



Protection Monitoring Quarterly Report  
October – December 2018

Protection Monitoring Task Force

**SYRIA PROTECTION  
CLUSTER (TURKEY)**



## About the PMTF

The Protection Monitoring Task Force (PMTF), an initiative of the Syria Protection Cluster (Turkey), is composed of Syrian NGOs and international NGOs. It aims to develop the capacity of humanitarian actors to assess, analyze, and respond to protection needs in Syria.

Roughly twenty non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and clusters were involved in the formation of the PMTF. As of the time of this reporting, twelve members actively contribute to monthly protection monitoring, which began in March 2017.

All quarterly reports are available on the Syria Protection Cluster (Turkey) page of the Humanitarian Response Website<sup>1</sup>, where readers can also consult the 2018 Protection Monitoring Interactive Dashboard<sup>2</sup>, which allows for more detailed information by indicator, location, and month.

Using lessons learned from monthly monitoring in 2017, the active members of the PMTF undertook the revision of the monthly community-level KI interview with the goal of streamlining data collection in 2018. This is the third quarterly report to reflect data collected with those tools.

## Acronyms

CAAFAG	Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GoS	Government of Syria
GoT	Government of Turkey
HLP	Housing, Land, and Property
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HTS	Hay'at Tahrir Ash-Sham
JTS	Jabhat Tahrir al-Souriya
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
KI	Key Informant
KII	KI Interview
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLF	National Liberation Front
NSAG	Non-State Armed Group
PMTF	Protection Monitoring Task Force
PNO	Protection Needs Overview
UASC	Unaccompanied and Separated Children
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/stima/protection>

<sup>2</sup> <http://tiny.cc/jwnory>



## Contents

About the PMTF .....	2
Acronyms .....	2
Executive Summary and Recommendations for Humanitarian Actors .....	4
Situational Overview .....	8
Data Collection Methodology and Data Presentation .....	9
Monitoring Location and KI Profile .....	11
Findings .....	16
2.1 Rights.....	16
2.1.1 Civil Status Documentation (CSD) .....	16
2.1.2 Access to Justice.....	20
2.1.3 Social Cohesion .....	22
2.2 Basic Services .....	26
2.2.1 Access to Education .....	27
2.2.2 Access to Health.....	33
2.2.3 Specialized Services.....	40
2.2.4 Access to Water .....	41
2.2.5 Humanitarian Assistance .....	45
2.2.6 Access to Markets .....	48
2.2.7 Access to Electricity.....	50
2.2.8 Access to Housing and Shelter .....	52
2.2.9 Access to Employment.....	54
2.3 Vulnerability .....	57
2.3.1 Risks for Children .....	57
2.3.2 Impact of Conflict on Children’s Psychological Wellbeing.....	61
2.3.3 Child Separation .....	61
2.3.4 Child Labor .....	62
2.3.5 Violence and Exploitation in Child Labor .....	64
2.3.6 Services for Persons with Specific Needs.....	64
2.4 Movements .....	65
2.4.1 Freedom of Movement / Movement Restrictions.....	65
2.4.2 IDP Movement .....	69
2.5 Explosive Hazards, Security Incidents, and Community Structures.....	72
2.5.1 Explosive Hazards.....	72
2.5.2 Security Incidents.....	74
2.5.3 Community Structures .....	75
2.6 Coping Mechanisms .....	77
Conclusion.....	79
Online Interactive Dashboard .....	80



## Executive Summary and Recommendations for Humanitarian Actors

The findings of protection monitoring between October and December 2018 demonstrate that communities in northwest Syria continue to experience numerous protection risks and challenges.

Civil Documentation: The lack of GoS-issued civil documentation in areas under the control of non-state armed groups in northeast and northwest Syria continues to affect freedom of movement by communities, access to humanitarian assistance, employment, and basic services. The new GOS flexible regulations for issuance of critical civil documentation in areas under government control has helped people to a large extent at a time when more than 50% of the civil registration departments throughout the country have been destroyed during the crisis.

Access to Services: While access to basic services such as education, health, water, electricity, and humanitarian assistance is safe and sufficient in some communities that have fallen under GoS control, other communities, particularly those controlled by non-state armed actors such as HTS, continue to experience irregular, insufficient and unsafe access to the services, which heightens protection risks. Challenges in access to essential services and humanitarian assistance have been noted for the following sectors: education (Jisr-Ash-Shugur, Afrin, Al Bab, A'zaz), health (Ariha, Jisr-Ash-Shugur, Afrin), water (Ariha, Harim, Idlib, Afrin, Jebel Saman), electricity (Ariha, As-Suqaylabiyah, Hama), and humanitarian assistance (Ariha, Harim, Idlib, Jisr-Ash-Shugur, Afrin).

Housing, Land and Property Issues: Findings suggest housing, land and property (HLP) issues, such as the lack or loss of HLP documentation, ownership disputes, rental disputes, and the unlawful occupation of property continue to permeate the lives of IDPs and host community members. The increase in undocumented or unofficial HLP transactions will present growing challenges in the future.

Child Protection: Children, mostly in areas controlled by non-state armed groups continue to experience heightened risks, particularly in regards to lack of access to education, child labor, early marriage, separation and exploitation.

Freedom of Movement: For most people, particularly in areas under the control of non-state armed actors, restrictions on freedom of movement caused by security concerns, as well as lack of job opportunities, continue to curtail access to employment. The inability to move freely has many negative consequences, such as challenges to obtaining documentation, or in accessing employment, education, markets and health care, exacerbating existing risks. In areas under GoS control destruction of basic social services and infrastructure due to the crisis also pose similar challenges.

Explosive Hazards: Explosive hazards are an increasing concern in many communities. Both urban and rural areas are contaminated with explosive hazards.

Persons with Specific Needs: Availability and access to services for persons with specific protection needs-- boys and girls at risk, unaccompanied and separated children (UASC), persons with serious health conditions, persons with specific legal or physical protection needs, single women, female-headed households, older persons and persons with disabilities-- continues to be severely insufficient, especially considering their growing numbers due to continued conflict conditions.

Coping Mechanisms: Due to the above-mentioned risks and challenges, community members continue to resort to negative coping mechanisms, such as early marriage, dropping out of school to work, and restricting movement. Communities remain highly dependent upon humanitarian assistance for survival and use positive coping mechanisms such as accessing community services and relying on community support when available. Many community members recognize the limitations that humanitarian actors experience in meeting the needs of the community and express expectations for their needs to be met to a greater extent by local governance actors (such as local councils)/community leaders/civil society groups and other local officials; however, some KI still



request basic services normally provided by local governing bodies, such as trash disposal and road repair. There is therefore a need for information sharing to clarify the role of humanitarian actors in the community, and for advocacy for capacity development support to local bodies who can provide services that are essential but outside the scope of humanitarian action.

In consideration of these findings, the Protection Monitoring Task Force and the Protection Cluster make the following recommendations to the humanitarian community. In implementing these recommendations, humanitarian actors are reminded to ensure and prioritize the security and safety of their staff and the communities they serve in every activity, and to formulate flexible and integrated programming and response. The Protection Monitoring Task Force recognizes that the unpredictability and volatility of the security situation, as well as other contextual factors, necessitate brave, creative, and innovative problem solving.

- **Ensure that lack of GoS-issued civil status documentation (CSD) in areas under the control of armed opposition groups does not become a barrier to accessing basic services and humanitarian assistance.** Absence of civil status documentation should not be an impediment to receiving humanitarian assistance or accessing critical services including health and education. Donors should take this into account for their reporting requirements and monitoring mechanisms. Humanitarian actors can utilize alternative forms of verification such as community validation and continue providing information on the risks and benefits of obtaining various forms of documentation, without encouraging individuals to approach any specific entity to obtain documents. As female KIs more frequently identified a lack of information on procedures as a critical barrier to obtaining documents, trained humanitarian actors can mitigate this issue by providing targeted awareness session and dedicated counseling services for female community members.
- **Improve access to clean and affordable water.** Donors are recommended to increase funding for water-related humanitarian programming in order to improve access to sufficient, clean and affordable water in both camp and other locations.
- **Improve access to affordable and quality health services.** Increase availability and access to health facilities and health services in communities experiencing challenges in access, with attention to the availability and cost of transportation and cost of secondary and tertiary health services. Access to underserved and hard-to-reach areas can be improved through medical mobile teams. Donors are recommended to increase funding for health services, including medical mobile teams.
- **Support programming and approaches that strengthen community networks in order to reduce dependency on humanitarian assistance.** While continuing to ensure that emergency and basic needs of communities are met, humanitarian organizations are encouraged to support more sustainable interventions and community networks that will reduce dependency on humanitarian assistance and poverty, such as livelihood projects. Community projects implemented by humanitarian actors should be inclusive of both host communities and IDPs, which will create opportunities for IDP-host community interaction and collaboration, and encourage community networks and support mechanisms. These activities should cater to both men and women in the community, and prioritize persons with specific needs and disabilities, at-risk women and girls, and other community members experiencing heightened protection risks; using clear, protection-sensitive criteria.
- **Improve availability of and access to specialized services for children by increasing case management services. Continue psychosocial support (PSS) activities, prioritizing remote, harder-to-reach communities that have never had access to these services.** Donors are



recommended to increase funding for specialized child protection services. In light of varying coping mechanisms used by children in response to trauma, to the extent possible, customize PSS services to every child's individual needs.

- **Mitigate factors that prevent school attendance. Raise awareness about the importance of education, and the risks associated with children dropping out of school to work, including risks associated with recruitment by armed groups.** Employ a multi-tiered approach that reduces financial, physical and security-related barriers to accessing schools. Vocational training programs and inclusion of vocational training into school curriculums may discourage school drop-out resulting from community perceptions that education does not contribute to livelihoods. Encouraging livelihood projects for men and women can help reduce the prevalence of children dropping out of school to work, and encourage working children to return to school.
- **Mitigate threat of explosive hazards through risk education, particularly for under-18 age groups, and advocate for survey, demarcation and explosive hazard-clearing activities, with a focus on residential areas and agricultural lands.** Continue and expand risk education and increase awareness on remaining safe from explosive hazards in areas where these risks are most commonly found. Ensure availability of victim assistance and rehabilitation for affected communities.
- **Improve access to specialized services for persons with disabilities (PWDs) through increased identification, inclusion and access. Conduct awareness-raising to reduce social stigma surrounding disability and improve social inclusion.** Disability awareness should be integrated both into trainings of humanitarian staff and into awareness sessions with community members and leaders, which will particularly combat social stigmas experienced by persons with specific needs. Humanitarian organizations should maintain updated service mapping and increase referrals to specialized services, especially cross-sector.



# 1

## **Situational Overview, Methodology, Location and Key Informant Profile**

## Situational Overview

The Syrian conflict, now in its eighth year, has caused continued and staggering suffering of civilians. In the context of armed conflict, displacement, increasing poverty and reliance on harmful coping mechanisms, civilians face numerous and overlapping protection risks. Despite the challenging security environment and access constraints, humanitarian actors continue to respond to the humanitarian needs occurring on an overwhelming scale in Syria.

During this reporting period, some key developments took place in the context of the Syrian conflict and related displacements. The months of October, November, and December witnessed ongoing tensions, clashes and shelling between GoS and non-state armed groups (NSAGs), as well as among various NSAGs. The GoS shelled NSAG-held areas in: west, south, and southeast Idleb, north Lattakia, Madiq Castle in Hama, west and north Hama, north, west, rural Aleppo and northwest suburbs of Aleppo city, with civilian casualties reported as a result of the conflict activity. NSAGs shelled GoS positions in northern and western Hama, and Aleppo city. There were tensions and incidents between Hay'at Tahrir Ash-Sham (HTS) and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), HTS and National Liberation Front (NLF), and HTS and other NSAGs in Idleb and Aleppo. Security incidents were also ongoing during this period, especially involving the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) explosions in Idleb City, southern and northern Idleb, and Western Aleppo resulting in civilian casualties. In addition, the following key events took place:

### October:

- In early October, NLF initiated the Buffer Zone agreement in NW Syria. However, at the end of the month, the agreement was still not fully implemented, and GoS continued shelling on the frontlines in western and northern Hama. Four non-state armed groups (Hurras Al Din, Ansar Al Din, Ansar Al Islam, Ansar Al Tawhid) rejected the Buffer Zone Agreement, resulting in tensions in contested areas.
- At the end of the month, HTS and NLF signed a ceasefire agreement in Aleppo and southern Idleb.
- A number of HTS military leaders of foreign origin in Idleb were reportedly assassinated.
- Tensions, military presence, and clashes between armed groups increased in Afrin region, northern Aleppo.

### November:

- Clashes between AOGs in Afrin continued, reportedly resulting in civilian casualties.
- Assassinations continued of HTS foreign leaders and military leaders of other non-state armed actors such as Faylaq Al Sham.

### December:

- Many weeks of escalation of conflict between GoS and NSAGs in November and GoS reinforcements in southeast Idleb and northern Hama created concerns about a potential offensive by the GoS in December. A major offensive into Idleb did not take place, but GoS continued shelling of these areas. Ongoing shelling by GoS resulted in disruptions to services, such as suspension of classes in schools.
- Assassinations of HTS foreign leaders reportedly continued.

As a result of these political and security-related developments, the following displacements were tracked for assessed communities in northwest Syria. These charts and tables are a compilation of data published by the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster. Please refer to the bi-weekly reports of CCCM IDP Situation Monitoring Initiative (ISMI) for additional information on these findings.



Total Arrivals and Departures in Assessed Communities for  
October, November, December 2018



			Location	Possible Reasons
2018 MONTH	OCTOBER	ARRIVALS	Idleb and surrounding areas, Northern Aleppo region	Continued clashes throughout the month in Idleb, despite a demilitarized zone (DMZ).
		DEPARTURES		
	NOVEMBER	ARRIVALS	Idleb and surrounding areas, Northern Aleppo region	Renewal in hostilities between GoS / allied forces and NSAGs in several parts of the DMZ in Idleb. Large security operations conducted in several major cities and urban centers in Aleppo.
		DEPARTURES		
	DECEMBER	ARRIVALS	Idleb and surrounding areas, Northern Aleppo region	Continuation of hostilities between GoS / allied forces and NSAGs, as well as inter-NSAG violence in areas considered part of the demilitarized zone in Idleb. Winter weather and flooding in northeast Idleb and southwest Aleppo. Military developments in northern Aleppo.
		DEPARTURES		

(Compilation from CCCM ISMI Monthly Overview of IDP Movements, October-December 2018<sup>3</sup>)

These figures and contextual information apply to communities assessed by the CCCM Cluster, which closely overlap with communities assessed through protection monitoring during this period. ISMI assesses total arrivals to and departures from communities on a monthly basis. Some figures reported may be repeat displacements.

## Data Collection Methodology and Data Presentation


PMTF members conducted key informant (KI) interviews on a monthly basis. The interview questions measure protection risks in the areas of rights, basic needs, vulnerability, movements, and incidents. The protection indicators were decided in consultation with protection actors and the coordinators of relevant clusters.

In order to achieve statistically significant results, members were encouraged to conduct at least four interviews per community per month. Locations were selected depending on factors such as member presence and accessibility.

<sup>3</sup> <https://app.box.com/s/me62wuy17xb1oi42hz9ag3fswvmh62de/folder/43635387298>



Members collect quantitative data and qualitative information from KIs -- active and aware members of the community who are able to assess various protection risks and concerns of all community members.




The data available in this report is from Idlib governorate (85%) and areas of Aleppo governorate (14%), and Hama governorate (1%) currently outside of GoS control. While governorate-level comparisons have been made in this report, readers are encouraged to take into consideration the limited data from Aleppo and Hama and note that the interviews only cover non-GoS-held parts of the governorate. Due to the variety of data collectors and agencies participating in this protection monitoring exercise, the type of responses can vary. In addition, conclusions of data from the governorates cannot be generalized to represent the Syrian population as a whole. The results reported can only be considered the opinions and perceptions of the survey participants. Comparisons between findings in this and earlier reports should also take into account the difference in locations of interviews between the two periods, due to changes in access.

Maps from the Online Interactive Dashboard which indicate severity of protection risks based on location for the monitoring period are found throughout this report.


The protection monitoring index is a value between 0 and 1, ranging from low values (green), which represent lower severity and fewer protection issues, to high values (red), which represent higher severity and more protection issues.

It is noted that the color severity index may not be representative of an entire sub-district in cases where few communities within a sub-district are monitored. Readers are encouraged to utilize the maps and analysis directly through the Online Interactive Dashboard in order to access all of this information, including the number of interviews conducted in a particular community during the monitoring period. Please refer to the last section of this report for additional information on how to access and use the PMTF Online Interactive Dashboard.




## Monitoring Location and KI Profile

**Protection Monitoring Index Map at the Subdistrict Level  
October-December 2018**




Online Interactive Dashboard 2018

The above map indicates severity of protection risks for all five groups of indicators for the October-December 2018 monitoring period. The most severe of protection issues have emerged for Maaret Tamsrin sub-district of Idleb district and Ehem sub-districts of Ariha district of Idleb governorate; and Afrin, Jandarisi, and Sheikh El-Hadid sub-districts of Afrin district of Aleppo governorate. *For most accurate analysis, the number of interviews per sub-district must be taken into consideration. Please visit the online dashboard for more detailed analysis.*



Percentage of Interviews per Governorate  
Total Number of Interviews: 606






This report is based on data from 606 community-level KI interviews conducted by fourteen PMTF members between October and December 2018 in three governorates in northwest and western Syria: Idleb, Aleppo and Hama. Monitoring was conducted in Ariha, Armanaz, Badama, Bensch, Dana, Darkosh, Ehem, Harim, Heish, Idleb, Kafr Takharim, Khan Shaykun, Maaret Tamsrin, Ma'arrat An Nu'man, Mhambal, Qourqeena, Salqin, Saraqab, Sarmin and Teftnaz sub-districts of Idleb governorate; Afrin, Al Bab, Atareb, A'zaz, Daret Azza, Jandariss, Ma'btali, Sheikh El-Hadid sub-districts of Aleppo governorate, and Kafr Zeita, Madiq Castle and Suran sub-districts of Hama governorate.

In-Camp / Off-Camp Locations of KIs  
546 Off-Camp and 60 In-Camp



In-Camp / Off-Camp Locations of KIs per Governorate-District






In this monitoring period, of a total of 606 KIs, 33% were female and 67% were male. Local authority was the most common type of KI (186), followed by teachers and school administrators (139), “other” (114), NGO staff (88), medical staff (48), religious leader (40), and camp manager (10). “Other” KIs include: civilians (97), small business owners (10), salespersons (4), engineer (1), and farmer (1).

The gender distribution per KI type indicates that a majority of local authorities, religious leaders, camp managers and “other” KIs are male. Teachers and school administrators and medical staff have a nearly equal gender distribution. As fewer women hold these positions in the community, partners experience challenges in interviewing equal numbers of male and female KIs.

7% (40 of 606) of the interviews conducted during this monitoring period resulted in a protection referral to the following sectors. It is noted that each interview may result in multiple referrals or referrals to more than one sector.



## Types of Assistance Referred




# 2

## Findings

## Findings

### 2.1 Rights

#### 2.1.1 Civil Status Documentation (CSD)



96% of KIs indicated that either some, most or all community members are lacking government-issued documentation.


#### Are People in the Community Lacking Government-Issued Civil Documents?



The chart below demonstrates the high prevalence of this issue for monitored areas, and how important it is for both humanitarian actors and donors to take this factor into consideration in relation to their humanitarian assistance procedures and civil status documentation requirements for identity verification. 50% or more of KIs in the following locations stated that most community members lack GoS-issued CSD: Jisr-Ash-Shugur district of Idleb and As-



Suqaylabiyah, Hama and Muhradah districts of Hama. In the absence of documentation, alternative methods of identification, such as community validation, should be accepted for the purposes of identifying persons receiving assistance. Community validation allows humanitarian staff to verify that the intended recipient of assistance is the actual recipient of the assistance in the absence of photo identification or when there is no identification. This approach triangulates personal information of the household through local council verification, witnesses (neighbors), and consistency between personal information provided by the household with documented information. This approach not only prevents the exclusion of in-need and vulnerable community members from life-saving assistance, but also helps mitigate the risks of corruption and fraud (*please refer to the Community Validation Tool by IRC, 2019*).




63% of KIIs from Jisr-Ash-Shugur district of Idlib governorate stated that most community members are lacking GoS-issued civil documents.


Overall, KIIs stating that some, most, or all community members lack government-issued civil documentation most commonly identified the following reasons: GoS services are unavailable in the areas, documents were lost, documents were left behind when fleeing, never had documents, concerns approaching authorities, and expired documents. Some KIIs also mentioned that community members don't attempt to obtain documents, some cannot afford it, counseling/legal services are not available. For community members who do not have documents due to unavailability of counseling/legal services, humanitarian actors can continue providing these services and inform and counsel community members without endorsing any specific authority for the issuance of documents.



### Why Do People in the Community Lacking Government-Issued Documents Not Have Them?



### If Lacking GoS-Issued Documents, Why Have They Been Unable to Obtain Them?




Security concerns were identified by KIs to be the primary reason for why community members lacking GoS-issued documents have been unable to obtain them. Around a quarter of KIs also indicated that there is no need for GoS-issued documents in non-GoS area. It is noted that GoS documents are often mentioned as being necessary for accessing humanitarian assistance. Other KIs mentioned barriers such as not knowing the procedure, transportation costs, lengthy procedures, fees and lack of a registrar. As female KIs more frequently identified a lack of information



on procedures as a critical barrier, trained humanitarian actors can mitigate this issue by providing targeted awareness session and dedicated counseling services for female community members.

As can be seen in the below chart, many KIs indicated that the lack of GoS-issued documentation or use of non-GoS documentation has no impact at all on the community. Other KIs mentioned the inability to move through certain areas. Additionally, KIs state that community members experience challenges in accessing humanitarian assistance, employment, schools and medical services. Female KIs were slightly more likely than male KIs to indicate some of these risks, including difficulty finding employment. Male KIs were slightly more likely to say that there is no impact.




KIs in Idleb governorate indicated that documentation is needed for community members to access humanitarian assistance, education, employment, and to secure freedom of movement. They noted that civil documents, most often a family booklet, is needed to access humanitarian assistance. Civil documents are requested as a proof of identity by many service providers.

Similarly, a birth certificate and/or registration in a family booklet often remains essential for the registration of children at schools. In the current system, access to education for children without documentation remains at the discretion of school administrators and is not guaranteed to them as it should be according to International Human Rights Law (IHRL). *Please refer to the “Guidance Note on Documents Requested for School Enrollment and National Exams in the Syrian Arab Republic” produced by UNHCR and NRC (May 2018) for additional information and guidance.*



## 2.1.2 Access to Justice

When There is a Problem or Dispute in this Community, to Which Entity Will People Go for Assistance?




Among “other” entity mentioned were camp managers.

While all communities rely on more than one type of entity for the resolution of their disputes, the most preferred also varies by location. For example, KIs in Al Mara district of Idleb were more likely to state that community members apply to the police in comparison to other Idleb districts which rely more heavily on local authorities, resolving themselves and sharia courts. Similarly, KIs in Harim and Jisr-Ash-Shugur were more likely to state that community members apply to sharia courts. Police was also commonly indicated as a primary dispute resolution entity in districts of Aleppo and Hama.

Whether community members apply to or prefer a particular entity also depends on access to that entity. For example, sharia courts and tribal leaders may be more available in some locations than others, depending on both tradition and the current governance structures prominent in these communities following the onset of the conflict. They type of dispute for which resolution is sought is also likely to determine to which entity community members apply.




When There is a Problem or Dispute in this Community, to Which Entity Will People Go for Assistance?



## 2.1.3 Social Cohesion


### Rights - Indicator 1.3

Prevalence of a Negative Relationship Between IDPs and Host Communities  
October-December 2018




### How Do You Describe the Relationship Between IDPs and Host Community?

■ Positive Interaction      ■ Limited Interaction  
■ Negative Interaction      ■ No Interaction



Consistent with data of previous reporting periods, the relationship between IDPs and host community continues to be predominantly a positive one. Both male and female KIs predominantly stated that the relationship between IDPs and host community is positive. Among KIs who stated that the relationship is limited, female KIs were more likely to choose this option than male KIs. One of the possible reasons for female KIs being more likely to state that the interaction is limited or non-existent may be due to cultural and social restrictions faced by women in the community. For example, restricted movement for women and girls within the community would also present a barrier for interaction between female IDPs and female host community members.




KIs in in-camp locations were more likely than those in off-camp locations to state that the interaction is limited or nonexistent. The difference is likely attributable to the additional barriers and limitations in-camp to interacting with the host community, including physical distances between camps and host community residences, the inability to afford transportation, or the unavailability of transportation.




The top reasons cited for the positive interaction between IDPs and the host community in this monitoring period is sympathy of the host community towards IDPs, IDPs having friends or relatives in the area, IDPs having lived in the area for a while, and religious reasons. On the other hand, job competition, increased cost of living and strain on infrastructure have a negative impact on IDP and host community relations.

### What is the Reason for the Level of Interaction Between IDPs and Host Community?




### What is the Reason for the Level of Interaction Between IDPs and Host Community?




In off-camp locations, which composes the majority of KI locations during the monitoring period, the sympathy of the host community towards IDPs was indicated as the primary reason for the positive relationship. KIs outside of camps were also slightly more likely to identify religious reasons.



### How Do You Describe the Relationship Between IDPs and Host Community?



### What is the Reason for the Level of Interaction Between IDPs and Host Community?




In Ariha district of Idleb governorate, a majority of KIs identified sympathy of the host community towards IDPs as cause of their positive interaction. In addition to sympathy, many KIs in Harim district indicated that IDPs having lived in the area for a while has a positive impact on their interaction. The presence of family and friends, and religious reasons also impact this relationship in Idleb districts.

Among negative influences, the increased cost of living and job competition especially affects host community-IDP relations in Harim and Jisr-Ash-Shugur districts. KIs in Jisr-Ash-Shugur districts provided explanations that high population density in their communities has led to increases in the cost of living and prices of basic goods and housing, and high competition for economic opportunities.

The findings from districts of Aleppo governorate are similar to findings of Idleb governorate, with the exception of Afrin district, where job competition and strain on infrastructure was mentioned more than in other locations. As in other locations, the influx of IDPs resulted in competition between host community and IDPs for limited economic opportunities and resources. In Afrin, KIs also noted cultural differences between the host community and IDPs, such as customs, traditions, dress preferences, and interactions between men and women; in addition, they noted instances of occupation of homes by IDPs, resulting in property disputes.

The perceived relationship between the host community and IDPs presented the following trend in Atma community of Idleb governorate, which has hosted high numbers of IDPs since the beginning of the crisis. Trends show that the host community and IDPs in Atma have experienced an improved relationship over time during 2018.



## 2.2 Basic Services



Monitoring shows that community members continue to experience challenges in accessing basic commodities and services, including food, education, healthcare and employment. Reasons include damage to education, health, and WASH infrastructure, as well as limitations on freedom of movement and security concerns, among them fear of generalized violence and criminal activity.

The monthly community-level KI interviews ask community members about damage to education, health and WASH infrastructure in their communities that occurred during the three weeks preceding the interview. Damaged or destroyed infrastructure limits and prevents community members' access to basic services. This information is not




representative of all affected/damaged infrastructure in Syria, does not attribute the act to any party to the conflict and does not identify the communities affected by this damage.

### 2.2.1 Access to Education




There are no significant differences in access to education between boys and girls in this monitoring data. As described below, however, there are some differences in perceived barriers to access for boys and girls.

### Are Boys Attending School in this Community?




### Are Girls Attending School in this Community?



In comparison to other districts in Idleb governorate, KIs in Jisr-Ash-Shugur district stated more commonly that only some boys and girls are attending school in their communities. Best school attendance was noted for Al Mara and Ariha districts of Idleb where around 50% of responding KIs stated that all boys and girls in the community attend school. In most districts of Aleppo governorate, around 50% of responding KIs stated that only some boys and girls are attending school.


### Why Do Boys and Girls Not Attend School?



The primary reason for the lack of school attendance by boys was the need for boys to work to support the family. For girls, the primary reason was that girls have to stay at home to help the family. The cost of school materials continue to be a barrier to school attendance in monitored communities. Humanitarian actors are recommended to include assistance for school materials in their education-related programming.




### Why Do Boys Not Attend School?



For boys, dropping out of school in order to work or stay at home to support the family are challenges consistently experienced in all monitored locations. These two issues were mentioned slightly more frequently in Ariha district of Idleb governorate. KIs in Al Ma'ra district highlighted security concerns and KIs in Jisr-Ash-Shugur district noted unaffordable transportation as barriers to school attendance by boys compared to other districts covered during this reporting period.



### Why Do Boys Not Attend School?



For girls in districts of Idleb, having to stay at home to help family is the primary reason for their lack of attendance in school. Once again, not being able to afford the cost of school materials remains a primary barrier, especially for girls in Harim district. Similar to boys, the transportation costs is a barrier for girls' school attendance in Jisr-Ash-Shugur district. In districts of Aleppo and Hama, KIs were far more likely to identify security concerns as a barrier.

Among "other" reasons for why boys not attending schools, KIs in Harim explained that there are no schools near camps and education at camps is limited to informal schooling, where children meet in a tent and volunteers give lessons. Some KIs in Harim also explained that the school in their community only provides education through 5<sup>th</sup> grade, and students are not able to continue their education due to absence of schools. Other reasons described for boys by KIs in Idleb district was the unaffordable cost of school fees and materials, and poor quality education due to lack of staff caused by irregular payment of teachers' salaries. KIs expressed that educational services do not receive enough support, and there is a lack of awareness on the challenges experienced.

*The educational service is poor. [There is] no support for education in this village (Male KII, Off-Camp, Salesperson, Idleb District, Idleb Governorate).*




*There is no teaching staff in the middle school. Women [teaching staff] need a car to take them to [location redacted] and they cannot afford rent because they did not receive their salary during this period (Female KII, Off-Camp, Teacher, Idleb District, Idleb Governorate).*


For girls, KIs in Ariha, Harim, Idleb and Jisr-Ash-Shugur districts of Idleb governorate frequently mentioned early marriage. Additionally, as similarly noted for boys, the absence of schools around camps, and the lack of schools that provide curriculum beyond the 5<sup>th</sup> grade were mentioned as barriers to school attendance by girls.

Community members continue to rely upon the negative coping mechanism of early marriage. Additional information on early marriage as a coping mechanism can be found in the sections on Risks for Children, and Coping Mechanisms.

Has There Been Any Education Infrastructure Damaged by Conflict Activity in this Community in the Last Three Weeks?



Has There Been Any Education Infrastructure Damaged by Conflict Activity in this Community in the Last Three Weeks?




Nearly all KIs in districts of Idleb stated that no education infrastructure has been damaged by conflict activity in the period preceding the interview. For the few communities which indicated damage from conflict activity in Idleb, this is consistent with conflict activity between NSAGs and shelling by GoS during the monitoring period.




## 2.2.2 Access to Health

### Basic Needs - Indicator 2.2

Prevalence of Challenges in Accessing Health Services  
October-December 2018




### Is It a Challenge for Members of the Community to Access Health Services?



59% of all KIs stated that members of the community do not experience challenges in accessing health services. 19% stated that some community members experience challenges, 14% stated that most community members experience challenges and 8% stated that all community members experience challenges.

### Is It a Challenge for Members of the Community to Access Health Services?




More than half of KIIs in Al Ma'ra, Harim and Idleb districts of Idleb governorate stated that it is not a challenge for any of the members in the community to access health services. On the other hand, more than half of KIIs in Ariha and Jisr-Ash-Shugur districts indicated that it is a challenge for some, most or all of the community.

Even in sub-districts with some presence of humanitarian organizations, access to health continues to be a challenge. Findings indicate that between 25-50% of responding KIIs from the following sub-districts indicated that either most or all of the community experiences challenges in accessing health services: Armanaz, Darkosh, Ehem, Maaret Tamsrin, Mhambal, Salqin in Idleb governorate, Jandarisi in Afrin district of Aleppo, Madiq Castle in Hama governorate.

Transportation costs, cost of health services, lack of services, lack of medication and poor quality services are the primary challenges that community members in monitored communities experience in accessing health services.



### What Barriers Does the Community Face When Accessing Health Services?




Male KIs were more likely to identify transportation costs as a barrier to accessing health services, while female KIs were more likely to identify poor-quality services in the area and the lack of privacy for women.

Among “other” reasons, KIs in Harim district predominantly indicated that the number of health facilities are not able to meet demand for health services in the area. Many communities have only one health center which is very crowded and it is difficult for patients to get a turn to be examined. Several KIs in Harim also indicated that medicines are insufficient and of poor quality.

When the health facility in their community is insufficient, patients are often not able to travel to other communities for medical treatment, either due to the poor security situation, including clashes or shelling, or because transportation is unavailable.



### What Barriers Does the Community Face When Accessing Health Services?




Humanitarian actors are encouraged to share information about available health services with community members, especially newly arrived IDPs to the community, or communities and camps that are located far from the city centers where medical facilities may be located. In addition, health actors are urged to continue their good practice of utilizing mobile teams to reach remote areas and IDP camps and to serve community members who cannot travel to medical facilities.

Transportation costs as a barrier to accessing health services was indicated by a higher percentage of KIIs in Ariha, Harim and Jisr-Ash-Shugur districts of Idleb governorate. Unavailability of medication was similarly noted by a higher percentage of KIIs in Idleb and As-Suqaylabiyah. Lack of health services in the area is a primary issue in Muhradah district of Hama and Afrin district of Aleppo. Poor quality of services was also noted for As-Suqaylabiyah.


Communities continue to rely heavily upon health care services provided by humanitarian actors, such as NGO clinics and medical mobile teams.



### Where Do Community Members Go If They Need Health Services?




### Where Do Community Members Go If They Need Health Services?



### Has Any Health Infrastructure Been Damaged by Conflict Activity in the Recent Period?




### Has Any Health Infrastructure Been Damaged by Conflict Activity in the Recent Period?



KIs in most monitored communities did not indicate any recent damage to health infrastructure by conflict activity. Damage was indicated for health infrastructure in As-Suqaylabiyah district of Hama governorate. Although damage to health infrastructure from conflict activity such as clashes and shelling was not common during the monitoring period, it is noted that security incidents can also impact health facilities, staff, and patients. For example, on 12 December, there was a VBIED explosion in close proximity to health facilities in A'zaz district of Aleppo governorate resulting in civilian casualties (*Health Cluster Turkey Hub Flash Update #103*).




### Are Pregnant Women Able to Access Prenatal Care?



More than half of KIs stated that some, most, or all pregnant women in the community are not able to access prenatal care. Access to prenatal care is a considerable challenge in all locations. In Al Ma’ra and Ariha districts of Idleb governorate, 50% or more of KIs stated that either none or only some pregnant women have access to prenatal care in the community. Similarly, access to this care is also limited in Aleppo and Hama governorates. FGD responses during the same monitoring period indicate that limited access to prenatal care, in addition to challenges in accessing sufficient and balanced food groups, impacts the health of pregnant women as well as newborns. The length of time for which new mothers are able to breastfeed has decreased, and many families are unable to afford infant formula (IRC Protection Monitoring Report for Northwest Syria November/December 2018).


While specific data on causes is not available, limited access to prenatal care is most likely caused by factors that restrict pregnant women’s access to health care, including distance to the nearest facility, security, social stigma (especially experienced by widows or divorced women), fear of violence and harassment, or the lack of facilities offering specialized health care services as described above. Humanitarian actors are encouraged to improve pregnant women’s access to prenatal care across the affected areas, for example through the use of mobile integrated reproductive health services. These services also support organizations in identifying, receiving disclosure and serving those in need of protection assistance, such as survivors of gender-based violence, who can then be referred for more specialized support.

### Are Pregnant Women Able to Access Prenatal Care?




## 2.2.3 Specialized Services

Are There Specialized Services Available for Persons with Disabilities?




Are There Specialized Services Available for Persons with Disabilities?




KIIs continue to report a significant gap in specialized services for persons with disabilities. 82% of KIIs stated that there are no specialized services available for persons with disabilities in their area. Considering the continued movement of IDPs into Northwest Syria during the monitoring period, as well as external reports that indicate a growing number of physically impaired persons, civilians with other types of disability, and the insufficiency of the services and support available to them, there is a significant need to scale up and expand dedicated and specialized services. Disabilities that result in lack of or reduction in mobility may result in additional challenges in accessing food, water, non-food items, and other vital humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian actors responsible for providing basic humanitarian assistance must specifically plan logistics, transportation, and access to ensure that persons with specific needs—the sick and disabled, as well as the elderly—have equal and sufficient access to these resources.

## 2.2.4 Access to Water


### Basic Needs - Indicator 2.5 Prevalence of Challenges in Accessing Water



### How Do People Access Water in the Area?



% of 60 In-Camp and 546 Off-Camp KIs Identifying Each Option




Overall, water trucks (for purchase - water provided by non-humanitarian actors at a cost) emerge as the primary source of water, followed by the public network, water trucks (NGOs - water provided by humanitarian actors at no cost) and wells. In off-camp locations, water trucks (for purchase) emerged as the leading source, while camp residents predominantly rely upon free water through water trucks provided by NGOs for their water needs.


Several KIs note that they have limited access to water through the public network, which in some communities may run for only 24 hours per week. In cases where water is provided by an NGO, the water quantity is at times insufficient which causes community members to purchase water in addition to what they receive.

29% of all KIs stated that the community does not experience challenges in accessing water. Due to regular water distribution by NGOs in camps, these locations experience fewer challenges than other locations, as seen below.

### Does the Community Face Challenges in Accessing Water?




### Does the Community Face Challenges in Accessing Water?




With the exception of Jisr-Ash-Shugur district, the majority of KIIs in all other districts of Idleb indicated that either some, most or all community members experience challenges in accessing water. Nearly half of KIIs in Ariha district stated that no one in the community has access to water. Most of these KIIs are located in locations other than camps and for these locations the primary challenge is cost. For camp locations, the primary challenge to accessing water is unavailability. Although in-camp locations receive free water distribution by NGOs, KIIs consistently indicate that the amount can be insufficient.

### What Are the Challenges to Accessing Water?



Nearly all responding KIs in Ariha and Idleb districts and more than 50% of responding KIs in Harim district stated that the challenge to accessing water is that it is too expensive. Water being unavailable was identified as the primary reason by KIs in Jisr-Ash-Shugur district. Cost was also the primary challenge identified by KIs in Afrin, Al Bab, and Jebel Saman districts of Aleppo governorate. Polluted and unclean water was most frequently mentioned in A'zaz district. Security concerns were most frequently mentioned in A'zaz district.


### What Are the Challenges to Accessing Water?



### Has Any WASH Infrastructure Been Damaged by Conflict Activity in the Recent Period?




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
The majority of KIIs from districts of Idleb did not indicate any damage to WASH infrastructure from conflict activity in the period preceding the interview. Some KIIs in Al Ma'ra district stated that there was damage to some WASH infrastructure. In Aleppo and Hama, recent damage was indicated for some WASH infrastructure in Al Bab, Jebel Saman, and Hama districts.

### 2.2.5 Humanitarian Assistance

#### Has the Community Received Humanitarian Assistance in the Recent Period?





### Has the Community Received Humanitarian Assistance in the Recent Period?



Humanitarian assistance includes food, water, shelter/NFI, cash, medical, PSS, counseling or other protection assistance. Half of all KI's stated that the community has not received humanitarian assistance in the recent period preceding the interview, and 47% stated that either some, most or all community members received humanitarian assistance. As expected, KI's in locations other than camps were far more likely to state that no one in the community received humanitarian assistance recently, while camp-based KI's were more likely to state that all of the community received assistance. This difference may be due to the systematic and comprehensive nature of organized humanitarian assistance in IDP camps, due to vulnerability criteria for assistance that prioritizes IDPs as more vulnerable, or due to the consideration of camp residents as more vulnerable than those living in other types of shelter arrangements. There is not a noteworthy difference in the responses of female and male KI's on whether the community has received assistance.

### Has the Community Received Humanitarian Assistance in the Recent Period?





51% of responding KIs stated that community members do not experience any challenges in accessing humanitarian assistance. Male KIs were more likely to state that there are no challenges. Among challenges, KIs continue to note the requirement of civil documentation to access assistance, discrimination or exclusion, and unsuitability for the community’s needs. Two KIs (1M/1F) indicated request for sexual favors as a challenge to receiving humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian organizations are recommended to review their Protection Against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) policies to ensure that they meet the minimum standards defined by the United Nations Secretary General, and ensure that every staff member is familiar with the policy. Please refer to UN General Assembly Report of the Secretary General *“Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse” (2017)*, *“Guidelines to implement the Minimum Operating Standards for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN and non-UN Personnel,”*<sup>4</sup> and Turkey Cross-Border Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) Network resources for guidance and guidelines for minimum standards<sup>5</sup>.

Among “other” challenges, KI respondents from districts of Idlib stated that humanitarian assistance is irregular and inadequate. Humanitarian organizations are encouraged to improve their communication and feedback mechanisms regarding planning and distribution processes to ensure more equal and sufficient coverage and assistance provision. Based on recent needs assessments, humanitarian organizations can also advocate with donors for increased funding. Donors are encouraged to review and adjust funding as needed in order to sufficiently meet life-saving and life-sustaining assistance needs.

Fairness in assistance distribution also contributes to protecting and maintaining the neutral and impartial stance and reputation of humanitarian organizations. Establishment and maintenance of trust in humanitarian organizations active within the community is not only essential for the security of humanitarian staff, but it also ensures that community members can reach out these organizations when they face protection risks and needs.

Aside from the perceptions of communities about humanitarian assistance provision, the humanitarian sector must also engage in discussions regarding the long-term effects of reliance on humanitarian assistance, and must brainstorm and implement alternative solutions to the massive needs in the area of operation, such as emergency livelihood creation projects. Livelihood creation within the emergency context will help generate economic and survival opportunities for these communities and reduce reliance on humanitarian assistance.

<sup>4</sup> <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XpKGc0uzUe85SKxtlmWFhE0-wlPoD75U/view>

<sup>5</sup> [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1DmurUsVaGpUbV\\_oi4RGvq-as6U49A-n](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1DmurUsVaGpUbV_oi4RGvq-as6U49A-n)




Livelihoods projects are better received and more successful if humanitarian assistance continues to meet the basic needs of communities during the transition. Livelihood projects must take into consideration the needs, preferences and skills of the affected communities to ensure that they are useful and sustainable.

## 2.2.6 Access to Markets



85% of KIs stated that all community members have safe access to markets. Responses of KIs in in-camp and other locations were similar. Male KIs were slightly more likely to say that all community members have safe access to markets while female KIs were more likely to say that most community members have safe access to markets.






As can be observed in the above chart, nearly all KIs in districts of Idleb governorate stated that all members of the community have safe access to markets. Around 20% of KIs in Jisr-Ash-Shugur district stated that most community members have safe access.

When describing why there are no safe access to markets, KIs from districts of Idleb governorate indicated security concerns (including shelling, kidnapping and IED/VBIEDs). Half or more of KIs in Afrin and Al Bab districts of Aleppo, and As-Suqaylabiyah district of Hama stated that some or most community members have safe access. KIs in Afrin, Al Bab and Jebel Saman districts mentioned security concerns (clashes, kidnapping, arrest at checkpoints, IED/VBIEDs).



## 2.2.7 Access to Electricity

### Basic Needs - Indicator 2.7 Prevalence of Challenges in Accessing Electricity




### Do Community Members Have Access to Electricity in the Area?

- None
- Less than 3 Hours/Day
- Between 3-6 Hours/Day
- Between 6-12 Hours/Day
- Continuously





Majority of KIs stated that community members have between three to six hours of electricity per day.

### Do Community Members Have Access to Electricity in the Area?



### How Do Community Members Access Electricity?




KIs in Ariha district of Idleb governorate were more likely to state that community members have either no access or access to less than three hours of electricity per day. The majority of KIs in remaining Idleb districts indicated that the community has access to between three and six hours of electricity per day. KIs in A'zaz and Al Bab districts of Aleppo indicated the best access to electricity, between six and twelve hours per day. KIs in Afrin and Jebel Saman districts of Aleppo predominantly indicated access of three to six hours per day. KIs in Hama district of Hama governorate indicated that the community does not have access to electricity.

Shared generator and solar energy are the primary ways in which community members access electricity. Shared generators are more common in locations other than camps, while solar energy is more common in camp locations.



## 2.2.8 Access to Housing and Shelter


### In What Type of Shelters Do IDPs Live?




Across all locations, solid/finished house and unfinished building are the most common types of shelters for IDPs. KIs in Idleb districts most commonly identified solid/finished house, unfinished building, and solid/finished apartment as shelter types in the community. Non-Residential/Public Building and “Other” were identified less frequently. In Al Bab, A’zaz and Jebel Saman districts of Aleppo, unfinished building was most frequently identified to be sheltering IDPs. Similarly in districts of Hama governorate, most KIs stated that IDPs reside in unfinished buildings.



### Do Families in the Community Pay Rent for the Camp or Accommodation?



### Do Families in the Community Pay Rent for the Camp or Accommodation?




While it is not surprising that some community members in off-camp locations pay rent for their accommodations, the data consistently indicates that even IDPs in some in-camp locations pay rent for camp accommodations. It is noted however that these camps are not necessarily formal camps registered with CCCM.

As can be seen in the below chart, more than half of KIs in Ariha, Harim and Idlib districts of Idleb governorate stated that there are no HLP problems in the period preceding the interview. It is especially noted that nearly all KIs in Ariha indicated that there are no problems. In comparison, KIs in Jisr-Ash-Shugur district were more likely to state that there are different HLP problems in the community, such as looting of private property, other disputes, inheritance issues, rents disputes and ownership disputes, among others. The highest percentage mention of HLP issues caused by lack or loss of HLP documents is in Al Ma'ra district in Idleb governorate. In Aleppo and Hama governorates, highest mention of no HLP problems was in A'zaz district of Aleppo, and Hama district of Hama governorate. Other locations



indicated numerous HLP problems. Highest percentage mention of lack or loss of HLP documents was in Afrin district. The highest mention of unlawful occupation of property was in Afrin district of Aleppo and As-Suqaylabiyah district of Hama governorate. Disputes related to rent and ownership were also frequently mentioned..

What Are the Top Three Most Common HLP Problems in the Community in the Recent Period?





### 2.2.9 Access to Employment

29% of all KIIs stated that no men in the community have access to employment. 57% stated that some, 13% stated most, and only 1% stated that all men in the community have access to employment in the community.



50% or more of all KIIs in districts of Idlib governorate stated that either no men or only some men in the community have access to employment. Men's access to employment appears to be better in Idlib district, where 27% of KIIs stated that most men have access to employment. Overall, men in districts of Idlib have very limited access to employment. Majority of KIIs from Aleppo governorate similarly stated that some men in the community have access to employment. Access to employment seems to be more challenging in Hama district of Hama governorate.



### Do Men in the Community Have Access to Employment?




### Do Women in the Community Have Access to Employment?



34% of KIs stated that no women in the community have access to employment. 53% stated that some women have access, 11% stated that most women have access and only 1% stated that all women have access to employment.

Similar to findings for men, women in monitored communities also experience limited access to employment. For all monitored districts, majority of KIs indicated that either no women or only some women in their communities have access to employment.



Lack of employment opportunities remain the primary restriction in accessing employment for both women and men in the community. Additional factors such as restrictions imposed by family or spouse (only for women), education not being recognized, fear of gossip and social restrictions (only for women), and security concerns present challenges in accessing employment. Between 12-14% of KIs stated that men and women do not experience any restrictions.

Key informants from districts of Idleb governorate who provided additional information on the restrictions to accessing employment primarily noted lack of opportunities, stating that there are few jobs available in general, there is a lot of competition, and these jobs are often restricted to a few specific fields such as agriculture. KIs from Harim district noted that

more women are employed than men in their area because women are paid less wages, and for this reason they are often preferred for jobs that have hourly or daily wages such as those in agriculture.

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*The region suffers from scarcity of [investment] and if it is found, it is confined only to agriculture which is seasonal, for example, the olive harvest season (Male KI, Off-Camp, NGO Staff, Harim District, Idleb Governorate).*

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Responses also indicate that young men and women, and especially those with higher levels of education, such as Bachelor's and Master's degrees, may be experiencing the greatest challenges in accessing employment. While men and women who had completed their education prior to the onset of the conflict currently cannot find any job opportunities suitable to their educational background, youth who completed their education after the onset of the conflict experience issues such as lack of documentation (which the student sometimes intentionally avoided obtaining in order to avoid forced conscription), or lack of recognition thereof. The conflict has stunted the economy



and labor in their area.

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*The youth of the region suffer from a lack of employment opportunities. The main reason for this is the war in the region which has made the region backward in terms of services and labor movement (Male KII, Off-Camp, Local Authority, Idleb District, Idleb Governorate).*

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In Afrin district of Aleppo governorate, KIs indicated security concerns, particularly among those with small businesses and those who have to travel for work and cross checkpoints.


## 2.3 Vulnerability

Amidst generalized violence and barriers to accessing basic items and services, conflict has placed persons with specific needs at an increased risk of additional protection threats. Data indicates that communities fear greater risk of harm for not only women, girls, boys, persons with disabilities, and older persons, but also for men. Communities take certain self-precautions and resort to certain harmful coping mechanisms in order to reduce these risks for community members.

### 2.3.1 Risks for Children

#### **Vulnerability - Indicator 3.1**

Prevalence of Children Affected by or at Risk of Exploitation  
October-December 2018




Online Interactive Dashboard 2018

The PMTF questions on child protection are part of a two-pronged approach. The PMTF maps the overall protection risks faced by children, while the Child Protection Monitoring Task Force (CPMTF) complements this information by



zooming into the following three areas: psychosocial needs, child labor and child separation. For additional information, please refer to CPMTF’s framework and dashboard<sup>6</sup>.


The prevalence of child exploitation is believed to be under-reported in these findings. It is noted that the risk of violence or exploitation is reported to be higher in other assessments conducted during the same monitoring period. This discrepancy is believed to be a result of community perceptions. Communities often have different perceptions about what constitutes exploitation, as well as how they define a child in terms of age group.



Overall, 34% of KIs stated that children are not at risk of violence or exploitation in the community 49% stated that some children are at risk, 12% stated that most children are at risk, 1% stated that all children are at risk and 4% were unable to answer. KI responses from camp and other locations present similar results.

Half or more of KIs in Al Ma’ra, Ariha, Harim and Idleb districts of Idleb stated that some children in the community are at risk of violence or exploitation. 23% of KIs from Al Ma’ra stated that most children are at risk. KIs in Jisr-Ash-Shugur district stated that children are not at risk.


In Aleppo governorate, half or more of KIs in Afrin and Al Bab stated that some children are at risk. Risk for some children in the community was similarly noted for As-Suqaylabiyah and Hama districts of Hama governorate.



<sup>6</sup> <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/whole-of-syria/northern-syria-child-protection-monitoring-framework>




The extent to which KIs identify risks to children are linked to perceptions of community members. Some community members may define children as those below the age of 13. Additionally, in communities where child labor and children affiliated with armed groups may be longstanding and pre-existing, these activities may no longer be perceived as forms of exploitation by community members.



Child labor continues to be the primary risk of violence and exploitation affecting children in monitored communities. The risk was identified in equal percentages by in-camp and off-camp KIs. Male KIs were slightly more likely to indicate child labor. *Further information on child labor can be found in section 3.3.4.*

The risks of physical neglect, trafficking/smuggling, and kidnapping were also identified by KIs. In-camp KIs were slightly more likely to indicate the risk of physical neglect, and female KIs were slightly more likely to indicate the risk of kidnapping.



One KI from Idleb governorate, a pediatrician, described physical neglect of children in his community in the following way:

*I am a pediatrician and so far, I have cases of children exposed to physical violence because of the ignorance of their communities, [such as children] with cigarettes put out on their bodies, in addition to the presence of children who are neglected due to family problems (Male KI, Off-Camp, NGO Staff, Harim District, Idleb Governorate).*

KIs from Afrin district of Idleb described how children have been impacted in the community:




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*The deterioration of the education situation led to neglect of children and sending them to work in insecure places (Female KII, Off-Camp, NGO Staff, Afrin District, Aleppo Governorate).*

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### 2.3.2 Impact of Conflict on Children’s Psychological Wellbeing



KIs were asked whether children in the community had in the recent period displayed behavioral changes indicative of emotional distress, such as isolation, non-participation in social activities, finger-sucking, bedwetting, extreme fear, shyness, anxiety, aggression, irregular sleep patterns, and learning difficulties. Overall, 52% of KIs stated that none of the children in the community displayed behavioral changes. 31% stated that some, 8% stated that most, and 3% stated that all children display such behavioral changes, while 6% were unable to answer.

KIs especially in Idleb district stated that many children are experiencing learning difficulties and have difficulty paying attention during lessons. The following comment by a KI from Afrin district of Aleppo summarizes the impact of conflict on children’s emotional well-being:

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*Children, whether resident or displaced, suffer from many psychological and emotional problems due to painful incidents during war that have affected their behavior (Female KII, Off-Camp, NGO Staff, Afrin District, Aleppo Governorate).*


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A “one size fits all” approach to PSS for all children in a community is unlikely to be equally effective for all children. The wide range of behaviors described by KIs clearly demonstrate that while some children in the community internalize their traumatic experiences, such as through shyness, anxiety, anti-social behavior, other children externalize and demonstrate aggressive and intense responses to their environment. Therefore, it will be necessary to approach children with more customized PSS approaches that will help meet each child’s specific emotional needs for safety and healing. Humanitarian actors are recommended to take this into consideration during the design of their PSS activities for children.

### 2.3.3 Child Separation



### Are You Aware of Child Separation in the Community in the Recent Period?




KIs described cases of unaccompanied or separated children due to reasons such as death of one or both parents and divorce. Children often live with relatives, usually grandparents or uncles.


While additional information on the risks experienced by children is not available in this data, considering that many separated children are dependent on elderly relatives for shelter and basic needs, these children may be at greater risk of dropping out of school and working to support the household.

### 2.3.4 Child Labor

**Vulnerability - Indicator 3.2**  
Prevalence of Child Labor  
October-December 2018



### Are There Children (Under 18 Years of Age) That Are Working in This Community?




6% of all KIs stated that no children in the community are working. The majority, 70%, stated that some children are working, 21% stated that most children are working, 1% stated that all children in the community are working and 1% were unable to answer. In-Camp KIs were more likely to state that most children in the community are working.

In districts of Idleb governorate, more than 50% of each district stated that some children work, and KIs in Jisr-Ash-Shugur were more likely to state that most children work. Responses from Aleppo governorate present similar findings, with at least half of KIs in each district indicating that some children work.

KIs indicated that children work in a variety of jobs and occupations such as agricultural labor, shepherding and raising livestock, construction labor, industry/manufacturing, salespersons (both freelance and employed by shops), car repair and maintenance, and skilled labor such as blacksmithing, carpentry, and baking.


### Are There Children (Under 18 Years of Age) That Are Working in This Community?



### 2.3.5 Violence and Exploitation in Child Labor

Are Children That Are Working Being Mistreated?

■ None ■ Some ■ Most ■ All ■ Unable to Answer



39% of KIs stated that working children are not being mistreated. 40% stated that some are being mistreated, 6% stated that most are being mistreated, 2% stated that all of them are being mistreated and 10% were unable to answer.

KIs' explanations demonstrate the severity of both physical and psychological risks and harm endured by these children. KIs state that children engage in work that is greatly disproportionate to their physical build and capacity, often having to carry extremely heavy materials, and are forced to work very long hours, placing their health and well-being in danger.

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
*They suffer many injuries, including burns and serious wounds, as well as harsh treatment by employers (Female KII, Off-Camp, Other, Idleb District, Idleb Governorate).*

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### 2.3.6 Services for Persons with Specific Needs

Are There Dedicated Services for Persons with Specific Needs and Elderly Persons?


■ Yes ■ No ■ Unable to Answer



KIs were asked to state whether there are any dedicated services for people with specific needs and elderly persons in their communities. Specific needs includes boys and girls at risk, unaccompanied and separated children (UASC), persons with serious health conditions, persons with specific legal/physical protection needs, single women, female-headed households, older persons and persons with disabilities.



### Are There Dedicated Services for Specific Needs?



90% of all KI's stated that there are no dedicated services for specific needs. 95% of all KI's stated that there are no dedicated services for older persons. Some specific needs services were noted by KI's in Jisr-Ash-Shugur and Al Ma'ra districts of Idleb governorate, and Jebel Saman district of Aleppo. Physical therapy and mobility aids are most frequently mentioned for the types of dedicated services. It is noted that when compared to information provided by members of the Protection Cluster, that these findings may not entirely reflect the availability of specific needs services as KI's and community members may not be aware of existing services, and services may be underreported or under-utilized.

In order to fill existing gaps in specialized service provision and better manage the use of existing services, there is a need to better utilize assessments of disability rates and needs in communities. *Please refer to Disability and Access to Healthcare in Syria: Western Aleppo, Idleb and Ar-Raqqa* published in December 2018 by the Physical Rehabilitation and Disability Working Group (PRDWG) and REACH. Existing community centers and safe spaces must also be made accessible to persons with specific needs through basic steps such as targeted transportation assistance, and by making the entrances of buildings accessible to wheelchairs. Disability awareness can be integrated both into training of humanitarian staff and into awareness sessions with community members and leaders, which will particularly combat social stigmas experienced by persons with specific needs. Humanitarian actors with health programming can provide direct guidance and support to families (IRC, Protection Monitoring Northwest Syria, June 2018).

It is necessary for all humanitarian organizations, including those without specialized programming, to have up-to-date service mapping with contact information of organizations that provide specialized services in their area, and undertake referrals to these organizations when possible. Humanitarian organizations should not hesitate to reach out to and inform the Protection Cluster of any gaps in service mapping or specialized service provision so that they can receive the needed support.


## 2.4 Movements

### 2.4.1 Freedom of Movement / Movement Restrictions

*Restrictions and impact for men and boys:*




### Are Men and Boys Able to Move Freely in the Community?



83% of all KIIs stated that men and boys are able to move freely in the community. 8% stated that most are able to move freely, 6% stated that some are able to move freely, and 3% stated that none are able to move freely in the community. In Idleb governorate, KIIs in Jisr-Ash-Shugur district were more likely to state than other districts that most, some or no men and boys in the community are able to move freely. In Aleppo Governorate, KIIs in Afrin, Al Bab, and Jebel Saman districts were more likely to indicate restrictions to freedom of movement.

### Why Are Men and Boys Not Able to Move Freely in the Community?




Of the KIs who stated that some, most and none are able to move freely, the most-mentioned causes of restriction were: fear of kidnapping/robbery (20%), fear of arrest, (18%), checkpoints (12%), and activities of armed groups (11%).

In Idleb governorate, KIs in Jisr-Ash-Shugur district noted various security concerns as restrictions on men and boys' freedom of movement. In addition to shelling and clashes between armed groups, KIs state that fear of robbery and kidnapping are concerns among community members.

In Aleppo governorate, restrictions were described by KIs from Afrin, who noted numerous and inter-related factors impacting the freedom of movement of men and boys. In addition to similar security concerns, KIs from Afrin also described restrictions caused by lack of documents, checkpoints, and permissions required from local authorities for movement. Additional information on civil status documentation can be found in section 2.1.1.

*Some people do not have personal documents so they cannot go to villages because of the large number of roadblocks (checkpoints). (Male KII, Off-Camp, Medical Staff, Afrin District, Aleppo Governorate).*


**Restrictions and impact for women and girls:**



79% of all KIs stated that women and girls are able to move freely in the community. 9% stated that most are able, 8% stated that some are able, 4% stated that no women and girls are able to move freely in the community.



### Why Are Women and Girls Not Able to Move Freely in the Community?



The primary factors impacting the ability of women and girls to move freely in the community differs from factors impacting the freedom of movement of men and boys. While women and girls are also impacted by security concerns such as general violence, presence of explosive hazards and checkpoints, the primary factors affecting the movement of women and girls are fear of gossip and social restrictions, and restrictions imposed by their family/spouse. Female KIs are more likely to note these restrictions than male KIs.

While general security concerns apply to both men and women, KI responses in some locations, for example Afrin district, indicate that women and girls are perceived to be at greater risk of harassment when the security situation worsens in a community, and may therefore experience slightly greater restrictions as a result.

Participants of FGDs conducted in 2018 cited fear of sexual violence as a reason for movement restriction, both self-imposed and by family members. Fear of sexual violence impacts both women and girls, and men and boys. FGD responses also indicate that movement restriction is the primary obstacle to accessing GBV-specialized services in monitored locations, meaning that these two factors both cause and result in one another (Voices from Syria 2019). Humanitarian actors can reduce the


protection risks associated with these factors by improving access to specialized protection services through outreach and mobile teams.



## 2.4.2 IDP Movement

Most IDP populations monitored through this and other assessments in North, Northwest and Northeast Syria have experienced more than one displacement. The survey used by the Protection Monitoring Task Force defines arrivals as IDPs newly arriving to a community for the first time, departures as IDPs newly departing from a community for the first time, and returnees as IDPs who are returning to their place of origin after a previous displacement.

### Recent Arrivals




31% of KIIs stated that there had been arrivals to their location in the recent period. 65% of KIIs stated that there have not been recent arrivals to their location.

In Idleb governorate, around half of KIIs in the districts of Al Ma'ra and Jisr Ash-Shugur stated that there have been arrivals to their communities in the recent period preceding the interview.

In Aleppo governorate, around half of KIIs in Al Bab and Jebel Saman stated that there have been recent arrivals.


Security concerns and the threat of violence were noted to be the two primary reasons why IDPs left their previous locations.

### What Are the Reasons That People Left Their Previous Location?




### Recent Returnees

Have There Been Any IDP Returnees to This Location in the Recent Period?




76% of all KIIs stated that there have not been any IDP returns to their location in the recent period, while 20% stated that there have been and 4% was unable to answer. Around half of KIIs in Al Ma'ra and Jisr-Ash-Shugur districts of Idleb governorate stated that there have been IDP returnees to their communities in the recent period preceding the interview. In Aleppo governorate, a little more than half of KIIs in Al Bab district stated that there have been returnees.



According to KIIs who indicated that there have been returnees, they primarily identified the following reasons: IDPs returned to their current location due to improvement in the security situation, and due to economic hardship and security concerns in the previous location.




### What Are the Reasons That People Left Their Previous Location?




### Departures

#### Have There Been Any Departures from This Location in the Recent Period?



67% of KIs stated that there have not been any departures from their locations recently, while 27% stated that there have been departures, and 5% were unable to answer.


In Idleb governorate, between 25 and 50% of KIs indicated departures from their communities in the recent period preceding the interview in Al Ma'ra, Harim and Jisr-Ash-Shugur districts.



According to KIs who stated that there have been recent departures, the primary reasons are: to return home, due to lack of access to employment, poor living conditions, inability to afford rent, and safety/security reasons in the location.



### What Are the Reasons for Leaving this Location?




## 2.5 Explosive Hazards, Security Incidents, and Community Structures


### 2.5.1 Explosive Hazards

#### Incidents - Indicator 5.1

Prevalence of Contamination with Explosive Hazards  
October-December 2018



### Is the Community Contaminated with Explosive Hazards?



79% of KIs indicated that their community is not affected by explosive hazards, including mines and other explosive remnants of war, 18% stated that some of the community is contaminated, and 2% stated that most of the community is contaminated. KIs may be identifying visible or recent explosive hazards and actual contamination levels may be different – and largely higher – than what is perceived and identified by the community.


In Idleb governorate, KIs in Al Ma'ra, Idleb, and Jisr-Ash-Shugur district were slightly more likely to state that some of the community is contaminated. In Aleppo governorate, KIs in Afrin, Al Bab, and Jebel Saman districts were more likely to state that some of the community is contaminated.

During the reporting period of October-November 2018, the Humanitarian Impact of Hostilities data indicated the following number of reported explosive hazard incidents: 1,325 incidents in Idleb governorate (93% due to heavy-weapons fire-related contamination), 1,009 incidents in non-GoS controlled areas of Aleppo governorate (13% caused by IEDs), and 573 incidents in Hama governorate (99% due to heavy-weapons fire-related contamination).

These findings of this protection monitoring through KI do not indicate confirmed explosive hazard contamination and only potential contamination. Humanitarian actors seeking data on risks in specific locations can contact the humanitarian Mine Action Sub-Cluster for information.



## 2.5.2 Security Incidents



48% of KIs stated that there have not been any security incidents in their community in the recent period preceding the interview. 38% stated that security incidents occurred sometimes, 10% stated that security incidents were common, 3% stated that security incidents were very common and 1% were unable to answer.


In Idleb governorate, KIs in Al Ma'ra, Harim, Idleb and Jisr-Ash-Shugur district were more likely to state that security incidents occurred sometimes in the recent period.

KIs who provided descriptions of security incidents in their communities mentioned incidents such as generalized violence/clashes, theft/robbery, kidnappings, and IED and VBIED explosions resulting in civilian casualties.

*In our neighborhood, there was a man guarding his brother's house. The car that was 10 meters away exploded, causing him to die, and his wife and children were injured (Female KII, Off-Camp, Other, Harim District, Idleb governorate).*




## 2.5.3 Community Structures




69% of KIs stated that there is a community structure, organization, association or group of leaders that meets or is organized to discuss and address issues and needs of the community. 26% stated that there is no such structure, and 6% were unable to answer.

443 KIs who stated that there is a community structure and provided a description indicated the following structures: local council (71%), police (5%), Shura Council (2%), Camp Management (2%), and Shari'a Court (1%).

63% of KIs who indicated that they have a community structure that addresses issues and needs of the community identified the oversight or management of humanitarian assistance as one of its primary purposes. 45% stated that its purpose is oversight or management of access to public utilities such as water and electricity, 45% stated that its purpose is dispute resolution between community members, 33% stated advocacy for community needs, 17% stated oversight of public security, 8% stated protection of vulnerable community members and 1% stated "other".




**Does the Community Feel That the Structure is Legitimate, Representative, and Its Work Useful?**




Around 18% of KIs stated that all of the community feels that the community structure is legitimate, representative and useful. Around 39% of KIs stated that most of the community feels that the structure is legitimate, representative and useful. Around 22% stated that some, and the remaining around 4% stated that none of the community members feel this way about the community structure.

**Percentage of Female and Male KIs Stating That All of the Community Feels That the Structure is Legitimate, Representative, Useful**



Male KIs were slightly more likely to state that all community members feel that their community structure is legitimate, representative and useful. Since the most common community structures are structures that are managed by men, such as local councils, police, Shari’a courts, shura councils, and camp management, these findings may be indicative of a lack of representation of women in community structures and/or a need for community structures to focus great attention on the needs and concerns of women and girls in the community.

**Does the Structure Receive Support?**




53% of KIs stated that the community structure does not receive any support. 21% stated that the structure receives material support, 14% stated that the structure receives financial support, and 4% stated that the structure receives capacity building support.




## 2.6 Coping Mechanisms

**Coping Mechanism Index Map at the Sub-District Level**  
October-December 2018




The below charts indicate how commonly community members have relied upon the following coping mechanisms in the recent period: early marriage, dropping out of school to work, humanitarian assistance, illegal activities (such as theft or smuggling), restricting movement of women and girls, begging, accessing community services (community centers, women centers) and local/community support. While some coping mechanisms, such as early marriage and dropping out of school, can be harmful, placing individuals and communities at risk, others are considered positive coping mechanisms, such as reliance on community services and community support.


### *Harmful or Neutral Coping Mechanisms*



Positive Coping Mechanisms




Community Reliance on Coping Mechanism: Humanitarian Assistance




In Idleb governorate, half or more of KIIs in every district stated that community reliance on humanitarian assistance occurs sometimes, commonly or very commonly. KIIs in Aleppo governorate similarly indicated high levels of reliance. Reliance levels indicated here may be dependent on different factors, such as concentration of IDPs in a particular district, presence of NGOs, access to assistance, and whether communities belong to host community or IDP and reside in on-camp or off-camp locations.

Community Reliance on Coping Mechanism: Restricting Movement of Women and Girls



Communities in nearly all monitored districts indicated some reliance on the harmful coping mechanism of restricting movement of women and girls. In Idleb governorate, KIs were slightly more likely to note reliance on this coping mechanism in Al Ma'ra and Jisr-Ash-Shugur districts. Overall, restricting movement of women and girls was mentioned more commonly in Aleppo governorate, where half or more of KIs in Afrin, Al Bab, A'zaz and Jebel Saman stated that this occurs sometimes, commonly or very commonly.

Increase in reliance on this coping mechanism may be due to factors that cause community members to perceive an increased risk towards women and girls. For example, IDPs living in crowded and close quarters and increased reports of security incidents such as kidnapping and harassment in the community can exacerbate movement restrictions of women and girls. This coping mechanism, however, significantly reduces women and girls' quality of life, restricts their access to services such as education, health care, employment and markets, and has a negative impact on their psychosocial experience.



The above chart visualizes the extent to which community members rely on community services, considered here as a positive coping mechanism. The findings indicate that communities do not or cannot commonly access community services. This is true despite the presence of a high number of IDPs and humanitarian actors in almost all monitored districts.

FGD responses during the same period indicate that IDPs are more likely to lack community support due to displacement, especially for IDPs arriving in new communities without relatives and friends (IRC Protection Monitoring Report November/December). While the relationship between IDPs and host communities are overall positive in most communities, factors such as the distance between IDP camps and host community centers and restrictions on movement due to security or transportation can restrict the interaction between the groups. This may negatively impact IDPs ability to access and benefit from community services and support.

## Conclusion

Communities of northwest Syria continued to experience volatile and unpredictable security situations and recurrent displacement, challenges in accessing basic needs and services, and a variety of inter-linked protection risks. The humanitarian community, including the Protection Cluster, continues its efforts to provide life-saving and life-



sustaining assistance and protection services to these communities and to support with emergency services, particularly in response to displacement. Communities require continued support and assistance for their survival, and also need the humanitarian community to help formulate solutions that are jointly-identified, effective and beneficial.

During this reporting period, findings indicate the following needs:

- Ensure that the lack of official civil documentation does not become a barrier to accessing services and humanitarian assistance. Utilize alternative forms of verification such as community validation in the absence of civil documentation and continue to provide information on the risks and benefits of obtaining various forms of documentation.
- Improve access to clean and affordable water.
- Improve access to low-cost, quality health services.
- Support programming and approaches that strengthen community networks in order to reduce dependency on humanitarian assistance. Ensure inclusion of men and women, while prioritizing persons experiencing specific needs or heightened protection risks, using clear, protection-sensitive criteria.
- Improve availability of and access to specialized services for children by increasing case management services. Continue psychosocial support (PSS) and child-friendly activities, prioritizing remote, harder-to-reach communities that have never had access to these services.
- Mitigate factors that prevent school attendance. Raise awareness about the importance of education, and the risks associated with children dropping out of school to work, including risks associated with recruitment by armed groups.
- Mitigate threat of explosive hazards through risk education, particularly for under-18 age groups. Advocate for demining and explosive-hazard clearing activities, with a focus on residences and agricultural lands.
- Improve access to specialized services for persons with disabilities (PWDs) through increased identification, inclusion and access. Conduct awareness raising to reduce social stigma surrounding disability.

Humanitarian actors are encouraged to take these needs into consideration for future programming, and also consult with the Protection Cluster regularly about these challenges.

## Online Interactive Dashboard

The PMTF Online Interactive Dashboard presents an overview and detailed analysis of protection monitoring findings from north and northwest Syria. It provides a user-friendly and practical approach for quick, location-based protection risk assessment, and makes it possible to follow trends and changes in the protection environment. As it is updated on a weekly basis, it provides a real-time understanding of the protection situation in these communities. Humanitarian actors are encouraged to utilize the dashboard for their analysis needs, and can analyze the findings available in this and future reports through the indicator-specific analysis, available on additional tabs. The interactive dashboard is available online at: <http://tiny.cc/jwnory><sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> The user guide for the Online Interactive Dashboard is accessible at: [https://www.dropbox.com/s/p65twgp53lwbeq6/User %20Guide.pdf?dl=0](https://www.dropbox.com/s/p65twgp53lwbeq6/User%20Guide.pdf?dl=0)



**Protection Monitoring - Interactive Dashboard - 2018**



**Introduction**

The PMTF Dashboard provides a picture of the protection threats affecting civilians in non-government-held areas of Syria. Data is collected on the ground on a regular basis, via community-level key informant interviews and observation checklists. This Dashboard is generated automatically from partners' data and is updated weekly; it is intended to be used in conjunction with periodic narrative reports.

Protection Monitoring Interactive Dashboard for 2019 is available [here](#).

PMTF Index

**0.43**

Filter Panel: Monthly and Geographic zoom in

Specific time period can be filtered by selecting month(s).

Month All	Interviews <b>3758</b>	In/Off Camp All	KI Gender All
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
Various administrative levels can be filtered by selecting respective locations.

Governorates 7 All	Districts 23 All	Sub-Districts 60 All	Communities 269 All
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
List of locations at various administrative levels

Governorat_Name Aleppo	District_Name Al Bab	Subdistrict_Name Al Bab	Community_Name Abdita
Ar-Raqqa	Al Ma'ra	Amuda	Abin Samaan


Protection Monitoring Index Map at the Sub-District level



Protection Monitoring Index Map at the Community level



**Indicators of Protection Risks/Threats Reported**



PMTF Index:

**List of Indicators:**

**Right**

- 1.1 Prevalence of loss or lack of civil documentation among population
- 1.2 Prevalence of forced eviction
- 1.3 Prevalence of a negative relationship between IDPs and host communities

**Basic Needs**

- 2.1 Prevalence of boys and girls not attending schools
- 2.2 Prevalence of challenges in accessing health services
- 2.3 Prevalence of challenges in accessing prenatal care services
- 2.4 Prevalence of challenges in accessing services for persons with disabilities
- 2.5 Prevalence of challenges in accessing water
- 2.6 Prevalence of challenges in accessing markets
- 2.7 Prevalence of challenges in accessing electricity
- 2.8 Prevalence of challenges in accessing employment

**Vulnerability**

- 3.1 Prevalence of children affected by or at risk of exploitation
- 3.2 Prevalence of child labor
- 3.3 Degree of lack of dedicated services for special needs (eg. UASC, female headed HH, disabled, etc)
- 3.4 Degree of lack of dedicated services for elderly people

**Demographics**

- 4.1 Prevalence of arbitrary restrictions on freedom of movement
- 4.2 Degree to which IDPs would not like to integrate (stay permanently) in current location

**Incidents**

- 5.1 Prevalence of contamination with explosive hazards
- 5.2 Prevalence of security incidents

Each indicator is calculated according to % of surveyed KIs reporting each protection threat, weighed according to reported severity (none, some, most, all) where relevant.

