, 2019 High-Risk List, 3/27/2019, p. 3.
476. SIGAR, 2019 High-Risk List, 3/27/2019, pp. 3; World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, Version 2.5, 3/26/2019, p. 29–30.
477. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 10/8/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019.
478. SIGAR, 2019 High-Risk List, 3/27/2019, pp. 30–31, 61; SIGAR conclusion based on analysis of available data sources. For example, see World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update, 8/2018, p. 15, where staff projections show increasing reliance in coming years on foreign grants as a percentage of domestic revenue; SIGAR, Private Sector Development and Economic Growth: Lessons from the U.S. Afghanistan Experience, 4/2018, ix.
479. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 10/8/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019.
480. Government of Afghanistan, MOF, “Chart of Accounts 1398 v1.1.”
481. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 10/8/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019.
482. USAID, OEG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
483. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 10/8/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019; Government of Afghanistan, MOF, “Chart of Accounts 1398 v1.1.”
484. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 10/8/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019; Government of Afghanistan, MOF, “Chart of Accounts 1398 v1.1.”
485. SIGAR, communications with MOF officials, 7/2/2019, 7/1/2019, and 8/21/2017.
486. Neither the IMF nor the MOF consider foreign exchange profit to be a “sustainable” source of revenue. However, in the case of foreign exchange profits, the distinction between “sustainable” and “one-off” revenues may in fact be arbitrary. Afghanistan has billions of dollars in foreign exchange reserves. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 10/8/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019; SIGAR, communications with MOF officials, 8/21/2017; SIGAR, communications with IMF officials, 9/7/2017.
487. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 10/7/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019.
488. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 10/7/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019.
489. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 10/7/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019.
490. USIP, “Afghan Government Revenue, Critical for Peace, Grows in 2019,” 8/15/2019.
491. USIP, “Afghan Government Revenue, Critical for Peace, Grows in 2019,” 8/15/2019.
492. USIP, “Afghan Government Revenue, Critical for Peace, Grows in 2019,” 8/15/2019.
493. USIP, “Afghan Government Revenue, Critical for Peace, Grows in 2019,” 8/15/2019.
494. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, p. 17.
495. USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategy, 3/31/2019, p. 9.
496. SIGAR analysis of quarterly NSIA trade data, accessed 3/23/2019, 6/21/2019, and 9/22/2019.
497. Exports contracted in U.S. dollar terms. Afghanistan’s National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA) does not publish quarterly export data in afghani. While nominal exports (i.e. U.S. dollar amounts reported by the NSIA converted back into afghani using monthly exchange rates published by Afghanistan’s central bank) increased by 7.8% in the second quarter of 2019, compared to the second quarter of 2018, the rates of nominal growth in the first and second quarters of 2019 were far lower than nominal growth rates in the first and second quarters of 2018. Deceleration, in other words, is observable irrespective of currency denomination. SIGAR analysis of quarterly NSIA trade data, accessed 3/23/2019, 6/21/2019, and 9/22/2019.
498. The World Trade Organization (of which Afghanistan is a member) prohibits export subsidies, subject to limited exceptions, because they provide an unfair competitive advantage to recipients and therefore distort market dynamics. However, exceptions are made for specified developing countries. IMF, Fifth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, 5/15/2019, p. 6; USAID, OEG, response to SIGAR data call, 3/21/2019; USAID, OEG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
499. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 7/30/2019, p. 141.
500. USAID, OEG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2018.
501. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, p. 18.
502. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, p. 18. USAID, OEG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2018.
503. IMF, Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan: Selected Issues, 12/2017, pp. 12–13.
504. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019; White House, “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Morrison of Australia Before Bilateral Meeting,” 9/20/2019.
505. White House, “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Morrison of Australia Before Bilateral Meeting,” 9/20/2019.
506. White House, “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Morrison of Australia Before Bilateral Meeting,” 9/20/2019; Treasury, OFAC, “Counter Terrorism Designations; IRGC Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation,” 4/15/2019; White House, “Statement from the President on the Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” 4/8/2019.

ENDNOTES

507. New York Times, "Trump Announces New Sanctions on Iran," 9/20/2019; State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019.
508. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019.
509. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019.
510. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019; UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Cultivation and Production, 11/2018, p. 8.
511. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019; UN, IOM, "About IOM," n.d., <https://www.iom.int/about-iom>, accessed 9/22/2019.
512. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, i-ii.
513. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, ii.
514. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, ii.
515. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, p. 7.
516. World Bank, Combined Project Information Documents/ Integrated Safeguards Datasheet (PID/ISDS), 2/8/2018, p. 5; DAB, "Licensed Financial Institutions," n.d., <http://www.dab.gov.af/Licensed-Financial-Institutions>, accessed 6/17/2019.
517. World Bank, The Global Findex Database 2017: Measuring Financial Inclusion and the Fintech Revolution, 5/2/2018, pp. 123, 127.
518. Government of Afghanistan, DAB, National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2020 – 2024, Draft dated 9/4/2019, p. 17.
519. State, "Strengthening the Strategic Partnership of the United States and Afghanistan," 3/24/2015; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019.
520. State, "Strengthening the Strategic Partnership of the United States and Afghanistan," 3/24/2015; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019.
521. Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2017 and 3/24/2017.
522. Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2017.
523. State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume II Money Laundering, 3/2019, pp. 14, 35; IMF, Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, 5/15/2019, p. 12.
524. The European Commission must revise the list due to an objection, raised by the Council of the European Union, that the list was compiled in an insufficiently transparent manner. FATF, "Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process - 22 February 2019," 2/22/2019; IMF, Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, 5/15/2019, p. 12.
525. State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume II Money Laundering, 3/2019, p. 14.
526. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019; USIP, Responding to Corruption and the Kabul Bank Collapse, 12/2016, p. 2; The Guardian, "The financial scandal that broke Afghanistan's Kabul Bank," 6/16/2011.
527. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019; USIP, Responding to Corruption and the Kabul Bank Collapse, 12/2016, p. 2; Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, Report of the Public Inquiry into the Kabul Bank Crisis, 11/15/2012, p. 2.
528. TOLONews, "US Envoy Criticizes Release Of Ex-CEO Of Kabul Bank," 8/15/2019; USIP, Responding to Corruption and the Kabul Bank Collapse, 12/2016, p. 2.
529. Ambassador John R. Bass, Twitter post, 8/15/2019, <https://twitter.com/USAmbKabul/status/1161986785318187009>, accessed on 8/15/2019.
530. TOLONews, "US Envoy Criticizes Release Of Ex-CEO Of Kabul Bank," 8/15/2019.
531. TOLONews, "US Envoy Criticizes Release Of Ex-CEO Of Kabul Bank," 8/15/2019.
532. TOLONews, "US Envoy Criticizes Release Of Ex-CEO Of Kabul Bank," 8/15/2019.
533. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019;
534. TOLONews, "US Envoy Criticizes Release Of Ex-CEO Of Kabul Bank," 8/15/2019; AAN, "The Afghan Government and the 'Smart City' Debacle," 11/21/2015.
535. AAN, "The Afghan Government and the 'Smart City' Debacle," 11/21/2015.
536. The Guardian, "The financial scandal that broke Afghanistan's Kabul Bank," 6/16/2011.
537. AAN, "The Afghan Government and the 'Smart City' Debacle," 11/21/2015; USIP, Responding to Corruption and the Kabul Bank Collapse, 12/2016, pp. 9–10.
538. Reuters, "Afghan government cancels property deal with convicted banker," 11/7/2015; AAN, "The Afghan Government and the 'Smart City' Debacle," 11/21/2015; USIP, Responding to Corruption and the Kabul Bank Collapse, 12/2016, p. 10.
539. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019;
540. USIP, Responding to Corruption and the Kabul Bank Collapse, 12/2016, p. 2; KBR, Khalilullah Ferozi Commitment Letter, 7/18/2019, p. 1; KBR, "Agreement Between Kabul Bank debtor and Kabul Bank Receivership Authority," 9/10/2018, p. 1; SIGAR analysis.
541. Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, Report of the Public Inquiry into the Kabul Bank Crisis, 11/15/2012, p. 13; KBR, "Kabul Bank Cash Recovery Report From 31 Aug 10 [Un]til 22 Sep 2019," 9/22/2019; KBR, Khalilullah Ferozi Commitment Letter, 7/18/2019, p. 1; KBR, "Agreement Between Kabul Bank debtor and Kabul Bank Receivership Authority," 9/10/2018, p. 1; SIGAR, correspondence with KBR official, 10/5/2019; SIGAR analysis.
542. SIGAR, communications with KBR officials, 9/29/2019 and 9/27/2019.
543. KBR, "Kabul Bank Recovery and Loan Portfolio Dated 20 September 2019," 9/20/2019.
544. USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategy, 3/31/2019, p. 9.
545. USAID, OEG, response to SIGAR data call, 3/21/2019; SIGAR, interview with USAID/OEG official, 11/8/2018.
546. UNAMA, Briefing to the United Nations Security Council by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan, Mr. Tadamichi Yamamoto, 9/10/2019, p. 3.
547. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, pdf p. 7.
548. SIGAR, Private Sector Development and Economic Growth: Lessons from the U.S. Afghanistan Experience, SIGAR 18-38-LL, 4/2018, p. 173.
549. Commerce, CLDP, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.

550. IWA, Afghan mining under spotlight as country suspended from key anti-corruption mechanism,” 1/24/2019; AEITI, Draft EITI Report for the Fiscal Years 1395–1396 (2015/16–2016/17), 7/9/2019, 7/9/2019, p. 11; EITI, “EITI Factsheet,” 3/29/2019, pp. 1–2.
551. Commerce, CLDP, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
552. Commerce, CLDP, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; USAID, OEG, Multi-Dimensional Economic Legal Reform Assistance Program (MELRA), Factsheet, 5/2019, p. 1.
553. USAID, OEG, Multi-Dimensional Economic Legal Reform Assistance Program (MELRA), Factsheet, 5/2019, p. 1.
554. IWA, Afghan mining under spotlight as country suspended from key anti-corruption mechanism,” 1/24/2019.
555. IWA, Afghan mining under spotlight as country suspended from key anti-corruption mechanism,” 1/24/2019; AEITI, Draft EITI Report for the Fiscal Years 1395–1396 (2015/16–2016/17), 7/9/2019, p. 22.
556. It is curious that the U.S. would consider it necessary for Afghanistan to be EITI-compliant when the U.S. is not. U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Natural Resources Revenue, Letter to Mr. Fredrik Reinfeldt, Chair, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Board, 11/2/2017, pp. 1–2.
557. IWA, Afghan mining under spotlight as country suspended from key anti-corruption mechanism,” 1/24/2019; EITI, “Afghanistan–Overview,” 1/21/2019, <https://eiti.org/afghanistan>, accessed 9/25/2019.
558. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, p. 31; World Bank, Jobs from Agriculture in Afghanistan, 2/2018, p. 9.
559. SIGAR, Private Sector Development and Economic Growth: Lessons from the U.S. Afghanistan Experience, SIGAR 18-38-LL, 4/2018, p. 7.
560. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Building Confidence Amid Uncertainty, 7/2019, i, p. 31.
561. AREU, The Sun Cannot be Hidden by Two fingers: Illicit Drugs and the Discussions on a Political Settlement in Afghanistan, 5/2019, p. 3.
562. SIGAR analysis of USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2019; SIGAR analysis of World Bank, ARTF, Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of July 22, 2019, 9/3/2019.
563. AECOM International Development, Strengthening Watershed And Irrigation Management (SWIM) Quarterly Report Fiscal Year 2019 Quarter 3 (FY2019 Q3)/Project Year 3 Quarter 2 (Y3 Q2) (April 1– June 30, 2019), 7/31/2019, pp. 6–7; SIGAR analysis of USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2019.
564. USAID, OAG, “Strengthening Watershed and Irrigation Management (SWIM),” Factsheet, 5/2019, p. 1.
565. AECOM International Development, Strengthening Watershed And Irrigation Management (SWIM) Quarterly Report Fiscal Year 2019 Quarter 3 (FY2019 Q3)/Project Year 3 Quarter 2 (Y3 Q2) (April 1– June 30, 2019), 7/31/2019, p. 7.
566. USAID, OAG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
567. USAID, OAG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
568. AECOM International Development, Strengthening Watershed And Irrigation Management (SWIM) Quarterly Report Fiscal Year 2019 Quarter 3 (FY2019 Q3)/Project Year 3 Quarter 2 (Y3 Q2) (April 1– June 30, 2019), 7/31/2019, p. 7.
569. AECOM International Development, Strengthening Watershed And Irrigation Management (SWIM) Quarterly Report Fiscal Year 2019 Quarter 3 (FY2019 Q3)/Project Year 3 Quarter 2 (Y3 Q2) (April 1– June 30, 2019), 7/31/2019, p. 7.
570. USAID, OAG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
571. USAID, OAG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
572. USAID, OAG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
573. USAID, OAG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
574. AECOM International Development, Strengthening Watershed And Irrigation Management (SWIM) Quarterly Report Fiscal Year 2019 Quarter 3 (FY2019 Q3)/Project Year 3 Quarter 2 (Y3 Q2) (April 1– June 30, 2019), 7/31/2019, p. 6.
575. AECOM International Development, Strengthening Watershed And Irrigation Management (SWIM) Quarterly Report Fiscal Year 2019 Quarter 3 (FY2019 Q3)/Project Year 3 Quarter 2 (Y3 Q2) (April 1– June 30, 2019), 7/31/2019, p. 50; USAID, OAG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
576. AECOM International Development, Strengthening Watershed And Irrigation Management (SWIM) Quarterly Report Fiscal Year 2019 Quarter 3 (FY2019 Q3)/Project Year 3 Quarter 2 (Y3 Q2) (April 1– June 30, 2019), 7/31/2019, vi, p. 51.
577. USAID, OAG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
578. AECOM International Development, Strengthening Watershed And Irrigation Management (SWIM) Quarterly Report Fiscal Year 2019 Quarter 3 (FY2019 Q3)/Project Year 3 Quarter 2 (Y3 Q2) (April 1– June 30, 2019), 7/31/2019, p. 6.
579. USAID, OAG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
580. USAID, Afghanistan Energy Sector Technical Assessment Final Report, 2/28/2018, p. 1; USAID, “Afghanistan: Our Work,” n.d., <https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/our-work>, accessed 7/8/2018.
581. SIGAR analysis of USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2019; SIGAR analysis of World Bank, ARTF, Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of July 22, 2019, 9/3/2019.
582. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2019.
583. USAID, Afghanistan Energy Sector Technical Assessment Final Report, 2/28/2018, p. 10.
584. NSIA, Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17 Analysis Report, 8/2018, p. 229.
585. NSIA, Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17 Analysis Report, 8/2018, p. 229; USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018.
586. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018.
587. USAID, Afghanistan Energy Sector Technical Assessment: Final Report, 2/28/2018, pp. 10–11; Asian Development Bank, “Sector Assessment (Summary): Energy,” attachment to the ADB’s Energy Supply Improvement Investment Program document for Afghanistan, www.adb.org, 12/2015, p. 5; SIGAR, interview with USAID/OI officials, 11/8/2018; USAID, OI, response to SIGAR data call, 6/20/2019.
588. USAID, Fact Sheet, “Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project,” 8/14/2017; USFOR-A, JENG, “Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund Program FY 11 through FY 14,” 9/20/2019.
589. USAID, Fact Sheet, “Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project,” 8/14/2017; USAID, OI, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/11/2019.

ENDNOTES

590. USAID, Fact Sheet, "Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project," 8/14/2017; USAID, OI, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/11/2019.
591. USFOR-A, JENG, "Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund Program FY 11 through FY 14," 9/20/2019. USAID, Afghanistan Energy Sector Technical Assessment: Final Report, 2/28/2018, p. 8.
592. See SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2018, p. 169 and SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2016, p. 186; Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Division C—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, pp. 146–147; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141.
593. DOD, OSD-P, response to SIGAR data call, 6/22/2018; DOD, OSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/16/2018; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, p. 97; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, pp. 146–147; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, pp. 150–151.
594. SIGAR, Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund: Agencies Have Not Assessed Whether Six Projects That Began in Fiscal Year 2011, Worth about \$400 Million, Achieved Counterinsurgency Objectives and Can Be Sustained, SIGAR 18-10-AR, 10/2017, i–ii; SIGAR, Afghanistan's Energy Sector: USAID and DOD Did Not Consistently Collect and Report Performance Data on Projects Related to Kajaki Dam, and Concerns Exist Regarding Sustainability, SIGAR 19-37-AR, 5/2019, p. 6.
595. SIGAR analysis of DOD, USFOR-A, JENG, "Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund Program FY 11 through FY 14," 9/20/2019; DOD, USFOR-A, JENG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2019, p. 152; DOD, U.S. Central Command, Office of the Commander, Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) Kandahar City 30 MW Diesel Power Generation Project, 6/5/2010, p. 1; SIGAR, communications with DOD, OSD-P official, 10/9/2019; DOD, USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
596. USAID, OI, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019 and 3/21/2019; USAID, "Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project," Factsheet, 5/2019, p. 2; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 7/30/2019, p. 156.
597. USAID, OI, response to SIGAR data call, 6/20/2019 and 9/19/2018; SIGAR, Afghanistan's Energy Sector: USAID and DOD Did Not Consistently Collect and Report Performance Data on Projects Related to Kajaki Dam, and Concerns Exist Regarding Sustainability, SIGAR 19-37-AR, 5/2019, p. 6; USAID, Afghanistan Energy Sector Technical Assessment: Final Report, 2/28/2018, p. 6.
598. USAID, OI, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
599. While three NEPS-SEPS Connector substations were not included in a USAID project budget updated in February 2018, the new contract includes all five originally planned substations between Ghazni and Kandahar. USAID, OAA, Solicitation, Offer, and Award for Solicitation No. 72030618R00011, 7/3/2019, p. 8; SIGAR, communications with USAID official, 9/26/2019; USAID, Afghanistan Energy Sector Technical Assessment: Final Report, 2/28/2018, p. 8; USAID, OI, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
600. SIGAR, communications with USAID official, 9/26/2019.
601. SIGAR, communications with USAID official, 9/26/2019.
602. SIGAR, communications with USAID official, 9/26/2019; USAID, Afghanistan Energy Sector Technical Assessment: Final Report, 2/28/2018, pp. 2, 8.
603. State, "Statement on Accountability and Anti-Corruption in Afghanistan," Press Statement, 9/19/2019; SIGAR, communications with USAID officials, 9/30/2019 and 9/26/2019.
604. USAID, OI, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
605. USAID, Afghanistan Energy Sector Technical Assessment: Final Report, 2/28/2018, pp. 7–8; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2018, p. 167.
606. SIGAR, communications with USAID official, 9/26/2019.
607. USAID, "Afghanistan: Education," Factsheet, 2/20/2019; Afghanistan in Review: Oversight of U.S. Spending in Afghanistan, Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency Management, 115th Cong., p. 3 (May 9, 2018) (statement of Laurel E. Miller, The RAND Corporation).
608. UNICEF, Global Initiative on Out-Of-School Children: Afghanistan Country Study, 6/2018, p. 1.
609. USAID, "Response to the Inquiry Letter on Afghanistan Education Data Reliability, (SIGAR Inquiry Letter-15-62-SP)," 6/30/2015, p. 6.
610. UN, The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security, report of the Secretary-General, 2/28/2018, p. 8; USAID, Data Quality Assessment of the Ministry of Education's Education Management Information System, 7/2016, p. 7; HRW, "I Won't Be a Doctor, and One Day You'll Be Sick": Girls' Access to Education in Afghanistan, 10/2017, pp. 21–22, 76; MEC, Ministry-wide Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment of the Ministry of Education, 10/2017, p. 3.
611. SIGAR analysis of USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2019; SIGAR analysis of World Bank, ARTF, Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of July 22, 2019, 9/3/2019.
612. USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategy, 3/31/2019, p. 4.
613. World Bank, "July 10, 2019 Heads of Cooperation Discussion In-depth Fiduciary Review of EQUIP II," Draft Brief, 7/10/2019, p. 1.
614. World Bank, "July 10, 2019 Heads of Cooperation Discussion In-depth Fiduciary Review of EQUIP II," Draft Brief, 7/10/2019, p. 2; SIGAR analysis.
615. World Bank, "July 10, 2019 Heads of Cooperation Discussion In-depth Fiduciary Review of EQUIP II," Draft Brief, 7/10/2019, p. 2.
616. World Bank, "July 10, 2019 Heads of Cooperation Discussion In-depth Fiduciary Review of EQUIP II," Draft Brief, 7/10/2019, p. 1.
617. World Bank, "July 10, 2019 Heads of Cooperation Discussion In-depth Fiduciary Review of EQUIP II," Draft Brief, 7/10/2019, p. 2; SIGAR analysis.
618. World Bank, "July 10, 2019 Heads of Cooperation Discussion In-depth Fiduciary Review of EQUIP II," Draft Brief, 7/10/2019, p. 2.

619. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report for the Second Education Quality Improvement Program, 7/31/2018, p. 1.
620. World Bank, "July 10, 2019 Heads of Cooperation Discussion In-depth Fiduciary Review of EQUIP II," Draft Brief, 7/10/2019, p. 1; World Bank, "EQUIP II in-depth fiduciary review – FAQs," Draft, 7/25/2019, p. 1.
621. USAID, University Support and Workforce Development Program Agreement No. AID-306-A-13-00009-00 3rd Quarterly Performance Report April–June 2018–2019 [sic], 7/31/2019, pp. 4, 15–16; SIGAR analysis.
622. USAID, University Support and Workforce Development Program Agreement No. AID-306-A-13-00009-00 3rd Quarterly Performance Report April–June 2018–2019, 7/31/2019, pp. 15–16.
623. USAID, OED, "University Support and Workforce Development Program (USWDP)," 3/2019, p. 1.
624. USAID, University Support and Workforce Development Program Agreement No. AID-306-A-13-00009-00 3rd Quarterly Performance Report April–June 2018–2019, 7/31/2019, p. 15.
625. USAID, University Support and Workforce Development Program Agreement No. AID-306-A-13-00009-00 3rd Quarterly Performance Report April–June 2018–2019, 7/31/2019, p. 15.
626. USAID, OED, University Support and Workforce Development Program, April–June 2018, 7/31/2018, p. 25.
627. USAID, OED, University Support and Workforce Development Program, April–June 2018, 7/31/2018, p. 25.
628. USAID, Contract AID-306-A-13-00004, Modification 23, 8/12/2019, p. 1.
629. USAID, Contract AID-306-A-13-00004, Modification 23, 8/12/2019, p. 1.
630. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2019, pp. 40–42.
631. USAID, Contract AID-306-A-13-00004, Modification 23, 8/12/2019, p. 4.
632. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2019, p. 42; USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
633. American University of Afghanistan, "About Us," <http://auaf.edu.af/about-us>, accessed 4/10/19.
634. SIGAR Investigations Directorate, summary of investigations of AUAF by SIGAR, USAID, and other entities, internal communication, 3/8/2019.
635. For more, see page 161 of SIGAR's October 2018 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. SIGAR, Afghanistan's Health Care Sector: USAID's Use of Unreliable Data Presents Challenges in Assessing Program Performance and the Extent of Progress, SIGAR 17-22-AR, 1/2017, i, p. 7.
636. Again, while it is difficult to verify the magnitude of improvement, the consensus is that health outcomes such as the under-five mortality rate have improved significantly since the U.S.-led intervention. World Bank, International Development Association Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 96.1 Million (US\$ 140 Million Equivalent) and Proposed Grant from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund in the Amount of US\$425 Million and a Proposed Grant from the Global Financing Facility in the Amount of US\$35 Million to the Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan for a Afghanistan Sehatmandi Project, 3/12/2018, p. 8.
637. CIA, The World Factbook, "Afghanistan," www.cia.gov, version of 3/29/2019.
638. USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2017; World Bank, International Development Association Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 96.1 Million (US\$ 140 Million Equivalent) and Proposed Grant from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund in the Amount of US\$425 Million and a Proposed Grant from the Global Financing Facility in the Amount of US\$35 Million to the Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan for a Afghanistan Sehatmandi Project, 3/12/2018, p. 8.
639. USAID, OAPA, Grant Agreement 306-AA-18, 9/6/2018, p. 11.
640. Overseas Development Institute, Life under the Taliban shadow government, 6/2018, pp. 5, 26.
641. USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategy, 3/31/2019, p. 27.
642. SIGAR analysis of USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2019; SIGAR analysis of World Bank, ARTF, Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of July 22, 2019, 9/3/2019.
643. FHI 360, Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition (IHSAN) Afghanistan Fiscal Year 2019 – Third Quarterly Report, 7/30/2019, pp. 1, 5–7.
644. FHI 360, Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition (IHSAN) Afghanistan Fiscal Year 2019 – Third Quarterly Report, 7/30/2019, p. 6.
645. FHI 360, Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition (IHSAN) Afghanistan Fiscal Year 2019 – Third Quarterly Report, 7/30/2019, p. 7.
646. FHI 360, Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition (IHSAN) Afghanistan Fiscal Year 2019 – Third Quarterly Report, 7/30/2019, p. 48.
647. FHI 360, Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition (IHSAN) Afghanistan Fiscal Year 2019 – Third Quarterly Report, 7/30/2019, p. 48.
648. FHI 360, Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition (IHSAN) Afghanistan Fiscal Year 2019 – Third Quarterly Report, 7/30/2019, p. 48.
649. FHI 360, Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition (IHSAN) Afghanistan Fiscal Year 2019 – Third Quarterly Report, 7/30/2019, p. 48.
650. USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
651. USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
652. Includes wild poliovirus cases only. Global Polio Eradication Initiative, "Where We Work–Afghanistan," n.d., <http://polioeradication.org/where-we-work/afghanistan/>, accessed 9/23/2019.
653. Global Polio Eradication Initiative, "Where We Work–Afghanistan," n.d., <http://polioeradication.org/where-we-work/afghanistan/>, accessed 9/23/2019; UNICEF and WHO, Afghanistan Polio Update – October–December 2017, 1/2018, p. 1; UN, The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security, report of the Secretary-General, 2/28/2018, p. 11.
654. USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
655. On September 19, 2019, after nearly two decades during which polio was believed to have been eliminated in the Philippines, the Philippine Department of Health announced an outbreak in the country. However, although the Philippines is experiencing a polio epidemic that does not mean that polio is

ENDNOTES

- endemic in the country, according to USAID. Nigeria has also teetered on the edge of eradication. In October 2017, USAID informed SIGAR that Nigeria had been removed from the list of countries where WPV was endemic. However, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, a public-private partnership led by national governments with five partners, including the WHO, continues to list Nigeria as a country with ongoing WPV transmission. WHO, "WHO, UNICEF and partners support Philippine Department of Health's polio outbreak response," 9/19/2019; Global Polio Eradication Initiative, "Where We Work-Afghanistan," n.d., <http://polioeradication.org/where-we-work/afghanistan/>, accessed 4/24/2019; USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2017; Global Polio Eradication Initiative, "Who We Are," n.d., <http://polioeradication.org/who-we-are/>, accessed 6/24/2019; USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
656. Guardian, "Pakistan and Afghanistan Join Forces to Wipe Out Polio," 4/5/2016; USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2017 and 4/11/2017.
 657. Overseas Development Institute, Life under the Taliban shadow government, 6/2018, p. 82.
 658. Afghanistan Analysts Network, "One Land, Two Rules (5): The polio vaccination gap," 5/9/2019.
 659. USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019; RFE/RL, "Taliban Lifts Ban On WHO Vaccine Operations In Occupied Afghan Territories," 9/25/2019;
 660. RFE/RL, "Taliban Lifts Ban On WHO Vaccine Operations In Occupied Afghan Territories," 9/25/2019; USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
 661. NPR, "Taliban Lift Ban on Red Cross, Pledge to Protect Aid Workers in Afghanistan," 9/16/2019.
 662. AFP, "WHO welcomes Taliban decision to lift ban on health workers," 9/26/2019.
 663. RFE/RL, "Taliban Lifts Ban On WHO Vaccine Operations In Occupied Afghan Territories," 9/25/2019
 664. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Challenges to Sustainable Development, Peace and Security, 7/2019, p. 3, 11; UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Cultivation and Production, 11/2018, p. 5.
 665. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Challenges to Sustainable Development, Peace and Security, 7/2019, p. 3.
 666. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "New US airstrikes obscure a dramatic development in the Afghan drugs industry—the proliferation of low cost methamphetamine," 5/28/2019. Blog. London School of Economics. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2019/05/28/new-us-airstrikes-obscure-a-dramatic-development-in-the-afghan-drugs-industry-the-proliferation-of-low-cost-methamphetamine/>, accessed 9/19/2019.
 667. SIGAR, Interview with Ministry of Interior Official from Deputy Directorate of Counter Narcotics, 9/1/2019.
 668. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/2019, p. 190–191.
 669. See Appendix B of this report.
 670. DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/16/2016.
 671. GIROA, Presidential Decree Number 139, 1/14/2019; SIGAR, Interview with MOI Official from Deputy Directorate of Counter Narcotics, 9/1/2019.
 672. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 6/20/2019.
 673. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
 674. SIGAR, Interview with MOI Official from Deputy Directorate of Counter Narcotics, 9/1/2019.
 675. SIGAR, Interview with MOI Official from Deputy Directorate of Counter Narcotics, 9/1/2019.
 676. SIGAR, Interview with MOI Official from Deputy Directorate of Counter Narcotics, 9/1/2019.
 677. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Challenges to Sustainable Development, Peace and Security, 7/2019, p. 2.
 678. SIGAR, Interview with MOI Official from Deputy Directorate of Counter Narcotics, 9/1/2019; DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 06/2019, p. 77.
 679. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2019; SIGAR, Interview with MOI Official from Deputy Directorate of Counter Narcotics, 9/1/2019.
 680. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/20/2019.
 681. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/20/2019.
 682. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/20/2019.
 683. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/20/2019; DEA, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/11/2018.
 684. DEA, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/11/2018.
 685. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, p. 78.
 686. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, pp. 76–77.
 687. CSTC-A, response to DOD OIG data call, 7/10/2018.
 688. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, pp. 67–68.
 689. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, p. 70; DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 12/2018, p. 88; SIGAR, 17–03 Inspection Report, Special Mission Wing Facilities at Kandahar Airfield: Construction Generally Met Contract Requirements, but Problems with Noncompliance, Maintenance, and Quality Assurance Need to be Addressed, 10/2016, p. 1.
 690. NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
 691. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 7/30/2019, pp. 91–92; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2019, pp. 98, 165; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2019, pp. 96, 188.
 692. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/15/2019; DEA, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2019.
 693. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/12/2017.
 694. OSD-P, DOD(CN), response to SIGAR data call, 9/20/2019; OSD-P, DOD(CN), response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2019; NIST, The United States and the Metric System: A Capsule in History, 1997, p. 8, <https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pml/wmd/metric/1136a.pdf>, accessed 10/6/2018.
 695. OSD-P, DOD(CN), response to SIGAR data call, 9/20/2019.
 696. UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, 9/3/2019, p. 13; NIST, The United States and the Metric System: A Capsule in History, 1997, p. 8.
 697. UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Special Report: Airstrikes on Alleged Drug-Processing Facilities, Farah, 5 May 2019, 10/2019, pp. 1–2.
 698. Khaama Press, U.S. Military in Afghanistan reacts to latest UNAMA report regarding civilian casualties, 10/9/2019, <https://>

- www.khaama.com/u-s-military-in-afghanistan-reacts-to-latest-unama-report-regarding-civilian-casualties-04204/, accessed 10/9/2019.
699. UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Special Report: Airstrikes on Alleged Drug-Processing Facilities, 10/2019, p. 2.
700. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2019, p. 180.
701. OSD-P, DOD(CN), response to SIGAR data call, 9/20/2019.
702. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "New US airstrikes obscure a dramatic development in the Afghan drugs industry – the proliferation of low cost methamphetamine," 5/28/2019 Blog. London School of Economics; The Economist, "Afghan drug barons are branching out into methamphetamines," 9/5/2019, <https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/09/05/afghan-drug-barons-are-branching-out-into-methamphetamines>, accessed 9/20/2019.
703. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "Long Read: The unknown unknowns of Afghanistan's new wave of methamphetamine production," 9/30/2019, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2019/09/30/long-read-the-unknown-unknowns-of-afghanistans-new-wave-of-methamphetamine-production/>, accessed 9/30/2019.
704. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "Long Read: The unknown unknowns of Afghanistan's new wave of methamphetamine production," 9/30/2019.
705. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "Long Read: The unknown unknowns of Afghanistan's new wave of methamphetamine production," 9/30/2019; NIST, The United States and the Metric System: A Capsule in History, 1997, p. 8.
706. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "Long Read: The unknown unknowns of Afghanistan's new wave of methamphetamine production," 9/30/2019.
707. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "Long Read: The unknown unknowns of Afghanistan's new wave of methamphetamine production," 9/30/2019.
708. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "Long Read: The unknown unknowns of Afghanistan's new wave of methamphetamine production," 9/30/2019; NIST, The United States and the Metric System: A Capsule in History, 1997, p. 8.
709. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "Long Read: The unknown unknowns of Afghanistan's new wave of methamphetamine production," 9/30/2019; NIST, The United States and the Metric System: A Capsule in History, 1997, p. 8.
710. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "Long Read: The unknown unknowns of Afghanistan's new wave of methamphetamine production," 9/30/2019.
711. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "Long Read: The unknown unknowns of Afghanistan's new wave of methamphetamine production," 9/30/2019.
712. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "Long Read: The unknown unknowns of Afghanistan's new wave of methamphetamine production," 9/30/2019.
713. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "Long Read: The unknown unknowns of Afghanistan's new wave of methamphetamine production," 9/30/2019.
714. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "Long Read: The unknown unknowns of Afghanistan's new wave of methamphetamine production," 9/30/2019.
715. David Mansfield and Alexander Soderholm, "Long Read: The unknown unknowns of Afghanistan's new wave of methamphetamine production," 9/30/2019.
716. Afghan Analysts Network, Jelena Bjelica, "Afghanistan Breaking Bad: Crystal meth, a new drug on the market," 12/7/2015, p. 6.
717. The Economist, "Afghan drug barons are branching out into methamphetamines," 9/5/2019.
718. State, INL, Governor Led Eradication Amended Implementing Instructions for the Letter of Agreement on Police, Criminal Justice, and Counternarcotics Support Programs of March 9, 2006 between the Government of the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 4/23/2014; GAO, Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals, GAO 07-78, 11/2006, pp. 16, 19.
719. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
720. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Cultivation and Production, 11/2018, p. 35.
721. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
722. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2019.
723. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
724. UNODC, World Drug Report 2019, Booklet 3: Depressants, 6/2019, pp. 79, 83.
725. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019; State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/15/2019.
726. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
727. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 6/25/2018.
728. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 6/22/2017 and 12/20/2018.
729. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 6/22/2017, 12/20/2018 and 9/18/2019; State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2019.
730. State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, 3/2019, p. 17.
731. State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, 3/2019, p. 95.
732. UNODC, World Drug Report 2019: Booklet 2 Global Overview of Drug Demand and Supply, p. 11.
733. State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, 3/2019, p. 95.
734. UNODC, World Drug Report 2019, Booklet 3: Depressants, 6/2019, p. 13.
735. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2019.
736. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2019.
737. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 3/20/2019.
738. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2019.
739. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 3/20/2019.
740. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 6/20/2019; State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/15/2019.
741. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2019.
742. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/2018, p. 174.
743. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 6/24/2016.
744. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/20/2019; State, INL, Letter of Agreement between U.S. Department of State's Bureau

ENDNOTES

- of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Colombo Plan, 12/7/2018.
745. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2019.
746. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2019.
747. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2018.
748. State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, 3/2019, p. 97.
749. The Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Programme (DAP), Quarterly Reporting Template for US/INL Funded Projects Period covered by the report: 2nd Quarter 2019 (April–June 2019), 2019, p. 1.
750. DAP, Quarterly Reporting Template for US/INL Funded Projects Period covered by the report: 2nd Quarter 2019 (April–June 2019), 2019, p. 1; SIGAR, Interview with MOI Official from Deputy Directorate of Counter Narcotics, 9/1/2019.
751. DAP, Quarterly Reporting Template for US/INL Funded Projects Period covered by the report: 2nd Quarter 2019 (April–June 2019), 2019, p. 2.
752. DAP, Quarterly Reporting Template for US/INL Funded Projects Period covered by the report: 2nd Quarter 2019 (April–June 2019), 2019, pp. 1–2.
753. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
754. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/26/2019.
755. State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, 3/2019, p. 98.
756. State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, 3/2019, p. 98; UNODC, Quarterly Report, INL Funded Alternative Development Project Boost Alternative Development Intervention through Licit Livelihoods (BADILL), Period Covered: April to June 2018, 2018, p. 3.
757. UNODC, Quarterly Report April–June 2019, INL Funded Alternative Development Project Boost Alternative Development Intervention through Licit Livelihoods (BADILL), 2019, pp. 3–4.
758. UNODC, Quarterly Report April–June 2019, INL Funded Alternative Development Project Boost Alternative Development Intervention through Licit Livelihoods (BADILL), 2019, pp. 3–4.
759. UNODC, Quarterly Report April–June 2019, INL Funded Alternative Development Project Boost Alternative Development Intervention through Licit Livelihoods (BADILL), 2019, p. 3.
760. UNODC, Quarterly Report April–June 2019, INL Funded Alternative Development Project Boost Alternative Development Intervention through Licit Livelihoods (BADILL), 2019, p. 14.
761. State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, 3/2019, p. 98.
762. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 6/20/2019.
763. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
764. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
765. SIGAR, Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR 18–52–LL, 6/2018, pp. 125–126.
766. UNDP, Quarterly Reporting Template for US/INL Funded Projects, Period covered by the report: Third Quarter (Apr–Jun 2019), 2019, p. 1.
767. UNDP, Quarterly Reporting Template for US/INL Funded Projects, Period covered by the report: Third Quarter (Apr–Jun 2019), 2019, p. 2; DAB, “Currency Hijri Monthly Average USD,” n.d., <http://www.dab.gov.af/Currency-Hijri-Average>, accessed 6/17/2019; DAB, “Exchange Rates, Last Updated 19 June 2019,” <http://www.dab.gov.af/>, accessed 6/19, 2019.
768. UNDP, Quarterly Reporting Template for US/INL Funded Projects, Period covered by the report: Third Quarter (Apr–Jun 2019), 2019, p. 2; DAB, “Currency Hijri Monthly Average USD,” n.d., <http://www.dab.gov.af/Currency-Hijri-Average>, accessed 6/17/2019; DAB, “Exchange Rates, Last Updated 19 June 2019,” <http://www.dab.gov.af/>, accessed 6/19, 2019.
769. UNDP, Quarterly Reporting Template for US/INL Funded Projects, Period covered by the report: Third Quarter (Apr–Jun 2019), 2019, p. 1.
770. UNDP, Quarterly Reporting Template for US/INL Funded Projects, Period covered by the report: Third Quarter (Apr–Jun 2019), 2019, p. 2; State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019.
771. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2019.
772. UNDP, Quarterly Reporting Template for US/INL Funded Projects, Period covered by the report: Third Quarter (Apr–Jun 2019), 2019, p. 2; DAB, “Currency Hijri Monthly Average USD,” n.d., <http://www.dab.gov.af/Currency-Hijri-Average>, accessed 6/17/2019; DAB, “Exchange Rates, Last Updated 19 June 2019,” <http://www.dab.gov.af/>, accessed 6/19, 2019.
773. USAID, Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP), Quarterly Report April–June 2019, pp. 4, 7.
774. USAID, Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP), Quarterly Report April–June 2019, pp. 13–14.
775. USAID, Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP), Quarterly Report April–June 2019, pp. 18, 42–44; SIGAR analysis.
776. USAID, Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP), Quarterly Report April–June 2019, pp. 4, 43; SIGAR analysis.
777. USAID, Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP), Quarterly Report April–June 2019, p. 43; SIGAR analysis.
778. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
779. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
780. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/9/2018.
781. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2016.
782. USAID, Afghanistan Value Chains–High Value Crops, Quarterly Performance Report, Quarter 2, FY2019, 4/30/2019, p. 2; USAID, Afghanistan Value Chains–High Value Crops, Quarterly Performance Report, January–March 2019, 4/30/2019, p. 3.
783. USAID, Afghanistan Value Chains–High Value Crops, Quarterly Performance Report, Quarter Three, FY2019, 7/30/2019, p. 4; USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/15/2019.
784. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018.
785. USAID, Afghanistan Value Chains–High Value Crops, Quarterly Performance Report, Quarter Three, FY2019, 7/30/2019, p. 5.
786. USAID, Afghanistan Value Chains–High Value Crops, Quarterly Performance Report, Quarter Three, FY2019, 7/30/2019, pp. 11–12; USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019; SIGAR analysis.
787. USAID, Afghanistan Value Chains–High Value Crops, Quarterly Performance Report, Quarter Three, FY2019, 7/30/2019, p. 31.

ENDNOTES

- 788. USAID, Afghanistan Value Chains-High Value Crops, Quarterly Performance Report, Quarter Three, FY2019, 7/30/2019, p. 23.
- 789. USAID, Afghanistan Value Chains-High Value Crops, Quarterly Performance Report, Quarter Three, FY2019, 7/30/2019, p. 24.
- 790. USAID, Contract 72030618C00011 between USAID/Afghanistan and DAI Global, LLC, 6/9/2018, pp. 5, 11.
- 791. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/15/2019.
- 792. USAID, Afghanistan Value Chains-Livestock, Quarterly Performance Report, April-June 2019, 7/30/2019, p. 2.
- 793. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.
- 794. USAID, Grant and Cooperative Agreement AID-306-IO-17-00005 with Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 10/20/2018, p. 1.
- 795. USAID, Promoting Value Chains-Western Afghanistan, Semi Annual Progress Report, October 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019, 4/30/2019, p. 1.
- 796. USAID, Promoting Value Chains-Western Afghanistan, Semi Annual Progress Report, October 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019, 4/30/2019, p. 4; SIGAR analysis.
- 797. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2016; USAID, Fact Sheet: Regional Agricultural Development Program-South (RADP-S), 9/2014.
- 798. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2019.
- 799. USAID, Regional Agricultural Development Program-East (RADP-E), Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, FY 2018, 1/20/2018.
- 800. USAID, Regional Agricultural Development Program-East (RADP-E) Quarterly Report, Year 3, Quarter 3 (April-June 2019), 7/30/2019, pp. 1, 34-38; SIGAR analysis.
- 801. USAID, Regional Agricultural Development Program-East (RADP-E) Quarterly Report, Year 3, Quarter 3 (April-June 2019), 7/30/2019, p. 1.
- 802. USAID, Regional Agricultural Development Program-East (RADP-E) Quarterly Report, Year 3, Quarter 3 (April-June 2019), 7/30/2019, p. 1.
- 803. USAID, Regional Agricultural Development Program-East (RADP-E) Quarterly Report, Year 3, Quarter 3 (April-June 2019), 7/30/2019, p. 1.
- 804. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019.



Despite the war, these buildings in the Murad Khani district of Kabul are being restored to their 18th-century character and intricate wood work. (UNAMA photo by Fardin Waezi)

Quarterly Report Staff

Atif Ahmad, Student Trainee

Michael Bindell, Deputy Director of Research and Analysis Directorate

Theodore Burns, Funding Subject Matter Expert

Daniel Fisher, Economic and Social Development Subject Matter Expert

Alyssa Goodman, Student Trainee

Clark Irwin, Lead Writer/Editor

Vong Lim, Senior Visual Information Specialist

James Misencik, Security Subject Matter Expert

Heather Robinson, Security Subject Matter Expert

Deborah Scroggins, Director of Research and Analysis Directorate

Omar Sharif, Project Coordinator

Solange Toura Gaba, Counternarcotics Subject Matter Expert

Daniel Weggeland, Governance Subject Matter Expert

SIGAR
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

2530 Crystal Drive
Arlington, VA 22202

www.sigar.mil

WASTE, FRAUD, OR ABUSE MAY BE REPORTED TO SIGAR'S HOTLINE

By phone: Afghanistan
Cell: 0700107300
DSN: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303
All voicemail is in Dari, Pashto, and English.

By phone: United States
Toll-free: 866-329-8893
DSN: 312-664-0378
All voicemail is in English and answered during business hours.

By fax: 703-601-4065
By e-mail: sigar.hotline@mail.mil
By Web submission: www.sigar.mil/investigations/hotline/report-fraud.aspx



SIGAR
Report Waste, Fraud, or Abuse